
A table of contents for *The Churchman* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_churchman_os.php

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distinct—the natural; not invading the spiritual, nor the spiritual the natural, and keeping them distinct; while in the study of nature we rejoice to follow Huxley, and Tindall, and Darwin in the examination of facts, in the study of Divine grace we delight to submit ourselves to the revelation by the Author of grace, and reverently to say, "We believe God, that it shall be as it was told unto us."

Having said so much against the book, I must have the satisfaction of adding that I believe it has been written by a Christian man for Christian purposes; and that the object has been, not to attack the truth, but to uphold it. I believe that the author's own mind has been bewildered by his admiration for Mr. Darwin and Mr. Spencer; and that, under the influence of that admiration, he has been led into the terrible mistake of supposing that Agnosticism can be reconciled with Christianity. I trust that a deeper acquaintance with both subjects will convince him of their irreconcilable antagonism, and lead him in calm, peaceful, trusting faith to employ his great power in upholding for the future the all-sufficiency of the *authority of* GOD!

EDWARD HOARE.

Review.

The Relations between Religion and Science. The Bampton Lectures for 1884. By the Right Rev. FREDERICK Lord Bishop of EXETER. Macmillan and Co.

IT is with feelings of deep responsibility that I undertake a review[1] of Bishop Temple's new work for three reasons: (1) It is rare, indeed, for any volume of Bampton Lectures to fall beneath a very high standard; and in my opinion this is, to say the least, fully up to the average in power, originality, and earnestness. (2) The subject chosen by the writer is one singularly difficult to treat wisely, and this difficulty is as much felt by his present critic as it could have been by the lecturer. (3) If the value of the book and the difficulty of its subject make a review no easy task, the position of the author as a Father in God, honoured and beloved in his diocese, is not likely to decrease the sense of responsibility in the reviewer.

I approach the task, however, with a lighter heart, because I think

[1] I must apologize to the reader that the review is after all only a fragment. Before I commenced the actual work of criticism it seemed to me that I should have only to summarize and enforce what had given me, in the main, real pleasure and profit to read. But as soon as I began the review, I found the work grew under my hands, there was so much to quote and so much to discuss. And it speedily became apparent that in the space allotted to me, I must content myself with discussing root principles as expounded in the first two lectures.

there can be no doubt as to the great excellences of these Bampton Lectures. There are many statements which cannot readily be accepted. These I shall respectfully but frankly point out, in any case where it seems a duty to do so. But that duty will be the less arduous, because I do *ex animo* regard the Bishop of Exeter's book as a truly noble contribution to theology in its philosophical, scientific, and, above all, ethical aspects.

There is a grand moral tone, a genuinely manly ring, a brave facing of difficulties, a capacity to grasp truths which some deem contradictory, and, in the concluding paragraphs, a vein of tender reverence for our Saviour's Person which command respect. And, though this may be regarded as a smaller matter, the absence of notes, throwing all the burden on the Lectures themselves, is not only merciful to the reader, but is wholly in keeping with the straightforward candour of the writer.

Lecture I. deals with "The Origin and Nature of Scientific Belief." Almost the first sentence that falls from the Bishop is this: "Among religious men we ought to expect to find the most patient, the most truth-seeking, the most courageous of men of science;" and further: "We know that it is not always so" (p. 4). I think it regrettable that he does not add, what is an undeniable fact, that the majority of great scientific men have been—and, thank God, are still—deeply religious. M. Naville, in his "Modern Physics" (translated by the Rev. H. Downton), has indubitably proved that all the great originators of scientific ideas before Laplace, themselves connected their discoveries with their belief in God. And no one would credit—unless, like the present writer, he had for years investigated this very thing—to what a truly remarkable extent our most renowned living *savans* are men of Christian faith. The reticence of most of them is due to two most honourable causes: first, that they are so thoroughly convinced of the claims of religion that they are careless about its vindication; second, that their modesty is so great that they in all humility leave the vindication to theologians.

But to return to our author's statements—he proceeds to explain that, while he does not venture to reconcile the respective claims of Religion and Science where they seem to many to be conflicting, he wishes to examine the relation between the two. He then distinctly excludes mathematics and metaphysics from the science he is to deal with, because scientific knowledge is, he thinks, generally allowed to rest upon the observations of the senses (in which he includes that internal sense by which we know all, or nearly all, that takes place within the mind itself). And he adds that it will be also admitted that the supreme postulate, without which scientific knowledge is impossible, is the uniformity of nature (p. 6).

The uniformity of nature is what the Bishop throughout regards as the root-idea of *science*, just as (it may be helpful to state this at once) *the supremacy and universality of the moral law* is what he insists upon as the very centre and core of *religion*. Round these two foci he draws the ellipse of his truce of God.

He asks (p. 8) as to the assumption, necessary to science, that nature is uniform, "What is its source? what is its justification? what, if any, are its limits?" Having shown that we always act in common matters of life on this assumption, he explains Hume's view that there is no rational ground for regarding the two members of an unvarying sequence as cause and effect; and Kant's, which our author very beautifully illustrates by the kaleidoscope, the mirrors of which by their number and arrangement add a pattern to the objects looked at within. The theory of the great philosopher of Königsberg was that "space and time and the perceptive faculties are the parts of the instrument," *i.e.*, the human

mind. Now Dr. Temple argues that, while it is true we can only explain a thing by showing "that it falls under the general rules which constitute the uniformity of nature" (p. 17), we are not compelled to believe that "all phenomena in nature observed by our senses are capable of being brought within the domain of science" (p. 19).

Now with regard to this, I must frankly state that it seems to me that if there be one dominant and almost universal belief as to what is an adequate explanation of anything, it is not to bring that particular instance under some general law, but to account for it by finding what is its cause. It is true that those who pose as scientific philosophers are always enunciating the definition of a law in accordance with Hume; but scientific men themselves will be found, *when at their work*, to be continually seeking for a "vera causa," though not for a first cause. Scientists, as such, are bound to look for uniformity; but they look for more than uniformity—a point which our author touches upon later on in this chapter, where (pp. 26, 27) he says, "The law of gravitation has an enormous evidence in support of it, considered simply as a fact. And yet how many attempts have been made to represent it as the result of vortices or of particles streaming in all directions, and pressing any two bodies together that lie in their path!" But while *he* there brings in those attempts as evidence of will being at the bottom of our scientific notions, *I* desire rather to lay stress on the fact of scientific men not being influenced practically by the philosophy of Hume, J. S. Mill, and the Positivist School. The whole system of evolution and the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer are based on the principle of causation, rather than upon what is falsely called the scientific notion of law, *i.e.*, the mere labelling of uniform sequences and co-existences.

I am, therefore, disposed to view the real difficulty of scientific men (so far as any such difficulty exists), in regard to an apparent breach of uniformity, from a different standpoint to that occupied by the Bishop. I imagine that they are sometimes in doubt whether (*a*) human freewill and (*b*) Divine interference with the ordinary course of nature are as sufficiently explainable by a "reason why" as to be accounted for in the same sense that natural phenomena are accounted for. And, therefore, we should surely endeavour to show (*a*) *that there is a whole sequence of facts of which the primary notion is freedom*, which we cannot indeed explain, but which we are no more bound to explain than we are the existence of colour, sound, or any other equally wide and primary perceptions of all sane human consciousness. And as to (*b*), is it not sufficient to suggest that human sin and suffering, and God's holiness and love, are perfectly adequate to explain causally what is not the breach of an existing law, but its modification, by the incoming of new forces, which, on the very principle of causation, *must* show their presence by new results?

Now, later on, Dr. Temple does insist much on both these points; but he also throughout insists on uniformity not involving universality, and, on the strength of that difference, finds room for the working of what he considers the two essentials of religion, human will and Divine will. This view seems to me to rest on a kind of dim dread that there is an almost fatal opposition between the root-notions of science and of religion, whereas may we not say that science has no more right to be hostile to freewill in man, regarded as an *originator*, than she has to the thought that the universe had an origin? The same thing would apply to the Divine will; and miracles, as I have just pointed out, are not exceptions to, but the noblest instance of, the root-notion of science, that everything not itself original must have an adequate cause.

But having thus pointed out what seems to me the truer and better way

of dealing with the subject, I return to its discussion in the Bampton Lectures for 1884. The Bishop says (pp. 19, 20), "In ordinary language, something more is meant by cause and effect than invariable sequence, and the common assumption is not that all nature obeys the rule with absolutely no variation, but that the rule is sufficiently general for all practical purposes." The second clause of this sentence is an instance of the importance attached by our author to his view that uniformity is not the same as universality. He proceeds to lay great stress on what is now much insisted on by the more orthodox school of philosophers. After summing up the process of thought by which Newton arrived at the law of gravitation, he says (pp. 20, 21):

> Now this being the invariable process of science, it follows that our conception of cause must come originally from that cause which we have within ourselves and with which we cannot but begin the action of the human will. It is from this action that is obtained that conception which underlies the ordinary conception of cause, namely, that of force or power.

Now whether this idea be true or not, and its exponents are men whose judgment is of the greatest weight, the consequences of holding it are undeniably immense. To hold it is to return to the old view that we must interpret Nature by Man, and not Man by Nature. To demonstrate its truth would be to shatter to pieces the systems of philosophy which have now a passing popularity. I regret to say that I am not prepared to express any very definite opinion of my own as to its truth or falsehood. One cannot build up a system of philosophy hastily, and on this point I am still in suspense. But the Bishop has a right to insist upon it to the fullest extent, and, as I have already observed, he is not fighting the battle single-handed. A little later on—pp. 26, 27—he throws out a very interesting hint that the tendency to explain all natural phenomena as phases of motion is part of the philosophic belief that our will is a cause of motion.

It may perhaps cause some surprise to the reader of his lectures that he does not say much upon this most important matter when first naming it, but proceeds immediately to show that "we discover" (*i.e.* scientifically) "invariability much faster than we can discover causation," and adds that, "as science advances, it is seen that the regularity of phenomena is far more important to us than their causes" (p. 24). Dr. Temple does, however, point out that permanence is an essential assumption of science, and that "this assumption of something permanent in things around us comes from the consciousness of something permanent within us," viz., "our own personal identity" (p. 25).

He then sums up his inquiry as to the great postulate: "We believe in the uniformity of nature, because, as far as we can observe it, that is the character of nature" (p. 28). "We can assert that the general character of nature is uniformity, but we cannot go beyond this" (p. 29). "If a miracle were worked, science could not prove that it was a miracle, nor of course prove that it was not a miracle" (p. 50). "Science may fairly claim to have shown that miracles, if they happen at all, are exceedingly rare. To demonstrate that they never happen at all is impossible, from the very nature of the evidence on which science rests. But for the very same reason science can never in its character of science admit that a miracle has happened. Science can only admit that, so far as the evidence goes, an event has happened which lies outside its province" (p. 31). I have already somewhat dissented from the philosophical view of the relative positions of science and religion implied in these statements; but looking at them merely as emphasizing facts, I think that no scientist who is inclined to speak of a miracle as impossible, can afford to set them aside. They are as powerful as they are original.

The first lecture concludes with two remarks. The one runs thus: "Order takes a rank in God's work far above where we should have placed it. It is not the highest—it is far from the highest; but it appears to be in some strange way the most indispensable" (p. 32). The other, leading to this, is that "eternal moral law" is, of all we know, including the religious instinct, "the highest and the holiest." This statement is an expression of one of the deepest of the Bishop's convictions.

Lecture II. deals with "The Origin and Nature of Religious Belief," and opens thus:

> The order of phenomena is not the highest revelation of God, nor is the voice of science the only nor the most commanding voice that speaks to us about Him. The belief in Him and in the character which we assign to Him does not spring from any observation of phenomena, but from the declaration made to us through the spiritual faculty. There is within us a voice which tells of a supreme Law unchanged throughout all space and all time; which speaks with an authority entirely its own; which finds corroboration in the revelations of science, but which never relies on those revelations as its primary or its ultimate sanction; which is no inference from observation by the senses, external or internal, but a direct communication from the spiritual kingdom, as philosophers call it, of things in themselves; which commands belief as a duty, and by necessary consequence ever leaves it possible to disbelieve, and in listening to which we are rightly said to walk by faith and not by sight.

I have quoted this at some length, because this passage sums up the Bishop's philosophy on the claims of religion upon us. Many times does he repeat, in fragments, what is here laid down as a whole, but this is the key to the whole position, and by this statement his arguments stand or fall. I need not perhaps say that I quite agree with the general line taken by the author; but, as in the case of his scientific statements, I should prefer to look at the matter in a somewhat different point of view.

First. There arises the question whether the spiritual world *does* stand in such violent contrast with the natural world. Now it seems to me that the voice of duty is, in one sense, like other voices which come to us from within or without. The perception of colour is as immediate and direct and absolute as the sense of right and wrong. The visual perception of blueness is primary and ultimate. We do not believe in blueness because of any observations or of any arguments; the perception is intuitive. And so the elementary perception of duty is primary, ultimate, and intuitive.

Second. The Bishop lays enormous stress upon the *universality* of the moral law. Thus he says (pp. 47, 48): "And along with this" (*i.e.* "the positive test" of "the sentiment of reverence") "there is a negative test by which we are perpetually to correct the other, namely, the test of universality. The moral law in its own nature admits of no exceptions. If a principle of action be derived from this law it has nothing to do with time, or place, or circumstances. It must hold in the distant future, in planets or stars utterly remote, as fully as it holds good now and here."

But is there not a mistake in claiming this universality as specially characteristic of the moral law? We believe that there is an eternal and necessary distinction between right and wrong; but so there is between truth and falsehood, love and hate, pleasure and pain. And besides, what it is my duty to do now and here, it might be my duty *not* to do under other circumstances. Duty is always the same in principle, but not in application. The very "evolution of religious knowledge," on which the Bishop dwells in Lecture V., if it be a fact, establishes this. That what it *is* my duty to do now and here, it *will always have been* my duty to have done now and here, is true, but so it is true that blueness will be always blueness anywhere and everywhere; and if a thing exist now and here, that this has been so will for ever be true. And we

do *not* practically use the test of universality. It is true we educate ourselves in the perception of moral law by various considerations; but, at any given crisis of a conflict between conscience and temptation, the voice of duty does not say "Do this, because it is always right," but "Do this because you ought to do it now." *The mood of duty is imperative, not infinitive.*

Third. The word "spiritual" is employed by the Bampton Lecturer in a different sense from that in which it is generally, perhaps universally, used in the New Testament. There it is contrasted with "natural;" it implies the belonging to a higher sphere of existence, which we can alone reach by a new birth. The spiritual and the moral are two different things. A man may be moral, and utterly unspiritual. If he be spiritual, he must indeed be moral, but he is also a great deal more than moral.

I feel bound to point out this important distinction, because it is not at all clear that the Bishop recognises it. I am far from saying that "the spiritual kingdom" is not the kingdom, as philosophers call it, of "things in themselves." For in the New Testament sense the spiritual is certainly closely connected with the true (ἀληθινὸς), is therefore opposed to the merely fleeting and phenomenal, and has therefore, I suppose, to do with "things in themselves." Yet surely the use of the word "spiritual," in a sense very different from that which has been fixed for it by the Bible, is, to say the least, quite as confusing and misleading as the extraordinarily varying use of the word "law" in scientific discussions. I have the greatest reverence for S. T. Coleridge's memory, but, bearing in mind what the New Testament says about the spiritual man in John iii., Romans viii., 1 Corinthians ii., xii., xiv., and xv., what are we to say of the quotation (p. 46): "'If there be aught spiritual in man,' says Coleridge, 'the will must be such. If there be a will, there must be a spirituality in man'"? Or again, can we agree with the following (p. 59)?—

Butler calls the spiritual faculty whose commands to us I have been examining, by the name of conscience: Kant calls it the practical reason.

Had I space, it would be tempting to discuss the statements on pp. 60-62 in which the word "spiritual" occurs; but I have already devoted so much to this point that I must pass on, only observing that, while by no means agreeing with all that Professor Drummond lays down in his "Natural Law in the Spiritual World," I yet entirely hold with him as to the distinction between moral and spiritual, and that we can enter the spiritual kingdom only by being regenerated. If we give up that, we must give up (I speak under correction) important Scriptural declarations.

It may seem that with so many serious (for, whether justifiable or not, they are certainly grave) objections to the lecturer's foundation statement, I must think it radically erroneous, if not untrue. But that is not the case, for I agree very largely with what is, after all, his most essential belief. And that is *the supremacy of the moral law.* There is a primary intuitive conviction within us that duty is duty, and that duty stands higher than any other consideration. Being a primary intuition, it cannot conflict with any other; but if it did, we simply could not help that being the case, for the conflict would be also primary. But, as I have already ventured to illustrate the perception of duty by the perception of colour, it may be asked, Where is the supremacy of duty? Well, we cannot make blueness to be other than blueness; and we cannot make duty cease to be duty. But we can, partially or wholly, blind our physical or our moral eyesight. And the supremacy of moral law consists in this, that while we may do right in sacrificing that which, considered alone, we are bound to keep and to improve, *e.g.*, our physical eyesight, we never can do right in sacrificing our moral eyesight; nay,

we are bound to the very utmost extent of our power to keep and improve it. And one cannot help noticing, as one says this, how one is compelled, in arguing *humanly*, to use words expressive of moral law. Whatever theories any reader of these remarks may have, he would feel himself unable to take rank with his fellow-men did he object to our using the phrases, "Do right," "Are bound."

I have said that the *supremacy of the moral law* is the most essential belief of the Bishop. Thus he says (pp. 31, 32), "The eternal moral law is, of all we know, the highest and holiest." "It is absolutely supreme, or it is nothing" (p. 52). And thus, as we ponder it, this eternal law is shown to be the very Eternal Himself, the Almighty God" (p. 57): and, "He does not make that law. He is that law. Almighty God and the moral law are different aspects of what is in itself one and the same" (p. 59).

Dr. Temple so much insists upon personality, that I imagine he only means that the most essential Name of the Almighty is "Holy, Holy, Holy;" and, if so, one important matter which he, in common with almost all writers on these subjects, appears to overlook is really included. He very frequently seems to almost identify the personal *ego* with the will: "The will is the man. It is the will that makes us responsible beings" (p. 46). And almost immediately after he adds:

> The will is not the whole spiritual faculty. Besides the power of willing, we have the power of recognising spiritual truth; and this power or faculty we commonly call the conscience. But the conscience is not a force. It has no power of acting except through the will. It receives and transmits the voice from the spiritual world, and the will is responsible so far as the conscience enlightens it. It is the will whereby the man takes his place in the world of phenomena.

Now, if the author uses the word *will* as simply equivalent to the permanent personal *ego*, I imagine he is right; but the word *will* is used by philosophers of very opposed schools—*e.g.*, Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Bain—in a different sense. The will is the active faculty in man's soul, as the heart (the emotions) is the passive faculty: the intellect standing midway. And what seems to be the real truth is, that "the man," *the permanent personal ego*—possessing *freewill* (which is not an energetic faculty, but the power of choosing or passing by what are energies) and a conscience which is the echo of the voice of the Eternal "Holy, Holy, Holy"—is thus able to deal with all that is subordinate, whether the lower forces of the outer natural world, or his own higher capacities and powers, or, highest of all, God's grace offered to him, but not forced upon him. Therefore he is able to weave his own character for good or for evil. He is free to listen to his conscience, or to refuse to listen. Hence he is responsible; and it is his responsibility, flowing from his possessing a conscience and freewill, which seems to constitute his essential likeness to God in the innermost shrine of his being.

If this view be correct—and I may, at any rate, say that I set it forth only because it seems the truest account of human nature *as it is*—then obedience to the moral law is shown to be much more than to energetically will what is right. That is only one part of our responsibility. We have to rightly deal with our emotions and our intellect, as well as with our will. We have to love the worthiest objects, and to think the truest thoughts, as well as to do the best actions. And our responsibility lies not so much at any given moment in loving a particular object, or in thinking a particular thought, or in acting in a particular way; for neither love, nor thought, nor action are at our disposal in this sudden, isolated fashion; but in the constant education of our emotions, intellect, and will by our ceaseless selection of that which is worthiest, truest, noblest.

I should not have ventured to dwell at such great length on what I deem

to be a true philosophy of human nature and of human responsibility, did I not believe that, while I am entirely at one with the Bishop in his root-principle, yet his principle needs clearer expression than he has given it. A fair test may perhaps be found in the very subject of these Bampton Lectures. The Bishop, like myself, accepts science as one of God's voices to us, yet we see that throughout he regards the attitude of science to be, in appearance at any rate, hostile to religion. But if we say that the moral law distinctly deals with our intellect, then it must really be the best director of science, which is nothing if it be not intellectual. And is it not so? Does not an enlightened conscience say in the name of God to the man of science, "It is your duty to hold and to proclaim the *uniformity* of nature, because you know it is true"? But then, does it not add, "It is your duty not to hold and not to proclaim the universality of uniformity, because you do not know it is true. You may believe in its universality as possible, or even probable, because the law of faith obtains in science as elsewhere. But you must allow the same faith to the theologian, and you must not allow your *faith* in a *possibility* or *probability* to oppose itself to what the theologian *knows certainly*, whether as to man's free will or God's interpositions, basing his knowledge on psychological and historical facts, as you base your knowledge on facts of observation and experiment"?

And to make use of an expression of Mr. Matthew Arnold's, the moral law calls upon us to exercise "intellectual seriousness," but it also,—and that is where Mr. Arnold's philosophy seems to be so utterly deficient, bids us exercise that much larger seriousness, *human* seriousness. The danger is not in our being intellectually serious, but in our not being humanly serious, *i.e.*, not making the noblest use of *all* our faculties. Reverence and virtue are as necessary as truth, and it is the glory of religion to combine all these, and thus to reign over science.

I have dwelt so long on these matters that it is necessary to recall the reader to the point where I left the regular path of our review of the Bampton Lectures, viz., the beginning of Lecture II. The Bishop says (p. 39) that we are told our knowledge is only relative. He meets that objection by showing that it is based on the tendency to unduly generalize, and he then proceeds to argue with admirable force on the inexpugnable conviction of personal identity. He shows that we use the word "same" in two very different senses, indistinguishable and identical. The latter notion is derived, he says, from our sense of personal identity; it is a primary notion. He condemns Mr. Herbert Spencer's attempt to explain the origin of this notion in his "First Principles" as utterly weak. This leads him on to enunciate his own view that the *will* is the man, and that the will is *spiritual*.

Dr. Temple tells us that "the voice within gives this command" (*i.e.*, "to live for a moral purpose, and believe in the ultimate supremacy of the moral over the physical") "in two forms: it commands our duty, and it commands our faith" (p. 47). Then, dealing with its first command, *duty*, he makes it to consist of the sentiment of reverence, the positive test, and that of universality, the negative test (which point I have already criticized unfavourably), and he then subdivides this duty under four heads.

His view of "the moral law as a faith" (p. 52) is that the inner voice not only commands obedience, but requires "us to believe that this moral law, which claims obedience from us, equally claims obedience from all else that exists. It is absolutely supreme or it is nothing. Its title to our obedience is its supremacy, and it has no other title." Now with the supremacy of the voice of conscience I emphatically agree. It is a primary characteristic of that voice that it claims supremacy. Our per-

ception of colour necessarily includes that of light. Our perception of duty as necessarily includes that of its supremacy. To deny the one is to be talking of something else than colour; to deny the other is to be talking of something else than duty.

The Bishop continues:

> The world before us is governed by uniformities, as far as we can judge; but above and behind all these uniformities is the supreme uniformity, the eternal law of right and wrong, and all other laws of whatever kind must ultimately be harmonized by it alone. The moral law would be itself unjust if it bade us disregard all physical laws, and yet was itself subordinate to those physical laws (p. 53).

This is a very fine and noble thought, and it is, after some necessary reiteration, applied to the hope of immortality; and to belief in "the very Eternal Himself, the Almighty God" (p. 57). For "in our very conception of a moral supremacy is involved the conception of an intended supremacy." Nothing in the volume is more worthy of study than this argument, and I say so with the more earnestness, because I am not as yet personally convinced as to the logical force of the argument. If I listen to the voice at all, I *must* listen to it as supreme over *me*; but I do not see that this necessarily involves my belief in its universal supremacy.

And yet I hold that the Bishop is right in his result; but why? Because science, in the widest sense of the word, is continually impressing upon us the unity of all that is. Man belongs to the physical world as well as to the moral, to the intellectual as well as to the spiritual, and he feels that he himself is one. Thus, that which I know to be supreme in me, is pronounced, in the name of science, to be supreme over the physical world. The argument is not against, but by, science. But we must add to this that Revelation leads to the same view, and that at an earlier stage. The supremacy of the moral law was, like the unity of nature, taught by Moses; but while the man who believes in God implicitly accepts both, it is science that has verified both. What religion, the mother, did with all the vital force of divine impulse, science, the daughter, has done with the reasoned evidence of human investigation.

After stating that his line of thought is that of Butler and Kant, and denying that the moral law can be brought under the dominion of science, the author lays down that "as the spiritual faculty is the recipient directly or indirectly of that original revelation which God has made of Himself to His rational creatures, so too this appears to be the only faculty which can take cognisance of any fresh revelation that it might please Him to make." "Such a revelation may be confirmed by signs or proofs in the world of phenomena" (p. 61). "But this always is, and must be, secondary. The spiritual faculty alone can receive and judge of spiritual truth; and if that faculty be not reached, a truly religious belief is not yet attained. External evidences of revealed religion must have a high place, but cannot have the highest" (p. 62). (I entirely agree with this subordination of physical to internal evidence.) The only criticism I offer on this, which evidently includes the subordination of miracles as evidences of Christianity, is that there is probably here the same apparent confusion as to the use of the word "spiritual" which I have already noted. The Bishop does not, indeed, say anything which would conflict with "Spiritual things are spiritually discerned," but I cannot help fancying that he might be disposed to interpret that thus, "Spiritual things are morally discerned." At any rate, there is nothing to show that he is now using "spiritual" in a different sense from that in which he used it before. But surely, as we have already seen, "moral" and "spiritual" do not mean the same thing. The spiritual world is not the moral world. The moral law cannot lay down laws as regards the

world of sense ; it cannot make the perception of blueness to be something else. Nor can it lay down laws as regards the spiritual world ; it cannot alter spiritual facts. But this is too large a subject to be treated here.

The lecture ends with one of the many noble passages in which the book abounds, showing how full the soul of the author is of intense belief in God and in holiness, and which, even if my criticisms of certain positions be just—and I am quite willing to believe I am mistaken—justify me in recommending it as worthy of the most careful, respectful, and sympathetic study.

C. LLOYD ENGSTRÖM.

Short Notices.

Essays, chiefly on Questions of Church and State, from 1850 *to* 1870. By A. P. STANLEY, D.D., late Dean of Westminster. New edition. John Murray.

MANY thoughtful Churchmen will be glad to make themselves acquainted, through a new edition (a cheap and handy volume), with Dean Stanley's Essays on Church and State ; and many who have already read them—all, or some of them—will find it a pleasure to attempt them now. Whatever else may be said of them, these two notes at least will be admitted : first, they are rich in bits of curious information and apt quotations ; second, they are eminently "readable." The Essays were collected and republished in 1870. First comes "The Gorham Controversy," *Edinburgh Review* (1850) ; *E. R.* articles on "Essays and Reviews" and "Ritualism," *Contemporary Review* papers, speeches in Convocation, and so forth, come after. The leading thought of the Essays is—"to maintain the advantages which flow from the Church as a national institution, comprehending the largest variety of religious life which it is possible practically to comprehend, and claiming the utmost elasticity which the 'will of our Lord Jesus Christ and the order of this realm'[1] will permit" (Preface, p. vi.). The characteristics of the highly cultured author's writings—he was more truly a scholar than a divine—are so well known that criticism in the present notice seems needless.

We may quote some sentences from two or three of the leading Essays. Thus, in "The Gorham Controversy" we read :

> In answer to the clamour against the anomaly of submitting spiritual causes to the judgment of a court of laymen, it is enough to reply that this anomlay, if anomaly it be, is the direct consequence of that theory—or, to speak more correctly, of that constitution of the relations of Church and State which has been the especial object of the praise of Cranmer, and Hooker, and Selden, and Burke, and Coleridge, and Arnold.

The judgment itself, wrote Mr. Stanley, is the best justification of the tribunal. "The correctness of the judgment may be left to fall or stand by its own merits. Its mode of procedure has been admirably vindicated by Archdeacon Hare. Its arguments have been triumphantly defended by Mr. Goode. Its conclusion has received, from the honourable confession of Mr. Maskell, a testimony in its favour which leaves nothing

[1] From the Ordination Service.