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ARTICLE II.

NOTES ON GROTIUS'S DEFENCE.

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CHAPTER I.

Note a, p. 106.

Origin of this Treatise. — The doctrine of the atonement was not a principal issue in the discussions of the Reformation period. The real centre of this movement was in the doctrine of justification by faith alone, in contrast with the Mediaeval doctrine of justification by works. The atonement received some attention as affording the objective basis of justification, and with more or less completeness the Reformers formed and taught a theory of the method of its operation. Still the atonement was not in any proper sense a principal issue of the times. We find in the writings of the Reformers a great deal said about the church and the sacraments, about predestination and grace, and they pursue the discussion of justification with Antinomians and others. But what discussion of the atonement there is, is called out by the inclinations of individual minds, rather than by the exigencies of the great controversy with Rome. Even the Council of Trent, although it alludes to the subject in its comments upon the Apostles' Creed, does not define the doctrine of the atonement as a distinct topic.

Accordingly, Grotius's treatise springs only indirectly from the general current of the times. It is strictly a reply to the treatise of Socinus. It has no connection with other previous writers, whether Protestant or Catholic, but with Socinus alone.

The Socinian views were first held by Laelius Socinus, but were adopted and promulgated with great zeal and success by his nephew Faustus. When rightly estimated the Socinian views appear to us in two aspects, partly as a natural recoil from the extreme views of some Protestant theologians, and partly as a rejection of the supernatural element in theology. We can but sympathize with a man who rejects views about sin and justice which outrage those funda-

mental and constitutional beliefs upon which are founded our moral and intellectual life. But on the other hand, we cannot avoid the impression that Socinus in rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity and an expiatory atonement, showed himself to be without deep religious feeling and moral earnestness. Grotius seems to have perceived this double character of the Socinian theology, and on the one part undoubtedly sympathized with many of the objections raised against the ordinary method of presenting the atonement. But, on the other, he felt a deep religious repugnance to the system as a whole, as appears from the almost impassioned manner in which he closes this treatise. It may be that he was influenced by the charge of Socinianism which was made against the Arminians to disprove his Socinianism by an attack upon Socinus (so suggests De Burigny, *Vie de Grotius*, Vol. i. p. 135). But his chief reason was the danger that these doctrines, which he recognized as the revival of the old doctrines of Arius and Paul of Samosata, would spread and work their injurious work in his own country (Vossius's preface). Conceding Socinus's valid objections, he bent his strength to opposing his errors, and as Socinus had rested his cause largely upon certain so-called legal principles, Vossius tells us that Grotius, who was already a learned juris-consult and held high positions in the State, determined to oppose him from a legal point of view. At first it was Grotius's object to confine himself to the satisfaction of Christ, by which we obtained immunity from punishment, in distinction from the imputation of his merits to us, and in this department to content himself with a mere answer to Socinus's false legal arguments. But Socinus's errors in interpretation and mistakes in history called for a more extended notice. And yet the work was finally published not as a complete view of the subject, but strictly as a reply to Socinus. Through a failure to understand this peculiarity of the treatise some have been led into needless confusion and inapplicable criticism.

Baur says (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*, p. 414 sq. Translated in the Bib. Sac., Vol. ix. p. 259 sq.), that Grotius originally intended "to defend the satisfaction theory which was held in the church," but that the "actual result was, that instead of defending that theory he substituted an entirely different one in its place." It is evident, as Baur asserts, that the theory of Grotius is entirely different from that which was gaining ground among the Protestant theologians, but it seems gratuitous to imply that Grotius did not

know this. He evidently believed that in previous discussions the argument had begun at the wrong place. Since the atonement related to punishment and release from punishment, God should be considered in the matter as a ruler. With this starting-point the true nature of the satisfaction became plain. In consequence of the fragmentary character of the work, Grotius does not explain the deep foundation of God's governmental acts in the moral nature of himself and his creatures. But it does not follow that Grotius did not have clear views, or an honest purpose in writing this treatise. His very form of stating the church doctrine, while it does not exclude the common satisfaction theory, certainly prepares the way for his own theory, in speaking of the *exhibition* of God's justice. An exhibition is an exterior fact, and involves relations to other beings than the one making the exhibition. While the governmental theory is not stated in these words, it is at least implied. It was Grotius's purpose from the first to present and defend this theory.

The work of Socinus to which Grotius replies is entitled: *De Jesu Christo Servatore*, and is to be found in the collection called *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, Soc. Works*, Vol. ii. p. 115, etc.

A brief statement of Socinus's view may be useful in gaining an understanding of Grotius's meaning.

The fundamental element of Socinus's system is to be found in his conception of justice. This is entirely different from that held by Calvin and the Reformed theologians. To them justice seemed to be an attribute of God, residing in him, and perfectly exercised and displayed in all his works. Justice demanded the punishment of every sin. Since justice demanded it, sin must be punished; and accordingly, since the forgiven sinner was freed from punishment, the sacrifice of Christ must be the bearing of that punishment for the satisfaction of justice.

Socinus also recognizes a justice which is an essential attribute of God, and perfectly displayed in all his works; but it is justice in the sense of righteousness or equity. That justice by which sins are punished is not an attribute of God, but merely a result of the action of his will (i. 1). In this respect it is like its opposite, mercy. Both are effects of God's will, but they are mutually exclusive. Justice is exercised in punishing, mercy in forgiving men; but they are both displays of God's righteousness. "God," says Socinus, "is said to be just no less in exercising mercy than in avenging injuries, for it is equal and so just that God should keep his promises, and so treat with favor and kindness repentant sinners" (i. 1).

With such a conception of justice, Socinus cannot admit the current satisfaction theory of his contemporaries. Mercy and justice are so far from being united in the atonement, that justice is entirely laid aside in forgiving sinners, and mercy alone prevails (i. 1). There is no recognition of any obstacle on God's part to the forgiveness of sinners.

A large part of Socinus's treatise is taken up with objections against the necessity and possibility of a satisfaction to justice. God was entirely able to forgive sins without antecedent satisfaction, just as every private person or a king may forgive injuries against himself without requiring any compensation (iii. 1). The justice of God does not prevent this, for it is not an attribute residing in God and unfaithfully executing itself. If it were, God could never forgive even the least sin. Besides, God has never required satisfaction from those whom he has forgiven, but only a pure life (iii. 2). If a satisfaction were required we must have given it ourselves. The only satisfaction we could give would be the bearing of our punishment, that is, eternal death. Except, therefore, we should perish, divine justice could not be satisfied (iii. 3). Transfer of punishment from one to another, and so a vicarious satisfaction is impossible, for the punishment is a corporal punishment and could not be transferred. Besides the law of God requires that "the soul that sinneth it shall die," and not another. That another should be punished is entirely to change the law, and thus in the very act of satisfying to render the satisfaction null and void (iii. 3). Substitution was further impossible because the substitute must bear the punishment of eternal death. Christ did not suffer this, and so cannot have made satisfaction for even one person; and if he had made it for *one*, he could certainly for no more, since he could suffer only *one* eternal death. Neither could the obedience of Christ be a satisfaction for our sins, because being a man, he was under the law, and must perfectly obey for himself (iii. 5).

For all these reasons, elaborated at great length, and supported from both reason and Scripture, Socinus rejects the theory of a satisfaction for sins in the sacrifice of Christ. He presents the theory which he holds in the following summary form: "I think and hold to be the orthodox doctrine that Jesus Christ is our Saviour, because he has announced to us the way of eternal salvation, has confirmed it, and in his own person both by his example and by rising from the dead manifestly exhibited it, and because he will himself give to

us who believe in him eternal life" (i. 1). He announces the way of salvation in a sense in which none of the prophets, or of his successors, the apostles, could, since he was the original herald of it, and the one by whom all the others were selected and instructed. He confirmed it not merely by his miracles, but chiefly by his death; and also by his resurrection. He exhibited the way of salvation in his life, which is imitable by us, and by the imitation of which we shall be saved; and also by rising from the dead which both illustrated what salvation was, and gave us a pledge of it. And, finally, he will, of his own power which he has both as man and as mediator, give to us eternal life.

It will be noted that in this theory the element of "moral influence" enters very slightly, if at all.

After Grotius had written, the controversy was resumed by Johannes Crellius Francus, in a work entitled: *A Reply to the Book of Hugo Grotius which he wrote concerning the Satisfaction of Christ against Faustus Socinus*. This may be found in the *Bibliotheca Frat. Pol.* A rejoinder was made by Andreas Essenius in: *The Triumph of the Cross, or the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction and Merit of our Lord Jesus Christ vindicated especially from Crellius*, Utrecht, 1666. This follows the argument of Grotius very closely, but on some points differs from it.

Note b, p. 106.

In contrast with this definition Socinus defines "the common and so-called orthodox doctrine" as follows: "That Jesus Christ is our Saviour because he has made full satisfaction for our sins to divine justice by which we as sinners deserved to be damned; and which satisfaction by faith is imputed to us who believe by the gift of God" (i. 1.)

Note c, p. 107.

It is necessary to observe upon the threshold of this treatise that the words *penalty* and *punishment* are not employed by Grotius in their strict signification. Strictly they signify pain or evil inflicted upon the transgressor in satisfaction of justice; or with a more general meaning, some say: "Evil inflicted in satisfaction of justice" (Hodge's Theol., i. p. 417). But in this treatise punishment is considered, in analogy with human punishment, as the act of the divine Ruler. It does not conflict with distributive justice, but it has another object primarily, viz. to promote order and the public good. Christ "pays the penalty for our sins," not in the sense that he

satisfies the demands of distributive justice, but in the sense that his affliction serves as an example and a warning to sinners. Strictly speaking, in Grotius's view, he was not punished at all, but his affliction is substituted for our punishment. Further remarks upon this topic will be reserved for chapter ii.

Note d, p. 116.

Upon 1 Pet. ii. 24, the following extracts from the commentators should be noted.

Meyer (Hutner) translates: "Who himself has borne our sins in his body up upon the tree" (*auf d a s Holz* in distinction from *d e m Holze*, as is expressly remarked below). "The expression employed in this verse is to be understood by the reference to Isa. liii. and the actual fulfilment of the prophecy therein contained. . . . The Heb. נָשָׂא has the accusative so that to bear the sins is to suffer the punishment for the sins, whether it be for one's own sins or for the sins of another; as now ἀνήνεγκε represents נָשָׂא , so the meaning is the same; 'he bore the suffering for the sins of many.'—But this suffering is in case of the servant of God such an one that by it they whose sins are in question, and for whom he bears the punishment, are free from the punishment, so that it is a representative suffering. As now Peter clearly had this passage in mind, the thought which he here expresses can be nothing else than this: that Christ, representing us, has borne the punishment which we have deserved for our sins, and so has borne our sins."

Lange (Fronmüller): "The exegesis is determined by Isa. liii. All exegetical attempts to explain away the idea of substitution and the system of sacrifice closely connected with it are altogether futile. As in the Old Testament, the expressions, 'to carry one's sin,' or 'to bear one's iniquity,' are equivalent to 'suffer the punishment and guilt of one's sin,' Lev. xx. 17, 19; xxiv. 15; Ezek. xxiii. 35, so 'to carry another's sin' denotes 'to suffer the punishment and guilt of another,' or 'to suffer vicariously,' Lev. iii. 17, 19; Num. xiv. 33; Lam. v. 7; Ezek. xviii. 19, 20. Can this be done in any other way than by the imputation of the guilt and sin of others, as was the case in the sin and guilt offerings?"

Calvin is quoted by Lange approvingly: 'As under the law the sinner, in order to become free from sin, offered a sacrifice in his stead, so Christ took upon himself the curse which we have merited by our sins in order to expiate it before God.'

Alford: "'Took them to the tree and offered them up on it,'

constr. praeagn., as the above (viz. 'bore to sacrifice,' 'carried and offered up') sense of ἀνήνεγκεν requires."

De Wette translates: "Who took our sins (our guilt and punishment) upon himself, and bore them up in his body upon the tree (*auf d a s Holz.*)"

Note e, p. 119.

The following extracts are from Delitzsch (Edinburgh translation). On Isa. liii. 4: "Matthew has very aptly rendered נָשָׂא by *λαβε*, and נָשָׂא by *ἐβάστασε*. For whilst נָשָׂא denotes the toilsome bearing of a burden that has been taken up, נָשָׂא combines in itself the ideas of *tollere* and *ferre*. When construed with the accusative of sin it signifies to take the debt of sin upon one's self, and carry it as one's own, i.e. to look at it and feel it as one's own (e.g. Lev. v. 1, 17), or more frequently to bear the punishment occasioned by sin, i.e. to make expiation for it (Lev. xvii. 16; xx. 19, 20; xxiv. 15), and in any case in which the person bearing it is not himself the guilty person, to bear sin in a mediatorial capacity, for the purpose of making expiation for it (Lev. x. 17). The LXX render this נָשָׂא, both in the Pentateuch and Ezekiel, *λαβεῖν ἀμαρτίαν, οὐκ ἀναφέρειν*; and it is evident that both of these are to be understood in the sense of an expiatory bearing, and not merely of taking away, as has been recently maintained in opposition to the *satisfactio vicaria*, as we may see clearly enough from Ezek. iv. 4-8, where הָשַׁבְתִּי אֶת־עֲוֹנוֹתָי is represented by the prophet in a symbolical action."

Verse 6, l. c. is translated: "And Jehovah caused the iniquity of us all to fall upon Him." In comment: "Many of the more modern expositors endeavor to set aside the *poena vicaria* here, by giving to הָשַׁבְתִּי אֶת־עֲוֹנוֹתָי a meaning which it never has. . . . What other reason could there be for God's not rescuing him from this bitterest cup of death than the ethical impossibility of acknowledging the atonement as really made without having left the representative of the guilty who had presented himself to him as though guilty himself, to taste of the punishment which they had deserved. It is true that vicarious expiation and *poena vicaria* are not coincident ideas. The punishment is but one element in the expiation, and it derives a peculiar character from the fact that one innocent person voluntarily submits to it in his own person. It does not stand in a thorough external identity to that deserved by the many who are guilty; but the latter cannot be set aside without the atoning individual enduring an intensive equivalent to it, and that in such a manner that it

endurance is no less a self-cancelling of wrath on the part of God than an absorption of wrath on the part of the Mediator; and in this central point of the atoning work, the voluntarily forgiving love of God and the voluntarily self-sacrificing love of the Mediator meet together, like hands stretched out to grasp one another from the midst of a dark cloud."

The question now arises whether Grotius in basing his doctrine upon such passages as these does not really support the commonly received satisfaction theory to the overthrow of his own theory. What he means by punishment has already been indicated. But can the punishment of our sins, endured according to these passages by Christ as a strict substitute for us, be anything else than the satisfaction of the retributive justice of God? The punishment of our sins, in the strict use of that term, certainly is intended to satisfy the retributive justice of God. If Christ took the punishment of our sins upon himself, as these passages indicate, did he not suffer under the retributive justice of God?

The answer to this question depends upon the amount of philosophical accuracy that we may expect to find in the statements of Scripture. No sooner do we put the words "philosophical accuracy" and "the Scriptures" together, than we perceive that they express contrary ideas. The Scriptures were not written for philosophical purposes nor in philosophical language, as is evident upon the slightest examination of them. Take, for example, the question of the mode of regeneration. Is the work of the Holy Spirit *miraculous*, immediately producing a change in the very constitution of the soul, or is it *supernatural*, working upon the soul by the presentation of motives, according to the soul's own laws? If the third of John is examined with this question in mind, no light will be cast upon the subject. The Scripture expressions admit equally well of either interpretation. Light must be sought from the affirmations of conscience, from experience, and from the teachings of philosophy, if it is to be obtained at all. We need not expect, therefore, to find philosophical accuracy in the passage of Scripture now before us. The meaning of the sacred writers is sufficiently answered when it is said that Christ suffered, and that his sufferings were substituted and accepted for our punishment. All parties to the contest really admit this in principle. Take the most hearty supporters of the strict satisfaction theory, and no respectable number of them will be found to say that Christ was guilty of our sins, or that God disapproved

of him as a sinner, or that he suffered remorse, or that he suffered eternal death. But all this is necessary if he strictly bore *our* punishment, for these things are a part of our punishment. Deviation from the strictest meaning of these passages is, then, only a matter of degree, and when you have decided to reject the rigidest interpretation, where have you the criterion by which you shall decide whether to stop with accepting the sufferings of Christ as our *punishment*, or as *afflictions* which serve the same general purpose as, and are substituted for, our punishment?

Upon the meaning of the word נָסַף the reader may consult an article in the Bib. Sac., Vol. xxx. p. 422, in which all the occurrences of this word are carefully examined, and much light shed upon the subject. The writer concludes his article with the following general remarks as to the sense in which Christ is said to have borne our sins:

(1) Christ bore our sins by enduring their consequences (suffering, temptation, death). (2) Christ bore our sins upon his sympathetic heart. (3) By forgiving them. (4) As a representative. (He endured pains that typified eternal punishment). (5) Christ did not bear our sins by being punished for them. נָסַף not merely does not favor this theory; it positively contradicts it. The eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel is a standing witness against such a belief.

Note f, p. 120.

Gesenius defines נָסַף among other meanings *to exact*, but נָסַף *to be pressed, harassed*. Delitzsch renders the verse (liii. 7), "He was ill treated; whilst he suffered willingly [נָסַף] and opened not his mouth," etc.

Note g, p. 121.

Delitzsch renders Isa. liii. 5: "Whereas he was pierced for our sins, bruised for our iniquities; the punishment was laid upon him for our peace; and through his stripes we were healed." Comment: "His suffering was a *mūsār* which is an indirect affirmation that it was God who had inflicted it upon him, for who else could the *yōsēr* (m^cyassēr) be? We have rendered *mūsār* "punishment;" and there was no other word in the language for this idea; for though נָסַף and נָסַף have indeed the idea of punishment associated with them, the former signifies *ἐκδίκησις*, the latter *ἐπίσκεψις*, whereas *mūsār* not only denotes *παιδεία*, as the chastisement of love (Prov. iii. 11), but also as the infliction of punishment (= *τιμωρία, κόλασις*,

Prov. vii. 22; Jer. xxx. 14), just as David, when he prayed that God might not punish him in his anger and hot displeasure (Ps. vi. 2), could not find a more suitable expression for punishment, regarded as the execution of punishment, than יָסַר. The word itself signified primarily being chastised, and included from the very outset the idea of practical chastisement, which then passed over into that of admonition in words, of warning by example, and of chastity as a moral quality. In the case before us in which the reference is to a sufferer, and to a *mūsār* resting upon him, this can only mean actual chastisement."

The following extracts pertain to 2 Cor. v. 21 :

Meyer : "ἀμαρτίαν ἐποίησε]. The abstract stands for the concrete (cf. λήρος, δλεθρος and the like in the classics) more strongly setting forth that for which God made him, and ἐποίησε expresses the establishment of the condition in which Christ appeared as the concrete of ἀμαρτία, as ἀμαρτωλός, namely when he suffered the punishment of death. Cf. κατάρα, Gal. iii. 13. To take ἀμαρτίαν as *sin-offering* (ἁμαρτία, ἁμαρτία) is not even well established by the dialect of the LXX, is against the constant usage of the N. T., and here especially also against the preceding ἀμαρτ."

Lange : "The idea expressed in making him to be sin must be that God made him the bearer of sin when he suffered, inasmuch as by his sufferings and death as a malefactor he was treated as a sinner (ἀμαρτωλός), or was given up to the fate of those who were sinners. The interpretation of ἀμαρτίαν as *sin-offering* is consistent neither with usage, with the context (τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἀμαρτίαν), nor with the contrast (δικαιοσύνη). Sin becomes actualized in one in whom there is no sin when he becomes a sinner in outward appearance though he is not so in reality. God allows sin to become an actual experience to him who has never committed it in fact."

De Wette : "ἀμαρτία is not equivalent to ἁμαρτία *sin-offering*, also not to ἀμαρτωλός, but according to the contrast of δικαιοσύνη like κατάρα, Gal. iii. 13, stronger, almost for personified sin, for the representation of sin, that on account of which he laid the punishment of sins upon him."

Note h, p. 123.

The following pertain to Gal. iii. 13.

Meyer : "Those bound to the law are subjected to the curse of God therein announced; but from this constraint of the curse, out of which they would not else have come, has Christ redeemed them,

and that by his having given his life for them on the cross, as a ransom paid to God, the *Dator et Vindex legis*, in that he procured by his *mors satisfactoria*, borne according to the gracious counsel of God in obedience to the same, the forgiveness of sins, so that now the curse of the law had no more relation to them."

Lange (closing with a quotation from Meyer): "The thought is not that Christ suffered the *definite*, just-named curse of the law, to which the subjects of the law are exposed, but in a general sense, that he became an accursed one; it is meant to express not *what* curse he became, but *that* he became a curse (the *that*, moreover, appears from the following Scripture passage). — Ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν: 'ὕπὲρ in all places where the discourse is of the atoning death is not = instead of, but = in behalf of. The satisfaction which Christ rendered, was rendered in our behalf; that it was vicarious is implied in the nature of the act itself, not in the preposition. The curse of the law would have had to be realized in that all who did not completely satisfy the law (and this no one could), would have been compelled to endure the execution of the Divine *δρῆ* against them; but for their deliverance from this sentence Christ with his death has intervened, inasmuch as he died as *accursed*, whereby, as through a ransom, that damnatory relation to the law was dissolved."

Alford: "κατάρα, abstract, to express that he became not only accursed, but the curse co-extensive with the disability which affected us."

De Wette: "*Has become a curse*, viz. inasmuch as he has expiated the curse, the punishment of the sin, which the law threatened."

Note i, p. 127.

We are to recur to the Socinian conception of justice for the explanation of Grotius's remarks.

Socinus in commenting on Rom. iii. 24, says (ii. 2): "God, in order that he might show himself veracious and faithful, and at the same time show in what manner he would have us just with himself (for these words *his righteousness* signify both things, as is evident from that which he adds a little after in explanation of himself, *that he might be just, and the justifier*, etc.), exhibited himself appeased with us in such a way as not only to redeem or liberate us, according to the ancient promises, from sins, that is, from the punishment of sins, by forgiving them to us; but also to determine that Christ himself should shed his blood and be tortured like some criminal. For the intervention of the blood of Christ, though it could not move

God to grant us this liberation from the punishment of our sins, yet moved us to receive it when offered, and to exercise faith in Christ, whence we are justified; and at the same time he strongly commended to us the ineffable goodness of God towards us."

Upon the word propitiation, after explaining that *ἱλαστήριον* is the word which was used in the O. T. to designate the cover of the ark, or the mercy-seat, "not because it placated God to the people of Israel, but because God, showing himself propitious and placated in it, gave his responses"; Socinus says: "Christ has been most appropriately called by this name by Paul in this place, since God not only exhibits himself most thoroughly appeased in him to us, but even declares through him what he wished us to know; whence our justification has followed."

Note j, p. 129.

The principal interest in this passage (Rom. iii. 25, 26), gathers about the words *ἱλαστήριον, ἔδειξεν, δικαιοσύνη, πάρεσις*. The following extracts from the Commentators may be of value.

Meyer (Edinburgh translation): "*ἱλαστήριον*] is the neuter of the adjective *ἱλαστήριος*, used as a substantive, and hence means simply *expiatorium* in general, without the word itself conveying the more concrete definition of its sense. The latter is supplied by the context. . . . In our passage the context makes the notion of an atoning sacrifice (comp. Lev. xvii. 11) sufficiently clear by *ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι* If it is objected to the interpretation of *expiatory offering* that it does not suit *προέθετο* because Christ offered himself as a sacrifice to God, but God did not present him as such to humanity, the objection is untenable, since the idea that *God* has given Christ to death pervades the whole N.T. — not that God has thereby *offered* Christ as a sacrifice, which is nowhere asserted, but that he *has set forth* before the eyes of the universe him who is surrendered to the world by the very fact of his offering himself as a sacrifice in obedience to the Father's counsel, as such actually and publicly, viz. on the cross." "*εἰς ἔδειξεν τ. δικ. αὐτοῦ*] purpose of God in the *προέθετο* *αἵματι*. The *δικαιοσύνη* is *righteousness*, as is required by the context, in the strict sense the opposite of *ἄδικος* in ver. 5, the *judicial* (more precisely, the punitive) *righteousness* which had to find its holy satisfaction, but received that satisfaction in the propitiatory offering of Christ, and is thereby practically demonstrated and exhibited. On *ἔδειξεν* in the sense of *practical proof*, comp. 2 Cor. viii. 24, and on *εἰς* Eph. ii. 7: *ἵνα ἐνδείξηται*." — "*διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν κ.τ.λ.*] *on account*

of the passing by of sins that had previously taken place, i.e. because he had allowed the pre-Christian sins to go without punishment, whereby his righteousness had been lost sight of and obscured, and therefore came to need an ἔνδειξις for men. Thus the atonement accomplished in Christ became "the divine Theodicee for the past history of the world," (Tholuck) and, in view of this ἔνδειξις, that πάρεσις ceases to be an enigma. — πάρεσις which occurs on'y here in the N. T. . . . is distinguished from ἀφεσις in so far as the omission of punishment is conceived in πάρεσις as a *letting pass* (ὑπερδών, Acts xvii. 30; comp. xvi. 16), in ἀφεσις (Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14) as a *letting free*. Since Paul according to Acts, *l.c.*, regarded the non-punishment of pre-Christian sins as an "overlooking" (comp. Wisd. xi. 23), we must consider the peculiar expression πάρεσις here as *purposely chosen*. Comp. Ecclus. xxiii. 2. If he had written ἀφεσις, the idea would be, that God instead of retaining those sins in their category of guilt (comp. John xx. 23) had *let them free*, i.e. had *forgiven* them. He has not forgiven them, however, but only *let them go unpunished* (comp. 2 Sam. xxiv. 10) *neglexit*. . . . The pre-Christian sins are not those of individuals prior to their conversion, but the sum of the sins of *the world before Christ*. The *ἱλαστήριον* of Christ is the epoch and turning-point in the world's history (comp. Acts xvii. 30; xvi. 16).

Lange explains *ἱλαστήριον* by *mercy-seat*, and supports his explanation by the following reasons: (a) the Septuagint uniformly has translated מַזְבֵּחַ *ἱλαστήριον*. (b) In Heb. ix. 5 *ἱλαστήριον* means the *mercy-seat*. (c) This view is sustained by the idea pervading the whole Epistle, of the contrast between the old worship, which was partly heathen, and partly only symbolical, and the real N. T. worship. (d) The *ἱλαστήριον* unites as symbol the different elements of the atonement.

Note k, p. 132.

Socinus has foreseen this objection and answered it with a considerable degree of success. He says: "Whom of the Apostles and disciples of Christ can we name who was especially delivered to death by God for this end, that by his blood God might confirm to us his new and eternal covenant? Many of these were, indeed, slain, and became partners of the afflictions of Christ, and were regarded worthy of the favor of God because they suffered for Christ, upon whom by the favor of the same God they had believed; but on this account most that they might obey God rather than man.

Whence even if the truth has been in some degree confirmed by them (for they have been called martyrs for this reason), they must not on that account be compared with Christ in this regard, because they have done nothing but give testimony to Christ himself. For they are not called, on account of the death which they bore for the sake of the gospel, simply martyrs, or witnesses, but they are called martyrs or witnesses of *Jesus Christ*" (i. 3).

Note l, p. 132.

Socinus was not so successful in removing this objection. He can say only: "We ought to notice that Christ confirmed the way of salvation which he had announced not only by miracles, but especially by the effusion of his blood" (i. 3).

Note m, p. 133.

The passage to which Grotius here alludes is found in ii. 4. Socinus seems to waver in his interpretation of the passages of Scripture under consideration (Matt. ix. 6; Mark ii. 10; Luke v. 24). He says: "He (*Jesus*) adds also the words 'upon earth' as if he should say: I, myself, although mortal and dwelling upon the earth, while I am with you have this power, and have descended upon the earth endowed with it. This gift has been committed to me dwelling upon the earth, though you are ignorant of it." Then he adds in a parenthesis: "Although since it is evident from Mark that the words 'upon earth' are to be joined with the word 'forgive,' I suspect that their sense is different, as I suggested a little before when I asserted for Christ the power of giving the fullest pardon of sins *in this* life, and also *for that time*." Socinus is not, on the whole, to be held responsible for this position, however, as it is his view that to Christ as a man is given the power of bestowing eternal life upon his followers. He who can bestow eternal life can certainly forgive sins in another world as well as in this.

Note n, p. 134.

Socinus's meaning will be more evident upon reading the following passage (i. 3): "But we ought to notice that Christ confirmed the way of salvation which he had announced not only by miracles, but most of all by the shedding of his blood which was therefore said to be the blood of the everlasting covenant (Heb. xiii. 20), and by Christ himself was called the blood of the New Testament (Mark xiv. 24). For as covenants were anciently ratified and confirmed by shedding the blood of some animal, so God has ratified

and confirmed his new and everlasting covenant, which he has made with us through Christ, by the blood of his own Son, the same Christ. Christ, therefore, died that he might establish the new and everlasting covenant of God of which he had himself been the mediator, whence he had deservedly obtained the name of a true and faithful witness. And he has so confirmed the divine promises that he has in a certain way bound God himself to perform them, and his blood constantly cries to the Father to remember the promises Christ has announced to us in his name, and to confirm which has not refused to shed his own blood."

It is, then, by confirming the promises and the covenant that the death of Christ induces us to exercise faith.

Socinus dwells at some length upon the office of the resurrection in creating faith in our hearts. He says (i. 5): "Paul in 1 Cor. xv. throughout the chapter employs the words *resurrection from the dead* in place of the eternal and blessed life, or in place of that resurrection which is followed by the eternal and blessed life." — "The head and, as it were, foundation of our whole faith and salvation in the person of Christ, is the resurrection of Jesus Christ himself." — "The resurrection causes us to have faith in God, who ought to be the ultimate and especial end and scope of our actions and of our faith, and leads us to place our hope in him." — "By the resurrection Jesus Christ is declared to be the Son of God with power. But he who believes that Jesus Christ is the Son of God conquers the world, and has eternal life, unless, indeed, a man can possibly acknowledge that Jesus Christ is the dearly beloved Son of God, and possessed of the highest power in heaven and upon earth, and not believe that all things which he has said are true, and not place in him the hope of his salvation. Whence, as we have seen before, correction of life and then the pardon of our sins, in which consists the happiness of men, necessarily follows; which he believes will be given to him by Christ himself. Wherefore, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ were penitence and the forgiveness of sins, as we have said before, not only given to the people, but also announced in the name of Christ himself to the whole world."

Note o. p. 135.

In the general scope of his objections against Socinus at this point Grotius is perfectly correct. Forgiveness of sins is ascribed in the Scriptures to the death of Christ, and any system which ascribes it to another source, or which tries to give another efficacy

to the death of Christ, is so far in error. Socinus is undoubtedly right in saying that the resurrection of Christ put the crowning proof upon the words of the Saviour, and so confirmed his promises to us and excited our faith in him. But the resurrection does not, therefore, take the place of the sacrificial death as the centre of the redemptive system. The remission of sins is so repeatedly ascribed in Scripture to the death of Christ that no theory which does not succeed in making this death the centre of the atoning work adequately presents biblical truth.

Yet Grotius's criticisms at this point are not quite so apposite as they should be, because Socinus and he differ more fundamentally as to the death of Christ than these criticisms imply. The truth is that Socinus does not ascribe the forgiveness of sins to the death of Christ as its ground, but to the goodness of God. The death of Christ is an incident to redemption. It plays so small a part in Socinus's conception that it is only seldom alluded to in his pages. It serves a certain purpose, but it is merely to confirm what is otherwise announced, and does not lay the foundation of anything new. It is necessary to give Christ a full portion in our sufferings, to exhibit him as the conqueror of death, and it is the path to the resurrection which confirms his promises, but it is not in itself and apart from other things an element, and by no means the chief element, of the atonement. Grotius has, therefore, made the antithesis between his view and that of Socinus too sharp at this point. Socinus would not claim that "rightly and fitly" (p. 134) is remission said to be obtained through the death of Christ in the sense in which Grotius would employ those words.

Note p, p. 137.

On this passage (Rom. iv. 25) Meyer (Edinburgh translation): "*διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν*] on account of our justification, in order to accomplish on us the judicial act of transference into the relation of δικαιοσύνη (comp. v. 18). For this object God raised Jesus from the dead; for the resurrection of the sacrificed one was necessary to produce in men, *the faith* through which alone the objective fact of the atoning offering of Jesus could have the effect of δικαίωσις *subjectively*, because Christ is the *ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως* (iii. 25). Without his resurrection, therefore, the atoning work of his death would have remained without subjective appropriation; his surrender *διὰ τὰ παραπτ. ἡμῶν* would not have attained its end, our justification."

CHAPTER II.

Note a, p. 138.

Speaking of the Grotian theory and the two others to which it is opposed, Baur says (*Versöhnung*, p. 483, Bib. Sac., Vol. ix. p. 271): "While they start from the idea, — the church theory from the idea of the absolute justice, the Socinian from the idea of the absolute goodness of God. — or at least put the historical fact into such a relation to these respective ideas that our whole mode of conceiving that fact is to be determined by them, the theory of Grotius is founded upon exactly the opposite view. This theory cannot rightly be said to start from an *idea*; since, in the penal example which it beholds in the death of Christ, absolute justice and absolute goodness neutralize each other in such a way that the theory hardly has a definite principle left."

We may readily admit that the theory as presented by Grotius is not presented in its ideal form. The work, as has been already observed, is an incomplete one, and consequently lacks a careful exposition of the idea underlying the theory. But there is some evidence in it that Grotius held at least the rudiments of such an idea. In his remarks upon justice (which are always more or less incidental), we find expressions which indicate that he believed in punitive justice as an element in the nature of God (p. 127, and p. 289 "[Socinus] says that punitive justice does not reside in God, but that it is an effect of his will. Certainly the act of punishing is an effect of the will; but the justice or rectitude from which other things as well as the execution of punishment spring, is an attribute residing in God"); and yet he believed that the demands of this justice were not satisfied (p. 152), else all sinners would be punished eternally; and that, although it is just in the nature of things to punish sinners eternally, it is not unjust to leave them unpunished (p. 154). The phrase "rectoral justice" (Lat. *justitia rectoris*), occurs on p. 291, — a phrase which points to some distinction between the justice of a ruler and justice simply considered. It is especially significant when we consider that Grotius makes God's position in this matter that of a ruler. He shows why it is necessary that God should be considered as a ruler in this matter, and also dwells upon the great principle which induced him to provide the atonement, viz. the principle of love. It only remains for Grotius to show how the principle of love works in a double way, both

leading God to forgive sinners and preventing him from forgiving them without an example in consequence of the demands of his government, and he has presented the ideal basis of his theory in the conception of love dominating all the actions of God.

Supplying this missing step, we may accordingly say with some degree of confidence that Grotius's conception of God was that of a being always acting under the supreme control of benevolence. It is to be remembered that he was an Arminian, and rejected the common Calvinistic teaching of his day as to the arbitrary will of God. The Arminians objected to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination not simply because it failed to show the reason for predestination, but because it denied that there was any reason, and founded it upon an unreasonable, or at least unreasoning will. Grotius believed that there was reason back of every act of God, and accordingly could not accept the idea of a mechanical, self-acting, and insatiate justice blindly calling for the exact satisfaction of its claims. The justice of God was justice *with a reason*, and because he was a governor it became *rectoral* justice. God's government flowed from his character. That character was love, and the government of God was accordingly one of the many displays of his eternal love. This is the *idea* of the Grotian system. (Comp. p. 289, beginning at "Further, God not only testified").

If it is necessary to trace the derivation of Grotius's theory from this source it may be briefly done as follows :

The justice of God demands the eternal punishment of every sinner (p. 152). If justice is satisfied this result inevitably follows. When men have sinned nothing remains but to forgive them or permit a whole race to be lost. That is, God must either *wave* the demands of justice or he must *execute* them to the eternal destruction of all men. His love prompts him to forgive. But the question arises: May not free forgiveness result in harm on the whole, even if it does benefit a few? May not love in its broad sense, as love to the whole, *oppose* forgiveness as well as *suggest* it? Evidently it does, for free forgiveness will do great harm in breaking down the authority of God's law, and thus injuriously affecting God's government over the entire universe as well as over the race of man. All moral beings, angels as well as men, would say upon seeing the free forgiveness of men that God was a *weak* ruler, and thus be *tempted* to sin against him; but, what is of vastly greater importance, they would say that he was an *unrighteous* ruler. A righteous ruler

must *disapprove* of sin. But to forgive is to express approval of the *sinner*, and thus is to express approval of the *sin*, unless something else shall at the same time exhibit the contrary feeling. But God cannot express approval of sin without not simply *appearing* to be, but *being* an unrighteous ruler, and so he cannot forgive sin freely without being an unrighteous ruler. Now the government of God rests upon his character. It is good because God is good, and so may claim the submission of creatures ultimately because he is good. If he should forgive sins without an atonement his subjects would therefore feel *called upon* in *conscience*, and by the deepest feelings of their nature, to rebel against him, that they might serve some righteous ruler, that is, to leave the service of him who would have thus proved himself to be no true God in order to serve him who should be the true God. Regard for his own government, therefore, both on the side of love for men, and love for himself, impelled God not to forgive men without an atonement.

God, therefore, determines to set up an example in the affliction (or as Grotius inexactly called it the punishment) of Christ in order that while forgiving men for Christ's sake he might express in that death for sake of which they were forgiven, his disapproval of sin. The punishment of sinners is *just*, and the affliction of Christ is *not unjustly* substituted for their punishment. Accordingly God *expresses* the demands of justice, and his regard for them, while at the same time he does the only thing that he can do, if he will save sinners, and *waives* its real claim.

The Grotian theory is thus directly deduced from the doctrine that God is governed in all his acts by benevolence. It starts from the idea of the *love* of God as the Socinian theory does from a perverted conception of the *goodness* of God.

Note b, p. 140.

The refutation of this error will also be the refutation of the error of those who hold the satisfaction-theory so-called. The Socinian and the common view of the atonement have this point of agreement in that they both start from the personal relations of God to sin. With the orthodox theologians an offence has been committed against the dignity of God, and justice calls for its punishment. This justice must be satisfied, and a personal repudiation of a personal indignity made. So with the Socinians, an offence has been committed against the dignity of God, but he hears no such call of justice, and as the offence is entirely against himself lets it go with-

out any further ado. We must say that if God is to be influenced by reasons entirely applying to himself we do not see but that the Socinians have the best of the argument. But Grotius's view is that God for great reasons pertaining to his whole plan of the universe, which are not merely personal but rectoral, cannot forgive without an atonement.

Note c, p. 140.

The meaning of the words punishment, penalty, etc., having been already explained, and fully illustrated in the preceding notes, it will be necessary only to point out the examples which show our explanation to be correct.

A good example may be found on p. 120. We are bidden there to look upon the punishment of Christ as an "example." On p. 141 a quotation from Lactantius, which is approved by Grotius, reads: "We rise to punishment not because we are injured, but that order may be preserved, manners corrected, license repressed." A second element is here added to the object of punishment. The same thought is brought out on p. 144. In punishment for debt it is said that "the cause of punishment is the viciousness of the act, not that anything is lacking to me." By the "viciousness of the act" is evidently meant its injurious tendency. Other passages like the above might be quoted, as p. 284: "the death of Christ is a weighty example against the great crimes of all of us with whom Christ was very closely connected"; and p. 286, "God was unwilling to pass over so many sins and so great sins without a distinguished example."

Perhaps the clearest passage is the following (p. 146): "The right of absolute ownership, as well as the right over the thing loaned, is secured for the sake of him who has that right; but the right of punishing does not exist for the sake of him who punishes, but for the sake of the community. For all punishment has as its object the common good, viz. the preservation of order, and giving an example; so that desirable punishment has no justification except this cause, while the right of property and debt are desirable in themselves. In this sense God himself says that he is not delighted with the punishment of those who are punished."

And, finally, a significant passage from p. 306: "God devoted his Son that he might openly testify of the desert of sin, and of his own hatred of sin, and at the same time, as far as it could be done in sparing us, consult for the order of things, and for the authority of his own law."

CHAPTER III.

Note a, p. 151.

Grotius here rejects the word *acceptilation* as descriptive of the action of God in waiving the claims of the law. But he has always been charged with teaching the thing signified by that word. Bretschneider (*vid. Bib. Sac.*, ix. p. 267), defines *acceptilation* as follows: "That which takes place when one consents to accept a thing as an equivalent, although it is not in itself really equal to that in place of which it is received; its sufficiency for the given purpose being constituted not by its own inherent worth, but by the receiver's determination to accept it."

Now we say, first, that in the nature of the case Grotius's theory cannot be one of *acceptilation*. Christ is punished for an example. His punishment is to have an effect upon moral agents, and that too, at least as great as would have been produced by the punishment of the sinners themselves. This moral influence in deterring from sin is not affected by God's estimate of that punishment. God cannot command a man to feel awe and fear in contemplation of Calvary, but that awe and fear must spring up naturally in every breast. It must be called out by that which is in itself fitted to excite such emotions. To call the death of Christ an awful spectacle will not make it so. It must have an inherent value of its own, and one plain to every beholder,—we may even say, so plain that it cannot be gainsaid nor resisted,—or it is worth nothing as an example. For the purpose designed it must be "really equal to that in place of which it is received." But this is not a theory of *acceptilation*.

But, again, Grotius's representations are inconsistent with *acceptilation*.

1. When arguing against the word *acceptilation* (p. 299), Grotius represents it as an imaginary payment, and says that Christ made a real payment, namely his blood. Baur tries to trip Grotius at this point (*Bib. Sac.*, ix. p. 268), by observing that the opposite of *acceptilation* is "only that particular kind of payment in which is rendered the very thing that was due, or else its perfect equivalent." To this we may reply that in one sense the sacrifice of Christ is a perfect equivalent of the punishment of the sinner, as has been shown above, in that it serves the same purpose; but that in another sense it is far different, for it does not satisfy the claims of *distributive*

butive justice Grotius, however, does not acknowledge the anti-thesis proposed by Baur. He sets payment over against acceptilation as its *contradictory*, but suggests also a *contrary*, satisfaction. In his mind satisfaction is neither acceptilation nor payment. God could have refused the satisfaction of Christ because the law demanded the punishment of the guilty one himself. The mere substitution of another as payer (in case of punishment, not in debt, though Baur perpetually confounds the two), makes the punishment the payment of another thing. But the payment offered — the satisfaction — accomplished the desired objects, and accordingly was accepted. God was not bound to accept, hence it is satisfaction, not payment. But it was in itself sufficient, hence it is satisfaction, not acceptilation.

2. Grotius brings out the inherent worth of Christ's satisfaction. This is involved in the elements of his theory as we have seen. It appears also in his remarks upon acceptilation. But we also have an explicit statement of the fact. On the one hand emphasis is laid upon the thought that Christ was the only begotten Son (p. 289). On the other he speaks of "the consummate fitness of Christ for displaying a distinguished example. This consisted in his intimate union with us, and in the incomparable dignity of his person" (p. 291). Again: "We believe that this punishment must be estimated with the consideration in mind that he who bore it was God, although he did not bear it as God. . . . The dignity of his whole person, that is, the dignity of Christ, contributed not a little to this estimation" (p. 412). In connection with this latter passage a number of arguments (overlooked by Baur), are adduced to prove the worth of the sacrifice as residing in the dignity of Christ's person. They are the same arguments that are adduced by the advocates of the older theory to prove the inherent worth of the atonement as a satisfaction to justice (Hodge, *Theol.* ii. 475, 483 sqq.). If they prove inherent worth for these, they do for Grotius; if inherent worth for the satisfaction of distributive justice, equally for the satisfaction of rectoral justice. But if this is the case, Grotius holding the inherent dignity of Christ's person, cannot have advanced a theory of acceptilation.

Note b, p. 153.

At this point it is necessary to use some little caution lest we should infer that the law is an arbitrary exercise of God's legislative power. On the contrary, Grotius's view is that it has its origin

in certain fixed and natural relations (p. 290). God acts the part of a lawgiver in establishing the law. He can establish whatever law he chooses, but his own character calls for a law based upon the principles of right. This he establishes in the exercise of his legislative justice. He then executes it in his capacity of ruler, and dispenses its rewards and punishments. Grotius has shown forgiveness to be the act of God considered as ruler, and not as offended party. It was as one *capable* of receiving offence that he *established* the law. The *execution* of the law is another thing, and belongs to him in another relation. But it should be remembered that the same character appears in all these acts of whatever class.

CHAPTER IV.

Note a, p. 274.

This passage brings out in strong relief the reasonableness of Grotius's view of Christ's sufferings. They are put by him in the same category with the sufferings which come upon us in consequence of human sodality. The object of the temporal penalties, or more properly speaking, painful consequences, of transgression, is not to *satisfy* the distributive justice of God, but to *express* that justice for the warning of men, and to exhibit the essential evil of sin. A good illustrative example may be found in things involving no moral relations. If I put my finger in the fire I am burned. It makes no difference if I do it unconsciously, I am burned all the same. In this case it is easy to see the object of the pain. It is that the hand may not be entirely lost. So even the unconscious violations of natural laws are followed by afflictions for the warning of men. Yet a man is not held guilty in a moral sense, that is, pronounced a sinner, for unconscious violations of law, nor can we believe that God will *punish* him for them; but he is made to suffer afflictions for them.

Just so there is a natural connection between our sins and Christ's sufferings. He was not guilty of our sins, nor was he punished in the strict sense of the word. But there existed a law whereby the sin of men brought suffering upon the race. God would not allow even his own Son to enter the world and become a member of the race of man without suffering the consequences of sin. Thus our sins resulted in the affliction of Christ, which served as an *example* of their essential evil, and as a warning against them. But more than this; God appointed by a special decree that these afflictions, thus naturally expressive of the evil of sin, should afford testimony

of his hatred of sin. Thus in accordance with nature and by special decree is Christ afflicted for us.

Note b, p. 275.

In commenting upon the Grotian theory, Oxenham (The Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement, by H. A. Oxenham, M.A., 2d ed., London, 1869, p. 238), says: "But if the theory itself is startling, the line of argument it is supported by is more startling still. In this world the innocent often suffer for the guilty, children bear the burden of their fathers', subjects of their rulers' sins; nay, it frequently happens in the execution of justice, that good and bad are punished together, or the good instead of the bad; therefore, while the law must visit crime, it need not touch the criminal! But does not Christian instinct, to say nothing of Scripture, teach us that these inequalities of earth will be rectified by unerring wisdom in the world beyond the grave? or, rather, are not these very inequalities a confirmation of our belief in the new heavens and new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness? Such seeming difficulties, which from the days of Job have tortured the philosopher, and sometimes disquieted the saint, run up at last into the one insoluble riddle of all metaphysics and all theology, the origin of evil. When once the existence of evil is accepted as a fact, though its original permission cannot be explained, they cease to be difficulties, and are felt to be a temporary and incidental interruption of the perfect order of the universe introduced by sin. They have also their bearings on the sacrifice of Christ. . . . But it is quite a different matter when the experience of human history, *delirant reges plectuntur Achivi*, is converted into a principle of divine governance, and it is gravely inferred that because God for wise ends permits the afflictions of the righteous, he *punishes* them for others' sins." — It is evident that Mr. Oxenham misunderstands the word *punishment* as found in Grotius. He acknowledges that the sufferings of men are for *wise* reasons, and that though interruptions of the universe, they are introduced by sin. Let him now understand that Grotius means simply to place the sufferings of Christ in the same category with them, and that punishment means in his use simply example, and all difficulty will vanish. There is no such difference between the governing principles of this world and the next as some seem to imagine. There will be no sin in heaven, and consequently no sufferings. But introduce sin there, and it would work precisely as it does here. Its working is *natural*, and no less natural in Christ's death than elsewhere.

CHAPTER V.

Note a, p. 287.

Prof. Crawford (The Doctrine of the Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement, 2d ed., 1874, p. 388), in commenting upon the governmental theory of the Atonement, says: "It represents the Atonement as nothing more than a hollow and unreal exhibition of principles which are not truly and substantially involved in it. . . . -In order to produce or to sustain in their [rational creatures'] minds an *impression* that sin and its threatened penalties are inseparably connected, and that even in the exercise of his boundless mercy he cannot compromise the requirements of justice, he gave up his only-begotten Son to humiliation, agony, and death? It is true, *the impression thus to be produced is an erroneous one* — we theologians have found out that it is so; for we are too wise to be taken in by mere appearances. Nevertheless, the erroneous impression is a salutary one."

Prof. Crawford does not intend to misrepresent the New England theory in these words, but he shows that he does not understand it. Grotius says that Christ was punished in our stead; but he never intended to convey the impression that God's distributive justice was satisfied. The cross simply stood for an example of the punishment *due* to sin, and a warning of what *would* come upon the sinner if he did not avail himself of the offers of mercy. The New England divines are equally simple in meaning and more clear in their statements. When sin has once been committed all that can be done if the sinner is to be saved is to forgive him. This destroys all possibility of satisfying justice, which would forever condemn him. Only the sin must be forgiven in such a way that the evil of it may spread no farther.

The conception of justice underlying the governmental theory in both its Grotian and New England forms may be analyzed as follows:

- (1) A feeling of displeasure on the part of God in view of sin and demand for its expression;
- (2) A sense of fitness of punishment to sin;
- (3) A motive for gratifying that feeling by the infliction of that fit punishment, viz. the display of his own character;
- (4) A choice to do it.

The result is an act of distributive justice. The first and second elements bring to view the justice in the act; the third shows the

purpose of the act, without which, or an equivalent, the act could not take place; the fourth, God's freedom in it all. The choice is not a necessary result of the first and second elements, and if a sufficient motive against it intervene, it will not be made.

The office performed by the sufferings of Christ in the view of Grotius and the New England divines, may be thus analyzed:

(1) The sufferings of Christ are a consequence of sin; (2) They show God's sense of the fitness of pain to sin; (3) They exhibit God's displeasure with sin; (4) They show that he is not careless of sin though he forgives; (5) They thus vindicate his character as loving right, by showing how he hates wrong; (6) They also serve as an example to deter from sin; (7) On both these grounds they remove the danger to law in pardoning sin.

The difference between the followers of the older school and the followers of Grotius in respect to justice is not so great, however, as some have thought. We may compare them easily under such an arrangement as the following:

The Old School.

1. Justice *must* be satisfied.
2. Another person than the guilty one *may* be punished.

The Grotians.

1. Justice *may* be unsatisfied.
2. The guilty one *must* be punished, if any one is.

The difference between them is, that while one is *longer* the other is *broader*. The one insists on a satisfaction, but admits such a satisfaction that to the other it becomes no satisfaction at all. The other does not claim a satisfaction, but secures every element of the satisfaction insisted upon by the first, except the name.

Note b, p. 287.

In a note (Bib. Sac., ix. p. 273), Baur (apparently) quoting from a writer in the *Evang. Kirchenzeitung* for 1834, says: "The question was: Why God would not forgive sin otherwise than on account of the death of Christ? The answer which Grotius gives stands in no necessary or even real connection with sin. Grotius himself acknowledges that God who in accordance with his love desired to spare, i.e. to admit the relaxation of the law, had also power to do it without setting forth any penal example, but that he was desirous of showing his wrath at the same time with his love. But why any additional example, when a sufficiently strong one is given in the case of the reprobate and his final condemnation? And to what exceptions and objections does Grotius in this way expose himself? Is

it not, for example, the grossest injustice, nay, the grossest cruelty, in God if, merely for the purpose of exhibiting his wrath, he gives over his Son to the most excruciating tortures, when he might forgive sin without them, yea, when he actually does (according to Grotius) forgive men without them?" — The last sentence contains a gross misrepresentation of Grotius. God does forgive sin without the tortures of Christ in the sense that the tortures are only a reason *justifying* forgiveness, and not a ground of *right* to forgiveness; but sinners are not forgiven entirely without the tortures, but *because* of them. How it can be called a reasonable objection to Grotius that he does not ascribe a reason for Christ's sufferings sufficient to acquit God of the charge of cruelty in inflicting them, when the reason ascribed is nothing less than the authority of divine law, and the preservation of a universe of holy beings who would otherwise be led into sin, we cannot see. A careful study of these two pages (286 and 287) would destroy such an objection.

Note c, p. 289.

Oxenham (Catholic Doctrine, p. 237), says: [According to Grotius] "the spectacle on Calvary was a grand dramatic exhibition of God's retributive justice, and having thus publicly vindicated the authority of his law, he consented to remit all further penalties of disobedience. Yet surely if a conspicuous example were needed to deter men from sin for the future — and it could have no other object — not only was there no ground for selecting an innocent victim, but it was absolutely essential that punishment should fall upon the guilty; the greater the criminal the more forcibly would the lesson be conveyed. Least of all was the incarnation of a divine person requisite that the Father might teach us the heinousness of our iniquities by visiting their merited chastisement on his sinless Son." These remarks are cited chiefly to show how differently the same facts appear to different minds.

Note d, p. 291.

Upon this passage (beginning with "But that the punishment") Baur remarks (Vers. Bib. Sac., ix. p. 271): "That the divine-human dignity of the Redeemer is as necessary a presupposition for the theory of the church as it is superfluous to that of Socinus, is obvious at first sight. The theory of Grotius, on the contrary, although it recognizes that dignity in form, really nullifies it in fact, since it is unable to explain what is the precise importance of that

dignity in the work of redemption. How Christ should have been peculiarly fitted to stand as a penal example on account of the dignity of his person as God-man, it is not easy to see. If he became incarnate for this end only, which could with equal ease have been secured by him as a mere man, as the Socinians hold, and so includes in himself nothing which is in its own nature necessary, then there is, and will always remain, an irreducible disproportion between the means and the end. Instead of falling back upon the internal necessity of things, and drawing an argument from thence, as was done in the theory of the church, and instead of entirely renouncing an idea whose rational necessity cannot be acknowledged, as was avowedly done by Socinus, Grotius has given us a mere vindication, flattering himself that it has done all that can be justly demanded of it, when by suggesting some plausible end to be accomplished, it has relieved the presupposed fact from the charge of being absolutely inconceivable. Such is the difference between the formal, judicial point of view, having as its outward standard of reference, a given case in law, and the speculative, which goes back to the internal idea of things, or to the absolute nature of God." This criticism loses much of its apparent force when we remember that Grotius's work is professedly incomplete, and strictly a defence *against Socinus*. Baur should have read the title-pages of books he criticised. But, really, we do not see but that Grotius has done as much towards showing the necessity of the incarnation as is now done by the advocates of what Baur calls the "church theory." The old arithmetical demonstration — the infinity of Christ's nature \times his finite sufferings = the finiteness of our nature \times the infinity of our sufferings, — is now given up, and the argument urged is that Godhead is necessary to the *dignity* of Christ's sufferings, and that their dignity while not making them an arithmetical equivalent of our punishment, gives them a real equivalence. But this view, although not developed by Grotius is more than hinted at. See pp. 274, 284, 289, 291, 412, 413. Professor Smeaton says (The Doctrine of the Atonement as taught by Christ himself, Edinburgh, 1868, p. 369): "The infinite value of the atonement, viewed in connection with the incarnation of the Son of God, is exhibited forcibly by GROTIUS, *De Satisfactione*. The latter is *peculiarly fresh and clear* upon this point;" and then quotes p. 412 and 413.

CHAPTER VI.

Note a, p. 296.

The following extracts from Baur, for the most part reliable, will be read with interest. (See Bib. Sac., ix. p. 263 seq.). "The best scale for the measurement of their [the theories of Grotius and of the church] mutual relations is furnished by the idea of satisfaction. The main point in the church's theory of satisfaction is this, that what Christ did was precisely the same thing which men themselves were to have done. If Christ had not made a strict and perfect satisfaction for men, they could not have been released from sin. Socinus objected to this, that satisfaction and forgiveness were contradictory ideas. This assertion Grotius, as the defender of the church's doctrine of satisfaction, could not admit. He therefore replied that satisfaction and forgiveness were not strictly simultaneous; that according to the conditions established by God the latter then first follows the former when a man by faith in Christ turns to God and prays him for the forgiveness of his sins. This distinction must certainly be made if the objection of Socinus is to be successfully met, and the two ideas are to be permitted to stand side by side. But Grotius could not stop here." Could not, Baur intimates, because he would not, but could not, say we, because this does not answer Socinus's objection. The universal Christian idea of forgiveness is that it is an act of *grace*. But upon such an idea of satisfaction as Baur here advances, forgiveness follows sin like a debt due to the sinner for Christ's sake, so that he can *claim* salvation. There may be grace in providing the atonement, but no *grace* in forgiving. To answer Socinus's objection, therefore, Grotius must show that satisfaction instead of creating a *claim* to *favor* merely opens a *way* to *forgiveness*, or renders it *consistent* to forgive. To resume: "Grotius could not stop here. If it is only a penal example that is furnished by the death of Christ, then the idea of satisfaction, strictly speaking, has no further relevancy. As, however, Grotius wished to retain this idea he brought to his assistance a peculiar distinction which is made in law between the two ideas denoted respectively by the terms *solutio* and *satisfactio*. If, said Grotius, the very thing which is owed be paid either by the debtor himself, or, which is in this case the same thing, by another in the debtor's name, then the discharge of the debt takes place by that very act, but it is to be called a discharge, not a remission (*remissio*). Not so, however,

when something else is paid than the specific thing which was due." In corporal punishment, Grotius would say, the fact that another *person* pays the punishment, itself makes the payment a payment of another *thing*, for, he says (p. 298), "In the obligation is prescribed the affliction of the guilty party himself." Baur continues: "In this case there must be added, on the part of the creditor or ruler, an act of remission as a personal act; and it is this kind of payment that may be either accepted or refused by the creditor which is properly called in the technical language of the law, satisfaction." Grotius himself states it better (p. 298): "Some act of the ruler must intervene that liberation may come to one from the punishment of another, for the law demands that the delinquent shall himself be punished. This act with respect to the law is a relaxation or dispensation; with respect to the debtor, a remission." Resuming from Baur a little below: "This, then, is the precise meaning of the theory of Grotius, and the difference between it and the satisfaction theory of the church. The idea of satisfaction is let down from its full and real import to the idea of a mere rendering of something; Christ has made satisfaction so far as he has fulfilled a condition, of whatever kind it may be, upon which God has suspended the forgiveness of the sins of men; so far as he has given to God a something with reference to that end. This something is that penal example without the setting forth of which God could not have forgiven the sins of men." In a note Baur adds: "It is always of a mere *aliquid* that he speaks, never of an *equivalent*." But it is an *aliquid* that is equivalent, though not identical. "Hence such expressions as that in the death of Christ 'there was no payment of the very thing due so as to liberate *ipso facto*, for our eternal death was in the obligation,' can be regarded only as a direct contradiction of the theory of the church, it being an essential part of that theory that Christ has endured eternal death for men." Such language is nonsense, and we are glad Baur acquits Grotius of using it!

Note b, p. 306.

In commenting upon these two pages (305 and 306), Baur says: "In what does the peculiarity of the Grotian theory consist? It can be found only in that idea of penal example which Grotius transferred to the death of Christ; though even in this respect it cannot be concealed that there is a close affinity between the two theories. Although Grotius chooses to hold fast the idea of satisfaction in a certain sense, it nevertheless amounts to nothing else at

last but the idea of a penal example through which God, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of his law, declares in the language of palpable fact his hatred and abhorrence of sin. For what other purpose, however, should the authority of the law be maintained than that sin may be prevented at the same time that the pardon of sin is bestowed? The principal thing insisted on, then, both by Grotius and Socinus is the moral impression produced by the death of Christ, with only this difference, that this moral element is taken by Grotius in a negative sense, by Socinus in a positive sense; since, according to Grotius, the moral effect of Christ's death consists in the fact that it is a setting forth of the punishment which is connected with sin, while, according to Socinus, it consists in the moral disposition which was exhibited by Christ in his death. Even by Socinus himself, therefore, the bestowment of pardon is made dependent upon a moral condition which is connected with the death of Christ."

The true affiliation of the Grotian theory is not with Socinus as Baur hastily concludes, but with the "theory of the church." Socinus represents God as entirely ready to forgive sin, and recognizes no obstacle to forgiveness except on the part of man. Christ's death plays some part, but only a subordinate part, in removing this obstacle by exciting in man penitence and faith. But Grotius recognizes an obstacle to forgiveness on the part of God, and here he agrees with the "church." The "church" makes that obstacle to reside in God's punitive justice, which must be satisfied, Grotius in God's regard for his character, and for the authority of his law, and for his moral government. The "church's" theory does not lack a moral element, for the pain of punishment must have its influence upon the soul of the punished sinner and "stop his mouth," or else justice is not satisfied. True, it is the moral influence of the afflictions of Christ upon the universe that upholds, according to Grotius, the authority of the law, and deters moral creatures from sin. But if there were but two beings in the universe, God and the sinner, that sinner could not be forgiven without an atonement, for God must sustain the character of his law before that sinner *and himself*. If this is not an obstacle to forgiveness on God's part as substantial as any lying in punitive justice, and separated by an infinite remove from the lawlessness of the Socinian view, we cannot imagine what could be. An instructive passage upon this point will be found on p. 418 sq.

CHAPTER VIII.

Notes a, p. 406.

Prof. Smeaton (*Doctrine of the Atonement*, p. 411), quotes this passage, and uses it as an argument to show that Grotius held that *λύτρον* may mean a sacrifice. (See also p. 153). But Grotius's position is the same as Prof. Smeaton's. The latter says (p. 152): "The word does not mean the redemption itself, but the price of it, or the price given to redeem another. And it will be found that the term "ransom" wherever it is used involves a causal connection between the price paid and the liberation effected, — that is, a relation of cause and effect." Grotius (p. 402) says: "The death of Christ was the *cause* of redemption, because God is induced by it to liberate us from punishment." "By this style of speech, *to redeem transgressions*, is signified not only the cause influencing one to liberate, but also such a cause as includes compensation or satisfaction." See also pp. 405, 407, 408, etc.

ARTICLE III.

BIBLE ILLUSTRATIONS FROM BIBLE LANDS.

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(Continued from p. 560).

IN so large a work it is not always easy to avoid repetition; for one forgets what is already written. The following instances of this occur: On one page (29) we are told that Egypt "is closed in on the west and east by arid sands and barren mountains, and owes its fertility to the yearly overflowings of the Nile"; and on another (73): It is "closed in on the east and west by perfectly barren mountains and sandy plains, and watered by the Nile."

On one page (71) Dr. Van Lennep says of the same country: "It is quite common to see troops of people, especially children, both boys and girls, swimming from one village to another"; and on another (493): "In the summer it is not uncommon to come upon a group of girls, whose graceful motions, as