

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL
COMMENTARY
ON
THE NEW TESTAMENT.

BY
HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, TH.D.
OBERCONSISTORIALRATH, HANOVER.

From the German.

THE TRANSLATION REVISED AND EDITED, WITH THE SANCTION OF THE
AUTHOR, BY

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PART VII.
THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

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MDCCCLXXXIV.

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CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL
HANDBOOK
TO
THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

BY
HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, TH.D.
OBERCONSISTORIALRATH, HANOVER.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FIFTH EDITION OF THE GERMAN BY
G. H. VENABLES.

Second Edition.

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PREFATORY NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

OME account of the circumstances in which this translation has been undertaken, of the plan adopted in preparing it, and of the abbreviations used throughout, will be found prefixed to the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, which also contains a Preface specially written by Dr. Meyer for the English edition of his work.

It is unnecessary here to repeat the explanations there given except in so far as they concern the course which I have followed in presenting to the English reader Dr. Meyer's work without subtraction or addition. In reproducing so great a masterpiece of exegesis, I have not thought it proper to omit any part of its discussions or of its references—however little some of these may appear likely to be of interest or use to English scholars—because an author such as Dr. Meyer is entitled to expect that his work shall not be tampered with, and I have not felt myself at liberty to assume that the judgment of others as to the expediency of any omission would coincide with my own. Nor have I deemed it necessary to append any notes of dissent from, or of warning against, the views of Dr. Meyer, even where these are decidedly at variance with opinions which I hold. Strong representations were made to me that it was desirable to annex to certain passages notes designed to counteract their effect; but it is obvious that, if I had adopted this course in some instances, I should

have been held to accept or approve the author's views in other cases, where I had not inserted any such *caveat*. The book is intended for, and can in fact only be used with advantage by, the professional scholar. Its general exegetical excellence far outweighs its occasional doctrinal defects; and in issuing it without note or comment, I take for granted that the reader will use it, as he ought, with discrimination. The English commentaries of Bishop Ellicott, Dr. Lightfoot, and Dr. Eadie serve admirably from different points of view—philological, historical, doctrinal—to supplement and, when necessary, to correct it; as does also the American edition of the Commentary in Lange's *Bibelwerk*, translated and largely augmented under the superintendence of Dr. Schaff.

The translation of the present volume has been executed with care by Mr. Venables, and remains in substance his work; but, as I have revised it throughout and carried it through the press, it is only due to him that I should share the responsibility of the form in which it appears. In translating a work of this nature, the value of which mainly consists in the precision and subtlety of its exegesis, it is essential that there should be a close and careful reproduction of the form of the original; but, in looking over the sheets, I find not a few instances in which the desire to secure this fidelity has led to an undue retention of German idiom. This, I trust, may be less apparent in the volumes that follow.

In such a work it is difficult, even with great care, to avoid the occurrence of misprints, several of which have been observed by Mr. Venables and myself in glancing over the sheets. Minor errors, such as the occasional misplacing of accents, it has not been thought necessary formally to correct. We have taken the opportunity of correcting in the translation various misprints found in the original. The commentator referred to in the text as "Ambrose" (from his work on the Pauline Epistles being frequently printed with the works of that Father) ought to have been designated, as in the critical

notes, "Ambrosiaster," and is usually identified with Hilary the Deacon.

I subjoin a note of the exegetical literature of the Epistle, which may be found useful.

W. P. D.

GLASGOW COLLEGE, *May* 1873.

EXEGETICAL LITERATURE OF THE EPISTLE.

[For commentaries embracing the whole New Testament, see Preface to the Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew; for those which deal with the Pauline, or Apostolic, Epistles generally, see Preface to the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. The following list includes only those which concern the Epistle to the Galatians in particular, or in which that Epistle holds the first place on the title page. Works mainly of a popular or practical character have not in general been included, since, however valuable they may be on their own account, they have but little affinity with the strictly exegetical character of the present work. Monographs on chapters or sections are generally noticed by Meyer *in loc.* The reader will find a very valuable notice of the Patristic commentaries given by Dr. Lightfoot, p. 223 ff.]

- AKERSLOOT (Theodorus), Reformed minister in Holland: de Sendbrief van Paullus an de Galaten, 4to, Leyd. 1695; translated into German by Brussken. 4o, Bremen, 1699.
- AURIVILLIUS (Olaus): Animadversiones exegeticae et dogmatico-practicae in Epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas. 4o, Halae, 1702.
- BAGGE (Henry T. J.): St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, the text revised and illustrated by a commentary. 8o, Lond. 1857.
- BATTUS (Bartholomäus), Professor of Theology at Greifswald: Commentarii in Epistolam ad Galatas. 4o, Gryphisw. 1613.
- BAUMGARTEN (Sigmund Jakob), Professor of Theology at Halle: Auslegung der Briefe Pauli an die Galater, Ephes., Philipp., Coloss., Philem., und Thessal. (Mit Beyträgen von J. S. Semler). 4o, Halle, 1767.
- BETULEIUS (Matthäus): Epistola Pauli ad Galatas, paraphrasi et controversiarum explicatione illustrata. 8o, Halae Sax. 1617.
- BORGER (Elias Annes), Professor of Greek and History at Leyden: Interpretatio Epistolae Pauli ad Galatas. 8o, Leyd. 1807.
- BOSTON (Thomas), minister of Ettrick: A Paraphrase upon the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians [Works, vol. vi.]. 12o, Lond. 1853.

- BREITHAUPT (Joachim Justus), Professor of Theology at Halle: *Observationum ex Commentario Lutheri in Epistolam ad Galatas exercitationes* 10; in his "Miscellanea." 1558.
- BRENTZ (Johann), Provost at Stuttgart: *Explicatio Epistolae ad Galatas.* 1558.
- BROWN (John), D.D., Professor of Exegetical Theology to the United Presbyterian Church, Edinburgh: *An Exposition of the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians.* 8o, Edin. 1853.
- BUGENHAGEN (Johann), Professor of Theology at Wittenberg: *Adnotationes in Epistolas ad Gal., Eph., Philipp., Coloss., Thess., Timoth., Tit., Philem., et Hebraeos.* 8o, Basil. [1525] 1527.
- CAREY (Sir Stafford), M.A.: *The Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Galatians, with a paraphrase and introduction.* 12o, Lond. 1867.
- CARPZOV (Johann Benedict), Professor of Theology and Greek at Helmstädt: *Brief an die Galater übersetzt.* 8o, Helmstädt, 1794.
- CHANDLER (Samuel), minister in London: *A Paraphrase and notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians, . . . together with a critical and practical commentary on the two Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians.* 4o, Lond. 1777.
- CHEMNITZ (Christian), Professor of Theology at Jena: *Collegium theologicum super Epistolam ad Galatas.* 4o, Jenae, 1656.
- CHYTRAEUS [or KOCHHAFF] (David), Professor of Theology at Rostock: *Enarratio in Epistolam ad Galatas.* 8o, Francof. 1569.
- CLAUDIUS Taurinensis, Bishop of Turin, called also Altissiodorensis or Autissiodorensis: *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas* [in *Magn. Bibl. Vet. Patr.* ix.].
- COCCEJUS [or KOCH] (Johann), Professor of Theology at Leyden: *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas.* 4o, Lugd. Bat. 1665.
- CRELL (Johann), Socinian teacher at Racow: *Commentarius in Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas ex praelectionibus J. Crellii conscriptus a Jon. Schlichting.* 8o, Racov. 1628.
- EADIE (John), D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Exegesis to United Presbyterian Church, Glasgow: *A Commentary on the Greek text of the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians.* 8o, Edin. 1869.
- ELLICOTT (Charles John), D.D., Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol: *St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians; with a critical and grammatical commentary, and a revised translation.* 8vo, Lond. 1854. 4th edition corrected, 1867.
- ESMARCH (Heinrich Peter Christian): *Brief an die Galater übersetzt.* 8o, Flensb. 1784.

- FERGUSON (James), minister of Kilwinning, Ayrshire: A brief Exposition of the Epistles of Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians. 8o, Lond. 1659.
- FLATT (Johann Friedrich von), Professor of Theology at Tübingen: Vorlesungen über den Brief an die Galater und Epheser, herausgegeben von Ch. F. Kling. 8o, Tübing. 1828.
- FRITZSCHE (Karl Friedrich August), Professor of Theology at Rostock: Commentarius de nonnullis Epistolae ad Galatas locis. 3 partes. 4o, Rostoch. 1833-4 [and in Fritzschorum Opuscula].
- GRYNAEUS (Johann Jakob), Professor of Theology at Heidelberg: Analysis Epistolae ad Galatas. 4o, Basil. 1583.
- GWYNNE (G. J.): Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. 8o, Dubl. 1863.
- HALDANE (James Alexander), Edinburgh: An Exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians. 12o, Lond. 1848.
- HENSLER (Christian Gotthilf), Professor of Theology at Kiel: Der Brief an die Galater übersetzt mit Anmerkungen. 8o, Leip. 1805
- HERMANN (Johann Gottfried Jakob), Professor of Poetry at Leipzig: De Pauli Epistolae ad Galatas tribus primis capitibus. 8o, Lips. 1832.
- HILGENFELD (Adolf), Professor of Theology at Jena: Der Galaterbrief übersetzt, in seinen geschichtlichen Beziehungen untersucht und erklärt. . . . 8o, Leip. 1852.
- HOFMANN (Johann Christian Konrad von), Professor of Theology at Erlangen: Die Heilige Schrift neuen Testaments zusammenhängend untersucht. II. 1. Der Brief Pauli an die Galater. 8o, Nördlingen, 1863; 2te veränderte Auflage, 1872.
- HOLSTEN (Carl), Teacher in Gymnasium at Rostock: Inhalt und Gedankengang des Briefes an die Galater, 4to, Rostock 1859; also, Zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus. 8o, Rostock, 1868.
- JATHO (Georg Friedrich), Director of Gymnasium at Hildesheim: Pauli Brief an die Galater nach seinem inneren Gedankengange erläutert. 8o, Hildesheim 1856.
- KRAUSE (Friedrich August Wilhelm), Private Tutor at Vienna: Der Brief an die Galater übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen begleitet. 8o, Frankf. 1788.
- KROMAYER (Hieronymus), Professor of Theology at Leipzig: Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas 4o, Lips. 1670.
- KUNAD (Andreas), Professor of Theology at Wittenberg: Disputationes in Epistolam ad Galatas. 4o, Witteb. 1658.

- LIGHTFOOT (Joseph Barber), D.D., Professor of Divinity at Cambridge :
St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. A revised text, with introduction, notes, and dissertations.
8o, Lond. 1865. 3d edition, 1869.
- LOCKE (John), the philosopher: A Paraphrase and notes on the
Epistles to Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, and
Ephesians. 4o, Lond. 1733.
- LUSHINGTON (Thomas), M.A., Rector of Burnham-Westgate, Norfolk :
A Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [said to be
chiefly translated from Crell]. fol., Lond. 1650.
- LUTHER (Martin). In Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius
(brevior), 4to, Lips. 1519; ab auctore recognitus, 1523. In
Epist. P. ad Gal. Commentarius (major) ex praelectionibus
D. M. Lutheri collectus . . . a Luthero recognitus et casti-
gatus, 8vo, Viteb. 1535; jam denuo diligenter recognitus,
8vo, Viteb. 1538. Often reprinted; translated into English
in 1575, and often re-issued.
- LYSER [or LEYSER] (Polycarp), Professor of Theology at Wittenberg :
Analysis Epistolae ad Galatas. 4o, Witteb. 1586.
- MATTHIAS (G. W.), Co-rector of Gymnasium at Cassel: Der Galater-
brief griechisch und deutsch, nebst einer Erklärung seiner
schwierigen Stellen. 8o, Cassel, 1865.
- MATTHIES (Konrad Stephan), Professor of Theology at Greifswald :
Erklärung des Briefes Pauli an die Galater.
8o, Greifswald, 1833.
- MAYER (Ferdinand Gregorius), Professor of Greek at Vienna: Der
Brief Pauli an die Galater und der 2 Brief an die Thessalo-
nicher übersetzt mit Anmerkungen. 8o, Wien, 1788.
- MICHAELIS (Johann David), Professor of Philosophy at Göttingen :
Paraphrase und Anmerkungen über die Briefe Pauli an die
Galater, Ephes., Phil., Col., Thessal., Tim., Tit., Philem. 4o,
Bremen und Götting. 1750; 2te vermehrte Auflage, 1769.
- MOLDENHAWER (Johann Heinrich Daniel), pastor at Hamburg: Brief
an die Galater übersetzt. 8o, Hamb. 1773.
- MORUS (Samuel Friedrich Nathanael), Professor of Theology at Leipzig :
Acroases in Epistolas Paulinas ad Galatas et Ephesios.
8o, Leip. 1795.
- MUSCULUS [or MEUSSLIN] (Wolfgang), Professor of Theology at Berne :
In Epistolas Apostoli Pauli ad Galatas et Ephesios commen-
tariū. fol., Basil. 1561) 1569.
- PAREUS [or WAENGLER] (David), Professor of Theology at Heidel-
berg: In divinam S. Pauli ad Galatas Epistolam commen-
tarius. 4o, Heidelb. 1613.

- PAULUS (Heinrich Eberhard Georg), Professor of Theology at Heidelberg: *Des Apostel Paulus Lehrbriefe an die Galater und Römerchristen, wortgetreu übersetzt mit erläuternden Zwischensätzen, einem Überblick des Lehrinhalts und Bemerkungen über schwere Stellen.* 8o, Heidelb. 1831.
- PERKINS (William), minister at Cambridge: *A commentarie or exposition upon the five first chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians . . . Continued with a supplement upon the sixth chapter by Rodolfe Cudworth, B.D. [Works, vol. ii.].* 2o, Lond. 1609.
- PRIME (John), Fellow of New College, Oxford: *Exposition and observations upon St. Paul to the Galatians.* 8o, Oxf. 1587.
- REITHMAYR (Franz Xaver), R.C. Professor of Theology at Munich: *Commentar zum Briefe an die Galater.* 8o, München, 1865.
- RICCALTOUN (Robert), minister at Hobkirk: *Notes and Observations on the Epistle to the Galatians [Works, iii.].* 8o, Edin. 1771.
- ROLLOCK (Robert), Principal of University of Edinburgh: *Analysis logica in Epistolam ad Galatas.* 8o, Lond. 1602.
- RÜCKERT (Leopold Immanuel), Professor of Theology at Jena: *Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Galater.* 8o, Leip. 1833.
- SARDINOUX (Pierre-Auguste): *Commentaire sur l'épître aux Galates, précédé d'une introduction critique.* 8o, Valence, 1837.
- SCHAFF (Philip), D.D., Professor of Theology at New York: *An Introduction and comment on chapters i. ii. of the Epistle to the Galatians [in the Mercersburg Review, Jan. 1861].*
- SCHILLING (Johann Georg): *Versuch einer Uebersetzung des Briefes an die Galater, mit erklärenden Bemerkungen, nach Koppe.* 8o, Leip. 1792.
- SCHLICHTING (Jonas), Socinian minister at Racow. See Crell (Johann).
- SCHMID (Sebastian), Professor of Theology at Strassburg: *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas.* 4o, Kiloni, 1690.
- SCHMOLLER (Otto) of Urach, Württemberg: *Der Brief Pauli an die Galater theologisch-homiletisch bearbeitet [in Lange's Bibelwerk],* 8vo, Bielefeld 1862; 2te Auflage 1865. [Translated by C. C. Starbuck, A.M.; edited, with additions, by M. B. Riddle, D.D. 8o, New York and Edin. 1870.]
- SCHOTT (Heinrich August), Professor of Theology at Jena: *Epistolae Pauli ad Thessalonicenses et Galatas. Textum Graecum recognovit et commentario perpetuo illustravit H. A. Schott.* 8o, Leips. 1834.
- SCHÜTZE (Theodor Johann Abraham): *Scholia in Epistolam ad Galatas.* 4o, Gerae, 1734.

- SEMLER (Johann Salomon), Professor of Theology at Halle: *Paraphrasis Epistolae Pauli ad Galatas.* 8o, Halae, 1779.
- SERIPANDO (Girolamo), Cardinal: *Commentarius in Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas; ad nonnullas quaestiones ex textu Epistolae catholicae responsiones.* 8o, Antv. 1565.
- STOLBERG (Balthasar), Professor of Greek at Wittenberg: *Lectiones publicae in Epistolam ad Galatas.* 4o, Wittemb. 1667.
- STRUENSEE (Adam), pastor at Altona: *Erklärung des Briefes an die Galater.* 4o, Flensburg, 1764.
- TRANA (August Leopold): *Pauli ad Galatas Epistola. Exposuit, etc.* 8o, Gothob. 1857.
- TURNER (Samuel Hulbeart), D.D., Professor of Biblical Interpretation at New York: *The Epistle to the Galatians in Greek and English, with an analysis and exegetical commentary.* 8o, New York, 1856.
- USTERI (Leonhard), Professor of Theology at Berne: *Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Galater, nebst einer Beilage . . . und einigen Excursen.* 8o, Zürich, 1833.
- VICTORINUS (C. Marius), teacher of rhetoric at Rome about A.D. 360. *In Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas commentariorum libri duo* [in Mai's *Scrip. Vet. Nov. Coll.* iii. 2].
- WEBER (Michael), Professor of Theology at Halle: *Der Brief an die Galater uebersetzt, mit Anmerkungen.* 8o, Leip. 1778.
- WEISE (Friedrich), Professor of Theology at Helmstädt: *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas.* 4o, Helmst. 1705.
- WESSELIUS (Johannes), Professor of Theology at Leyden: *Commentarius analytico-exegeticus tam litteralis quam realis in Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas.* 4o, Lugd. Bat. 1750.
- WIESELER (Karl), Professor of Theology at Göttingen: *Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Galater, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Lehre und Geschichte des Apostels.* 8o, Götting. 1859.
- WINDISCHMANN (Friedrich), R.C. Professor of Theology at Munich: *Erklärung des Briefes an die Galater.* 8o, Mainz, 1843.
- WINER (Georg Benedict), Professor of Theology at Leipzig: *Pauli ad Galatas Epistola. Latine vertit et perpetua annotatione illustravit Dr. G. B. Winer.* 8o, Lips. 1821. *Editio quarta aucta et emendata*, 1859.
- ZACHARIAE (Gotthilf Traugott), Professor of Theology at Kiel: *Paraphrastische Erklärung der Briefe Pauli an die Galater, Ephes., Phil., Col., und Thess.* 8o, Götting. [1771] 1787.

P R E F A C E.



SINCE the days of Luther, who, as is well known, bestowed more especial and repeated labour on the exposition of this than of any other book of the New Testament, the Epistle to the Galatians has always been held in high esteem as the Gospel's banner of freedom. To it, and to the kindred Epistle to the Romans, we owe most directly the springing up and development of the ideas and energies of the Reformation, which have overcome the work-righteousness of Romanism with all the superstition and unbelief accompanying it, and which will in the future, by virtue of their divine life once set free, overcome all fresh resistance till they achieve complete victory. This may be affirmed even of our present position towards Rome. For, if Paul by this Epistle introduces us into the very arena of his victory; if he makes us witnesses of his not yielding, even for an hour, to the false brethren; if he bids us hear how he confronts even his gravely erring fellow-apostle with the unbending standard of divinely-revealed truth; if he breaks all the spell of hypocrisy and error by which the foolish Galatians were bound, and in the clear power of the Holy Spirit brilliantly vindicates what no angel from heaven could with impunity have assailed; how should that doctrine, which at this moment the sorely beset old man in the chair of the fallible Peter proposes to invest with the halo of divine sanction,—how should the *ἑτέρον εὐαγγέλιον* from Rome, which it is now sought to push to the extremity of the most flagrant *contradictio in adjecto*—possibly issue in any other final result

than an accelerated process of self-dissolution? It is, in fact, the profoundly sad destiny which a blinded and obdurate hierarchy must, doubtless amidst unspeakable moral harm, fulfil, that it should be always digging further and further at its own grave, till it at length—and now the goal seems approaching, when these dead are to bury their dead—with the last stroke of the spade shall sink into that grave, to rise no more.

The Epistle to the Galatians carries us back to that first Council of the Church, which at its parting could present to the world the simple and true self-witness: *ἔδοξε τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι καὶ ἡμῖν*. How deep a shadow of contrast this throws not merely on the Vatican Fathers, but also—we cannot conceal it—on our own Synods, when their proceedings are pervaded by a zeal which, carried away by carnal aims, forfeits the simplicity, clearness, and wisdom of the Holy Spirit! Under such circumstances the Spirit is silent, and no longer bears His witness to the conscience; and instead of the blessing of synodal church-life,—so much hoped for, and so much subjected to question,—we meet with decrees, which are mere compromises of human minds very much opposed to each other,—agreements, over which such a giving the right hand of holy fellowship as we read of in this letter (ii. 9) would be a thing impossible.

In issuing for the fifth time (the fourth edition having appeared in 1862) my exposition of this Epistle, so transcendently important alike in its doctrinal and historical bearings, I need hardly say that I have diligently endeavoured to do my duty regarding it. I have sought to improve it throughout, and to render it more complete, in accordance with its design; and, while doing so, I have striven after a clearness and definiteness of expression, which should have nothing in common with the miserable twilight-haze and intentional concealment of meaning that characterize the selection of theological language in the present day. If I have been pretty often under the necessity of opposing the more recent

expositors of the Epistle or of its individual sections, I need hardly give an assurance that I, on my part, am open to, and grateful for, any contradiction, provided only some true light is elicited thereby. Even if that opposition should come from the energies of youth, which cannot yet have attained their full exegetical maturity, I gladly adopt the language of the tragedian (Aeschyl. *Agam.* 583 f.):

Νικώμινος λόγοισιν οὐκ ἀναίνομαι
'Αὐτὸ γὰρ ἤβη τοῖς γέρονσιν εὖ μαθεῖν.

DR. MEYER.

HANNOVER, 18th June 1870.

THE
EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE GALATIANS.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. I.—THE GALATIANS.



THE region of *Galatia*, or *Gallograecia* (see generally Strabo, xii. 5), bounded by Paphlagonia, Pontus, Cappadocia, and Bithynia, and having as its chief cities Ancyra, Pessinus, and Tavium, derived its name from the *Gauls* (*Γαλάται*, which is only a later form of the original *Κελτοί* or *Κέλται*, Pausan. i. 3, 5). For the *Gallic* tribes of the *Τροκμοί* and *Τολιστοβόγοι* (Strabo, *l.c.* p. 566),—in conjunction with the Germanic¹ tribe of the Tectosages, which, according to Strabo, was akin to them in language (Caes. *B. Gall.* vi. 24; Memnon in Phot. cod. 224, p. 374),—after invading and devastating Macedonia and Greece (Justin. xxiv. 4) about 280 B.C., and establishing in Thrace the kingdom of Tyle (Polyb. iv. 45 f.), migrated thence under the leadership of Leonorius and Lotharius to Asia, where they received a territory from the Bithynian king Nicomedes for their services in war. This territory they soon enlarged by predatory expe-

¹ This serves to explain Jerome's statement, based on personal experience (*Prol. in libr. secund. comment. in ep. ad Gal.*), that the popular language, which in his time was still spoken by the Galatians along with Greek, was almost the same (*eandem paene*) with that of the *Treviri*. Now the *Treviri* were Germans (Strabo, iv. p. 194), and "circa affectationem Germanicae originis ultro ambitiosi" (Tacit. *Germ.* 28). Comp. Jablonski, *de lingua Lycaon.* p. 23. See, generally, Diefenbach, *Celtica*, Stuttg. 1839 f.; Rettberg, *Kirchengesch. Deutschl.* i. p. 19 ff. The two last, without adequate grounds, call in question the Germanic nationality of the Galatians. See, on the other side, Wieseler, p. 524 ff., and in Herzog's *Encykl.* XIX. p. 524. The conversion of the Galatians is the beginning of *German Church-history*.

ditions (Liv. xxxviii. 16; Flor. ii. 11; Justin. xxv. 2; Strabo, iv. p. 187, xii. p. 566); although by Attalus, king of Pergamus, who conquered them, it was restricted to the fertile region of the Halys (Strabo, xii. p. 567; Liv. xxxviii. 16). This powerful, dreaded (Polyb. v. 53; 2 Macc. viii. 20), and freedom-loving (Flor. ii. 11) people, were brought into subjection to the Romans by the consul Cn. Manlius Vulso, 189 B.C. (Liv. xxxviii. 12 ff.); but they still for a long time retained both their Celtic cantonal constitution and their own tetrarchs (Strabo, xii. pp. 541, 567), who subsequently bore the title of king (Cic. *p. rege Deiotaro*; Vellei. ii. 84; Appian, v. p. 1135; Plut. *Ant.* 61). The last of these kings, Amyntas (put to death 26 B.C.), owed it to the favour of Antonius and Augustus that Pisidia and parts of Lycaonia¹ and of Pamphylia were added to his territory (Dio Cass. xlix. 32, liii. 26; Strabo, xii. p. 569). In the year 26 Galatia, as enlarged under Amyntas, became a Roman province (Dio Cass. liii. 26; Strabo, xii. p. 569). See generally, in addition to the Commentaries and Introductions, Wernsdorf, *de republ. Galatar.*, Norimb. 1743; Hoffmann, *Introd. theol. crit. in lect. ep. P. ad Gal. et Col.*, Lips. 1750; Schulze, *de Galatis*, Francof. 1756; Mynster, *Einl. in d. Brief an d. Gal.*, in his *kl. theol. Schr.*, Kopenh. 1825, p. 49 ff.; Hermes, *rerum Galaticar. specimen*, Vratisl. 1822; Baumstark, in Pauly's *Realencykl.* III. p. 604 ff.; Rüetschi, in Herzog's *Encykl.* IV. p. 637 f.; Contzen, *Wanderungen der Celten*, Leip. 1861.

On account of the additional territories thus annexed to Galatia proper under Amyntas, it has been maintained that the readers of this epistle are not to be looked upon as the Galatians proper, but as the *new Galatians*, that is, *Lycaonians* (especially the Christians of *Derbe* and *Lystra*) and *Pisidians* (Joh. Joach. Schmidt (in Michaelis); Mynster, *l.c.* p. 58 ff.; Niemeyer, *de temp. quo ep. ad Gal. etc.*, Gött. 1827; Paulus, in the *Heidelb. Jahrb.* 1827, p. 636 ff., and *Lehrbriefe an d. Gal. u. Röm.* p. 25 ff.; Ulrich, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1836, ii.; Böttger, *Beitr.* 1 and 3; Thiersch, *Kirche im apost. Zeitalt.* p. 124). But this view is decisively opposed both by the

¹ Not the whole of Lycaonia, particularly not the south-eastern portion and Iconium. See Rückert, *Magaz.* I. p. 98 ff.

language of Acts (xiv. 6, comp. with xvi. 6, xviii. 23), in which the universally current popular mode of designation, not based on the new provincial arrangements, is employed; and also by the circumstance that Paul could not have expressed himself (Gal. i. 2) in a more singular and indefinite way than by ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Γαλατίας, if he had *not* meant Galatia proper, the old Galatia. Nor are any passages found in Greek authors, in which districts of Lycaonia or Pisidia are designated, in accordance with that extension of the limits of the province, by the name of Galatia. See Rückert, *Magaz.* I. p. 105 f.; Anger, *de ratione temp.* p. 132 ff.; Wieseler, *Chronol. d. apost. Zeitalt.* p. 281 f, and on *Gal.* p. 530 ff.

The founder of the Galatian churches was Paul himself (Gal. i. 6–8, iv. 13 ff.) on his second missionary journey, Acts xvi. 6 (not so early as xiv. 6). Bodily weakness (iv. 13) had compelled him to make a halt in Galatia, and during his stay he planted Christianity there. Looking at the involuntary character of this occasion and the unknown nature of the locality to which his first work in the country was thus, as it were, accidentally directed, it might appear doubtful whether in this case he followed his usual rule, as attested in Acts, of commencing his work of conversion with the Jews; but we must assume that he did so,¹ for the simple reason that he would be sure to seek the shelter and nursing, which in sickness he needed, in the house of one of his own nation: comp. on iv. 14. Nor was there any want of Jewish residents, possibly in considerable numbers, in Galatia (as we may with reason infer from Joseph. *Antt.* xii. 3. 4, xvi. 6. 2, as well as from the diffusion of the Jews over Asia generally; not, however, from 1 Pet. i. 1); although from the epistle itself it is evident (see sec. 2) that the larger part, indeed the great majority, of its readers (not the whole, as Hilgenfeld thinks; comp. Hofmann) consisted of *Gentile Christians*. The arguments from the Old Testament (together with a partially rabbinical mode of interpretation), which Paul nevertheless employs, were partly based on the necessary course of the apostolic

¹ As also Neander, de Wette, Wieseler, and most others assume, in opposition, however, to Schneckenburger (*Zweck d. Apostelgesch.* p. 104), Baur, and Hilgenfeld.

preaching which had to announce Christ as the fulfilment of Old Testament promises, as well as on the acquaintance with the Old Testament which was to be presupposed in all Christian churches (comp. on iv. 21); partly suggested to the apostle by the special subject itself which was in question (see sec. 2); partly justified, and indeed rendered necessary, by the fact that the apostle—who must, at any rate, have taken notice of the antagonistic *teachers* and the means of warding off their attack—had to do with churches which had already for a time been worked upon by Judaists and had thus been sufficiently introduced to a knowledge of the Old Testament. The supposition of Storr, Mynster (*l.c.* p. 76), and Credner, that great part of the Galatian Christians had been previously proselytes of the gate, appears thus to be unnecessary, and is destitute of proof from the epistle itself, and indeed opposed to its expressions; see on iv. 9.

SEC. II.—OCCASION, OBJECT, AND CONTENTS OF THE EPISTLE.

Judaizing Christian teachers with Pharisaic leanings (comp. Acts xvi. 1)—emissaries from Palestine (not unbelieving Jews; Michaelis, *Einl.*)—had made their appearance among the Galatian churches after Paul, and with their attacks upon his apostolic dignity (i. 1, 11, ii. 14), and their assertion of the necessity of circumcision for Christians (v. 2, 11, 12, vi. 12 f.), which involved as a necessary consequence the obligation of the whole law (v. 3), had found but too ready a hearing, so that the Judaizing tendency was on the point of getting the upper hand (i. 6, iii. 1, 3, iv. 9 ff., 21, v. 2 ff., 7). Now the question is, whether these anti-Pauline teachers—who, however, are not, on account of v. 12, vi. 13, to be considered either wholly or in part as proselytes (Neander, Schott, de Wette; see, on the other hand, Hilgenfeld, p. 46 f.)—made their appearance *before* (Credner, Rückert, Schott, Hilgenfeld, Reuss, Wieseler, and others), or not till *after* (Neander, de Wette, Hofmann, and others), the second visit of the apostle (Acts xviii. 23; see sec. 3). From i. 6, iii. 1, it is evident that Paul now for the first time has to do with the church as actually *perverted*; he is surprised and warmly indignant at

what had taken place. Nevertheless it is evident, from i. 9, v. 3, iv. 16, that he had already spoken personally in Galatia against Judaizing perversion, and that with great earnestness. We must therefore assume that, when Paul was among the Galatians for the second time, the danger was only *threatening*, but there already existed an *inclination* to yield to it, and his language against it was consequently of a *warning* and *precautionary* nature. It was only after the apostle's departure that the false teachers *set to work* with their perversions; and although they did not get so far as circumcision (see on iv. 10), still they met with so much success,¹ and caused so much disturbance of peace (v. 15), that the accounts came upon him with all the surprise which he indicates in i. 6, iii. 1. Comp. also Ewald, p. 54; Lechler, *apost. Zeitalt.* p. 383.

In accordance with this state of things which gave occasion to the letter, it was the *object* of Paul to defend in it his apostolic authority, and to bring his readers to a triumphant conviction of the freedom of the Christian from circumcision and the Mosaic law through the justification arising from God's grace in Christ. But we are not entitled to assume that "in the liveliness of his zeal he represented the matter as too dangerous" (de Wette); the more especially as it involved the most vital question of Pauline Christianity, and along with it also the whole personal function and position of the apostle, who was divinely conscious of the truth of his gospel, and therefore must not be judged, in relation to his opponents, according to the usual standard of "party against party."²

As regards *contents*, (1) the apologetico-dogmatic portion of the epistle divides itself into two branches: (a) the defence of the apostolic standing and dignity of Paul, ch. i. and ii., in connection with which the foundation of Christian freedom is also set forth in ii. 15–21; (b) the proof that the Christian, through God's grace in Christ, is independent of circumcision and Mosaism, ch. iii. and iv. Next, (2) in the hortatory portion, the readers are encouraged to hold fast to their Christian

¹ To the extent, at any rate, of an observance of the Jewish feast-days and seasons (iv. 10).

² Baur, *Paulus*, I. p. 282, ed. 2.

freedom, but also not to misuse it, ch. v. Then follow other general exhortations, ch. vi. 1-10; and finally an energetic autograph warning against the seducers (vi. 11-16), and the conclusion. The idea that the epistle is the *reply* to a *letter* of information and inquiry *from the church* (Hofmann), is neither based on any direct evidence in the epistle itself (how wholly different is the case with 1 Cor. !), nor indirectly suggested by particular passages (not even by iv. 12); and such an assumption is by no means necessary for understanding the course and arguments of the epistle.

SEC. III.—TIME AND PLACE OF COMPOSITION—GENUINENESS.

The date of composition may be gathered from iv. 13, compared with Acts xvi. 6, xviii. 23. From *εὐηγγελισάμην ὑμῖν τὸ πρότερον*, iv. 13, it is most distinctly evident that, when Paul wrote, he had already twice visited Galatia and had preached the gospel there. The constant use of *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* to denote *oral* preaching precludes us from taking (with Grotius, and Keil, *Anal.* IV. 2, p. 70) *τὸ πρότερον* as said with relation to his present *written* instruction. Those, therefore, are certainly in error, who assume that the epistle was composed after the *first* visit of the apostle, whether this first visit be placed correctly at Acts xvi. 6 (Michaelis) or erroneously at Acts xiv. 6 (Keil). As regards the latter, Keil has indeed asserted that in ch. i. and ii. Paul continues his history only down to his second journey to Jerusalem, Acts xi. 30; that he does not mention the apostolic conference and decree, Acts xv. (comp. also Ulrich, *l.c.*); and that in this epistle his judgment of Mosaism is more severe than after that conference. But the journey, ii. 1, is identical with that of Acts xv. (see the commentary); his omission to mention the apostolic conference and decree¹ is necessarily connected with the self-subsistent position—wholly independent of the authority of all the other apostles, and indeed recognised by the “pillars”

¹ Against the opinion that the unhistorical character of the narrative of the apostolic council and decree may be inferred from our epistle (Baur, Schweigler, Zeller, Hilgenfeld), see on Acts xv. 15f. The Tübingen school believe that in this epistle they have found “the Archimedean point of their task” (Hilgenfeld, in the *Zeitschrift f. histor. Theol.* 1855, p. 484).

themselves (ii. 9 f.)—which Paul claimed for himself on principle in opposition to Judaizing efforts. Therefore neither in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (viii. 1 ff., x. 23 ff.), nor in that to the Romans (ch. xiv.), nor anywhere else, does he take any notice of the Jerusalem decree.¹ Assured of his own apostolic independence as a minister of Christ directly called and furnished with the revelation of the gospel for the Gentile world in particular, he has never, in any point of doctrine, cited in his favour the authority of other apostles or decrees of the church; and he was least likely to do so when, as in the present case, the matter at stake was a question not merely affecting some point of church-order, but concerning the deepest principles of the plan of salvation.² Moreover, the first three injunctions of that decree in particular (Acts xv. 29) agree so little with the principle of full Christian liberty, consistently upheld in the letters of the apostle, that we must suppose the decree to have speedily—with his further official experience acquired after the council—lost altogether for him its provisional obligation. It is, further, a mistake to apply ἡ περίχωρος, Acts xiv. 6, to Galatia, as, besides Keil, also Koppe, Borger, Niemeyer, Mynster, Paulus, Böttger, and others, have done; for this περίχωρος can only be the country round Lystra and Derbe, and it is quite inadmissible to transfer the name to the Lycaonian region (see sec. 1). Lastly, in order to prove a very early composition of the letter, soon after the conversion of the readers, appeal has been made to οὕτω ταχέως, i. 6, but without due exegetical grounds (see the commentary); and indeed the mention of Barnabas in ii. 13 ought not to have been adduced (Koppe), for a *personal* acquaintance of the readers with him (which they must certainly have made before Acts xv. 39) is not at all expressed in it. If, in accordance with all these considerations, the epistle was *not* written after the first visit to Galatia,—a date also inconsistent

¹ This *uniform* silence as to the decree in *all* the epistles shows that that silence in *our* epistle must not be explained either by the presumed *acquaintance* of the Galatians with it (Schaff, p. 182), or by the idea that the apostle was unwilling to supply his opponents with any *weapon* against him (Ebrard).

² “His word as Christ’s apostle for the Gentiles must be decree enough for them” (Thiersch, *Kirche im apost. Zeitalt.* p. 130. See also Wieseler, in Herzog’s *Encykl.* XIX. p. 528).

with the fact that its contents presuppose a church-life already developed, and an influence of the false teachers which had already been some time at work—and if the first visit of the apostle is to be placed, not at Acts xiv. 6, but at Acts xvi. 6,¹ followed by the second visit *confirming* the churches, Acts xviii. 23, then most modern expositors, following the earlier, are right in their conclusion that *the epistle was not composed until after* Acts xviii. 23. So Bertholdt, Eichhorn, Hug, de Wette, Winer, Hensen, Neander, Usteri, Schott, Rückert, Anger, Credner, Guericke, Olshausen, Wieseler, Reuss, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Bleek, Hofmann, and others. We must reject the views, which place the date of composition *between* Acts xvi. 6 and Acts xviii. 23, as maintained by Grotius (on i. 2), Baumgarten, Semler (on *Baumg.* p. 895, not in the *Paraphr.*), Michaelis, Koppe, Storr, Borger, Schmidt, Mynster, or which carry the epistle back to a date even *before the apostolic conference*, as held by Beza, Calvin, Keil, Niemeyer, Paulus,² Böttger,³ Ulrich.

As we cannot gather from the relative expression *οὐτω ταχέως* (i. 6) *how soon* after Acts xviii. 23 the epistle was composed, the *year* of its composition cannot be stated more precisely than (see Introd. to Acts) as about 56 or 57.⁴ *Ephesus*

¹ It has been objected, indeed, that on this journey Paul only *confirmed* the churches, which presupposes an earlier conversion (Acts xv. 36 ff., xvi. 5). But Acts xvi. 6 begins a new stage in the historical narrative, and Phrygia and Galatia are *separated* from those places to which the *confirming* ministry referred. Nor is it to be said that in Acts xvi. 6 Paul was withheld by the Spirit from preaching in Galatia. For the hindrance by the Spirit affected not Galatia, but the regions along the coast of Asia Minor. See on Acts xvi. 6.

² According to Paulus, the apostle wrote to the *New-Galatians* (see sec. 1), whom he converted at Acts xiv. 6 and visited for the second time (Gal. iv. 13) at Acts xiv. 21.

³ According to Böttger (*Beitr.* 3, § 1–11), the epistle is addressed to the *New-Galatians* (Lycaonians and Pisidians), and was written in the year 51, after the first missionary journey of the apostle. Böttger has repeated Keil's arguments, and has added fresh ones, which are untenable. See their copious refutation by Rückert, *Magaz.* I. p. 112 ff.

⁴ From the remarkable difference in the positions which have been assigned to our letter in the history of the apostle,—Marcion (in Tertull. *c. Marc.* 5, and in Epiph. *Hær.* xlii. 9), and subsequently Michaelis, Baumgarten, Koppe, Schmidt, Keil, Mynster, Niemeyer, Paulus, Ulrich, making it the very *first*, and Schrader and Köhler the very *last*, of the Pauline epistles,—it was natural that the *year* of composition should be fixed at the most various dates, even apart

appears to be the *place* from which it was written; for Paul proceeded thither after his second labours in Galatia (Acts xix. 1). So Theophylact, Oecumenius, Erasmus, and most modern expositors. Rückert, however, following Hug, maintains that Paul wrote his epistle *very soon* after his departure from Galatia, probably even on the *journey* to Ephesus; but, on the other hand, the passage iv. 18 indicates that after the apostle's departure the Judaists had perverted the churches which he had warned and confirmed, and some measure of time must have been required for this, although the perversion appears still so recent that there is no adequate reason for postponing the composition of the epistle to the sojourn of the apostle at Corinth, Acts xx. 3 (Bleek conjecturally).

The usual subscription, which is given by the old codd. B***, K, L, says *ἐγράφη ἀπὸ Πώμης*; and Jerome, Theodoret, Euthalius, and the Syrian church, as afterwards Baronius, Flacius, Salmasius, Estius, Calovius, and others, held this opinion, which arose simply from a misunderstanding of iv. 20, vi. 11, and especially vi. 17, and was quite unwarrantably supported by ii. 10 (comp. with Rom. xv. 28). Nevertheless, recently Schrader (i. p. 216 ff.) and Köhler (*Abfassungzeit der epistol. Schriften*, p. 125 ff.), the latter of whom exceeds the former in caprice, again date the epistle from Rome. For the refutation of which their arguments are not worthy, see Schott, *Erörterung*, pp. 63 ff., 41 ff., 116 ff.; Usteri, p. 222 ff.

The *genuineness* is established by external testimony (Iren. *Haer.* iii. 6. 5, iii. 7. 2, iii. 16. 3, v. 21. 1; Tatian, in Jerome; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iii. p. 468, ed. Sylb.; Tertull. *de praescr.* 6, *et al.*; *Canon Murat.*, Valentinus in Irenaeus, Marcion)—although the apostolic Fathers contain no trace in any measure certain, and Justin's writings only a probable trace, of the letter¹—as

from the differences of reckoning as to the Pauline chronology. In consequence of this divergence of opinion as to its historical position, the *statements as to the place of composition* have necessarily been very various (Troas, Corinth, Antioch, Ephesus, Rome).

¹ Even in Polycarp, *Phil.* 5, comp. Gal. vi. 7, there may be a quite accidental similarity of expression. Lardner appealed to Clem. *ad Cor.* i. 49; Ignat. *ad Philad.* 1, *ad Magnes.* 8; Just. Mart. *ad Graec.* p. 40, ed. Colon, and discovered in these passages allusions to Gal. i. 4, i. 1, v. 4, iv. 12. There appears to be an actual allusion to this last passage in Justin, where it runs: *γινώσκῃς ὡς*

well as by the completely and vividly Pauline cast of the writer's spirit and language. It is thus so firmly established, that, except by Bruno Bauer's wanton "*Kritik*" (1850), it has never been, and never can be, doubted. The numerous *interpolations* which, according to Weisse (*Beiträge zur Krit. d. Paulin. Briefe*, edited by Sulze, 1867, p. 19 ff.), the apostolic text has undergone, depend entirely on a subjective criticism of the style, conducted with an utter disregard of external critical testimony.

ἰγὰρ ὅτι καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὡς ὑμεῖς. The probability of this is increased by the fact that Justin soon afterwards uses the words, ἰχθῦραι, ἱριεῖς, ζῆλotes, ἐριθεῖαι, εὐμοί, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις, which look like an echo of Gal. v. 20 f.

Παύλου ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Γαλάτας.

A B K \aleph , and many min., also Copt., give simply *πρὸς Γαλάτας*, which—doubtless the earliest superscription—is adopted by Lachm. and Tisch.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 3. *ἡμῶν*] is wanting only in min., Damasc. Aug. (once); whilst A, min., Copt. Arm. Vulg. ms. Chrys. Ambrosiast. Pel. Ambr. (once), Fulg. place it after *πατρός*. But as in the other epistolary salutations there is no *ἡμῶν* after *κυρίου*, it was sometimes omitted, sometimes moved to the position, which it holds in the other epistles, after *πατρός* (Rom. i. 7; 1 Cor. i. 3; 2 Cor. i. 2, *et al.*). — Ver. 4. *περί*] Elz. has *ὑπέρ*, in opposition to A D E F G K L \aleph , and many min., also Or. Theophyl. Oec. This external evidence is decisive, although Paul has written *ὑπέρ τ. ἀμαρτ.* only in 1 Cor. xv. 3. — Ver. 6. *Χριστοῦ*] is wanting in F G, Boern. Tert. (twice), Cypr. (twice), Lucif. Victorin. But with the erroneous (although very ancient) connection of *Χριστοῦ* with *καλέσαντος*, *Χριστοῦ*, since the *καλεῖν* is *God's*, could not but give offence; and hence in 7, 43, 52, *et al.*, Theodoret, Or., it is changed for *Θεοῦ*. — Ver. 10. *εἰ ἔτι*] Elz. Scholz, Tisch. have *εἰ γὰρ ἔτι*. But *γὰρ* is wanting in A B D* F G \aleph , min., Copt. Arm. Vulg. It. Cyr. Damasc. and Latin Fathers, and has been inserted for the sake of connection. — Ver. 11. Instead of *δέ*, B D* F G \aleph^{**} , 17, 213, It. Vulg. and Fathers have *γάρ*. The latter has mechanically crept in from the use of the same word before and after (vv. 10, 12). \aleph^{***} has restored *δέ*. — Ver. 12. Instead of *οὕτε*, A D* F G \aleph , min., and Greek Fathers have *οὕδέ*. So Lachm. A mechanical error of copying after the previous *οὕδέ*. — Ver. 15. *ὁ Θεός*] after *εὐδοκ.* is wanting in B F G, 20, and many vss. and Fathers. Bracketed by Lachm. and Schott; deleted by Tisch.; rejected justly also by Ewald and Wieseler. An explanatory addition. — Ver. 17. *ἀνῆλθον*] B D E F G, 46, 74, Syr. Syr. p. (in the margin), Bas., have *ἀπῆλθον*. So Lachm. and Schott. Certainly *ἀνῆλθον* has the appearance of interpolation, suggested as well by the direction of the journey (comp. *ἀναβαίνειν εἰς*

'Ἰεροσολ.) as by ver. 18. — Ver. 18. Πέτρον] A B s, min., Syr. Epp. Copt. Sahid. Aeth. Syr. p. (in the margin) have Κηφᾶν. Approved of by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. Scholz, Schott, Tisch. Justly; the Hebrew name, both here and also in ii. 9, 11, 14, was supplanted by the Greek as a gloss; hence in ii. 7, 8, where Paul himself wrote the *Greek* name, the variation Κηφᾶς does not occur. We must not assume that the reading Κηφᾶν arose through several Fathers, like Clem. Al. in Eus. i. 12, being unwilling to refer the unfavourable account in ii. 11 ff. to the *Apostle* Peter (Winer), because otherwise the Hebrew name would only have been used from ii. 11 onwards.

CONTENTS.—After the apostolic address and salutation (vv. 1–5), Paul immediately expresses his astonishment that his readers are so soon falling away to a false gospel; against the preachers of which he utters his anathema, for he seeks to please God, and not men (vv. 6–10). Next, he assures them that his gospel is not of men, for he had not received it from any man, but Christ had revealed it to him (vv. 11, 12). In order to confirm this historically, he appeals to his pre-Christian activity in persecution and to his Jewish zeal at that time (vv. 13, 14), and gives an exact account of his journeys and abodes from his conversion down to his formal acknowledgment on the part of the original apostles; from which it must be evident that he could be no disciple of the apostles (vv. 15–24).

Ver. 1. 'Απόστολος οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.] Thus does Paul, with deliberate incisiveness and careful definition, bring into prominence at the very head of his epistle his (in the strictest sense) apostolic dignity, because doubt had been thrown on it by his opponents in Galatia. For by οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων he denies that his apostleship *proceeded* from men (*causa remotior*), and by οὐδὲ δι' ἄνθρ. that it *came by means of* a man (*causa medians*). It was neither of human *origin*, nor was a man the *medium* of conveying it. Comp. Bernhardt, pp. 222, 236; Winer, p. 390 [E. T. 521]. On ἀπό, comp. also Rom. xiii. 1. To disregard the diversity of meaning in the two prepositions (Semler, Morus, Koppe, and others), although even Usteri is inclined to this view ("Paul meant to say that *in no respect* did his office depend on human authority"), is all the more arbitrary, seeing that, while the two

negatives very definitely separate the two relations, these two relations cannot be expressed by the mere change of number (Koppe, "non hominum, ne cujusquam quidem hominis;" comp. Bengel, Semler, Morus, Rosenmüller). This in itself would be but a feeble amplification of the thought, and in order to be intelligible, would need to be more distinctly indicated (perhaps by the addition of πολλῶν and ἐνός), for otherwise the readers would not have their attention drawn off from the difference of the *prepositions*. Paul has on the second occasion written not ἀνθρώπων again, but ἀνθρώπου, because the contrast to δι' ἀνθρώπου is διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. It was not a *man*, but the exalted *Christ*, through whom the divine call to the apostleship came to Paul at Damascus; αὐτὸς ὁ δεσπότης οὐρανόθεν ἐκάλεσεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ χρησάμενος ὑπουργῷ, Theodoret. And this contrast is quite just: for Christ, the incarnate Son of God, was indeed as such, in the state of His self-renunciation and humiliation, ἄνθρωπος (Rom. v. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 21), and in His human manifestation not specifically different from other men (Phil. ii. 7; Gal. iv. 4; Rom. viii. 3); but in His state of exaltation, since He is as respects His whole divine-human nature in heaven (Eph. i. 20 ff.; Phil. ii. 9, iii. 20, 21), He is, although subordinate to the Father (1 Cor. iii. 23, xi. 3, xv. 28, *et al.*), partaker of the divine majesty which He had before the incarnation, and possesses in His whole person at the right hand of God divine honour and divine dominion. Comp. generally, Usteri, *Lehrbegr.* p. 327; Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.* p. 306. — καὶ Θεοῦ πατρός] Following out the contrast, we should expect καὶ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρ. But availing himself of the variety of form in which his idea could be set forth, Paul comprehends the properly twofold relation under one preposition, since, in point of fact, with respect to the modification in the import of the διὰ no reader could doubt that here the *causa principalis* is conceived also as *medians*. As to this usage of διὰ in popular language, see on 1 Cor. i. 9. Christ is the mediate agent of Paul's apostleship, inasmuch as Christ was the instrument *through* which God called him; but *God* also, who nevertheless was the *causa principalis*, may be conceived of under the relation of διὰ (comp. iv. 7; Lachmann), inasmuch as Christ made him His apostle οὐκ ἄνευ

Θεοῦ πατρός, but, on the contrary, *through the working of God*, that is, through the interposition of the divine will, which exerted its determining influence in the act of calling (comp. 1 Cor. i. 1; 2 Cor. i. 1; Eph. i. 1; Col. i. 1; 1 Tim. i. 1; 2 Tim. i. 1). Comp. Plat. *Symp.* p. 186 E, διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τουτοῦ κυβερνᾶται; and Rom. xi. 36, δι' αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα; Winer, p. 354 f. [E. T. 474]. — The words Θεοῦ πατρός (which together have the nature of a *proper name*: comp. Phil. ii. 11; Eph. vi. 23; 1 Pet. i. 2), according to the context, present God as the *Father of Jesus Christ*, not as Father *generally* (de Wette; comp. Hilgenfeld), nor as *our Father* (Paulus, Usteri, Wieseler). The Father is named *after* the Son by way of *climax* (comp. Eph. v. 5): in describing the superhuman origin of his apostleship Paul proceeds from the *Higher* to the *Highest*, without whom (see what follows) Christ could not have called him. Of course the calling by Christ is the element *decisive* of the true ἀποστολή (Wieseler); but it would remain so, even if Paul, advancing to the more definite agent, had named Christ *after* God. The supposition of a dogmatic precaution (Theodoret, ἵνα μὴ τις ὑπολάβῃ ὑπουργὸν εἶναι τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱόν, εὐρῶν προσκείμενον τὸ διὰ, ἐπήγαγε καὶ Θεοῦ πατρός; comp. Chrysostom, Calovius, and others) would be as irrelevant and inappropriate, as Rückert's opinion is arbitrary, that Paul at first intended merely to write διὰ Ἰ. Χ., and then added as an afterthought, but inexactly (therefore without ἀπό), καὶ Θεοῦ πατρός. — τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν] For Paul was called to be an apostle by the Christ who had been *raised up* bodily from the dead by the Father (1 Cor. xv. 8, ix. 1; Acts ix. 22, 26); so that these words involve a historical confirmation of that καὶ Θεοῦ πατρός in its special relation as thoroughly *assuring* the full apostolic commission of Paul:¹ they are not a mere designation of God as *originator of the work of redemption* (de Wette), which does not correspond to the definite connection with ἀπόστολος. According to Wieseler, the addition is intended to *awaken faith* both in Jesus as the Son and in God as our reconciled Father. But apart from the fact that the Father is here the Father of *Christ*, the idea of *reconciliation* does not suggest itself at this stage; and the whole self-descrip-

¹ Comp. Beyschlag in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1864, p. 225.

tion, which is appended to *Παῦλος*, is introduced solely by his consciousness of *full apostolic authority*: it describes by contrast and historically what in other epistles is expressed by the simple *κλητὸς ἀπόστολος*. The opinion that Paul is pointing at the reproach made against him of *not having seen Christ* (Calvin, Morus, Semler, Koppe, Borger; comp. Ellicott), and that he here claims the pre-eminence of having been the only one called by the *exalted Jesus* (Augustine, Erasmus, Beza, Menochius, Estius, and others), is inappropriate, for the simple reason that the resurrection of Christ is mentioned in the form of a predicate of *God* (not of Christ). This reason also holds good against Matthies (comp. Winer), who thinks that the *divine elevation of Christ* is the point intended to be conveyed. Chrysostom and Oecumenius found even a reference directed *against the validity of the Mosaic law*, and Luther (comp. Calovius) *against the trust in one's own righteousness*.

Ver. 2. *Καὶ οἱ σὺν ἐμοὶ πάντες ἀδελφοί*] *ἀδελφοί* denotes nothing more than *fellow-Christians*; but the words *σὺν ἐμοί* place the persons here intended in special connection with the person of the apostle (comp. ii. 3; Phil. iv. 21): *the fellow-Christians who are in my company*. This is rightly understood as referring to his travelling companions, who were respectively his official assistants, at the time (comp. Pareus, Hammond, Semler, Michaelis, Morus, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Winer, Paulus, Rückert, Usteri, Wieseler, Reithmayr), just as Paul, in many other epistles, has conjoined the name of official associates with his own (1 Cor. i. 1; 2 Cor. i. 1; Phil. i. 1; Col. i. 1; 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 1). Instead of mentioning their names,¹ which were perhaps known to the Galatians at least in part—possibly from his last visit to them (Acts xviii. 23) or in some other way—he uses the emphatic *πάντες* (which, however, by no means implies any very large number, as Erasmus and others, including Olshausen, have supposed), indicating that these brethren collectively desired to address the very same instructions, warnings, exhortations, etc., to the Galatians, whereby the impressive

¹ Which indeed he might have done, even if the epistle had been, as an exception, written by his own hand (but see on vi. 11); so that Hofmann's view is erroneous.

effect of the epistle, especially as regards the apostle's opponents, *could not but be strengthened*, and therefore was certainly *intended to be* so strengthened (comp. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Jerome, Erasmus, Calvin, and others). At the same time, there is no need to assume that his opponents had spread abroad the suggestion that some one in the personal circle of the apostle did not agree with him in his teaching (Wieseler); actual indications of this must have been found in the epistle. Others have thought of *all the Christians in the place where he was then sojourning* (Erasmus, Estius, Grotius, Calovius, and others; also Schott). This is quite opposed to the analogy of all the other epistles of the N. T., not one of which is composed in the name of a church along with that of the writer. It would, in that case, have been more suitable that Paul should have either omitted *σὺν ἐμοί* (comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 20), or expressed himself in such a way as to intimate, not that the church was *σὺν αὐτῷ*, but that he was *σὺν αὐτοῖς*. To refer it (with Beza) to the *office-bearers* of the church, is quite arbitrary; for the readers could not recognise this in *σὺν ἐμοί* without further *ἐξplanation*. — *ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Γαλατ.*] consequently a *circular* epistle to the several *independent* churches. The relations of the churches were different in Achaia: see on 1 Cor. i. 2; 2 Cor. i. 1. The fact that Paul adds no epithet of honour (as *κλητοῖς ἁγίοις*, or the like) is considered by Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius, and by Winer, Credner, Olshausen (comp. Rückert), Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, a sign of indignation. Comp. Grotius, “*quia coeperant ab evangelio declinare*.” And justly so; because it is in keeping with the displeasure and chagrin which induce him afterwards to refrain from all such favourable testimony as he elsewhere usually bears to the Christian behaviour of his readers, and, on the contrary, to begin at once with blame (ver. 6). In no other epistle, not even in the two earliest, 1 and 2 Thess., has he put the address so barely, and so unaccompanied by any complimentary recognition, as in this; it is not sufficient, therefore, to appeal to the earlier and later “usage of the apostle” (Hofmann).

Ver. 3. *Θεοῦ πατρός*] refers *here*, according to the context, to the *Christians*, who through Christ have received the *υἱοθεσία*.

See iv. 26 ff.; Rom. viii. 15.—See, further, on Rom. i. 7.

Ver. 4. This addition prepares the readers thus early for the recognition of their error; for their adhesion to Judaism was indeed entirely opposed to the aim of the atoning death of Jesus. Comp. ii. 20, iii. 13 ff. "See how he directs every word against self-righteousness," Luther's gloss. — τοῦ δόντος ἑαυτὸν] that is, who did not withhold (ἐφείσατο, Rom. viii. 32), but *surrendered Himself*, namely, to be put to death.¹ This special application of the words was obvious of itself to the Christian consciousness, and is placed beyond doubt by the addition περὶ τ. ἁμαρτ. ἡμ. Comp. Matt. xx. 28; Eph. v. 25; Tit. ii. 14; 1 Tim. ii. 6; 1 Macc. vi. 44; and Wetstein *in loc.* — περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτ. ἡμ.] *in respect of our sins* (Rom. viii. 3), *on account of them*, namely, *in order to atone for them*. See Rom. iii. 23 ff.; Gal. iii. 12 ff. In essential sense περὶ is not different from ὑπέρ (1 Pet. iii. 18; Matt. xxvi. 28; Heb. x. 26, xiii. 11; Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 17; Eur. *Alc.* 176, comp. 701; Hom. *Il.* xii. 243, comp. i. 444; see Buttmann, *Ind. ad Mid.* p. 188; Schaefer, *App. Dem.* I. p. 190; Bremi, *ad Dem. Ol.* p. 188, Goth.), and the idea of satisfaction is implied, not in the signification of the preposition, but in the whole nature of the case. Hom. *Il.* i. 444: Φοίβῳ . . . ἐκατόμβην ῥέξαι ὑπὲρ Δαναῶν (*for the benefit of the Danaï*), ὅφρ' ἱλασόμεσθα ἄνακτα. As to περὶ and ὑπέρ in respect to the death of Jesus, the latter of which (never περὶ) is always used by Paul when the reference to *persons* is expressed, see further on 1 Cor. i. 13, xv. 3. — ὅπως ἐξέληται ἡμᾶς κ.τ.λ.] *End*, which that self-surrender was to attain. The ἐνεστῶς αἰῶν is usually understood as equivalent to ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος, ὁ νῦν αἰὼν. Certainly in practical meaning ἐνεστῶς may denote *present* (hence in the grammarians, ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, *tempus praesens*), but always only with the definite reference suggested by the literal signification, *setting in*, that is, *in the course of entrance*, that which has already begun. So not merely in passages such as Dem. 255. 9, 1466. 21; Herodian, ii. 2. 3; Polyb. i. 75. 2; 3 Esd. v. 47, ix. 6; 3 Macc. i. 16, but also

¹ Comp. Clem. *Cor.* I. 49, τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. For instances from Greek authors of ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν, see Dissen, *ad Dem. de Cor.* p. 348.

in Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 5; Plat. *Legg.* ix. p. 878; Dinarch. i. 93; Polyb. i. 83. 2, i. 60. 9, vii. 5. 4; 2 Macc. iii. 17, vi. 9; comp. Schweighäuser, *Lex. Polyb.* p. 219; Dissen, *ad Dem. de Cor.* p. 350. So also universally in the N. T., Rom. viii. 38; 1 Cor. iii. 22, vii. 26; 2 Thess. ii. 2 (comp. 2 Tim. iii. 1; Heb. ix. 9). Now, as this definite reference of its meaning would be quite unsuitable to designate the αἰὼν οὗτος, because the latter is not an aeon *just begun*, but one running its course from the beginning and lasting until the παρουσία; and as elsewhere Paul always describes this *present* αἰὼν as the αἰὼν οὗτος (Rom. xii. 2; 1 Cor. i. 20; and frequently: comp. ὁ νῦν αἰὼν, 1 Tim. vi. 17; 2 Tim. iv. 10; Tit. ii. 12), we must explain it as *the period of time which is already in the act of setting in*, the evil time which has already *begun*, that is, the time *immediately* preceding the παρουσία, so that the αἰὼν ἐνεστώς is the last *part* of the αἰὼν οὗτος. This αἰὼν ἐνεστώς is not only very *full of sorrow* through the *dolores Messiae* (see on 1 Cor. vii. 26), to which, however, the ethical πονηρός in our passage does *not* refer; but it is also in the highest degree *immoral*, inasmuch as many fall away from the faith, and the antichristian principle develops great power and audacity (2 Thess. ii. 3 ff.; 1 Tim. iv. 1 ff.; 2 Tim. iii. 1 ff.; 2 Pet. iii. 3; Jude 18; 1 John ii. 18; Matt. xxiv. 10–12). Comp. Usteri, *l.c.* p. 348 ff.; Lücke and Huther on 1 John ii. 18. *On that account* this period of time is pre-eminently ὁ αἰὼν πονηρός. With his idea of the nearness of the παρουσία, Paul conceived this period as having then already begun (comp. 2 Thess. ii. 7), although its full development was still in reserve (2 Thess. ii. 8). Accordingly, the same period is here designated ὁ αἰὼν ἐνεστώς which in other places is called καιρὸς ἔσχατος (1 Pet. i. 5), ἔσχαται ἡμέραι (Acts ii. 17; 2 Tim. iii. 1), ἔσχατη ὥρα (1 John ii. 18), and in Rabbinic קָלָה or סוף or אַחֲרֵית הַיָּמִים (Isa. ii. 2; Jer. xxiii. 20; Mic. iv. 1). See Schoettgen, *Hor. ad 2 Tim.* iii. 1. Christ, says Paul, desired by means of His atoning death to *deliver us out of* this wicked period, that is, *to place us out of fellowship with it*, inasmuch as through His death the guilt of believers was blotted out, and through faith, by virtue of the Holy Spirit, the new moral life—the life in the Spirit—was

brought about in them (Rom. vi. 8). Christians have become objects of God's love and holy, and as such are now taken out of that αἰὼν πονηρός, so that, although living in this αἰὼν, they yet have nothing in common with its πονηρία.¹ Comp. Barnabas, *Ep.* 10, where the righteous man, walking in this world, τὸν ἁγίον αἰῶνα ἐκδέχεται. The ἐξέληται, moreover, has the emphasis and is accordingly prefixed. For how antagonistic to this *separation*, designed by Christ, was the *fellowship* with the αἰὼν πονηρός into which the readers had relapsed through their devotion to the false teachers!—Observe, moreover, that the αἰὼν πονηρός forms one idea, and therefore it was not necessary to repeat the article before πονηροῦ (as Matthias contends); see Krüger, § 57. 2. 3. — κατὰ τὸ θέλημα κ.τ.λ.] strengthens the weight of the ὅπως ἐξέληται κ.τ.λ., to which it belongs. Comp. Eph. i. 4 f.; Col. i. 13 f. The salvation *was willed by God*, to whom Christ was *obedient* (Phil. ii. 8); the reference of κατὰ τ. θελ. κ.τ.λ. to the whole sentence from τοῦ δόντος onwards (Bengel, Wieseler, probably also Hofmann) is less simple, and unnecessary. The connection with πονηροῦ (Matthias) would only be possible, if the latter were predicative, and would yield an idea entirely paradoxical. — τ. Θεοῦ κ. πατρ. ἡμ. of God, who (through Christ) is our Father. Comp. Phil. iv. 20; 1 Thess. i. 3, iii. 11, 13. As to the καί, comp. on 1 Cor. xv. 24; Eph. i. 3: from the latter passage it must not be concluded that ἡμῶν belongs also to Θεοῦ (Hofmann). The more definite designation κ. πατρ. ἡμῶν conveys the *motive* of the θέλημα, *love*.

Ver. 5. To the mention of this counsel of deliverance the piety of the apostle annexes a doxology. Comp. 1 Tim. i. 17; Rom. xi. 36, ix. 5, xvi. 27; Eph. iii. 21. — ἡ δόξα] that is, the *honour due* to Him for this θέλημα. We have to supply εἴη, and not ἐστί (Vulgate, Hofmann, Matthias), which is *inserted* (Rom. i. 25; 1 Pet. iv. 11) where there is *no* doxology. So in the frequent doxologies in the apostolic

¹ It is therefore self-evident how unjust is the objection taken by Hilgenfeld to our interpretation, that it limits the Redeemer's death to this short period of transition. This the apostle in no way does, but he portrays redemption concretely, displaying the whole importance and greatness of its salvation by the force of strongest contrast. This remark also applies to Wieseler's objection.

Fathers, *e.g.* Clement, *Cor.* I. 20, 38, 43, 45, 50, 58. Comp. the customary εὐλογητός, *sc.* εἴη, at Rom. ix. 5; Eph. i. 3. See, further, on Eph. iii. 21.

Ver. 6. Without prefixing, as in other epistles, even in those to the Corinthians, a conciliatory preamble setting forth what was commendable in his readers, Paul at once plunges *in mediam rem*. He probably wrote without delay, immediately on receiving the accounts which arrived as to the falling away of his readers, while his mind was still in that state of agitated feeling which prevented him from using his customary preface of thanksgiving and conciliation,—a painful irritation (πυροῦμαι, 2 Cor. xi. 29), which was the more just, that in the case of the Galatians, the very foundation and substance of his gospel threatened to fall to pieces. — θαυμάζω] often used by Greek orators in the sense of surprise at something *blameworthy*. Dem. 349. 3; Sturz, *Lcx. Xen.* II. p. 511; Abresch, *Diluc. Thuc.* p. 309. In the N. T., comp. Mark vi. 6; John vii. 21; 1 John iii. 13. — οὕτω ταχέως] *so very quickly*, so recently, may denote either the *rapid development* of the apostasy (comp. 2 Thess. ii. 2; 1 Tim. v. 22; Wisd. xiv. 28), as Chrysostom (οὐδὲ χρόνου δέονται οἱ ἀπατῶντες ὑμᾶς κ.τ.λ.), Theophylact, Koppe, Schott, de Wette, Windischmann, Ellicott, Hofmann, Reithmayr understand it; or its *early occurrence* (1 Cor. iv. 19; Phil. ii. 19, *et al.*), whether reckoned from the last visit of the apostle (Bengel, Flatt, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler) or from the conversion of the readers (Usteri, Olshausen). The latter is preferable, because it corresponds with ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος κ.τ.λ., whereby the time of the *calling* is indicated as the *terminus a quo*. Comp. iii. 1–3. This view is not inconsistent with the fact that the epistle was written a considerable time after the conversion of the readers; for, at all events, they had been Christians for but a few years, which the οὕτω ταχέως as a *relative* idea still suits well enough. By their μετατίθεσθαι they showed themselves to be πρόσκαιροι (Matt. xiii. 21), and this *surprises* the apostle. As to οὕτω, comp. on iii. 3. — μετατίθεσθε] μετατίθημι, *to transpose*, in the middle, *to alter one's opinion*, to become of another mind, and generally *to fall away* (with εἰς, App. *Hisp.* 17; Eccus. vi. 8; with πρὸς, Polyb. xxvi. 2. 6). See Wetstein *in loc.*; Kypke, II. p. 273;

Ast. ad Plat. de Leg. p. 497 ; from the LXX., Schleusner, *s.v.* ; and from Philo, Loesner, p. 325. It might also be understood in a *passive* sense (Theodorus of Mopsuestia, μετατίθ., not μετάρσθε, is used : ὡς ἐπὶ ἀψύχων ; Beza, “verbum passivum usurpavit, ut culpam in pseudo-apostolos derivet”). But the use of the middle in this sense is the *common* one ; so that the passive sense, and the nicety which, according to Beza, is involved in it, must have been more definitely indicated to the reader in order to be recognised. The *present tense* denotes that the readers were still *in the very act* of the falling away, which began so soon after their conversion. According to Jerome, the word itself is intended to convey an allusion to the name Galatia : “Galatia enim translationem in nostra lingua sonat” (גלתי ; hence גלתי, גלתי, *carrying away*). Although approved by Bertholdt, this idea is nevertheless an empty figment, because *the thing* suggested the expression, and these Hebrew words denote the μετατίθεσθαι in the sense of *exile* (see Gesenius, *Thes.* I. p. 285). But from an *historical* point of view, the appeals of Grotius and Wetstein to the fickleness of the *Gallie* character (Caes. *B. Gall.* iii. 19, iv. 5, ii. 1, iii. 10) are not without interest as regards the *Galatians*. — ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι X.] On ἀπό, *away from*, comp. 2 Macc. vii. 24 ; and see generally, Kühner, § 622 c. The τοῦ καλέσαντος is not to be taken with Χριστοῦ, as Syr., Jerome, Erasmus (in the version, not in the paraphrase and annotations), Luther, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, and others, also Morus and Flatt, understand it; against which may be urged, not (with Matthies and Schott) the want of the article before Χριστοῦ (see on Rom. ix. 5 ; comp. also 1 Pet. i. 15), but the fact that the calling into the kingdom of the Messiah is presented by Paul (and the apostles generally) so constantly as the work of *God*, that we must not deviate from this analogy in explaining the words (see on Rom. i. 6 ; and Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.* p. 387). Thence, also, τοῦ καλέσ. is not to be taken as *neuter*, and referred to the *gospel* (Ewald) ; but ὁ καλέσας is *God*, and Χριστοῦ belongs to ἐν χάριτι, *from Him who has called you through the grace of Christ*. Ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ is *instrumental* ; for the grace of Christ (Acts xv. 11 ; Rom. v. 15 ; 2 Cor. viii. 9 ; Tit. iii. 6 ; comp. also Rom. xvi. 20 ; 2 Cor. xii. 9, xiii. 13 ; Philem. 25),

that is, the favour of Christ unmerited by sinful men, according to which He gave up His life to atone for them (comp. ver. 4), is that *by which*, that is, by the *preaching of which*, the divine calling reaches the subjects of it; comp. Acts xiv. 3, xx. 24. So *καλεῖν* with *ἐν*, 1 Cor. vii. 15; Eph. iv. 4; 1 Thess. iv. 7; to which passages the interpretation "*on the ground of grace*" (Wieseler) is not suitable. Others take *ἐν* for *εἰς* (Vulgate, Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, Beza and others, also Borger and Rückert); so that by brevity of language *ἐν*, indicating the result of the direction, includes within it this also; see Winer, p. 388 [E. T. 514]. This is unnecessarily forced, for such a *constructio praeagnans* in Greek and in the N. T. is undisputed only in the case of verbs of motion (as *ἔρχεσθαι*, *εἰσιέναι*, *ἐμπίπτειν*, κ.τ.λ.). Comp. also Hartung, *über d. Kas.* p. 68 f. In point of sense, moreover, this view is liable to the objection that the *κλήσις* always refers to the *Messianic kingdom* (1 Thess. ii. 12; 1 Tim. vi. 12; 2 Thess. ii. 14; 1 Pet. v. 10; Rev. xix. 9, *et al.*; also 1 Cor. i. 9, and passages such as Col. iii. 15; 1 Thess. iv. 7), and the grace of Christ is *that which procures* the Messianic *σωτηρία* (Rom. v. 15, *et al.*), and not the *σωτηρία* itself. On the absence of the article before *χάριτι*, see Winer, p. 118 f. [E. T. 147 f.]—Observe, moreover, how the whole mode of setting forth the apostasy makes the readers sensible of its antagonism to God and salvation! Comp. Chrysostom and Theodoret. — *εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγ.*] *to a gospel of a different quality*, from that, namely, which was preached to you when God called you. Comp. 2 Cor. xi. 4. The contrast is based on the previous designation of their calling as having taken place *ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ* (not somehow by the law),—a statement clearly enough indicating the specific nature of the *Pauline* gospel, from which the nature of the Judaistic teaching, although the Galatians had likewise received the latter as the gospel for which it had been passed off, was withal so different (*ἕτερον*). Comp. ver. 8.

Ver. 7. The expression just used, *εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον*, was a paradoxical one, for in the true sense there is only one gospel: it seems to presuppose the existence of several *εὐαγγέλια*, but only serves to bring into clearer light the misleading efforts of the Judaists, and in this sense the apostle now

explains it. — ὁ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ κ.τ.λ.] which ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, to which ye have fallen away, is not another, not a second gospel, alongside of that by means of which ye were called (ἄλλο, not ἕτερον again), except there are certain persons who perplex you, etc. That is, this ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον is not another by the side of the former, only there are certain persons who perplex you; so that in this respect only can we speak of ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον as if it were an ἄλλο. So in substance Wieseler and Hofmann; comp. Matthias. It must be observed that the emphasis is laid first on οὐκ and then on ἄλλο; so that, although Paul has previously said εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, he yet guards the oneness of the gospel, and represents that to which he applied the words ἕτερον εὐαγγ. as only the corruption and perversion of the one (of the εὐαγγ. τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ). Thus εἰ μὴ retains its general meaning nisi, without any need to assume (with Matthies) an abbreviation for εἰ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ παρασσοντες κ.τ.λ.¹ The two emphatic words ἕτερον and ἄλλο preserve, however, their difference in sense: ἄλλο meaning absolutely another, that is, a second likewise existing (besides the one gospel); and ἕτερον one of another kind, different (ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμιον, Plat. Conv. p. 186 B). Dem. 911. 7; Soph. Phil. 501, O. C. 1446; Xen. Anab. vi. 4. 8 (and Krüger in loc.); Wisd. vii. 5; Judith viii. 20. In the N. T., comp. especially 1 Cor. xii. 8–10, xv. 40; 2 Cor. xi. 4; Acts iv. 12; also 1 Cor. xiv. 21; Rom. vii. 23; Mark xvi. 12; Luke ix. 29. Comp. also the expression ἕτερον παρά τι, Stallbaum, ad Plat. Phaed. p. 71 A., Rep. p. 337 E. The interpretation most generally received (Peschito, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theodoret, Erasmus, Luther, Castalio, Beza, Wolf, Bengel, and many others; also Morus, Koppe, Borger, Flatt, Usteri, de Wette, Hilgenfeld) connects ὁ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο

¹ Fritzsche, ad Marc. vi. 5, takes εἰ μὴ ironically, and τινὲς in the well-known sense, *people of importance* (see on Acts v. 36, and Hermann, ad Viger. p. 731): “*nisi forte magni est facienda eorum auctoritas, qui,*” etc. But the article which follows renders this interpretation not at all necessary (see below). Besides, in this sense Paul uses only the neuter (see ii. 6, vi. 3; 1 Cor. iii. 7). Lastly, he is fond of designating false teachers, adversaries, etc., as τινὲς, that is, *quidam, quos nominare nolo* (Hermann, ad Viger. l.c.). See 1 Cor. iv. 18; 2 Cor. iii. 1; Gal. ii. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 12; 1 Tim. i. 8.

merely with εὐαγγέλιον,¹ and for the most part understands εἰ μὴ adversatively, "Neque tamen est ulla alia doctrina de Jesu Christo vera; sunt vero homines," etc., Koppe. Against this interpretation may be urged, first, the fact that ἕτερον previously had the chief emphasis laid on it, and is therefore quite unwarrantably excluded from the reference of the relative which follows; secondly, that Paul must have logically used some such expression as μὴ ὄντος ἄλλου; and lastly, that εἰ μὴ never means anything else than *nisi*, not even in passages such as ii. 16; Matt. xii. 4 (see on this passage); Luke iv. 26; 1 Cor. vii. 17; and Rev. ix. 4, xxi. 27. Comp. Hom. Od. xii. 325 f., οὐδέ τις ἄλλος γίγνεται ἑπέειτ' ἀνέμων, εἰ μὴ Εὐρώς τε Νότος τε, and the passages in Poppo, *ad Thuc.* III. 1, p. 216. Others, as Calvin, Grotius (not Calovius), Homberg, Winer, Rückert, Olshausen, refer ὃ to the whole contents of ὅτι οὕτω ταχέως . . . εὐαγγέλιον, "*quod quidem (sc. vos deficere a Christo) non est aliud, nisi, etc., the case is not otherwise than*" (Winer). But by this interpretation the whole point of the relation, so Pauline in its character, which ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο bears to ἕτερον, is lost; and why should the more special explanation of the *deficere a Christo* be annexed in so emphatic a form, and not by a simple γάρ or the like? Lastly, Schott (so also Cornelius a Lapide) looks upon ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο as a parenthesis, and makes εἰ μὴ τινες κ.τ.λ. depend on θαυμάζω κ.τ.λ.; so that that, which is expressed in the words θαυμάζω κ.τ.λ., by εἰ μὴ τινες κ.τ.λ. "*limitibus circumscribatur proferenda defectionis causa, qua perpendenda illud θαυμάζειν vel minuatur vel tollatur.*" This is incorrect, for logically Paul must have written ἐθαύμαζον ἂν . . . εἰ μὴ τινες ᾔσαν; and with what arbitrary artifice ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο is thus set aside and, as it were, abandoned, and yet the reference of the ὃ to the emphatic ἕτερον is assumed! — οἱ παράσσοντες ὑμᾶς] The participle with the article designates the τινές as those whose characteristic was the παράσσειν of the Galatians, as persons who dealt in this, who were occupied with it. Comp. the very usual εἰσὶν οἱ λέγοντες; also Luke xviii. 9; Col. ii. 8. See generally Winer, p. 104 [E. T. 136]; Krüger, § 50. 4. 3; Fritzsche, *Quaest.*

¹ So already the Marcionites, who proved from our passage that there was no other gospel than theirs! See Chrysostom *in loc.*

Luk. p. 18; Dissen, *ad Dem. de Cor.* p. 238. On *ταράσσειν*, in the sense of perplexing the faith and principles, comp. here and v. 10, especially *Acts* xv. 24; *Ecclus.* xxviii. 9. — *καὶ θέλοντες μεταστρέφαι*] “*re ipsa non poterant, volebant tamen obnixe*,” Bengel; “*volunt . . . sed non valent*,” Jerome. On the other hand, the *ταράσσειν* of the *Galatians* actually took place. — The article before *ταρ.* refers to *θέλοντες* as well. See Seidler, *ad Eur. El.* 429; Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 52; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 19. — *μεταστρέφαι*, to *pervert*, that is, to alter so that it acquires an entirely opposite nature. Comp. *LXX.* 1 Sam. x. 9; *Ecclus.* xi. 31; *Hom. Il.* xv. 203; *Dem.* 1032. 1. — *τὸ εὐαγγ. τοῦ Χ.*] see generally on *Mark* i. 1. The genitive is here not *auctoris*, but, as expressing the specific characteristic of the one only gospel in contradistinction to those who were perplexing the Galatians, *objecti* (*concerning Christ*). This is evident from ver. 6, where *ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ* indicates the *contents* of the gospel.

Ver. 8. Ἀλλά, not *but*, as an antithesis to οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο (*Hofmann*), which has already been fully disposed of by εἰ μὴ κ.τ.λ. It is rather the *however* confronting most emphatically the *τινές εἰσιν οἱ ταράσσοντες κ.τ.λ.* “There are some, etc.; *whoso, however, it may be who so behaves, let him be accursed!*” This curse pronounced by the apostle on his opponents is *indirect*, but, because it is brought about by a conclusion *a majori ad minus*, all the more *emphatic*. — καὶ ἐάν] to be taken together, *even in the case that*. See *Herm. ad Viger.* p. 832; Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 140 f. — ἡμεῖς] applies primarily and chiefly to the apostle himself, but the σὺν ἐμοὶ πάντες ἀδελφοί (ver. 2) are also included. To embrace in the reference the associates of the apostle in *founding the Galatian churches* (*Hofmann*) is premature, for these are only presented to the reader in the *εὐηγγελισάμεθα* which follows. — ἄγγελος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ] to be taken together: an angel οὐρανόθεν καταβάς (*Hom. Il.* xi. 184). Comp. ἄγγελοι ἐν οὐρανῷ, *Matt.* xxii. 30. If Paul rejects both his own and angelic authority—consequently even the supposed superhuman intervention (comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 1)—with reference to the case assumed, as accursed,¹

¹ Comp. Ignatius, *ad Smyrn.* 6, where it is said even of the *angels*, ἵνα μὴ πιστεύσωσιν εἰς τὸ αἷμα Χριστοῦ, καὶ κείνοις κρίσις ἔστιν.

every one without exception (comp. *δοτις ἄν ἡ*, v. 10) is in the same case subject to the same curse. The certainty, that no other gospel but that preached by the apostle to his readers was the true one, cannot be more decisively confirmed. — *παρ' ὃ εὐηγγελισ. ὑμῶν*] This *ὃ*, which is not to be explained by *εὐαγγέλιον* (Schott, Flatt, Hofmann), is simply *that which*, namely, as the context shows, as *contents* of the gospel; "*beyond that which we*," etc. (Bernhardy, p. 259.) This may mean either *praeterquam* (Vulgate, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Beza, Calovius, Rambach, and others) or *contra* (so Theodoret and the older Catholics, Grotius, and many others; also Winer, Rückert, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Wieseler, Hofmann). For the two meanings, see Matthiae, p. 1381; Winer, p. 377 [E. T. 503]. In earlier times a dogmatic interest was involved in this point: the Lutherans, in order to combat tradition, laying the stress on *praeterquam*; and the Catholics, to protect the same, on *contra*. See Calovius and Estius. The *contra*, or more exactly, the *sense of specific difference*, is most suitable to the context (see ver. 6, *ἕτερον εὐαγγέλ.*). Comp. Rom. xvi. 17. — *εὐηγγελισάμεθα ὑμῶν*] that is, "I and my companions at the time of your conversion" (comp. *παρελάβετε*, ver. 9). The emphasis, however, lies on *παρ'*. — *ἀνάθεμα ἔστω*] *Let him be subject to the divine wrath and everlasting perdition* (כְּחֵרֶם), the same as *κατάρα* and *ἐπικατάρατος*, iii. 13; see on Rom. ix. 3. The opposite, vi. 16. To apply it (Rosenmüller, Baumgarten-Crusius, comp. also Grotius and Semler) to the idea of *excommunication* subsequently expressed in the church (Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 270) by the word *ἀνάθεμα*, is contrary to the usage of the N. T. (Rom. ix. 3; 1 Cor. xii. 3, xvi. 22), and is besides in this passage erroneous, because even a false-teaching *angel* is supposed in the protasis. Comp., on the contrary, v. 10, *βαστάσει τὸ κρίμα*; 2 Thess. i. 9. See generally the thoroughly excellent discussion of Wieseler, p. 39 ff. Mark, moreover, in the use of the preceptive rather than the mere optative form, the expression of the apostolic *ἐξουσία*, *Let him be!*

Ver. 9. Again the same curse ("deliberate loquitur," Bengel); but now the addition of an allusion to an earlier

utterance of it increases still more its solemn earnestness. — *ὡς προειρήκαμεν*] is referred by Chrysostom, Theophylact, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Luther, Erasmus, Estius, Grotius, Bengel, and most of the earlier expositors, also Flatt, Winer, Matthies, Neander, to ver. 8. But in this case Paul would have written merely *ὡς εἰρήκαμεν, πάλιν λέγω*, or simply *πάλιν ἐρῶ*, as in Phil. iv. 4. The compound verb *προειρήκαμεν* (v. 21; 2 Cor. vii. 3, xiii. 2; 1 Thess. iv. 6) and *καὶ ἄρτι* point necessarily to an *earlier* time, *in contrast to the present*. Hence the Peschito, Jerome (comp. Augustine, who leaves a choice between the two views), Semler, Koppe, Borger, Rückert, Usteri, Schott, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Wieseler, Hofmann, Reithmayr, and others, rightly take it as indicating the *presence* of the apostle among the Galatians at the time when he uttered this curse; comp. v. 3. We must, however, look upon this presence as the *second* and not the *first* visit (Hofmann); for the expression in the form of *curse* betrays an *advanced* stage of the *danger*, and not a merely *prophylactic* measure. — *καὶ ἄρτι πάλιν λέγω*] apodosis, “*so say I also now* (at the present moment) *again*;” so that *πάλιν* thus glances back to the time to which the *προ* applied. Rückert regards *ὡς . . . λέγω* together as the *protasis* (comp. Ewald), in which case the proper apodosis, *so it is in fact*, before *εἴ τις* would be *wanting*. Or rather, if *ὡς . . . λέγω* were the protasis, *εἴ τις ὑμᾶς . . . ἀνάθεμα ἔστω* would be the real apodosis. But why introduce at all such a forced departure from the separation, which presents itself so naturally, and is so full of emphasis, of *ὡς . . . λέγω* into protasis and apodosis? The reference of *προειρήκ.* to an earlier time is certain enough; and *ἄρτι, now*, in the sense of the point of time then present, is very usual in Greek authors (Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 18 ff.) and in the N. T. — *εἴ τις ὑμᾶς κ.τ.λ.*] Paul does not here, as in ver. 8, again use *ἐάν* with the subjunctive, but on account of the actual occurrence puts the positive *εἰ*,—thus giving to his utterance a *climactic* character, as in Acts v. 38 f. (see on the passage); Luke xiii. 9; Winer, p. 277 [E. T. 369]; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 190; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 93 B. Comp. 2 Cor. xii. 20, 21, *μήπως — μήπως — μή*. — As to

εὐαγγελίζεσθαι with the *accusative*,¹ which does not occur elsewhere in Paul's writings, see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 268. — παρελάβετε] often used of that which one gets through *instruction*. See Kypke, II. p. 222. It may, however, denote either *to take* (actively), as in 1 Cor. xv. 1 ; 1 John i. 11 ; Phil. iv. 9 ; or *to receive* (passively), as in ver. 12 ; 1 Thess. ii. 13 ; 1 Cor. xv. 3, *et al.* The latter is preferable here, as a parallel to εὐηγγελισάμεθα ὑμῖν in ver. 8.

Ver. 10. Paul feels that the curse which he had just repeated twice might strike his readers as being repulsive and stern ; and in reference thereto he now gives an *explanatory justification* (γάρ) of the harsh language. He would not have uttered that ἀνάθεμα ἔστω, if he had been concerned at present to influence men in his favour, and not God, etc. — ἄρτι] has the chief emphasis, corresponds to the ἄρτι in ver. 9, and is therefore to be understood, not, as it usually is (and by Wieseler also), in the wider sense of the *period of the apostle's Christian life generally*, but (so Bengel, de Wette, Ellicott) in reference to the *present moment*, as in ver. 9, just as ἄρτι always in the N. T., corresponding to the Greek usage of the word, expresses the narrower idea *modo, nunc, ipsum*, but does not represent the wider sense of νῦν (ii. 20 ; 2 Cor. v. 16 ; Matt. xxvi. 53, *et al.*), which is not even the case in the passages in Lobeck, p. 20. Hence, often as νῦν in Paul's writings covers the whole period from his conversion, ἄρτι is never used in this sense, not even in 1 Cor. xiii. 12. The latter rather singles out from the more general compass of the νῦν the present moment specially, as in the classical combination νῦν ἄρτι (Plat. *Polit.* p. 291 B, *Men.* p. 85 C). Now, Paul would say, *just now*, when he is induced to write this letter by the Judaizing reaction against the very essence of the true and sole gospel which he upheld,—*now*, at this critical point of time—it could not possibly be his business to conciliate men, but God only. Comp. Hofmann. — ἀνθρώπους] is quite *general*, and is not to be restricted either to

¹ The studied design which Bengel discovers in the alternation between ὑμῖν (ver. 8) and ὑμῖς (ver. 9), “*evangelio aliquem instruere convenit insultationi falsorum doctorum,*” is groundless. For they might say just as boastfully, “*evangelium prædicavimus vobis !*” The change in the words is accidental.

his *opponents* (Hofmann) or otherwise. The category, which is pointed at, is negatived, and thus the generic *ἀνθρώπ.* needed no article (Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 619. 13; Sauppe, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 4, 14). — *πείθω*] *persuadeo*, whether by words or otherwise. The word never has any other *signification*; but the more precise definition of its *meaning* results from the context. Here, where that which was repulsive in the preceding curse is to receive explanation, and the parallel is *ζητῶ ἀρέσκειν*, and where also the words *ἡ τὸν Θεόν* must fit in with the idea of *πείθω*, it denotes, as often in classical authors (Nägelsbach *zur Ilias.* i. 100), *to win over, to conciliate and render friendly to oneself* (Acts xii. 20, and Kypke thereon). Comp. especially on *πείθειν θεόν*, Pind. *Ol.* ii. 144; Plat. *Pol.* iii. p. 390 E, ii. p. 364 C; Eur. *Med.* 964; also the passages from Josephus in Krebs. Lastly, the *present* tense expresses, *I am occupied with it, I make it my business*. See Bernhardt, p. 370. Our explanation of *πείθω* substantially agrees with that of Chrysostom, Theophylact, Flacius, Hammond, Grotius, Elsner, Cornelius a Lapide, Estius, Wolf, Zachariae, Morus, Koppe, and others; also Borger, Flatt, Winer, Rückert, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Ewald (who, however, restricts the reference of *ἡ τὸν Θεόν*, which there is nothing to limit, to the day of judgment), Wieseler, Hofmann, Reithmayr, and others. The interpretations which differ from this, such as “*humana suadeo or doceo, an divina*” (Erasmus, Luther, Beza, Vatablus, Gomar, Cramer, Michaelis); or “*suadeone secundum homines an secundum Deum,*” thus expressing the *intention* and not the contents (Calvin); or “*suadeone vobis, ut hominibus credatis an ut Deo*” (Piscator, Pareus, Calixtus; so also in substance, Holsten, z. *Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 332 ff., and Hilgenfeld), are contrary to the meaning of the word: for *πείθειν τινα* always means *persuadere alicui*, and is not to be identified with *πείθειν τι* (Acts xix. 8, xxviii. 23), placing the personal accusative under the point of view of the thing. — *ἡ ζητῶ ἀνθρώποις ἀρέσκειν*] or do I strive to be an object of *human* goodwill? —not tautological, but more general than the preceding. The stress which lies on *ἀνθρώποις* makes any saving clause on the part of expositors (as, for example, Schott, “*de ejusmodi cogitari*

studio hominibus placendi, *quod Deo displiceat*") appear unsuitable. Even by his winning accommodation (1 Cor. ix. 19 ff., x. 15) Paul sought not at all to please *men*, but rather *God*. Comp. 1 Thess. ii. 4. — εἰ ἔτι ἀνθρώποις ἡρεσκον κ.τ.λ.] contains the negative answer to the last question. The emphasis is placed first on ἀνθρώποις, and next on Χριστοῦ: "*If I still pleased men*, if I were not already beyond the possession of *human* favour, but were still well-pleasing to men, *I should not be Christ's servant*." According to de Wette, ἔτι is intended to affirm nothing more than that, if the one existed, the other could no longer exist. But in this case ἔτι must logically have been placed after οὐκ. The *truth* of the proposition, εἰ ἔτι κ.τ.λ., in which ἀνθρώπ. is not any more than before to be limited to Paul's *opponents* (according to Holsten, even including the apostles at Jerusalem), rests upon the principle that no one can serve two masters (Matt. vi. 24), and corresponds to the οὐαί of the Lord Himself (Luke vi. 26), and to His own precedent (John vi. 41). But how decidedly, even at that period of the development of his apostolic consciousness, Paul had the full and clear conviction that he was an object, not of human goodwill, but of human hatred and calumny, is specially evident from the Epistles to the Corinthians composed soon afterwards; comp., however, even 1 Thess. ii. 4 ff. In this he recognised a mark of the servant of God and Christ (2 Cor. vi. 4 ff., xi. 23 ff.; 1 Cor. iv. 9). The ἀνθρώποις ἀρέσκειν is the *result* of ζητεῖν ἀνθρώποις ἀρέσκειν, and consequently means *to please* men, not *to seek to please* or *to live to please* them, as most expositors, even Rückert, Usteri, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius,¹ quite arbitrarily assume, although apart from the context the words *might* have this meaning; see on 1 Cor. x. 33; and comp. ἀνθρωπάρεσκος, Eph. vi. 6. — Χριστοῦ δοῦλος οὐκ ἂν ἤμην] is understood by most expositors, following Chrysostom, including Koppe, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Paulus,

¹ *To live to please, to render oneself pleasing*, is also Wieseler's interpretation (comp. also Rom. xv. 1), who consistently understands the previous ἀρίσκειν in the same way. Comp. Winer and Hofmann. But there would thus be no motive for the change from ζητῶ ἀρίσκειν to ἡρίσκον only, which according to our view involves a very significant progress. Paul *seeks* not to please, and *pleases* not.

Schott, Rückert, "so should I now be no apostle, but I should have remained a Jew, Pharisee, and persecutor of Christians;" taking, therefore, *Χριστοῦ δοῦλος* in an *historical* sense. But how feeble this idea would be, and how lacking the usual depth of the apostle's thought! No; *Χριστοῦ δοῦλος* is to be taken in its *ethical* character (Erasmus, Grotius, Bengel, Semler, Zachariae, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Ewald, Wieseler, and others): "Were I still well-pleasing to men, this would exclude the character of a servant of Christ, and I should not be such an one; whom men misunderstand, hate, persecute, revile." As to the relation, however, of our passage to 1 Cor. x. 32, see Calovius, who justly remarks that in the latter passage the *πάντα πᾶσιν ἀρέσκω* is meant *secundum Deum et ad hominum aedificationem*, and not *secundum auram et voluntatem nudam hominum*.

Vv. 11, 12.¹ *Theme of the apologetic portion of the epistle.* See *Introd.* sec. 2. — δέ] carrying on the discourse. The way having been *prepared* for this theme in vv. 8–10, it is now *formally announced* for further discussion.² And after the impassioned outburst in vv. 6–10, the language becomes composed and calm. Now therefore, for the first time, we find the address *ἀδελφοί*. — *γνωρίζω δὲ ὑμῖν*] *but* (now to enter more particularly on the subject of my letter) *I make known to you*. This announcement has a certain solemnity (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 1; 2 Cor. viii. 1; 1 Cor. xii. 3), which is only enhanced by the fact that the matter must have been already known to the reader. There is no need to modify the sense of *γνωρίζω*, which neither here nor in 1 Cor. xv. 1 means *monere vos volo* or the like (Morus, Rosenmüller, and others). — *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον . . . ὅτι*] attraction, Winer, p. 581 f. [E. T. 781 f.] — *τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ*] *which has been announced by me*, among you and among others (comp. *ὁ κηρύσσω*, ii. 2); not to be limited to the conversion of the

¹ See Hofmann's interpretation of i. 11–ii. 14 in his *heil. Schr. N. T. I.* p. 60 ff., ed. 2. On the other hand, see Hilgenfeld, *Kanon u. Kritik d. N. T.* p. 190 ff.

² If *γάρ* were the correct reading (Hofmann), it would correspond to the immediately preceding contrast between *ἀνθρώποις* and *Χριστοῦ*, confirming ver. 10, but would not introduce a justification of ver. 9, as Hofmann, arbitrarily going back beyond ver. 10, assumes.

readers only. — *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*] cannot indicate the mode of announcement, which would require us to conceive *εὐαγγελισθέν* as repeated (Hofmann). Necessarily belonging to *οὐκ ἔστι*, it is the negative modal expression of the *gospel itself* which was preached by Paul; specifying, however, not its *origin* (Augustine, Cornelius a Lapide, Estius, Calovius, Wolf, and others), which *κατά* in itself never expresses (Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 3), but its *qualitative relation*, although this is conditioned by its origin (ver. 12). The gospel announced by me is not according to men, that is, not of such quality as it would be if it were the work of men; it is not of the same nature as human wisdom, human efficiency, and the like. Comp. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4. 24, τὸ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὰς τιμωρίας ἔχειν βελτίονος ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον νομοθέτου δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι. Eur. *Med.* 673, σοφώτερ' ἢ κατ' ἄνδρα συμβαλεῖν ἔπη. Soph. *Aj.* 747, μὴ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονεῖ. Comp. *Aj.* 764; *Oed. Col.* 604; Plat. *Pol.* 2. 359 D. The opposite, ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 2. Looking to the context, the view of Grotius is too narrow, “nihil humani affectus admixtum habet.” Bengel hits the mark, “non est humani census evangelium meum.”

Ver. 12. Proof of the statement, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον . . . οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ ἄνθρωπον. — οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ] for neither I, any more than the other apostles. On οὐδὲ γάρ, for neither, which corresponds with the positive καὶ γάρ, comp. Bornemann, *ad Xen. Symp.* p. 200; Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 211. The earlier expositors (also Morus, Koppe, and others) neglect both the signification of οὐδέ and the emphasis on ἐγώ, which is also overlooked by de Wette, “for also I have not,” etc.; and Ewald, “I obtained it not at all.” Comp., on the contrary, Matt. xxi. 27; Luke xx. 8; John viii. 11. Rückert, Matthies, and Schott understand οὐδέ only as if it were οὐ, assuming it to be used on account of the previous negation; and see in ἐγώ a contrast to those, quibus ipse tradiderit evangelium, in which case there must have been αὐτός instead of ἐγώ. This remark also applies to Hofmann's view, “that he himself has not received what he preached through human instruction.” Besides, the supposed reference of ἐγώ would be quite unsuitable, for the apostle had not at all in view a comparison with his dis-

ciples; a comparison with the other *apostles* was the point agitating his mind. Lastly, Winer finds too much in οὐδέ, "*nam ne ego quidem*." This is objectionable, not because, as Schott and Olshausen, following Rückert, assume, οὐδ' ἐγὼ γάρ or καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐγὼ must in that case have been written, for in fact γάρ would have its perfectly regular position (vi. 13; Rom. viii. 7; John v. 22, vii. 5, viii. 42, *et al.*); but because *ne ego quidem* would imply the concession of a certain *higher position* for the other apostles (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 8, 9), which would not be in harmony with the apostle's present train of thought, where his argument turned rather on his *equality* with them (comp. 1 Cor. ix. 1). — παρὰ ἀνθρώπου] *from a man*, who had given it to me. Not to be confounded with ἀπ' ἀνθρώπου (see on 1 Cor. xi. 23, and Hermann, *ad Soph. El.* 65). Here also, as in ver. 1, we have the contrast between ἀνθρώπος and Ἰησ. Χριστός. — αὐτό] viz. τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ. — οὔτε ἐδιδάχθην] As οὔτε refers only to the οὐκ contained in the preceding οὐδέ, and δέ and τέ do not correspond, οὔτε is here by no means inappropriate (as Rückert alleges). See Hand, *De part. τέ diss.* II. p. 13; Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 101 f.; Buttmann, *neutest. Gr.* p. 315. Comp. on Acts xxiii. 8. *For neither have I received it from a man, nor learned it.* Παρέλαβον denotes the receiving through *communication in general* (comp. ver. 9), ἐδιδάχθην the receiving *specially* through *instruction* duly used. — ἀλλὰ δι' ἀποκαλύψ. Ἰ. X.] The contrast to παρὰ ἀνθρώπου; Ἰησοῦ X. is therefore the genitive, not of the *object* (Theodoret, Matthies, Schott), but of the *subject* (comp. 2 Cor. xii. 1; Rev. i. 1), *by Jesus Christ giving to me revelation.* Paul alludes to the revelations¹ received soon after the event at

¹ Of which, however, the book of Acts gives us no account; for in Acts xxii. 17, Christ appeared to him not to reveal to him the gospel, but for the purpose of giving a special instruction. Hence they are not to be referred to the *event at Damascus itself*, as, following Jerome and Theodoret, many earlier and more recent expositors (Rückert, Usteri, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hofmann, Wieseler) assume. The *calling* of the apostle, by which he was converted at Damascus, is expressly distinguished in ver. 16 from the divine ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν νότον ἐν ἐμοί, so that this inward ἀποκάλυψις followed the calling; the calling was the fact which laid the foundation for the ἀποκάλυψις (comp. Müller on de Wette)—the historical preliminary to it. In identifying the ἀποκάλυψις of our passage with the phenomenon at Damascus, it would be necessary to assume that

Damascus, and consequent therefore upon his calling, which enabled him to comply with it and to come forward as a preacher of the gospel. Comp. vv. 15, 16; Eph. iii. 3. The revelation referred to in 2 Cor. xii. 1 ff. (Thomas, Cornelius a Lapide, Balduin, and others) cannot be meant; because this occurred at a subsequent period, when Paul had for a long time been preaching the gospel. Nor must we (with Koppe, Flatt, and Schott) refer it to the revelations which were imparted to him *generally*, including those of the later period, for here mention is made only of a revelation by which he *received and learned* the gospel. — *How* the ἀποκάλυψις took place (according to Calovius, through the Holy Spirit; comp. Acts ix. 17), must be left undecided. It may have taken place with or without vision, in different stages, partly even before his baptism in the three days mentioned Acts ix. 6, 9, partly at and immediately after it, but not through instruction on the part of Ananias. The ἐν ἐμοί in ver. 16 is consistent with either supposition.

Ver. 13. Now begins the *historical proof* that he was indebted for his gospel to the ἀποκάλυψις he had mentioned, and not to *human* communication and instruction. In the first place, in vv. 13, 14, he calls to their remembrance his well-known conduct whilst a Jew; for, as a persecutor of the Christians and a Pharisaic zealot, he could not but be the less fitted for human instruction in the gospel, which must, on the contrary, have come to him in that superhuman mode. — ἡκούσατε] emphatically prefixed, indicates that what is contained in vv. 13, 14, is something already well known to his readers, which therefore required only to be recalled, not

Paul, to whom at Damascus the resurrection of Jesus was revealed, had come to add to this fundamental fact of his preaching the remaining contents of the doctrine of salvation, partly by means of argument, partly by further revelation, and partly by information derived from others (see especially Wieseler). This idea is, however, inconsistent with the assurance of our passage, which relates without restriction to the whole gospel preached by the apostle, consequently to the whole of its essential contents. The same objection may be specially urged against the view, with which Hofmann contents himself, that the wonderful phenomenon at Damascus *certified* to Paul's mind the truth of the Christian faith, which had not been unknown to him before. Such a conception of the matter falls far short of the idea of the ἀποκάλυψις of the gospel through Christ, especially as the apostle refers specifically to *his* gospel.

to be proved. — τὴν ἐμὴν ἀναστροφὴν ποτε ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ] *my previous course of life in Judaism*, how I formerly behaved myself as a Jew. Ἰουδαϊσμός is not Judaistic zeal and activity (Matthies, "when I was still *out and out* a Jew;" comp. Schott), but just simply *Judaism*, as his national religious condition: see 2 Macc. ii. 21, viii. 1, xiv. 38; 4 Macc. iv. 26. It forms the historical contrast to the present Χριστιανισμός of the apostle. Comp. Ignat. *ad Magnes.* 8, 10, *Philad.* 6. — ἀναστροφή in the sense of *course of life, behaviour*, is found, in addition to the N. T. (Eph. iv. 22; 1 Tim. iv. 12, *et al.*) and the Apocrypha (Tob. iv. 14; 2 Macc. v. 8), only in later Greek, such as Polyb. iv. 82. 1. See Wetstein. — ποτε ἐν τῷ Ἰουδ.] a definition of time attached to τὴν ἐμὴν ἀναστροφὴν, in which the repetition of τὴν was not necessary. Comp. Plat. *Legg.* iii. p. 685 D, ἡ τῆς Τροίας ἄλωσης τὸ δεύτερον. Soph. *O. R.* 1043, τοῦ τυράννου τῆςδε γῆς πάλαι ποτέ. Phil. i. 26. Comp. also on 1 Cor. viii. 7 and on 2 Cor. xi. 23. — ὅτι καθ' ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ.] a more precise definition of the object of ἠκούσατε, *that I, namely, beyond measure persecuted*, etc. On καθ' ὑπερβολὴν, the sense of which bears a superlative relation to σφόδρα, comp. Rom. vii. 13; 1 Cor. xii. 31; 2 Cor. i. 8, iv. 17; Bernhardt, p. 241. — τοῦ Θεοῦ] added in the painful consciousness of the wickedness and guilt of such doings. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 9; 1 Tim. i. 13. — ἐπόρθουν] is not to be understood *de conatu* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Menochius, and others); Paul was then *actually engaged in the work of destruction* (Acts xxii. 4, comp. ix. 1, xxvi. 10, 11), and therefore it is not to be understood (with Beza, Piscator, Estius, Winer, Usteri, and Schott) merely as *vastavi, depopulated sum* (Hom. *Od.* xiv. 264, ἀγροὺς πόρθειν, *et al.*). Paul wished to be not a mere devastator, not a mere *disturber* (see Luther's translation), but a *destroyer*¹ of the church; and as such he was active (Hom. *Il.* iv. 308, πόλιας καὶ τείχε' ἐπόρθουν, *et al.*). Moreover, in the classic authors also πορθεῖν and πέρθειν are applied not only to things, but also to men (comp. Acts ix. 21) in the sense of *bringing to ruin* and the like. See Heindorf, *ad Plat. Prot.* p. 340 A; Lobeck, *ad Soph. Aj.* 1187; Jacobs, *Del. epigr.* i. 80.

¹ [Nicht bloss *Verstörer*, sondern *Zerstörer*.]

Ver. 14. Still dependent on ὅτι. — καί] the προκόπτειν ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ had then been *combined* in Paul with his hostile action against Christianity, had *kept pace with it*. — Ἰουδαϊσμός, not *Jewish theology* (Grotius, Rückert), but just as in ver. 13. *Judaism* was the sphere in which he advanced further and improved more than those of his age by growth in Jewish culture, in Jewish zeal for the law, in Jewish energy of works, etc. On προκόπτειν as intransitive (Luke ii. 52; 2 Tim. ii. 16, iii. 9, 13), very frequent in Polyb., Lucian, etc., comp. Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* X. p. 35; on ἐν τ. Ἰουδ., comp. Lucian, *Herm.* 63, ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι, *Paras.* 13, ἐν ταῖς τέχναις. — συνηλικιώτης] *one of the same age*, occurring only here in the N. T., a word belonging to the later Greek (Diod. Sic. i. 53? *Alciph.* i. 12). See Wetstein. The ancient authors use ἡλικιώτης (Plat. *Apol.* p. 33 C, and frequently). — ἐν τῷ γένει μου] a more precise definition of συνηλικ.; γένει is therefore, in conformity with the context (comp. ἐν τῷ Ἰουδ.), to be understood in a *national* sense,¹ and not of the *sect of the Pharisees* (Paulus). Comp. Phil. iii. 5; 2 Cor. xi. 26; Rom. ix. 3; Acts vii. 19. — περισσοτέρως ζηλωτῆς ὑπάρχων κ.τ.λ.] a more detailed statement, specifying *in what way* the προέκοπτον . . . γένει μου found *active expression*; “so that I” etc. — περισσοτέρως] than those πολλοί. They, too, were zealous for the traditions of their fathers (whether like Paul they were Pharisees, or not); but Paul was so *in a more superabundant measure* for his. — τῶν πατρικῶν μου παραδόσεων] endeavouring with zealous interest to obey, uphold, and assert them. On the genitive of the *object*, comp. 2 Macc. iv. 2; Acts xxi. 20, xxii. 3; 1 Cor. xiv. 12; Tit. ii. 14; Plat. *Prot.* p. 343 A. The πατρικαί μου παραδόσεις, that is, *the religious definitions handed down to me from my fathers* (in respect to doctrine, ritual, asceticism, interpretation of Scripture, conduct of life, and the like), are the *Pharisaic* traditions (comp. Matt. v. 21, xv. 2; Mark vii. 3); for Paul was Φαρισαῖος (Phil. iii. 5; Acts xxvi. 5), υἱὸς Φαρισαίων (Acts xxiii. 6). So also Erasmus (*Annot.*), Beza, Calovius, de Wette, Hofmann, and others. If Paul had intended to refer to the

¹ For with *Hellenist* associates, of whom likewise in Jerusalem there could be no lack, he does not desire to compare himself.

Mosaic law, either *alone* (Erasmus, *Paraphr.*, Luther, Calvin, and others) or *together with* the Pharisaic traditions (Estius, Grotius, Calixtus, Morus, Koppe, Flatt, Winer, Usteri, Rückert, Schott, Olshausen, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, "the law according to the strict rule of Pharisaism," comp. Möller), he would have *named* the law either by itself or along with the traditions (Acts xxi. 20, xxii. 3; 2 Macc. iv. 2); but by *μου* he limits the *πατρικὰς παραδόσεις* to the special elements resulting from his descent, which did *not* apply to those who were in different circumstances as to descent; whereas the law applied to *all* Jews. Comp., as parallel, Acts xxvi. 5. That Paul had been zealous for the *law* in general, followed as a matter of course from *προέκοπτ. ἐν τ. Ἰουδαϊσμῷ*; but here he is stating the *specific* way in which his *own peculiar προκόπτειν ἐν Ἰουδαϊσμῷ* had displayed itself—his *Pharisaic* zealotry. It would have been surprising if in this connection he had omitted to mention the latter. — *πατρικός*, not found elsewhere in the N. T., means *paternal*. Comp. LXX. Gen. i. 8; Lev. xxii. 13; Ecclus. xlii. 10; 3 Esd. i. 5, 29; 4 Macc. xviii. 7; Plat. *Lach.* p. 180 E, *Soph.* p. 242 A; Isocr. *Evag.* p. 218, 35; Diod. Sic. i. 88; Polyb. i. 78. 1; Athen. xv. p. 667 F. In this case the context alone decides whether the idea *a patribus acceptus* (*πατροπαράδοτος*, 1 Pet. i. 18) is conveyed by it, as in this passage by *μου*, or not (as, for instance, Polyb. xxi. 5, 7). The former is very frequently the case. As to the much discussed varying distinction between *πάτριος*, *πατρικός*, and *πατρῷος*, comp. on Acts xxii. 3.

Ver. 15. *But when it pleased*, etc. Comp. Luke xii. 32; 1 Cor. i. 21; Rom. xv. 26; Col. i. 19; 1 Thess. ii. 8, iii. 1. It denotes, of course, the free *placuit* of the divine decree, but is here conceived as an act in time, which is immediately followed by the execution of it, not as from eternity (Beza). — *ὁ ἀφορίσας με ἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μου*] *who separated me*, that is, in His counsel set me apart from other men for a special destination, *from my mother's womb*; that is, not *in* the womb (Wieseler); nor, from the time when I was in the womb (Hofmann, comp. Möller); nor, *ere* I was born (Rückert); but, as soon as I had issued from the womb, *from my birth*. Comp. Ps. xxii. 11; Isa. xlv. 2, xlix. 1, 5; Matt. xix. 12;

Acts iii. 2, xiv. 8 (in Luke i. 15, where *ἔτι* is added, the thought is different). *ἐκ γενετῆς*, John ix. 1, has the same meaning. Comp. the Greek *ἐκ γαστροῦ*, and the like. We must not assume a reference to Jer. i. 5 (Grotius, Semler, Reithmayr, and others), for in that passage there is an essentially different definition of *time* (*πρὸ τοῦ με πλάσαι σε ἐν κοιλίᾳ κ.τ.λ.*). We may add, that this designation of God completely corresponds with Paul's representation of his apostolic *independence of men*. *What it was*, to which God had *separated* him from his birth and had *called* him (at Damascus), is of course evident in itself and from i. 1; but it also results from the sequel (ver. 16). It was the *apostleship*, which he recognised as a special proof of free and undeserved divine grace (Rom. i. 4, xii. 3, xv. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 10); hence here also he adds *διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ*.¹ Rückert is wrong in asserting that *καλέσας* cannot refer here to the call at Damascus, but can only denote the calling to salvation and the apostleship *in the Divine mind*. In favour of this view he adduces the *aorist*, which represents the *κλήσις* as *previous* to the *εὐδόκησεν ἀποκαλύψαι*, and also the connection of *καλέσας* with *ἀφορίσας* by means of *καί*. Both arguments are based upon the erroneous idea that the revelation of the gospel was coincident with the calling of the apostle. But Paul was first *called* at Damascus by the miraculous appearance of Christ, which laid hold of him without any detailed instruction (Phil. iii. 12), and thereafter, through the apocalyptic operation of God, *the Son of God was revealed in him*: the *κλήσις* at Damascus preceded this *ἀποκάλυψις*;² the former called him to the service, the latter furnished him with the contents, of the gospel. Comp. on ver. 12. Moreover, the *κλήσις* is never an act in the Divine mind, but always an historical fact (Rom. viii. 30). This also militates against Hofmann, who makes *ἐκ*

¹ For *διὰ τ. χάρ. αὐτοῦ* belongs to *καλέσας* as a modal definition of it, and not to *ἀποκαλύψαι*, as Hofmann, disregarding the symmetrically similar construction of the two participial statements, groundlessly asserts. Paul knew himself to be *κλητὸς ἀπόστολος διὰ θελήματος Θεοῦ* (1 Cor. i. 1; 2 Cor. i. 1), and he knew that this *θέλημα* was that of the divine grace, 1 Cor. xv. 10, iii. 10; Gal. ii. 9; Rom. i. 5, xii. 3.

² Hence also *ἐν ἐμοί* by no means diminishes the importance of the external phenomenon at Damascus (as Daur and others contend).

κοιλίας μητρός μου belong to καλέσας as well—a connection excluded by the very position of the words. And what a strange definition of the idea conveyed by καλεῖν, and how completely foreign to the N. T., is the view of Hofmann, who makes it designate “an act executed *in the course of the formation of this man*”! Moreover, our passage undoubtedly implies that by the calling and revelation here spoken of the consciousness of apostleship—and apostleship in reference to the heathen—was divinely produced in Paul, and became clear and certain. This, however, does not exclude, but is, on the contrary, a divine preparation for, the fuller development of this consciousness in its more definite aspects by means of experience and the further guidance of Christ and His Spirit.

Ver. 16. Ἀποκαλύψαι] belongs to εὐδόκησεν; but ἐν ἐμοί is *in my mind*, in my consciousness, in which the Son of God was to become manifest as the sum and substance of knowledge (Phil. iii. 8); comp. 2 Cor. iv. 6, ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν. See Chrysostom, τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως καταλαμπούσης αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν. Comp. Oecum. (εἰς τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον τῆς γνώσεως ἐνιζησάσης), Theophylact, Beza, and most expositors. Calvin, Koppe, Flatt, and others, wrongly hold that it stands for the mere dative. Comp. Bengel. But ἐν is never *nota dativi*, and all the passages adduced to that effect (such as 1 Cor. ix. 15, xiv. 11; 1 Tim. iv. 15; Acts iv. 12, *et al.*) are to be so explained that ἐν shall retain its signification (Winer, p. 204 [E. T. 272]); as must also be the case in the passages used to support the sense of the *dativus commodi* (see Bernhardt, p. 212). Jerome, Pelagius, Erasmus, Piscator, Vorstius, Grotius, Estius, Morus, Baumgarten-Crusius, and others, interpret it *through me*, “ut per me, velut organum, notum redderet filium suum” (Erasmus, *Paraphr.*). But the revelation given *to the apostle himself* is a necessary element in the connection (ver. 12): Paul was immediately after his birth *set apart* by God, subsequently *called* at Damascus, and thereafter provided inwardly with the *revelation of the Son of God*, in order that he might be able outwardly to *preach*, etc. Others, again,¹ take it

¹ Comp. Hilgenfeld *in loc.* and in his *Zeitschr.* 1864, p. 164: Paul regarded his Christian and apostolic *life and working* as a revelation of Christ in his person. Similar is the view taken by Paul in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1863, p. 208.

as "*on me*," *in my case*, which is explained to mean either that the conversion appeared as a proof of Christ's power, etc. (Peter Lombard, Seb. Schmidt), or that the revelation had been imparted to the apostle as matter of fact, by means of his own experience, or, in other words, through his own case (Rückert). Comp. 1 John iv. 9, ἐφανερώθη ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν. But the former explanation is unsuitable to the context, and the latter again depends on the erroneous identification of the calling of the apostle at Damascus with the revelation of the gospel which he received. — τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ] This is the great foundation and whole sum of the gospel. Comp. ver. 6 f., ii. 20. In his pre-Christian blindness Paul had known Christ κατὰ σάρκα, 2 Cor. v. 16. — εὐαγγελίζωμαι] *Present tense*;¹ for the fulfilment of this destination which had even *then* been assigned to him by God (Acts ix. 15, xxii. 15, xxvi. 17 f.) was, at the time when the epistle was written, still *in course of execution* (Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 618). Thus, in opposition to his adversaries, the continuous divine right and obligation of this apostolic action is asserted. — ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν] *among the heathen peoples*. See Acts ix. 15, xxii. 21, xxvi. 17, 18; Eph. iii. 8; Rom. xi. 13. The fact that Paul always began his work of conversion with the *Jews* resident among the Gentiles, was not inconsistent with his destination as the *apostle of the Gentiles*; this, indeed, was the *way* of calling adopted by the Gentile apostle in accordance with that destination (see Rom. i. 16). Comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 37. — εὐθέως] does not belong exclusively either to the *negative* (Hilgenfeld, Hofmann) or to the *affirmative* part of the apodosis (Winer); but as the two parts themselves are inseparably associated, it belongs to the whole sentence οὐ προσανεθέμην . . . ἀλλὰ ἀπῆλθον εἰς Ἀραβ., "Immediately I took not counsel with flesh and blood, nor did I make a journey to Jerusalem, but," etc. He expresses that which he had done *immediately* after he had received the revelation, *by way of antithesis*, negatively and positively; for it was his object most as-

¹ Which, according to Hofmann, is intended to designate the purpose from the standpoint of the *present time* in which it is being realized. This retrospective interpretation is purely imaginary, by no means suits even Plat. *Legg.* p. 653 D, and in our passage is opposed to the context (see ver. 17).

siduously to dispel the notion that he had received human instruction. Jerome, in order to defend the apostle against Porphyry's unjust reproach of presumption and fickleness, connects *εὐθέως* with *εὐαγγελίζομαι*; as recently Credner, *Einl.* I. 1, p. 303, has also done. No objection can be taken to the emphasis of the adverb at the end of the sentence (Kühner, II. p. 625; Bornemann, *ad Xen. Anab.* ii. 6. 9; Stallbaum, *ad Phædr.* p. 256 E); but the whole strength of the proof lies not in what Paul *was* immediately *to do*, but in what he *had* immediately done. "Notatur subita habilitas apostoli," Bengel. We must, moreover, allow *εὐθέως* to retain its usual strict signification, and not, with Hofmann,¹ substitute the sense of "immediately *then*," "just at once" ("not at a subsequent time only"), as if Paul had written *ἤδη ἐκ τότε* or the like. Observe, too, on comparing the book of Acts, that the purposely added *εὐθέως* still does not exclude a brief ministry in Damascus previous to the journey to Arabia (Acts ix. 20), the more especially as his main object was to show, that he had gone from Damascus to no other place than Arabia, and had not until three years later gone to Jerusalem. To make special mention of his brief working in Damascus, before his departure to Arabia, was foreign to the logical scope of his statement. — *οὐ προσαναθέμην*] *I addressed no communication to flesh and blood*, namely, in order to learn the opinion of others as to this revelation which I had received, and to obtain from them instruction, guidance, and advice. *πρός* conveys the notion of *direction*, not, as Beza and Bengel assert (comp. also Usteri and Jatho), the idea *praeterea*.² See Diod. Sic. xvii. 116, *τοῖς μάντεσι προσαναθέμενος περὶ τοῦ σημείου*; Lucian, *Jur. Trag.* 1, *ἐμοὶ προσανάθου, λάβε με σύμβουλον πόνων*, in contrast to the preceding *καταμόνας σαντῶ λαλεῖς*; Nicetas, *Angel. Commen.*

¹ Who invents the hypothesis, that the apostle had been reproached with having *only subsequently* taken up the ground that he did not apply to men in order to get advice from them. Hofmann strangely appeals to *εὐθύς*, John xiii. 32, and even to Xen. *Cyr.* i. 6. 20, where the idea, "not at a subsequent time only," is indeed conveyed by *ἐκ παιδίου*, but not at all by *εὐθύς* in itself. Even in passages such as those in Dorvill. *ad Charit.* pp. 298, 326, *εὐθύς*, like *εὐθὺς* constantly, means *immediately, on the spot*.

² So, too, Märcker in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1866, p. 534, "no further communication." It is not, however, apparent to what *other ἀνατ' θέσεαι* this is conceived to refer.

ii. 5. Comp. C. F. A. Fritzsche in *Fritzschor. Opusc.* p. 204. Just so *προσαναφέρειν*, 2 Macc. xi. 36; Tob. xii. 15; Polyb. xxvi. 19. 4, xvii. 9. 10. — *σαρκὶ καὶ αἵματι*] that is, *to weak men*, in contrast to the experience of *God's* working. See on Matt. xvi. 17. Eph. vi. 12 is also analogous. Comp. the rabbinical *בשר ודם* (Lightfoot on Matt. *l.c.*). As the apostle was concerned simply to show that he was not *ἀνθρωποδιδάκτος*, it is *wholly* unsuitable in this connection to refer *σαρκὶ κ. αἵμ.* to *himself* (Koppe, Ewald), and unsuitable, as regards *half* the reference, to apply it to others *and* the apostle himself (Winer, Matthies, Schott, comp. Olshausen). He is speaking simply of the consultation of *others* (Beza, Grotius, Calovius, Zachariae, Morus, Rosenmüller, Borger, Flatt, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Hofmann, and others), and that *quite generally*: “having received this *divine* revelation, I did not take weak *men* as my counsellors.” In the continuation of the discourse towards its climax the apostles are specially brought into prominence as members of this category, and therefore *σαρκὶ κ. αἵμ.* is not (with Chrysostom, Jerome, Theophylact, Oecumenius, and others) at once to be referred to the *apostles* themselves, although they also are included in it.

Ver. 17. *Neither went I away* (from Damascus) *to Jerusalem, unto those who were apostles before me; but I went away into Arabia.* So according to Lachmann's reading; see the critical notes. *Τοὺς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀποστ.* is written by Paul in the consciousness of his *full equality of apostolic rank* (beginning from Damascus), in which nothing but greater *seniority* pertained to the older apostles. On the twice-employed emphatic *ἀπῆλθον*, comp. Rom. viii. 15; Heb. xii. 18 ff.; Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 137. — *εἰς Ἀραβίαν*] It is possible that some special *personal* reason, *unknown* to us, induced him to choose this particular country. The region was heathen, containing, however, many Jews of the Diaspora (Acts ii. 11). This journey, which is to be looked upon not as having for its object a quiet preparation (Schrader, Köhler, Rückert, Schott), but (comp. Rom. *Introd.* § 1) as a first, certainly fervent experiment of extraneous ministry,¹ and which was of short

¹ Our passage bears testimony in favour of this view by *εὐθὺς . . . ἀπῆλθον* following immediately on *ἡν εὐαγγ. αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*. Hence Holsten's view

duration,¹ is not mentioned in Acts. Perhaps not known to Luke at all, it is most probably to be placed in the period of the *ἱκαναὶ ἡμέραι*, Acts ix. 23,—an inexact statement of the interval between the conversion and the journey to Jerusalem, which betrays, on the part of Luke, only a vague and inadequate knowledge of the chronology of this period. See on Acts ix. 19 ff. Paul mentions the journey here, because he had to show—following the continuous thread of the history—that, in the first period after his conversion, he had not been anywhere where he could have

(*die Bedeutung des Wortes ἀπὸξ im N. T.* p. 25; *ueber Inh. u. Gedankeng. d. Gal. Br.* p. 17 f.; also *zum Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 269 f.), that Paul, “purposely tearing himself away for three years from the atmosphere of the national spirit at Jerusalem,” had gone to Arabia, “in order to reconcile the new revelation with the old by meditating on the religious records of his people,” is quite opposed to the context. Certainly the system of the apostle’s gospel, as it is exhibited in the Epistles to the Galatians and Romans, must have taken its shape gradually, and by means of a long process of thought amidst the widening of experience; but even in the absence of such a developed system he might make a commencement of his ministry, and might preach the Son of God as the latter had been directly revealed in him by divine agency. Thiersch arbitrarily considers (*Kirche in apostol. Zeitalt.* p. 116) that he desired to find protection with *Aretas*. It is the view also of Acts, that Paul immediately after his conversion followed the divine guidance, and did not postpone his beginning to preach till the expiration of three years. According to Acts, he preached immediately, even in Damascus, ix. 20; comp. xxvi. 19 f. See, besides, on Rom. *Introd.* § 1.

¹ L. Cappellus, Benson, Witsius, Eichhorn, Hemsén, and others, also Anger, *Rat. temp.* p. 122, and Laurent, hold the opinion that Paul spent almost the whole three years (ver. 18) in Arabia, because the Jews at Damascus would not have tolerated his remaining there so long. But in our ignorance of the precise state of things in Damascus, this argument is of too uncertain a character, especially as Acts ix. 22, comp. with ver. 23, ὡς δὲ ἰσλῆρ. ἡμεῖραι ἱκαναί, points to a relatively longer working in Damascus. And if Paul had laboured almost three years, or, according to Ewald, about two years, in Arabia, and that at the very beginning of his apostleship, we could hardly imagine that Luke should not have known of this ministry in Arabia, or, if he knew of it, that he should not have mentioned it, for Paul never stayed so long anywhere else, except perhaps at Ephesus. It may indeed be alleged that Luke *purposely* kept silence as to the journey to Arabia, because it would have proved the independent action of the apostle to the Gentiles (Hilgenfeld, Zeller); but this view sets out from the premiss that the book of Acts is a partisan treatise, wanting in historical honesty; and it moreover assumes—what without that premiss is not to be assumed—that the author was acquainted with our epistle. If he was acquainted with it, the intentional distortion of portions of his history, which it is alleged he allowed himself to make, would be the more shameless, and indeed foolish.

received instruction from the apostles. — *πάλιν ὑπέστρεψα*] *παλιν*, used on the hypothesis that the locality of the calling and revelation mentioned was well known to his readers, refers to the notion of *coming* conveyed in *ὑπέστρ.* Comp. Acts xviii. 21; Hom. *Od.* viii. 301, *αὐτίς ὑποστρέψας*, et al.; Eur. *Alc.* 1022; Bornemann, *ad Cyrop.* iii. 3. 60; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 2. 4.

Ver. 18. *Ἐπειτα*] *After that*, namely, after my second sojourn in Damascus—whence he escaped, as is related Acts ix. 24 f.; 2 Cor. xi. 32 f. The more *precise* statement of time then follows in the words *μετὰ ἔτη τρία* (comp. ii. 1), in which the *terminus a quo* is taken to be *either* his *conversion* (as by most expositors, including Winer, Fritzsehe, Rückert, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Wieseler, Hofmann, Reithmayr, Caspari) or his *return from Arabia* (Marsh, Koppe, Borger). The former is to be preferred, as is suggested by the context in *οὐδὲ ἀπῆλθον εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα . . . μετὰ ἔτη τρία ἀνῆλθον εἰς Ἱεροσόλ.* Comp. also on ii. 1. — *ἀνῆλθον εἰς Ἱεροσ.*] This is (contrary to Jerome's view) the *first* journey to Jerusalem, not omitted in the Acts (Laurent), but mentioned in ix. 26. The quite untenable arguments of Köhler (*Abfassungszeit*, p. 1 f.) against this identity are refuted by Anger, *Rat. temp.* p. 124 f. It must, however, be conceded that the account in Acts must receive a partial *correction* from our passage (see on Acts ix. 26 f.); a necessity, however, which is exaggerated by Baur, Hilgenfeld, and Zeller, and is attributed to intentional alteration of the history on the part of the author of Acts, it being supposed that the latter was *unwilling* to do the very thing which Paul in our passage wishes, namely, to bring out his independence of the original apostles. But this consciousness of independence is not to be exaggerated, as if Paul had felt himself "alien in the very centre of his being" from Peter (Holsten). — *ἰστορήσαι Κηφᾶν*] *in order to make the personal acquaintance of Cephas*; not, therefore, in order to obtain instruction. But the position of Peter as *κορυφαῖος* (Theodoret) in the apostolic circle, especially urged by the Catholics (see Windischmann and Reithmayr), appears at all events from this passage to have been then known to Paul and acknowledged

by him. *Ἱστορεῖν*, *coram cognoscere*, which does not occur elsewhere in the N. T., is found in this sense applied to a person also in Joseph. *Bell.* vi. 1. 8, οὐκ ἄσημος ὢν ἀνὴρ, ὃν ἐγὼ κατ' ἐκείνουν ἱστορήσα τὸν πόλεμον, *Antt.* i. 11. 4, viii. 2. 5; frequently also in the *Clementines*. It is often used by Greek authors (comp also the passages from Josephus in Krebs, *Obs.* p. 318) in reference to things, as τὴν πόλιν, τὴν χώραν, τὴν νόσον κ.τ.λ. See Wetstein and Kypke. Bengel, moreover, well says: "grave verbum ut de re magna; non dixit ἰδεῖν (as in John xii. 21) sed ἱστορήσαι." Comp. Chrysostom. — καὶ ἐπέμεινα πρὸς αὐτόν] Comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 7. πρὸς, *with*, conveys the direction of the *intercourse* implied in ἐπέμ. Comp. Matt. xxvi. 55; John i. 1; and the passages in Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 202. Comp. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 653. — ἡμέρας δεκαπέντε] For the *historical* cause why he did not remain longer, see Acts ix. 29, xxii. 17 ff. The *intention*, however, which induced Paul to *specify* the time, is manifest from the whole connection,—that the reader might judge for himself whether so short a sojourn, the object of which was to become personally acquainted for the first time with Peter, could have been also intended for the further object of receiving evangelic instruction, especially when Paul had himself been preaching the gospel already so long (for three years). This intention is denied by Rückert, because the period of fifteen days was not so short but that during it Paul might have been instructed by Peter. But Paul is giving an *historical* account; and in doing this the mention of a time *so short* could not but be welcome to him for his purpose, without his wishing to give it forth as a *stringent* proof. This, notwithstanding what Paul emphatically adds in ver. 19, it certainly was not, as is evident even from the high representative repute of Peter.¹ But the briefer his stay at that time, devoted to making the personal acquaintance of Peter, had been, the more it told against the notion of his having received instruction, although Paul

¹ Hofmann is of opinion that Paul desired his readers to understand that he could not have journeyed to Jerusalem in order to ask the opinion and advice of the "*apostolic body*" there. As if Peter and James could not have been "*apostolic body*" enough! Taking refuge in this way behind the distinction between *apostles* and the *apostolic body* was foreign to Paul.

naturally could not, and would not, *represent* this time as shorter than it *had really been*. Rückert's arbitrary conjecture is therefore quite superfluous, that Paul mentions the fifteen days on account of the false allegation of his opponents that he had been first brought to Christianity by the apostles, or had, at any rate, spent a long time with them and as their disciple, but that he sought ungratefully and arrogantly either to conceal or deny these facts. According to Holsten, Peter and James were the representatives of the ἑτερον εὐαγγ., who in consequence could not have exerted any influence on Paul's Gentile gospel. But this they were not at all. See on ii. 1 ff. and on Acts xv.

Ver. 19. *But another of the apostles saw I not, save James the brother of the Lord.* Thus this James is distinguished indeed from the circle of the twelve (1 Cor. xv. 5) to which Peter belonged, but yet is included in the number of the apostles, namely in the wider sense (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 7, ix. 5); which explains the merely supplementary mention of *this* apostle. After εἰ μὴ we must supply not εἶδον merely (as Grotius, Fritzsche *ad Matth.* p. 482, Winer, Bleek in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1836, p. 1059, Wieseler), but, as the context requires, εἶδον τὸν ἀπόστολον. — ἑτερον is not qualitative here, as in ver. 6, but stands in contrast to the *one* who is named, Peter. In addition to the latter he saw not one more of the apostles, except only that he saw the apostle in the wider sense of the term—James the brother of the Lord (who indeed belonged to the church at Jerusalem as its president),—a fact which conscientiously he will not leave unmentioned. — On the point that *James the brother of the Lord* was not James the son of Alphaeus,—as, following Clemens Alex., Jerome, Augustine, Pelagius, Chrysostom, and Theodoret, most modern scholars, and among the expositors of the epistle Matthies, Usteri, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, Jatho, Hofmann, Reithmayr, maintain,—but a *real brother of Jesus* (Matt. xiii. 35; Mark vi. 3), the son of Mary, called James the Just (Heges. in *Eus.* ii. 23), who, having been a Nazarite from his birth, and having become a believer after the resurrection of Jesus (1 Cor. xv. 7; Acts i. 14), attained to very high apostolic reputation among the Jewish Christians (ii. 9), and was the most

influential presbyter of the church at Jerusalem,¹ see on Acts xii. 17; 1 Cor. ix. 5; Huther on *Ep. of James*, Intro. § 1; Laurent, *neutest. Stud.* p. 175 ff. By the more precise designation, τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ κυρίου, he is *distinguished* not only from the elder James, the brother of John (Hofmann and others), but also from James the son of Alphaeus, who was one of the twelve. Comp. Victorinus, “cum autem fratrem dixit, apostolum negavit.” The whole figment of the identity of this James with the son of Alphaeus is a result of the unscriptural (Matt. i. 25; Luke ii. 7) although ecclesiastically orthodox (*Form. Conc.* p. 767) belief (extending beyond the birth of Christ) in the perpetual virginity of Mary. Comp. on Matt. xii. 46; 1 Cor. ix. 5. We may add that the statement, that Paul at this time saw only Peter and James at Jerusalem, is not at variance with the inexact expression τοὺς ἀποστόλους, Acts ix. 27, but is an authentic historical definition of it, of a more precise character.

Ver. 20. Not a parenthesis, but, at the conclusion of what Paul has just related of that first sojourn of his at Jerusalem after his conversion (namely, that he had travelled thither to make the acquaintance of Cephas, had remained with him fifteen days, and had seen none of the other apostles besides, only James the brother of the Lord), an affirmation by oath that in this he had spoken the pure truth. The *importance* of the facts he had just related for his object—to prove his apostolic independence—induced him to make this sacred assurance. For if Paul had ever been a disciple of the apostles, he must have become so *then*, when he was with the apostles at Jeru-

¹ Wieseler also justly recognises here the actual brother of Jesus, but holds the James, who is named in ii. 9, 12 (and Acts xii. 17, xv. 13, 21; 1 Cor. xv. 7) as the head of the Jewish Christians, not to be identical with this brother of the Lord, but to be the apostle *James the son of Alphaeus*; affirming that it was the latter also who was called ὁ δίκαιος. See, however, on ii. 9. The Gospel of the Hebrews, in Jerome, *Vir. ill.* 2, puts James the Just among the apostles who partook of the last Supper with Jesus, but nevertheless represents him as a *brother* of the Lord, for it makes him to be addressed by the Risen One as “*frater mi.*” Wieseler, indeed, understands *frater mi* in a spiritual sense, as in John xx. 17, Matt. xxviii. 10. But, just because the designation of a James as ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου is so solemn, this interpretation appears arbitrary; nor do we find that anywhere in the Gospels Jesus *addressed* the disciples as brethren.

salem for the first time after his conversion; but not only had he been there with another object in view, and for so few days, but he had also met with James only, besides Peter. The reference to all that had been said from ver. 12 (Calvin, Koppe, Winer, Matthies), or at least to vv. 15-19 (Hofmann), is precluded by the fact that *ἔπειτα* in ver. 18 begins a fresh section of the report (comp. ver. 21, ii. 1), beyond which there is no reason to go back. — The sentence is so *constructed* that *ἀ δὲ γράφω ὑμῖν* stands emphatically by itself as an anacoluthon; and before *ὅτι*, *that*, we have again to supply *γράφω*, *But what I write to you* — *behold in the sight of God I write, that I lie not*; that is, in respect to what I write to you, I write, I assure you before the face of God (*לְפָנַי יְהוָה*, so that I have God present as witness), that I lie not. Comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 338. Schott takes *ὅτι* as *since*, "*coram Deo scribo, siquidem non mentior*," whereby *ἀ δὲ γρ. ὑμ.* does not appear as an anacoluthon. But this *siquidem non mentior* would be very flat; whereas the anacoluthon of the prefixed relative sentence is precisely in keeping with the fervency of the language (comp. Matt. x. 14; Luke xxi. 6, and the note thereon). The completely parallel protestation also, *ὁ Θεὸς . . . οἶδεν . . . ὅτι οὐ ψεύδομαι* (2 Cor. xi. 31; comp. Rom. i. 9; 2 Cor. i. 33), is quite unfavourable to the explanation of *ὅτι* as *siquidem*. To supply with Bengel, Paulus, and Rückert (comp. Jerome), an *ἐστὶ* after *Θεοῦ* (*ὅτι*, *that*), does not make the construction easier (Rückert); on the contrary, it is arbitrary, and yields an unprecedented mode of expression.

Ver. 21. After this stay of fifteen days in Jerusalem (*ἔπειτα*, comp. ver. 18), I came into the regions of Syria and Cilicia; and consequently was again far enough away from the seat of the apostles! — *τῆς Συρίας*] As it is said in Acts ix. 30 that Paul was accompanied from Jerusalem to Caesarea, it is assumed by most modern expositors: "*Syriae eam partem dicit, cui Phoenices nomen fuit*," Winer. So also Koppe, Rückert, Usteri, Matthies, Schott. Comp. Matt. iv. 24; Acts xxi. 3. This view runs entirely counter to the design of the apostle. For here his main concern was to bring out his comparatively *wide separation* from Judaea, as it had occurred in his actual history; the whole context (comp. ver.

22) shows that it was so, and therefore the reader could only understand τῆς Συρίας as meaning *Syria proper* (with Antioch as its capital). It could not in the least occur to him to think of *Phoenicia* (which even Wieseler, though not understanding it alone to be referred to, includes), the more especially as alongside of τῆς Συρίας Cilicia, which borders on Syria proper, is immediately named (comp. Acts xv. 23, 41; Plin. v. 22, xviii. 30). An appeal is also wrongly made to Matt. iv. 24 (where, in the language of hyperbole, a very large district—namely, the whole province of Syria, of which Judaea and Samaria formed portions—is meant to be designated) and Acts xxi. 3 (where likewise the Roman province is intended, and that only loosely and indefinitely with reference to the coast district¹). The relation of our passage to Acts ix. 30 is this: On leaving Jerusalem, Paul desired to visit Syria and Cilicia; he was accordingly conducted by the Christians as far as the first stage, Caesarea (the Roman capital of Judaea, not Caesarea Philippi), and thence he went on by land to Syria and Cilicia. Comp. on Acts ix. 30.—*For what object* he visited Syria and Cilicia, he does not state; but for this very reason, and in accordance with ver. 5, it cannot be doubted that he preached the gospel there. *Tarsus* was certainly the central point of this ministry; it was at Tarsus that Barnabas sought and found him (Acts xi. 25).

Ver. 22. But I was so completely a stranger to the land of Judaea, that at the time of my sojourn in Syria and Cilicia I was personally unknown to the churches, etc. These statements (vv. 22–24) likewise go to prove that Paul had not been a disciple of *the apostles*, which is indeed the object aimed at in the whole of the context. As a pupil of the *apostles*, he would have remained in communication with *Jerusalem*; and thence issuing, he would first of all have exercised his ministry in the churches of *Judaea*, and would have become

¹ For any one sailing from Patara and passing in front of Cyprus to the right has the Syrian coast before him towards the east, and is sailing towards it. Thus indefinitely, as was suggested by the popular view and report, Luke relates, Acts xxi. 3, ἐπλίσσμεν εἰς Συρίαν, without meaning by the καὶ πατήχθημεν εἰς Τύρον that follows to make this Συρίαν equivalent to Phoenicia. For instance, a man might say, "We sailed towards Denmark and landed at Glückstadt," without intending it to be inferred that Denmark is equivalent to Holstein.

well known to them. According to Hofmann, the end at which Paul aims in ver. 22 f. is conveyed by *καὶ ἐδόξαζον κ.τ.λ.* in ver. 24, so that vv. 22, 23 are only related to this as the protasis to the apodosis. This idea is at variance with the independent and important nature of the two affirmations in vv. 22, 23; if Paul had intended to give them so subordinate a position as that which Hofmann supposes, he would have done it by a participial construction (*ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ . . . μόνον δὲ ἀκούοντες, ὅτι κ.τ.λ., ἐδόξαζον κ.τ.λ.*), perhaps also with the addition of *καίπερ*, or in some other marked way. In the form in which the apostle has written it, his report introduced by *ἔπειτα* in ver. 21 is composed of propositions quite as independent as those following *ἔπειτα* in ver. 18, and vv. 22, 23 cannot be intended merely to introduce ver. 24. Hofmann is therefore the more incorrect in asserting that Paul, from ver. 21 onwards, is not continuing the proof of his apostolic independence in contradistinction to the other apostles, but is exhibiting the *harmony of his preaching with the faith of the mother-church at Jerusalem and its apostles*. Others, inconsistently with the context, suppose that Paul desired to refute the allegation that he had been *a learner* from the churches of Judaea (Oecumenius, Gomarus, Olshausen), or that he himself had *taught* judaistically in Judaea (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Grotius; comp. Usteri), or that he had visited Syria and Cilicia as the deputy of the churches of Judaea (Michaelis). — *τῷ προσώπῳ*] *as regards the (my) countenance*, that is, *personally*. Comp. 1 Thess. ii. 17. — *ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Ἰουδ.*] This is meant to refer to the churches *out of* Jerusalem, consequently in the *Ἰουδαία γῇ*, John iii. 22. For that he was known to the church in the *capital* is not only a matter of inference from his pre-Christian activity, but is certain from that fifteen days' visit (ver. 18), and is attested by Acts ix. 26–30. Neither in Acts ix. 26–30 nor in Acts xxvi. 19 f. (see on these passages) is there any such inconsistency with the passage before us, as has been urged against the historical character of the Acts, especially by Hilgenfeld, Baur, and Zeller.

Vv. 23, 24. *Δέ*] places *μόνον ἀκούοντες ἦσαν* in *correlation* to *ἤμην ἀγνοούμενος τῷ προσώπῳ*; it is not, however, to be

understood as a mere repetition of the former *δέ* (Hofmann), for it introduces another¹ subject (Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 97). The *masculine* refers to the *persons* of whom those *ἐκκλησίαι* consisted. See Pflugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 39; Winer, p. 586 [E. T. 787]. The participle *with ἦσαν*, however, does not stand for the simple imperfect (Luther renders quite incorrectly, "they *had* heard"), but prominence is given to the predicate as the main point. See Pflugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 1179. The clause expresses the sole relation in which they *were* to Paul; they were simply in a position to *hear*. "*Rumor apud illos erat,*" Erasmus. Comp. Vulgate: "*tantum autem auditum habebant.*" — *ὅτι ὁ διώκων ἡμᾶς ποτε κ.τ.λ.*] *ὅτι* is explained most simply, not by a supposed transition from the indirect to the direct form (so most expositors, including Rückert and Wieseler), but as the *recitativum* (Matthies, Schott, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Hofmann), the use of which by Paul is certain not merely in quotations of Scripture, but also in other cases (Rom. iii. 8; 2 Thess. iii. 10). Moreover, the statement thus gains in vividness. In *ὁ διώκων ἡμᾶς*, *ἡμᾶς* applies to the *Christians generally*; the joyful information came to them from *Christian* lips (partly from inhabitants of Jerusalem, partly perhaps directly from Syrians and Cilicians). The *present* participle does not stand for the *aorist* (Grotius), but quite substantively: our (former) *persecutor*. See Winer, p. 331 [E. T. 444]; Bremi, *ad Dem. adv. Aphob.* 17. — *τὴν πίστιν*] never means *Christian doctrine* (Beza, Grotius, Morus, Koppe, Rückert, and others), not even in Acts vi. 7, where faith in Christ is conceived as the authority commanding submission (comp. on Rom. i. 5); it denotes *the faith*—regarded, however, *objectively*. Comp. on iii. 2, 23. He preaches the faith (in the Son of God, ver. 16), which formerly he destroyed. On the latter point Estius justly remarks, "*quia Christi fidelibus fidem extorquere persequendo nitebatur.*" Comp. ver. 13. — *ἐν ἐμοί*] does not mean *propter me* (as was generally assumed before Winer), in support of which an appeal was erroneously made to Eph. iv. 1 *et al.*: for *ἐν*, used with persons, is never *on account of*

¹ Hofmann appeals to Eur. *Iph. T.* 1367. But in this, as in the other passages quoted by Hartung, I. p. 169, the well-known *repetition of the same word* with *δέ* occurs.

(Winer, p. 363 [E. T. 484]); but it means, "they praised God *on me*," so that their praise of God was based on me as the vehicle and instrument of the divine grace and efficacy (1 Cor. xv. 10). God made Himself known to them by my case, and so they praised Him; ὅλον γὰρ τὸ κατ' ἐμέ, φησί, τῆς χάριτος ἦν τοῦ Θεοῦ, Oecumenius. Comp. John xvii. 10; Ecclus. xlvii. 6. See generally Bernhardt, p. 210; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 598. It was not, however, without a purpose, but with a just feeling of satisfaction, that Paul added καὶ ἐδόξαζον ἐν ἐμοὶ τὸν Θεόν; for this impression, which Paul then made on the churches in Judaea, stood in startling contrast to the hateful proceedings against him of the Judaizers in Galatia.—Mark further (in opposition to Holstein and others), how ver. 23 rests on the legitimate assumption that Paul preached in substance no other gospel than that which those churches had received from Jerusalem, although they were not yet instructed in the special peculiarities of his preaching; as, in fact, the antagonism between the Pauline teaching and Judaism did not become a matter of public interest until later (Acts xv. 1).

CHAPTER II.

Ver. 5. *οἷς οὐδέ*] is wanting in D* Clar.* Germ. codd. Lat. in Jerome and Sedul., Ir. Tert. Victorin. Ambrosiast. Pelag. (?) Primas. Claudius autissidor. Condemned by Seml., Griesb., Koppe, Dav. Schulz. But the omission is much too weakly attested, and arose simply from *δέ* in ver. 4 being understood antithetically, and from the belief, induced by the remembrance of the apostle's principle of accommodation, that it was necessary to find here an analogue to the circumcision of Timothy (Acts xvi. 3); *οὐδέ* stood in the way of this, and with it, on account of the construction, *οἷς* was also omitted. This *οἷς* was wanting at most only in manuscripts of the It. (see Reiche, p. 12), and ought not to have been rejected by Grot., Morus, and Michael. — Ver. 8. *καὶ ἐμοί*] With Lachm. and Tisch., read, according to preponderating testimony, *καί μοι*. — Ver. 9. *Ἰάκωβος καὶ Κηφᾶς*] D E F G, It., and several Fathers, have *Πέτρος καὶ Ἰάκωβος*. A transposition according to rank. — *μέν*, which is wanting in Elz. and Tisch. (bracketed by Lachm.), is to be deleted, according to B F G H K L *8**, min. vss. and Fathers. Inserted on account of the *δέ* which follows. — Ver. 11. Here, and also in ver. 14, *Κηφᾶς* and *Κηφῶ* is the correct reading according to preponderating evidence. Comp. on i. 18. The *very ancient* fiction (see the exegetical note) that it is not the *Apostle* Peter who is here spoken of, testifies also to the originality of the Hebrew name. — Ver. 12. *ἦλθον*] B D* F G *8*, 45, 73, codd. It., read *ἦλθεν*. So Lachm.¹ Comp. Orig.: *ἐλθόντος Ἰακώβου*. An ancient clerical error after ver. 11. — Ver. 14. The position of the words *καὶ οὐκ* (Lachm. and Tisch. *οὐχ*) *Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῆς* is to be adopted, with Lachm., following decisive testimony. No doubt *καὶ οὐκ Ἰουδαϊκῶς* is wanting in Clar. Germ. Ambrosiast. Sedul. Agapet.; but this evidence is much too weak to induce us (with Seml. and Schott) to pronounce the words a gloss, especially as their omission might very easily be occasioned by the similar terminations of the two adverbs. — *πῶς*] Elz. Tisch. read *τί*, in opposition to decisive testimony. — The evidence is also

¹ Who (*Praef.* p. xii.) conjectures as to this reading that *τινί* should be read instead of *τινάς*.

decisive against the omission of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, ver. 16 (Elz.), which was caused by $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ being understood as the definition of what precedes, with which view $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ was not compatible. The omission was facilitated by the fact of a lesson beginning with $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\varsigma$. — Ver. 18. Instead of $\sigmaυν\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\eta\mu\iota$ read, with Griesb., Scholz, Lachm., Tisch., $\sigmaυν\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$. — Ver. 20. $\tau\omicron\upsilon \nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$] Lachm. reads $\tau\omicron\upsilon \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$, according to B D* F G, It. But most probably this reading arose from the writer passing on immediately from the first $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ to the second, and thus writing $\tau\omicron\upsilon \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ only; and, as the sequel did not harmonize with this, $\kappa\alpha\iota \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$ was afterwards added. If, as Schott thinks, $\tau\omicron\upsilon \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon \kappa. \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$ was written because God and Christ are mentioned in vv. 19, 20, the original $\tau\omicron\upsilon \nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsυ \tau\omicron\upsυ \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsυ$ would have been turned into $\tau\omicron\upsυ \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsυ \kappa. \nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsυ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsυ$. If, however, $\tau\omicron\upsυ \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsυ \kappa. \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsυ$ had been the original text, there would have been no reason whatever for altering this into $\tau\omicron\upsυ \nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsυ \tau. \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsυ$.

CONTENTS.—Paul continues the historical proof of his full apostolic independence. On his second visit to Jerusalem, fourteen years after, he had laid his gospel before those in repute, and had been, not instructed by them, but formally acknowledged as an apostle ordained by God to the Gentiles (vv. 1–10). And when Peter had come to Antioch, so far was he, Paul, from giving up his apostolic independence, that, on the contrary, he withstood Peter openly on account of a hypocritical line of conduct, by which Christian freedom was imperilled (vv. 11–21).

Ver. 1. On vv. 1–10, see C. F. A. Fritzsche in *Fritzschor. Opusc.* p. 158 ff.; Elwert, *Progr. Annot. in Gal.* ii. 1–10, etc., 1852; Reiche, *Comm. Crit.* p. 1 ff. On ver. 1, see Stölting, *Beiträge z. Exeg. d. Paul. Briefe*, 1869, p. 155 ff. — $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha$] *thereafter*, namely, after my sojourn in Syria and Cilicia; correlative to the $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha$ in i. 21, and also in i. 18. Ἐπειτα joins the statement to what is narrated immediately before. Therefore not: after the journey to Jerusalem, i. 18 (Wieseler). — $\delta\iota\alpha \delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\sigma\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\omega\nu \acute{\epsilon}\tau\omega\nu$] *interjectis quatuordecim annis, after an interval of fourteen years*: comp. Polyb. xxii. 26. 22, $\delta\iota' \acute{\epsilon}\tau\omega\nu \tau\rho\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$; Acts xxiv. 17. The *length* of this period quite accords with the systematic object of the apostle, inasmuch as he had already, up to the time of this journey, laboured for *so many years* entirely on his own footing and *independently of the*

original apostles, that this very fact could not but put an end to any suspicion of his being a disciple of these apostles. As to the use of *διά*, which is based on the idea that the time intervening from the starting-point to the event in question is *traversed* [*passed through*] when the event arrives (comp. Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 856), see generally Bernhardy, p. 235; Krüger, § 68. 22. 3; Winer, p. 336 [E. T. 475]; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 50, and in *Fritzschior. Opusc.* p. 162 f.; Herod. iv. 1, ἀποδημήσαντας ὀκτὼ κ. εἴκοσι ἔτεα καὶ διὰ χρόνου τοσούτου (after so long an interval) κατιόντας κ.τ.λ.; Deut. ix. 11, διὰ τεσσαράκοντα ἡμερῶν . . . ἔδωκε κύριος ἐμοὶ τὰς δύο πλάκας; Joseph. *Antt.* iv. 8. 12. Comp. the well-known διὰ χρόνου, Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 8. 1; δι' αἰῶνος, Blomfield, *Gloss. ad Aesch. Pers.* 1003; διὰ μακροῦ, Thuc. vi. 15. 3; δι' ἔτους, Lucian, *Paras.* 15; δι' ἡμέρων, Mark ii. 1, and the like; also 4 Macc. xiii. 20. Following Oeder (in Wolf) and Rambach, Theile (in Winer's *Neue krit. Jour.* VIII. p. 175), Paulus and Schott have understood διὰ as *within*, "*during the 14 years I have now been a Christian*;" or, as Stölting, acceding to this explanation, gives to it the more definite sense, "*during a space of time which has lasted 14 years from my conversion, and is now, at the time I am writing this epistle, finished.*" But against this view may be urged the grammatical objection that διὰ is never used by Greek authors of duration of time, except when the action *extends throughout the whole time* (Valckenaer, *ad Herod.* vi. 12; Ast, *ad Plat. de Leg.* p. 399), either continuously, as Mark xiv. 53, or at recurring intervals, as Acts i. 3 (see *Fritzschior. Opusc. l.c.*). Even the passages which are appealed to, Acts v. 19, xvi. 9, xvii. 10, xxiii. 31, admit the rendering of διὰ τῆς νυκτός as *throughout the night*, without deviation from the common linguistic usage.¹ Moreover, how unintelligibly Paul would have expressed himself, if, without giving the slightest intimation of it (possibly by εἰς οὗ ἐν Χριστῷ εἰμι, or in some other way), he had meant the present duration of his standing as a Christian! Lastly, how entirely

¹ See on these passages the *Commentary on Acts*. There is no cause for accusing (with Fritzsche) Luke of an improper deviation from the Greek *usus loquendi*. Comp. on διὰ νυκτός, Thuc. ii. 4. 1; Xen. *Anab.* iv. 6. 22. On the Homeric διὰ νύκτα, *during the night*, see Nägelsbach on the *Iliad*, p. 222, ed. 3.

idle and objectless in itself would be such a specification of time! For that Paul could only speak of *the* journeys which he made *as a Christian* to Jerusalem, was self-evident; but whether at the time when he wrote the epistle his life as a Christian had lasted 14 years, or longer or shorter, was a point of no importance for the main object of the passage, and the whole statement as to the time would be without any motive in harmony with the context. — *From what point has Paul reckoned the 14 years?* The answer, *From the ascension of Christ* (Chronic. Euseb., Peter Lombard, Lud. Cappellus, Paulus), must at once be excluded as quite opposed to the context. Usually, however, the *conversion* of the apostle is taken as the *terminus a quo* (so Olshausen, Anger, Matthies, Schott, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, Wieseler, Hilgenfeld, Ebrard, Ewald, *apost. Zeit.* p. 55, Stölting), an appeal being made to the analogy of i. 18. Thus the three years of i. 18 would be again included in the fourteen years. But *πάλιν* and the *διά*, indicating the *interval* which in the meantime had elapsed, point rather to the *first journey to Jerusalem* as the *terminus a quo*. The *πάλιν* points back to the *first journey*, and so *διὰ δεκατεσσ. ἐτῶν* presents itself most naturally as the period intervening between the first journey and this *πάλιν*. If Paul had again written *μετά*, as in i. 18, we might have inferred from the intentional identity of expression the identity also of the starting-point; but since he has here chosen the word *διά* not elsewhere employed by him in this sense (after an *interval* of fourteen years), the relation of this *διά* to *πάλιν* leads us to take the first journey to Jerusalem as the starting-point of the reckoning. This is the reckoning adopted by Jerome, Chrysostom on ver. 11, Luther,¹ Ussher, Clericus, Lightfoot, Bengel, Stroth (in the *Repert. für bibl. u. morgenl. Lit.* IV. p. 41), Morus, Keil, Koppe, Borger, Hug, Mynster, Credner, Hensen, Winer, Schrader, Rückert, Usteri, Zeller,

¹ In the Commentary of 1519 (*Opp.* Jena 1612, I. p. 336 B), "Post annos 14, quibus si annos tres, quos supra memoravit, adjunxeris, jam 17 aut 18 annos eum prædicasse invenies, antequam conferre voluerit." Even with *this* reckoning, his conversion still remains "the great event by which Paul measures for himself all Christian time" (Ewald); for the whole reckoning begins at i. 18 from this event as its starting-point.

Reiche, Bleek, and others, as also by Hofmann, who, however, labours under an erroneous view as to the whole aim of the section beginning with i. 21 (see on i. 22). — δεκατεσσάρων] emphatically placed *before* ἐτῶν (differently in i. 18), in order to denote the *long* interval. Comp. Herod. *l.c.* — πάλιν ἀνέβην εἰς Ἱεροσ.] Paul can mean by this no other than his *second*¹ journey to Jerusalem, and he says that between his first and his renewed (πάλιν) visit to it a period of 14 years had elapsed, during which he had not been there. If Paul had meant a *third* journey, and had kept silence as to the *second*, he would have furnished his opponents, to whom he desired to prove that he was not a disciple of the apostles, with weapons against himself; and the suspicion of intentionally incomplete enumeration would have rested on him justly, so far as his adversaries were concerned. Indeed, even if on occasion of a second visit to Jerusalem, here passed over, he had not come at all into close contact with the apostles (and how highly improbable this would be in itself!), he would have been the less likely to have omitted it, as, in this very character of a journey which had had nothing to do with any sort of instruction by the apostles (comp. i. 18), it would have been of the greatest importance for his object, in opposition to the suspicions of his opponents.² To have kept silence as to this journey would have cut the sinews of his whole *historically* apologetic demonstration, which he had entered

¹ Very correctly put in the *Chron. Euseb.*, ὃ εἶπε πάλιν, δηλονότι ἑτέρα ἐστὶν ἀνάβασις αὐτοῦ.

² Wieseler's objection that Paul, according to our view of his historical argument, would also have left unmentioned the journey spoken of in Acts xviii. 22, whereby the reasoning above would fall to the ground as *nimum probans*, is incorrect. For if he had shown that *up to the apostolic council* (see the sequel) he could not have received the instruction of the apostles, his task of proof was *completely solved*; because on occasion of his presence at that council he received formal acknowledgment and sanction as the apostle to the Gentiles. If up to that time he had not been a disciple of the apostles, now, when he had received in an official way the fullest acknowledgment as an independent apostle, there could no longer be any discussion as to his having at some subsequent date procured apostolic instruction in Jerusalem. It would therefore have been purely unmeaning, and even absurd, to have continued the history of his journeys to Jerusalem beyond the date of the apostolic council. But *up to that date* he could not *omit any* journey, without rendering his historical deduction *nugatory as a proof*.

upon in i. 13 and still continues from i. 21 (though Hofmann thinks otherwise). Comp. also Bleek, *Beitr.* p. 55. This purely exegetical ground is quite decisive in favour of the view that Paul here speaks of his *second* journey to Jerusalem;¹ and considered by itself, therefore, our passage presents no difficulty at all. The difficulty only arises when we compare it with Acts. According to the latter, the *second* journey (Acts xi. 30, xii. 25) is that which Paul made with Barnabas in the year 44 in order to convey pecuniary assistance to Judaea; hence many hold our journey as identical with that related in Acts xi. 30, xii. 25. So Tertullian *c. Marc.* i. 20, *Chron. Euseb.*, Calvin,² Keil (*Opusc.* p. 160, and in Pott's *Sylloge*, III. p. 68), Gabler (*neutest. theol. Journ.* II. 2, p. 210 ff.), Rosenmüller, Süskind (in Bengel's *Archiv.* I. 1, p. 157 ff.), Bertholdt, Kuinoel (*ad Act.* p. xxv.), Heinrichs (*ad Act.* p. 59), Tychsen (*on Koppe*, p. 149), Niemeyer (*de temp. quo ep. ad Gal. conscr. sit*, Gott. 1827), Paulus, Guericke (*Beitr.* p. 80 ff.), Kückler (*de anno, quo Paul. ad sacra Chr. convers. est*, Lips. 1828, p. 27 ff.), Flatt, Fritzsche, Böttger, Stölting. So also Caspari (*geograph. chronol. Einl. in d. Leb. Jesu*, 1869). But the chronology, through the 14 years, is decisively opposed to this view. For as the year 44 A.D. or 797 U.C. is the established date of the journey in question (see *Introd. to Acts*), these 14 years with the addition of the three years (i. 18) would carry us back to the year 27 A.D.! Among the defenders

¹ Bloch, *Chronotax.* p. 67 f., and Schott find *two* journeys mentioned in ver. 1: the former obtains them from *πάλιν* (after 14 years I made the second journey to Jerusalem, undertaken with Barnabas); and the latter brings them out thus: "intra 14 annos iterata vice adscendi Hierosolymas, cum Barnaba quidem (Act. xi. 30), posthac (Act. xv.) assumpto etiam Tito." Both views are *introduced* into the passage inconsistently with the text. For according to Bloch's explanation, Paul must have spoken previously of a journey made with Barnabas; and in Schott's interpretation not only is *διὰ* wrongly understood (see above), but it would be necessary at least that instead of *συμπαράλ. καὶ τίτον* the text should run, *ἔτα δὲ συμπαράλ. κ. τ.* Nevertheless Lange, *apostol. Zeitalt.* I. p. 99 f., has again resorted to the evasion that *πάλιν* is to be referred to *μετὰ Βαρν.* and presupposes an earlier journey already made *with Barnabas* (Acts xi.).

² Among the older expositors, J. T. Major is also named as in favour of this view, whose *Annotata ad Acta Ap.* Jen. 1647, 8vo, are quoted by Gabler and Winer. But in the *second* edition of Major's *Annotata*, which appeared after his death, Jena 1670, 4to, Major (p. 410 ff.) pronounces decidedly for the view which holds the journey mentioned in Gal. ii. 1 to be identical with that in Acts xv.

of this view, Böttger has indeed turned δεκατεσσάρων into τεσσάρων; but how little he is justified in this, see below. Fritzsche, on the other hand, has endeavoured to bring out the 14 years, by supposing the reckoning of Luke iii. 1 to begin from the year of the *joint* regency of Tiberius, that is, the year 765 U.C., as, following Ussher, has been done by Clericus, Lardner, and others (see on Luke iii. 1), and now also by Wieseler in Herzog's *Encycl.* XXI. p. 547 ff., and especially in his *Beitr. z. Würdigung d. Evang.* 1869, p. 177 ff. It is assumed, consequently, that Christ commenced His ministry in 779, and was crucified in 781; that Paul became a Christian at the beginning of 783, and that 14 years later, in 797, the journey in question to Jerusalem took place. But against the assumption that the 14 years are to be reckoned from Paul's conversion, see above. Besides, the year of the conversion cannot, for other chronological reasons, be put back beyond the year 35 A.D., that is, 788 U.C. (see on Acts, *Introd.*). Lastly, the hypothesis, that Luke in iii. 1 did not reckon from the actual commencement of the reign of Tiberius, is nothing but a forced expedient based on extraneous chronological combinations, and finding no support at all in the plain words of Luke himself (see further, in opposition to it, Anger, *rat. temp.* p. 14 f., and *z. Chronol. d. Lehramtes Chr.* I.). The opinion, therefore, that the journey Gal. ii. 1 is identical with that mentioned in Acts xi., must be rejected; and we must, on the other hand, assume that *in point of fact* those expositors have arrived at the correct conclusion who consider it as the same which, according to Acts xv., was undertaken by Paul and Barnabas to the apostolic conference. So Irenaeus, *adv. haer.* iii. 13, Theodoret, Jerome, Baronius, Cornelius a Lapide, Pearson, and most of the older expositors, Semler, Koppe, Stroth, Vogel (in Gabler's *Journ. für auserl. theol. Lit.* I. 2, p. 249 ff.), Haselaar, Borger, Schmidt (*Einl.* I. p. 192 and in the *Analect.* III. 1), Eichhorn, Hug, Winer, Hensen, Feilmoser, Hermann (*de P. ep. ad Gal. tribus prim. capp.*, Lips. 1832), Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Olshausen, Anger, Schneckenburger, Neander, Baumgarten-Crusius, Baur, Hilgenfeld, Zeller, Lekebusch, Elwert, Lechler (*apost. u. nachapost. Zeitalt.* p. 394 ff.), Thiersch, Reuss, Reiche, Ewald, Ritschl,

Bleek, Ellicott, Hofmann, Laurent, Holsten, Trip, Oertel, and others.¹ This result is, however, to be based in the first instance not on a comparison of the historical references contained in Gal. ii. and Acts xv., but on διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν; and the historical references of Acts xv. afterwards serve merely as a partial, although very material, confirmation. For the point of view, from which the journey is brought forward in our passage, is one so special and subjective, that it cannot present itself in the connected objectively historical narrative of Acts, whether we take it in connection with Acts xi. or Acts xv. By the search for points of agreement and of difference, with the view of thereby arriving at a decision, far too much room is left for argument *pro* and *contra*, and consequently for the play of subjective influences, to reach any certain result.

I. Thus in support of the identity of the journey Gal. ii. 1 with that of Acts xi. xii., it is argued (see Fritzsche, *l.c.* p. 227) —(1.) That the journey follows on the sojourn in Cilicia and Syria (i. 21, ii. 1; comp. Acts ix. 30, xi. 25 ff.). But why should not Paul, in the *ἔπειτα*, ii. 1, have also mentally included his first missionary journey (to Cyprus, Pamphylia, Pisidia, and Lycaonia, Acts xiii. xiv.) as preceding, seeing that he made this journey from Antioch and after its completion again abode in Antioch for a considerable time, and seeing that his object made it important not so much to write a special history of his labours, as to show at what time he had first come into closer official connection with the apostles, in order to make it plain that he had not learnt from them? (2.) That it is probable that Paul *soon* after the beginning of his labours as the apostle to the Gentiles (Gal. i. 23; Acts xi. 25 f.; comp. Acts xv. 23, ix. 30) expounded his system of teaching at Jerusalem, and laid it before the apostles for their opinion. But this is an *argumentum nimium probans*, since it is evident from i. 16 that Paul commenced the exercise of his vocation as an apostle to the Gentiles immediately after his conversion; so that, even if the 14 years are reckoned

¹ Rückert does not come to a decision, but (in his Commentary and in the *exeget. Mag.* I. 1, p. 118 ff.) denies the identity of our journey with that related in Acts xi. xii., and leaves it a matter of doubt whether the journey mentioned in Acts xv. or that in xviii. 22 is the one intended.

from the conversion, there still remains this long period of 14 years during which Paul allowed this alleged requirement to be unsatisfied. According to our interpretation of ii. 1, this period is increased from 14 to 17 years; but, if Paul had taught 14 years without the approbation of the apostles, he may just as well have done so for 17 years. (3.) That the sanction given to Paul and Barnabas as apostles to the Gentiles (ii. 9) must have been consequent on the journey mentioned in Acts xi. xii., because otherwise the Holy Spirit would not have set them apart (Acts xiii. 2 f.) as apostles to the Gentiles. But might not the ordination of the two to be teachers of the Gentiles (Acts xiii. 2) have taken place *previously*, and the formal acknowledgment of this destination on the part of the apostles in Jerusalem have *followed* at a subsequent period? This latter view, indeed, is supported even by the analogy of αὐτοὶ δὲ εἰς τὴν περιτομήν (Gal. ii. 9), inasmuch as James, Peter, and John had been already for a long time before this apostles to the Jews, but now arranged that as their destination formally in concert with Paul and Barnabas. (4.) That the stipulation respecting the poor (ii. 10) was occasioned by the very fact of Paul and Barnabas having brought pecuniary assistance (Acts xi. 30). But the care for the poor lay from the very beginning of the church so much at its heart, and was so much an object of apostolic interest (Acts ii. 44 f., iv. 34 ff., vi. 1 ff.), that there was certainly no need of any special occasion for expressly making the remembrance of the poor one of the conditions in the concert, ii. 9 f. (5.) That the apostles, according to ii. 3, had insisted on the circumcision of Titus,—a non-emancipation from Mosaism, which might agree with the time of Acts xi. xii., when the conversion of the Gentiles was still in its infancy, but not with the later time of Acts xv. But see the *note* on ver. 3. Even if we allow the (erroneous) idea that the apostles had required this circumcision, we should have to consider that James at a much later point (Acts xxi. 17 ff.) required Paul to observe a completely Jewish custom, from which it is evident how much, even at a very late date, the Jewish apostles accommodated themselves to the Jewish Christians, and Paul also assented to it. (6.) That in Acts xv. there is no trace of the presence

of John at Jerusalem. But although John is not mentioned by name, he may very well have been included in the general οἱ ἀπόστολοι (Acts xv.). (7.) Lastly, Fritzsche remarks, "Paulum novem circiter annos in Cilicia commoratum esse (v. Act. ix. 30, xi. 25; Gal. i. 18, cf. Gal. ii. 1; Act. xl. 30), quis tandem, quum multorum ab apostolis actorum memoria aboleverit . . . prae fracte negare sustineat?" etc. Paul may certainly have been a long time in Syria and Cilicia, but *how* long, must remain entirely undetermined after what we have remarked on (1). Besides these arguments¹ it has been urged (see especially Süsskind and Keil), that the conduct of Peter at Antioch (ii. 11 ff.) is too contradictory to the apostolic decree of Acts xv. to permit our identifying the journey in question with that made to the conference; that in the whole of the epistle Paul makes no mention at all of the authority of the conference; and lastly, that *after* the conference Paul judged more mildly as to the nullity of circumcision than he does in our epistle. But nothing can be built on these arguments; since (a) even if our journey were that mentioned in Acts xi. xii., still the reproach of inconstancy (grounded on his natural temperament) would rest upon Peter, because he had in fact at an earlier period been already divinely instructed and convinced of the admissibility of the Gentiles to Christianity (Acts x. 8 ff., xi. 2 ff.); (b) in the principle of his apostolic independence Paul had quite sufficient motive (comp. *Introd.* § 3) for not mentioning the apostolic decree, especially when dealing with the Galatians;² and lastly (c) the severe judgment of the apostle as to the nullity of circumcision in our letter was, in his characteristic manner, adapted altogether to the *polemical* interest of the moment: for that he should pass judgment on the same subject, according to circumstances, sometimes more severely and sometimes

¹ As a revelation afforded to Paul himself must certainly be intended, the assertion often brought forward, that κατ' ἀποκάλυψιν in ii. 2 applies to the narrative about the prophet Agabus (Acts xi. 28 ff.), is so evidently incorrect, that it does not merit notice. Also the special ground brought forward by Böttger, in order to confirm the identity of the journey Gal. ii. 1 with that described in Acts xi. xii., carries with it its own refutation. See, on the contrary, Rückert, in the *Magaz. f. Exeg. u. Theol. des N. T.* I. 1, p. 118 ff.

² Comp. Ritschl, *altkathol. K.* p. 149.

more mildly, accords completely with the vigorous freedom and elasticity of his mind; hence the passages cited for the freer view (Acts xvi. 3; 1 Cor. ix. 20 ff.; Acts xxi. 20 ff.) cannot furnish any absolute standard. — II. To prove the identity of our journey with that of Acts xv., appeals have been made to the following arguments: (1) That Titus, whom Paul mentions in ii. 1, is included in *τινας ἄλλους ἐξ αὐτῶν*, Acts xv. 2; (2) That in ver. 2, *ἀνεθέμην αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγ. ὁ κηρ. ἐν τοῖς ἔθν.* is parallel to Acts xv. 4, 12; (3) That the Judaizers mentioned in Acts xv. 5 are identical with the *παρεισάκτους ψευδαδέλφους*, Gal. ii. 4; (4) That the result of the apostolic discussions recorded in Acts xv. quite corresponds with *ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Τίτος . . . ἡναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι*, Gal. ii. 3; (5) That in an historical point of view, Gal. ii. 11 agrees exactly with Acts xv. 30; (6) That in Acts xi. Barnabas still has precedence of Paul, which, however, is no longer the case throughout in Acts xv. (only in vv. 12, 25); (7) That in our epistle Paul could not have omitted to mention the important journey of Acts xv. But on the part of those who look upon our journey as that related in Acts xi. xii., or even in Acts xviii. 22 (Wieseler), such grounds for doubt are urged against all of these points (see especially, Fritzsche *l.c.* p. 224 ff.; Wieseler, p. 557 ff.), that they cannot be used at least for an independent and full *demonstration* of the identity of our journey with that of Acts xv., but merely furnish an important partial *confirmation* of the proof otherwise adduced; to say nothing of the fact that the accounts in Gal. ii. and Acts xv. present also points of difference, from which attempts have been made with equal injustice to deny the whole historical parallel, and to abandon unduly the historical truth of the 15th chapter of the Acts (Baur, Schwegler, Zeller, Hilgenfeld, Holsten). — The result of all the discussion is as follows:—*As Paul, in accordance with his own clear words in Gal. ii. 1 as well as with his whole plan and aim in the passage, can mean no other journey whatever except the second which he made as an apostle to Jerusalem; and as, moreover, the διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν forbids our thinking of that journey which is related in Acts xi. xii. as the second; the journey represented by him in Gal. ii. 1 as his second journey*

must be held to be the same as that represented by Luke in Acts xv. as the third,—an identity which is also confirmed by the historical parallels to be found in Gal. ii. and Acts xv.¹ In this way, doubtless, the account of the Epistle to the Galatians conflicts with that of Acts;² but, in the circumstances, it is not difficult to decide on which side the historical truth lies. The account of Luke, as given in Acts xi. xii., that Paul came to Jerusalem with Barnabas to convey the moneys collected, must be described as *in part unhistorical*. Perhaps (for it is not possible definitely to prove how this partial inaccuracy originated) Paul went only a part of the way with Barnabas

¹ Accordingly, the opinions that our passage relates to a journey still later than that reported in Acts xv. fall to the ground of themselves, for the journey Acts xv. can neither be historically disputed nor can it have been omitted by Paul. Following Jac. Cappellus, Whiston, and others, Köhler (*Abfassungsz.* p. 8) has found our journey in Acts xviii. 22,—a view more recently defended by Wieseler, *Chronologie d. ap. Zeitalt.* p. 201 ff., and *Komment.* p. 553 ff., also in Herzog's *Encykl.* XIX. art. *Galaterbrief*; but Schrader transfers it to the interval between vv. 20 and 21 of Acts xix.—to the time of the composition of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. Against Köhler and Schrader, see especially Schott, *Erörterung*, p. 22 ff.; Wurm, in the *Tübing. Zeitschr.* 1833, I. p. 50 ff.; Anger, *rat. temp.* p. 153 ff. According to Epiph. *Haer.* xxviii. 4, even the journey of Acts xxi. 15–17 is the one intended! Against Wieseler, who is supported by Lutterbeck, see Baur in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1849, p. 460 ff.; Zeller, *Apost.* p. 218 f.; Hilgenfeld, in his *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.* 1860, p. 144 ff.; Möller on De Wette (ed. 3), p. 35 ff. Comp. also Düsterdieck in *Reuter's Reprint.* Sept. 1849, p. 222; Schaff, *Gesch. d. chr. K.* I. p. 181 ff.; Holtzmann, in Schenkel's *kirchl. Zeitschr.* 1860, 8, p. 55 ff.; Ebrard, and others. It is unnecessary for us here to go further into Wieseler's arguments from an exegetical point of view; for the supposition of some later journey than Acts xv. must at all events from Gal. ii. 1 appear an *exegetical impossibility*, so long as we allow this much at least of truth to the Acts of the Apostles—that Paul was at the apostolic council. The journey to this council *cannot* have been passed over by Paul in his narrative given in our passage; and consequently the journey Acts xviii. 22—which, too, he cannot have taken in company with Barnabas (Acts xv. 36 ff.)—*cannot* have been the one intended by him. This is completely sufficient to invalidate even the latest discussions of Wieseler. Reiche aptly observes (*Comm. crit.* p. 3): “Paulus aut non affuisse in apostolorum conventu Act. xv., aut male causae suae consuluisse, silentio id praeteriens, censendus esset.”

² Hofmann (with whom Laurent agrees) still contents himself with the superficial current evasion, that Paul had no need to mention the journey related in Acts xi., because it did not afford his opponents any matter for suspicion. As if his opponents were to be reckoned so innocent and guileless in their judgment, and as if Paul would not have been shrewd enough to see the use that would be made of his *passing over in silence* one of the journeys made by him to the seat of the apostles!

(Acts xi. 30), and then, probably even before reaching Judaea (see below), induced by circumstances unknown to us, allowed Barnabas to travel alone to Jerusalem; and thereafter the latter again met Paul on his way back, so that both returned to Antioch together (Acts xii. 25), but Barnabas only visited Jerusalem in person. Schleiermacher (*Einl. in's N. T.* p. 369 f.) assumes an error on the part of Luke as author; that, misled by different sources, he divided the one journey, Acts xv., into two different journeys, Acts xi. and xv. But the total dissimilarity of the historical connection, in which these journeys are placed by the narrative of Acts, makes us at once reject this supposition; as, indeed, it cannot possibly be entertained without unjustifiably giving up Luke's competency for authorship, and by consequence his credibility, in those portions of his book in which he was not an eye-witness of the facts. Credner also (*Einl.* I. 1, p. 315) has pronounced himself inclined to the hypothesis of an error on the part of Luke. He, however, makes the apostle travel with Barnabas (Acts xi. xii.) as far as Judaea, only not as far as the capital; assuming that Paul remained among the churches of the country districts, and made the acquaintance with them presupposed in i. 22-24, Rom. xv. 19. But, on the one hand, looking at his apostolic interest, it is not in itself probable that, having arrived in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, he would fail, after so long an absence, to be drawn towards the mother-seat of the church, especially when he had come as deputy from Antioch; on the other hand, we should expect that, in order to preclude his opponents from any opportunity of misrepresenting him, he would have briefly mentioned this presence in Judaea (comp. i. 22), and mentioned it in fact with the express remark that at that time he had not entered Jerusalem itself. And, as regards the acquaintance with the churches in the country districts presupposed in i. 22-24, he may have made it sufficiently during his journey to the conference. The fact itself, that Paul during the journey recorded in Acts xi. was *not* at Jerusalem (which is admitted by Neander, ed. 4, p. 188, following Bleek, *Beitr.* p. 55, and has been turned to further account by Baur and his school against the historical character of the narrative of the Acts; see on Acts

xi. 30), remains independent of the possible modes of explaining the so far unhistorical account there given. — *μετὰ Βαρνάβαν*] The following *συμπαρ. κ. Τίτον* shows that Paul recognised himself as on this occasion the chief person, which agrees with Acts xv. 2, but not with Acts xi. 25, 30, xii. 25. — *συμπαράλαβὼν καὶ Τίτον*] *having taken along with us* (as travelling companion) *also Titus*. This *καὶ* finds its reference in *μετὰ Βαρνάβαν*, to which the *σύν* in *συμπαρ.* also refers; not *among others also* (Wieseler),—a meaning which is not suggested by the text. Whether, however, at Acts xv. 2, Titus is meant to be included in *καὶ τινὰς ἄλλους ἐξ αὐτῶν*, must remain an open question. If he is meant to be included, then our passage serves to put the statement on the more exact historical footing, that Titus was not *sent* with the others by the church at Antioch, but *was taken by Paul on his own behoof*. The idea that he was sent on the part of the *opposite party* (Fritzsche), cannot, on a correct view of Acts *l.c.*, be entertained at all.

Note.—*Τεσσαρων*, which Ludwig Cappellus, Grotius, Semler, Keil, Bertholdt, Heinrichs, Kuinoel, and others, also Guericke, Rinck, Krichler, Böhl, Matthaei (*Religionsl. d. Ap.* I. p. 624), Schott (in his *Isagoge*, p. 196, not in his later writings), Wurm, Ulrich, and Böttger, wish to read instead of *δεκατεσσαρων*, is a mere conjectural emendation on chronological grounds, confirmed by no authority whatever, not even by the *Chronic. Euseb.*, from the words of which it is, on the contrary, distinctly evident that the chronographer *read δεκατεσσαρων*,¹ but on account of the chronology, because he took the journey for that recorded in Acts xi. xii., *suggested τεσσαρων*.² See Anger, *Rat. temp.* 128 ff.; Fritzsche, *l.c.* p. 160 ff.; Wieseler, *Chronol.* p. 206 f. Nevertheless Reiche, in the *Comm. Crit.*, has again judged it necessary to read *τεσσαρων*, specially because the few matters related of Paul in Acts x.–xv. cannot be held compatible with his having been seventeen years an apostle, and also because so early a conversion, as must be assumed from the reading *δεκατεσσαρων*, does not agree with Acts i.–ix., several of the narratives of which, it is alleged, lead us to infer a longer, perhaps a ten years', interval between the ascension of Christ and the

¹ Τῇ εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν διὰ ἰδ' ἰσῶν δοκῶμαι τοὺς χρόνους τῶν ἀποστόλων τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναλήψεως ἀριθμῆν αὐτὸν. . . . Καὶ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο δῶμεν, εὐρίθῃσται ὁ χρόνος ἀφ' οὗ ἱεραποστολὴ καὶ ἀνέβλεψεν, ὡς περιέχουσιν αἱ Πράξεις, ἴση δ'.

² It is therefore a pure error, when *τεσσαρων* is sometimes styled a *varia lectio*.

conversion of the apostle; as indeed the existence of churches already established in Judaea at the time of this conversion (Gal. i. 22) points to the same conclusion, and 2 Cor. xii. 2 ff., where the ἀποκάλυψις refers to the conversion, agrees with τεσσάρων, but not with δεκατεσσάρων in our passage. But when we consider the great incompleteness and partial inaccuracy of the first half of Acts, the possibility of explaining the establishment of the Judæan churches even in a shorter period embracing some four years, and the groundlessness of the view that 2 Cor. xii. 2 (see on the passage) applies to the conversion of the apostle, these arguments are too weak to make us substitute a *conjecture* for an *unanimously attested reading*.

Ver. 2. Δέ] continuing the narrative, with emphatic repetition of the same word, as in Rom. iii. 22; 1 Cor. ii. 6; Phil. ii. 8, *et al.* Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 361; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 97. — κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν] *in conformity with a revelation received.* What an essential element for determining the bearing of the whole narrative! Hence ἀνέβ. δὲ κ. ἀπ. is not parenthetical (Matthias). But *what kind of ἀποκάλυψις* it was—whether it was imparted to the apostle by means of an ecstasy (Acts xxii. 17; 2 Cor. xii. 1 ff.), or of a nocturnal appearance (Acts xvi. 9, xviii. 19, xxiii. 11, xxvii. 23), or generally by a prophetic vision (so Ewald), or by a communication from the Spirit (Acts xvi. 6, 7, xx. 22, 23), or in some other mode—remains uncertain. According to Acts xv. 2, he was *deputed by the church of Antioch* to Jerusalem; but with this statement our κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν does not conflict (as Baur and Zeller maintain): it simply specifies a circumstance having reference to Paul himself individually, that had occurred either before or after that resolution of the church, and was probably quite unknown to Luke. Luke narrates the outward cause, Paul the inward motive of the concurrent divine suggestion, which led to this his journey; the two accounts together give us its historical connection *completely*. Comp. Acts x., in which also a revelation and the messengers of Cornelius combine in determining Peter to go to Caesarea. The state of the case would have to be conceived as similar, even if our journey were considered identical with that related Acts xi. xii., in which case κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν would apply not—possibly—to the prophesying of Agabus, but likewise to a divine revelation imparted to Paul

himself. Hermann (*de P. ep. ad Gal. trib. prim. capp.* Lips. 1832, also in his *Opusc.* V. p. 118 ff.), as before him Schrader, and after him Dav. Schulz (*de aliquot N. T. locor. lectione et interpr.* 1833), have explained it: "*explicationis causa*, i.e. ut patefieret inter ipsos, quae vera esset Jesu doctrina." No doubt *κατά* might express this relation: comp. Wesseling, *ad Herod.* ii. 151; Matthiae, p. 1359; Winer, p. 376 [E. T. 502]. But, on the one hand, the account of Acts as to the occasion of our journey does not at all require any explaining away of the revelation (see above); and, on the other hand, it would by no means be necessary, as Hermann considers that on our interpretation it would, that *κατὰ τινα ἀποκάλυψιν* should have been written, since Paul's object is not to indicate some sort of revelation which was not to be more precisely defined by him, but to express the *qualifying* circumstance that he had gone up not of his own impulse, but at the divine command, not *ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ*, but *κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν*, *conformably to revelation*. Moreover, it is the only meaning consonant with the aim of the apostle, who from the beginning of the epistle has constantly in view his apostolic dignity, that here also, as in i. 12, 6, *ἀποκάλ.* should express *a divine revelation* (comp. Eph. iii. 3), as in fact the word is constantly used in the N. T. in this higher sense: comp. i. 12. — *ἀνεθέμην*] *I laid before them*, for cognisance and examination. Comp. Acts xxv. 14; 2 Macc. iii. 9, and Grimm thereon. Among Greek authors, in Plutarch, Polyh., Diog. L., etc. — *αὐτοῖς*] that is, *the Christians at Jerusalem*, according to the well-known use of the pronoun for the inhabitants of a previously named city or province; Bernhardt, p. 288; Winer, p. 587 [E. T. 788]. The restriction of the reference to the *apostles* (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Calvin, Koppe, Schott, Olshausen, and others), who are of course not excluded, is, after *εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα*, even still more arbitrary¹ than the view which confines it to the *presbyterium* of the church (Winer, Matthies). Reuss also (in the

¹ If *αὐτοῖς* applied to the apostles, there was no need for regarding (with Chrysostom and others) *κατ' ἰδίαν δι τοῖς δοκοῦσι* as a more precise definition of *ἀντίμενη αὐτοῖς*; for if so, Paul would have expressed himself in a way very illogical and liable to misunderstanding, because *κατ' ἰδίαν δι* would be without meaning, if it was not intended to denote some act *different* from the general *ἀντίμενη αὐτοῖς*. Paul must have written simply *ἀντίμενη αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.*, *ἀντίμενη*

Revue théol. 1859, p. 62 ff.) wrongly denies the consultation of the church. — τὸ εὐαγγ. ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθν.] The main doctrine of which is that of *justification by faith*. Chrysostom aptly remarks, τὸ χωρὶς περιτομῆς. The *present tense* denotes the identity which was still *continuing* at the time the epistle was written (comp. i. 16); ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι does not, however, mean *among the nations* (Usteri), but that it was his gospel *to the Gentiles* which Paul laid before the mother-church of *Jewish Christianity*. Comp. Rom. xi. 13. — κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ τοῖς δοκοῦσι] *sc. ἀνεθέμην τὸ εὐαγγ. ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθν.* But *apart*, that is, in one or more separate conferences, *to those of repute*. On κατ' ἰδίαν, comp. Matt. xvii. 19; Mark iv. 34, ix. 28; Valckenaer, *ad Eur. Phoen.* p. 439. It is, like the *ἰδίᾳ* more usual in the classical authors (Thuc. i. 132. 2, ii. 44. 2; Xen. *Mem.* iii. 7. 4, *Anab.* v. 7. 13, vi. 2. 13; Ast, *Lex. Plat.* II. p. 88), the contrast to *κοινῇ* or *δημοσίᾳ* (comp. Macc. iv. 5). Τοῖς δοκοῦσι singles out the *aestumatos* from the body of Christians at Jerusalem. This, however, is not meant to apply to the esteemed members of the church generally (comp. ἄνδρας ἡγουμένους ἐν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, Acts xv. 22), but (see on ver. 9) to *James* the brother of Christ, *Peter*, and *John*. The other apostles who were still alive appear already to have ceased from personal connection with the church at Jerusalem. Vv. 6, 7, 9 show, that it is not the anti-Pauline partisan *adherents* of those three who are referred to (Grotius); and, indeed, it would have been entirely opposed to his apostolic character to lay his gospel specially before the δοκοῦσι *in this sense*. Moreover, the designation of the three apostles as οἱ δοκοῦντες is not “an ironical side-glance” (Schwegler, I. p. 120), nor has

δὲ τοῖς δοκ. This remark applies also against the view of Baur and Zeller, who, although they allow that the language warrants our view, take the sense to be, “I set it forth to them, *but only to those of highest repute* in particular.” On the contrary, if αὐτοῖς applied to the apostles, the meaning, as the passage runs, would have to be taken as Schott (comp. Olshausen) gives it: “doctrinam . . . apostolis omnibus exposui, privatim vero (uberius ac diligentius) iis, qui magni aestumantur, apostolis auctoritate insignibus, Petro, Johanni, Jacobo.” But how improbable it is in itself, that Paul should have held such a separate conference with a select few of the apostles, and should not have vouchsafed an equally circumstantial and accurate exposition of his teaching to the whole of the apostles as such! Apart, however, from this, the three δοκοῦντες appear to have been the only apostles present in Jerusalem at that time.

it proceeded from the irritation of a bitter feeling against those who had habitually applied this expression to these apostles (Cameron, Rückert, Schott, comp. Olshausen); but it is used in a purely historical sense: for an ironical designation at this point, when Paul is about to relate his *recognition* on the part of the earlier apostles, would be utterly devoid of tact, and would not be at all consonant either to the *point of view of a colleague*, which he constantly maintains in respect to the other apostles, or to the *humility* with which he regards this collegiate relation (1 Cor. xv. 8 ff.). He has, however, *purposely chosen* this expression ("*the authorities*"), because the very matter at stake was his *recognition*. Homberg, Paulus, and Matthies wrongly assert that τοῖς δοκοῦσι means *putantibus*, and that the sequel belongs to it, "*qui putabant, num forte in vanum currerem.*" Vv. 5, 6, 9 testify against this interpretation; and the introduction of φοβεῖσθαι into the notion of δοκεῖν is arbitrary, and cannot be supported by such passages as Hom. *Il.* x. 97, 101 (see, on the contrary, Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 138 f.). Besides, it would have been inconsistent with apostolic dignity to give such a private account to those who were suspicious. In classical authors also οἱ δοκοῦντες, without anything added to define it, means *those of repute, who are much esteemed, nobiles*. See Eur. *Hec.* 295, and thereon Schaefer and Pflugk; Porphy. *de abstin.* ii. 40, *et al.*; Kypke, *II.* p. 274; Dissen, *ad Pind. Ol.* xiii. 56. Comp. also Clem. *Cor.* I. 57. Just so the Hebrew צִדִּיק. See Gesenius, *Thes.* I. p. 531; Buxtorf, *Lex. Talm.* p. 839 f. Comp. δόκιμοι, Plat. *Pol.* x. p. 618 A; Herod. i. 65; Blomfield, *Gloss. in Aesch. Pers.* p. 109.—But *why* did Paul submit his gospel not merely to the Christians in Jerusalem generally, but also specially to the three apostles? By both means he desired to remove every suspicion which might anywhere exist in the minds of others (comp. Chrysostom), that he was labouring or had laboured in vain; but how easy it is to understand that, for this purpose, he had to address to the apostles a more thorough and comprehensive statement, and to bring forward proofs, experiences, explanations, deeper dialectic deductions, etc.,¹

¹ This was a case in which the principle beyond doubt applied, σοφίαν δὲ ἀκλύμεν ἐν τοῖς τελεσίοις, 1 Cor. ii. 6.

which would have been unsuitable for the general body of Christians, among whom nothing but the simple and popular exposition was appropriate! Therefore Paul dealt with his colleagues *κατ' ἰδίαν*. But we must not draw a distinction as to *matter* between the public and the private discussion, as Estius and others have done: "publice ita contulit, ut ostenderet gentes non debere circumcidi et servare legem Mosis . . . privato autem et secreto colloquio cum apostolis habito placuit ipsos quoque Judaeos ab observantia Mosaicae legis . . . esse liberandos," etc. In this way Paul would have set forth only the *half* of *his* gospel to the mass of the Christians there; and yet this half-measure, otherwise so opposed to his character, would not have satisfied the Jewish-Christian exclusiveness. Thiersch also (*Kirche im apost. Zeitalt.* p. 128) wrongly holds (comp. Lange, *apost. Zeitalt.* p. 100) that the subject of the private discussion was Paul's *apostolic dignity*; it was nothing else than τὸ εὐαγγέλιον κ.τ.λ., and only *in so far* his apostolic legitimacy. The *object* of the private discussion was, in Winer's opinion: "ut ne, si his (the δοκοῦσι) videretur P. castigandus, publica expostulatione ipsius auctoritas infringereetur." But this also is not in accordance with the decided character of Paul; and if he had dreaded a *public expostulation*, he would not have ventured first to set forth his gospel *publicly*, because the apostles, in the event of disapproval, would not have been able to withhold *public* contradiction. The view that the private discussion with the δοκοῦσι *preceded* the general discussion with the church (so Neander, p. 277; Lekebusch, *Apostelgesch.* p. 295), runs counter to the account of our passage, which represents the course of events as the converse. — μήπως εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον] Taken by itself, μήπως may signify either *lest possibly*, *ne forte*, and thus express directly the *design* of the ἀνεθέμην (so, following the Vulgate and the Greek Fathers, Erasmus, Luther, and most expositors, including Winer, Fritzsche, Rückert, Schott), or *whether . . . not possibly*, *num forte* (Usteri, Hilgenfeld, Hofmann, Wieseler), thus indirectly *interrogative*. The former interpretation is decidedly to be rejected, because the indicative aorist ἔδραμον does not suit it; for, according to the Greek use of the particles of design with the indicative aorist

or imperfect (see on iv. 17), the ἀνεθέμην would not actually have taken place; and besides this, we should have to assume—without any ground for doing so in the context—that τρέχω and ἔδραμον are said *ex aliorum judicio*,¹ and that τρέχω is subjunctive, although by its connection with ἔδραμον it evidently proclaims itself indicative. Hence μήπως must be rendered *num forte*, and the reference of the *num* is supplied by the idea, “for consideration, for examination,” included in ἀνεθέμην (Hartung, *Partikell.* II. pp. 137, 140). The passage is therefore to be explained: “*I laid before them my gospel to the Gentiles, with a view to their instituting an investigation of the question whether I am not possibly running or have run in vain.*” The apostle himself, on his own part, was in no uncertainty about this question, for he had obtained his gospel from revelation, and had already such rich experience to support him, that he certainly did not fear the downfall of his previous ministry (Holsten²); hence μήπως is by no means to be understood, with Usteri and Hilgenfeld, also Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 303, and Holsten, as implying any uncertainty or apprehension of his own (*in order to see, in order to be certain, whether*). But he wanted to obtain the judgment and declaration of the church and the apostles (so, correctly, Wieseler); comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 44 f., who, however, *heil. Schr. N. T.* I. p. 86, supplies only ἀνεθέμην (*without τὸ εὐαγγ. κ.τ.λ.*) after τ. δοκοῦσι, thus making μήπως κ.τ.λ. the matter itself laid before them; but this would be at variance with the essential idea of laying before them the gospel, of which Paul is speaking, for he does not repeat ἀνεθέμην, and that alone. According to Hofmann, the state of the case would amount to this, that Paul desired to have the answer to the question μήπως κ.τ.λ. from the δοκοῦσι only, and not also from the church,—a view which would neither harmonize with the position of the latter (comp. Acts xv. 22 f.), nor would leave apparent in the text any object for his submitting his gospel to the church at all. Observe,

¹ Those who do not agree with this, fall into forced interpretations, as Fritzsche, *Opusc.* p. 175: “ne forte frustra etiam tum, quum epistolam ad Galatas scriberet, apostolus laboraret, aut . . . ante iter jam laboravisset.”

² Against Holsten's exaggeration Hilgenfeld (in his *Zeitschr.* 1860, p. 117 f.) has justly declared himself. The counter remarks of Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Petr. u. Paul.* p. 277, are immaterial.

moreover, that the apostle does not say *εἴπως* (*whether possibly*); but, with the delicate tact of one who modestly and confidently submits himself to the judgment of the church and the apostles, while hostile doubts as to the salutary character of his labours are by no means unknown to him, he writes *μήπως*, *whether . . . not possibly* (iv. 11; 1 Thess. iii. 5), that is, in the positive sense, *whether perhaps*.¹ In no case has the apostle in *μήπως κ.τ.λ.* expressed the intention of procuring for himself a conviction of the correctness of his teaching.² — *εἰς κενόν*] *in cassum*. See Jacobs *ad Anthol.* VII. p. 328. Comp. the passages from Josephus in Kypke; from the LXX., Isa. lxx. 23 *et al.*; from the N. T., 2 Cor. vi. 1, Phil. ii. 16, 1 Thess. iii. 5. Comp. also the use of *εἰς κοινόν*, *εἰς καιρόν*, *εἰς καλόν*, and the like, in Bernhardt, p. 221. Paul conceives his running as *vain*, that is, not attaining the saving result aimed at,³ if his gospel is not the right and true one. — *τρέχω*] a figurative expression, derived from the running in the *stadium*, for earnestly striving activity—in this case, official activity, as in Phil. ii. 16, 2 Tim. iv. 7; in other passages, Christian activity in general, as 1 Cor. ix. 24 f., Gal. v. 7, Heb. xii. 1. Comp. Rom. ix. 16. The present indicative transfers us into the present time of the *ἀνεθέμην*, from which *ἔδραμον* then looks back into the past. A clear and vivid representation. As to the indicative generally with the indirect interrogative *μή*, *whether not*, see Bernhardt, p. 397; Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 810; also Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 104.

¹ In *μήπως κ.τ.λ.*, let us conceive to ourselves the moment when the apostle has laid his gospel before those assembled, and then says as it were, "Here you have my gospel to the Gentiles; by it you may now judge *whether I am perhaps labouring in vain*, or—if from the present I look back upon the past—*have so laboured!*" The supposition of *irony* (Märcker in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1866, p. 537) is not warrantable amidst the gravity of the whole surrounding circumstances.

² Winer (p. 470) justly lays stress upon this in opposition to Fritzsche, but is of opinion (with de Wette) that Paul desired to obviate the frustration involved in *μήπως κ.τ.λ.*, by inducing the assent of the apostles to his gospel, "because without this assent and recognition the Christians who had been converted by him would have remained out of communion with the others" (de Wette). But this latter idea is unnecessarily introduced; and even in the event of non-recognition, Paul, looking to his direct calling and the revelation he had received, could not have regarded it as involving the result of his labour being *in vain*.

³ Comp. the classical *ἀνόνητα ποιεῖν*, Plat. *Rep.* p. 486 C.

Note.—Acts xv. 4, 12 must not be adduced as proof either for or against (Fritzsche, Wieseler, and others) the identity of our journey with that of Acts xv. The two facts—that related in Acts xv. 4, 12, and that expressed by ἀνεθέμην κ.τ.λ. in Gal. ii. 2—are two *different* actions, both of which took place at that visit of the apostle to Jerusalem, although what is stated in our passage was foreign to the historical connection in Acts xv., and therefore is not recorded there. The book of Acts relates only *the transactions conducive to his object, in which Paul took part as deputy from the church at Antioch*. What he did besides in the personal interest of his apostolic validity and ministry,—namely, his laying his gospel as well before the church (not to be identified with the assembly of the council) as before the δοκοῦντες also separately,—forms the subject of his narrative in Gal. ii., which is related to that in the Acts, not as excluding it and thereby impugning its historical character, but as supplementing it (contrary to the view of Baur, Schwegler, Zeller, Hilgenfeld). Comp. on Acts xv. 19 f. As to the non-mention of the apostolic decree, see Introd. § 3.

Ver. 3. Observe, that Paul does not pass on to the result of his discussions with the δοκοῦσι until ver. 6, and consequently it is ver. 6 ff. which corresponds to the κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ δοκοῦσι in ver. 2; so that vv. 3–5 have reference to the result of the laying his gospel to the Gentiles before *the Christians in Jerusalem generally*, and correspond with the first part of ver. 2 (ἀνεθέμην αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγ. ὃ κηρ. ἐν τ. ἔθν.). — But so little had that exposition of my gospel to the church at Jerusalem a result counteracting it and implying the εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον, that, on the contrary, *not even Titus*, etc. Thus ἀλλ' οὐδέ (comp. Luke xxiii. 15; Acts xix. 2) introduces a fact which—in contrast to the idea of “running in vain,” which had just been brought forward as the point for inquiry in that exposition of his gospel—serves as the surest palpable proof how triumphantly the Gentile gospel of the apostle (which rejected the necessity of circumcision for the Hellenes) maintained its ground then before the church of Jerusalem, and how very far people were from ascribing to the apostle a running, or having run, in vain. For otherwise it would have been absurd, if the church had not pleaded for, and carried

out, the circumcision at least of Titus.¹ "But not even this was done, to say nothing of its being a duty of the church to reject my gospel which was altogether opposed to the circumcision of Gentiles, and to decide that I εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον!" This line of argument involves a *syllogism*, of which ἀλλ' οὐδὲ . . . περιτμηθῆναι is the *minor*. — "Ἑλλην ὢν] Although a *Hellene*, a *Gentile*.² We have no further details as to his descent. — ἡναγκάσθη] From vv. 4, 5 it follows that, on the part of certain Christians at Jerusalem (not of the apostles also, who are not referred to until ver. 6, where the κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ τοῖς δοκ. is resumed), the circumcision of Titus had been *urged*, but had not been *complied with* on the part of Paul, Barnabas, and Titus, and this resistance was respected by the church;³ hence the οὐκ ἡναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι, *there was not imposed on him the necessity of submitting to be circumcised*. Most expositors, however, adopt the common opinion that οὐδὲ . . . ἡναγκάσθη περιτ. implies that the circumcision of Titus *had not been demanded*, which is adduced by Paul as a proof of his agreement with the apostles. See Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, and many others, including Winer, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, de Wette, Hofmann. This view is decisively set aside by the sequel (see on ver. 4), apart from the fact that here the relation to the *apostles* is not yet under discussion. Moreover, if the circumcision of Titus had not been demanded, there would have been no occasion for the expression ἡναγκάσθη. Certain individuals in the church, no doubt instigated by the false brethren (ver. 4), had really come forward with the demand that Titus must submit to be circumcised. Comp. the subsequent case

¹ The latter, as associated with the apostle in teaching, must, in his uncircumcised Gentile condition, have been *specially* offensive to those who had Judaistic views.

² This "although a *Hellene*" refers to ὁ σὺν ἡμοῖς. Paul is conscious of the boldness, nay, of the defiance (comp. Jerome on ver. 1, "*ausus sit*"), which was involved in bringing the *Hellene* with him to the council at Jerusalem, the seat of Judaism. In the sense of *my official colleague* (Reiche, Wieseler), the simple ὁ σὺν ἡμοῖς is not in harmony with the context.

³ For the ἡναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι, if it had occurred, *could* only have occurred through the church—and indeed possibly even the apostolic college (as the Tübingen criticism asserts)—joining in the demand made on Titus, and adopting it as their own.

of Timothy, who under different circumstances was circumcised by Paul himself (Acts xvi. 3). To look upon the false brethren themselves as those who demanded the circumcision of Titus (Bleek, Wieseler, and others) does not suit ver. 4, in which they appear only as the *more remote* cause of the demand; they kept *in the background*.¹

Note.—An inconsistency with Acts xv., in which the argument and decision are *against* the necessity of circumcision, would only emerge in ver. 3, if the matter in question here had been the principal transactions of the *council itself*, and if those who required the circumcision of Titus had been the *apostles* (or had at least *included* the apostles), as Fritzsche, Baur, Hilgenfeld, Holsten, and others assume. But as neither of these is the case, and as, indeed, it does not even follow from our passage that the apostles had so much as merely *advised* the circumcision of Titus (Wieseler's earlier opinion, which he has now rightly abandoned), this passage cannot furnish arguments either against the identity of the journey Gal. ii. with that of Acts xv. (Fritzsche, p. 224), or against the historical character of Acts xv (Baur and his followers).

Ver. 4 f. The motive, *why* the demand of circumcision made as to Titus was not complied with by Paul, Barnabas, and Titus (comp. *εἴξαμεν*, ver. 5). It was refused *on account of the false brethren*, to whom concession would otherwise have been made in a way conducive to their designs against Christian freedom. — *διὰ δὲ τοὺς παρεισάκτους ψευδαδελφούς*] *sc. οὐκ ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι*.² These words, however, are not, properly speaking, *to be supplied*; in *διὰ δὲ τ. π. ψ.* they receive their more precise definition, made specially prominent by *δέ, autem*: *on account, however, of the false brethren*. Though Paul might have subjoined this immediately without *δέ*, he inserts the *δέ* not superfluously (Jerome, Theodoret, Theophylact), but on account of the important bearing of the matter on his argu-

¹ Holsten wrongly reverses the relation, when he holds that behind the false brethren Paul saw the Christians of Jerusalem and the *δοκοῦντες*.

² To supply merely *ἠναγκάσθη περιτμ.* without *οὐκ* (Koppe), so that *ἠναγκάσθη* is to be understood in the altered sense, "But on account of the false brethren, it was insisted on in his case," is entirely inadmissible, both on account of this very diversity of sense, and also because in ver. 3 the negation is essential and indeed the chief point.

ment. The case is similar when a more precise definition is made prominent by *δέ*, the same word being repeated, as in ver. 2. So, in substance, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Augustine, Camerarius, Erasmus, Castalio, Piscator, Bos, Calovius, Estius, Bengel, and others; more recently, Schott, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Ellicott, Reithmayr; also Matthies, who, however, so explains the passage that we should rather expect it to run, *διὰ δὲ τῶν παρεισάκτων ψευδαδέλφων*. On *δέ* Bengel justly remarks, “*declarat et intendit*,” as in fact *δέ* is often used by classical authors for giving prominence to an explanatory addition in which the previous verb is of course again understood (Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 359). As to the matter itself, observe how Paul under other circumstances, where there was no dogmatic requirement of opponents brought into play, could bring himself to allow circumcision; see Acts xvi. 3. Consequently after ver. 3 a comma only is to be placed, not a full stop, or even a colon (Lachmann, Tischendorf). Others, as Zachariae, Storr, Borger, Flatt, Hermann, Matthias, supply *ἀνέβην*, which, however, after ver. 3, could not possibly occur to the mind of a reader.¹ Rinck, *Lucubr. crit.* p. 170 f. (so previously Grotius, and recently Wieseler), assumes an *anacoluthon*,—that *οὐκ εἴξαμεν* was intended to follow on *διὰ δὲ τοὺς παρεισάκτ. ψευδαδέλφ.*, but that Paul had been led off by the long parenthesis and had then added *οἷς*. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 329 f., leaves the choice to be made between this view and ours. But if Paul had intended to write, *on account of the false brethren we have not yielded*, he would not in doing so have represented the false brethren as those *to whom* he had not yielded; by using *οἷς* he would thus have *altered*² the sense of what he had begun to say, and would simply have occasioned perplexity by the mixture of *on account of* and *to*

¹ Olshausen takes a similar but still more harsh and arbitrary view, that the idea in Paul's mind was, “I went indeed up to Jerusalem, in order to lay my gospel before the apostles (?) for examination; on account of these, however, it was really not at all necessary . . . but, on account of the false brethren, I found myself induced to take steps.” In the ardour of his language, Paul had allowed himself to be diverted from the construction he had begun; and described instead the nature of the false teachers.

² Wieseler seeks to avoid this by taking *διὰ δὲ τοὺς παρισ. ψευδ.* as equivalent to *τῶν δι' ψευδαδέλφων κλιυνόντων τοῦτο*: *with their demand* Paul had not ex-

whom. But there is no need to resort at all to an anacoluthon when, as here, what immediately precedes presents itself to complete the sense. This remark holds good also against Winer, p. 529 [E. T. 711], who (comp. Hilgenfeld) assumes that Paul mixed up the two thoughts: "We did not have Titus circumcised on account of the false brethren;" and, "I might nowise yield to the false brethren." Hofmann (comp. his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 46) also produces an unnecessary anacoluthic derangement of the sentence, by supposing that a new sentence begins with *διὰ δὲ παρεισάκτ. ψευδ.*, but that the relative definition *οἵτινες κ.τ.λ.* does not allow it to be completed; that, in fact, this completion does not take place *at all*, but with ver. 6 a new period is begun, attached to what immediately precedes. Following the example of Tertullian, *c. Marc.* v. 8, Ambrose, Pelagius, and Primasius (opposed by Jerome), Rückert, who is followed by Elwert, supplements the passage as follows: "But on account of the false brethren *I withheld allowed Titus to be circumcised*" (consequently *περιετμήθη*). According to his view, this is the course of thought in the passage: "Even Titus was at that time *not forced* to be circumcised; there was not, and could not be, any question of *compulsion*; but because I saw that there were false brethren, whose sole endeavour was to discover a vulnerable point in us, I considered it advisable to give them no occasion (?), and had Titus circumcised. *Nevertheless, to yield out of obedience* to them, and to acknowledge a necessity in respect to all Gentiles, never occurred to me for a moment," etc. Against this view it may be decisively urged, first, that in ver. 3 the emphasis is laid on *Τίτος* and not on *ἡναγκάσθη*, and in ver. 5 on *πρὸς ὥραν* and not on *τῇ ὑποταγῇ*; secondly, that the idea of "acknowledging a necessity in respect to all Gentile Christians"

hibited compliance. But *διὰ* means nothing else than *on account of*, that is, according to the context, *with reference to them* (comp. Acts xvi. 3), namely, because they lurked in the background in the matter, and it was inexpedient to take account of their designs or to give them any free scope. Also in Heb. ii. 10, vi. 7, John vi. 57, *διὰ* with the accus. is simply *on account of*, and has to receive its more precise meaning from the context. In the passages quoted by Wieseler (Xen. *Cyr.* v. 2. 35, and Plut. *Cam.* 35), *διὰ*, according to the well-known Greek usage, is "*for the sake of*," that is, *through merit* or *through fault* of any one.

is not even hinted at by any word of Paul; and thirdly, the general consideration that a point so important and so debateable as the (alleged) permission of the circumcision of Titus would have been, would have needed, especially before the *Galatians* (comp. v. 2), a very different elucidation and vindication from one so enigmatically involved, in which the chief ideas could only be read between the lines. But such a compliance itself shown towards *false* brethren,—not for the sake, possibly, of some *weak* brethren, who are imported into the case by Elwert, nor on account of the *Jews*, as in the circumcision of Timothy (Acts xvi. 3),—would have been quite unprincipled and wrong. Very near to the interpretation of Rückert comes that of Reiche, who places the (supposed) circumcision of Titus not at the time then being and at Jerusalem, but at an earlier period, at which it took place either in Antioch or elsewhere: “*At vero . . . ut rem aliam hic interponam, vv. 3–6 (nam ver. 6 oratio ad apostolos redit), Titi nimirum circumcisionem, quam quis forte modo dictis ver. 2 opponat, quasi apostolorum aliorumve auctoritate vel jussu fecerim, aut ipse circumcisionem legisque observationem necessariam duxerim 6 f. parum mihi constans, sufficiat monuisse:—nec Titus ille comes meus et adiutor, Graecus natus, minime est coactus circumcidi a me vel a quocunque; propter falsos autem fratres, qui tum nos speculabantur, quomodo immunitate a lege Mos. a Christo nobis parta uteremur, eo consilio, ut denuo nos sub legis servitium redigerent . . . propter hos dico Titus ritum hunc externum . . . suscepit volens, ut istis calumniandi nocendique ansa et materies prae-ripiatur,*” etc. But against this view may be urged partly the arguments already used against Rückert, and in addition the arbitrary procedure involved in shifting vv. 3–6 to an earlier time; although *Τίτος ὁ σὺν ἐμοί*, evidently referring back to *συμπαλαβὼν καὶ Τίτον* in ver. 1, precludes our taking this event out of the course of the narrative begun in ver. 1. Moreover, *περιετμήθη* as supplied by Reiche cannot be invested with the sense “*liber et volens* circumcisionem suscepit,”—a sense which, for the very sake of the contrast, since the emphasis lies on *liber et volens*, would need to be expressed (by *ἐθελουτῇν περιετμήθη* or the like). Lastly, an un-Pauline

compliance¹ would be the result of *the* sense which would follow from the omission of οἷς οὐδέ in ver. 5 (see the critical notes): "But on account of the false brethren . . . I gave way momentarily and caused Titus to be circumcised," to which also the sentence of purpose which follows, ἵνα ἡ ἀλήθεια κ.τ.λ., would be utterly unsuitable; for, *according to the point of view of our epistle*, the "truth of the gospel" could only continue with the Galatians if such a compliance did *not* take place. — παρεισάκτους] *subintroductos* (Vulgate), *brought in by the side*, that is, *privily and illegitimately*,—namely, into the association of Christian brotherhood, of which they are not at all true members. See the note after ver. 5. The word does not occur elsewhere in ancient authors (*Prolog. Sir.* in Biel, III. p. 43, and Schleusner, IV. p. 228, πρόλογος παρείσακτος ἀδελφου); but it must have been employed on several occasions, as παρείσακτον is quoted by Hesychius, Photius, Suidas, and παρεισάκτους by Zonaras, being explained by ἀλλότριον and ἄλλοτρίους. The word has also been preserved as a *name* (by-name) in Strabo, xvii. 1, p. 794, Παρείσακτος ἐπικληθεὶς Πτολεμαῖος. The verb παρεισάγω is very current in later authors (Plut. *Mor.* p. 328 D; Polyb. ii. 7. 8, vi. 56. 12; Diod. xii. 41; 2 Pet. ii. 1). Comp. παρεισέδυσαν, Jude 4. — ψευδαδελφους] as in 2 Cor. xi. 26, persons who were Christians indeed, but were not so according to the true nature of Christianity—from the apostle's standpoint, anti-Pauline, Judaizing reactionaries against Christian freedom. The *article* points out that these people were historically known to the readers, Acts xv. 1, 5. — οἵτινες κ.τ.λ.] *quippe qui*, contains the explanation as to the *dangerous character* of these persons, by which the διὰ δὲ τ. π. ψ. is justified. — παρεισῆλθον] Comp. Lucian, *Asin.* 15, εἰ λύκος παρεισέλθοι; Polyb. ii. 55. 3. The idea of *being smuggled in* (which is denied by Hofmann) is here accordant with the context, and indicated

¹ Reiche seeks to evade this by thus explaining ver. 5: "*quibus, quanquam prudentiae fuerit, propter eos Titum circumcidere, attamen ceterum, in rebus ad fidem libertatemque Christianam fere facientibus, ne paulisper quidem cessimus iis obtemperantes.*" We should thus have in ver. 5 a saving clause, *the most essential point of which* ("*ceterum, in rebus,*" etc.) *would have to be mentally supplied.*

purposely by the twice-repeated *παρεις*. Comp. generally on Rom. v. 20, and see Chrysostom on our passage. — *κατασκοπῆσαι*] *in order to spy out, hostilely to reconnoitre, to watch*. Comp. Josh. ii. 2, 3; 2 Sam. x. 3; 1 Chron. xix. 3; Eur. *Hel.* 1623; Polyb. x. 2; also *κατάσκοπος, a spy*. — *ἣν ἔχομεν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησ.*] a more precise definition of the preceding *ἡμῶν*. Comp. Eph. ii. 4 *et al.* This freedom is, as may be gathered from the entire context, nothing else than the *freedom from Mosaism* (Rom. x. 4) through justification by faith. Comp. iii. 13, v. 1. Matthies introduces also the *Christian life*, but without warrant; the spying of the pseudo-Christians was directed to the point, whether and to what extent the Christians did not conform to the enactments of the Mosaic law. *Ἐν Χριστῷ* implies as its basis the solemn idea of the *ἐν Χριστῷ εἶναι* (v. 6; 2 Cor. v. 21; Eph. iii. 6, *et al.* Comp. Eph. i. 7, iii. 12). Hence: *in Christ*, as our element of life by means of faith (comp. 2 Cor. iii. 17), *as Christians*. — *ἵνα ἡμᾶς καταδουλώσουσιν*¹] is the dangerous *design* which they had in view in their *κατασκοπῆσαι*. *Ἡμᾶς* applies, as before, to the *Christians* as such, not merely to Paul and Titus (Winer, de Wette), or to Paul and the Gentile Christians (Baur); for it must be the wider category of those to whom, as the *genus*, the *ὑμεῖς* in ver. 5 belong as the *species*. We must also notice *διαμεῖνῃ* in ver. 5, which is

¹ The *Recepta*, defended by Reiche, is *καταδουλώσονται*. But B** F G, 17, Dam., have *καταδουλώσωσιν*; and A B* C D E N, min., *καταδουλώσουσιν* (so Lachmann, Scholz, Tischendorf). The *middle* (to which, moreover, Lucian, *Soloec.* 12, assigns an unfounded difference from the active) is accordingly abandoned unanimously by the best mss., and is the more readily to be given up, because in this case the versions cannot come into consideration, and consequently the importance of the mss. is all the greater. The *middle* being most familiar from the LXX. (Gen. xlvii. 21; Ex. i. 14, vi. 5; Lev. xv. 46; Ezek. xxix. 18; the *active*, only in Jer. xv. 14, xvii. 4; the Apocrypha has the *middle* only), intruded itself unsought. This much in opposition to Reiche, who derives the active from 2 Cor. xi. 20. Further, as *καταδουλώσουσιν* has the great preponderance of testimony, and was very easily liable to the alteration into the subjunctive usual after *ἵνα*, it is to be adopted (with Usteri, Schott, Wieseler, Hofmann), but is not to be considered (with Fritzsche) as a corruption of the subjunctive. The *Recepta* *καταδουλώσονται*, which K and most of the later mss. have, shows that the change into the subjunctive must have been very prevalent at an early date. Nevertheless L and one min. have *καταδουλώσονται*, which must have sprung from the original *καταδουλώσουσιν*.

correlative to the ἔχομεν in ver. 4. The *future* after ἵνα indicates, that the false brethren expected their success to be certain and enduring. See Matthiae, p. 1186; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 683; Rost, *ad Duncan. Lex.* p. 870. In classical authors we find only ὅπως, ὅφρα, and μή thus construed, and not ἵνα, as Brunck, *ad Eur. Bacch.* 1380, supposed (Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 629), but in the Hellenists and Fathers ἵνα also. Comp. Winer, p. 271 [E. T. 361]; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 202. *Karà* strengthens the idea of the simple verb: *to make us wholly slaves* (of Mosaism), *to enslave us.* Comp. 2 Cor. xi. 20; Plat. *Pol.* i. p. 315 B, δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι: Thuc. iii. 70. 2, and Duker *in loc.* The mode in which the apostle looks at these people does not confound the result with the intention (de Wette); it represents the latter correctly according to the fact (they desire to bind the Christians to the law), but in the form which it assumed *from the Pauline point of view.* Comp. vi. 12 f.

Ver. 5. *Connection*:—"On account of the false brethren, however, Titus was not compelled to be circumcised; *to these we did not yield even for an hour.* Had we consented to the suggestion, which was made to us by Christians at Jerusalem (see on ver. 3), at least to circumcise Titus, we should have thereby yielded to the false brethren standing in the background, who declared the circumcision of Gentile Christians to be necessary; but this did not at all take place."¹ — οἷς] in the sense of τοῦτοις γάρ. See Stallbaum, *ad Phil.* p. 195 f.; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 64; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 371. — πρὸς ὥραν] not even *for an hour*, indicating a very short duration of time. Comp. 2 Cor. vii. 8; Philem. 15; John v. 35; 1 Thess. ii. 17; also πρὸς μίαν ῥοπήν, Wisd. xviii. 12; πρὸς ὀλίγον, πρὸς βραχύ, and the like. — εἵξαμεν] namely, I and Barnabas and Titus. — τῇ ὑποταγῇ] belongs not to διαμεῖνῃ (Matthias), an inverted arrangement which would be without motive, but to εἵξαμεν, beside which it stands: "through the obedience claimed by the false brethren," that is, *by rendering to them the obedience which they desired.* On the matter itself, see Acts xv. 1, 5. Matthias regards τῇ

¹ Paul was therefore by no means "*nearly* compelled to have Titus circumcised" (Hilgenfeld in his *Zeitschr.* 1860, p. 121).

ὑποταγῇ as an appositional explanation of οἷς (as to this usage, see Fritzsche, *Diss. in 2 Cor.* II. p. 135 f.). But the yielding takes place not to the obedience, but to the demand (τῇ ἐντολῇ). Fritzsche correctly takes it in an ablative sense, but explains, "eo obsequio praestito, quod apostoli postularent." But in combination with οἷς . . . εἴξαμεν, and with ἵνα ἡμᾶς καταδουλ. preceding, it would not occur to the reader to think of anything else than the obedience claimed by the ψευδάδελφοι. Besides, it was not the apostles at all who demanded the circumcision of Titus, but (see on ver. 3) Christians at Jerusalem, acting on the instigation of the ψευδάδελφοι, so that *these latter* would have been obeyed by the circumcision in question. Comp. the state of matters at Acts xxi. 21. Holsten, without any indication of support in the context, interprets: "by the *subordination to the δοκοῦντες*, which had been demanded by the false brethren." Lastly, Hermann (who is followed by Bretschneider), entirely in opposition to the context, explains it, "quibus ne horae quidem spatium *Jesu obsequio* segnior fui." — ἵνα ἡ ἀλήθεια κ.τ.λ.] *Object* of this non-compliance at that time, which, although in the nature of the case it concerned Pauline Christians generally, is represented concretely as referring to the *Galatians*: "*in order that the truth of the gospel may abide with you*; in order that by our conduct the principle of Christian freedom should not be shaken, and ye should not be induced to deviate from the truth, which forms the subject-matter of the gospel (ver. 14; Col. i. 5), by mixing it up with Mosaism" (comp. ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, i. 6). A purpose, therefore—and this the readers were intended to feel—to which their present apostasy entirely ran counter! — πρὸς ὑμᾶς] as πρὸς αὐτόν, i. 18, comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 7; here also it is not the *with* of simple rest, but expresses the relation of an active bearing on life; Bernhardt, p. 265. Besides, Paul might justly say πρὸς ὑμᾶς, as the Galatians were for the most part *Gentile Christians*, and in that opposition to the false brethren it was the freedom of the Gentile Christians which he sought to maintain. The ὑμᾶς individualizes the readers of the letter (iii. 26, iv. 6; Col. i. 25; Eph. iii. 2, and frequently). The reference to the yet *unconverted* Gentiles, whom the truth of the gospel had still to

reach (πρὸς ὑμᾶς), as suggested by Hofmann,¹ is in complete opposition to the text. — διαμείνη] *permaneret*; denoting the *abiding* continuance. The truth which they have received was not again to be lost. Heb. i. 11; 2 Pet. iii. 4; Luke xxii. 8; and frequently in Greek authors.

Note.—As by the ψευδάδελφοι (vv. 4, 5) cannot be meant the Judaizers at work *among the Galatians* (which is assumed by Fritzsche entirely in opposition to the connection), but only the same persons mentioned in Acts xv. 1, 5; they cannot be described as *false brethren* in relation to any *one particular church* (e.g. to the church of Antioch, into which they had crept from Jerusalem, as Baur and Reiche think). On the contrary, the general form of their antagonism, vv. 4, 5, as well as the further account in vv. 7–10, and the whole argument of the epistle, admit only of one point of view,—that the apostle, out of the certainty of the ἀλήθεια τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, styles them false brethren *in relation to Christianity generally*, of which they had, as regards their Judaizing character and action looked at from a Pauline standpoint, falsely pretended to be professors. This does not in itself exclude the fact that they had come from Jerusalem to Antioch (Acts xv. 1). The inflexible opposition offered to them by the apostle in Jerusalem doubtless contributed much to the bringing about of the apostolic decree. Comp. Märcker, *l.c.* p. 539.

Ver. 6. Paul having described in vv. 3–5 the momentous result of his relations towards the Christians in Jerusalem (αὐτοῖς, ver. 2), now passes on (corresponding to the κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ τοῖς δοκοῦσι, ver. 2) to *his relations towards the apostles*, explaining that the same result had then followed his discussions *with them*. — *The construction is anacoluthic.* For when the apostle wrote ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι τι, he had it in view subsequently to finish his sentence with οὐδὲν ἔλαβον, οὐδὲν ἐδιδάχθην, or something of that kind; but by the intervening remarks *ὅποιοί ποτε . . . λαμβάνει* he was completely diverted from the plan which he had begun, so that now the thought which floated before his mind in ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι τι is no longer brought into connection with these words, but is annexed in the form of a ground (γάρ) to πρόσωπον Θεοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαμβάνει; and this altered chain of thought

¹ Comp. Windischmann.

occasions *ἐμοί* to be now placed emphatically at the beginning. Properly speaking, therefore, we have here a parenthesis beginning with *ὅποιοι*, which, without any formal conclusion, carries us back again by *ἐμοί γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* to the main thought, leaving the words *ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναί τι* entirely unconnected, and merely pointing back by means of *οἱ δοκούντες*, as by a guide-post, to that abandoned commencement of the sentence. For it is only in substance, and not in form, that the parenthesis is concluded with *λαμβάνει*. Comp. Rom. v. 12 ff.; Eph. ii. 1 ff. An anacoluthon is also assumed by Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Piscator, Cornelius a Lapide, Grotius, Estius, Morus, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Winer, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Baumgarten - Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, and others; so that—according to the usual view (Wieseler takes the correct one)—with *ἐμοί γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Paul again takes up the thread of the discourse which had broken off with *ἀπὸ δὲ δοκούντων εἶναί τι*, and merely continues it *actively* instead of *passively* (Winer, p. 529 [E. T. 711]). But this is opposed both by *ἐμοί*, which logically would not be in its proper place at the head of the resumed sentence, and also by *γάρ*, which does not correspond to the mere *inquam* (*οὖν*, *δέ*) after parentheses, but in the passages concerned (also Rom. xv. 27; 1 Cor. ix. 19) is to be taken as explaining or assigning a reason. Hermann makes out an *aposiopesis*, so that *quid metuerem?* has to be supplied after *ἀπὸ . . . εἶναί τι*.¹ But this is not suggested by the context, nor is it permitted by the tranquil flow of the discourse, in which no such emotion as warrants an *aposiopesis* is discoverable. Fritzsche supplies the very same thing which in ver. 4 was to be supplied after *ψευδαδέλφους*, making Paul say, “*a viris autem* (nempe), *qui auctoritate varent* [circumcisionis necessitatem sibi imponi non sivit].” But however easy and natural this supplement was in ver. 4 after *ψευδαδέλφους*, because it was suggested as a matter of course by the words immediately preceding, in the present case it appears both harsh and involved, as the whole body of ideas in vv. 4, 5 intervenes and hinders the reader from going back to that supplement. And how abrupt would be the position of the

¹ Comp. Dav. Schulz, who believes that *quidnam tandem adversus me actum est?* is suppressed.

following ὅποιοι κ.τ.λ. ! Lastly, the (erroneous) idea, that the apostles had demanded the circumcision of Titus, is thus violently imported into the text. Holsten's involved construction (z. *Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 273 f.)—according to which ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκ. κ.τ.λ. is to be carried on to ver. 9 in conformity with the notion of δεξιὰς λαμβάνειν ἀπὸ—is shown by ἐμοὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., where the δοκοῦντες already reappear, to be an impossible solution of the anacoluthon, which even thus is not avoided. The passage is explained without supposing either supplement or anacoluthon:—1. Most simply, and without violence to the language, by Burk, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1865, p. 734 ff., making εἶναί τι belong to οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει: “That on the part of those in authority (by their recognition) I am something (namely, as respects my outward position), I reckon of no value.” But, in reality, Paul attached to his recognition by the original apostles the true and great value which it necessarily had for him in confronting his opponents; and hence he very carefully relates it in ver. 7. This interpretation therefore runs counter to the context. Comp. also, against it, Märcker in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1866, p. 532 ff. 2. Just as little allowable is it (with Märcker) to connect ἀπο δὲ τ. δοκ. ἐ. τ. with the words preceding, “but certainly (this enduring confirmation of Christian freedom was only possible) through the authority of the δοκοῦντες εἶναί τι.” But to the signification of ἀπό, from the side of, a sense would thus be arbitrarily ascribed, which is not justified by passages such as Matt. xvi. 21, and must have been expressed by some such explanatory addition as in Acts ii. 22. It was impossible also for Paul—above all in this epistle—to conceive the maintenance of the truth of his Gentile gospel as conditional on the authority of the original apostles. Lastly, instead of the sentence which next follows asyndetically (ὅποιοι κ.τ.λ.), we should expect an emphasized antithesis (such as ἀλλ’ ὅποιοι κ.τ.λ.). 3. The Greek Fathers, Castalio, Calovius, Zachariae, Bolten, Borger, and others, interpret the passage, “But as regards those of repute, it is one and the same thing to me,” etc., by which, however, ἀπό is quite in violation of language interchanged with περί. So also Rückert,¹

¹ Comp. Olshausen, who, however, assumes that in using ἀπό Paul had at first some other phrase in his mind, but that he afterwards inexactly followed it

who at the same time wishes to preserve for *ἀπό* its due signification ("on the part of any one, it makes no difference to me; that is, what concerns him, is quite indifferent to me"), without authority, however, from any actual linguistic usage.

4. Following Homberg, Ewald understands it as if it stood *τῶν δὲ δοκούντων . . . οὐδὲν διαφέρω*, "But compared with those who etc., however high they once stood, *I am in nothing inferior*."

5. Hofmann (comp. above, against Holsten) brings *ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναί τι* (*ἀπό, from the side of*) into regimen with ver. 9, and in such a manner that the three *δοκούντες στῦλοι εἶναι* in ver. 9 are supposed to form the subject of the period beginning with *ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ.* in ver. 6; but this mode of construction is decisively condemned by its very inherent monstrosity, with its parentheses inserted one within another; and besides this, the repetition of *οἱ δοκούντες* in ver. 6 would be entirely without aim and simply perplexing, if the continuation of the construction as regards *ἀπὸ δ. τ. δ. ε. τ.* were still to follow, as is supposed by Hofmann. Nevertheless, Laurent, *neut. Stud.* p. 29 f., has agreed with the latter, but has at the same time arbitrarily removed from the disjointed construction *ὅποιοι . . . τούναντίον* as a marginal note of the apostle,—another make-shift, whereby *ἀλλὰ τούναντίον*, so violently dealt with by Hofmann, finds the connection with *ιδόντες*, which it evidently has (see below), dissevered. — On *δοκεῖν εἶναί τι*, which may mean either *to reckon oneself to be something great*, or *to be esteemed great by others* (so here), see Wetstein. Comp. Plat. *Euthyd.* p. 303 C, *τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκούντων τι εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει*. The same persons are meant who are referred to in ver. 2 by *τοῖς δοκοῦσι*. But the addition of *τι εἶναι*, and the *ὅποιοι κ.τ.λ.* which follows, betray here a certain irritation in reference to the opponents, who would not concede to Paul an estimation equal to that given to the original apostles, as if *εἶναί τι* belonged *pre-eminently* to the latter. — *ὅποιοί ποτε ᾔσαν*] Now come the parenthetical remarks, on account of which Paul leaves his *ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκ. εἶναί τι* standing alone, but which he introduces, lest the high estimation of those apostles—which in itself, according to the

up with *οὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει*. In all essential points Matthias agrees with Rückert, as does also Reithmayr, who improperly compares Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 1. 4.

real (and by him undisputed) circumstances of the case, he by no means calls in question—should lead to the inference that he had needed instruction from them. Comp. the subsequent *ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἱ δοκ. οὐδέν προσανέθ.*, and the thought already floating before the apostle's mind in the anacoluthic *ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναί τι* (see above). Wieseler affirms too generally, that “Paul desired to check the *overvaluing* of the older apostles.” The real state of the case is this: Paul, with all decision, by way of countervailing that *δοκεῖν εἶναί τι* of those men of high standing which he does not dispute, throws into the scale his own independence of them. And the weight of this countervailing lies precisely in *ὅποιοί ποτε ἦσαν*, so far as the latter belongs to *οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει*, and is not, as Hofmann will have it, an appendage to *τῶν δοκούντων εἶναί τι*. — The *ποτέ*, with a direct or indirect interrogative, is the strengthening *cunque* or *tandem* which occurs constantly in Greek authors (Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1), although not elsewhere in the N. T. (comp. 2 Macc. xiv. 32); see also Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 515 f. *Whosoever they were*, in whatsoever high repute they stood¹ while I was then with them, *it is all the same to me*. Rückert makes *ὅποιοι* mean, “whether high or low, apostles or what else;” holding that Paul speaks intentionally in an indefinite way of these men in high repute, as if he did not exactly know that they were apostles (?), in order to give the less offence in what he said. How strange this would be! for every reader knew whom he meant. And how unsuitable to his purpose! for what Paul desires to tell, is the recognition he received *from the apostles*. Many refer *ὅποιοι ποτε ἦσαν* back to the *lifetime of Jesus*, when those apostles had been His trusted disciples: some taking *ποτέ* as *olim* (Vulgate, Jerome, Pelagius, Luther, Beza, and others, including Matthies, Schott, Olshausen, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Ewald); and others, with us, as *cunque* (“quiqui illi fuerunt, etiam si ab ipso Jesu instituti, perinde est,” Hermann; comp. Winer). But in the case of James (see on ver. 9) this reference would not be even historically applicable, or it would need at least to be applied to a different kind of relation (that of *kinship*); see Hilgenfeld. And be-

¹ Not: how *friendly* and *brotherly* they were towards me (Matthias), to which meaning *οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει* is far from suited.

sides, there is nothing at all to indicate any such retrospective reference to that remote past; the context points merely to the time of Paul's sojourn in Jerusalem. Hence also it must not, with others still, be referred to—what was quite foreign to the apostle's aim—the *pre-Christian* condition of the apostles, in which they had been *sinners* (Estius; comp. Augustine), or *ιδιώται* and *fishermen* (Ambrose, Thomas, Cajetan, Cornelius a Lapide, and others), *ποτέ* being likewise understood as *olim*.¹ — οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει] *matters to me nothing*. See Schaefer, *ad Dion. Hal.* p. 294; Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 394. — πρόσωπον Θεὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαμβάνει] לֹא הִלָּחַשׁ אֱלֹהִים פְּנֵי אָדָם, an asyndetic, and thereby more forcible and weighty, statement of the reason for οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει. “*Dei judicium sequebatur Paulus*,” Bengel. אֱלֹהִים פְּנֵי, πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν, properly, *to accept the countenance of any one* (not to dismiss), is used in the O. T. both in a good sense (*to be inclined, or gracious, to any one*, Gen. xix. 21, xxxii. 21, *et al.*) and in a bad sense, implying a *favour and respect* which is *partial*, determined by personal considerations (Lev. xix. 15; Deut. x. 17, *et al.*; Ecclus. iv. 27; 3 Esr. iv. 39). In the N. T. it is used *solely in this bad sense* (Matt. xxii. 16; Mark xii. 14; Luke xx. 21; Jude 16. Comp. Acts x. 34; Jas. ii. 9; Rom. ii. 11; Eph. vi. 9; Col. iii. 26; Jas. ii. 1). The transposed arrangement of the words lays the *chief emphasis* upon πρόσωπον, and then by Θεὸς ἀνθρώπου makes us sensible of the *contrast* between the manner and dignity of the *divine* procedure and such partiality for *human* authority. Comp. Hom. *Od.* xix. 363 f., ἧ σε περὶ Ζεὺς ἀνθρώπων ἤχθηρε θεοῦδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντα. — ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἱ δοκοῦντες οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο] *Proof*, not of his independence of the apostles generally, but specially for what he had just said, πρόσωπον Θεὸς ἀνθρ. οὐ λαμβάνει, *from personal experience*. Hence ἐμοί is emphatically placed first: “*for to me for my part—although others may have received instruction from them, to me—they have communicated nothing.*” Paul’s idea therefore is, that if God

¹ It was entirely in opposition to the context, that Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Jerome referred it to the earlier *teaching* of the apostles; taking Paul to say, that whether at an earlier date they had been Judaizers or not was to him a matter of indifference.

had been partial, *He would not have placed him on such parity with the δοκοῦσι, that to him, etc.* Rückert, wrongly anticipating, says that the prefixed ἐμοί finds its antithesis in ver. 11: “to me they have communicated nothing, etc.; but indeed, when Peter came to Antioch, I was compelled to admonish him.” But in this case, at least ver. 11 must have begun with ἐγὼ δὲ or ἀλλ’ ἐγώ. According to Wieseler, Paul in ἐμοί is thinking of “to me, the former persecutor,” an idea gratuitously introduced. In Hofmann’s view the antithesis is intended to be, that *not to him from the others* was anything submitted, but *the converse*. Comp. τινές in Chrysostom, and the paraphrase of Erasmus. But if this were so, Paul must have written οὐ γὰρ ἐμοί κ.τ.λ., just as afterwards ἀλλὰ τοὺναντίον αὐτοὶ κ.τ.λ., in order to have given at least a bare indication of this alleged antithesis. — οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο] quite as in i. 16 (comp. also Hofmann): *they addressed no communications* (“nihil contulerunt,” Vulgate) *to me*, namely, in order to instruct and advise me,—a sense which is here also demanded by the context; see the sequel, and comp. i. 12. It is usually understood: οὐδὲν προσέθηκαν, οὐδὲν διώρθωσαν (Chrysostom), “nihil illi praesumserunt iis *adjicere*, quae prius a Christo accepta docueram inter gentes,” Beza; as also Valla, Estius, Grotius, Bengel, Koppe, Morus, Borger, Flatt, Winer, Usteri, Matthies, Schott,¹ and others. Comp. Wieseler, Märcker, and Hilgenfeld: “They submitted nothing in addition to that which had been submitted by me; they approved the gospel, which I am preaching among the Gentiles.” But πρὸς expresses merely the *direction*, and not *insuper* (see on i. 16). Should ἀνατίθημι, however, be understood as *to impose*, πρὸς would certainly express the idea *novum opus imponere* (Xen.

¹ Baur arbitrarily (I. p. 141, ed. 2) brings in the thought, “They have brought forward nothing against me, wherein I should have had to acknowledge them in the right.” Οὐδὲν is made to mean, nothing *conclusive* and *convincing*—nothing whereby they would have confuted him and brought him over to their side (comp. Baur in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1849, p. 463). There is not the most remote allusion in the passage to any *conflict* between Paul and the original apostles; on the contrary, it implies the complete understanding on both sides, which was the result of the discussion. The *conflict* affected the members of the church who were stirred up by the ψευδοᾱδελφοί and the false brethren themselves (vv. 3-5).

Mem. ii. 1. 8); as Rückert (so also Bretschneider and Lechler, p. 412) explains it, "*they imposed on me no further obligations*," the observance of the law being the point principally alluded to. Comp. also Zeller, *Apostelgesch.* p. 235. But in opposition to this view, apart from the fact that it involves a quite needless departure from the signification of the same word in i. 16, the circumstance is decisive, that *προσανατίθημι* in the middle would necessarily mean "*suscipere novum opus*," as *Xen. Mem. l.c.*, and not "*imponere novum opus*," even though the comparison of the apostle's obligation to a burden (comp. 1 Cor. ix. 16 f.) should appear sufficiently justified by the legal nature of the matters imposed. — οὐδέν] either the accusative of the object, or more strongly (comp. i. 16), *in no point*, in no respect whatever. The idea that a *revelation* is intended as the contents of *προσαν.* (Holsten), must be sought for in the context: it is not conveyed by the words *per se*.

Ver. 7. Ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον] to be separated merely by a comma from the preceding, being still connected with γάρ. "To me they made no kind of communication; but, on the contrary, when they had seen etc., the three pillar-apostles concluded with me and Barnabas the apostolic alliance," etc. (ver. 9). Hofmann, with a view to extort a regimen for ἀπὸ τῶν δοκούντων in ver. 6, very arbitrarily tears asunder the clear and simple connection which the words obviously present, taking ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον by itself and dis severed from what follows, and supplementing the sense by the insertion, "They have not proposed anything to me, but *conversely*, I to them." Comp. on τοῦναντίον, 2 Cor. ii. 7, 1 Pet. iii. 9; very frequently (also τάναντία) occurring in Greek authors (Schaefer, *ad Ros. Ell.* p. 297). But this strange ellipsis is a device utterly unprecedented.¹ — ἰδόντες] *after they had seen*, namely, from the way in which I to them κατ' ἰδίαν ἀνεθέμην τὸ εὐαγγ. ὁ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι (ver. 2). Usteri, "from the blessed result of my preaching." So also Rosenmüller, Winer, Baur, Hilgenfeld, Holsten, Hofmann; Rückert, Schott, de Wette,

¹ Certainly the ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον was, for Hofmann at least, the most refractory part of the sentence, which had in some sort of way to be forcibly torn from its natural connection with ἰδόντες, — a connection justly unassailed by expositors. And he has managed it by the device of the above mentioned ellipsis!

Wieseler, mix the two views; and Fritzsche includes the previous labours of the apostle among the Gentiles, *e.g.* in Tarsus and Antioch, among the grounds of knowledge. But nothing beyond what we have just given can be gathered from the context. Erasmus appropriately paraphrases, “ubi communicato cum illis evangelio meo perspexissent.” — ὅτι πεπίστ. τ. εὐαγγ. τ. ἀκροβ. κ.τ.λ.] The emphasis is laid on καθὼς Πέτρος τῆς περιτ., as ver. 8 shows. They saw that my having been divinely entrusted with the gospel for the Gentiles was just such (just as undoubted, true, direct, etc.), as was Peter’s divine trust with the gospel for the Jews; consequently there could be no question of any προσαναθεῖναι, and nothing could follow but complete recognition (ver. 9). The construction (comp. Rom. iii. 2; 1 Cor. ix. 17) in the sense of πεπίστευταί μοι τὸ εὐαγγ. (as F G, 19*, 46** actually read) is regular; as to the perfect, used of the enduring subsistence of the act, see Winer, p. 255 [E. T. 339]. — τῆς ἀκροβυστίας] that is, τῶν ἀκροβύστων (Rom. ii. 26, iii. 30; Eph. ii. 11), the gospel which belonged to the uncircumcised, and was to be preached to them. — καθὼς Πέτρος τῆς περιτομ.] Thus Peter appears as the *representative* of the Jewish apostles, in accordance with his superiority among them (Matt. xvi. 18; Acts ii. iii. iv. v. *et al.*). The destination of Peter as an apostle to the Gentiles also (Acts xv. 7; 1 Pet. i. 1) is not negatived, but *a potiori fit denominatio*. — That this passage relates not to *two different gospels*, but to the same gospel for *two different circles of recipients*, to whose peculiarities respectively the nature and mode of preaching required special adaptation, is obvious of itself, and is clear from vv. 8, 9. But the passage cannot be worse misunderstood than it has been by Baur, according to whom there was a special gospel of the uncircumcision and a special gospel of the circumcision, differing in this respect, that the one maintained the necessity of circumcision, while the other allowed it to drop. Comp. Holsten, who discovers the distinctive feature of the Gentile gospel in the “*gnosis* of the death of the cross,” in spite of 1 Cor. i. 23 f. In opposition to such a separation, see also Ritschl, *altkath. K.* p. 127 f.

Ver. 8. A parenthetic historical substantiation of the preceding πεπίστευμαι τὸ εὐαγγ. τῆς ἀκροβ., καθὼς Πέτρ. τῆς

περιτ.: for *He who has been efficacious for Peter as regards the apostleship to the circumcision, has also been efficacious for me as regards the Gentiles*; that is, "for God, who has wrought effectually¹ in order to make Peter the apostle to the Jews, has also wrought effectually for me, to make me an apostle to the Gentiles." The stress lies on *ἐνεργήσας* and *ἐνήργησε*: God has been not inactive, but efficacious, etc. But that in *ὁ ἐνεργήσας* Paul did not refer to *Christ* (Paulus, comp. Chrysostom), is evident not only from passages such as 1 Cor. xii. 6, Phil. ii. 13, Col. i. 29, but also from the fact that he constantly considers his apostleship to be the gift of *God's* grace, bestowed upon him through the *mediation* of Christ (i. 1, 15; Rom. i. 5, xv. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 10; Eph. iii. 2, 7, *et al.*). — Πέτρω is the *dativus commodi*; comp. Prov. xxix. 12 (xxxix. 12), according to the usual reading, *ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ τῷ ἀνδρὶ εἰς ἀγαθά*. — *εἰς τὰ ἔθνη*] in reference to the Gentiles. The precise sense follows from the first half of the verse, namely, *εἰς ἀποστολὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν*. The well-known *comparatio compendiaria*. See Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* iii. 5. 4; Winer, p. 578 [E. T. 778]; Fritzsche, *Opusc.* p. 217 f. There is therefore the less reason for assuming that Paul desired to *avoid* the expression *εἰς ἀποστ. τ. ἔθνων* (Holsten). Observe, however, how Paul places himself *on a par* with Peter; "perfecta auctoritas in praedicatione gentium," Ambrosiaster.

Ver. 9. *Καὶ γινόντες*] is connected, after the parenthesis, with *ιδόντες κ.τ.λ.* in ver. 7.² — *τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι*] is not arbitrarily to be limited either to the *apostolic office* (Piscator, Estius, and others; also Hofmann), or to the *pros-*

¹ Namely, by communicating the requisite endowments, enlightenment, strengthening, and generally the whole equipment belonging thereto. It is not the divine action towards the *attainment* of the *ἀποστολή* (Vatablus, Schott, Fritzsche) that is meant, but the *making fit* for it; the *attainment* was indicated in ver. 7, and is substantiated in ver. 8 by the *further* divine action which had taken place. But neither are the *results* of the office, brought about by God's helpful operation, referred to (Winer, Usteri, Baur, de Wette, Hofmann), which would anticipate the sequel.

² While *ιδόντες* denotes the immediate *impression of the phenomenon*, *γινόντες* represents the *knowledge of reflection*. A further step in the description. Hofmann wrongly remarks, "It signifies nothing further than that they *had heard of the occurrence of his calling*." But this they must have already known years before (i. 18 f.).

peros successus of the same (Morus, Koppe, Winer, Fritzsche; de Wette, *both*); but is to be left quite general: *the grace which had been given me*. They recognised that *Paul was highly gifted with grace*, and was—by the fact that God had so distinguished him by means of His grace and thereby legitimized him as His apostle—fully fitted and worthy to enter into the bond of collegiate fellowship with them. His apostolic mission, his apostolic endowments, the blessed results of his labour, are all included in the χάρις which they recognised, —a general term which embraces everything that presented itself in him as divinely-bestowed grace and working on behalf of his office. — Ἰάκωβος] the same as in i. 19; not the brother of John (Augustine), who at that time had been long dead (Acts xii. 2); also not the son of Alphaeus (Wieseler on i. 19, and in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1842, p. 95 f.); but *the brother of the Lord*, as is obvious of itself after what has been remarked on i. 19. Comp. on Acts xii. 17. See also Hilgenfeld, p. 158 ff.; and Ewald, *Gesch. d. apost. Zeit.* p. 221 ff. The mention of his name here *before* the other two is not in compliance with the view of the false teachers (Windischmann), but is quite in due form, as the apostle is relating an official act *done in Jerusalem*, where James stood at the head of the church (comp. Credner, *Einl.* I. 2, p. 571 ff.). There is a certain *decorum* in this—the tact of a respectful consideration towards the mother-church and its highly-esteemed representative, who, as the Lord's actual brother, sustained a more peculiar and unique relation to Him than any of the twelve. The higher rank possessed by Peter and the apostles proper generally *as such*, is surely enough established by i. 18 f. But James, just as the brother of the Lord, had already attained a certain archiepiscopal position in the *Jewish-Christian mother-church*, and consequently for Jewish Christianity generally, agreeably to the monarchic principle which was involved in the latter. If James had been precisely one of the twelve, Paul would *not* (comp. i. 18) have given him precedence over Peter; for, as mouthpiece of the twelve, Peter was the first for Jerusalem also and for the whole of the Jewish Christians (ver. 7). The precedence, however, finds its explanation and its justification solely in the *unique* personal relation to Christ,—which

belonged to none of the apostles. James, as the eldest of the brethren of the Lord (Matt. xiii. 55; Mark vi. 3), was, as it were, his legitimate hereditary successor *κατὰ σάρκα* in Israel. — *οἱ δοκοῦντες στῦλοι εἶναι*] *who pass* (not *passed*, see vv. 2, 6) *as pillars*, namely, of the Christian body, the continued existence of which, so far as it was conditioned by human agency (for Christ is the foundation), depended chiefly on them. The metaphor (comp. 1 Tim. iii. 15; Rev. iii. 12; Clem. *Cor.* I. 5) is current in all languages. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 146, “*Ἐκτορ’ ἔσφαλε Τροίας ἄμαχον ἀστραβῇ κίονα*”; Eur. *Iph. T.* 50. 67 (Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* VII. p. 120); Hor. *Od.* i. 35. 13, and Mitscherlich *in loc.* Comp. Maimonides, in *More Nevoch.* ii. 23, “*accipe a prophetis, qui sunt columna generis humani*”; also the passages in Schoettgen, *Hor.* p. 728 f.; and the Fathers in Suicer, *Thes.* II. p. 1045 f. Looking at the *frequent use* of the figure, it cannot be maintained that Paul here thought of the body of Christians exactly as *a temple* (1 Cor. iii. 16; Eph. ii. 21), although he certainly regarded it as *οἰκοδομή*, 1 Cor. iii. 9. These *δοκοῦντες στῦλοι¹ εἶναι*, according to their high repute now, when the decisive final result is brought forward, designated *with solemn precision* and mentioned *by name*, are the *very same* who were characterized in ver. 2 as *οἱ δοκοῦντες*, and in ver. 6 as *δοκοῦντες εἶναί τι*, as is evident from the uniform term *οἱ δοκοῦντες* being used three times. Hofmann nevertheless understands the expression in vv. 2 and 6 *more generally*, so that what the three *δοκοῦντες στῦλοι εἶναι* did is supposed to be designated *as that which was done for the sake of the false brethren on the part of those standing in special repute*; but this view is based on the misinterpretation, by which an awkward grammatical connection with ver. 9 is forced upon the anacoluthic *ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκοῦντων* in ver. 6, and at the same time—in the interest of harmonizing (with Acts xv.)—a position in relation to the older apostles, unwarranted by the text, is invented to explain the notice *διὰ δὲ τοὺς παρεισάκτ. ψευδαδέλφ.* in ver. 4. — *δεξιὰς . . . κοινωνίας*] On the separation of the genitive from its governing noun (in this case, because the following clause of purpose, *ἵνα ἡμεῖς κ.τ.λ.*, gives the

¹ The accentuation usual before Lachmann, *στῦλοι*, is incorrect. See Lipsius, *gramm. Unters.* p. 43.

explanation of *κοινωνίας*), see Winer, p. 179 f. [E. T. 238]; Kühner, § 865. 1; Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 330 f. Both words are *without the article*, because *δεξιὰς* did not require it (1 Macc. vi. 58, xi. 62, *et al.*; Krüger, § 50. 2. 13); and in *κοινωνίας* the *qualitative* element is to be made prominent: *right hands of fellowship*. For the giving of the right hand is the symbol of *alliance* (Doug. *Anal.* p. 123), 1 Macc. vi. 58, and Grimm *in loc.* In opposition to the idea of an *alliance* being concluded, the objection must not be made (with Hofmann, who finds merely a *promise* of fellowship) that the act took place on the part of the apostles only; for, as a matter of course, Paul and Barnabas *clasped* the proffered hands. — *ἵνα ἡμεῖς εἰς τὰ ἔθνη κ.τ.λ.*] The verb to be supplied must be furnished by the context, and must correspond with *εἰς*; see Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 338. Therefore either *πορευθῶμεν* and *πορευθῶσι* (Bengel, Fritzsche, Wieseler), or *apostolatu fungemur*, ver. 8 (Erasmus, Schott, and many others), or *εὐαγγελισώμεθα* (Winer, Usteri, de Wette). The latter, in no way unsuitable to *εἰς* (see on 2 Cor. x. 16), is to be preferred, because it is suggested immediately by the protasis in ver. 7, from which, at the same time, it is evident that the recognition was not merely that of a *συνεργός*, but really amounted to an acknowledgment of *apostolic* equality (in opposition to Holsten). Moreover, as regards the partition here settled, the *ethnographical* bearing of which coincided on the whole with the *local* division of territory, we must not supply any such qualification as *praecipue* (Bengel, Schott, and others). On the contrary, the agreement was, “*Ye shall be apostles to the Gentiles, and we to the Jews*,” and nothing beyond this, except the appended clause in behalf of the poor, was thereby settled: so that the state of things hitherto existing in respect to the field of labour on both sides remained undisturbed. The *modifications* of this arrangement obviously and necessarily connected with its *practical* working, primarily occasioned by the existence of the Jewish *διασπορά*—in accordance with which the principle of the division of the spheres of labour could in fact be carried out merely relatively, and without *exclusive* geographical or ethnographical limitation (comp. Lechler, p. 415)—were left an open question, and not dis-

cussed. The idea that the recognition of Paul on the part of the apostles was merely external—simply an outward *concordat*—and that they themselves would have wished to know nothing of the ministry among the Gentiles (Baur, Zeller), is not conveyed in the text, but is, on the contrary, inconsistent with the representation given vv. 7–9. According to this, the apostles recognised the twofold *divine call to apostleship*, by which two nationally different spheres of labour were to be provided with the one gospel; but a merely external and forced agreement, without any acknowledgment or ratification of the principles and modes of procedure which had long regulated the action of Paul and Barnabas, would have been as little compatible with such a recognition as with the *apostolic character* generally. If, however, we take the *κοινωνία* in our passage to be true and heartfelt,¹ then the doubts thrown by Baur and his followers upon the truth of the account of the apostolic council in Acts fall in substance to the ground. How little Paul especially considered his apostolic call to the *Gentiles* as *excluding* the conversion of the Jews from his operations, may be gathered, even laying Acts out of view, from passages such as 1 Cor. ix. 20, Rom. i. 16, ix. 1 ff., xi. 14.

Ver. 10. After *μόνον* interpreters usually supply a verb such as *αἰτοῦντες* or *παρακαλοῦντες*, which in itself would be allowable (Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 207 f.), but is nevertheless quite superfluous; for *μόνον τῶν πτωχῶν ἵνα μνημ.* appears dependent on *δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν ἐμοὶ καὶ Βαρν. κοιν.*, so that it is parallel with the preceding *ἵνα* and limits it. Comp. Matthies, Fritzsche, Hofmann. “They made with us a collegiate alliance, to the end that we should be apostles to the Gentiles; . . . only that we should not omit to remember the poor of the *περιτομή* (not *merely* of the mother-church) as to support.” In that alliance nothing further, *in respect to our relation to the περιτομή*, was designed or settled. On *μνημονεύειν* in the sense of beneficent care, comp. Ps. ix. 12; Hom. *Od.* xviii.

¹ Thiersch (*Kirche im apost. Zeit.* p. 129) well remarks: “When they bade farewell, it was not a parting like that when Luther in the castle at Marburg rejected the hand of Zwingli, or when Jacob Andreae at Montbeliard refused that of Theodore Beza.”

267. — *μόνον*, which belongs to the whole clause, and *τῶν πτωχῶν* stand *before ἵνα* on account of the emphasis laid upon them. Comp. on Eph. iii. 18; 1 Cor. vii. 29; 2 Cor. ii. 4; 2 Thess. ii. 7, *et al.* The *poverty* of the Christians of *Palestine*, which was the principal motive for this proviso being added, finds its explanation in the persecutions which they underwent, in the community of goods which they had at first, and perhaps also in the expectation of the *Parousia* as near which they most of all cherished. Moreover, the *μόνον κ.τ.λ.* by no means excludes the ordinances of the apostolic council, for Paul here has in view nothing but his recognition as apostle on the part of the original apostles in the private discussions held with the latter. How Baur misuses *μόνον κ.τ.λ.*, as contrasted with the supposed *irreconcilable* diversity subsisting in *doctrine*, may be seen in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1849, p. 470; *Paulus*, I. p. 142 ff. ed. 2; comp. also Holsten. In the face of real antagonism of doctrine, the older apostles certainly would not have tendered Paul their hands; and had they desired to do so, Paul would have refused them his.¹ — ὁ καὶ ἐσπούδασα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι] The aorist, not used instead of the pluperfect, relates to the time from that apostolic alliance to the composition of the epistle. Paul, however, continues in the *singular*; for soon afterwards he separated himself from Barnabas (Acts xv. 39). So, correctly, Estius, Winer, Usteri, Schott. Those who identify our journey with that related in Acts xi. xii. must conclude, with Fritzsche, that Paul desired to report *concerning himself*, and hence only mentioned Barnabas (and Titus) as well, *where it was necessary*. Nevertheless this joint-mention, although not *necessary*, would have been very *natural* in our passage; for ἵνα μνημονεύωμεν had just been said, and then in a single stroke of the representation, with ὁ καὶ ἐσπούδασα κ.τ.λ., is given the conclusion of the matter so referred to. — αὐτὸ τοῦτο] is not superfluous (Piscator, Vorstius, Grotius, Morus), as neither αὐτό alone (Winer, p. 140) nor τοῦτο alone (see Matthiae, p. 1050; Kühner, II. p. 527) is used; it is the emphatic epexegetis of ὁ, *hoc ipsum*

¹ Tertullian (*de praescr.* 23) already gives the right view: "inter se distributionem officii ordinauerant, non separationem evangelii, nec ut aliud alter, sed ut unus alter praedicarent."

(see Bornemann, *Schol. in Luc.* p. LIII.), whereby Paul makes his readers feel the contrast between the Jewish Christian *antagonism* and his *zeal of love* thus shown. Studer and Usteri find in *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* the tacit antithesis, "but nothing further which the apostles had imposed on me." Inappropriately, for the idea of any other matters imposed was already excluded by the previous account. Schott proposes to take *ὁ* as *δι' ὃ* (see on Acts xxvi. 16), but the assumption of this poetical use cannot be justified except by a necessity such as is presented to us in the N. T. only at Acts xxvi. 16. Still more easily might *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* be explained (Poppo, *ad Xen. Cyrop.* iv. 1. 21; Matthiae, p. 1041; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 204 A) as *on that very account* (2 Pet. i. 5; Xen. *Anab.* i. 9. 21). But in that case *ὁ* would so naturally take up what preceded, that there would be no reason why Paul should have brought *on that very account* so prominently forward. It would rather have the appearance of suggesting that, if it had not been for the agreement in question, Paul would *not* have cared for the poor. — *We have no historical vouchers* for the truth of *ὁ καὶ ἐσπούδασα κ.τ.λ.*; for the conveyance of the contributions in Acts xi. took place earlier than our journey; and the collection mentioned 1 Cor. xvi., 2 Cor. viii. f., Rom. xv. 27, comp. Acts xxi. 17 f., xxiv. 17, occurred *after the composition of our epistle*. But who would be inclined to doubt that assurance? Looking at the more or less fragmentary accounts in Acts and the Pauline epistles, who knows how often Paul may have sent pecuniary assistance to Palestine? as indeed he may have brought the like with him on occasion of his own journey, Acts xviii. 20–22. It has, however, been wrongly asserted that, by means of this obligation in respect to the poor, a connection was intended to be maintained between the Gentile churches and the primitive church, and that at the bottom of it lay the wish *to bring over the preliminarily converted Gentiles gradually more and more to the principles and the mode of life of the primitive church* (Hilgenfeld, in his *Zeitschr.* 1860, p. 141). This is an insinuation derived from mere fancy.

Ver. 11. Paul now carries still further the historical proof of his apostolic independence; "*ad summa venit argumentum*,"

Bengel. For not only has he not been instructed by the apostles; not only has he been recognised by them, and received into alliance with them; but he has even asserted his apostolic authority *against one of them*, and indeed against *Peter*. There is no ground in the text for assuming (with Hofmann) any suspicion on the part of the apostle's opponents, that in Antioch he had been defiant, and in Jerusalem submissive, towards Peter. — *ὅτε δὲ ἦλθε Κηφᾶς κ.τ.λ.*] After the apostolic conference, Paul and Barnabas travelled back to Antioch, Acts xv. 30. During their sojourn there (Acts xv. 33) Peter also came thither,—a journey, which indeed is not mentioned in Acts, but which, just because no date is given in our passage, must be considered as having taken place soon after the matters previously related (not so late as Acts xviii. 23, as held by Neander, Baumgarten, Lange; and by Wieseler, in favour of his view that the journey Gal. ii. 1 coincides with that of Acts xviii. 22).¹ — *Κηφᾶς*] The opinion deduced from the unfavourable tenor of this narrative, as bearing upon Peter, by Clement of Alexandria *ap. Euseb.* i. 12, that the person meant is not the apostle, who certainly in this case is far from corresponding to his destination as “the rock” of the church, but a certain Cephas, one of the seventy disciples, has been already refuted by Jerome, and also by Gregory, *Hom.* 18 *in Ez.* — *κατὰ πρόσωπον*] *To his face* I opposed him. See Acts iii. 13; often in Polybius. Comp. *κατ’ ὀφθαλμούς*, Herod. i. 120; Xen. *Hiero.* 1, 14; Gal. iii. 1; and *κατ’ ὄμμα*, Eur. *Rhes.* 421, *Bacch.* 469. Not *coram omnibus* (Erasmus, Beza, Vatablus), which is not expressed until ver. 14. The opinion of Jerome, Chrysostom, Theodoret, and several Fathers, that the contention here related was nothing more than a conten-

¹ Grotius, although he considers the journey Gal. ii. 1 as identical with that in Acts xv., strangely remarks: “Videtur significare id tempus, de quo in Act. xiii. 1.” Also Hug and Schneckenburger, *Zweck d. Apostelg.* p. 108 ff., place the occurrence at Antioch earlier than the apostolic council,—a view which, according to the chronological course of Gal. i. ii., is simply an error; in which, however, Augustine, *ep.* 19 *ad Hieron.*, had preceded them.—Whether, moreover, Peter then visited the church at Antioch *for the first time* (Thiersch, *Kirche im apost. Zeitalt.* p. 432) must be left undecided; but looking at the length of time during which this church had already existed, it is not at all probable that it was his first visit.

tion *in semblance* (κατὰ πρόσωπον = *secundum speciem*!), is only remarkable as a matter of history.¹ — ὅτι κατεγνωσμένος ἦν] not “quia reprehensibilis or reprehendendus erat” (Vulgate, Castalio, Calvin, Beza, Cornelius a Lapide, Elsner, Wolf, and others; also Koppe, Borger, Flatt, Matthies); for the Greek participle is never used, like the *Hebrew*, for the verbal adjective (Gesenius, *Lehrgeb.* p. 791; Ewald, p. 538), neither in Jude 12, Rev. xxi. 8, nor in Hom. *Il.* i. 388, xiv. 196, xviii. 427; and what a feeble, unnecessary reason to assign would be ὅτι κατεγνωσμένος ἦν in this sense! Moreover, καταγγνώσκειν τινα (not to be confounded with καταγ. τινός τι, as is done by Matthias), so far as its significations are relevant here, does not mean *reprehendere* at all, but either *to accuse*, which here would not go far enough, or *condemnare* (comp. 1 John iii. 20, 21; Ecclus. xiv. 2, xix. 5). Hence also it is not: *quia reprehensus* or *accusatus erat* (Ambrose, Luther, Estius, and others; also Winer, Schott, de Wette), but: *quia condemnatus erat*, whereby the *notorious certainty of the offence occasioned* is indicated, and the *stringent ground* for Paul’s coming forward against him is made evident. Peter, through his offensive behaviour, had become *the object of condemnation* on the part of the Christians of Antioch; the public judgment had turned against him; and so Paul could not keep silence, but was compelled to do what he certainly did with reluctance. The passive participle has not a *vis reciproca* (Bengel, comp. Rückert, “because *he had an evil conscience*”); the condemnation of Peter was the act of the *Christian public* in Antioch. The idea “*convicted before God*” (Ewald) would have been *expressed*, if it had been so meant. If the condemnation is understood as having ensued *through his own mode of action* (Bengel, Lechler, p. 423; comp. Windischmann and

¹ A contest arose on this point between Jerome and Augustine. The former characterized the *reprehensio* in our passage as *dispensatoria*, so contrived by Peter and Paul, in order to convince the Jewish Christians of the invalidity of the law, when they should see that Peter had the worst of it against Paul. Augustine, on the contrary, asserted the correct sense, and maintained that the interpretation of Jerome introduced untruth into the Scriptures. See Jerome, *Ep.* 86–97; Augustine, *Ep.* 8–19. Subsequently Jerome gave up his view and adopted the right one: *c. Pelag.* i. 8; *Apol. adv. Rufin.* iii. 1. See Möhler, *gesammelte Schriften*, I. p. 1 ff.

Hofmann), the question as to the persons from whom the condemnation proceeds is left unanswered.

Ver. 12 ff. Paul now relates the particulars of the occurrence. — ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου] sent by James. It belongs to ἐλθεῖν. Comp. Plat. Prot. p. 309 B, ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι: Matt. xxvi. 47; Mark v. 35; 1 Thess. iii. 6. Why they—and, to judge from the impression made upon Peter, they were certainly men of importance, strict in their Jewish-Christian observances—were sent to Antioch by James, we know not, any more than why Peter journeyed thither.¹ But the conjecture that they belonged to the ψευδάδελφοι of ver. 4 (Winer, Schott), conflicts directly with the fact, that they were sent by James: for at the apostolic conference the latter had nowise made common cause with the ψευδάδελφοι; and therefore in sending any of them to Antioch he would have acted very unwisely, or would, with reactionary intent (so de Wette, whereby, however, the character of James is placed in a very awkward position, which is not to be supported by Acts xxi. 18), have simply supplied new fuel to the scarcely settled controversy. Others (as Studer, Usteri, Zeller²), connecting the words with τινάς, understand adherents of James (comp. οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος and the like; Schaefer, Melet. p. 26 ff.; Bernhardt, p. 222),

¹ The book of Acts is silent both on this point and also as to the whole scene between Peter and Paul,—a silence indeed, which, according to Baur and Zeller, is supposed to be maintained intentionally, and in consistency with the false representation of the transactions in Jerusalem. According to Ritschl (*altkath. Kirche*, p. 145), they were deputed by James to bring the relation between the Jewish and Gentile Christians back to the rule of the apostolic decree, as James understood it, that is, according to Ritschl, in the sense of a retraction of the Jewish-Christian defection from the law, and on behalf of restoring the separation between the two parties as respected their customs of eating. This assumed task of the τινάς is neither in any way intimated in the text, nor is there a trace of it in Acts (comp., on the contrary, xv. 30 ff.). Just as little can it be proved that, as Ewald thinks, a decree had been passed in the church at Jerusalem that the Jewish Christian should refrain from eating in company with Gentile Christians (because he did not know whether blood or something strangled might be among their food), and that those τινάς had come to Antioch to make known this new decree. Hilgenfeld also assumes that those sent by James had some charge relating to withdrawal from the Gentile Christians. Comp. Holsten, *z. Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 357, in whose opinion they were sent after Peter, because his intercourse with the Gentiles had been notified at Jerusalem.

² So also Vömel, *Br. a. d. Gal. mit deutsch. Uebers. u. krit. Anm.*, Frankfurt 1865, p. 29.

or, as Winer (comp. Wolf) says, “qui Jacobi auctoritate sive jure seu secus utebantur;” but this brings upon James the designation of a party-chief (some Jacobites!), which would be neither necessarily nor wisely introduced here, even supposing Winer’s modification to be mentally supplied. Lastly, the explanation of Beza, Grotius, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius (following Chrysostom), that ἀπὸ Ἱερουσολέμων means nothing more than *from Jerusalem*, because James was the president of the church there (comp. Koppe), is an unauthorized setting aside of the person, who is named expressly and not without due reason. — μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν] *he joined in meals with the Gentile Christians*. Comp. on συνεσθίειν in this sense, Plat. Legg. ix. p. 881 D; Luke xv. 2; 1 Cor. v. 11. Notice the *imperfect*. The Jew might not eat with Gentiles without incurring Levitical defilement (Acts xi. 3); but Peter, who previously by special revelation (Acts x. f.), had been instructed as to the invalidity of this separation in Christianity, had in the apostolic conference defended Christian freedom (Acts xv. 7 ff.), and taken part in passing the decree that, as regards food, the Gentile brethren should only have to abstain from meat offered to idols, things strangled, and blood (Acts xv. 29). This decree was received and accepted with joy by the church at Antioch (Acts xv. 30 f.). It would therefore have been all the easier for Peter in Antioch to follow his divinely attained conviction,¹ and to take part without hesitation in the more familiar intercourse of meals with the Gentile Christians there—free from any scruple that he should defile himself by Gentile food, which no legal enactments restricted except as to those three points. But to this free and correct standpoint the stricter Jewish Christians, who were still entangled in the observances of the Levitical precepts as to purity (comp. Acts xxi. 20), had not been able to rise; and to this class belonged the τινές (ver. 12). When, therefore, these people arrived from Jerusalem and from James, Peter unhappily no longer continued his previous liberal-minded conduct in Antioch, but drew back and separated himself from

¹ That the *Christian* fellowship in meals included also the joint observance of the *agapae* (which Thiersch, Hilgenfeld, and others take to be meant), is obvious. It is not, however, expressly denoted by συνήσθιεν.

intercourse at meals with the Gentile Christians, whereby he gave a practical denial to his better conviction. How similar to his conduct in his former denial of the Lord! Calovius, however, justly, in conformity with the temperament of Peter, remarks, "*una haec fuit Petri actio, non habitus.*" — φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐκ περιτ.] By this are meant the *Jewish Christians generally*, as a class, so far as they were represented by those *τινές*, who belonged to the stricter school. Peter feared the Jewish-Christian strictness, displeasure, disapprobation, etc. The explanatory gloss of Chrysostom (οὐ τοῦτο φοβούμενος μὴ κινδυνεύσῃ, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἀποστῶσιν; comp. Theophylact, μὴ σκανδαλισθέντες ἀποσκιρτήσωσι τῆς πίστεως), which is followed by Piscator, Grotius, Estius, and others, favours Peter quite against the literal sense of the words (Matt. x. 26, xiv. 5; Mark ix. 18; Luke xii. 5; Acts v. 26; Rom. xiii. 3). — Observe also, on the one hand, the *graphic* force of the *imperfects* ὑπέστ. and ἀφώρ., and, on the other hand, the expression of his own bad precedent, *ἐαυτόν*, which belongs not merely to ἀφώρ., but also to ὑπέστ. (Polyb. vii. 17. 1, xi. 15. 2, i. 16. 10); he withdrew *himself*, etc., and thereby induced his *Jewish-Christian associates* also to enter on a like course (ver. 13). It is not, according to the context, correct that these imperfects express an *enduring* separation (Wieseler); the behaviour begins when the *τινές ἀπὸ Ἰακώβ.* have come; it excites the unfavourable judgment of the church, and Paul immediately places himself in decided opposition to Peter. The imperfects are therefore the usual *adumbrativa*; they place the withdrawal and separation of Peter, as it were, *before the eyes* of the readers. On the other hand, the *συνυπεκρίθ.* which follows is the wider action which took place and served further to challenge Paul; hence the *aorist*.

Ver. 13. *And the rest of the Jewish Christians also played the hypocrite jointly with him*—those, namely, living in Antioch, who previously, in harmony with the liberal standpoint which they had already attained to, had held fellowship at meals with the Gentile Christians of the place, but now, misled by the influential example of Peter, had likewise drawn back. This was *hypocrisy* on their part and on Peter's, because, although at the bottom of their hearts convinced of Christian

freedom, they, from fear of men (ver. 12), concealed the more liberal conviction of which they were conscious, and behaved just as if they entertained the opposite view. It is true that the apostolic council had not decided anything as to the conduct of the Jewish Christians among Gentile Christians; but the immorality consisted in the inwardly untrue *duplicité* of their behaviour, which was more than a mere *inconsistency* (Baur) of reformed Judaism, *conceived* by Paul as being hypocrisy (Hilgenfeld). The view of Holsten, *z. Ev. des Paul. u. Petr.* p. 357 ff., is similar. — On *συνυπεκρίθ.*, comp. Polyb. iii. 92. 5, v. 49. 7; Plut. *Mar.* 14. 17; Joseph. *Bell.* xv. 7. 5. — *καὶ Βαρνάβ.] even Barnabas*, who was my associate withal in the apostleship to the Gentiles (ver. 9), and should consequently least of all have ventured insincerely to deny the principle of Christian freedom, to the disparagement of the Gentile Christians! So injurious was the effect of Peter's example! — *συναπήχθη]* *was jointly led away* (led astray), namely, from his own standpoint. Comp. 2 Pet. iii. 17 (Rom. xii. 16, and Wetstein *in loc.*). ὥστε with a *finite verb*, in the secondary sentence (comp. John iii. 16), denotes the consequence simply as a fact which has occurred. See Tittmann, *Synon.* II. p. 70; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 1012 f.; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 772. The *infinitive* would make the representation subjective (the seduction being conceived as a necessary result). — *αὐτῶν]* that is, *αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Ἰουδ.* It is emphatically prefixed. The dative is *instrumental*: *by* their hypocrisy, not *to* their hypocrisy (Luther and others). No one can, without wronging Paul in respect to the choice of his strongly inculcating expression,¹ either *call in question* the fact that the conduct of *Peter* is here expressly designated as *hypocrisy* (Schwegler, I. p. 129), or reduce it to a mere *supposition*; although Ritschl, p. 145, is of opinion that the

¹ This expression is all the more strictly to be understood as it stands, since Paul has not anywhere else in his epistles or speeches used either the word *ὑπακρίσθαι*, or *ὑποκριτής*, or (with the exception of 1 Tim. iv. 2) *ὑπόκρισις*. He would be the less likely to have omitted to weigh the gravity of the reproach conveyed in this very word otherwise strange to him, especially seeing that it was used after so *long* a time and was directed against *Peter*. This remark also applies in opposition to Schneckenburger in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1855, p. 651 f., and to Möller on de Wette.

reproach thus used does not quite evince a clear and thorough conviction of the rightness of the non-Jewish practice. The purposely chosen expression in our passage shows, on the contrary, that *Peter's conviction, which was well known to Paul*, agreed with the conviction of Paul himself, although it was *hypocritically denied* by the former. Peter's *ὑπόκρισις*, according to the text, consisted in the *Ἰουδαΐζειν*, to which he had drawn back after his intercourse with the Gentile Christians, not in his previous fellowship with them, which is alleged to have been "a momentary unfaithfulness to his real conviction" (Baur, in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1849, p. 476; Schwegler, Zeller, Hilgenfeld). And the censure which Paul—certainly unwillingly, and with a complete realizing and appreciating of the moral situation to which it has reference—has directed against Peter expressly on the ground of *hypocrisy*,¹ exhibits plainly the agreement in principle of the personal convictions of the two apostles (comp. Wiesinger, *de consensu locor. Gal. ii. et Act. xv.* p. 36; Lechler, p. 426).

Ver. 14. "*Ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθοποδοῦσι*]" *ὀρθοποδεῖν* (comp. *ὀρθοβατεῖν*, *Anthol.* ix. 11. 4), not preserved elsewhere in Biblical language, undoubtedly means to be *straight-footed*, that is, to *walk with straight feet* (comp. *ὀρθόπους*, *Soph. Ant.* 985; *Nicand. Alexiph.* 419, *ὀρθόποδες βαίνοντες*). Here used in a figurative sense—as words expressive of *walking* are favourites with Paul in representing ethical ideas (comp. *περιπατεῖν*, *στοιχεῖν* κ.τ.λ.)—equivalent to *acting rightly* (with straightness), *conducting oneself properly* (*ὀρθοπραγεῖν*, *Aristot. Pol.* i. 5. 8). Vulgate, "*recte ambularent*."² It is the moral *ὀρθότης πράξεως* (*Plat. Men.* p. 97 B), the opposite of the moral *σκολιόν* (*Plat. Gorg.* p. 525 A), *στρεβλόν* (*Ecclus.* xxxvi. 25), *χωλόν* (*Heb.* xii. 13). According to the leaning of Greek authors

¹ Not merely (comp. de Wette) on account of an easily excusable want of firmness and clearness in conviction (Bisping), or of a momentary throwing of the same into the background *under pressure of circumstances* (Reithmayr). Even Erasmus exerts himself to come at length to the result, that "*Pauli objurgatio nihil aliud fuit quam confirmatio parum adhuc sibi constantium*."

² Hofmann, "*to stand with straight foot*." But comp. *ἔξυποδεῖν*, *ἠκυποδεῖν*, to be swift-footed, that is, swift in running. The *standing* would probably have been expressed, as perhaps by *ὀρθοστατεῖν*. The *ὀρθοποδῶν* is not lame (*χωλῆς*), but makes *προχίως ὁρᾷς τοῖς ποσίν*, *Heb.* xii. 13.

towards the direct mode of expression, the *present* is quite regular. See Kühner, § 846. — *πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθ. τοῦ εὐαγγέλ.*] *πρὸς* is understood as *secundum* (2 Cor. v. 10; Luke xii. 47; Bernhardt, p. 265) by most expositors (including Winer, Rückert, de Wette, Ewald, Wieseler); by others in the sense of *direction towards the mark* (Flacius, Grotius, Estius, Wolf, Morus, Hofmann), which would mean, “so as to maintain and promote the truth of the gospel.” The former interpretation is to be preferred, because it is the more simple and the first to suggest itself, and it yields a very suitable sense. Hence: *corresponding to the truth*, which is the contents of the gospel (ver. 5). Certainly Paul never in verbs of walking expresses the *rule* prepositionally by *πρὸς*, but by *κατά* (Rom. viii. 4, xiv. 15; 1 Cor. iii. 3, *et al.*); but in this passage *πρὸς κ.τ.λ.* is the epexegetis of *ὁρθῶς*, according to its *ethical* idea. — *ἐμ-προσθεν πάντων*] consequently, not under some four eyes merely, but *in the sight of the whole church* although not assembled expressly for this purpose (Thiersch); *τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας ἐνώπιον πάντων ἔλεγε, ἵνα καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ φόβον ἔχωσι*, 1 Tim. v. 20. “Non enim utile erat errorem, qui *palam* noceret, *in secreto* emendare,” Augustine. — *εἰ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ὑπάρχων κ.τ.λ.*] that is, “If thou, although a born Jew, orderest thy mode of living in conformity with that of the born Gentiles, *χωρὶς Ἰουδαϊκῆς παρατηρήσεως* (Chrysostom), and not with that of the born Jews—a course of conduct, which thou hast just practically exemplified by eating in company with Gentile Christians—how comes it to pass that thou (by the example of the wholly opposite conduct which thou hast now adopted since the arrival of those *τινές*) urgest the born Gentiles to adopt the custom of the born Jews?” What a contradiction of conduct is it, thus in one breath to live *ἐθνικῶς* and to urge the *ἔθνη* to the *Ἰουδαΐζειν*! The present *ζῆς* denotes that which was *constant, accordant with principle*, in Peter’s case (contrary to the view of Hilgenfeld and others). This is *laid down* by Paul, with the argumentative *εἰ*, as *certain and settled*, and that not merely by inference from his recent experience of Peter having eaten in company with Gentiles, but also on the ground of his knowledge otherwise of this apostle and of his practical principles on

this point, with which the *ἔθνικῶς ζῆν* just before actually carried out by Peter was in accordance. Groundlessly and erroneously Rückert labours (since it does not run: *ἐπειδή . . . ἔζησας*) to extract an entirely different meaning, understanding *Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῆς* in an *ideal* sense (Rom. ii. 28 f.; John i. 48), and *ἔθνικῶς ζῆς* as its opposite: "By thy present conduct thou showest thyself truly not as a genuine Jew, but as a Gentile (sinner); how art thou at liberty to ask that the Gentiles should adopt Jewish customs, which by thy behaviour thou thyself dost not honour?" But, in fact, the reader could only take the explanation of the *ἔθνικῶς ζῆς* from *μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν* (ver. 12), and of the *Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῆς* from *ὑπέστελλε . . . περιτομῆς* (ver. 12). No one could light upon the alleged ideal view (reverting, in the apodosis, to the empirical!), the more especially as the *breaking off* from eating with the *Gentiles* would have to be regarded as a *Gentile* habit (in an ethical sense)! The *ζῆν* is not the *moral* living according to the Gentile or the Jewish fashion, but the shaping of the life *with reference to the category of external social observances* within the Christian communion, such as, in the individual case in question, the following (*Ἰουδαϊκῶς*) or non-following (*ἔθνικῶς*) of the Jewish restrictions as to eating. — *πῶς*] *qui fit, ut* (Rom. iii. 6, vi. 2, x. 14, and frequently), indicating the *incomprehensibleness* of this morally contradictory behaviour. — *τὰ ἔθνη ἀναγκάζεις Ἰουδαίξειν*] *indirect* compulsion. For the Gentile Christians in Antioch must very naturally have felt themselves constrained by the imposing *example* of the highly-esteemed Peter to look upon the Jewish habit of living—the observance of the special peculiarities of the outward legal Judaism (the *Ἰουδαίξειν*: comp. Esth. viii. 17; Plut. Cic. 7¹)—as something belonging to Christianity, and necessary for partaking in Christian fellowship and for attaining the Messianic salvation; and they would shape their conduct in practice in accordance with this view (comp. Usteri, p. 66 f.). De Wette (comp. also Wieseler, *Chronol.* p. 198 f., *Komment.* p. 168) assumes, that the emissaries of James *preached* the

¹ Where a freedman is spoken of, who was *ἑνοχος τῷ Ἰουδαίξειν*, and in reference to whom Cicero says, *τί Ἰουδαίῳ πρὸς χοίρον*; comp. also Ignat. *ad Magnes.* 10, *ἐς τὸν ἵστον Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν λαλεῖν καὶ Ἰουδαίξειν.*

principle of the necessity of observing the law, and that Peter *gave his support*, at least tacitly, to this preaching. This is not at all intimated in the text, and is not rendered necessary by the literal sense of ἀναγκάζειν, which is sufficiently explained by the *moral constraint* of the inducement of so influential an example, as it is often used in classical authors, “de varia necessitate quam praesens rerum conditio efficit” (Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* I. 18. 6). The view which understands the word here not at all of indirect constraint, but of definite demands (Ritschl, p. 146), by which Peter sought to turn them back into the path of Jewish Christianity, is opposed to the divine instruction imparted to this apostle, to his utterances at the council, and to our context, according to which the ἀναγκάζειν can have consisted in nothing more than the οὐκ ὀρθοποδεῖν as it is represented in ver. 12 f., and consequently must have been merely a practical, indirect compulsion, not conveyed in any express demands. Wieseler obscures the intelligibility of the whole passage by understanding the Ἰουδαίῳ of the *observance of the restrictions as to food enacted by the apostolic council*. In decisive opposition to this view it may be urged, that in the whole context this council is left entirely unmentioned; further, that these restrictions as to food had nothing to do with the Jewish proselytes (on whose account, possibly, their observance might have been called an Ἰουδαίῳ); lastly, that the compliance with the same on the part of the church at Antioch, especially so soon after the council (see on ver. 11), cannot, according to Acts xv. 30, at all be a matter of doubt. Moreover, how could Paul, who had himself together with Peter so essentially co-operated towards this decree of the council, have—in the presence of Peter, of the Christians of Antioch, and even of those who were sent by James—characterized the obedience given to the restrictions in question by the inapplicable and ill-sounding name Ἰουδαίῳ? It would have shown at least great want of tact.

Ver. 15. *A continuation of the address to Peter down to ver. 21.* So Chrysostom, Theodoret, Jerome, Estius, Bengel, Rosenmüller, Tittmann (*Opusc.* p. 365), Knapp (*Scr. var. arg.* II. p. 452 f.), Flatt, Winer, Rückert, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette and Möller, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Holsten. Others have

looked upon vv. 15–21 as addressed *to the Galatians* (Theodore of Mopsuestia, Oecumenius, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Semler, Koppe, Matthies, Hermann, Hofmann, Wieseler, Reithmayr); but to this view it may be objected, that Paul himself does not indicate the return to his readers until iii. 1, and that the bare, brief reproach in ver. 14 would neither correspond to the historical character of so important an event, nor stand in due relation with the purpose for which Paul narrates it (see on ver. 11); as indeed he himself has in vv. 11 and 14 so earnestly prepared the way for, and announced, his opposition, that the reader could not but expect something *more* than that mere question—so hurriedly thrown out—of indignant surprise.¹ And how could he have written to his (for the most part) Gentile-Christian readers *ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι κ.τ.λ.*, without telling them whom he meant thereby? Just as little can we assume that Paul again turns to the Galatians with *καὶ ἡμεῖς* in ver. 16 (Calovius, Paulus), or in ver. 17 (Luther, Calvin), or in ver. 18 (Cajetanus, Neander); or that he (Erasmus and Estius by way of suggestion, Usteri) has been imperceptibly *led away* from the thread of his historical statement, so that it is not possible to show *how much* belongs to the speech *at Antioch*. No, the *whole* of this discourse (vv. 15–21)—thoroughly unfolding the truth from principles, and yet so vivid, and in fact annihilating his opponent—harmonizes so fully with the importance of a public step against Peter, as well as with the object which Paul had in

¹ Indeed the practical *renunciation* (not mere *denial*) of the principle of Christian freedom required a renewed *apology* for, and *vindication* of, the latter; especially as Paul had called Peter to account *before the assembled church*, whereby the act assumed a solemnity to which the brief question in ver. 14 alone could in no way seem adequate, and least of all could it suffice to procure a duly proportionate satisfaction for the offence given to the *church* (ver. 11). He does not, however, “demonstrate” his explanation to Peter (Wieseler’s difficulty), but presents it in the most vivid and striking dialectic, compressing everything which would have afforded matter for a very copious demonstration sharply and sternly, towards the defeat of the great opponent who had been unfaithful to himself. Hofmann inconsiderately holds that, if Paul after the concession *ἰθὺς καὶ οὐκ Ἰουδαῖος* had thus explained himself in a detailed statement to Peter, he would have acted *absurdly*. It would have been absurd, if Paul, in order to say the *two or three words* to Peter recorded in ver. 14, had brought the whole act of the *κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτῷ ἀντίστην* *before the assembled church*.

view in relating this occurrence to the *Galatians* especially (among whom indeed these very principles, against which Peter offended, were in great danger), that, up to its grave conclusion ἄρα Χριστὸς δωρεὰν ἀπέθανεν (ver. 21), it must be regarded as an unity—as the effusion directed against Peter at Antioch; but, at the same time, it cannot be maintained that Paul spoke the words quite *literally* thus, as he here, after so long a lapse of time, quotes from lively recollection of the scene which he could not forget. — ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτ.] Paul begins his dogmatic explanation in regard to the reproach expressed in ver. 14 with a concession: “*We are Jews by birth* (in this Paul feels the whole advantage of belonging to the ancient holy people of God, Rom. iii. 1 f., ix. 1 ff.), *and not sinners of the Gentiles* (by Gentile descent).” Gentiles as such, because they are ἄνομοι and ἄθεοι (Rom. ii. 12; 1 Cor. ix. 21; Eph. ii. 12), are to the Israelite consciousness ἁμαρτωλοί and ἄδικοι (1 Sam. xv. 18; Tob. xiii. 6; Wisd. x. 20: comp. Luke xviii. 32, xxiv. 7; 1 Cor. vi. 1); and from *this*—the theocratical—point of view Paul says ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί, born *Gentiles*, and as such *sinners*, as *all* Gentiles are. Not as if he would look upon the Ἰουδαίους as *not sinners*; according to the sequel, indeed, they needed justification equally with the Gentiles (see Rom. ii. 3, 22 f., v. 12; Eph. ii. 2 f.). But the passage affirms that the Jews—as the possessors of the revelation and the law, of the ancient theocratic *υἰοθεσία* and the promises (Rom. ix. 4), and as belonging to the holy ἀπαρχή and root-stock of the theocracy (Rom. xi. 16)—possessed as their own a religious consecration of life, whereby they stood on a certain stage of righteousness in virtue of which, although it was not that of the true δικαιοσύνη, they were nevertheless exalted far above the Gentiles in their natural state of sinfulness (Eph. ii. 12; Tit. iii. 5). Luther well says: “Nos natura Judaei in *legali* justitia excedimus quidem gentes, qui peccatores sunt, si nobis conferantur, ut qui nec legem nec opera ejus habent; verum non in hoc justi sumus coram Deo, *externa* est illa justitia nostra.” If ἁμαρτωλοί had not been unduly understood according to the purely ethical idea (the opposite of sinlessness), the discourse would not have been so broken

up as by Elsner, Er. Schmidt, and others: "*Nos natura Judaci, licet non ex gentibus, peccatores;*" comp. Paulus. Hofmann's view is also similar: "that the apostle excluded from himself that sinfulness only, which was implied in Gentile descent—characteristic of those not belonging naturally to the Jewish nationality;" comp. his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 564, 610 ("our sinfulness does not bear the characteristic Gentile shape"). Paul wishes, not to affirm the different *nature of the sinfulness* of those born as Jews and Gentiles respectively, but to recall the *theocratic advantage* of the Jews over the sinners of Gentile descent; in spite of which advantage, however, etc. (ver. 16). The contrast lies in the idea of a theocratic *sanctitas*, peculiar to the born *Jew*, on the one hand;¹ and on the other, of a profane *vitiositas*, wherewith the *Gentile* descent is burdened. — *ἡμεῖς*] has the emphasis: *We on our part* (I and thou). *μέν* is not to be supplied here (Rückert, Schott); but the concession in ver. 15 stands by itself, and the contrast *is added* without preparation in ver. 16. Comp. Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 423; Bremi, *ad Isocr. Paneg.* 105, "quando altera pars per *δέ* sit evehenda." The contrast thus strikes one *more vividly*, and hence the absence of the *μέν* can afford no ground for calling in question (with Hofmann) the sense of a concession. Comp. also Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 3. 15. On the difference between *Ἰουδαῖοι* (theocratic bond of union) and *Ἑβραῖοι* (nationality), see Wieseler, *über d. Hebräerbrief*, 1861, II. p. 28.

Ver. 16 is usually construed so that *εἰδότες . . . Χριστοῦ* is a parenthesis; and either the sentence is made to begin with *ἡμεῖς* in ver. 15, and this *ἡμεῖς* is again taken up by the subsequent *καὶ ἡμεῖς* (so Castalio and others, Winer, Matthies, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Holsten, Reithmayr), or *sumus* is supplied after *ἀμαρτωλοί*, a new sentence is commenced by *εἰδότες*, and *καὶ ἡμεῖς κ.τ.λ.* is taken as apodosis (Beza and others; also Rückert, Usteri, Schott, Fritzsche, *de conform. N. T. Lachm.* p. 53, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Hofmann, Matthias, Möller). Both forms of construction would give *εἰδότες . . . Χριστοῦ* as the *motive* for the *ἐπι-*

¹ Calvin appropriately says: "Quia autem promissio *haereditariam* benedictionem faciebat, ideo *naturale* vocatur hoc bonum."

στεύσαμεν. But in this way the statement, how Paul and Peter (for *these* are the subject; see on ver. 15) attained to faith, would not tally with history, for the conversion of these two apostles did not at all take place by means of logical process in the argumentative way of εἰδότες . . . ἐπιστεύσαμεν. Both of them were in fact *miraculously* and *suddenly* laid hold of by Christ; and thereby, on their becoming believers, the light of the statement of purpose in the sequel dawned upon them. We must therefore consider as correct the punctuation of Lachmann,¹ who is followed by Wieseler: a comma only before εἰδότες, and a period after Χριστοῦ, "*We are Jews by birth and not sinners of the Gentiles, knowing however*" (εἰδότες still belonging to the ἐσμέν, which has to be supplied), that is, since we nevertheless know, *that a man is not justified*, etc.; so that what thou, Peter, doest (ver. 15), completely conflicts with this certainty, which we have notwithstanding of our Jewish pre-eminence.—οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος] The emphatically prefixed δικαιοῦται is negatived: *a man is not justified*. As to the idea of δικαιοῦσθαι, see on Rom. i. 17. Here also it appears clearly as an *actus forensis*, and as incompatible with the perversion of the idea by the Catholics and the followers of Osiander. See especially Wieseler *in loc.* *From works of the law*, which would be the determining ground of God's acquittal; *by means of faith*, which is imputed by God as righteousness (Rom. v. 5, 24 f.),—these are the *contrasted points*, while the *idea* of δικαιοῦσθαι is the same. Comp. on Rom. iii. 25 f.—ἐξ ἔργων νόμου] νόμου is not *subjective* (works, which the law by its precepts calls forth), but *objective*: works, *which relate to the law*, that is, works *by which the precepts of the law are fulfilled*, which have as their opposite the ἀμαρτήματα νόμου, Wisd. ii. 12. See on Rom. ii. 15. Our passage testifies also in favour of this view by the contrast of πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, inasmuch as the one relation (ἔργων) to the one object (νόμου) stands correlatively contrasted with the other relation (πίστεως) to the other object (Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ). Schott, following the older expositors (including Theodoret, Pelagius, Erasmus), quite erroneously limits νόμος to the cere-

¹ In the *small* edition; in the *larger* one the usual punctuation is followed.

monial law,—a limitation which never occurs in the N. T.¹ (see on Rom. iii. 20, and Schmid, *bibl. Theol.* II. p. 336), and, especially where justification is the matter in question, would be quite unsuitable; for the impossibility of justification by the law has reference to the *whole* law, viewed in its requirements *jointly and severally*, which in its full extent, and in the way willed by God, no man can fulfil. Comp. iii. 10; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 259.—ἐὰν μὴ] not a compromise between justification by works and justification by faith in the Jewish-Christian consciousness (Holsten, in spite of the *apodosis*), but a transition to another mode of conception: A man is not justified by the works of the law; *he is not justified, except by* etc. Comp. *Hymn. Cer.* 77 f., οὐδέ τις ἄλλος αἴτιος ἀθανάτων, εἰ μὴ νεφεληγερέτα Ζεὺς. Comp. on Matt. xii. 4; Rom. xiv. 14. See also on i. 7. Consequently we have here neither *justification by the works*, which are done by means of faith (the Catholic view), nor *Christ's* fulfilment of the law, which is *apprehended* by faith.² The former is not Pauline,³ and the latter has only its indirect truth (for the N. T. nowhere teaches the imputation of Christ's obedience to the law), in so far as the atoning work of the Lord completed on the cross, which is the specific object and main matter of justifying faith, necessarily presupposes His active, sinless obedience (2 Cor. v. 21), of which, however, nothing is here said. But here in ἐὰν μὴ we have the "*sola fide*" of Luther and his Church. Comp. on Rom. iii. 28. It is only the man justified solely by faith, who thereupon fulfils by means of the Spirit the requirements of the law; see on Rom. viii. 4. This is the moral completion of the relation of the law to redemption. — Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] object: *on Jesus Christ*. Comp. Mark xi. 22; see on Rom. iii. 22, and Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 112.—ἐξ and

¹ Although, according to the context, at one time the ethical, and at another the ritual, aspect of the law preponderates. Comp. on Rom. iii. 20.

² So also Jatho, *Br. an d. Gal.* p. 18 f.

³ See the constantly repeated attacks on the part of the Catholics against the evangelical doctrine of justification by faith, in Möhler, *Symbol.* p. 132, ed. 4; Reithmayr, p. 179 ff. More unprejudiced is Döllinger, *Christenth. u. Kirche*, pp. 187, 202, and elsewhere. On the other hand, Romang (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1867, 1, 2) has made *too much* concession to the Catholic justification by works, and has, like Hengstenberg, erroneously assumed a gradual progress of justification.

διὰ denote the same idea (of causality) under two forms (that of origin and that of mediate agency), as Paul in general is fond of varying his prepositions (see on Rom. iii. 30 ; 2 Cor. iii. 11 ; Eph. i. 7). In διὰ (comp. iii. 26) faith is conceived as the subjective condition of justification—the presence of which is the necessary *causa medians* of the latter. Certainly the man, as soon as he believes, enters *immediately* into the state of justification ; but the *preposition* has (notwithstanding what Hofmann says) nothing to do with this relation, any more than ἐξ postpones *the being righteous*, as the result of action, *until the very end of life*, whereas it may be conceived at any moment of life, as a result *for the time being*. — καὶ ἡμεῖς] begins a new sentence (see above). That which Paul had just laid before Peter as a point on which both were convinced,—ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστ. 'I. X.,—he now confirms by reminding him of the righteousness which *they also* had aimed at in having become believers (ἐπιστεύσαμεν) ; so that καὶ ἡμεῖς, *even we both*, supplies the special application of the foregoing general ἄνθρωπος. The order Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν lays a greater stress on the *Messianic character* of the historical person who is the object of faith, than is the case in the usual order (comp. ver. 4, iii. 26). — ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιοθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ] Comp. Rom. iii. 20. These words, ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, take up again what had just been said with solemn emphasis, by means of the confirmatory ὅτι, *since indeed*. Πᾶσα σὰρξ conveys the idea of "*all men*" (comp. above, ἄνθρωπος), with the accompanying idea of moral weakness and sinfulness, on which is based both the need of justification, and also its impossibility by means of works in the sight of the justifying God. Comp. on Acts ii. 17. Looking at the difference in the terms used and the absence of the usual formula of quotation, it is not to be assumed that Paul intended here to give a *Scripture-proof* (from Ps. cxliii. 2), as Wieseler and others think. An involuntary echo of the language may have occurred, while the idea was more precisely defined. The *negation* is here also not to be separated from the verb ; for it is not πᾶσα σὰρξ which is negated, but δικαιοθήσεται in reference to πᾶσα σὰρξ. Fritzsche (*Diss. II. in 2 Cor.* p. 26) aptly says : " non pro-

habitur per praestitum legi obsequium quicquid est carnis." Lastly, the *future* denotes that which never *will occur*. The reference to the *judgment* (Rom. v. 19), which is discovered here by Hofmann and the earlier expositors, is quite out of place. Comp. ver. 21. It is otherwise, v. 5; 2 Tim. iv. 8.

Ver. 17. The *δέ* dialectically *carries on* the refutation of Peter; but the protasis beginning with *εἰ* cannot have its apodosis in *εὐρέθημεν κ. ἀ. ἀμ.* (Hofmann¹); on the contrary, it runs on as far as *ἀμαρτωλοί*, which is then followed by the interrogatory apodosis. Consequently: *But if we* (in order to show thee, from what has been just said, how opposed to Christ thy conduct was), *although we sought to be justified in Christ, we were found even on our part sinners*. This protasis supposes that which must have been the case, if Peter's Judaizing conduct had been in the right; namely, that the result would then have been that faith does not lead to, or does not suffice for, justification, but that it is requisite to combine with it the observance of the Jewish law. *If* faith does *not* render the *Ἰουδαΐζειν* superfluous, as was naturally to be concluded from the course of conduct pursued by Peter, then this seeking after *justification* in Christ has shown itself so ineffectual, that the believer just stands on an equality with the *Gentiles*, because he has ceased to be a Jew and yet has not attained to righteousness in Christ: he is therefore now nothing else than an *ἀμαρτωλός*, just as the Gentile is. But if this is the case, the apodosis now asks, *Is Christ, therefore, minister of sin* (and not of righteousness)?—seeing that our faith in Him, which seeks for righteousness by Him, has the sad result that we have been found like the Gentiles in a state of sin. The *answer* to this question is, *Far be it!* It is a result to be abhorred, that Christ, instead of bringing about the righteousness sought in Him, should be the promoter of *sin*. Consequently the state of things supposed in the protasis is an anti-Christian absurdity. — The subject of

¹ Hofmann explains it, as if Paul had written *εἰ δὲ ἔζητοῦμεν* (if we, when we became believers, sought, etc.) *δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ, εὐρίθημεν κ.τ.λ.* (we thereby exhibit ourselves at the same time as sinners). According to Hofmann, the *εὐρίθημεν* is intended to apply to both members of the sentence,—a forced, artificial view for which the context affords neither right nor reason.

ζητοῦντες and εὑρέθημεν is, as before, Peter and Paul. — ζητοῦντες] emphatically prefixed, in reference to the preceding sentence of *purpose*, ἵνα δικαιωθῶμεν κ.τ.λ.; so that this ζητεῖν δικαιωθ. is not in reality different from the πιστεῖν εἰς Χριστ., but denotes the same thing as respects its *tendency*. To the ζητοῦντες then corresponds the εὑρέθημεν, which introduces an entirely different *result*: *if we have been found*, if it has turned out as a matter of fact, that, etc. (Rom. vii. 10 ; 1 Cor. iv. 2, xv. 15 ; 2 Cor. xi. 12). As to εὑρέθημεν we must, however, notice that—as in the apodosis ἀρὰ Χριστός κ.τ.λ. we cannot without proceeding arbitrarily supply anything but the simple ἔστιν, and not ἦν (iii. 21)—the aorist requires the explanation: *inventi sumus* (Vulgate, Beza, Calvin, and many others¹), and therefore neither *reperimur* (Erasmus, Castalio) nor *inventi essemus* (de Wette and many others), nor *should be found* (Luther), nor *were to be found* (Schott). Observe, moreover, that in εὑρέθ., in contrast to ζητοῦντες κ.τ.λ., the accessory idea of *something unexpected* suggests itself (comp. on Matt. i. 20). — ἐν Χριστῷ] nothing else than what was previously put as ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, but *expressed* according to the notion that in Christ, whose person and work form the object of faith, justification *has its causal basis* (2 Cor. v. 21 ; Acts xiii. 39 ; Rom. iii. 24). Its opposite: ἐν νόμῳ, iii. 11, and the ἰδία δικαιοσύνη, Rom. x. 3. — καὶ αὐτοί] *et ipsi*, also *on our part*, includes Peter and Paul in the class of ἁμαρτωλοί previously referred to in ver. 15. — ἄρα X. ἁμαρτ. διάκ.] is, at any rate, *a question* (Vulgate, *numquid*), for with Paul μὴ γένοιτο is always preceded by a question (Rom. iii. 4, vi. 2 ;

¹ So correctly also Lipsius in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1861, p. 73 ff. He, however, improving on Holsten's similar interpretation, thus explains the whole passage: "If we, being born Jews, have, by our seeking after the salvation in Christ, confessed our sinfulness (and consequently, at the same time, the impotence of the law to make us righteous), does it thence follow that Christ, by inviting also us Jews to seek righteousness in Him and not in the law, has led us astray to a life in Gentile impurity?" But this inference does not stand in logical consistency with the protasis, and could not even suggest itself as a false conclusion ; for ἁμαρτίας is assumed to be taken in a different sense from ἁμαρτωλοί,—the latter in the sense of *defectus justitiæ*, the former as *vitiositas ethnica*. Holsten also understands ἁμαρτίας as the unfettering of sin in the moral life (comp. v. 13 ; Rom. i. 6 f., *et al.*),—an idea which is here foreign to the context.

Gal. iii. 21, *et al.*). With this, however, either mode of writing, *ἄρα* (Lachmann) or *ἀρα* (Tischendorf), may stand. Both express *igitur, rebus sic se habentibus*; but *ἀρα* (Luke xviii. 8; Acts viii. 30), although Paul does not elsewhere use it (but just as little does he use an interrogative *ἄρα*¹), is the livelier and stronger. See Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 180; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 39 f. To take *ἀρα* for *ἀρ' οὐ*, *nonne* (Olshausen, Schott), is a purely arbitrary suggestion, which fails to apprehend the subtlety of the passage, the question in which (not *ἀρα* in itself, as held by Hartung) bears the trace of an ironical suspicion of doubtfulness (comp. Buttmann, *ad Plat. Charmid.* 14, ed. Heind.). Besides, *ἀρα* is never really used for *ἀρ' οὐ*, although it sometimes seems so (Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 823; Heind. *ad Plat. Theact.* p. 476; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 216). See Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 6. 1. Rückert has mistaken the sense of the whole passage: "If we, although we seek grace with God through Christ, nevertheless continue to sin, etc., do ye think that Christ will then take pleasure in us, greater pleasure than in the Gentiles, and thus strengthen and further us in our sin?" Against this it may be urged, that Paul has not written *ἐπισκόμεθα*; that the comparison with the Gentiles implied in *καὶ αὐτοί* would be unsuitable, for the sin here reproved would be hypocritical *Judaizing*; and that ver. 18 would not, as is most arbitrarily assumed, give the reason for the *μὴ γένοιτο*, but, passing over the *μὴ γένοιτο* and the apodosis, would carry us back to the protasis and prove this latter. The nearest to this erroneous interpretation is that of Beza and Wieseler, who (so also essentially Reithmayr) find expressed here the necessity of the union of sanctification with justification.² But the right sense of the passage, as given

¹ Which is assumed by Wieseler, Buttmann, Hofmann.

² They take the essential sense to be: "If the man who is justified in Christ has sinned, Christ is not to blame for this; for (ver. 18) the man himself is to blame for the transgression, because he builds again the dominion of sin which He had destroyed." So Wieseler. This interpretation is utterly unsuitable, if ver. 15 ff. is still addressed to Peter. It may be urged also against it, that Paul, by using *ἐπίσημιν* (instead of *ἐπισκόμεθα*), would have written in a way both obscure and misleading; further, that the relapse of the justified man into sin did not at all suggest or presume as probable the conclusion that Christ was to blame for it; moreover, that the expression *ἁμαρτίας δάκονος* must assert something of a far stronger and more positive character (namely, *sin-producer*); lastly, that ver. 18,

above, is found in substance, although with several modifications, and in some cases with an incorrect apprehension of the aorist *ἐυρέθημεν* (see above), in Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Castalio, Calvin, Calovius, Estius, Wolf, Wetstein, and others; also Semler, Koppe, Borger, Flatt, Winer, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Matthias; several of whom, however, such as the Greek Fathers, Luther, Calovius, Koppe, Usteri, Lachmann, taking the accentuation *ἄρα*, do not assume any question, which does not alter the essential sense, but does not correspond with the *μὴ γένοιτο* which follows; while Hilgenfeld unnecessarily supposes a *breviloquence*: “*then I ask*, Is then Christ,” etc. ? — *Χριστός*] “in quo tamen quærimus justificari,” Bengel. — *ἁμαρτ. διάκ.*] *ἁμαρτ.* emphatically prefixed, in contrast to the *δικαιωθῆναι*: one, through whom *sin* receives service rendered, *sin* is upheld and promoted.¹ The opposite, *διάκονοι δικαιοσύνης*, 2 Cor. xi. 15.

Ver. 18. Ground assigned for the *μὴ γένοιτο*: No! Christ is not a minister of sin; *for*—and such is the result, Peter, of the course of conduct censured in thee—*if I again build up that which I have pulled down, I show myself as transgressor*; so that Christ thus by no means appears, according to the state of the case supposed in ver. 17, as the promoter of sin, but the reproach—and that a reproach of *transgression*—falls upon myself alone, as I exhibit myself by my own action. — Remark the emphasis—energetically exposing the great personal guilt—which is laid *first* on *παράβāτην* (in contrast to *ἁμαρτίας διάκονος*), *then* on *ἐμαυτόν* (in contrast to *Χριστός*), and *jointly* on the *juxtaposition* of the two words. — In the *building up of that which had been pulled down* Paul depicts the behaviour of Peter, in so far as the latter previously, and even taken in Wieseler's sense, would, notwithstanding its carefully-chosen expressions, contain nothing more than an almost meaningless and self-evident thought, in which, moreover, the destruction of the dominion of sin, which has been accomplished by Christ or by the justifying grace of God (Rom. viii. 3), would be attributed to *man* (*κατίλυσα*).

¹ Luther's gloss: “Whoever desires to become pious by means of works, acts just as if Christ by His ministry, office, preaching, and sufferings, made us first of all to be sinners who must become pious through the law; thus is Christ denied, crucified again, slandered, and sin is built up again, which had previously been done away by the preaching of faith.”

still in Antioch (ver. 12), had pronounced the Mosaic law not to be obligatory in respect of justification on the Christian who has his righteousness in Christ and not in the law, and had thus pulled it down as a building thenceforth useless, but subsequently by his Judaizing behaviour again represented the law as obligatory for righteousness, and thus, as it were, built up anew the house which had been pulled down.¹ Paul is fond of the figure of building and pulling down. See Rom. xv. 20; 1 Cor. viii. 1, x. 23; Eph. ii. 20 f.; Rom. xiv. 20; 2 Cor. v. 1, *et al.* Comp. Talmud, *Berach.* 63. 1, in Wetstein: "jam aedificasti, an destruis? jam sepem fecisti, an perrumpes?"—The *first* person veils that, which had happened with Peter *in concreto*, under the milder form of a general proposition, the subject of which (= one, any one) is individualized by *I* (comp. Rom. vii. 7). — ταῦτα] with emphasis: *this*, not anything else or more complete in its place. — παραβάτην] not *sinner* generally, as Wieseler, according to his interpretation of the whole passage, is forced to explain it (see on ver. 17), but *transgressor of the law* (Rom. iv. 15, ii. 25); so that, in conformity with the significance of the figure used, νόμου is obviously supplied from the context (vv. 16, 19),—and that as the *Mosaic* law, not as the νόμος τῆς πίστεως, the gospel (Koppe, Matthies). But *how far* does he, who re-asserts the validity of that law which he had previously as respects justification declared invalid, present himself as a transgressor of the same? Not in so far as he *proves that he had wrongly declared it invalid and abandoned it* (Ambrosius, Oecumenius, Erasmus, Vorstius, Baumgarten, Zachariae, Rosenmüller, Borger, Usteri, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Ewald), or as he has in the pulling down sinned against that which is to him *right*, as Hofmann interprets it,² but, as ver. 19 shows, because

¹ Comp. Holsten, *z. Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 283.

² The application to be made of the general proposition is said to be this: "Whosoever desires and seeks to become righteous in Christ would not do so, unless he recognised the matter in which he sinned as a *breach of the law*, which he has again to make good, and that which he does to make it good is *self-confession as a transgressor*." This forced perversion should have been precluded by the very consideration that καταλύειν in reference to the law cannot be understood in the sense of breaking it, like λύειν τὸ σάββατον, John v. 18 (comp. vii. 26), but only in the sense of Matt. v. 17, according to which, of course, the *building up again* is *no making good again*. Comp. on καταλύειν τοὺς νόμους, Polyb. iii. 8. 2.

the law itself has brought about the freedom of the Christian from the law, in order that he may live to God; consequently he that builds it up again acts in opposition to the law, and thus stands forth as *transgressor*, namely, of the law in its real sense, which cannot desire, but on the contrary rejects, the re-exchanging of the new righteousness for the old. Comp. Rom. iii. 31. See the fuller statement at ver. 19. Comp. Chrysostom and Theophylact (αὐτὸς γὰρ . . . ὁ νόμος . . . με ὠδήγησε πρὸς τὴν πίστιν καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀφεῖναι αὐτόν). Bengel, moreover, well says: "Vocabulum horribile, legis studiosioribus." The word is *purposely chosen*, and stands in a *climactic* relation to ἁμαρτωλοί (ver. 17),—the category which includes also the Gentiles without law.—συνιστάνω] *I show*. See Wetstein and Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* iii. 5; Munthe, *Obs.* p. 358; Loesner, p. 248. But Schott explains it as *commendo, laudo* (2 Cor. iii. 1, v. 12, x. 12), making it convey *an ironical reference to the Judaists*, who had boasted of their Judaizing behaviour. This idea is not in any way indicated;¹ and the ironical reference must have rather pointed at *Peter*, who, however, had not made a boast of his Judaizing, but had consented to it in a timid and conniving fashion. Hence Bengel's explanation is more subtle: "Petrus voluit commendare se ver. 12 fin.; ejus commendationis tristem Paulus fructum hic mimesi ostendit." But according to the connection, as exhibited above, between ver. 18 and ver. 17, the idea of commendation is so entirely foreign to the passage, that, in fact, ἐμαυτὸν συνιστάνω expresses essentially nothing more than the idea of εὐρέθημεν in ver. 17; bringing into prominence, however, the *self*-presentation, the *self*-proof, which the person concerned practically furnishes in his own case: he establishes *himself* as a transgressor.

Ver. 19 f., containing the "summa ac medulla Christianismi" (Bengel), furnishes the confirmation of ver. 18; for which purpose Paul makes use of his own experience (not—as Olshausen and Baumgarten-Crusius hold, contrary to the context—designating himself as *representative of believers generally*)

¹ Schott should not have appealed to the form συνιστάνω. Both forms have the same signification. Hesychius: συνιστάνειν, ἰπαινῖν, φανισαῖν, βιβαιοῖν, παρατιθέναι. Only the form συνιστάνω is less frequent and later, Polyb. iv. 5, 6, xxviii. 17. 6, xxxii. 15. 8; 2 Cor. iii. 1, v. 12.

with sublime self-assurance and in a way sufficient to shame Peter: *For I* for my own part (to give utterance here to the consciousness of my own experience, apart from the experience of others) *am through the law dead to the law, in order to live to God.* In this view the contrast to *Χριστός* is not expressed already by this *ἐγώ* (Hofmann); but only by the *ἐγώ* of ver. 20. The point confirmatory of ver. 18 lies in *διὰ νόμου*; for he, who *through the law* has passed out of the relation to the law which regulated his life, in order to stand in a higher relation, and yet reverts to his legally-framed life, acts *against the law*, *παραβάτην ἑαυτὸν συνιστάνει*. The *νόμος* in both cases must be the *Mosaic law*, because otherwise the probative force and the whole point of the passage would be lost; and because, if Paul had intended *νόμου* to refer to the *gospel* (Jerome, Ambrose, Erasmus, Luther, Vatablus, Zeger, Vorstius, Bengel, Michaelis, Koppe, Morus, Rosenmüller, Borger, Vater), he must have added some distinguishing definition (Rom. iii. 27, viii. 2, ix. 31; comp. 1 Cor. ix. 21). The immediate context, that is, the *Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι κ.τ.λ.* which closely follows (and not ver. 16), supplies precise information how Paul intended the *διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον* to be understood. By the crucifixion the curse of the law was fulfilled in Christ (iii. 13); and so far Christ died *through the law*, which demanded, and in Christ's death received, the accomplishment of its curse. In one, therefore, who is crucified *with Christ*, the curse of the law is likewise fulfilled, so that in virtue of his ethical fellowship in the death of Jesus he knows himself to be dead *διὰ νόμου*,¹ and consequently at the same time dead *to the law* (comp. Rom. vii. 4); because, now that the law has accomplished in his case its rights, the bond of union which joined him to the law is broken; for *κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νομοῦ, ἀποθανόντες ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα*, Rom. vii. 6. So, in all essential points, Chrysostom² and others, Zachariae, Usteri (Schott wavers in his view, Rückert still

¹ Not, therefore, as Hermann interprets, *διὰ νόμου ὃν κατίλυσσα*, through the law rejected by myself.

² He indeed also specifies the interpretation, by which *νόμου* is understood of the *gospel*, as well as the view, which takes *νόμου* of the *Mosaic law*, but elucidates the relation of *διὰ* by Deut. xviii. 18. He nevertheless evidently gives the preference to the interpretation given above.

more so): comp. Lipsius, *l.c.* p. 81 f.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 363; Möller on de Wette, p. 50. This is the only interpretation which keeps closely to the context, and is therefore to be preferred to the views of others, who understand *διὰ νόμου* to refer to the *Messianic contents* of the law and the prophets, by which Paul had been induced to abandon the law (Theodoret, Corn. a Lapide, Hammond, Grotius, and others; also Baumgarten-Crusius), and of others still, who find the *insufficiency* of the law for salvation expressed, as Winer (*“lex legem sustulit; ipsa lex, cum non posset mihi salutem impertire, mei me juris fecit atque a suo imperio liberavit”*), Olshausen, Matthias, and likewise Hofmann, who understands it to refer to the knowledge acquired through the law, that it was impossible to attain righteousness in the way of the law,—which righteousness, therefore, could only be attained by means of faith; comp. Hilgenfeld, Reithmayr, also Ewald, whose interpretation would seem to call for *διὰ τὸν νόμον*. Neither is there suggested in the context *the* reference to the pedagogic functions of the law, iii. 24, which is found by Beza (*“lex enim terrens conscientiam ad Christum adducit, qui unus vere efficit, ut moriamur legi, quoniam nos justificando tollit conscientiae terrores”*), Calvin, Wolf, and others; also by Matthies, who, however, understands *διὰ* as *quite through* (*“having passed quite through the law, I have it behind me, and am no longer bound to it”*). De Wette thus explains the pedagogic thought which he supposes to be intended: *“By my having thoroughly lived in the law and experienced its character in my own case, I have become conscious of the need of a higher moral life, the life in the Spirit; and through the regeneration of my inner man I have made my way from the former to the latter.”* So also, in all essential points, Wieseler, although the *usus paedagogicus* of the law does not *produce* regeneration and thereby moral liberation from its yoke (which, however, *διὰ νόμου* must affirm), but only awakens the longing after it (Rom. vii. 21 ff.), and prepares the ground for justification and sanctification. The inner deliverance from the yoke of the law takes place *διὰ πνεύματος* (v. 18; Rom. viii. 2). A clear commentary on our passage is Rom. vii. 4–6. — *ἵνα Θεῷ ζήσω*] *that I might live to God, that my life* (brought

about by that ἀπέθανον) might be dedicated to God, and should not therefore again serve the νόμος,¹—which is the case with him who ἂ κατέλυσε ταῦτα πάλιν οἰκοδομεῖ (ver. 18). Comp., moreover, Rom. vi. 11. — Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι] Situation in which he finds himself through that διὰ νόμον νόμῳ ἀπέθανον, and accompanying information how this event took place in him. Corresponding with this, afterwards in ver. 20, ζῶ . . . Χριστός contains information as to the way in which ἵνα Θεῷ ζήσω was realized in him. With Christ I am crucified, thus expressing the consciousness of moral fellowship, brought about by faith, in the atoning death of Christ,—a subjective fellowship, in which the believer knows that the curse of the law is accomplished on himself because it is accomplished on Christ (comp. iii. 13) (διὰ νόμον ἀπέθανον), and at the same time that his pre-Christian ethical state of life, which was subject to the law, is put an end to (νομῷ ἀπέθανον). Comp. Rom. vi. 6, vii. 4, and on Col. ii. 20. Observe also how in this very passage it is evident from the whole context, that σύν in συνεσταύρ. and in the corresponding expressions (Rom. vi. 8; Col. ii. 12, 20, et al.) denotes not the mere *typical character* of Christ or the *resemblance* to Him (Baumgarten-Crusius), but the actual *fellowship*, which, as accomplished and existing in the consciousness of faith, is matter of real experience. On the *perfect*, which expresses the blessed feeling of the *continuance* of what had taken place, comp. vi. 14. Here it is the continuance of the liberation of the moral personal life from the law, which was begun by the crucifixion with Christ.

Ver. 20. Ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ, ζῆ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός] The comma which is usually placed after ζῶ δὲ is correctly expunged by Lachmann, Rückert, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Tischendorf, Wieseler, Hofmann; for, if ζῶ . . . ἐγὼ were not to be conjoined, ἀλλά must have stood before οὐκέτι. The second δὲ is our *but indeed* after a negative (Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 171), and ζῶ and ζῆ are on both occasions emphatically prefixed: *alive however no longer am I, but alive indeed is*

¹ ἵνα Θεῷ ζήσω is therefore not (with Chrysostom, Cajetan, Calvin, and others) to be joined to Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι; for it essentially belongs to the completeness of the thought introduced by γάρ.

Christ in me; whereby the new relation of *life* is forcibly contrasted to the previously expressed relation of *death* (Χριστῷ συνεστ.). After the crucifixion of Christ followed His new life; he, therefore, who is crucified with Christ, thenceforth *lives* also with Him; his whole pre-Christian moral personality is, in virtue of that fellowship of death, no longer in life (ὁ παλαιὸς αὐτοῦ ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη, Rom. vi. 6), and Christ is the principle of life in him. This change is brought about by faith (see the sequel), inasmuch as in the believer, according to the representation here given of Paul's own experience, it is no longer the individual personality that is the agent of life ("mortuus est *Saulus*," Erasmus), but Christ, who is present in him (through the Spirit, Rom. viii. 9 f.; Eph. iii. 16 f.), and works, determines, and rules everything in him, ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός: the mind of Christ is in him (1 Cor. ii. 16), the heart of Christ beats in him (Phil. i. 8), and His power is effectual in him. Thereby is the proof of the words ἵνα Θεῷ ζήσω rightly given; see on Rom. vi. 10.—ὁ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκὶ κ.τ.λ.] Explanation of what has just been said, ζῶ . . . Χριστός: *but that which I now live in the flesh, I live in faith on*, etc. This explanation is placed by δέ in formal contradistinction to the preceding apparent paradox. The emphasis, however, lies on νῦν, *now*, namely, *since the beginning of my Christian condition of life*, so that a glance is thrown back to the time before the Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι, and νῦν corresponds with οὐκέτι. Νῦν is often understood—as by Erasmus, Grotius (adhuc), Rückert, Usteri, Schott, following Augustine and Theodoret—in contrast not with the pre-Christian life, but with the future life after death (rather: *after the παρουσία*). A reference of this kind is, however, entirely foreign to the context, does not harmonize with the emphasis which is laid on νῦν by its position, and is by no means required by ἐν σαρκί; for this addition to ζῶ is made by Paul simply with a view to indicate that after his conversion the material form of his life remained the same, although its ethical nature had become something entirely different. — ἐν σαρκί] denotes *life in the natural human phenomenal form of the body consisting of flesh*. The context does not convey any reference to the *ethical* character of

the *σάρξ* (as *sedes peccati*). Comp. Phil. i. 22; 2 Cor. x. 3. — *ἐν πίστει*] not *per fidem* (Chrysostom, Beza, and others), but, corresponding to *ἐν σαρκί*, *in faith*; so that faith—and indeed (comp. i. 16) the faith in the great sum and substance of the revelation received, in the Son of God (notice the anarthrous *πίστει*, and then the article affixed to the more precise definition)—is the specific element in which my life moves and acts and is developed. It is prefixed emphatically, in contrast to the entirely different pre-Christian sphere of life, which was the *νόμος*. — *τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με κ.τ.λ.*] points out the special historical fact of salvation, which is the subject-matter of the faith in the Son of God, giving impulse to this new life. Comp. Rom. viii. 37; Eph. v. 2. *Καί* is explanatory, adding the *practical proof* of the love. Observe also the *μέ* and *ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ* (see on i. 4) as expressive of the conscious and assured *fiducia* in the *fides*.¹—Lastly, the *construction* is such, that *ὁ* is the accusative of the object to *ζῶ*, and the whole runs on in connection: *the life which I live, I live*, etc. See Bernhardt, p. 106; Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* I. p. 393 f.; Dissen *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 302. The interpretation: *quod vero attinet, quod*, etc. (Winer), is indeed grammatically admissible (see on Rom. vi. 10), in so far as *ὁ* is likewise retained as the accusative of the object; but it needlessly injures the flow of the discourse.

Ver. 21. Negative side—opposed to an antagonistic Judaism—of the life which Paul (from ver. 19) has described as his own. By this negative, with the grave reason assigned for it, *εἰ γάρ κ.τ.λ.*, the perverse conduct of Peter is completely condemned. — *I do not annul* (as is done by again asserting the validity of the law) *the grace of God* (which has manifested itself through the atoning death of Christ). — *ἀθετῶ*] as in iii. 15, Luke vii. 30, 1 Cor. i. 19, 1 Tim. v. 12, Heb. x. 28: *make of none effect*; see the sequel. It is here the *annulling*—practically involved in the Judaistic courses—

¹ Luther well says, “Hae voces: dilexit *me*, plenissimae sunt fidei, et qui hoc breve pronomen *me* illa fide dicere et sibi applicare posset, qua Paulus, etiam futurus esset optimus disputator una cum Paulo contra legem.” But this faith is not the *fides formata* (Catholics, including Bising and Reithmayr), although it is the *source* of Christian love and Christian life.

of the grace of God in Christ, which is in fact rendered inoperative and cannot make righteous, if righteousness is furnished by the *law*. The *rejection* of grace (Vulgate and others, *abjicio*) which is involved in this, is a *practical* rejection.¹ As to ἀθετεῖν generally, which does not occur until after Polybius, see Schweigh. *Lex. Polyb.* p. 12. — εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] justifies what has just been said, οὐκ ἀθετῶ. — διὰ νόμου] *through the law*, namely, as the institute which brings about justification by virtue of the works done in harmony with it (comp. on iii. 11). This is emphatically prefixed, so that Χριστός corresponds in the apodosis. — δωρεάν] not: *without result* (Erasmus, *Paraphr.*, Piscator), a meaning which it never has either in classical authors (in whom it occurs in the sense of *gratis* only) or in the LXX., but: *without reason, without cause*, as 1 Sam. xix. 5, Ps. xxxiv. 8 (not Job i. 9): comp. John xv. 25; Ecclus. xx. 21, xxix. 6 f.; Ignat. *Trall.* 10, δωρεάν οὖν ἀποθνῆσκα. Chrysostom justly says: περιττὸς ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ θάνατος, which was the very *act* of the *grace* which desired to justify men. This death would have taken place *unnecessarily*; it would have been, as it were, an *act of superfluity* (comp. Holsten), if that which it was intended to effect were attainable by way of the *law*. Erasmus aptly remarks, “est autem ratiocinatio *ab impossibili*.” Observe the *exclusive* expression of the clause assigning the reason of οὐκ ἀθετῶ, which allows of no *half-and-half division* of justification between law and grace.

Note.—Paul is discreet enough to say nothing as to the impression which his speech made on Peter. Its candour, resolution, and striking force of argument would, however, be the less likely to miss their aim in the case of Peter, seeing that the latter was himself convinced of Christian freedom (Acts xv. 7 ff.), and had *played the hypocrite* in Antioch only by connivance from fear of men (ver. 13). But as, according to this view, an opposition of principle between the two apostles cannot be conceded (contrary to the view of Baur and his followers), we must abstain from assuming that this occurrence at Antioch had any lasting and far-reaching *consequences*; for it simply had reference to a *moral* false step taken in opposition to Peter's own better judgment, and the scandal arising therefrom. It was therefore so essentially of a *personal* nature,

¹ So that ἡ χάρις οὐκ αἰτὶ γίνεται χάρις, Rom. xi. 6.

that, if known at all by Luke, it might well have remained unmentioned in Acts—considering the more comprehensive historical destination of that work—without suggesting any suspicion that the absence of mention arose from any *intentional concealment* (comp. on Acts xv.). Such a concealment is but one of the numberless dishonest artifices of which the author of Acts has been accused, ever since certain persons have thought that they recognised in our epistle “the mutely eloquent accuser of the Book of Acts” (Schwegler), which is alleged to throw “a veil of concealment” over the occurrences at Jerusalem and Antioch (Baur, Paulus, I. p. 148, ed. 2).

CHAPTER III.

Ver. 1. After ἐβάσκανε Elz. (and Matth.) has τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι, against decisive evidence. An explanatory addition from v. 7. — ἐν ὑμῖν] is wanting in A B C 8, min., and several vss. and Fathers, and is omitted by Lachm. But not being required, and not understood, how easily might it be passed over! There was no reason in the text for attaching it as a gloss, least of all to κατ' ὀφθαλμοῦς προεγρ. (as conjectured by Schott), for these words were in fact perfectly clear *by themselves*. Justly defended also by Reiche. — Ver. 8. ἐνευλογηθήσονται] Elz. gives εὐλογ., against decisive testimony. In Acts iii. 25 also, ἐνευλογ. is exchanged in several authorities for the usual simple form. — Ver. 10. According to decisive evidence, ὅτι is to be adopted (with Griesb., Lachm., Scholz, and Tisch.) before ἐπικατάρατος. — Ver. 12. After αὐτά Elz. has ἄνθρωπος, against decisive testimony. Addition from the LXX., Lev. xviii. 5; Rom. x. 5. — Ver. 13. Instead of γέγρ. γάρ, read, on preponderating testimony, with Lachm. and Tisch., ὅτι γέγραπται approved by Griesb. The former arose from ver. 10. — Ver. 17. After Θεοῦ, Elz., Scholz, Reiche, have εἰς Χριστόν, in opposition to A B C 8, min., several vss. and Fathers. Added as a gloss, in order, after ver. 16, to make it evident from ver. 24 *what* covenant is intended, although this is obvious from the context, and the addition was therefore by no means necessary (as maintained by Ewald and Wieseler). In the sequel, ἔτη is (with Griesb., Lachm., Scholz, Tisch.) to be placed *after* the number, according to decisive evidence. — Ver. 19. προσετίθη] Griesb. and Scholz (following Mill and Bengel) read ἐτίθη. Not sufficiently attested by D* F G and a few min., vss., and Fathers; and the compound verb appeared to conflict with ver. 15. — Instead of ᾧ ἐπήγγελται, only L and many min., along with some Fathers, read ὃ ἐπήγγ. A reading arising from the fact that ᾧ was not understood. — Ver. 21. τοῦ Θεοῦ] is wanting only in B, Clar. Germ. Ambrosiast. (bracketed by Lachm.), and is therefore so decisively attested that it cannot be regarded as an explanatory addition. The self-evident meaning and the previous reference *without* τοῦ Θεοῦ (see ver. 16 ff.) led to the omission. — Ver. 21. ὧν ἐκ νόμου ἦν]

Many variations. F G have merely ἐκ νόμου;¹ D*, Damasc., ἐκ νόμου ἦν; A B C, Cyr., ἐκ νόμου (B, ἐν νόμῳ) ἂν ἦν. In default of internal evidence, the latter is, with Lachm., Tisch., Schott, to be preferred as the best attested (comp. κ, ἐκ νόμου ἦν ἂν). The omission of ἂν arose from the ἦν following, just as easily as the omission of ἦν from the following ἦ. The *Recepta* is to be considered as the restoration of the original ἂν in a wrong place. — Ver. 23. συγκεκλεισμένοι] A B D* F G κ, 31, Clem. (once) Cyr. Damasc. read συγκαλεισμένοι. Recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm., Scholz, Schott. The *Recepta*, specially defended by Reiche, is an ancient emendation of the not-understood present participle. — Ver. 28. εἰς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ] A has ἐστε Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ; and κ, ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰ. But εἰς was very easily suppressed by the preceding ὑμεῖς, and then ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ was altered in accordance with the beginning of ver. 29. The reading ἐν instead of εἰς in F G and several vss., also Vulgate, It., and Fathers, is an interpretation. — Ver. 29. καί] is wanting in A B C D E κ, 89**, and a few vss. and many Fathers, and is expunged by Lachmann, Tisch., and Schott; justly, because it was inserted for the purpose of connection.

CONTENTS.—Paul now begins to unfold to his readers that righteousness comes not from the law, but from faith. With this view, after having expressed censure and surprise, he refers in the first place to their own experience, namely, to their reception of the Holy Spirit (vv. 1–5). He then passes on to Abraham, who had been justified by faith, and of whom believers were the sons who, in conformity with Scripture, were to enjoy with Abraham the blessing announced to him (vv. 6–9). For those that trust in works of the law are cursed, and by the law can no man be justified (vv. 10–12). It is Christ who by His atoning death has freed us from the curse of the law, in order that this blessing should reach the Gentiles through Christ, and the promised Holy Spirit should be received through faith (vv. 13, 14). But the covenant of promise concluded with Abraham, which moreover applied not merely to Abraham, but also to Christ, cannot be abrogated by the law which arose long after (vv. 15–18). This leads the apostle to the question as to the destination of the law,

¹ Which Buttmann in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1858, p. 488, considers as probably the original reading.

which he briefly answers in ver. 19 positively, and then in vv. 20–23 negatively, to the effect that the law is not opposed to the promises. Before the period of faith, the law had the office of a *παιδαγωγός* in reference to Christ; but after the appearance of faith this relation came to an end, for faith brought believers to the sonship of God, because by baptism fellowship with Christ was established, and thereupon all distinctions apart from Christ vanished away (vv. 23–28). And this fellowship with Christ includes the being children of Abraham and heirs of the promises.

Ver. 1. *O irrational Galatians!* With this address of *severe censure* Paul turns again to his readers, after the account of his meeting with Peter; for his reprimand to the latter (ii. 15–21) had indeed so pithily and forcibly presented the intermixture of Judaism with faith as *absurd*, that the excited apostle, in re-addressing readers who had allowed themselves to be carried away to that same incongruous intermingling, could not have seized on any predicate more suitable or more naturally suggested. The more inappropriate, therefore, is the idea of Jerome (comp. also Erasmus, and Spanheim *ad Callim. H. in Del.* 184, p. 439), who discovered in this expression a *natural* weakness of understanding *peculiar to the nation*. But the testimony borne on the other hand by The-
 rist. Or. 23 (in Wetstein, on i. 6) to the Galatian *readiness to learn*, and *acuteness* of understanding—the consciousness of which would make the reproach all the more keenly felt—is also (notwithstanding Hofmann) to be set aside as irrelevant. Comp. Luke xxiv. 25; Tit. iii. 3. — *τίς ὑμᾶς ἐβόσκει*] *τίς* conveys his astonishment at the great ascendancy which the perversion had succeeded in attaining, and by way of emphatic contrast the words *τίς ὑμᾶς* are placed together: *Who* hath bewitched *you*, before whose eyes, etc.? Comp. v. 7. — *βασκαίνω* (from *βάζω*, to speak) means here to *cast a spell upon* (*mala lingua nocere*, Virg. *Ecl.* vii. 28), to *bewitch by words*, to *enchant* (Bos, *Exercitatt.* p. 173 f., and Wetstein),—a strong mode of describing the perversion, quite in keeping with the indignant feeling which could hardly conceive it possible. Comp. *βασκανία*, *fascinatio*, Plat. *Phaed.* p. 95 B; *βάσκανος*, Plut. *Symp.* v. 7; *ἀβάσκαντος*, *unenchantèd*. Hence

the word is not to be explained, with Chrysostom and his followers: *who has envied you*, that is, your previous happy condition?—although this signification is of very frequent occurrence, usually indeed with the *dative* (Kühner, II. p. 247; Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 462; Piers. *ad Herodian.* p. 470 f.), but also with the *accusative* in Ecclus. xiv. 6, Herodian. ii. 4. 11. — οἷς κατ' ὀφθαλμούς Ἰησ. Χρ. προεγράφη ἐν ὑμῖν ἐσταυρωμένος] This fact, which ought to have guarded the Galatians from being led away to a Judaism opposed to the doctrine of atonement, and which makes their apostasy the more culpable, justifies the question of surprise, of which the words themselves form part; hence the mark of interrogation is to be placed after ἐσταυρ. — κατ' ὀφθαλμούς] *before the eyes*. See examples in Wetstein. Comp. κατ' ὄμματα, Soph. *Ant.* 756, and on ii. 11. — προεγράφη] is explained by most expositors, either as *antea* (previously) *depictus est* (Chrysostom, Luther, Erasmus, Castalio, Beza, Cornelius a Lapide, and others; also Hilgenfeld, Reithmayr), or *palam depictus est* (most modern expositors, following Calvin; including Winer, Paulus, Rückert, Usteri, Matthies, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Reiche, Ewald, Wieseler, Hofmann, Holsten), with which Hofmann compares the brazen serpent in the wilderness, and Caspari (in the *Strassb. Beitr.* 1854, p. 211 f.) even mixes up a stigmatization with the marks of Christ's wounds, which Paul, according to vi. 17, is supposed to have borne on his own body. But these interpretations are opposed not only by the words ἐν ὑμῖν (see below), but also by the *usus loquendi*. For, however frequent may be the occurrence of γράφειν in the sense of *to paint*, this signification can by no means be proved as to προγράφειν, not even in Arist. *Av.* 450 (see Rettig in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, p. 97). The Greek expression for *showing how to paint, tracing out*, in the sense of a picture given to copy, is ὑπογράφειν. Following Elsner and others, Morus, Flatt, and Schott understand it as *palam scriptus est* (1 Macc. x. 36; Lucian, *Tim.* 51; Plut. *Mor.* p. 408 D, Demetr. 46, Camill. 11 *et al.*¹): “ita Christus vobis est ob

¹ On this meaning is based the interpretation of Ambrose, Augustine, and Lyra, “He was *proscribed*, that is, condemned,” which is indeed admissible so far as usage goes (Polyb. xxxii. 21, 12 xxxii. 22, 1; Plut. *Brut.* 27), but quite

oculos palam descriptus, *quasi in tabula vobis praescriptus*," Morus. This is inconsistent with ἐν ὑμῖν, for these words cannot be joined with ἐσταυρωμένος (see below); and Schott's interpretation: *in animis vestris*—so that what was said figuratively by οἷς . . . προεργ. is now more exactly defined *sermone proprio* by ἐν ὑμῖν—makes the ἐν ὑμῖν appear simply as something quite foreign and unsuitable in the connection, by which the figure is *marred*. In the two other passages where Paul uses προγράφειν (Rom. xv. 4; Eph. iii. 3) it means *to write beforehand*, so that πρό has a *temporal* and not a *local* signification (comp. Ptol. viii. 25. 15, and see Hermann on our passage); nor is the meaning different in Jude 4 (see Huther). And so it is to be taken here.¹ Paul represents his previous *preaching* of Christ as crucified to the Galatians figuratively as a writing, which he had *previously written* (προεγράφη) *in their hearts* (ἐν ὑμῖν). Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 2 f. In this view κατ' ὀφθαλμούς is that trait of the figure, by which the personal *oral* instruction is characterized: Paul formerly wrote Christ *before their eyes* in their hearts, when he stood before them and preached the word of the cross, which through his preaching impressed itself on their hearts. By his vivid illustration he recalls the fact to his readers, who had just been so misled by a preaching altogether different (i. 6). With no greater boldness than in 2 Cor. iii. 2 f., he has moulded the figure according to the circumstances of the case, as he is wont to do in figurative language (comp. iv. 19); but this does not warrant a pressing of the figure to prove traits physically incompatible (an objection urged by Reiche). Jerome and others, also Hermann, Bretschneider, and Rettig, *l.c.* p. 98 ff., have indeed correctly kept to the meaning *olim scribere* (Rettig, however, remarking undecidedly, that it may also mean *palam scribere*), but have quite inappropriately referred it to the *prophecies of the O. T.*: "quibus ante oculos praedictio fuit Christi in crucem sublatis," Hermann. Apart from the circumstance that the *precise* mode unsuitable to the context. Comp. Vulgate: *proscriptus est*, instead of which, however, Lachmann has *praescriptus est*.

¹ So taken correctly also by Matthias, who, however, explains the expression from the idea of an *amulet* used against the *enchantment*. But this idea would presuppose some *secret writing*, the very opposite of which is conveyed by the expression.

of death by *crucifixion* is not mentioned in the prophetic utterances, this would constitute a ground for surprise on the part of the apostle of a nature much too general, not founded on the personal relation of Paul to his readers, and therefore by no means adequate as a motive; and, in fact, vv. 2—4 carry back their memory to *the time, when Paul was at work among them*. — *ἐν ὑμῖν*] is not, with Grotius, Usteri, and others, to be set aside as a Hebrew pleonasm (אֲנִי בְּכֶם), but is to be understood as *in animis vestris* (comp. 2 Cor. iii. 2; Soph. Phil. 1309: γράφου φρενῶν ἔσω; Aesch. Prom. 791, Suppl. 991, Choeph. 450), and belongs to *προεγράφη*; in which case, however, the latter cannot mean either *palam pictus* or *palam scriptus est*, because then *ἐν ὑμῖν* would involve a *contradictio in adjecto*, and would not be a fitting exegesis of *οἷς* (Winer, comp. Schott), for the *depicting* and the *placarding* cannot take place otherwise than on something external. To take *ἐν ὑμῖν* as *among you* and connect it with *προεγρ.*, would yield not a *strengthening* of *οἷς* (as de Wette holds), but an empty addition, from which Reiche and Wieseler also obtain nothing more than a purport obvious of itself.¹ On the other hand, Hofmann hits upon the expedient of dividing the words *οἷς . . . ἔσταυρ.* into *two independent sentences*: (1) *Before whose eyes is Jesus Christ*; (2) *as the Crucified One, He has been freely and publicly delineated among you*. But, apart from the linguistically incorrect view of *προεγράφη*, this dismemberment would give to the language of the passage a violently abrupt form, which is the more intolerable, as Paul does not dwell further on the *asyndetically* introduced *προεγρ. ἐν ὑμῖν ἔσταυρ.* or subjoin to it any more particular statement, but, on the contrary, in ver. 2 brings forward *asyndetically* a new thought. Instead of introducing it abruptly in a way so liable to misapprehension, he would have subjoined *προεγράφη* — if it was not intended to belong to *οἷς* — in some simple form by *γάρ* or *ὅτι* or *ὅς* or *ὅσγε*. Without any impropriety, he might, on the other hand, figuratively represent that he who preaches Christ to others *writes*

¹ Reiche, "id factum esse a se, gentium apostolo, *inter eos praesente*" (not, it might be, *alio loco* or *per homines sublestae fidei*, not *clanculum*, but *cunctis, publico eorum conventu*, etc.). Wieseler: "not merely *from a distance* by means of an *epistle*."

(not *placards* or *depicts*) Christ before their eyes in their hearts. Most expositors connect ἐν ὑμῖν with ἐσταυρ., and explain either as *propter vos* (Koppe), contrary to the use of ἐν with *persons* (see on i. 24); or, unsuitably to the figurative idea κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς κ.τ.λ., *in animis vestris*; ¹ or (as usually) *inter vos*: "so clearly, so evidently . . . just as if crucified among you," Rückert. But the latter must have been expressed by ὡς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐσταυρ., and would also presuppose that the apostle's preaching of the cross had embodied a vivid and detailed *description* of the crucifixion. It was not this however, but the *fact itself* (as the ἰλαστήριον), which formed the sum and substance of the preaching of the cross; as is certain from the apostle's letters. Lastly, Luther's peculiar interpretation, justly rejected by Calovius, but nevertheless again adopted in substance by Matthias,—that ἐν ὑμῖν ἐσταυρ. is a severe *censure*, "*quod Christus* (namely, after the rejection of grace) *non vivit, sed mortuus in eis est* (Heb. vi. 6)," which Paul had laid before them *argumentis praedictis*,—is as far-fetched, as alien from the usual Pauline mode of expression, and as unsuitable to the context as the view of Cajetan, that, according to the idea "Christ suffers in His members" (Col. i. 24), ἐν ὑμ. ἐσταυρ. is equivalent to *for the sake of whom ye have suffered so much*. — ἐσταυρ.] as the *Crucified One*, is with great emphasis moved on to the end. Comp. 1 Cor. ii. 2, i. 23.

Ver. 2. The *foolishness* of their error is now disclosed to them, by reminding them of their reception of the Holy Spirit. "Vide, quam efficaciter tractat locum *ab experientia*," Luther, 1519. — τοῦτο μόνον θέλω μαθεῖν ἀφ' ὑμῶν] *This only*—not to speak of other self-confessions, which I might demand of you for your refutation—*this only I wish to become aware of from you*. Bengel pertinently remarks: "*μόνον*, grave argumentum." To

¹ To this category belongs Bengel's mystical interpretation, "*forma crucis ejus in corde vestro per fidem expressa, ut jam vos etiam cum illo crucefigeremini*." Thus the expression would signify the killing of the old man which had taken place through ethical fellowship in the death of Christ, to which ἐν ὑμ. ἐσταυρ. is referred by Storr also. A similar view is taken by Jatho, *Br. an d. Gal.* p. 24: that ἐν ὑμῖν is proleptic, "so that He, as the atoning One, came into and abode in you;" comp. Ewald, "to paint clearly before the eyes that Christ is now really crucified in them, and, since they have Him in them, He has not been crucified for them in vain;" also Windischmann.

take *μαθεῖν* (with Luther, Bengel, Paulus) in the narrower sense *to learn*—the apostle thus representing himself ironically as a *scholar*—is justified neither by the tone of the context nor by the tenor of the question, which in fact concerns not a doctrine, but simply a *piece of information*; *μανθάνω* is well known in the sense of *to come to know, cognoscere*. See Acts xxiii. 27; Ex. ii. 4; 2 Macc. vii. 2; 3 Macc. i. 1; Xen. *Cyr.* vi. 1. 31; *Hell.* ii. 1. 1; Aesch. *Agam.* 615. Comp. Soph. *Oed. Col.* 505: *τοῦτο βούλομαι μαθεῖν*. — ἀφ' ὑμῶν] is not used instead of παρ' ὑμῶν (Rückert); for ἀπό also may denote a *direct μαθεῖν* (comp. especially Col. i. 7): see on 1 Cor. xi. 23. And *this* is what Paul means, for he conceives himself speaking with his readers as if they were present. — ἐξ ἔργων νόμου κ.τ.λ.] Was it your fulfilment of works which the law prescribes (comp. on ii. 16), or was it the preaching to you of *faith* (that is, faith in Christ), which caused your reception of the Spirit? The πνεῦμα is the *Holy Spirit* (the personal divine principle of the whole Christian nature and life), and the Holy Spirit viewed generally according to His very various modes of operation, by which He makes Himself known in different individuals; not merely in relation to the *miraculous gifts*, 1 Cor. xii.–xiv. (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Jerome); for Paul reminds the *whole body* of his readers of their reception of the Spirit, and it is not till ver. 5 that the δυνάμεις are specially brought forward as a *specific form* of the operations of the Spirit. Comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 27 f.—The ἥ which follows means: *or, on the other hand*; “duo directe opposita,” Bengel. The ἀκοή πίστεως is explained either as the *hearing of faith* (reception of the gospel preached: Vulgate, Beza, Bengel, Morus, Rückert, Usteri, Schott, Matthias, Reithmayr, and others), or as *that which is heard, i.e. the report, the message of faith*, which treats of faith. ἀκοή admits of either meaning (for the former, comp. Plat. *Theæt.* p. 142 D.; Plut. *Mor.* p. 41 E; Soph. *El.* 30; LXX. 1 Sam. xv. 22: and for the latter, comp. Plat. *Phædr.* p. 274 C; Dem. 1097. 3; LXX. Isa. liii. 1; John xii. 38; 1 Thess. ii. 13; Rom. x. 17; Heb. iv. 2; Eccclus. xli. 23). But πίστεως is decisive in favour of the latter, for it is never the “*doctrina fidei*” (see on i. 23), but always the subjective *faith*, which however, as

here, may be regarded objectively; and hence also adherents of the second interpretation (as Calvin, Grotius, Zachariae, Rosenmüller, and others) are wrong in taking *πίστις* as *system of doctrine*. Moreover, *ἀκοή*, in the sense of *preaching* (discourse heard), but *not* in the sense of *auditio*, is familiar in the N. T. (so even in Rom. x. 16, John xii. 38, passages which Matthias seeks to explain differently); hence Holsten incorrectly takes *πίστεως* as the genitive of the subject to *ἀκοῆς*, so that the *πίστις* is the *ἀκούουσα*,—a view opposed also by Rom. x. 17. But Hofmann also is incorrect in holding that it should be construed *ἐκ πίστεως ἀκοῆς* (faith in news announced); against which the antithesis *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* is decisive. Through the news concerning faith, which was preached to them, the readers had become believers (Rom. x. 17; Heb. iv. 2), and consequently partakers of the Holy Spirit. Lastly, Flatt and Matthies, following a few ancient expositors, have quite arbitrarily and, although not without linguistic precedent in the LXX. (1 Sam. xv. 22), without any countenance from the N. T., understood *ἀκοῆς* as equivalent to *ὑπακοῆς* (Rom. i. 5, xvi. 26; 1 Pet. i. 22). The *acceptance* of the *ἀκοή πίστεως* which took place on the part of the readers was understood by them as a matter of course, since from this *ἀκοή* proceeded the reception of the Spirit. They were in fact *called* through the gospel.

Ver. 3. *Are ye to such a degree irrational?*—pointing to *what follows*. The *interrogative* view (in opposition to Hofmann) is in keeping with the fervour of the language, and is logically justified by the indication of the *high degree* implied in *οὕτως*. On *οὕτως*, comp. Soph. *Ant.* 220, *οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτω μῶρος*: John iii. 16; Gal. i. 6; Heb. xii. 21; and see Voigtländer, *ad Luc. D. M.* p. 220; Jacob, *ad Luc. Alex.* p. 28. — *ἐναρξάμενοι πνεύματι, νῦν σαρκὶ ἐπιτελείσθε*;] *After ye have begun by means of the Spirit, are ye now brought to completion by means of the flesh?* The second part of the sentence is *ironical*: “After ye have made a beginning in the Christian life by your receiving the Holy Spirit (ver. 2), are ye now to be made perfect by your becoming persons whose life is subject to the government of the *σάρξ*? Do ye lend yourselves to *such* completion as this?” In the same measure in which the

readers went back to the legal standpoint and departed from the life of faith, must they again be emptied of the Holy Spirit which they had received, and consequently be re-converted from πνευματικοί into σαρκικοί (Rom. vii. 5, 14), that is, men who, loosed from the influence of the Holy Spirit, are again under the dominion of the σάρξ which impels to sin (Rom. vii. 14 ff., viii. 7 f., *et al.*). For the law cannot overcome the σάρξ (Rom. viii. 3, 4; 1 Cor. xv. 56). According to this view, therefore, πνεῦμα and σάρξ¹ designate, not Christianity and Judaism *themselves*, but the *specific agencies of life* in Christianity and Judaism (Rom. vii. 5, 6), expressed, indeed, without the article in *qualitative contrast* as *Spirit* and *flesh*, but in the obvious concrete application meaning nothing else than the Holy Spirit and the unspiritual, corporeal and psychical nature of man, which draws him into opposition to God and inclination to sin (see *e.g.* Rom. iv. 1; John iii. 6). — ἐναρξάμενοι] *What it is which* they have begun, is obvious from πνεῦμα ἐλάβετε in ver. 2, namely, the state into which they entered through the reception of the Spirit—the Christian life.² This reception is “the indisputable sign of the existence and working of true Christianity,” Ewald. — ἐπιτελείσθε] is understood by most modern expositors (including Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Wieseler, Hofmann) as *middle* (comp. Luther, Castalio, and others); although Koppe (with whom Rückert agrees) entirely obliterates the literal sense by the assumption, that it is put so only for the sake of the contrast and denotes “*tantum id, quod nunc inter Gal. fieri solebat, contrarium pristinae eorum sapientiae,*” etc. Winer explains more definitely: “carne finire, h. e. ita ad τὴν σάρκα se applicare, ut in his studiis σαρκικαῖς plane acquiescas;” and Wieseler: “instead of your advancing onward to the goal,

¹ Following Chrysostom, Theophylact, and many ancient expositors, Rückert, Usteri, and Schott believe that σαρκί is chosen with special reference to *circumcision* (Eph. ii. 11). But the context by no means treats specially of circumcision, and the contrast of itself necessarily involved σαρκί.

² Bos, Wolf, and others, as also Schott, assume the figurative idea of a *race in the stadium*. But this reference would require to be suggested by the context (as in v. 7); for although ἵππικαὶς is used of the completion of a race, as of every kind of completion (Herodian. viii. 8. 5, iii. 8. 17 f., iv. 2. 7), it has not this special meaning of itself, but acquires it from the context.

ye make the most shameful retrogression ;” comp. Hofmann. But ἐπιτελεῖν and ἐπιτελεῖσθαι always denote *ending* in the sense of *completion*, of accomplishing and bringing fully to a conclusion (*consummare*): see especially Phil. i. 6, ὁ ἐναρξάμενος . . . ἐπιτελέσει; 1 Sam. iii. 12, ἄρξομαι καὶ ἐπιτελέσω: Zech. iv. 9; Luke xiii. 32; Rom. xv. 28; 2 Cor. vii. 1, viii. 6, 11; Heb. viii. 5, ix. 6. Comp. Thucyd. iv. 90. 4, ὅσα ἦν ὑπόλοιπα ἐπιτελέσαι: Xen. *Anab.* iv. 3. 13. If, therefore, the word is taken as *middle*, it must be explained: “*After ye have begun (your Christian life) with the Spirit, do ye now bring (that which ye have begun) to completion with the flesh?*” Comp. Holsten. But the active *to complete* is always in the N. T. represented by ἐπιτελεῖν, not by ἐπιτελεῖσθαι in the middle (comp., on the contrary, 1 Pet. v. 9), however undoubted is the occurrence of the medial use among Greek authors (Plat. *Phil.* p. 27 C; Xen. *Mem.* iv. 8. 8; Polyb. i. 40. 16, ii. 58. 10, v. 108. 9). Moreover, the τοσαῦτα ἐπάθετε εἰκῇ which follows (see on ver. 4) makes the subject of ἐπιτελεῖσθε appear as *suffering*, and thereby indicates the word to be *passive*, as, following the Vulgate (*consummamini*), Chrysostom, and Theophylact, many of the older expositors have understood it,¹—viz., so that the Judaistic operations, which the readers had experience of and allowed to be practised on themselves, are expressed by antiphrasis, and doubtless in reference to their own opinion and that of their teachers, as *their Christian completion* (τέλειοι ποιεῖσθε!). Comp. also Matthias, Vömel, Reithmayr. But how cutting and putting to shame this irony is, is felt at once from the contradictory juxtaposition of *carne perficimini*! Nearest to our view (without, however, bringing forward the *ironical* character of the words) comes that of Beza, who says that *perficimini* applies to the teaching of the pseudo-apostles, who ascribed “*Christo tantum initia, legi perfectionem justitiæ.*” Comp. Semler. The *present* denotes that the Galatians were *just* occupied in this ἐπιτελεῖσθαι. Comp. i. 6. The emphatic νῦν (“*nunc, cum magis magisque deberetis spirituales fieri relictæ carne,*” Bengel) should have prevented it from being taken as the *Attic future* (Studer, Usteri).

¹ Some of them indeed translating it passively, but in the interpretation (comp. Erasmus, Calvin, and others, also Bengel) not strictly maintaining the passive sense.

Ver. 4. After Paul, by the *νῦν σαρκὶ ἐπιτελείσθε*, has reminded his readers of all that they had most foolishly submitted to at the hands of the false apostles, in order to be made, according to their own and their teachers' fancy, finished Christians, he now discloses to them the uselessness of it in the *exclamation* (not *interrogation*), "*So much have ye suffered without profit!*" What he means by *τοσαῦτα ἐπάθετε*, is therefore everything with which the false apostles in their Judaistic zeal had molested and burdened the Galatians,—the many exactions, in name of compliance with the law, which these had necessarily to undergo at the hands of their new teachers. Comp. i. 6 f., iv. 10, v. 2, 8, vi. 12, ii. 4. Comp. 2 Cor. xi. 20. Bengel refers it to the patient endurance of the apostle's ministry, produced through the Holy Spirit; but this view is not at all suggested by the context, and would not correspond to the sense of *πάσχειν* (but rather of *ἀνέχεσθαι*). All the expositors before Schomer (in Wolf) and Homberg, as also Grotius, Calovius, Wolf, Semler, Michaelis, Morus, Rückert, Olshausen, Reithmayr, and others, understand it (following Chrysostom and Augustine) of *the sufferings and persecutions on account of Christianity*; so that Paul asks, "Have ye suffered so much in vain? Seeing, namely, that ye have fallen away from the faith and hence cannot attain to the glory which tribulation brings in its train" (2 Cor. iv. 17; Rom. viii. 17). But, apart from the fact that no extraordinary sufferings on the part of the Galatians are either touched upon in the epistle (iv. 29 is quite general in its character) or known to us otherwise, this interpretation is completely foreign to the connection. After Schomer and Homberg, others (including Schoettgen, Raphel, Kypke, Zachariae, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Borger, Flatt, Winer, Usteri, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Hofmann, Matthias) explain it: "*So many benefits* (by means of the Spirit) *have ye experienced in vain?*" So also Fritzsche, *Diss. I. in 2 Cor.* p. 54, and Holsten. Certainly *πάσχω*, *something befalls me*, is a *vox media* (hence Matthias even wishes to understand it of the agreeable and disagreeable *together*), which, according to the well-known Greek usage, as the passive side of the idea of *ποιεῖν*, may be employed also of *happy* experiences (Xen. *Anab.* v. 5.

9 : ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι πάσχειν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν); but, as the latter use of the word always occurs with a qualitative addition either expressed (εἰ, χάριν, τερπνόν, ἀγαθὰ, ὀνήσιμα, or the like) or indicated beyond doubt by the immediate context (as Joseph. *Antt.* iii. 15. 1 : ὅσα παθόντες ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ πηλίκων εὐεργεσιῶν μεταλαμβάνοντες), it is not to be found at all in the whole of the New Test., the LXX., or the Apocrypha (not even Esth. ix. 29). Thus the interpretation, even if *τοσαῦτα* could convey any such qualitative definition of the text, is without precedent in the usage of Scripture. Paul in particular, often as he speaks about the experiences of divine grace, never uses for this purpose *πάσχειν*, which with him always denotes the experience of *suffering*. He would have written, as the correlative of the bestowal of grace, ἐλάβετε or ἐδέξασθε (2 Cor. vi. 1). Ewald's suggestion of *powerful and vehement* movements of the Spirit is forced, and unwarranted by the text. The very word *τοσαῦτα* points to the suffering of *evil*, just as πολλά, μάλα πολλὰ παθεῖν, without κακά or the like, is frequently so used in Greek authors. — εἶγε καὶ εἰκῇ] A hint that the case might be *still worse* than was expressed in εἰκῇ: *if indeed it is only in vain* (and not even to the positive jeopardy of your Messianic salvation) that ye have suffered. On καί, compare Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 136; Baeuml. *Partik.* p. 150. So, in substance, Beza, Grotius, Wolf, Semler, Kypke, Michaelis, Rosenmüller, Paulus, Matthies, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Ewald, Wieseler, Matthias, and others. Chrysostom and his followers discover a *mitigation* and *encouragement to improvement* in the words (εἰ γὰρ βουληθείητέ φησιν ἀνανήψαι καὶ ἀνακτήσασθαι ἑαυτοὺς, οὐκ εἰκῇ, Chrysostom), as also Ambrose, Luther,¹ Erasmus, Calvin, Clarius, Zeger, Calovius, Cornelius a Lapide, Estius, Zachariae, Morus, and others. In this case καί must be understood as *really* (Hartung, I. p. 132); but the idea of *improvement*, whereby the supposed case of the εἰκῇ would be cancelled, is not indicated by aught in the context. Even should the words be taken as merely leaving open the *possibility*, that matters had not actually already gone so far with the readers (Hofmann), Paul himself would have

¹ "Objurgat quidem, sed ita ut semper oleum juxta infundat, ne eos ad desperationem adigat. . . . Non omnino abjeci spem de vobis."

rendered his very earnest reproach *τοσαῦτα ἐπάθ. εἰκῇ* both problematical and ambiguous, and would thus have taken the whole pith out of it.—*εἵγε*] *assuming, namely*, that ye even only, etc., makes the condition more prominent, and serves to intensify the mere *εἰ*. Paul fears that *more* may take place than that which was only expressed by *εἰκῇ*. This, however, is conveyed by the context, and is independent of the *γέ*, instead of which *πέρ* might have been used. See Baeu ml. *l.c.* p. 64 f. Comp. on 2 Cor. v. 3; Eph. iii. 2. Still more marked prominence would have been given to the condition by *εἵπερ γε καί* (Plat. *Theact.* p. 187 D; Herod. vi. 16).

Ver. 5. After the logical parenthesis (vv. 3, 4), *οὖν* resumes (Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 22 f.; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 719) what was said in ver. 2, but in an altered tense (the *present*), in order to annex the example of Abraham as a proof of justification by faith. — *ἐπιχορηγῶν* and *ἐνεργῶν* are not to be understood as *imperfect* participles (Castalio, Bengel, Semler, and others); for, if referring to the reception of the Spirit *for the first time* corresponding to *ἐλάβετε* in ver. 2, Paul must have written *ἐπιχορηγήσας* and *ἐνεργήσας*. No, he denotes the *ἐπιχορηγεῖν κ.τ.λ.* as *still continuing* among the Galatians; it has not yet ceased, although now, of course, in consequence of the active efforts of the Judaizers under which they had suffered, it could not but be less strong and general than previously (*νῦν σαρκὶ ἐπιτελείσθε*, ver. 3); “*nondum ceciderant, sed inclinabantur, ut caderent*,” Augustine. — In *ἐπιχορηγεῖν* the *ἐπί* is not *insuper*, but denotes the *direction*, as in the German ‘*darreichen, zukommen lassen*’ (2 Cor. ix. 10; Col. ii. 19; 2 Pet. i. 5; comp. also Phil. i. 19). — *καὶ ἐνεργ.]* *and*—to make mention of a particular *χάρισμα*—*which*, etc. — *δυνάμεις*] may be *miracles* (1 Cor. xii. 10), in which case *ἐν* is *among* (Winer and others); or *miraculous powers* (1 Cor. xii. 28), in which case *ἐν* is *within* you (Borger, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Olshausen, Wieseler, and others). The analogy of 1 Cor. xii. 6 (comp. Phil. ii. 13; Eph. ii. 2) favours the latter. — *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ἢ ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστ.]* *sc. ποιεῖ τοῦτο* (Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 336), or *ἐπιχορηγεῖ ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα κ. ἐνεργεῖ δυνάμεις ἐν ὑμῶν*; Is this his operation upon you caused by works of the law or by the news of faith?

comes it in consequence of your prosecuting those works, or of such news being communicated to you? by the former way of active merit, or by the latter way of the reception of divine preaching? As to ἀκοὴ πίστεως, here also not (with Hofmann) = πίστις ἀκοῆς, see on ver. 2.

Ver. 6. The answer, obvious of itself, to the preceding question is: ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως; and to this, but not directly to that question itself (as Hofmann holds, according to his wrong interpretation of ἀκοῆς πίστεως), Paul subjoins—making use of the words well known to his readers, Gen. xv. 6, according to the LXX.—that great religious-historic argument for the righteousness of faith, which is presented in the justification of the progenitor of the theocratic people. Seeing that Paul has just specified the operation of the Spirit caused by the preached news of faith, as *that which proves the justifying power of faith*, he may with just logic continue: *even as Abraham believed God* (trusted His Messianic promise; comp. on John viii. 56), *and it* (this faith) *was counted to him as righteousness*, that is, in the judgment of the gracious God was imputed to him as rectitude.¹ Neither, therefore, is a colon to be placed (with Koppe) after Ἀβρ., nor (with Beza and Hilgenfeld) is ver. 6 to be considered as protasis and ver. 7 as apodosis, for ver. 7 is evidently independent, and it would be a very arbitrary course (with Hilgenfeld) to take ver. 6 as an anacoluthon. See, moreover, on Rom. iv. 3; Hoelemann, *de justitiæ ex fide ambabus in V. T. sedibus*, Lips. 1867, p. 8 ff. For the reward of Abraham's justifying faith according to Gen. *l.c.*, see Jas. ii. 22 f.; 1 Macc. ii. 52; and Mechilta in *Jalkut Sim.* I. f. 69. 3, "hoc planum est, Abrahamum neque hunc mundum neque futurum hæreditate consequi potuisse, nisi per fidem, qua credidit, q. d. Gen. xv. 6."

Ver. 7. *Know ye therefore* (since Abraham's faith was counted to him for righteousness) *that those who are of faith*, etc. — γνώσκετε is taken as *indicative* by Cyprian, *ep.* 63 *ad Cæcil.*, Jerome, Ambrose, Luther, Erasmus, Beza, Menochius,

¹ It is self-evident from the words of the text, how improperly the idea of sanctification is here mixed up with justification by the Catholics (also Bisping and Reithmayr). We have here justification simply as an *actus forensis* of the divine judgment, and that proceeding from grace. Rom. iv. 2 ff.

Piscator, Semler, Rosenmüller, Rückert, Reithmayr, and others. The tone of the passage is more animated by taking it as *imperative*.¹ — οἱ ἐκ πίστεως] designates believers, according to this their specific peculiarity, under the point of view of *origin*. It is *faith* from which their spiritual state of life proceeds. Comp. Rom. ii. 8, iii. 26, iv. 14; John xviii. 37, *et al.* — οὗτοι] has the emphasis (comp. Rom. viii. 14, ix. 6): *these*, and no others. The contrast here is usually supposed to be: *not the bodily descendants of Abraham*. But how foreign to the context is a comparison between the bodily and spiritual children of Abraham! The only interpretation in harmony with the context is: "*these, and not those who are ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*." See vv. 8–10. So also, correctly, Rückert and Wieseler. — υἱοὶ Ἀβρ.] *children of Abraham* in the true sense. For the true υἱοὶ can have no nature different from the essential nature of the father. Comp. John viii. 8, 39; Rom. iv. 11 f.

Vv. 8, 9. After having pointed out from the Scripture that none other than believers are *sons* of Abraham, Paul now shows further according to Scripture that none other than these have a share in Abraham's *blessing*, that is, *are justified*.

Ver. 8. Δέ] marks the transition from the *sonship* of Abraham pertaining to believers to the *participation in his blessing*. — προῖδούσα] personification. Comp. ver. 22; Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17; John vii. 38. The *Scripture* foresaw and the *Scripture* announced beforehand, inasmuch as whatever *God* foresaw and announced beforehand—in reference, namely, to that which is at present taking place—formed an element of Scripture, and was expressed in it. Comp. the frequent λέγει ἡ γραφή; likewise *Siphra*, f. 186. 2: *Quid vidit* (וַיִּרְאֶה) *scriptura*, etc. — ἐκ πίστεως] is the main point of the participial sentence: *of faith*, not of the works of the law as the causal condition on the side of man. — δικαιοῖ] *present*, for the time foreseen (προῖδούσα) was the Christian present. — τὰ ἔθνη] *the Gentiles* (comp. ver. 14), so that the latter have not to subject themselves to the law in order to become righteous. — προεγγεγέλισατο] *pre-announced the glad tidings*. προ

¹ The Vulgate has in Lachmann's text, *cognoscite*. So also Castalio, Calvin, and others, as well as most modern expositors.

refers, as in *προϊδοῦσα*, to the future realization in Christian times. This promise was a gospel *before* the gospel. The word does not occur elsewhere in the New Test., in the LXX., or the Apocrypha; but it is found in Philo, *de opif. m.* p. 7 A, *de nom. mut.* p. 1069 D; also *Schol. Soph. Trach.* 335. — ὅτι ἐνευλογηθήσ. ἐν σοὶ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη] Gen. xii. 3, quoted according to the LXX. with the recitative ὅτι, but so that, instead of *πάσαι αἱ φυλαὶ τῆς γῆς, πάντα τὰ ἔθνη* is adopted from Gen. xviii. 18 (comp. also xxii. 18); and this not accidentally, but because Paul is dealing with *Gentile* Christians, whom it was desired to subject to the law. Hence (and see ver. 14) it is not to be explained (with Winer, Matthias, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, following earlier expositors) of all *nations*, both Jews and Gentiles. — The *emphasis* in this utterance of promise is to be laid, not on *πάντα* (Schott), but on the prefixed *ἐνευλογηθήσονται*. For if the Scripture had not foreseen that *faith* would justify the Gentiles, it would not have promised *blessing* in Abraham to all the Gentiles; from which it follows (ver. 10) that it is *believers* who receive this blessing, and not those of the law, on whom indeed the Scripture pronounces not blessing, but *curse* (ver. 10). The characteristic *ἐνευλογ.* can only be meant to apply to those who are of faith, and not to those who are of the law. *What* it is that in Paul's view is expressed by *ἐνευλογεῖσθαι*, Gen. xii. 3, in its Messianic fulfilment, is evident from the preceding ὅτι ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοὶ τὰ ἔθνη, namely, God's gracious gift of *justification* (the opposite of the *κατάρα*, vv. 10, 11), which, because it is promised as *blessing*, can only be shared by *believers*, and not by those of the law who are under *curse*.¹ The correctness of this view is certainly confirmed by ver. 14, where to the reception of the blessing there is annexed, as a *further* reception, that of the Holy Spirit, so that the bestowal

¹ De Wette, who is followed by Wieseler, understands the *blessing* to be "the whole salvation of the kingdom of God,"—an idea too comprehensive for the context. Bähr (in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1849, p. 920) erroneously concludes from ver. 14, that by the blessing is meant the *reception of the Spirit*. See on ver. 14. This reception, as well as the Messianic salvation generally,—or, "the good which is intended for mankind," as Hofmann puts it,—ensues as a *consequence* of the *εὐλογία*, as the Messianic *ἀπόλυσις* ensues as a *consequence* of the *κατάρα*, if the latter, as in the case of those who adhere to the works of the law,

of the Spirit is not included in the idea of the *εὐλογία*, but this idea is limited in conformity with the context to the justification, with which the whole reception of salvation begins. — *ἐν σοί* is not: *per tuam posteritatem*, i.e. *Christum* (Jerome, Oecumenius, Menochius, Estius, Calovius, Rambach, Morus, Borger, Flatt, Schott; comp. also Bengel), by which interpretation the personal *σοί* (and how much at variance with ver. 9!) is entirely set aside, as if *ἐν τῷ σπέρματί σου* (ver. 16) were used. But it is: *in thee*; that is, in the fact that *thou art blessed* (art justified) is involved (as a consequence) the blessedness of all the Gentiles, in so far as all the Gentiles are to attain justification by faith, and it is in the blessing of Abraham, the father of all the faithful (Rom. iv.), that the connection between faith and justification is opened and instituted for all future time. Comp. Ellicott. On *ἐνευλογεῖσθαι*, *to be blessed in the person of any one*, a word which does not occur in Greek authors, comp. Acts iii. 25, Ecclus. xlv. 21.

Ver. 9. *Ὡστε*] The general result from vv. 7, 8. If, namely, *believers* are sons of Abraham (ver. 7), and if the Scripture, in its promise of blessing to Abraham, has had in view *faith* as the source of divine justification for the Gentiles, *believers accordingly are those who are blessed with believing Abraham*. *ὥστε* is used in its common acceptation of the *actual consequence*, and is therefore not to be explained in the sense of *οὕτως νῦν*, to which Hofmann's view comes. — *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως*] has the whole emphasis, as in ver. 7. — *σὺν τῷ πιστῷ Ἀβρ.*] Paul does not repeat *ἐν*, but writes *σὺν*, because he looks from the present time of *εὐλογοῦνται* into the past, in which Abraham stands forth as the blessed one, *with* whom those who become blessed are now placed on a like footing. *σὺν* is not, however, equivalent to *καθώς*, a view on behalf of which appeal ought not to be made to Rom. viii. 32 (Koppe and others); but it expresses *fellowship*, for believers, inasmuch

is not cancelled (ver. 10). The *εὐλογία*, therefore, is not yet the blessing of Messianic salvation itself, the *κληρονομία*, but, as Hunnius (in Calovius) aptly explains it, "*Benedici in hac promissione est liberari maledictione legis aeternae et vicissim haeredem scribi justitiae et bonorum coelestium.*" Grotius is much too indefinite: "*Summa bona adipiscentur.*" Also Ewald's paraphrase, "*the blessing of the true religion,*" is too general. Beza, Usteri, Rückert, take the right view; comp. also Möller (on de Wette) and Reithmayr.

as they are blessed (justified), share with believing Abraham the same divine benefit which began in his person and is extended to believers as the *νιός* homogeneous with him. The predicate *πιστῶ* is added to 'Αβρ., in order to denote the similarity of the ethical character, which necessarily accompanies the similarity of the result.

Ver. 10. *Argumentum e contrario* for the correctness of the result exhibited in ver. 9.¹ For how entirely different is the position of those who are *workers of the law*! These, as a whole, according to the Scripture, are under a *curse*; so that it cannot be supposed that they should *become blessed*. The extension of the argumentative force of the *γάρ* to the whole series of propositions, vv. 10–14 (Holsten, Hofmann), so that ver. 10 would only form the introduction to the argument, is the less to be approved, because this *γάρ* is followed by a second and subordinate *γάρ*, and then in ver. 11 an argument entirely complete in itself is introduced by *δέ*. Moreover, by the quotation of Scripture in ver. 10 that which it is intended to prove (*ὅσοι κ.τ.λ.*) is proved completely and strikingly.² — *ὅσοι γὰρ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσὶν*] the opposite of the *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως* in ver. 7: *for all who are of works of the law*, that is, those whose characteristic moral condition is produced and regulated by observance of the law (comp. on Rom. ii. 8), the men of law, *οἱ ἐχόμενοι τοῦ νόμου*, Oecumenius. Comp. *ὁ ἐργαζόμενος*, Rom. iv. 4. — The quotation is from Deut. xxvii. 26 freely after the LXX.; and the *probative* force of the passage in reference to *ὅσοι . . . ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσὶ* turns on the fact that no one is adequate, either quantitatively or qualitatively, to the *ἐμμένειν ἐν πᾶσι κ.τ.λ.*; consequently all who are *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* are subjected to the curse here ordained. He alone would not be so, who should really render the *complete* (*ἐν πᾶσι*) and *constant* (*ἐμμένει*) obedience to the law, by virtue of which he as a doer of the law would necessarily be pronounced righteous (Rom. ii. 13), and would have

¹ The conclusion is based upon the dilemma: *either* from faith *or* from the law. *Tertium non datur*. This is no supposititious idea (as Hofmann objects), but a necessary logical assumption, such as exists in every argument *e contrario*.

² In opposition to Holsten, z. *Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 290.

a claim to salvation as ὁφείλημα (Rom. iv. 4); but see Rom. iii. 9-20, vii. 7-25. — ἐπικατάρατος] *sc. ἐστι*, ἡγῆς, κατηράμενος, Matt. xxv. 41, that is, has incurred the divine ὀργή. Comp. Rom. iv. 15. The word does not occur in Greek authors, among whom κατάρατος is frequently used. But comp. Wisd. iii. 13, xiv. 8; Tob. xiii. 12; 4 Macc. ii. 19. The ἀπώλεια, eternal death, the opposite of the ζήσεται in ver. 11, ensues as the final destiny of the ἐπικατάρατος (comp. Matt. xxv. 41), the consummation and effect of the κατάρα. — ὃς οὐκ ἐμμένει] What is written in the book of the law is conceived as the normal range of action, which man *steps beyond*. Comp. Acts xiv. 22; Heb. viii. 9; 2 Tim. iii. 14; Xen. Ages. 1. 11; Thuc. iv. 118. 9; Plat. Legg. viii. p. 844 C; Polyb. iii. 70. 4; Isocr. *de Pace*, p. 428 *fin.*; Liban. IV. 271, Reiske; Joseph. *Antt.* viii. 10. 3, *et al.* More frequently used by classical authors with the mere dative than with ἐν. — πᾶσι] as well as the previous πᾶς, is found in the Samaritan text and in the LXX., but not in the Hebrew. Jerome, however, groundlessly accuses the Jews of mutilating the text on purpose (to mitigate the severity of the expression). — τοῦ ποιῆσαι αὐτά] design of the ἐμμένει κτλ.

Ver. 11 f. Δέ] carrying on the argument. After Paul in ver. 10 has proved the participation of *believers* in the blessing of Abraham by the *argumentum e contrario*, that *those who are of the law* are under curse, it is his object now—in order to complete the doctrinal explanation begun in ver. 6 on the basis of Scripture—to show, on the same basis, the only way of justification, and that (a) *negatively*: it is not by the way of the law that man becomes righteous (vv. 11, 12), and (b) *positively*: Christ has made us free from the curse of the law (ver. 13). Observe (in opposition to Wieseler's objection) that in δικαιούται παρὰ τ. Θεῷ, the being justified *in spite of the curse*, and consequently the becoming free from it, is clearly and necessarily implied by the context preceding (ver. 10) and following (ver. 13). — Vv. 11 and 12 contain a complete *syllogism*; ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστ. ζήσεται forming the major proposition, ver. 12 the minor, and ἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιούται παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ the conclusion. The subtle objections of Hofmann are refuted not only by the combination ὁ

δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως, but also by the necessary inner correlation of δικαιοσύνη and ζωή, which are put as reciprocal. — The first ὅτι is declaratory, and the second causal: “but *that* through the law no one . . . , is evident, *because*,” etc. Homberg and Flatt take them conversely: “But *because* through the law no one . . . , it is evident *that*,” etc. The circumstance that δηλον ὅτι must mean *it is evident, that* (Flatt), comp. 1 Cor. xv. 27, is not to be adduced as *favouring the latter view*; for in our interpretation also it has this meaning, only ὅτι is made to precede (see Kühner, II. p. 626). *Against* it, on the other hand, we may urge, that ver. 12 would be quite superfluous and irrelevant to the argument, and also that ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται, as a well-known *aphorism of Scripture*, is far more fitly employed to prove than to be itself proved. Far better is the view of Bengel, who likewise is not inclined to separate δηλον ὅτι: “Quod attinet ad id (the former ὅτι thus being equivalent to εἰς ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι, 2 Cor. i. 18, xi. 10; John ii. 18, ix. 17), quod in lege nemo justificetur coram Deo, id sane certum est,” etc. The usual view is, however, more natural¹ and more emphatic. Hofmann, *in loc.* and *Schriftbew.* I. p. 615 f., wishes to take vv. 11, 12 as protasis to vv. 13, 14; according to his view, ὅτι specifies the cause, and δηλον (or δηλονότι) only introduces the illustration of this cause. But we thus get a long parenthetically involved period, differing from the whole context, in which Paul expresses himself only in short sentences without periodic complication; moreover, the well-known use of δηλονότι as *namely* (see especially Buttmann, *ad Plat. Crit.* p. 106; Bast, *Palaeogr.* p. 804) does not occur elsewhere in the N. T., although the opportunities for its use were very frequent (1 Cor. xv. 27, 1 Tim. vi. 7, are wrongly adduced); further, it is *à priori* very improbable that the two important quotations in vv. 11, 12 should be destined merely for incidental illustration (comp. Rom. i. 17); and lastly, there would result an awkward thought, as if, namely, Christ had been moved to His work of redemption,

¹ For if we take Bengel's explanation, the δηλον will not suit well the following words, *because they form an utterance of Scripture*. We should expect possibly γράσσονται, so that then the first ὅτι would have to be understood as: ἵνα ἰδῇτε, ὅτι (Fritzsche, *Quaest. Luc.* p. 59 ff.; Schaef. *ad Dem.* II. p. 71).

in the death on the cross, by the *reflection* contained in vv. 11, 12 (comp., on the contrary, iv. 3-5; Rom. viii. 3; 2 Cor. v. 21). — ἐν νόμῳ] not: *by observance of the law*, which would be ἐξ ἔργων νόμου (Erasmus, Koppe, Rosenmüller, and others), but: *through the law*, in so far, namely, as the law is an institution which does not cancel the curse so pronounced and procure justification; for otherwise faith must have been its principle, which is not the case (see the sequel). The law is consequently, *in principle*, not the means by the use of which a man can attain to justification. On this ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου (Rom. viii. 3), comp. Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 68; Neander, II. p. 658 ff.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 286 f. Χριστός in ver. 13 corresponds to the emphatically prefixed ἐν νόμῳ (what *by the law* is not done, *Christ* has effected); therefore ἐν is not to be understood (with Rückert, de Wette, and others) as: *in*, in the condition of Judaism, or in the sense of the *rule* (Wieseler), but as: *through, by means of*. — παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ] *judice Deo*, opposed to the judgment of men. Comp. Rom. ii. 13; Winer, p. 369 [E. T. 492]. — ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται] an *aphorism of Scripture* well known to the readers, which therefore did not need any formula of quotation (D* E F G, Syr. Erp. It., have γέγραπται γάρ before ὅτι, F G also omitting δῆλον). Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 27; Rom. ix. 7; and van Hengel *in loc.* The passage is from Hab. ii. 4, according to the LXX. (ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστ. μου ζήσεται, or, according to A.: ὁ δὲ δίκ. μου ἐκ π. μ. ζ.), where it is said: *The righteous (P'ṭ) shall through his fidelity (towards God) become partaker of (theocratic) life-blessedness.* The apostle, glancing back from the Messianic fulfilment of this saying—which he had everywhere in view, and experienced most deeply in his own consciousness—to the Messianic destination of it, recognises as its *prophetic* sense: “*He who is righteous through faith (in Christ) shall obtain (Messianic) life.*” Comp. on Rom. i. 17. In so doing Paul, following the LXX., which very often renders אֱמוּנָה by πίστις, had the more reason for retaining this word, because the faithful self-surrender to God (to His promise and grace) is the fundamental essence of faith in Christ; and he might join ἐκ πίστεως to ὁ δίκαιος, because the *life ἐκ πίστεως* presupposes no other *righteousness* than

that ἐκ πίστεως. Here also, as in Rom. *l.c.* (otherwise in Heb. x. 38), the words ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως are to be connected (Chrysostom, Cajetan, Pareus, Bengel, Baumgarten, Zachariae, Michaelis, Semler, Morus, Griesbach, Knapp, Rückert, Winer, *Gramm.* p. 129 [E. T. 170], Hilgenfeld, Reithmayr, Hoelemann, and others), and not ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται (so most of the older expositors, following Jerome and Augustine; also Borger, Winer, Matthies, Schott, de Wette, Wieseler, Ewald, Holsten, Hofmann, Matthias): for Paul desires to point out the cause of the *righteousness*, and not that of the life of the righteous, although this has the same cause; and in ver. 12, ὁ ποιήσας αὐτά stands in contrast not to ὁ δίκαιος merely, but to ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως. Compare, besides, Hoelemann, *l.c.* p. 41 f. Paul, however, did not write ὁ ἐκ πίστεως δίκαιος or δίκαιος ὁ ἐκ πίστεως, because this important saying was well known and sanctioned by usage in the order of the words given by the LXX.; so that he involuntarily abstained from the freedom of dealing elsewhere manifested by him in quoting from Scripture. The *grammatical* correctness of the junction of ἐκ πίστ. to δίκαιος is evident from the fact that the phrase δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστ. is used; comp. ver. 8.

Ver. 12. Minor proposition; δέ the syllogistic *atqui*. See on ver. 11. — οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πίστεως, *is not of faith*, is not an institution which has faith as the principle of its nature and action. Comp. ver. 10. — ἀλλ' ὁ ποιήσας κ.τ.λ.] *but he who shall have done them* (namely, the προστάγματα and κρίματα of God, Lev. xviii. 5) *shall live* (shall have life in the Messiah's kingdom) *through them*, so that they form, in this way of *doing*, the channel of obtaining life. Thus in the express words of the law (Lev. xviii. 5), likewise presumed to be familiar to his readers, Paul introduces the nature of the law as contrasted with ἐκ πίστεως. Comp. Rom. x. 5. After ἀλλ', γέγραπται is not (with Schott) to be supplied (comp. also Matthias, who understands even οὐκ ἔστιν as *runs not*); but, as the form with the apostrophe indicates, Paul has connected ἀλλ' immediately with ὁ ποιήσας αὐτά, leaving it to the reader not only to explain for himself αὐτά and ἐν αὐτοῖς from his acquaintance with the O. T. context of the saying referred to, but also to complete for himself the connection from the first half of the

verse: "The law, however, has not *faith* as its principle; but the *doer* of the commandments—this is the axiom of the law—shall live by them." Comp. on Rom. xv. 3; 1 Cor. i. 31.

Ver. 13. Connection: "*Through the law* no one becomes righteous (vv. 11, 12); *Christ* has redeemed us from the curse." See on ver. 11. The *asyndeton* renders the contrast stronger. Comp. Col. iii. 4. Rückert (comp. also Flatt, Koppe, Schott, Olshausen) reverts to ver. 10, supplying μέν in ver. 10, and δέ in ver. 13. This is incorrect, for Χρίστος finds its appropriate antithesis in the words immediately preceding; and, as in general it is a mistake thus to supply μέν and δέ, it is here the more absurd, because ὅσοι in ver. 10 has expressly received in γάρ its reference to what precedes it. Against Hofmann's interpretation, that ver. 13 is apodosis to vv. 11, 12, see on ver. 11. — ἡμᾶς] applies to the *Jews*; for *these* were under the curse of the law¹ mentioned in ver. 10, and by faith in Christ made themselves partakers of the redemption from that curse accomplished by Him, as Paul had himself experienced. Others have understood it as the *Jews and Gentiles* (Gomarus, Pareus, Estius, Flatt, Winer, Matthies). But against this view it may be urged, that the Gentiles were not under the curse of the Mosaic law (Rom. ii. 12); that a reference to the natural law as well (Rom. ii. 14, 15) is quite foreign to the context (in opposition to Flatt); that the law, even if it had not been done away by Christ, would yet never have related to the Gentiles (in opposition to Winer), because it was the partition-wall between Jew and Gentile (Eph. ii. 14 f.); and lastly, that afterwards in ver. 14 εἰς τὰ ἔθνη is placed in contrast to the ἡμᾶς, and hence it must not be said, with Matthies, that it so far applies to the Gentiles also, since the latter as Christians could not be under obligation to the law,—which, besides, would amount to a very indirect sort of ransom, entirely different from the sense in which it applied to the Jews. — ἐξηγόρασεν] Comp. iv. 5; 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23; Eph. i. 7; 2 Pet. ii. 1; Matt. xx. 28; Rev. v. 9 Diod. *Exc.* p. 530. 4; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Polyb.

¹ Which is not to be turned into a subjective condition, as Bähr (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1849, p. 922) wishes, who explains it as the *state of spiritual death*, in consequence of his erroneous view of εὐλογία in ver. 8.

iii. 42. 2. Those who are under obligation to the law as the record of the direct will of God,¹ are subject to the divine curse expressed therein; but from the bond of this curse, from which they could not otherwise have escaped, *Christ* has *redeemed* them, and that by giving up for them His life upon the cross as a λύτρον paid to God the *dator et vindex legis*,—having by His *mors satisfactoria*, suffered according to God's gracious counsel in obedience to the same (Rom. v. 19; Phil. ii. 8), procured for them the forgiveness of sins (Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14; Rom. iii. 24; 1 Tim. ii. 6: Matt. xx. 28, xxvi. 28), so that the curse of the law which was to have come upon them no longer had any reference to them. This *modus* of the redemption is here expressed thus: “by *His* having become curse for us,” namely, by His crucifixion, in which He actually became the One affected by the divine ὀργή. The *emphasis* rests on the κατάρα, which is therefore placed at the end and is immediately to be vindicated by a quotation from Scripture. This *abstract*, used instead of the *concrete*, is purposely chosen to *strengthen* the conception, and probably indeed with reference to the קללת אלהים, Deut. xxi. 23; comp. Thilo, *ad Protev. Jac.* 3, p. 181. But κατάρα is used *without the article*, because the object is to express that which Christ has become as regards the *category of quality*—He became *curse*, entered into the position, and into the *de facto* relation, of one visited with the divine wrath; it being obvious from the context that it was in reality the divine curse stipulated in the law, the accomplishment of which He suffered in His death, as is moreover expressly attested in the passage of Scripture that follows. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 321, *d*; Kahn, *Dogm.* I. p. 518 f., III. p. 382; Delitzsch, *z. Hebr.* p. 714. The idea of κατάρα as the *curse of God*—obvious of itself to every reader—forbids us to explain away (with Hofmann) the “becoming a curse” as signifying, not that God accomplished *His* curse on Christ, but that God decreed respecting Christ that He should suffer that which *men* did to Him as fulfilment of the curse of the *law*, which was not incurred by,

¹ For in the apostle's view everywhere, and here also, the law is *this*, and ver. 19 is not at variance with its being so (in opposition to Ritschl in *d. Jahrb. f. D. Theol.* 1863, p. 523 f.). Comp. on Col. ii. 15.

and did not apply to, Him. The exact real parallel, 2 Cor. v. 21, ought to have prevented any such evasive interpretation. And if Paul had not meant the curse of *God*, which Christ suffered *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*,—as no reader, especially after the passage of Scripture which follows, could understand anything else,—he would have been practising a deception. Christ made sin by *God*, and so suffering the *divine* curse—that is just the foolishness of the cross, which is wiser than men (1 Cor. i. 25). Comp., besides, Rich. Schmidt, *Paulin. Christol.* p. 81, who, however, regards the contents of our passage and of 2 Cor. v. 21 under the point of view of the *cancelling* of sin (sin being viewed as an objective power), and thus comes into contact with Hofmann's theory. — *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*] That *ὑπέρ*, as in all passages in which the atoning death is spoken of, does not mean *instead of* (so here, Bengel, Koppe, Flatt, Rückert, Reithmayr, following earlier expositors; comp. also Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 134f.), see on Rom. v. 6. Comp. on i. 4. The satisfaction which Christ rendered, was rendered *for our benefit*; that it was vicarious,¹ is implied in the circumstances of the case itself, and not in the preposition. The divine curse of the law must have been realized by all, who did not fully satisfy the law to which they were bound (and this no one could do), being compelled to endure the execution of the divine *ὀργή* on themselves; but for their deliverance from the bond of this curse Christ intervened with His death, inasmuch as He died as *an accursed one*, and thereby, as by a purchase-price, dissolved that relation to the law which implied a curse. Comp. 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23; Col. ii. 14. This effect depends certainly on the sinlessness of Christ (2 Cor. v. 21), without which His surrendered life could not have been a *λύτρον* (Matt. xx. 28), and He Himself, by the shedding of His blood, could not have been a *ἱλαστήριον* (Rom. iii. 25), because, with guilt of

¹ As is expressly stated in Matt. xx. 28, 1 Tim. ii. 6, by *ὅντι*. Comp. Thomasius, *Chr. Pers. u. Werk*, III. 1, p. 88 ff.; Gess, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* II. 4, III. 4. The less satisfactory is it, therefore, with Schweizer in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1858, p. 425 ff., to find that the essential import of our passage only amounts to this, that the Mosaic law had been set aside on the appearance of Christianity, and that this setting aside was decisively evinced by the death on the cross. See, on the other hand, Baur in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*, 1859, p. 226 ff., and in his *neut. Theol.* p. 156 f.

His own, He would have been amenable to the curse on His own account, and not through taking upon Him the guilt of others (John i. 29); but utterly aloof from and foreign to the N. T. is the idea which Hilgenfeld here suggests, that the curse of the law had lost its validity once for all, because it had for once shown itself as an *unrighteous* curse. The death of Christ served precisely to show the *righteousness* of God, which has its expression in the curse of the law. See on Rom. iii. 25. — ὅτι γέγρα. . . . ξύλου is not an epexegetis to γενομ. ὑπ. ἡμ. κατ. (Matthias, who writes ὁ, τι), but is a parenthesis in which the γενόμενος κατάρα, which had just been said of Christ, is vindicated agreeably to Scripture, by Deut. xxi. 23, freely quoted from the LXX.¹ *Accursed* (visited with the wrath of God) *is every one who* (according to the LXX., in which the article is wanting, *every one, if he*) *is hanged on a tree.* The original historical sense of this passage applies to those malefactors who, in order to the aggravation of their punishment,

¹ The LXX. has πεκατηραμένος ὑπὸ Θεοῦ πᾶς κριζόμενος ἐπὶ ξύλου. The ὑπὸ Θεοῦ is also expressed in the Hebrew. Jerome accuses the Jews here also of intentional falsification of the text, alleging that in an anti-Christian interest they had inserted the name of God into the original text. Bähr, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1849, p. 928 ff., is of opinion that Paul *purposely* omitted ὑπὸ Θεοῦ, so as not to represent Christ as cursed *by God* (with which Hofmann agrees); that He was called cursed only because, through His death, He *appeared* as cursed before all to whom the law was given. But this is incorrect, because the expression is not Paul's, and because, so interpreted, the whole proof adduced would amount only to a *semblance*, and not to a *reality*. Christ has certainly averted from men the curse of God which was ordained in the law (ver. 10), by the fact that He, as the bearer of the divine curse, died while hanging on the cross. Having thus actually become *ἱπικατάρματος*, He became the propitiatory sacrifice for those who were subject to the law, whom He consequently redeemed from the definite divine curse of the law (ver. 10), so that on the part of God the *actus forensis* of justification now commenced; and for this reason, although the crucified One was *ἱπικατάρματος*, Paul could elsewhere represent Him as *ἡμῶν ἰουδίας* (Eph. v. 2). Luther aptly remarks: "*Si vis negare eum esse peccatorem et maledictum, negato etiam passum, crucifixum et mortuum.*" The cause of the non-adoption of ὑπὸ Θεοῦ cannot be that Paul, under the influence of a subordinate value assigned to the law as not directly given by God, had the passage imprinted on his mind without ὑπὸ Θεοῦ (Ritschl, *l.c.* p. 526), for he did not entertain any such estimate of its inferior value. We must, in fact, simply abide by the explanation that he quoted the passage of Scripture from a free recollection (as is already shown by *ἱπικατάρματος* and the addition of *ὁ*), and in doing so, having in view only the "*cursed*" as the point of the passage, left unnoticed the entirely obvious ὑπὸ Θεοῦ. In a similar way, in ver. 11, in the quotation Hab. ii. 4, he does not adopt the *μου* of the LXX.

were after their execution publicly hung up on a (probably cross-shaped) stake,¹ but were not allowed to remain hanging over the night, lest such accursed ones should profane the holy land (Deut. xxi. 23; Num. xxv. 4; Josh. x. 26; 2 Sam. iv. 12). See Lund, *Jüd. Heiligh.* ed. Wolf, p. 536; Saalschütz, *Mos. R.* p. 460 f.; Bähr in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1849, p. 924 f. Now, so far as Christ when put to death hung upon a stake (comp. Acts v. 30, x. 39; 1 Pet. ii. 24), the predicate ἐπικατάρατος applies also to Him; and this furnishes the scriptural proof of the preceding γεγόμενος κατάρα.

Ver. 14. Divine purpose in Christ's redeeming us (the Jews) from the curse of the law; *in order that the blessing promised to Abraham* (justification; see on ver. 8) *might be imparted in Christ Jesus to the Gentiles* (not: to all peoples, as Olshausen and Baumgarten-Crusius, following the earlier expositors, take τὰ ἔθνη, in opposition to the context). So long, namely, as the curse of the law stood in force and consequently the Jews were still subject to this divine curse, the Gentiles could not be partakers of that blessing; for, according to that promise made to Abraham, it was implied in the preference which in the divine plan of salvation was granted to the Jews (Rom. i. 17, xv. 8, 9, iii. 1, 2, ix. 1-5), that salvation should issue from them and pass over to the Gentiles (comp. Rom. xv. 27; John iv. 22, xi. 52). Hence, when Christ by His atoning death redeemed the *Jews* from the curse of the divine law, God, in thus arranging His salvation, must necessarily have had the design that the *Gentiles*, who are expressly named in the promise made to Abraham (ver. 8), should share in the promised justification, and that not in some way through the *law*, as if they were to be subjected to this, but in *Christ Jesus*, through whom in fact the Jews had been *made free* from the curse of the law. The opposite of this liberation of the *Jews* could not exist in God's purpose in regard to the *Gentiles*. Rückert takes a different view of the logical connection (as to which most expositors are silent), in the light of Eph. ii. 14 ff.: "So long as the law continued, an impenetrable wall of partition was set up between the Jewish

¹ Analogous to our former custom of fastening criminals on the wheel, in order to aggravate the punishment.

and the Gentile world; . . . and just as long it was simply impossible that the blessing should pass over to the Gentiles." But the context speaks not of the *law itself* as having been *done away*, but of the *curse of the law*, from which Jesus had redeemed the Jews; so that the idea of a *partition-wall*, formed by the *law itself* standing between Jew and Gentile, is not presented to the reader. Usteri thus states the connection: "Christ by His vicarious death has redeemed us (Jews) from the curse of the law, in order that (justification henceforth being to be attained through faith) the Gentiles may become partakers in the blessings of Abraham, *since now there is required for justification a condition possible for all,—namely, faith.*" Comp. Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and Theophylact. But since the *point of the possibility* of the justification of the Gentiles is not dealt with in the context, this latter expedient is quite as arbitrarily resorted to, as is Schott's intermingling of the *natural law*, against the threatenings of which faith alone yields protection (Rom. ii. 12 ff., iii. 9 ff.). — εἰς τὰ ἔθνη] might reach to the Gentiles (Acts xxi. 17, xxv. 15), that is, be *imparted* to them (Rev. xvi. 2). Comp. on 2 Cor. viii. 13 f. *Such* was to be the course of the divine way of salvation, *from Israel to the Gentiles*. Observe, that Paul does not say καὶ εἰς τ. ἔθνη, as if the Gentiles were merely an *accessory*. — ἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβρ.] the blessing already spoken of, which was pre-announced to Abraham (ver. 8), the opposite of the *κατάρα*; not therefore *life* (Hofmann), the opposite of which would be *θάνατος*, but *justification*—by which is meant the benefit itself (Eph. i. 3; Rom. xv. 29), and not the mere *promise* of it (Schott). — ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ] so that this reception of the blessing depends, and is founded, on Christ (on His redeeming death). The διὰ τῆς πίστεως which follows expresses the matter from the point of view of the *subjective medium*, whilst ἐν Χριστῷ presents the *objective* state of the case—the two elements corresponding to each other at the close of the two sentences of purpose. — ἵνα τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν κ.τ.λ.] cannot be *subordinated* to the previous sentence of purpose (Rückert), for it contains no benefit specially accruing to the Gentiles (Paul must have written λάβωσι, which Chrysostom actually read—evidently an alteration arising from misunderstanding).

It is *parallel* to the *first sentence of purpose* by way of climax: comp. Rom. vii. 13; 2 Cor. ix. 3; Eph. vi. 19 f. After Paul had expressed the blessed aim which the redeeming death of Christ had in reference to the Gentiles,—namely, that they should become partakers of the *εὐλογία* of Abraham,—he raises his glance still higher, and sees the reception also of the Holy Spirit (the consequence of justification) as an aim of that redeeming death; but he cannot again express himself in the third person, because, after the justification of the Jews had been spoken of in ver. 13 and the justification of the Gentiles in ver. 14 (*ὥτα εἰς τὰ ἔθνη . . . Ἰησοῦ*), the statement now concerns the justified generally, Jews and Gentiles without distinction: hence the first person, *λάβωμεν*, is used, the subject of which must be the *Christians*, and not the *Jewish Christians* only (Beza, Bengel, Hofmann, and others). This by no means accidental emergence of the first person, after *τὰ ἔθνη* had been previously spoken of in the *third*, is incompatible with our taking the reception of the Spirit as *part* of the *εὐλογία* (Wieseler), or as essentially *identical* with it (Hofmann). — *τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος*] *τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν λαμβάνειν* means *to become partakers in the realization of the promise* (Heb. x. 36; Luke xxiv. 49; Acts i. 4); but *τοῦ πνεύματος* may be either the genitive of the *subject* (*that which is promised by the Spirit*) or of the *object* (*the promised Spirit*). The latter interpretation (comp. Acts ii. 33; Eph. i. 13) is the usual and correct one.¹ For if (with Winer) we should explain it, “*bona illa, quae a divino Spiritu promissa sunt*” (Luke xxiv. 49; Acts i. 4), then, in conformity with the context, this expression must refer back to ver. 8 (*προϊδοῦσα ἡ γραφή κ.τ.λ. προεγγεγέλίστατο τῷ Ἀβρ. κ.τ.λ.*); and to this the *first* person *λάβωμεν* would not be suitable, as Paul referred that promise given to Abraham in the Scripture (by the Holy Spirit) to the Gentiles. And if *τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος* were essentially the same as the *εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβρ.*, it would be entirely devoid of the *explanatory* character of an

¹ So that *τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν* is to be referred to the O. T. promise of the communication of the Holy Spirit (Joel iii.; Acts ii. 16),—a promise well known to all the apostle's readers. Hilgenfeld incorrectly holds that “the promise given to Abraham is directly designated as an *ἐπαγγελία τοῦ πνεύματος* (a promise, the substance of which is the *πνεῦμα*).”

epexegetis. — *διὰ τ. πίστεως*.] For faith is the *causa apprehendens* both of justification and of the reception of the Spirit; comp vv. 2–5, v. 5.

Vv. 15–18. What Paul has previously said concerning justification, not of the law, but of faith, with reference to that promise given to Abraham (vv. 8–14), could only maintain its ground as true before the worshippers of the law, in the event of its being acknowledged that the covenant once entered into with Abraham through that promise was not deprived of validity by the subsequent institution of the law, or subjected to alteration through the entrance of the law. For if this covenant had been done away with or modified by the law, the whole proof previously adduced would come to nothing. Paul therefore now shows *that this covenant had not been invalidated or altered through the Mosaic law*.

Ver. 15.¹ *Ἀδελφοί*] Expressive of loving urgency, and conciliating with reference to the instruction which follows. Comp. Rom. x. 1. How entirely different was it in ver. 1! Now the tone of feeling is softened. — *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω*] not to be placed in a parenthesis (Erasmus, Calvin, and many others), points to *what follows*—to that which he is just about to say in proof of the immutability of a *divine διαθήκη*. The analogy to be adduced from a *human* legal relation is not intended to be excused, but is to be placed in the proper point of view; for the apostle does not wish to adduce it from his higher standpoint as one enlightened by the Spirit, according to the measure of divinely-revealed wisdom, but he wishes thus to accommodate himself to the *ordinary way among men* (of adducing examples from common life), so as to be perfectly intelligible to his readers (not in order to put them to shame, as Calvin thinks). Comp. *ἀνθρωπείως* and *ἀνθρωπίνως* (Dem. 639. 24, 1122. 2; Rom. vi. 19). See generally on Rom. iii. 5; 1 Cor. ix. 8; and van Hengel, *Annot.* p. 211 f. — *ὅμως*] yet. The *logical* position would be before *οὐδεὶς*. A *διαθήκη*, although *human*, no one yet cancels. Such a *transposition* of the *ὅμως* (which here intimates a conclusion *à minori*) is not un-

¹ As to vv. 15–22, see Hauck in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, p. 512 ff.; Matthias, *d. Abschn. d. Gal. Br.* iii. 15–22, Cassel, 1866. As to vv. 15–29, see Buhl, in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1867, p. 1 ff.

frequent in classical authors, and again occurs in the case of Paul, 1 Cor. xiv. 7. See on this passage. There is therefore all the less reason for writing it *ὁμῶς*, *in like manner* (Morus, Rosenmüller, Jatho), which would be unsuitable, since that which is to be illustrated by the comparison only *follows* (at ver. 17). Rückert (so also Olshausen and Windischmann) takes it in antithetical reference to *κατὰ ἄνθρ. λέγω*: "I desire to keep only to human relations; nevertheless," etc. This would be an illogical antithesis. Others, contrary to linguistic usage, make it mean *yet even* (Grotius, Zachariae, Matthies), or *quin imo* (Wolf), and the like. — *κεκυρωμένην*] *ratified*, made legally valid, Gen. xxiii. 20; 4 Macc. vii. 9; Dem. 485. 13; Plat. *Pol.* x. p. 620 E; Polyb. v. 49. 6; Andoc. *de myst.* § 84, p. 11; comp. on 2 Cor. ii. 8. — *διαθήκην*] *not testament* (Heb. ix. 16 f.), as the Vulgate, Luther, Erasmus, and many others, including Olshausen, render it, quite in opposition to the context; nor, in general, *voluntary ordainment, arrangement* (Winer, Matthies, Usteri, Schott, Hofmann: "destination as to anything, which we apply for one's benefit," Holsten, following earlier expositors); but in the *solemn* biblical signification of בְּרִית, *covenant* (Jerome, Beza, Calvin, Zachariae, Semler, Koppe, Flatt, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Matthias, Reithmayr, and others; also Ewald: "*contract*"), as in iv. 24 and all Pauline passages. The emphatic prefixing of *ἀνθρώπου* points to the *major*, the *διαθήκη of God*; and God had entered into a *covenant* with Abraham, by giving him the promises (ver. 17. Comp. Gen. xvii. 7; Ex. ii. 24; Lev. xxvi. 42; Luke i. 72; Acts iii. 25; 2 Macc. i. 2; Ecclus. xlv. 20, 22). The *singular* (*ἀνθρώπου*) is not opposed to this view; on the contrary, since *ἀνθρώπου διαθήκη* is put as analogue of the *διαθήκη of God* (which God has established), there could, in accordance with this latter, be only *one* contracting party designated: a ratified covenant, *which a man has established*. The *ratification*, as likewise follows from the *διαθήκη of God*, is not to be considered as an act accomplished by a third party; but the covenant is legally valid by the definitive and formal conclusion of the parties themselves who make the agreement with one another. — οὐδεὶς ἀθετεῖ ἢ ἐπιδιαιτ.] viz. no third party. Such an interference would indeed be possible in itself, and

not inconsistent with the idea of a covenant (as Hofmann objects). But cases of this sort would be exceptional, and, in the *general legal axiom* expressed by Paul, might well be left unnoticed. On ἀθετεῖν διαθήκ., *to do away a covenant, irritum facere*, comp. 1 Macc. xv. 27; 2 Macc. xiii. 25; Polyb. xv. 1. 9, iii. 29. 2, xv. 8. 9. That οὐδείς is not the same subject as ἀνθρώπου (Holsten¹), is evident both from the expression in itself, and from the application in ver. 17, where the ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ corresponds to the ἀνθρώπου and the (personified) νόμος, which comes in as a third person, to the οὐδείς. — ἡ ἐπιδιατάσσεται] or *adds further stipulations thereto*, which were not contained in the covenant. That the ἐπί in the word ἐπιδιατάσσεται (not occurring elsewhere) denotes *contra* (Schott), is inconsistent with the analogy of ἐπιδιατίθημι, ἐπιδιαγινώσκω, ἐπιδιακρίνω, and so forth (comp. Joseph. Bell. ii. 2. 3, ἀξιῶν τῆς ἐπιδιαθήκης τὴν διαθήκην εἶναι κυριωτέραν, Antt. xvii. 9. 4); in that case ἀντιδιατάσσεται must have been used. Erasmus, Winer, Hauck, and others wish at least to define the nature of the additions referred to as coming into conflict with the will of the author of the διαθήκη or changing it; but this is arbitrary. The words merely affirm: *no one prescribes any addition thereto*; this is altogether against the general rule of law, let the additions be what they may.—Chrysostom aptly remarks: μὴ τολμᾷ τις ἀνατρέψαι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλθὼν ἢ προσθεῖναι τι, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιδιατάσσεται.

Ver. 16. This verse is usually considered as minor proposition to ver. 15, so that vv. 15–17 contain a complete syllogism, which is, however, interrupted by the exegetical gloss οὐ λέγει κ.τ.λ., and is then resumed by τοῦτο δὲ λέγω in ver. 17 (see Morus, Koppe, Rückert, Schott, de Wette, Hilgenfeld). But against this view it may be urged, (1) that the minor proposition in ver. 16 must necessarily, in a logical point of view,—as corresponding to the emphatic ὁμῶς ἀνθρώπου in ver. 15,—bring into prominence the *divine character* of the promises, and must have been expressed in some such form

¹ “Yet in the sphere of the human no one cancels his voluntary disposition, which has become legally valid.” Matthies also identifies the subject in οὐδείς with the founder of the διαθήκη.

as Θεὸς δὲ τῷ Ἀβρ.; and (2) that the explanation as to καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ, so carefully and emphatically brought in (not merely "allusive," Hilgenfeld), would be here entirely aimless and irrelevant, because it would be devoid of all reference to and influence on the argument. The train of ideas is really as follows (comp. also Wieseler):—After Paul has stated in ver. 15 that even a man's legally valid covenant is not invalidated or provided with additions by any one, he cannot immediately link on the conclusion intended to be deduced from this, viz. that a valid covenant of God is not annulled by the law coming afterwards; but he must first bring forward the circumstance which, in the case in question, has an *essential bearing* on this proof,—that the promises under discussion were issued not to Abraham only, *but at the same time to his descendants also*, that is, *to Christ*. From this essential circumstance it is, in fact, clear that that covenant was not to be a mere temporary contract, simply made to last *up to the time of* the law. Accordingly, the purport of vv. 15–17 is this: "Even a man's covenant legally completed remains uncanceled and without addition (ver. 15). But the circumstance which conditions and renders incontestable the conclusion to be thence deduced is, that the promises were spoken not merely to Abraham, but also to his seed, by which, as is clear from the *singular* τῷ σπέρματι, is meant *Christ* (ver. 16). And now—to complete my conclusion drawn from what I have said in vv. 15 and 16—what I mean is this: A covenant previously made with legal validity by God is not rendered invalid by the law, which came into existence so long afterwards" (ver. 17). — τῷ δὲ Ἀβρ. ἐρρέθησαν αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι κ. τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ] The emphasis is laid on καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ, the point which is here brought into prominence as the further specific foundation of the proof to be adduced. This element essential to the proof lies in the destination of Christ as *the organ of fulfilment*; in the case of a promise which had been given not merely to the ancestor himself, but also to Christ, the fulfiller, it was not at all possible to conceive an ἀθέτησις by the law. Comp. also Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 204. The passage of the O. T. to which Paul refers in καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ, is considered by most expositors, fol-

lowing Tertullian (*de carne Christi*, 22) and Chrysostom, to be Gen. xxii. 18 : ἐνευλογηθήσονται ἐν τῷ σπέρματί σου πάντα τὰ ἔθνη τῆς γῆς. But, from the words οὐ λέγει καὶ τοῖς σπέρμασιν κ.τ.λ. which follow, it is evident that Paul was thinking of a passage in which καὶ τῷ σπέρματί σου is *expressly* written. Hence (with Estius and Bengel, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Hofmann, Reithmayr, Buhl) the passages Gen. xiii. 15, xvii. 8, are rather to be assumed as those referred to,—a view confirmed by the expression κληρονομία in ver. 18.¹ Comp. Rom. iv. 13. — ἐρρέθησαν²] *they were spoken*, that is, *given*, as some min., Eusebius and Theophylact, actually read ἐδόθησαν. The *datives* simply state *to whom* the promises were spoken, not: *in reference to whom* (so Matthias),—an interpretation which was the less likely to occur to the reader, well acquainted as he was with the fact that the promise was spoken directly to Abraham, who at the same time represented his σπέρμα. — αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι] in the *plural*: for the promise in question was given *on several occasions* and under various modifications, even as regards the contents; and indeed Paul himself here refers to a place and form of promise different from that mentioned above in ver. 8. In καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ he finds that *Christ* is meant; hence he adds the following gloss (Midrasch): οὐ λέγει καὶ τοῖς σπέρμασιν κ.τ.λ., in which the *singular* form of the expression is asserted by him to be significant, and the conclusion is thence drawn that only *one* descendant (not: only one *class* of descendants, namely the spiritual children of Abraham, as, following Augustine, Cameron and others, Olshausen and Tholuck, *d. A. T. im neuen T.* p. 65 ff. ed. 6, also Jatho, hold) is intended, namely *Christ*. That this inference is purely rabbinical (Surenhusius, *καταλλ.* p. 84 f.; Schoettgen, *Hor.* p. 736; Döpke, *Hermeneut.* I. p. 176 ff.), and without objective force as a proof, is evident

¹ The correct view is found even in Origen, *Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.* iv. 4, *Opp.* IV. p. 532: "Ipse enim (apostolus) haec de Christo dicta esse interpretatur, cum dixit: 'Scriptum est, tibi dabo terram hanc et semini tuo. Non dixit: et seminibus, tanquam in multis, sed semini tuo, tanquam in uno, qui est Christus.'" Comp. also p. 618, and *Homil.* 9 in *Genes.* *Opp.* II. p. 85; and earlier, Irenaeus, *Haer.* v. 32. 2; later, especially Jerome.

² As to this form, which has preponderant attestation (Lachm., Tisch.), comp. on Rom. ix. 12; Kühner, I. p. 810, ed. 2.

from the fact that in the original text נָרַע is written, and this, in every passage in the O. T. where it expresses the idea of *progenies*, is used in the *singular* (in 1 Sam. viii. 15, נָרַעֵיכֶם are *scgetes vestrae*), whether the posterity consists of many or of one only (Gen. iv. 25; 1 Sam. i. 11; Targ. Ps. xviii. 26, where Isaac is called Abraham's נָרַע¹). Also the later Hebrew and Chaldee usage of the plural form in the sense of *progenies* (see Geiger in the *Zeitschr. d. morgenl. Gesellsch.* 1858, p. 307 ff.) does not depend, any more than the Greek use of σπέρματα (Soph. *O. C.* 606. 1277; *O. R.* 1246; Aesch. *Eum.* 909), on the circumstance that, in contradistinction, the singular is to be understood ὡς ἐφ' ἑνός. Comp. 4 Macc. xviii. 1: ὁ τῶν Ἀβραμαίων σπερμάτων ἀπόγονοι παῖδες Ἰσραηλῖται, πείθεσθε τῷ νόμῳ τούτῳ. The classical use of αἵματα is analogous (comp. on John i. 13). Moreover, the original sense of these promises, and also the τῷ σπέρματι of the LXX., undoubtedly apply to the posterity of Abraham *generally*: hence it is only in so far as Christ is the theocratic culmination, the goal and crown of this series of descendants, that the promises were spoken to Him; but to discover this reference in the *singular* καὶ τῷ σπέρματί σου was a mere feat of the rabbinical subtlety, which was still retained by the apostle from his youthful culture as a characteristic element of his national training, without detriment to the Holy Spirit which he had, and to the revelations which had been vouchsafed to him. Every attempt to show that Paul has not here allowed himself any rabbinical interpretation of this sort (see among recent expositors, particularly Philippi in the *Mecklenb. Zeitschr.* 1855, p. 519 ff.: comp. also Hengstenberg, *Christol.* I. p. 50 f.; Tholuck, *l.c.*, and Hofmann) is incompatible with the language itself, and conflicts with the express ὅς ἐστι Χριστός; which

¹ In the so-called Protevangelium also, Gen. iii. 15, the LXX. translators have referred σπέρμα to an individual (to a son); for they translate, αὐτός σου τηρήσει κεφαλὴν. But it does not thence follow that this subject was the Messiah, to whom the נָרַע, correctly understood by the LXX., but wrongly by the Vulgate (*conteret*), is not suitable. The Messianic reference of the passage lies in the *enmity against the serpent* here established as the expression of a moral idea, the final victorious issue of which was the subject-matter of the Messianic hope, and was brought about through the work of the Messiah. Comp. Hengstenberg, *Christol.* I. p. 26 ff.; Ewald, *Jahrb.* II. p. 160 f.; also Schultz, *alttest. Theol.* I. p. 466 f.

clearly shows that we are not to understand *σπερμάτων* with *ἐπὶ πολλῶν*, nor *σπέρματος* with *ἐφ' ἐνός* (Hofmann, Buhl), but that the contrast between many *persons* and one *person* is the point expressed. But the truth itself, which the gloss of the apostle is intended to serve, is entirely independent of this gloss, and rests upon the *Messianic tenor* of the promises in question, not on the *singular* τῷ σπέρματι. — οὐ λέγει] *sc. Θεός*, which is derived from the historical reference of the previous ἐρρέθησαν, so well known to the reader. Comp. Eph. iv. 8, v. 14. — ὡς ἐπὶ πολλῶν] *as referring to many individuals*, in such a manner that He intends and desires to express a plurality of persons. On ἐπί, *upon*, that is, *in reference to*, with the genitive along with verbs of speaking, see Heindorf, *ad Plat. Charm.* p. 62; Bernhardt, p. 248; Ast. *Lex. Plat.* I. p. 767. — ὅς ἐστι Χριστός] *which σπέρμα*, denoting a single individual, *is Christ*. The feebly attested reading *ὁ* is a mistaken grammatical alteration; for how often does the gender of the relative correspond by attraction to the predicative substantive! See Kühner, II. p. 505. Χριστός is the *personal Christ Jesus*, not, as some, following Irenaeus (*Haer.* v. 32. 2) and Augustine (*ad iii.* 29, *Opp.* IV. p. 384), have explained it: *Christ and His church* (Beza, Gomarus, Crell, Drusius, Hammond, Locke, and others; also Tholuck, Olshausen, Philippi *l.c.*, Hofmann), or *the church* alone (Calvin, Clericus, Bengel, Ernesti, Döderlein, Nösselt, and others). Such a *mystical sense* of Χριστός must necessarily have been suggested by the context (as in 1 Cor. xii. 12); here, however, the very contrast between πολλῶν and ἐνός is decidedly against it. See also vv. 19, 22, 24, 27, 28. Ver. 29 also is *against*, and not in favour of, this explanation; because the inference of this verse depends on the very fact that *Christ Himself* is the σπέρμα τοῦ Ἀβρ. (see on ver. 29). The whole explanation is a very superfluous device, the mistaken ingenuity of which (especially in the case of Tholuck and Hofmann) appears in striking contrast to the clear literal tenor of the passage.¹

¹ Tholuck holds that in ver. 16 Paul desired to show that the promises could not possibly extend to "the posterity of Abraham in every sense," and that consequently the *natural* posterity was not included; that the *singular* points rather to a *definite* posterity, namely the *believing*. The latter are taken along with *Christ* as an unity, and, partly as the spiritual successors of the patriarch,

It is not, however, Christ in His *pre-human* existence, in so far as He *according to the Spirit* already bore sway in the patriarchs (1 Cor. x. 1 ff.), who is here referred to, because it is only as the λόγος ἔνσαρκος that He can be the descendant of Abraham (Matt. i. 1; Rom. i. 3). Comp. ver. 19.

Ver. 17. Result of vv. 15 and 16, emphatically introduced by τοῦτο δὲ λέγω, *but this which follows* (see on 1 Cor. i. 12) *I say* as the conclusion drawn from what is adduced in vv. 15 and 16: *A covenant which has been previously made valid* (ratified) by God, *the law . . . does not annul.* What covenant is here intended, is well known from the connection, namely, the covenant made by God with Abraham, through His giving to him, and to his σπέρμα included along with him, the promises in Gen. xii. 3, xviii. 18 (ver. 8), xiii. 15, xvii. 8 (ver. 16). The κύρωσις (comp. on ver. 15) is not any separate act following the institution of the covenant, but was implied in the very promises given: through them the covenant became valid. The προ in προκεκυρ. is correlative with the subsequent μετα, and therefore signifies: *previously, ere the law existed.* — ὁ μετὰ τετρακόσια κ.τ.λ.] cannot be intended to denote a comparatively *short* time (Koppe), which is not suggested by the context; but its purport is: The law, which came into existence *so long a time after*, cannot render invalid a covenant, which had been validly instituted so long previously by God and consequently had already subsisted so long. “Magnitudo in-

partly in their oneness with the great Scion proceeding from his family, they constitute the descendants of Abraham. But in this case Paul, instead of ὡς ἐπὶ πολλῶν, must at least have written ὡς ἐπὶ πάντων; instead of ὡς ἐφ’ ἑνός, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός; and instead of ὅς ἐστι Χριστός, he must have written ὃ ἵσταν ἡ ἐκκλησία σὺν Χριστῷ. — According to Hofmann, *in loc.* (not quite the same in his *Schriftbew.* II. 1, p. 107 f.), Paul, following the analogy of Gen. iv. 25 and thinking in τοῖς σπέρμασιν of *several posterities by the side of each other*, lays stress on the *oneness* of Abraham’s posterity expressed in the *singular*, the expression in the singular serving him only as the *shortest means* (?) for asserting a fact testified to by Scripture generally; but, on the other hand, he has, *by means of estimating* this unit of posterity *in the light of the history of redemption*, been able, and indeed obliged, to interpret τῷ σπέρματί σου as referring to *Christ*, the promised Saviour, *without thereby maintaining that this expression in the singular could signify only an individual, and not a race of many members.* But in this way everything which we are expected to read in the plain words is imported into them, and artificially imposed upon them, by the expositor. Besides, in Gen. iv. 25 σπέρμα ἕτερον means nothing more than *another son*.

tervalli auget promissionis auctoritatem," Bengel. According to Hofmann, the statement of this length of time is intended to imply that the law was something *new* and *different*, which could not be held *as an element forming part of the promise*. But this was obvious of itself from the contrast between promise and law occupying the whole context, and, moreover, would not be dependent on a longer or shorter interval. *With regard to the number 430*, Paul gets it from Ex. xii. 40 (in Gen. xv. 13 and Acts vii. 6 the *round* number 400 is used); but in adopting it he does not take into account that this number specifies merely *the duration of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt*. Consequently the number here, taken by itself, contains a chronological inaccuracy; but Paul follows the statement of the LXX., which differs from the original text—the text of the LXX. being well known to and current among his readers—without entering further into this point of chronology, which was foreign to his aim. In Ex. xii. 40 the LXX. has ἡ δὲ κατοίκησις τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσρ. ἣν κατέκνησαν ἐν γῇ Αἴγ. καὶ ἐν γῇ Χαναάν (the words κ. ἐ. γ. X. are wanting in the Hebrew), ἔτη τετρακόσια τριάκοντα. This text of the LXX. was based upon a different reckoning of the time—a reckoning which is found in the Samaritan text and in Joseph. *Antt.* ii. 15. 3. See Tychsen, *Exc.* X. p. 148. The interval between God's promise to Abraham and the migration of Jacob to Egypt—an interval omitted in the 430 years—cannot indeed be exactly determined, but may be reckoned at about 200 years; so that, if Paul had wished to give on his own part a definition of the time, he would not have exceeded bounds with 600 years instead of 430. The attempts to bring the 430 years in our passage into agreement with the 430 years in Ex. xii. 40 are frustrated by the unequivocal tenor of both passages.¹ — γεγωνός] is not

¹ *E.g.* Grotius: The time in Ex. xii. 40 is reckoned from Abraham's journey to Egypt. Perizonius, *Orig. Aeg.* 20; and Schoettgen, *Hor.* p. 736. The 430 years do not begin until after the period of the promises, that is, after the time of the patriarchs, and of Jacob in particular. Bengel, *Ordo temp.* 162: The *terminus a quo* is the birth of Jacob. Comp. Olshausen: Paul reckons from Jacob and his journey into Egypt. In like manner Hofmann: The *terminus a quo* is the time "at which the promise given to Abraham was *at all repeated*;" also Hauck: "From Jacob, as far as the pure, genuine στίγμα 'Αβρ. reached."

said *ad postponendam legem* (see, on the contrary, John i. 17); as Bengel thinks ("non dicit *data*, quasi *lex fuisset*, *antequam data sit*"); for every law only comes into existence as law with the act of legislation.—On ἀκυροῖ, *invalidates, overthrows*, comp. Matt. xv. 6; Mark vii. 13; 3 Esr. vi. 32; Diod. Sic. xvi. 24; Dion. H. vi. 78; and ἀκυρον ποιεῖν, in more frequent use among Greek authors. — εἰς τὸ καταργ. τὴν ἐπαγγελ.] Aim of the ἀκυροῖ: in order to do away the promise (by which the διαθήκη was completed), to render it ineffective and devoid of result. Comp. Rom. iv. 14. "Redditur autem inanis, si vis conferendae haereditatis ab ea ad legem transfertur," Bengel. Observe once more the *personification* of the law.

Ver. 18. "I am right in denying, that through the law the διαθήκη passes out of force and the promise is to cease." The proof depends on the relation of *contrast* between law and promise, whereby the working of the one excludes the like working of the other. *For if the possession of the Messianic salvation proceeds from the law*, which must have been the case if God's covenant with Abraham had lost its validity by means of the law, *then this possession comes no longer from promise*,—a case which, although necessary on that supposition, cannot occur, as is evident from the precedent of Abraham, to whom salvation was given by God *through promise*. The mode of conclusion adopted in Rom. iv. 14 is similar. — ἐκ νόμου] so that the law is the institution which causes this result (in the way of following its commandments). Comp. on ἐν νόμῳ, ver. 11. — ἡ κληρονομία] the possession, הָאָרֶץ, refers in the theocratic-historical sense of the O. T. to the land of Canaan and its several portions (Deut. iv. 21; Josh. xiii. 23); but in its N. T. sense, the conception of the κληρονομία is elevated to the idea of its Messianic fulfilment (Matt. v. 5), so that the *kingdom of the Messiah* and the whole of its fulness of salvation and glory are understood thereby (1 Cor. vi. 9; Gal. v. 21; Eph. v. 5; Acts xx. 32, *et al.*). Comp. on Rom. iv. 13; Eph. i. 11. So also here; and Paul uses this word (not ἡ σωτηρία, ἡ ζωή, or the like) because he has previously (see on ver. 16) referred to passages in which the κληρονομία (that is, according to this Christian idealizing of the O. T. historical sense: the *kingdom of the Messiah*) is promised. — οὐκέτι] The

one relation, if it exists, cancels the other. It is (in opposition to Koppe) the *logical* (not historical) *no longer*. Comp. Rom. vii. 17, xi. 6. — δι' ἐπαγγελίας] *by means of promise*, so that in his case the possession of the Messianic salvation is the fulfilment (by way of grace) of a promise, and not the possible result (by way of reward) of rendering prescribed services, and the like, which fall under the idea of the νόμος. — κεχάρισται] *sc. τὴν κληρονομίαν donavit* (Vulgate), *bestowed by way of gift* (the contrast to ὀφείλημα, Rom. iv. 4, 16), namely, as a future possession to be realized at the time of the παρουσία (Matt. viii. 11). On χαρίζεσθαι τινί τι, comp. Rom. viii. 32; 1 Cor. ii. 12; Phil. i. 29, ii. 9; Acts xxvii. 24; Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 6. 22; Polyb. xvi. 24. 9. Without supplying anything, Schott and Matthias render: to Abraham God has, through promise, *been gracious*. Comp. Holsten: He has *bestowed a favour* on him. But the supplying of τὴν κληρονομίαν harmonizes best with the immediate context and the logical relation of the two divisions of the verse, the second of which forms the *propositio minor*, and therefore, like the *major*, must speak of the κληρονομία.¹ Caspari (in *d. Strassb. Beitr.* 1854, p. 206 ff.), following classical usage, but not that of the N. T., has wrongly taken κεχάρισται in a *passive* sense, so that *God* is conceived as the inheritance. This is in opposition to the context, and also against the view of the N. T. generally, according to which the κληρονομία proceeds from God (Rom. viii. 17), and is not God Himself, but eternal life (ver. 21; Tit. iii. 7; Matt. xix. 29, *et al.*), the kingdom of the Messiah (v. 21; 1 Cor. vi. 9, xv. 50; Jas. ii. 5), and its salvation (Rom. i. 16) and dominion (Rom. iv. 13 f.; Matt. v. 5; 2 Tim. ii. 12).

Ver. 19.² After Paul has shown in vv. 15–18 that the law does not abolish the far earlier covenant of promise, he might very naturally be met by the inquiry, “According to this view, then, what sort of end is left to be served by the law in connection with the history of salvation?” Hence he himself raises this question and answers it. — τί οὖν ὁ νόμος] *sc.*

¹ Ver. 18 is a *sylogismus conditionalis* of the nature of a dilemma, the conclusion of which, because self-obvious, is not expressed.

² On ver. 19, see Stölting, *Beiträge z. Exegese d. Paul. Br.* 1869, p. 50 ff.

ἐστι: *how does it stand therefore* (if it is the case that the law does not abolish the covenant of promise) *with the law?* A general question, in which, to judge from the answer that follows, the apostle had in view the *purpose* for which God gave the law. On the neuter τί, with a nominative following, comp. 1 Cor. iii. 5 (in the correct reading): τί οὖν ἐστὶν Ἀπολλῶς; and see Stallbaum, *ad Gorg.* p. 501 E; Bernhardt, p. 336 f. Following J. Cappellus, Schott (also Matthies, though undecidedly, Jatho and Wieseler) takes τί for διὰ τί; very unnecessarily, however, and in opposition to the constant use of the τί οὖν so frequently recurring in Paul's writings (Rom. iii. 1, iv. 1, *et al.*; comp. Gal. iv. 15). — τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη] *for the sake of transgressions it was added*; that is, in order that the transgressions of the law might be brought out as real, it was, after the covenant of promise was already in existence, superadded to the latter (παρεισῆλθεν, Rom. v. 20). The law namely, because it gives occasion to the potency of sin in man to bring about in him all evil desire (Rom. vii. 5, 8), and nevertheless is too weak as a counter-power to oppose this sinful development (Rom. viii. 3), is the δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας (1 Cor. xv. 56; and see Rom. vii. 7 ff.); but sin—which, although existing since Adam (Rom. v. 13), is yet increased by that provocation of the law—has only come to assume the definite character of παράβασις in virtue of the existence of the law and its relation thereto (Rom. iv. 15). The same purpose of the law is expressed in Rom. v. 20, but without the stricter definition of sin as παράβασις. Accordingly, τῶν παραβ. χάριν is not (with Wetstein) to be rationalized to this effect: "Lex sine dubio eo consilio lata est, ut servaretur, ὑπακοῆς χάριν; vitio tamen hominum evenit, ut peccata multiplicarentur." This is in itself correct (comp. Rom. vii. 12), but is irrelevant here, where the point in question is the position of the law in connection with the divine plan of salvation, the final aim of which is redemption. The real idea of the apostle is, that the emergence of sins—namely, in the penal, wrath-deserving (Rom. iv. 15), moral form of *transgressions*—which the law brought about, was *designed* by God (who must indeed have foreseen this effect) when He gave the law, and designed in fact as a mediate end in reference to

the future redemption; for the evil was to become truly great, that it might nevertheless be outdone by grace (Rom. v. 20). The result, which the law, according to experience, has on the whole effected, and by which it has proved itself the *δύναμις τῆς ἀμαρτίας* (comp. also 2 Cor. iii. 6), could not be otherwise than the *aim* of God. Comp. Ritschl, p. 74 f.; Baur, *neutest. Theol.* p. 140 f.; Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Holsten, Hofmann, Reithmayr, Matthias (who, however, assumes the intentional appearance of an ambiguity), Stölting, and others; also Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 75; Lechler, *apost. Zeit.* p. 110. Luther (1519) strikingly remarks: "Ut remissio propter salutem, ita praevaricatio propter remissionem, ita lex propter transgressionem." Observe, further, the *article* before *παράβ.*, which summarily comprehends, as having really that character, the transgressions arising and existing since the giving of the law; comp. Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 297. Others¹ consider that by *τῶν παράβ. χάριν* the *recognition of sins* is expressed as the aim of the law. So Augustine, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Calovius, Wolf, Schoettgen, Michaelis, Windischmann, and others; also Winer ("ut manifestam redderet atque ita argueret illam, quam Judaei peccando sibi contrahebant, culpam"). But (1) this idea could not have been expressed by the mere *τῶν παράβ. χάριν*; for although *χάριν* is not always exclusively used in its original sense, *for the sake of, in favour of*, but may also be taken simply as *on account of*,² still, in order to be intelligible, Paul must have written *τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν* as signifying: in order to bring sins to recognition *as transgressions*. And (2) the point of the *recognition of sin* was entirely foreign to this passage; for in *τῶν παράβ. χάριν* Paul desires to call attention to the fact that the law, according to the divine plan, was intended to produce exactly the objective, actual (not merely the subjective) opposite of the *δικαιοσύνη* (comp. vv. 21, 22). On account of this connection also the interpretation of many expositors,

¹ Some unexegetically combine the two explanations, as Bengel: "ut agnoscerentur et invalerescerent."

² Ellenft, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 947, appropriately remarks: "*χάριν* cum genitivo dictum: *in gratiam* alicuius, inde *alicuius* aut *hominis* aut *rei causa* significans, quamquam minime semper *gratia* adsignificatur, quae Ammonii doctrina est, p. 53." Comp. 1 John iii. 12.

ad coercendas transgressionēs, is wholly to be rejected, because opposed to the context. So Jerome, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Grotius, Zachariae, Semler, Morus, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Paulus, Rückert, Olshausen, Neander, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Baur, Ewald ("in order to *punish* them *more strictly*"); also Messner, *Lehre d. Ap.* p. 222, and Hauck, comp. Buhl; several, such as Grotius and Rückert, think that the inclination to Egyptian idolatry is chiefly referred to. This view is decidedly disposed of by the expression *παραβάσεων*, since *παραβάσεις* as such could only come into existence *with* the law (Rom. iv. 15); previously there were sins, but no transgressions,—a view with which Rom. v. 14 does not conflict, because the matter in question there is the transgression of a quite definite, positive command of God. *The two last interpretations are combined* by Flatt and Schott, as also by Reiche, following older expositors (comp. also Matthies),—a course inconsistent with hermeneutical principles in general, and here in fact involving an amalgamation of *two erroneous views*. — *προστέθη*] *it was added*, is not inconsistent with what was said in ver. 15, οὐδεὶς . . . ἐπιδιατάσσεται, because in the latter general proposition under οὐδεὶς *third persons* are thought of. The law, moreover, was not given as ἐπιδιαθήκη (see on ver. 15), but as *another* institution, which, far from being a *novella* to the διαθήκη, was only to be a temporary intermediate measure in the divine plan of salvation, to minister to the final fulfilment of the promise. See the sequel, and comp. Rom. v. 20, x. 4. — ἄχρις οὗ ἔλθῃ τὸ σπέρμα κ.τ.λ.] *terminus ad quem* of the merely provisional duration of this added institute. But these words are neither to be connected, in disregard of their position, with διαταγείς (Hofmann), nor to be placed in a parenthesis; for the construction is not interrupted. As to ἄχρις οὗ ἔλθῃ, *usque dum venerit*, comp. on Rom. xi. 25. According to the general usage of the N. T. (Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 198), the *subjunctive*, and not the *optative* (Matthiae, p. 1158), is used. Paul has *not* put ἄν, because there was no idea in his mind of any circumstances which could have hindered the event. See Stallbaum, *ad Phaed.* p. 62 C; Hermann, *de part. ἄν*, p. 110 ff.: Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p.

291 ff. Comp. on 1 Cor. xi. 26. — τὸ σπέρμα ᾧ ἐπήγγ.] that is, *Christ*, whose advent, according to ver. 16, necessarily brought with it the fulfilment of the promise. The *dative*, however, does not stand for εἰς ὃν (Winer, Usteri), but just as in ver. 16: *to whom the promise was made*. — ἐπήγγελλται] not *promiserat* (Vulgate, Bengel, Flatt, Hofmann), comp. Rom. iv. 21, Heb. xii. 26; but *promissio facta est* (2 Macc. iv. 27), because thus it is not requisite to supply Θεός, and the expression corresponds very naturally with ἐρρέθησαν αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι in ver. 16. Hence also it is superfluous to supply ἡ κληρονομία (Ewald).—διαταγείς δι' ἀγγέλων ἐν χ. μεσ.] the mode *in which* ὁ νόμος προσετέθη, or the *form* of this act: *having been ordained through angels*, etc. On διατάσσειν νόμον, comp. Hesiod, ἔργ. 274. The simple τάσσειν νόμον is more frequently used, as in Plat. Legg. p. 863 D. It means *to ordain a law*, that is, *to issue it for obedience*, not *to arrange it for publication* (Stölting), so that the angels would be described here as the *diaskeuastai* of the law,—an idea which has no support anywhere, and would run counter to the view of the *directly* divine origin of the law (Ex. xxxi. 18, xxxii. 16; Deut. ix. 10). As to the use of the aorist participle in the language of narration, see Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 774; Bernhardt, p. 383. The tradition that the divine promulgation of the law took place amidst the *ministry of angels*, is first found in the LXX., Deut. xxxiii. 2 (not in the original text); then in Heb. ii. 2, Acts vii. 38, 53, Joseph. *Antt.* xv. 5. 3, and in the Rabbins, and also in the Samaritan theology. Comp. on Acts vii. 53; Delitzsch, on *Hebr.* ii. 2. Because the tradition itself and its antiquity are thus beyond doubt, and there is no warrant for supposing that Paul did not know it or was not likely to adopt it (as, indeed, he adopted other traditional teachings, 1 Cor. x. 4, 2 Cor. xii. 2), it is a mere mistaken evasion to explain διά as *inter* or *coram* (Calovius, Loesner, Morus), which would have ultimately to be referred to the idea “by the mediation of” (as 2 Tim. ii. 2). The same remark applies to the view which looks upon the ἀγγέλων even as *men*, like Moses and Aaron (Zeger, and revived by Cassel, *d. Mittler e. exeg. Versuch*, 1855); Chrysostom left it optional to understand it either of *priests* or of *angels*. As to the

monstrous amplifications which this tradition of the agency of the angels underwent at the hands of the later Rabbins, see Eisenmenger, *entdecktes Judenth.* I. p. 309 f. Paul does not look upon the angels as *authors* of the law (as held by Schulthess, Voigtländer in Keil and Tzschirner's *Anal.* IV. p. 139 ff., and Huth, *Commentat.* Altenb. 1854),—a point which is certain from the whole view taken in biblical history of the law generally as *divine* (see the apostle's own designation of the law as νόμος Θεοῦ, Rom. vii. 22, 25), and as γραφή (vers. 10, 13, iv. 21 f., *et al.*), and here especially is all the more decidedly indicated by the use of the διά (and not ὑπό), for every reader in fact conceived of the angels as *ministering* spirits of God (comp. LXX. Deut. xxxiii. 2: ἐκ δεξιῶν αὐτοῦ ἄγγελοι μετ' αὐτοῦ), who accompanied the Lord appearing in majesty; and consequently no one could attach any other sense to διά than "*ministerium angelorum*," which is clear as the meaning in Heb. ii. 2 from διὰ τοῦ κυρίου in ver. 3. — ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου¹] For Moses received the tables of the law from God, and carried them down to the people. Thus in the legislation he was the middle person between the *Giver* of the law and its *recipients*; *with the tables in his hand*, he was God's envoy to Israel, acting between the two parties. On account of this historical circumstance (Ex. xxxi. 18, xxxii. 15), ἐν χειρὶ is to be understood not merely as a vivid mode of designating the mediation (מִדְּבָר), but quite literally: comp. Ex. xxxii. 15; Lev. xxvi. 46. In the N. T. the designation of Moses as μεσίτης forms the basis of the expression in Heb. viii. 6, ix. 15, xii. 24; and on the subject itself, comp. Acts vii. 38. This designation does not occur in the O. T. or in the Apocrypha; but by the Rabbins Moses is called *mediator* מְדַבֵּר, אֲמֵנִי, also שְׁלִיחַ. See Schoettgen, *Hor.* p. 738 f.; Wetstein, p. 224. Comp. Philo, *de vita Mos.* II. p. 678 f. A; and on the matter itself, Deut. v. 5; also Joseph. *Antt.* iii. 5. 3. The better known and the more celebrated *Moses* was as mediator of the law (comp. *Aboth R. Nath.* i. 1, "Legem, quam Deus Israelitis dedit, non nisi *per manus Mosis* dedit"), the more decidedly must we reject every interpretation in which the

¹ μεσίτης is a word that belongs to the later Greek (Polyb., Lucian, *et al.*). Comp. Lobeck, *ad Phrygn.* p. 121. It occurs in the LXX only in Job ix. 33.

μεσίτης—not more precisely defined by Paul, but presumed to have its historical reference universally familiar—is *not* referred to Moses. This applies not only to the view of most of the Fathers (Origen, Athanasius, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact; so also Beza, Lyra, Erasmus, Calvin, Pareus, Calovius, and others), who, following 1 Tim. ii. 5, Heb. viii. 6, ix. 15, xii. 24, take the Mediator to be *Christ*,¹ but also to Schmieder's view (*nova interpr. Gal.* iii. 19, 20, Numburg. 1826), that an *angel* is intended—the *angel of the law*, who, according to Jewish theology, had the special duty of teaching Moses the law. Certainly the Rabbins speak of an angel of the law (he was called *Jefifia*; see *Talkut Rubeni*, f. 107. 3); but this part of their teaching cannot be shown to have existed in the time of the apostles, nor can it find a biblical basis in the passages quoted by Schmieder (Ex. xix. 19 f., xx. 18, xxxiii. 11; Num. xii. 5–8; Deut. v. 4 f.; also Ex. xxxiii. 18–23, xl. 35; Deut. xxxiii. 2; Ps. lxxviii. 18; Acts vii. 53; Mal. iii. 1). See also, in opposition to Schmieder,² especially Lücke in the *Stud. u. Krit.* p. 97 f. — *The object for which Paul has added διαταγὰς . . . μεσίτου*, is not to convey the impression of an *inferior, subordinate* position held by the law in comparison with that of the gospel or that of the promise, inasmuch as the former was ordained not directly by God, but through angels and a mediator³ (Luther, Elsner, Wolf, Estius, Semler, Rosenmüller, Tychsen, Flatt, Rückert, Usteri, de Wette, Baur, Ewald, Hofmann, Reithmayr, Hauck, and others; comp. also Olshausen, and Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 77; Vogel in the *Stud. u. Krit.*

¹ So also very recently Culmann, *zum Verständn. der Worte Gal.* iii. 20, Strassb. 1864.

² With whom Schneckenburger agrees. See on ver. 20.

³ Luther, 1538: "Lex est servorum vox, evangelium Domini." Hofmann: Paul gives his readers to understand *that the event of the giving of the law was no fulfilment of the promise* (see, however, on ver. 20). Bengel: God committed the law to angels "*quasi alienius quiddam et severius*." Buhl confines himself to saying that Paul wished to represent the *difference* between the mode of revelation in the case of the law and that of the covenant of promise. But the question regarding the purpose of this representation as bearing on the apostle's argument thus remains unanswered. According to Hilgenfeld, Paul's intention was to detach as far as possible the origin of the law from the supreme God; and in this respect also he was the precursor of Gnosticism.

1865, p. 530), but to enable the reader to realize the *glory* of the law in the dignity and formal solemnity of its ordination. So Calvin and others, including Winer, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, Wieseler, Matthias; comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 284. It may be decisively urged in favour of the latter view, (1) that, if the mention of the angels was intended to suggest a lower relation in comparison with a higher, this higher relation must have been distinctly expressed (as in Heb. ii. 2), or at least must have been quite definitely discoverable from the immediate context (by the addition of a *μόνον* perhaps, or the like). Regarded in themselves, the appearance of angels and the agency of angels (comp. also i. 8) are always conceived as something majestic and glorifying,¹ even in respect to *Christ* (Matt. xxiv. 31, xxv. 31; John i. 52; 1 Tim. iii. 16, *et al.*), and especially in respect to the law (LXX. Deut. xxxiii. 2; Acts vii. 38, 53), the bestowal of which was one of the high divine distinctions of Israel (Rom. ix. 4). Just as little can it be said (2) that *ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου* is a depreciatory statement, for in fact the gospel also is given *ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου*; to which argument the objection cannot be made, that the Mediator of the gospel, as the Son of God, is far more exalted than the mediator of the law: for *ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου* does not state at all *what kind of* mediator it was who intervened in the promulgation of the law, but leaves the dignity or lowliness of his person entirely out of view, and asserts only *that* a mediator was employed in the giving of the law; so that in respect of this relation regarded by itself there was no qualitative difference between the law and the gospel: *both were mediated, given through the hand of a mediator.* By way of comparison and contrast with the gospel, *ἐν χειρὶ ἀνθρώπου* or some such expression must have been used, whereby the mediation of the law would be characterized as *inferior* to that of the gospel. Lastly, (3) it by no means formed a part of the plan and object of the apostle to depreciate the law as a less divine institution,—a course which, besides being inconsistent with his recognition of the law elsewhere (Rom. vii. 12–25), would have been even

¹ Hence we must not say with Schmid, *bibl. Theol.* II. p. 280, that the intention was to intimate that the giving of the law was not "*the absolute normal act*" of the divine economy.

unwise in dealing with zealots for the law; whereas it was in the highest degree appropriate to acknowledge the high dignity of the law as evinced in the majesty and solemn formality of its promulgation, and then to show that it had by no means cancelled the promises. Thus the glory of the law glorified the covenant of promise, while the apostle's opponents could not find any antagonism to that law. In opposition to these arguments, the appeal to ὁ Θεός, ver. 20 (Usteri, Schneckenburger, de Wette), has the less weight, because in προσετέθη and διαταγείς (ver. 19) God in fact is obviously the acting subject, and the *promise* also was expressed *passively* by ἐπήγγελλται (without Θεός). According to Holsten, *z. Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 299 ff., Paul intends to express "the pneumatic truth," that, in the purpose of God, the significance of the law in the economy of salvation was to be that of a mediator, viz. between promise and fulfilment. But if this were so, how wonderfully would Paul have concealed his thoughts! He must have said that this mediatorial position of the law *exhibited itself* in the form of its bestowal; for this in itself, and apart from any other intimation, could in no way be known to the reader, to whom angelic and mediatorial agency presented themselves only as historically familiar attributes of the majesty and divinity of the law. The law *itself* would not be placed by these attributes in the category of the μεσίτης. Nor is Stölting's view more worthy of acceptance, who, in διαταγ. δι' ἀγγέλων, detects the idea: "*in order that the Jews might obtain the blessing of Abraham*" (Heb. i. 14), and explains ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου to mean that the law served as an instrument to the mediator for *reconciling discordant parties* with one another (and these parties are alleged to have been the *Jews* and *Gentiles*). These two ideas, which are only in a very indirect way compatible with the scope of the Pauline teaching as to the relation of the law to the gospel, or with history itself, could not have been found out by the readers, especially after ver. 18, and after τῶν παραβάσ. χάριν, and would have needed a more precise explanation *in what reference* they were to be taken. In unison with the *history* of the giving of the law, which was familiar to every reader, the two points could only be understood as reminiscences of the historical circumstances in question; and μεσίτης

in particular could not be conceived as a *reconciling* mediator, but only in the sense conveyed in Acts vii. 38.

Ver. 20 down to *μὴ γένοιτο*, ver. 21. "*But from the fact that the law was ordained through a mediator, it must not at all be concluded that it is opposed to the promises of God.*" The expression just used, *ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου*, might possibly be turned to the advantage of the law and to the prejudice of the promises, *in this way*, that it might be said: "Since the idea of a mediator supposes not *one* subject, to whom his business relates, but *more than one*, who have to be mutually dealt with, and yet God (who gave the law through a mediator) is *one*, so that there could not be one God who gave the law and another who gave the promises (for there are not more Gods than one); it might possibly be concluded that, because the law was ordained by God in a different way from the promises,—namely, by the calling in of a mediator acting between the two parties,—the earlier divine mode of justification (that of faith) opened up in the promises was abolished by the law, and instead of it, another and opposite mode of justification (that of the works of the law) was opened up by God." Paul conceives the possibility of this inference, and therefore brings it forward, not, however, as an objection on the part of opponents, but as his own reflection; hence he expresses the concluding inference, *ὁ οὖν νόμος κ.τ.λ.*, in an interrogative form, to which he thereupon replies by the disclaimer, *μὴ γένοιτο*. The *explanation* of the words, which in themselves are simple enough, is accordingly as follows: "*But the mediator*—not to leave unnoticed an inference which might possibly be drawn to the prejudice of the promises from the *ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου* just said—but *the mediator*, that is, any mediator, *does not belong to a single person*, but intervenes between two or more; *God, on the other hand, is a single person*, and not a plurality. *Is it now*—when these two propositions are applied *in concreto* to the law and the promises—*is it now to be thence inferred that the law*, which was given through a mediator, and in which therefore there took part more subjects than one, in point of fact two (namely, God and Israel), between whom the mediator had to deal, *is opposed to the divine promises*, in which the same one God, who in the case of the law acted

through a mediator and so implied two parties, acted directly? God forbid! From this point of difference in the divine bestowal of the law and the promises, by no means is any such conclusion to be arrived at to the prejudice of the latter, as if now, through the law mediatorially given by the one God, another divine mode of justification were to be made valid." In this view, ver. 20 contains two *loci communes*, from the mutual relation of which in reference to the two *concreta* under discussion (the law and the promises) in ver. 21 a possible inference is supposed to be drawn, and proposed by way of question for a reply. The *δέ* is in both cases adversative: the first introducing a supposed objection, and the second an incidental point belonging to this objection, the relation of which incidental point to the first proposition strengthens the doubt excited; *ὁ μεσίτης* denotes the mediator absolutely as *genus* ("quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis," Hermann, *ad Iph. Aul.* p. 15, pref.): *ένος οὐκ ἔστιν* is predicate, negating the *ένος εἶναι* as regards the mediator, with emphatic stress laid on the prefixed *ένός* (not on the *οὐκ*, as Hofmann thinks), and *ένός* is *masculine*,¹ without requiring anything to be supplied: *εἷς ἔστιν* is predicate, and *εἷς*, in conformity with the axiom of monotheism here expressed, is used quite in the same purely *numerical* sense as *ένός* previously. Lastly, in the interrogative inference, ver. 21, *ὁ νόμος* is used, as the close annexation by *οὖν* sufficiently indicates, in precise correlation to *ὁ μεσίτης* in ver. 20 (for the law was given through a mediator, ver. 19), and *τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ* to *ὃ ἐπήγγελλται*, ver. 19; but the emphasis in this question of ver. 21 is laid upon *κατά*, for Paul will not allow it to be inferred from the two propositions expressed in ver. 20 (*μὴ γένοιτο*), that the law stood in a relation to the promises which was

¹ Not *neuter*, as Holsten takes it, although *ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἔστιν* which follows can only indicate the *masculine*. Holsten, notwithstanding all his subtle acuteness, errs also in making the law itself, in opposition to the tenor of the words, to be the *μεσίτης* (see on ver. 19), and in explaining the predicate *εἷς* attached to *ὁ Θεός* in the sense of the *immutability* of the divine will; holding that the law stands, not in unity with the promise, but between the two component parts of the latter (the giving of the promise and its fulfilment), and that God's *one* saving will reveals itself in the promise and its two parts. See, in opposition to Holsten, Hilgenfeld in his *Zeitschr.* 1860, p. 230 ff.

antagonistic to them and opposed to their further validity as regards justification. — The numerous *different interpretations* of this passage—and it has had to undergo above 250 of them—have specially multiplied in modern times: for the Fathers of the Church pass but lightly over the words which in themselves are clear, without taking into consideration their difficulties in relation to the general scope of the passage,—mostly applying the *ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἐνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν*, taken correctly and generally, to Christ,¹ who is the Mediator between God and man, and partly casting side-glances at the opponents of Christ's divinity (see Chrysostom); although a *diversity* of interpretation (some referring *μεσίτης* to *Moses*, and others to Christ) is expressly mentioned by Oecumenius. Although no special dogmatic interest attached to the passage, nevertheless in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see Poole's *Synopsis*) the variety of interpretations was already such that almost every interpreter of importance (yet, as a rule, without polemical controversy, because the dogmatic element did not come into play) took a way of his own. It became, however, still greater after the middle of the eighteenth century (especially after grammatico-historical exegesis gained ground, but with an abundant intermixture of its philological aberrations), and is even now continually increasing. How often have the most mistaken fancies and the crudest conjectures sought to gain acceptance in connection with our pas-

¹ Jerome, however, explains the passage as referring to *the two natures* of Christ: “*manu mediatoris potentiam et virtutem ejus debemus accipere, qui cum secundum Deum unum sit ipse cum Patre (ὁ δὲ Θεός, as God), secundum mediatoris officium (ὁ δὲ μεσίτης) alius ab eo intelligitur*” (*ἐνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν*)! Theodore understands *ὁ δὲ μεσίτης* definitely of *Moses*, who intervened between God and the people (*ἐνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν*), but holds that *ὁ δὲ Θεός εἷς ἔστιν* affirms that it is one and the same God who first gave the promises to Abraham, then gave the law, and now has shown the goal (*τὸ τέλος*) of the promises. *Μεσίτης* is explained as referring to *Moses* by Gennadius in Oecumenius (p. 742 C); on the other hand, Chrysostom and Theophylact take as a basis the conclusion, *ὥστε καὶ ὁ Χριστός δύο τινῶν ἴσθι μεσίτης, Θεοῦ δηλαδὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων* (Theophylact).—Among modern Catholic expositors, Windischmann and Bisping have closely followed Jerome in the reference of the second half of the verse to *the two natures of Christ*. The meaning is supposed to amount to this, that the promise was directly addressed from God to God (*i.e.* to Christ), and the passage is thus a *locus classicus in favour of the divinity of Christ*. Not so Reithmayr, who in substance follows the interpretation of Theodore.

sage, the explanation of which was regarded as a feat of exegetical skill! For a general view of the mass of interpretations, the following works are of service:—Koppe, *Exc.* VII. p. 128 ff. ed. 3: Bonitz, *Plurimor. de l. Gal.* iii. 20 *sententiae examinatae novaeque ejus interpr. tentata*, Lips. 1800; also his *Spicileg. observatt. ad Gal.* iii. 20, Lips. 1802: Anton, *Diss. l. Gal.* iii. 20 *critice, historice, et exeg. tract.* in Pott's *Sylloge*, V. p. 141 ff.: Keil (seven programmes), in his *Opusc.* I. p. 211 ff.: Winer, *Exc.* III.: Schott, p. 455 ff.: Wieseler, and de Wette ed. Möller, *in loc.* It is enough that out of the multitude of various interpretations—omitting the criticism in detail of the earlier views down to Keil¹—we specify the more recent literature, and adduce the following: 1. Keil, who comes

¹ Luther, 1519: “*Ex nomine mediatoris concludit, nos adeo esse peccatores, ut legis opera satis esse nequeant. Si, inquit, lege justi estis, jam mediatore non egetis, sed neque Deus, cum sit ipse unus, secum optime conveniens. Inter duos ergo quaeritur mediator, inter Deum et hominem, ac si dicat; impiissima sit ingratitude si mediatorem rejicitis, et Deo, qui unus est, remittitis,*” etc. Erasmus in his *Paraphr.*, understanding Christ as referred to (in the *Annotat.* he says nothing at all about the passage): “*Atqui conciliator, qui intercedit, inter plures intercedat oportet; nemo enim secum ipse dissidet. Deus autem unus est, quocum dissidium erat humano generi. Proinde tertio quopiam erat opus, qui naturae utriusque particeps utramque inter sese reconciliaret, Deum placans sua morte, et homines sua doctrina ad verum Dei cultum pelliciens.*” Calvin also, explaining the passage of Christ, considers: “*diversitatem hic notari inter Judaeos et gentiles. Non unius ergo mediator est Christus, quia diversa est conditio eorum, quibuscum Deus, ipsius auspiciis, paciscitur, quod ad externam personam. Verum P. inde aestimandum Dei foedus negat, quasi secum pugnet aut varium sit pro hominum diversitate.*” Castalio gives the sense of the words correctly: “*Sequester autem internuntius est duorum, qui inter sese aliquid paciscuntur: atqui Deus unus est, non duo,*” but then draws therefrom the strange inference: “*itaque necesse est Mosen Dei et Israelitarum internuntium fuisse, nec enim potest Dei et Dei internuntius fuisse, cum duo Dei non sint;*” and from this again he infers that both parties had thus promised something, God promising life and the Israelites obedience; and lastly, with equal arbitrariness: “*nunc quoniam legi parere nequeunt, supplicio sunt obnoxii.*” Grotius (comp. Beza): “*Non solet sequester se interponere inter eos, qui unum sunt (iis, neuter), i.e. bene conveniunt; Deus sibi constat,*” from which he arbitrarily infers: “*quare nisi homines se mutassent, nunquam opus fuisset mediatore neque tum neque nunc.*” Comp. Schoettgen, who, however, assumes the first part of the verse to be an objection on the part of the Jews, and ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἰς ἑστίον to be Paul's reply. Wolf, although referring *μίστου* in ver. 19 to Moses, yet in ver. 20 understands *μίστης* of Christ: “*Ille vero mediator (qui imprimis hic respiciendus est) unius non est (sed duorum), quorum unus est Deus.*” Clarke, who understands *μίστ.* in ver. 19 as referring to Christ: “*Quilibet vero μίστης est duarum partium. Deus est una pars. Ergo quorum erit Christus mediator nisi*

nearest to our view, explains thus (see *Opusc.* I. p. 365 ff.): "*Mediatorem quidem non unius sed duarum certe partium esse, Deum autem, qui Abrahamo beneficii aliquid promiserit, unum modo fuisse; hincque apostolum id a lectoribus suis colligi voluisse, in lege ista Mos. pactum mutuum Deum inter atque populum Israelit. mediatoris opera intercedente initum fuisse, contra vero in promissione rem ab unius tantum (Dei sc., qui solus eam dederit) voluntate pendentem transactam, hincque legi isti nihil plane cum hac rei fuisse, adeoque nec potuisse ea novam illius promissionis implendae conditionem constitui, eoque ipso promissionem hanc omnino tolli.*" But (a) to take the second half of the verse not generally, like the first, but historically, as if $\eta\nu$ was written, is an arbitrary deviation from the parallelism; and (b) the conclusion professedly to be drawn by the reader, *Dei et hominum?*" Bengel discovers the syllogism: "*Unus non utitur mediatore illo (i. e. quisquis est unus, is non prius sine mediatore, deinde idem per mediatorem agit); atqui Deus est unus (non est alius Deus ante legem, alius deinceps, sed unus idemque Deus); ergo mediator Sinaiticus non est Dei, sed legis, Dei autem promissio.*" Wetstein: "*Sicut quando arbitrum vel medium vel sequestrum dicimus, intelligimus ad officium ejus pertinere, ut non uni tantum partium faveat, sed utrique sese aequum praebeat; ita etiam quando Deum dicimus, intelligimus non Judaorum solum, sed omnium hominum patrem. Unde statim colligitur, Moesen, qui inter Judaeos solum et Deum medius fuit, non veri nominis medium fuisse, sed a bonitate Dei expectari debere alium, totius humani generis negotium gerentem, i. e. Christum.*" Michaelis (following Locke): "*But this law cannot, in respect to the Gentiles, alter anything in the former covenant of God. For one of the parties who had a share in this covenant, namely the Gentiles, had not empowered Moses as a mediator and knew nothing of him; but God Himself is only one party, and cannot alter His covenant through a mediator appointed on one side only.*" Nösselt (*Exercitatt. ad s. s. interpr.* p. 143 ff.) and Rosenmüller: "*Ille autem (Moses nempe) mediator illius unius (prolis Abrahamicae, the Christians!) non est, Deus autem est unus (communis omnium) Deus.*" Morus, interpreting it as a syllogism with an interrogative major: "*Hic vero (Moses) nonne est mediator ejus, qui immutabilis est? Subsumtio: atqui vero Deus est immutabilis. Conclusio; num ergo lex adversari potest, etc?*" Gabler (*Prolus. ad Gal.* iii. 20, 1787) has the same alteration in the sense of $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$: "*He (Moses) was not, however, a mediator of something immutable,*" etc. Koppe: "*Jam quidem non $\nu\mu\mu\phi$ Mosis tantum suus est $\mu\epsilon\sigma\iota\tau\eta\varsigma$ (plures fuerunt, imprimisque ι $\mu\epsilon\sigma\iota\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\iota\iota\nu$ $\delta\iota\alpha\theta\eta\eta\kappa\eta\varsigma$ Jesus), sed unus tamen idemque Deus est, qui misit omnes, is adeo debet sibi constare nec potest secum ipse pugnare.*" So also in substance, Baumgarten-Crusius: $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ means *for one matter*; and the sense is, "that the law has been one of the many divine institutions, but as such it must stand in connection with the general plan of the divine government."—Some of these interpretations condemn themselves, and others find their refutation in our examination of the more modern interpretations after Keil.

hincque legi isti nihil, etc., is quite without warrant, for *Paul himself* puts as a question in ver. 21 the inference which he conceives may be possibly drawn from ver. 20. 2. Schleiermacher's explanation is essentially similar (in Usteri, *Lehrbegr.* p. 186 ff.): "*The mediator of an agreement does not exist where there is only one person, but always presupposes two persons; these were God and the Jewish nation. But God is One in reference to His promises; that is, God therein acts quite freely, unconditionally, independently, and for Himself alone, as One numerically, because it is no agreement between two, but His free gift (χάρις). Does the law therefore conflict, etc.?*"¹ But in this view (a) the application of ver. 20 to the *concreta* of the law and the promises, which is in fact not made until ver. 21, is imported into and anticipated in ver. 20. Moreover, (b) εἷς imperceptibly changes from its numerical sense into the idea of aloneness and independence; and (c) the idea of free grace is arbitrarily introduced, and is not expressed by Paul. Nearest to this interpretation of Schleiermacher and Usteri comes Hilgenfeld, whose interpretation,² accompanied essentially by the same difficulties, ultimately amounts to the non-Pauline idea, that the position of God as a party in regard to the law is not in harmony with the divine unity (that is, with the divine monarchy). Comp. also Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 77, according to whom Paul negatively "strikes the law to the ground as incompatible with the sole agency of God." But how could Paul desire to strike to the ground the law, which

¹ In essential points, Usteri (*Kommentar*, p. 121; comp. with *Beilage*, p. 239) agrees with Schleiermacher in his explanation. Moreover, the substance of Schleiermacher's interpretation is already to be found in Zachariae, who paraphrases as follows: "A mediator presupposes two parties who make some promise to each other, inasmuch as a promise made on one side without a counter promise does not need any mediation between two. But in the case of Abraham God alone promises, who grants him a promise out of free grace."

² In his *Commentary*. He takes another view in his *Zeitschr.* 1860, p. 236 ff.: "Paul wished to express that the covenant of the law, being ordained through angels and a mediator, and consequently through a plurality, shows itself thereby to be entirely *different* from the covenant of promise which was given by the divine unity, and consequently cannot cancel the latter." But this cancelling might certainly have been inferred from the very difference; besides, the plurality, which is supposed to be implied in ἰνδὶ οὐκ ἑστίς, would have nothing at all to do with the angels, but would necessarily refer only to the mediator, who has to mediate between two—in this case, between God and the Israelites.

to him was ἅγιος, ἀγαθός, and πνευματικός (Rom. vii. 12, 14)? No, all he desires to show is, that, notwithstanding the diversity of its divine bestowal from the mode of giving the promise, it is not opposed to the promise. 3. Winer: "*Non potest μεσίτης cogitari aut fingi, qui sit ἐνός, unius h. e. unius partis: ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστι, Deus est unus, una (altera) tantummodo pars; ita quatenus est altera? gens Israel. Jam si hoc, sponte efficitur, legem Mos. pertinere etiam ad Judaeos, hosque legi isti observandae adstrictos fuisse.*"¹ Thus ver. 20 contains only a parenthetical idea, Paul having in view to re-establish the dignity of the law, which appeared weakened by τῶν παραβ. χάριν προσετέθη: "*Lex Mos. data fuit peccatorum gratia; propterea vero non est, quod quis eam tanquam ista ἐπαγγελία longe inferiorem contemnat; data enim et ipsa est auctoritate divina — διαταγ. δι' ἀγγέλων — gentique Hebr. tanquam agendi norma proposita ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτ. ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνός.*" It cannot be urged against Winer, that Paul must necessarily have written ὁ εἷς (see Winer, *Gramm.* p. 110 [E. T. 144]). But (a) in the logically exact chain of argument there is no indication at all that ver. 20 is to be taken as a parenthesis. (b) Since ὁ μεσίτης is *subject*, ὁ Θεός, which likewise is placed at the beginning of the sentence, may not be arbitrarily understood as *predicate*. (c) It must have been more

¹ In the explanation of the words Kern (in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1830, 3) agrees with Winer, only he does not insert *tantummodo* in the second clause. He looks upon the words as an opponent's objection, and in ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν he finds the idea intimated, that God in consequence took it upon Himself to bless those who obey the law; whence the question follows: Does therefore the law, by which God has bound Himself to make blessed on account of works, conflict with the promises of God? But against this view it may be urged that there is absolutely nothing to indicate ver. 20 as the language of an opponent; further, that the points brought forward against Winer, under (b), (c), and (d), equally apply here; and lastly, that the idea found in ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν is not suggested by the context, but arbitrarily introduced. Baur also, *Paulus*, II. p. 215 f. ed. 2 (comp. his *neutest. Theol.* p. 157), agrees with Winer in his conception of the words: the mediator belongs not to one, but to two parties, but God is only the one of the two parties. By this Paul is supposed to intimate, that the law has a merely subordinate significance, just as that of the mediator, inasmuch as he is not himself one of the two parties, is merely subordinate: "*the ἐπαγγελία, as a διαθήκη in which God εἷς ἐστι without a μεσίτης having anything to do with it, stands higher than the νόμος, which cannot be conceived without the μεσίτης and is essentially conditioned by him.*" But in this interpretation Paul would not have said what he meant to say, and

precisely indicated by Paul, if it were intended that the first *ἐστίν* should be understood as the copula of a general judgment, and the second as historical (*appears in the giving of the law*); for every reader, if he had understood the first half of the verse as a general judgment, would naturally understand the second in like manner. (d) It would not occur to any reader to refer *εἰς* to a suppressed *ὁ ἕτερος*: for *ένός* had just been used absolutely in a numerical sense, in which therefore *εἰς* at once presents itself; and this the more, because the first sentence, by its negative form, has prepared the way for an antithesis to follow. (e) The idea which *ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἰς ἐστίν* is supposed to indicate: *therefore the law is obligatory on the Israelites*, conveys something which is so entirely a matter of course, that it could not be made use of at all as an element of the *dignity* of the law; for the law was, in fact, *given* to the Israelites, and even to *think* of that obligation as non-existent would have been incongruous. And (f) even assuming such a superfluous idea, in what a strangely mysterious way would Paul have intimated it! That which he meant to *say*, he would wholly without reason have *concealed*, and have given out as it were a riddle. Apart from the unsuitableness of the idea generally, and from the inappropriate *εἰς*, he must have said: *ὁ δὲ Ἰσραὴλ εἰς ἐστίν*. 4. Schulthess has sought to vindicate his interpretation (proposed in Keil and Tzschirner's would have said what he did not mean. The view of Holsten (*Deutung u. Bedeutung. d. Worte Gal. iii. 20*, Rostock 1853, and *Inhalt u. Gedankengang des Gal. Br. 1859*, pp. 39 ff., 63 ff.) is allied to the explanation of Baur. Holsten understands *μυσίους* as referring to the law, and makes *ένός* neuter: Between the law and the promise the relation is not that of an *ἐν*, but of an essential distinction: but God is at one with Himself, not presenting any difference with Himself, namely, in the sense of the immutability of the divine will. This explanation cannot be accepted, because it starts from the supposition that the law is placed under the category of the *μυσίους*. Paul cannot have so conceived it, because he has said that the law was *ordained* through a *μυσίους*; therefore law and mediator must have been present to his mind as *different ideas*. — Steinfass (in Guericke's *Zeitschr.* 1856, p. 237) understands the literal sense definitely and correctly, but from the words *ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἰς ἐστίν* derives the tacit idea: God therefore is not the other party, and consequently is not under the law—by which the freedom of *Christ* as the Son of God from the law is supposed to be proved. But this is an idea foreign to the context and imported into the passage, not even quite Pauline; for submission to the law certainly formed a part of the state of humiliation of the Son of God (Gal. iv. 4), while as to the state of exaltation His elevation above the law is a matter of course.

Anal. II. 3, p. 133 ff.) in his *Engelwelt, Engelgesetz und Engeldienst*, Zürich 1833, and in *de G. Hermannno, enodatore ep. P. ad Gal.*, Zürich 1835, viz.: "*Hic mediator (Moses) non est mediator unius, i.e. communis illius Dei, qui olim Abrahamo spopondit, per eum aliquando gentes beatum iri, et qui est unus, s. communis omnium parens, sed est potius mediator angelorum.*"¹ But (a) how erroneous it is to assume that the anarthrous ἐνός should denote the universal God of men, and how alien this reference is to the context! (b) How opposed is the δι' ἀγγέλων to the notion, that Moses was "mediator angelorum"! (c) How at variance is the idea of the law as the work of angels with the conception throughout the Bible (comp. on ver. 19) of the law as the work of God! In how wholly different a way must Paul have spoken of and proved such a paradox, and how frequently would he have reverted to it (especially in the Epistle to the Romans) in his antinomistic discussions! 5. Akin to this, as far as the idea is concerned, is the interpretation of Schmieder (*Nova interpr. l. Paul. Gal.* iii. 19 f., Numb. 1826, and in Tholuck's *literar. Anz.* 1830, No. 54): "*Quivis minister vel multorum est vel unius: atqui mediator non est*

¹ Similar also is the interpretation of Caspari (in the *Strassb. Beitr.* 1854, p. 206 ff.), that "Moses, the middle-man of the angels who gave the law, is not the mediator of the One who gave the promise; he is the mediator of many angels, but God is one." Vogel's explanation (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1865, p. 524) comes in substance to the same effect: "Where there is a mediator, there is a plurality of those commissioning him; such a plurality existed in the giving of the law; but God is one; consequently the law proceeded from a plurality distinct from God, and the angels form this plurality." In opposition to Vogel, see Hilgenfeld, in his *Zeitschrift*, 1865, p. 452 ff.; Matthias, in the monograph quoted at ver. 19, p. 30 ff.; Hauck, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1866, p. 699 ff. Nevertheless Hauck (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, p. 541 ff.) has likewise assumed a plurality in μεσίτης—the plurality of men, whom Moses represents as one out of the midst of them (but μεσίτης does not mean this); hence he cannot be representative of the one God. Nothing in our passage can be regarded as more certain than that ὁ μεσίτης, applied to the act of giving the law, embraces in itself the idea: ὃν ἔδωκε κύριος (not directly, but) ἀνὰ μέσον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ ἐν τῷ ὅρει Σινᾶ ἐν χειρὶ Μωυσῆ (Lev. xxvi. 46). Buhl, *l.c.* p. 13, has interpreted the passage similarly to Hauck, but with an incorrect inference from the negation of necessity to the negation of possibility: the mediator always represents a great number of persons; but God is single, and as such does not need any mediator: therefore the mediator (ver. 19) cannot be the representative of God, but, on the contrary, can only accept the law for a plurality of recipients. Thus the law stands in contrast to the covenant of promise, which was given to the One σάίμα.

unius : ergo est multorum minister. Qui multorum est minister, ad quod genus mediator pertinet, non est unius : atqui Deus (absolute) unus est : ergo cum multorum sit mediator, non est Dei minister." The connection is supposed to be : "*Concedo legem per angelos datam esse a Deo, non humana arte inventam, sed eo ipso, quod per angelos ministros, non per Deum aut Dei filium promulgata est, inferior est evangelio.*"¹ This interpretation is objectionable, (a) in a general point of view, because it rests wholly on the erroneous view that *μεσίτου* in ver. 19 applies not to Moses, but to the *angelus mediator* ; (b) because Paul could not have expressed so peculiar an antinomistic argument more obscurely or more enigmatically than by thus omitting the essential points ; (c) because the idea of *μεσίτης* by no means implies that the *μεσίτης* is the "*minister multorum*:" he may be commissioned as well by one as by many, as, in fact, Christ was commissioned as a *μεσίτης* by One, viz. by God. See also, in opposition to Schmieder, Lücke in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1828, p. 95 ff. ; Winer, *Exc.* III. p. 171 ff. 6. Steudel, in Bengel's *Archiv* I. p. 124 ff., supposes that ver. 19 is an opponent's question : "*To what purpose then serves the law ? Was it bestowed merely somehow as an additional gift on account of transgressions (in order to be transgressed), until the seed should come to whom the promise applied ? And yet was it made known through angels, and by the ministry of a mediator ?*" To which Paul answers, "*Certainly through the ministry of a mediator ; only he was not the mediator of an united seed (of the σπέρματος τῶν πιστεύοντων, ver. 16), but God is one (not another for the Gentiles).*" But (a) there is nothing that indicates any

¹ Schneckenburger's explanation (in his *Beitr.* p. 189 ff., and in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1835, p. 121) agrees with Schmieder's. Huth's attempt at an explanation (*Comment. de loco Gal.* iii. 19f., Altenb., 1854) agrees partly with Schmieder and partly with Schulthess ; he understands in *ὑπὲρ μεσίτου* of an "*angelus mediator*," and then in ver. 20 finds the idea that the law proceeds from angels, and not from God, as follows : "*Mediatore enim nihil opus fuisset, si unus tantummodo legem tulisset ; at si multitudo quaedam, qualis est angelorum, legem ferre vult, tum rei summa exsequenda traditur uni, qui mediatoris vicem inter legis latores et eos gerat, quibus lex destinata est. Haec autem ratio cadere non potest in Deum, quippe qui unus numero sit, ideoque mediator non indigeat. Ex hoc ipso igitur, quod in ferenda lege Mosaica opus fuit mediatore, colligendum est, originem ejus repeti non debere ab uno Deo, sed a pluribus, h. e. ab angelis, quorum mediator vice fungebatur.*"

such division of the passage into dialogue; and (b) how strange it would be that Paul should have grasped, and furnished a reply to, nothing but the *last* part of the opponent's question, ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου, which, moreover, would be only a subordinate part of it! (c) The article must be added to ἐνός, if it is to apply to the σπέρμα already spoken of (as assumed also by Jatho); but *no* supplement whatever to ἐνός is suggested by the context;¹ and if τοῦ ἐνός σπέρματος were read, then, according to ver. 16, it would mean not the body of Christians, but Christ Himself.² (d) ἐνός and εἰς would be taken in different senses: *united* and *one*.³ 7. Sack (in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1831, I. p. 106 f.) supposes that Paul avails himself of the idea of a mediator to *limit* the recognition of the law, which perhaps some Jewish Christians were disposed to assert to an exaggerated extent, and says: "*The mediator, however, is not of one kind, but God is One and the same. For us Christians there is certainly another mediator than Moses; but God, the God in both Testaments, is nevertheless One and the same.*" But it is obvious that ἐνός ἐστὶν cannot mean *unius generis est*, and it is equally evident that the clause, "for us Christians there is certainly," etc., is arbitrarily brought in. See also Schnecken-

¹ This applies also against Kaiser's strange attempt (*de apologetic. Ev. Joh. consiliis*, Erl. 1824, p. 7 ff.) to obtrude the entirely foreign supplement of *νός*: "*Hic mediator Moses non est unius filius, Deus autem (nempe) est unus*:" Moses is not to be compared with Christ, the only-begotten Son of God.

² This remark also applies to the very forced and arbitrary explanation of Mich. Weber (*Paraphr. cap. III. ep. ad Gal.* 1863): "*Hic autem interventor (Moses) non est interventor unius illius posteritatis Abrahami, quam paulo ante Christianos esse dixi, Israelitarum κατὰ πνεῦμα, sed Israelitarum κατὰ σάρκα interventor quippe in quo spem suam fiduciamque ponunt (Joh. ii. 45). Ex hac igitur parte, in interventore, Israelitae κατὰ σάρκα differunt ab Israelitis κατὰ πνεῦμα, quippe qui spem fiduciamque suam non in Mose, sed in solo Christo ponunt, μισίτη Θεοῦ κ. ἀνθρώπων (1 Tim. ii. 5). In Deo autem (ὁ δὲ Θεός) nulla est diversitas; nihil discriminis Israelitis κατὰ σάρκα cum Israelitis κατὰ πνεῦμα intercedit, eundem Deum verum colunt illi quem hi, Deus est unus idemque. Utrique habent quidem ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον interventorem, non autem ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον Deum.*"

³ And in *εἰς* the relation of God to the *Jews and Gentiles* would be arbitrarily assumed. This is also done by the anonymous writer in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1867, p. 331 ff., according to whom our passage is intended to assert that the mediator of the law was not only the mediator of God, but also had reference to the Jewish people, whereas God with His promise had reference to all the nations of the earth, both Jews and Gentiles.

burger, *Beitr.* p. 187 f., and (in opposition to Stéudel, Kern, and Sack) Winer, *Zeitschr. f. wissenschaft. Theol.* II. 1, p. 31 ff. 8. Hermann: "*Interventor non est unius (i. e. interventor ubi est, duos minimum esse oportet, inter quos ille interveniat); Deus autem unus est: ergo apud Deum non cogitari potest interventor; esset enim is, qui intercederet inter Deum et Deum, quod absurdum est.*" And the connection is: "*Id agebat P. ut ostenderet, legem Mosis, quae nihil neque cum promissione Abrahamo data neque cum praesente effectione promissionis commune haberet, dumtaxat interim valuisse, jam autem non amplius valere. Rationem reddit hanc, quod superaddita sit (ideo προσετέθη dixit), eoque non pertineat ad testamentum, cui non liceat quidquam addi; deinde quod non, sicut testamentum illud, ab ipso Deo condita et data, sed disposita per angelos allataque sit manu interventoris: atqui interventori, quod interventor non sit unius, non esse locum apud Deum, qui unus sit, utpote testator, cujus unius ex voluntate nemine intercedente haereditatem capiat haeres.*" But (a) it could not be expected that the reader should derive from ver. 20 the idea that no mediator is conceivable in the case of God on account of His oneness; nor could it be so conceived by Paul himself, for, in fact, with the one God a mediator may certainly have a place,—not, however, "*inter Deum et Deum,*" into which absurdity no one could fall, unless Paul so expressed it, but "*inter Deum et homines,*" in which office the history of the theocracy showed so many mediators and at last Christ Himself. (b) The question in ver. 21 (οὖν), with the answer expressive of horror, *μὴ γένοιτο*, presupposes that the subject-matter of this question—consequently an antagonistic relation of the law to the promises—*might possibly* (although quite unduly) *be derived from ver. 20.* But according to Hermann, Paul in vv. 19 and 20 has already proved that an antagonism of the law to the promises does *not* exist, that the law was no longer valid, and had nothing at all in common with the promises. So, in a logical point of view, the question in ver. 21, *ὁ οὖν νόμος κ.τ.λ.*, could not be asked, nor could the answer *μὴ γένοιτο* be made. (c) It may, besides, be urged against Hermann, that not only is *δι' ἀγγ. ἐν χειρὶ μεις.* regarded as lowering the authority of the law, but a quite undue stress is also laid upon *προσετέθη*; for in ver. 19 the emphasis lies on *τῶν παραβ*

χάριν. 9. Matthies (as in substance also Rinck, *Lucubr. crit.* p. 172 ff., and in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1834, p. 309 ff.) interprets: "*But the mediator . . . does not relate to one, for his nature is in fact divided or disunited, since he is placed between two sides or parties opposed to one another; and therefore in connection with him we cannot think of unity, but only of duality, or of the variance subsisting between two parties; but God is One, comprehends in Himself nothing but unity, so that His nature contains no variance or disunion.*" Thus also, in the main, de Wette,¹ and among the older expositors Jac. Cappellus. But the simple *numerical* conception of unity is thus arbitrarily transformed into the *philosophical* idea, and the contrast of *plurality* is turned into the contrast of *disunion*. How could a reader discover in ὁ Θεὸς εἰς ἑστίν anything else than the popular doctrine of Monotheism? 10. Schott: "*Mediator quidem non uni tantum (eidemque immutabili) addictus est homini s. parti, i. e. in quavis causa humana, quae mediatore indiget, duae certe adsunt partes, quibus μεσίτης inserviat, sive res inter duos tantum homines singulos transigatur, sive multitudo sit ingens eorum, qui alterutram vel utramque partem constituent (v. c. populus) . . . ubi plures imo multi ejusdem foederis participes sunt et fiunt (praesertim ubi maxima est singulorum vicissitudo, dum mortuis succedunt posteri), facile etiam mutatis animorum consiliis atque propositis, foedus mutatur aut tollitur, μεσίτην cujus ope constitutum fuerat haud impediante . . . proinde ex eo quidem, quod lex Sinaitica ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου promulgata est (ver. 19), non sequitur auctoritatem ei competere perpetuam [his verbis P. corrigere voluit perversam eorum opinionem, qui in defendenda legis auctoritate perpetua valitura ad personam Moysi mediatoris provocarent] . . . attamen Deus est unus, qui semper idem manet Deus immutabilis, foedus legislationis Sinaiticae non fuit humanae, sed divinae auctoritatis, neque ab arbitrio hominum, sed a voluntate Dei pendebat immutabilis. His perpendendis quaestio excitabatur (ver. 21), an forte haec legislatio Sinai. auctoritate divina insignis ipso Deo jubente promissionem Abrahamo datam ejusmodi limitibus*

¹ According to him, the idea in the second clause is merely: "*that which God in Himself, irrespective of the disunion which has arisen between Him and men, has promised, is elevated above this disunion.*"

circumscribere (mutare) voluerit, ut non amplius esset promissio, cujus eventus liberae tantum Dei gratiae adnecteretur." How much is supplied by the expositor in this interpretation so copiously provided with modifying clauses! But it is decidedly erroneous, on account of the sense of εἷς and ἐνός being changed into the idea of *immutabilis* (for which Schott should not have appealed to Rom. iii. 30, Phil. i. 27); and also because the proposition ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἐνός οὐκ ἔστιν is limited to *causae humanae*, and yet the inference is supposed to be therein conveyed that the *Sinaitic legislation* is not always valid. Paul assuredly could never have thus illogically corrected the zealots for the law, and then in the very same breath have set aside the inference by *attamen Deus est unus*. 11. Gurlitt (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1837, p. 805 ff.; 1843, p. 715 ff.) refers ἐνός to the *Gentile Christians*, as one of the two divisions of the σπέρμα Ἀβρ.: "*The law was given through angels and through a mediator, and God indeed is throughout only One; what proceeds from Him, therefore, demands in every case equal recognition. It must nevertheless be taken into consideration, that the mediator is no mediator of those who were previously Gentiles, and that therefore the law was not destined for the latter by God Himself.*" But, apart from the fact that in this view of ἐνός there must have been previous mention of a twofold posterity of Abraham and τοῦ ἐνός must have been here used, and not to mention that the ἐνός and εἷς are not taken as alike in sense, the interpretation must be at once pronounced decidedly wrong, because it depends upon the erroneous view that the σπέρμα, vv. 16, 19, means not merely Christ Himself, but also the *corpus mysticum* of Christ. 12. Olshausen, taking ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἔστιν as: *God is one or a single one, and consequently only one party*, explains it thus: "*Mediation presupposes a state of separation, and there can be no mediation in the case of one; since God is the one party, there must also have been a second, viz. men, who were separated from God. In the gospel it is otherwise: in Christ, the representative of the Church, all are one; all separations and distinctions are done away in Him*" (ver. 28). Thus Paul, in order to call attention to the inferiority of the law to the gospel, gives a cursory, parenthetical explanation as to the

idea of a mediator. This is (1) unsuitable to the context; for in ver. 19, διαταγ. δι' ἀγγέλων ἐν χειρὶ μεις. has set forth the *glory* of the giving of the law. (2) The idea: *and consequently also only one party*, is quite arbitrarily added to ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἰς ἐστίν. (3) In like manner, all the rest which is supposed properly to constitute the sense of the words ("men, who were separated from God;," "in the gospel it is otherwise," etc.) is the pure invention of the expositor. 13. Matthias,¹ correctly explaining the first half of the verse, sees in ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἰς ἐστίν the minor premiss of an *enthymeme*, which has to be completed by supplying the major premiss and conclusion: "*If God is one of those two parties, the law, although ordained by angels, is nevertheless an ordinance of God; but God is this; and consequently the law, etc., is an ordinance, not of angels, but of God.*" Against this interpretation we may urge that the special connection with the point διαταγείς δι' ἀγγέλων is *not* conveyed by the text; that the explanation of εἰς by *alter* is contrary to the context; that ver. 21 would be unsuitably subjoined from a logical point of view (see on κατά, ver. 21); and lastly, that the idea of the law being an ordinance of God was one altogether undisputed and not needing any proof. 14. Ewald (comp. also his *Jahrb.* IV. p. 109) assumes that Paul with this "quick flash of thought" intended to say: "The idea of the mediator necessarily presupposes two different living beings between whom, as being at variance or separated, mediation has to take place; because *the mediator of one is not*, does not exist at all, is an impossibility. But since *God* is in strictness only *One*, and does not consist of two inwardly different Gods or of an earlier and later God, it is evident that Moses as mediator did not mediate between the God of the promise and the God of the law, and thereby mix up the law with the promise and cancel the promise by the later law; but he only mediated (as is well known) between God and the people of that time." But even this interpretation, the thought of which would probably have been expressed most simply by Paul writing ὁ δὲ μεσίτης Θεοῦ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἰς ἐστίν, is liable to the objections urged above (under 8)

¹ After several earlier attempts, according to his last view of 1866, in the monograph quoted at ver. 15.

against Hermann's explanation. 15. According to Hofmann (compare also his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 55 ff.), the *first* half of the verse is intended to affirm *that, where there is only one to whom something is to be given, there is no room for mediatorship*; such an individual recipient may receive it directly. Now, as the promise ran to Abraham's posterity *as an unity*, it is evident that the giving of the law, just because it was destined for a plurality of individuals, could be no fulfilment of the promise. The *second* half of the verse, which with δέ passes on to the *divine* side of the event, *places the unity of God in contradistinction to the plurality of angels; that which comes to men through the latter must be of a different kind from the promised gift, which the One was to give to the One—the one God to the one Christ.* Thus on this side also it is clear that the giving of the law was not the fulfilment of the promise, but was only ordained for the time, until Christ should come. But (a) all this artificial interpretation must at once fall to the ground, because it conceives ἐνός to be opposed to a plurality of *recipient* subjects; for it is not true that the bestowal through a mediator presupposes such a plurality, seeing that it may take place just as well with one as with many recipients. (b) It is incorrect that the unity of God is placed in contrast with the plurality of *angels* (which is not even marked, by πολλῶν ἀγγ. or the like): it stands in contrast to the ἐνός οὐκ ἔστιν, and it is untrue that the "*mediateness* of the giving involved its taking place through *many*"—just as if the mediate giving could not with equal fitness take place through one, as in fact it has very often been given by God through one! (c) Paul's intention is, not to show that the giving of the law was not *the fulfilment* of the promise, but, as is clearly evident from ver. 21, to show that the law was *not opposed* to the promise. — 16. Wieseler: "*Moses as mediator, however (δέ being restrictive), has reference not merely to God (but also to men): for a mediator from his nature has not reference to one (but to two parties); but God is one.* Consequently the failure of that mediatorial office of Moses was based on the fact, that he as *mediator* had to do *not only* with *God*, but also with *men*. The fault does not lie with the faithfulness of *God*, who appointed him as mediator,—an idea

which cannot be entertained,—but rather with the action of men,' etc. Against this interpretation it may be urged, not only that the words εἰς ἐστίν imperceptibly acquire the sense: *is only one of the two parties*, which Paul would certainly have been able to express otherwise than by the confession of monotheism (Deut. vi. 4; Jas. ii. 19; Rom. iii. 30; 1 Cor. viii. 4, 6, *et al.*), but also that the idea of a *failure* on the part of the law-giving, and of the blame due for it, was remote from the apostle's mind, and would here be unsuitable to the divine purpose expressed in ver. 19. The law became to men the δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας (1 Cor. xv. 56); but this falls to be regarded not as a *failure* on the part of the law-giving, but as a *necessary stage in the development of the divine plan of salvation* (ver. 22 ff.; Rom. vii.). 17. According to Stölting (*Beiträge z. Exeg. d. Paul. Br.* 1869, p. 86 ff.), ἐνός and εἰς are to be taken in the sense of *absolute unity*. Ver. 20 is supposed to contain a *syllogism with a suppressed conclusion*: viz., A mediator does not belong to one; but God is one; consequently a mediator does not belong to God. Accordingly God is *absolutely excluded from any mediation through the law*: the objects of this mediation are on the one hand the *Jews*, and on the other hand their contrast, the *Gentiles*; and the law was to unite these two dissociated parts, which it effected by showing that the Jews were *in need of redemption*, and by making the Gentiles *capable of redemption* (Rom. iii. 22 f., 29 f.). The mediator, with the law in his hand, is supposed to have placed himself *between Jews and Gentiles*, and to have made both *equal* through the law,—an *equalization* which does *not take place with God*, as there is not one God of the Jews and another God of the Gentiles, between whom mediation might occur, but only a single God, who treats Jews and Gentiles with equal justice, being, as He is, a single Person without opponent, an absolute unity. Even this acutely carried out interpretation is not tenable: for (a) the reader finds no indication in the text that ἐνός and εἰς are to be taken in the pregnant sense of *absoluteness*; and Paul, in order to be understood, must at least have written, in the second half of the verse, something like ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ὁ ὄντως εἰς (or ὁ ἀπλῶς εἰς) ἐστίν. Nor (b) is it correct that absolute

unity excludes the being an object of mediation; because the absolutely one God has allowed mediation to take place between Himself and man, not only through Christ, but also in the ancient history of salvation, through His ministers (the angels, Moses, and the prophets). (c) There is nothing in the words of the passage to make us think of the Jews and Gentiles as objects of the mediation; since the law is rather to be recognised as the *μεσότηχον* (Eph. ii. 14) between the two, which had to be removed by Christ in order to their union. To the national consciousness, not only of the apostle, but also of his readers, *God and Israel* could alone occur as the parties reconciled with one another through the *μεσίτης*. (d) It is not correct that the conclusion drawn from ver. 20 is not expressed. It is expressed in ver. 21, and rejected as erroneous.—Lastly, Rückert confines himself to the correct translation of the words, “*The mediator does not refer to one (but always to more than one); but God is one;*” from which is to be concluded, “*Therefore the mediator does not refer to God alone, but also to others.*” He, however, at the same time confesses that he does not see any way, in which these propositions and this conclusion are to be connected with the foregoing passage, so as to yield any relevant and lucid thought. While Rückert has thus despaired of an explanation on his own part, he has not questioned the title of the passage to receive an explanation. But this course, to which Michaelis was already inclined,¹ has been actually adopted by Lücke (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1828, p. 83 ff.), who holds ver. 20 to be a *gloss*, which had originally served, on the one hand, to explain the conclusion of ver. 19 (the mediator was interpreted as applying to Christ, and it was desirable to point out that this mediator belonged not merely to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles), and, on the other, to give a reason for the beginning of ver. 21. But the witnesses in favour of its genuineness² are so decisively unanimous, that no other

¹ “I wished, in fact, that it were allowable for me in the explanation to pass over the whole verse, and to give it out as a marginal note of some reader not understanding Paul, which had found its way into the text.”—Michaelis, *Paraphr.* p. 33, ed. 2.

² There is not even the slightest variation in the individual words, or in their

passage can appear better attested. Lücke only makes use of an *argumentum a silentio*,—namely, that Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen do not cite our verse (Clement of Alexandria has it at least once, in the *Theodot.* ed. Col. p. 797 A); but little stress can be laid on this, when we consider how lightly in general the Fathers were wont to pass over the words in question, without even discerning in them any special importance or difficulty.

Ver. 21. ὁ οὖν νόμος κατὰ τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν ;] οὖν, the reference of which is differently explained according to the different interpretations of ver. 20, draws an inference, *not* from the definition of the object of the law in ver. 19 (Castalio, Luther, Gomarus, Pareus, Estius, Bengel, and others, including Lücke, Olshausen, de Wette, Wieseler, Hofmann, Stölting), but from ver. 20, which is not arbitrarily to be set aside, or to be treated merely as an appendage of ver. 19.¹ The law, namely, which was given through a mediator, and therefore essentially otherwise than the promise, might thereby appear to introduce on the part of God another way of granting the Messianic salvation than the promises, and consequently to be *opposed to* the latter. See the fuller statement at ver. 20. — κατὰ τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν] See vv. 8, 16. The κατά is the usual *contra*, *in opposition to*. Matthias incorrectly explains it: “Is it included *under the idea* of the promises?” Since the simple ἐστί—and not, possibly, τάσσεται (see Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 272)—is to be supplied, the expression would be wholly without the sanction of usage. Moreover, looking to the specific difference in the ideas of the two things, Paul *could* not have asked such a question at all. — εἰ γὰρ ἐδόθη νόμος κ.τ.λ.] ground assigned for the μὴ γένοιτο, and therefore proof that it would be incorrect to conclude from ver. 20 that the law was opposed to the promises. For if it had been opposed to the promises, *the law*

arrangement,—a fact which, judging by critical analogy, would be scarcely conceivable in a text compiled from a double gloss. Only the Æth. adds *duorum* at the end, evidently an exegetical addition, the author of which appears to have had in his mind some explanation which bore a similarity to that of Clarke, Locke, Winer, or Gurlitt.

¹ Also in 1 Cor. vi. 15, οὖν (in opposition to Stölting’s appeal to the passage) introduces a possible (mischievous) inference from *what immediately precedes*, to be at once repelled with horror by μὴ γένοιτο.

must have been in a position to procure life;¹ and if this were so, then would righteousness actually be *from the law*,² which, according to the Scriptures, cannot be the case (ver. 22). — νόμος] just as in the whole context: the *Mosaic law*, although without the article, as in ii. 21, iii. 11, 18; Winer, p. 117 [E. T. 152]. — ὁ δυνάμ. ζωοπ.] The article marks off the definite quality which, in the words εἰ γὰρ ἐδόθη νόμος, is conceived by the lawgiver as belonging to the law (Winer, p. 127 [E. T. 167]; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 7, 13): *as that which is able to give life*; and this is the *point* of this conditional sentence. — ζωοποιῆσαι] “Hoc verbo praesupponitur mors peccatori intentata,” Bengel. The ζωή, however, which the law is not able to furnish, is not the *being alive morally* (Winer, Rückert, Matthies, Olshausen, Ewald, Wieseler, Hauck, Hofmann, Buhl, and others, following older expositors), but, in harmony with the context, *the everlasting Messianic life* (see Käuffer, *de bibl. ζωῆς αἰωνίου notione*, p. 75), as is evident from ver. 18 (εἰ γὰρ ἐκ νόμου ἡ κληρονομία) and from ver. 22. Comp. also 2 Cor. iii. 6. The *moral* quickening is *presupposed* in this ζωοποιῆσαι. The law, in itself good and holy, could not subdue the dominion of the principle of sin in man (Rom. viii. 3), but rather necessarily served to promote this dominion (see on ver. 19), and was therefore unable to bring about the eternal life which was dependent on obedience to the law (ver. 12): given unto life, it was found unto death, Rom. vii. 10. Paul never uses ζωοποιεῖν of the *moral* quickening, nor συζωοποιεῖν either (Eph. ii. 5; Col. ii. 13). The ζωή is the eternal life which is manifested at the *Parousia* (Col. iii. 3 f.), and therefore in reality the κληρονομία (vv. 18, 29). Comp. ζήσεται, ver. 12, to which our ζωοπ. glances back. — ὅντως ἐκ νόμου ἂν ἦν ἡ δικαιοσύνη] *then in reality* (not merely

¹ This consequence depends upon the dilemma: Life may be procured *either* through the promises *or* through the law. If, therefore, the law stands in opposition to the promises, so that the latter shall no longer be valid, the *law* must be able to procure life. This dilemma is correct, because no *third* possibility is given in the divine plan of salvation.

² Even if ἂν be not genuine, this interpretation is not altered (Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 194, 6); and we cannot explain (with Hofmann): “If there *was* given, etc., then *was*,” etc. This *imperfect (erat)* would be illogical; Paul would have written ἴστί or γέγονε.

in Jewish imagination) *the law would be that, from which the existence of righteousness would proceed*, namely, by its enabling men to offer complete obedience. The argument proceeds *ab effectu* (ζωοποιῆσαι) *ad causam* (ἡ δικαιοσύνη), for, without being righteous before God, man cannot attain eternal life: not as Rückert, Wieseler, Hofmann, and others, in accordance with their view of ζωοπ., are compelled to assume, *a causa* (the new moral life whereby the law is fulfilled) *ad effectum* (the δικαιοσύνη which would be acquired by the fulfilment of the law). The relation between ζωοποιῆσαι and ἡ δικαιοσύνη is aptly indicated by Oecumenius: οὐκ ἔσωσεν οὐδὲ ἐδικαίωσεν, and by Bengel: "*Justitia est vitæ fundamentum.*"

Ver. 22. But the case supposed (ἐδόθη νόμος ὁ δυνάμ. ζωοποιῆσαι) does not exist: for, on the contrary, according to the Scriptures all men have been subjected to the dominion of sin, and the purpose of God therein was, that the promised salvation should not come from the law, but should be bestowed on believers on account of faith in Christ. What sort of position is assigned under these circumstances to *the law*, is then stated in ver. 23. — συνέκλεισεν ἡ γραφή κ.τ.λ.] Scripture is personified, as in ver. 8. That which *God* has done, because it is divinely revealed and attested in Scripture (see Rom. iii. 9–19) and thereby appears an infallible *certainty*, is represented as the *act* of *Scripture*, which the latter, as in its utterances the professed *self-revelation of God*, has *accomplished*. The Scripture—that is, when regarded apart from the personification, God, according to the divine testimony of the Scripture—*has brought all into ward under sin*, that is, has put the whole of mankind without exception into the relation of bondage, in which sin (comp. Rom. iii. 9) has them, as it were, under lock and key, so that they cannot escape from this control and attain to moral freedom. On the figurative expression, and on the conception of the matter as a *divine measure* (not a mere declaration), compare on Rom. xi. 32. Following Chrysostom (ἡλέγξεν) and others, Hermann finds the sense: "*per legem datum cognitum esse peccatum*" (Rom. vii. 7 f., iii. 19 ff.), which, however, does not correspond with the significance of the carefully-chosen συνέκλεισεν, and is

also at variance with ἡ γραφή, which is by no means—as, following the Fathers (but not Theodoret), Beza, Calvin, Baumgarten-Crusius and others think—equivalent to νόμος, but denotes the O. T., whilst ὁ νόμος in the whole connection is the *institute* of the law. The *bond of guilt* which is implied in the dominion of sin is obvious of itself, without any need for explaining ἁμαρτίαν as the *guilt* of sin. — Moreover, the *emphasis* is on the prefixed συνέκλεισεν: *included*, so that freedom, that is, the attainment of δικαιοσύνη, is not to be thought of. Συγκλείειν, however, does not denote: to include *together, with one another*, as Bengel, Usteri, and others hold (not even in Rom. xi. 32), which is clearly proved by the fact that the word is very often used of the shutting up of *one*, unaccompanied by others (1 Sam. xxiv. 19; Ps. xxxi. 9; Polyb. xi. 2. 10; 1 Macc. xi. 66, xii. 7); but συν corresponds to the idea of *complete* custody, so that the enclosed are entirely and absolutely held in by the barriers in question. Comp. Herod. vii. 129: λίμνη συγκληϊσμένη πάντοθεν, Eur. Hec. 487; Polyb. i. 17. 8, i. 51. 10, iii. 117. 11; also Plat. Tim. p. 71 C, where it is used with ἐμφράττειν; 1 Macc. iv. 31, v. 5. Una includere would be συγκατακλείειν, Herod. i. 182; Lucian, Vit. auct. 9, D. mort. xiv. 4. — τὰ πάντα] *the collective whole*, not: *all which man ought to do* (Ewald), but like τοὺς πάντας, Rom. xi. 32. The *neuter* used of *persons*, who are thus brought under the point of view of the general category: the *totality*. See on 1 Cor. i. 27; Arrian. v. 22. 1. According to Calvin, Beza, Wolf, Bengel, and others (comp. also Hofmann), τὰ πάντα is supposed to refer not merely to men, but *also to everything which they are, have, or do*. But the figurative συνέκλεισεν, and also the context by τοῖς πιστεύουσιν and the *personal* indications contained in ver. 23 ff., give the preference to our interpretation. Besides, τὰ πάντα, taken of things, would mean *all things* (Xen. Mem. i. 11; Rom. xi. 36, *et al.*), which is here unsuitable. Comp. on the matter itself, Rom. iii. 9, 19. — ἵνα ἡ ἐπαγγελία κ.τ.λ.] *the purpose of God*, because that which was previously represented as the action of *Scripture* was in reality the action of *God*. Therefore we must not (with Semler, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Winer, Matthias, and others) explain *logice: quo appareat dari*, etc. — ἡ ἐπαγ-

γελία] *that which was promised*, a sense which the *abstract* receives through δοθῇ. Comp. ver. 14. That which is meant is the promised gift, already well known from the context, namely, the κληρονομία, vv. 16, 18. — ἐκ πίστεως] not from obedience to the law, which with that subjection under the control of sin was impossible, but so that the divine bestowal proceeds, as regards its subjective cause, *from faith in Jesus Christ*; comp. ver. 8. The emphasis is on this ἐκ πίστ. 'I. X., and not on ἐπαγγελία (Hofmann); see ver. 23 ff. — τοῖς πιστεύουσιν] is explained by Winer and others as an apparent tautology arising from the importance of this proposition (and therefore *emphatic*); but without adequate ground (and passages such as ver. 9, Rom. i. 17, Phil. iii. 9, are not relevant here); the expression, on the contrary, is quite in keeping with the circumstances of the Galatians. That salvation was intended *for believers*, was not denied; but they held to the opinion that obedience to the law must necessarily be the procuring cause of this salvation. Paul therefore says: in order that, *in virtue of faith in Jesus Christ*, not in virtue of obedience to the law, salvation should be given to the believers—so that thus the believers have no need of *anything further* than faith. Comp. v. 4 f.

Ver. 23. Δε] no longer connected with ἀλλά (Hofmann), but leading over to a new portion of the statement (the counterpart to which is to follow in ver. 25),—namely, to the position which *the law* held under the circumstances expressed in ver. 25. Before the introduction of faith, it was to guard and maintain those who belonged to it in this relation of bondage, so that they should not get rid of it and become free,—a liberation which was reserved for the *faith* which was to come. — πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἐλθεῖν] δέ in the *third* place with the *prepositional* phrase. See Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 397; Klotz, *ad Devar.* II. p. 378 f. — Here also πίστις is neither *doctrina fidem postulans*, the *gospel*, as most ancient expositors and Schott think, nor the *dispensation* of faith (Buhl, comp. Rückert), but *subjective faith*, which is treated objectively. Comp. on i. 23, iii. 2. As long as there was not yet any belief in Christ, faith was not yet present; but when on the preaching of the gospel men believed in Christ, the faith, which was previously wanting,

had come, that is, *had now set in*, *had presented itself*,—namely, in the hearts of those who had become believers. On ἐλθεῖν as applied to mental things and states, which set in, comp. Pind. *Nem.* i. 48 (*hopes*); Plat. *Pol.* iii. p. 402 A (*understanding*); Soph. *O. R.* 681 (δόκησις). Comp. also Rom. vii. 9. — ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρουρούμεθα συγκλείόμενοι] (see the critical notes): *under the law we were held in custody, so that we were placed in ward with a view to the faith about to be revealed.* The subject is: *we Jewish Christians* (ver. 25); the emphasis is on ὑπὸ νόμον, and afterwards on πίστιν. The law is represented as a ruler, *under whose dominion* (ὑπὸ νόμον) those who belonged to it were held in moral captivity, as in a prison; so that they, as persons shut up in the φρουρά under lock and key, were placed beyond the possibility of liberation—which was only to ensue by means of the faith that was to be revealed in the future.¹ The words and the context do not yield more than this: the *paedagogic* efficacy of the law is not *inferred* till ver. 24, and is not to be anticipated here. This view is opposed to that of many expositors (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Erasmus, Grotius, Estius, Winer, Rückert, Schott, Ewald, and others), who find already expressed here that *paedagogic function*, which, however, is understood in the sense of the “*usus politicus*” of the law (but see on ver. 24): “*in severam legis disciplinam, quae ne in omnem libidinem effunderemur cavit, traditi*,” Winer. But the whole explanation of the law guarding *from sin* (to which also Wieseler refers ἐφρουρ.) is opposed to the correct interpretation of τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν (ver. 19), and also to ver. 22. The captivity so forcibly described by Paul is just the *sinful* bondage under the law, Rom. vii. 1; 1 Cor. xv. 56. Observe, more-

¹ If, with Winer, Usteri, and Schott, ἐφρουρ. is explained merely as *asservabamur* (1 Pet. i. 5),—comp. Hofmann, “*we were held in keeping*,”—it yields, according to the connection with συγκλεισμένοι, and with the inference thereupon of the *paedagogic function* of the law, too weak a thought. Comp. Wisd. xvii. 16. Luther, Calvin, and many others, including Rückert and de Wette, have rightly found in ἐφρουρ. and συγκεκλ. the figurative idea of a prison (φρούριον, Plat. *Ax.* p. 365 E; φρουρά, Plat. *Phaed.* p. 62 ff.). The prison, however, is not the law itself; but the latter is the ruler, under whose power the captives are in prison,—because, namely, under the law, as the δυνάμεις τῆς ἁμαρτίας (1 Cor. xv. 56), they are not in a position to attain to the freedom of moral life.

over, in order to a just understanding of the passage, that ὑπὸ νόμον, according to the very position of the words, cannot without proceeding arbitrarily be connected with συγκλ. (so de Wette, Wieseler, and many others, also my own former interpretation),—a connection which is not warranted by the other thought, ver. 22,—but must be joined to ἐφρουρ. (Augustine and many others, also Hofmann, Reithmayr, Buhl); and further, that the present participle συγκλειόμενοι (with the εἰς τὴν μέλλ. κ.τ.λ. belonging to it) forms the *modal definition* of ἐφρουρούμεθα, representing the *continued* operation of the latter, which, constantly appearing in fresh acts, renders liberation impossible. Hofmann (comp. his *Schribbew.* II. 2, p. 59) understands συγκλείειν εἰς in the sense of *constraining to something*; it expresses in his view the constraining power, with which subjection to the law served to keep the people directed towards the faith which was to be revealed in the future.¹ Such an use of the phrase is indubitably found among later Greek authors, and is especially frequent in Polybius (see Raphel, and Schweighäuser, *Lex. Polyb.* p. 571 f.); but how improbable, and in fact incredible it is, that Paul should have here used this word in a different sense from that in which he used it immediately before in ver. 22, and in the kindred passage, Rom. xi. 32 (he has it not elsewhere)! This sense could not have occurred to any reader. Besides, the idea of constraint *against one's will*, which must be conveyed in συγκλειόμ. εἰς (see Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 545), and which Hofmann obliterates ("the law conferred on the people *its distinctive position*, and its *abiding* in this distinctive position was at the same time an *abiding directed towards the faith* that was to come"), would neither agree with the text (vv. 22, 24) nor harmonize with history (Rom. xi.; Acts xxviii. 25 ff.). — εἰς τὴν μέλλουσιν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι] As εἰς in ver. 24 is evidently to be understood as *telic*, and as the temporal interpretation *usque ad* (Erasmus, Grotius, Michaelis, Koppe, Morus, Rosenmüller, Rückert, Usteri, and others) after πρὸ τοῦ ἐλθεῖν τὴν πίστιν, which includes in itself the *terminus ad quem*,

¹ Raphel, *Polyb.* p. 518, has understood συγκλείειν εἰς in a similar way to Hofmann, and finely paraphrased it: "eo necessitatis quem adigere, ut ad fidem tanquam sacram ancoram confugere cogatur." Comp. Bengel.

would be very unmeaning, εἰς is to be explained: *towards the faith*, that is, with the *design*, that we should pass over into the state of faith. Luther (1519) aptly remarks: "in hoc, ut fide futura liberaremur." In accordance with the view of Oecumenius, Theophylact, Augustine, Calovius, Raphel, Bengel, Hofmann, εἰς κ.τ.λ. is to be connected with συγκελιόμενοι, because the latter, without this annexation of the telic statement εἰς κ.τ.λ., would not form a *characteristic* modal definition of ἐφρουρ. This εἰς κ.τ.λ. is, in the history of salvation, the divine aim of that σύγκλεισις, which was to cease on its attainment; Christ is the end of the law. Comp. ver. 22, where ἵνα κ.τ.λ. corresponds with the εἰς κ.τ.λ. here. — μέλλουσιν] is placed first (Paul did not write, εἰς τ. πίστ. τ. μέλλ. ἀποκ.), because with that *earlier* situation is contrasted the *subsequent future* state of things which was throughout the object of its aim. Comp. on Rom. viii. 18. Similarly in 1 Pet. v. 1, 2 Macc. viii. 11. — ἀποκαλυφθῆναι] for so long as there was not yet belief in Christ, faith had not yet made its appearance: it was still a (in the counsel of God) *hidden* element of life, which became *revealed* as a historical phenomenon, when Christ had come and the gospel—the preaching of faith (vv. 2, 5)—was made known. Ἀποκαλ. cannot be understood as the infinitive of *design* and, according to the reading συγκεκλεισμένοι, as belonging to the latter word (Matthias: "in order to become manifest, as those who were under the ban with a view to the future faith"), because in the religious-historical connection of the text it must signify the final appearance of the blessing of salvation, which hitherto as a μυστήριον had been unknown (Rom. xvi. 25). Besides, Paul would thus have written very far from clearly; he must at least have placed the infinitive before συγκεκλεισ.

Ver. 24. *Accordingly the law has become our paedagogue unto Christ.* As a *paedagogue* (see on 1 Cor. iv. 15) has his wards in guidance and training for the aim of their future majority, so the law has taken us into a guidance and training, of which Christ was the aim, that is, of which the aim was that we in due time should no longer be under the law, but should belong to Christ. This *munus paedagogicum*, however, resulting from ver. 23, did not consist in the *restriction of*

sin,¹ or in the circumstance that the law "*ab inhonestis minarum asperitate deterreret*" (Winer, and most expositors, including de Wette, Baur, Hofmann, Reithmayr, but not Usteri, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler),—views decidedly inconsistent with the aim expressed in ver. 19, and with the tenor of ver. 23, which by no means expresses the idea of preparatory improvement; but it consisted in this, that the law prepared those belonging to it for the future reception of Christian salvation (justification by faith) in such a manner that, by virtue of the principle of sin which it excited, it continually brought about and promoted transgressions (ver. 19; Rom. vii. 5 ff.), thereby held the people in moral bondage (in the *φρουρά*, ver. 23), and by producing at the same time the acknowledgment of sin (Rom. iii. 20) powerfully brought home to the heart (Rom. vii. 24) the sense of guilt and of the need of redemption from the divine wrath (Rom. iv. 15),—a redemption which, with our natural moral impotence, was not possible by means of the law itself (Rom. iii. 19 f., viii. 3). Luther appropriately remarks: "*Lex enim ad gratiam praeeparat, dum peccatum revelat et auget, humilians superbos ad auxilium Christi desiderandum.*" See also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 287 f.; Holsten, *z. Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 315 f. Under this paedagogal discipline man finally cries out: *ταλαίπωρος ἐγώ*, Rom. vii. 24. — *εἰς Χριστόν*] not *usque ad Christum* (Castalio, J. Cappellus, Morus, Rosenmüller, Rückert, Matthias), but designating the end aimed at, as is shown by *ἵνα ἐκ π. δικ.*; comp. ver. 23. Chrysostom and his successors (see Suicer, *Thes.* II pp. 421, 544), Erasmus, Zeger, Elsner, and others, refer *εἰς* to the idea that the law *πρὸς τὸν Χριστόν, ὃς ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἀπήγε*, just as the *paedagogi* had to conduct the boys to the schools and gymnasia (Plat. *Lys.* p. 208 C; Dem. 313. 12; Ael. *V. H.* iii. 21). But this introduces the idea of Christ as a *teacher*, which is foreign to the passage; He is conceived of as *reconciler* (*ἵνα ἐκ πίστ. δικ.*). — *ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθ.*] is the *divine destination*, which the paedagogic function of the law was to fulfil in those who were subject to it.

¹ Comp. Liban. *D.* xxv. p. 576 C: *πρῶτον μὲν νομῷ παιδαγωγήσομεν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὡς ἂν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου ζημίαν ἀναδυόμεναι σωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάζωνται.* Comp. also Simplic. *Epict.* 10, p. 116, ed. Schweigh.; and see Grotius on our passage.

The emphatic ἐκ πίστεως (*by faith*, not by the law) shows how erroneously the paedagogic efficacy of the law is referred to the restriction of sin.

Ver. 25. No longer dependent on the ὥστε in ver. 24. Paul now desires to unfold the beautiful picture of the salvation *which had come*. — οὐκέτι] This is the *breathing afresh of freedom*. On the matter itself, comp. Rom. vi. 14, x. 4, vii. 25. — ὑπὸ παιδαγ.] without article: *under tutorial power*.

Ver. 26. The *argumentative emphasis* is laid first on πάντες, and then, not on υἱοί,—which expositors have been wont to understand in the pregnant sense: sons of full age, free, in contrast to the παισὶ implied in παιδαγωγός (see, against this view, Wieseler and Matthias),—but on υἱοὶ Θεοῦ, because in this Θεοῦ the υἱοί actually has its express and full definition, and therefore to supply the defining idea is quite unwarrantable. *All of you are sons of God by means of faith*; ¹ but where all without exception and without distinction are sons of God, and are so through faith, none can be, like Israel before the appearance of faith, under the dominion of the law, because the new state of life, that of *faith*, is something altogether different,—namely, fellowship with the *υἰότης* of Christ (ver. 27). To be a son of God through *faith*, and to be under the old *tutorial training*, are contradictory relations, one of which excludes the other. The higher, and in fact perfect relation, ² excludes the lower. — πάντες] Paul now speaks in the *second* person, because what is said in ver. 26 f. held good, *not* of the Jewish Christians alone (of whom he previously spoke in the *first* person), but of *all Christians in general as such*, consequently of *all his readers* whom he now singles out for address; whether they may have previously been Jews or Gentiles, now they are *sons of God*. Hofmann supposes that Paul meant by the *second* person his *Gentile-Christian* readers, and wished to employ what he says of them in proof of his assertion respecting those who had been previously subject to the law. In

¹ διὰ τ. πίστ. stands *third* in the order of emphasis, but has not the main stress laid upon it in contradistinction to the πάντες (Hofmann), as if it stood immediately after πάντες γάρ.

² Theodoret aptly remarks: ἐδιζῖ τῶν πισπιστυκότων τὸ τίλειον· τί γὰρ τιλειόν τ' ἐρον τῶν υἱῶν χρηματίζόντων Θεοῦ;

this case he must, in order to be intelligible, have used some such words as *καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἔθνη πάντες κ.τ.λ.* According to the expression in the second person used without any limitation, the *Galatian Christians* must have considered themselves addressed *as a whole* without distinction,—a view clearly confirmed to them by the *ἑσσι* (ver. 27), and the *Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην* comp. with *πάντες ὑμεῖς* (ver. 28). Where, on the other hand, Paul is thinking of the Galatians as *Gentile Christians* (so far as the majority of them actually were so), this may be simply gathered from the context (iv. 8). — *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*] belongs to *πίστεως*. According to the construction *πιστεύειν ἐν τινι* (see Mark i. 15; Eph. i. 13; LXX. Ps. lxxviii. 22, Jer. xii. 6; Clem. 1 Cor. 22: *ἡ ἐν Χριστῷ πίστις*, Ignat. *ad Philad.* 8: *ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ οὐ πιστεύω*), *ἡ πίστις ἐν Χριστῷ* is *fides in Christo reposita*, the faith resting in Christ; the words being correctly, in point of grammar, combined so as to form *one* idea. See Winer, p. 128 [E. T. 169]; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 63, *ad Rom.* I. p. 195 f. Comp. Eph. i. 1, 15; Col. i. 4; 1 Tim. iii. 13. But Usteri, Schott, Hofmann, Wieseler, Ewald, Matthias, Reithmayr (Estius also pronouncing it allowable), join *ἐν Χρ. Ἰ.* with *υἱοὶ Θεοῦ ἐστε*, of which it is alleged to be the modal definition; specially explaining the sense, either as “*utpote Christo prorsus addicti*” (Schott), or of the “*inclusion in Christ*” (Hofmann), or as assigning the *objective ground* of the sonship, which has its subjective ground in *διὰ τ. πίστ.* (Wieseler; comp. Hofmann and Buhl). But all these elements are already obviously involved in *διὰ τ. πίστ.* itself, so that *ἐν Χ. Ἰ.*, as parallel to *διὰ τ. π.*, would be simply superfluous and awkward; whereas, connected with *διὰ τ. π.*, it expresses the *emphatic* and indeed *solemn completeness* of this idea (comp. ver. 22), in accordance with the great thought of the sentence, coming in all the more forcibly at the end, as previously in the case of *ἐλθεῖν* (ver. 23) and *ἐλθούσης* (ver. 25) the *πίστις* was mentioned *without* its object, and the latter was left to be understood as a matter of course.

Ver. 27. The words just used, *υἱοὶ Θεοῦ ἐστε*, expressing what the readers as a body are through faith in Christ, are now confirmed by the mention of the *origin* of this relation;

and the ground on which the relation is based is, that Christ is the *Son of God*. Comp. Chrysostom: εἰ ὁ Χριστὸς υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, σὺ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐνδεδύσαι, τὸν υἱὸν ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιωθεὶς εἰς μίαν συγγένειαν καὶ μίαν ἰδέαν ἤχθης. Luther, 1519: "*Si autem Christum induistis, Christus autem filius Dei, et vos eodem indumento filii Dei estis.*" — ὅσοι] corresponding to the emphatic πάντες in ver. 26. — εἰς Χριστόν] *in relation to Christ* (see on Rom. vi. 3), so that ye who belong to Christ through baptism become partakers in fellowship of life with Him. — Χριστόν ἐνεδύσασθε] laying aside the figure, according to the connection: Ye have appropriated the same peculiar state of life, that is, the very same specific relation to God, in which Christ stands; consequently, as He is the Son of God, ye have likewise *entered into the sonship of God*, namely by means of the πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας received at baptism (iv. 5–7; Rom. viii. 15; 1 Cor. vi. 11; Tit. iii. 5). Observe, besides, how baptism necessarily presupposes the μετάνοια (Acts ii. 38) and faith (comp. Neander, II. p. 778 f.; Messner, *Lehre der Ap.* p. 279). The *entrance on the state of being included in Christ*, as Hofmann from the point of view of εἶναι ἐν Χ. explains the expression, is likewise tantamount to the obtaining a share in the sonship of God. The figure, derived from the putting on of a characteristic dress,¹ is familiar both to the Greek authors and the Rabbins (Schoettgen, *Hor.* p. 572). See on Rom. xiii. 14. In the latter passage the putting on of Christ is *enjoined*, but it is here represented as *having taken place*; for in that passage it is conceived under the *ethical*, but here under the primary *dogmatic*, point of view. Comp. Luther, 1538. Usteri in-

¹ Looking at the very general occurrence of the figure, and seeing that the context contains no indication whatever of any special reference, we must entirely reject any historical or ritual references. See the many discussions of the earlier expositors in Wolf. By some the figure was looked upon as referring to *heathen* customs (as Bengel: "Christus nobis est *toga virilis*"), by others to *Jewish* customs ("it applies to the putting on of the robes of the high priest at his appointment," Deyling, *Obs.* III. p. 480, ed. 2), by others to *Christian* customs ("it applies to the putting on of new—at a later time white—garments after baptism," Beza). The latter idea is especially to be set aside, because the custom concerned cannot be shown to have existed in *apostolic* times; at any rate, it has only originated from the N. T. idea of the putting on of the new man, and is its emblematic representation.

correctly desires to find in the ἐνδύσθαι Χριστόν of our passage, not the entering into the sonship of God, but the *putting on of the new man* (Col. iii. 9–11), having especial reference to the thought of the universalistic, purely human element, in which all the religious differences which have hitherto separated men from one another are done away. This view is inconsistent with the word actually used (Χριστόν), and with the context (υἱοὶ Θεοῦ, ver. 26). Nevertheless, Wieseler has in substance supported the view of Usteri, objecting to our interpretation that υἱοὶ Θεοῦ expresses a sonship of God different from that of *Christ*, who was *begotten* of God. It is true that Christians are the sons of God only by *adoption* (υἰοθεσία); but just by means of this new relation entered upon in baptism, they have morally and legally entered into the like state of life with the only-begotten Son, and have become, although only His brethren *by adoption*, still His *brethren*. Comp. Rom. viii. 29. This is sufficient to justify the conception of having put on Christ, wherein the metaphysical element of difference subsists, as a matter of course, but is left out of view. On the legal aspect of the relation, comp. ver. 29; Rom. viii. 17. — Moreover, that the formula ἐν Χριστῷ εἶναι is not to be explained from the idea Χριστόν ἐνδύσασθαι, see in Fritzsche, *ad. Rom.* II. p. 82. Just as little, however, is the converse course to be adopted (Hofmann), because both εἶναι ἐν τινι and ἐνδύσασθαι τινα or τι are frequently used in the N. T. and out of it, without any correlation of the two ideas necessarily existing. The two stand independently side by side, although in point of *fact* it is correct that whosoever is ἐν Χριστῷ has *put on* Christ through baptism.

Ver. 28. After ye have thus put on Christ, the distinctions of your various relations of life apart from Christianity have vanished; from the standpoint of this new condition they have no further validity, any more than if they were not in existence. — ἐν] is an abbreviated form for ἐνεστι (1 Cor. vi. 5; Col. iii. 11; Jas. i. 17), not the adverbially used preposition (Hom. *Od.* vii. 96; Schaefer, *ad Bos.* p. 51; Kühner, II. § 618), as Winer, Usteri, Wieseler, and others assume, with the accent thrown back. Against this view it is decisive,

that very frequently *ἐν* and *ἐν* are used together (1 Cor. vi. 5, and frequently in Greek authors, as Xen. *Anab.* v. 3. 11; Herod. vii. 112), and yet there is no *ἐστὶ* added, whereby the *ἐν* shows that it stands independently as a compound word = *ἐνεστί* or *ἐνεῖσι*. Comp. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 591. Translate: *there is not*, namely, in this state of things when ye have all put on Christ, *a Jew*, etc. The *ὑμεῖς* in vv. 28, 29 shows that the *individualizing* form of statement, applying to the *readers*, is still continued; therefore Hofmann is wrong, although consistent with his erroneous interpretation of the second person in ver. 26 f., in taking *ἐν* as *general*: “*in Christ*,” or “*now since faith has come*,” on the ground that *ἐν ὑμῖν* is not added (which was obvious of itself from the context). As to the idea generally, comp. Col. iii. 11; Rom. x. 12; 1 Cor. xii. 13. — *ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ*] Comp. Matt. xix. 4. The relation here is conceived otherwise than in the previous *οὐκ . . . οὐδὲ*, namely: there are not *male and female*, two sexes; so that the negative is not to be supplied after *καὶ* (Bornemann, *ad Act.* xv. 1). — *πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*] Proof from the relation cancelling these distinctions, which is now constituted: *For ye all are one*, ye form a single moral person; so that now those distinctions of individuals outside of Christianity appear as non-existent, completely merged in that higher unity to which ye are all raised in virtue of your fellowship of life with Christ. This is the *εἰς καινὸς ἄνθρωπος*, Eph. ii. 15. Observe the emphatic *πάντες* as in ver. 26, and *ὅσοι* in ver. 27. — *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*] Definition of *εἰς ἐστε*. They are one, namely, not absolutely, but in the definite sense of their relation as Christians, inasmuch as this unity is causally dependent on Christ, to whom they all belong and live (ii. 20; 2 Cor. v. 15 f.; Rom. xiv. 8). See Col. iii. 11.

Ver. 29. *But by your thus belonging to Christ ye are also Abraham's posterity*: for Christ is indeed the *σπέρμα Ἀβ.* (ver. 16), and, since ye have entered into the relation of *Christ*, ye must consequently have a share in *the same state*, and must likewise be Abraham's *σπέρμα*; with which in conformity to the promise is combined the result, that ye are *heirs*, that is, that ye, just like heirs who have come into the possession of the property belonging to them, have as your own

the salvation of the Messianic kingdom promised to Abraham and his seed (the realization of which is impending). — δέ] drawing a further inference, so that, after the explanation contained in ver. 28, εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ in point of fact resumes the Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε of ver. 27. The emphatic ὑμεῖς has as its background of contrast the *natural descendants of Abraham*, who as such do not belong to Christ and therefore are not Abraham's σπέρμα. — τοῦ Ἀβρ.] correlative to Χριστοῦ, and emphatically prefixed. Ye are *Abraham's seed*, because *Christ* is so (ver. 16), whose position has become yours (ver. 27). Comp. Theodoret and Theophylact. — κατ' ἐπαγγ.] for τῷ Ἀβρ. ἐρρήθησαν αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ, ver. 16. It is true that this σπέρμα in ver. 16 is *Christ*: but Christians have put on Christ (ver. 27), and are altogether one in Christ (ver. 28); thus the κατ' ἐπαγγ. (*in conformity with promise*) finds its justification. But the *emphasis* is laid, not on κατ' ἐπαγγ. as contrasted with κατὰ νόμον (Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald, Wieseler), or with *another* order of heirs (Hofmann), or with *natural* inheritance (Reithmayr), but on κληρονόμοι, which forms the link of connection with the matter that follows in ch. iv., and both here and at iv. 7 constitutes the important key-stone of the argument. This κληρονόμοι is the *triumph* of the whole, accompanied with the seal of *divine certainty* by means of κατ' ἐπαγγ.; the two together forming the final death-blow to the Judaistic opponents, which comes in all the more forcibly without καί (see critical notes). The alleged contrast was obvious of itself long before in the words σπέρμα τοῦ Ἀβρ. (comp. ver. 18). The article was no more requisite than in ver. 18. — κληρονόμοι] The connection with the sequel shows, that the sense of *heir* is intended here. Τοῦ Ἀβρ. is not, however, to be again supplied to κληρονόμοι, as might be inferred from σπέρμα; but, without supplying a genitive of the person inherited from, we have to think of the κληρονομία of the *Messianic salvation*. Comp. Rom. viii. 17. Against the supplying of τοῦ Ἀβρ. we may decisively urge not only the sequel, in which nothing whatever is said of any inheriting from *Abraham*, but also κατ' ἐπαγγ. For if Paul had wished to express the idea that Christians as the children of Abraham were also the heirs of *Abraham*, the κατ' ἐπαγγ.

would have been inappropriate; because the promise (ver. 16) had announced the heirship of the Messianic kingdom to Abraham *and* his seed, but had not announced this heirship in the first instance to Abraham, and then announced to his seed in their turn that they should be *Abraham's* heirs.

CHAPTER IV.

Ver. 6. ἡμῶν] Elz. has ὑμῶν, against decisive testimony, after the foregoing ἐστὶ. — Ver. 7. κληρονόμος] Elz. and Scholz add Θεοῦ διὰ Χριστοῦ. There are many variations, among which κληρ. διὰ Θεοῦ has most external attestation, viz. A B C* S*, Copt. Vulg. Boern. Clem. Bas. Cyr. Didym. Ambr. Ambrosiast. Pel.; so Lachm., Schott, Tisch. The Recepta κληρ. Θεοῦ διὰ Χριστοῦ is defended by C. F. A. Fritzsche in *Fritzschiolum Opusc.* p. 148, and Reiche; whilst Rinck, *Lucubr. crit.* p. 175, and Usteri, hold only κληρ. διὰ Χριστοῦ as genuine, following Marian.** Jerome (238, lect. 19, have κληρ. διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ); Griesb. and Rück., however, would read merely κληρονόμος (so 178 alone). Theophyl. Dial. c. Maced., and two min., have from Rom. viii. 17 κληρ. μὲν Θεοῦ, συγκληρ. δὲ Χριστοῦ. Amidst this great diversity, the much preponderating attestation of κληρ. διὰ Θεοῦ (in favour of which F G also range themselves with κληρ. διὰ Θεόν) is decisive; so that the Recepta must be regarded as having arisen from a gloss, and the mere κληρονόμος, which has almost no attestation, as resulting from a clerical omission of διὰ Θεοῦ. — Ver. 8. φύσει μὴ] So A B C D* E S, min., vss., Ath. Nyss. Bas. Cyr. Ambr. Jer. Approved by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. and Tisch. But Elz. Matth. Scholz, Schott, Reiche, have μὴ φύσει. Opposed to this is the decisive weight of the evidence just given, and the internal ground, that in τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὔσι θεοῖς people might easily find the entire non-existence of the heathen gods, which could not but be more satisfactory than our reading, leaving as this does to the gods reality in general, and only denying them actual *divinity*. The same cause probably induced the omission of φύσει in K, 117, Clar. Germ. codd. Lat. in Ambr. Ir. Victorin. Ambrosiast. — Ver. 14. πειρασμὸν μου τόν] So Elz. Matth. Scholz, Tisch. Reiche, following D*** K L, many min., and a few vss. and Fathers. But A B C** D* F G S*, 17, 39, 67*, Copt. Vulg. It. Cyr. Jer. Aug. Ambrosiast. Sedul., have πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν. Recommended by Mill. and Griesb., adopted by Lachm. And justly; ὑμῶν not being understood, was either expunged (so C*?, min., Syr. Erp. Arm. Bas. Theophyl.; approved by Winer, Rück., Schott, Fritzsche), or amended by μου τόν. Comp. Wieseler. — Ver. 15.

τις οὖν] Grot., Lachm., Rück., Usteri, Ewald, Hofm., read ποῦ οὖν, which is indeed attested by A B C F G **κ**, min., Syr. Arr. Syr. p. (in the margin), Arm. Copt. Vulg. Boern. Dam. Jer. Pel., but by the explanations of Theodore of Mopsuestia (τὸ οὖν τις ἐνταῦθα ἀντὶ τοῦ ποῦ ὁ μακαρ.), Theodoret, Theophyl., and Oecum., is pretty well shown to be an ancient interpretation. — The ἦν which follows is omitted in A B C L **κ**, min., Aeth. Damasc. Theophyl. Theodoret. ms. Expunged by Lachm. and Scholz, also Tisch. Rightly. According as τις was understood either correctly as expressing quality, or as equivalent to ποῦ, either ἦν (D E K *et al.*) or ἐστὶ (115, Sedul. Jer.), or even οὖν (122, Erp.), was supplied. In Oecum. the reading ἦν is combined with the explanation ποῦ by recourse to the gloss: οὖν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ αὐτόν. — ἄν] before ἐδώκ. is wanting in A B C D* F G **κ**, 17, 47, Dam. Deleted by Lachm. and Tisch.: a grammatical addition. — Ver. 17. ἐκκληῖσαι ἡμᾶς] Elz. has ἐκκλ. ἡμᾶς, which is found only in a very few min., was introduced into the text by Beza,¹ and must be looked upon as an unnecessary conjecture. — Ver. 18. τὸ ζηλοῦσθαι] A C and four min., Damasc. have ζηλοῦσθαι merely (so Lachm.), while B **κ**, and three min., Aeth. Vulg. Jer. Ambrosiast., read ζηλοῦσθε. The latter is an ancient error in transcribing, which involved the suppression of the article. The correct form ζηλοῦσθαι was restored, but the article, which seemed superfluous, was not recovered. — Ver. 21. ἀκούετε] D E F G, 10, 31, 80, Vulg. It. Sahid. Arm., and Fathers, have ἀναγινώσκετε. An ancient interpretation. — Ver. 24. δύο] Elz. has αἱ δύο, against decisive testimony. — Ver. 25. "Ἀγαρ] is wanting in C F G **κ**, 17, 115, Aeth. Arm. Vulg. Goth. Boern. Cyr. Epiph. Damasc. Or. int. Ambrosiast. Jer. Aug. Pel. Sedul. Beda. Deleted by Lachm. and Wieseler, condemned also by Hofmann, who refers Ἀγαρ to the Syriac Church, although it is attested by A B D E K L, and most min., Chrys., and others. But instead of γάρ, A B D E, 37, 73, 80, lect. 40, Copt. Cyr. (once), have δέ. The juxtaposition of γάρ "Ἀγαρ led to the omission sometimes of the "Ἀγαρ, and sometimes of the γάρ. After the latter was omitted, in a part of the witnesses the connection that was wanting was restored by δέ; just as in the case of several, mostly more recent authorities, instead of γάρ after δουλεύει, δέ has crept in (so Elz.), because the argument of the apostle was not understood. — συστοιχεῖ δέ] D* F G, Vulg. It. Goth., read ἡ συστοιχοῦσα; D*, however, not having the article. A gloss, in order to exhibit the reference to "Ἀγαρ in ver. 24. — Ver. 26. ἡμῶν] Elz. reads πάντων ἡμῶν; Lachm. has bracketed πάντων. But it is

¹ Beza himself allows that ἡμᾶς stands in *all* the codd. (in the fifth edition he adds: *Latin*), but considers that the *sense* requires ἡμᾶς.

wanting in B C* D E F G Σ , some min., most vss., and many Fathers. Deleted by Tisch.; defended by Reiche. An amplifying addition, involuntarily occasioned by the recollection of iii. 26, 28, and the thought of the multitude of the τέκνα (ver. 27). — Ver. 28. ἡμεῖς . . . ἐσμὲν) Lachm. and Schott, also Tisch., read ὑμεῖς ἐστε, following B D F G, some min., Sahid. Aeth. Ir. Victorin. Ambr. Tychon. Ambrosiast. Justly; the first person was introduced on account of vv. 26 and 31. — Ver. 30. κληρονομήσῃ] Lachm. reads κληρονομήσει, following B D E Σ and Theophylact; from the LXX. — Ver. 31. ἄρα] A C, 23, 57, Copt. Cyr. Damasc. Jer. Aug., have ἡμεῖς δέ; B D* E Σ , 67**, Cyr. Marcion, read διό. The latter is (with Lachm. and Tisch.) to be preferred; for ἡμεῖς δέ ἀδελφοί is evidently a mechanical repetition of ver. 28 (Rec.), and ἄρα is too feebly attested (F G, Theodoret, have ἄρα οὖν).

CONTENTS.—*Further discussion of the κληρονόμους εἶναι* (iii. 29), as a privilege which could not have been introduced *before* Christ, while the period of nonage lasted, but was *first* introduced *by means of* Christ and Christianity at the time appointed by God, when the earlier servile relation was changed into that of sonship (vv. 1–7). After Paul has expressed his surprise at the apostasy of his readers, and his anxiety lest he may have laboured among them in vain (vv. 8–11), he entreats them to become like to him, and supports this entreaty by a sorrowful remembrance of the abounding love which they had manifested to him on his first visit, but which appeared to have been converted into enmity (vv. 12–16). He warns them against the selfish zeal with which the pseudo-apostles courted them (ver. 17), while at the same time he reproves their fickleness (ver. 18), and expresses the wish that he were now present with them, in order to regain, by an altered mode of speaking to them, their lost confidence (vv. 18–20). Lastly, he refutes the tendency to legalism from the law itself, namely by an allegorical interpretation of the account that Abraham had two sons, one by the bond-woman, and one by the free woman (vv. 21–30), and then lays down the proposition that Christians are children of the free woman, which forms the groundwork of the exhortations and warnings that follow in ch. v. (ver. 31).

Ver. 1. λέγω δέ] Comp. iii. 17, v. 16; Rom. xv. 8; 1 Cor.

i. 12: *now I mean*, in reference to this *κληρονομία* brought in through Christ, the idea of which I have now more exactly to illustrate to you as for the first time realized in Christ. This illustration is derived by Paul from a comparison of the pre-Christian period to the period of the non-free, slave-like childhood of the heir-apparent. — ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον] As in Rom. vii. 1; 1 Cor. vii. 39. — ὁ κληρονόμος] The article as in ὁ μεσίτης, iii. 20: the heir in any given case. *Κληρ.* is, however, to be conceived here, as in Matt. xxi. 38, as the heir of the father's goods, who is so not yet in actual personal possession, but *de jure*—the *heir apparent*, whose father is *still alive*. So Cameron, Neubour (*Bibl. Brem.* v. p. 40), Wolf, Baumgarten, Semler, Michaelis, and many others, including Winer, Schott, Wieseler, Reithmayr. But Rückert, Studer (in Usteri), Olshausen (undecided), Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Hofmann, following Chrysostom, Theodoret, and most of the older expositors, conceive the heir as one *whose father is dead*. Incorrectly, on account of ver. 2; for the duration of the guardianship (in which sense ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους, ver. 2, must then be understood) could not have been determined by the *will of the father*,¹ but would have depended on the *law* (Hermann, *Staatsalterth.* § 121). Hofmann thinks, indeed, that the point whether the father was bound by a law of majority is not taken into account, but only the fact, that it is *the father himself* who has made arrangements respecting his heir. But in this view the *προθεσμία*, as prescribed by the father, would be entirely illusory; the notice would be absurd, because the *προθεσμία* would be not τοῦ πατρός, but τοῦ νόμου. — νήπιος] still in boyhood. Comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 11. “Imberbis juvenis tandem custode remoto gaudet equis,” etc., Virg. *Aen.* ix. 649. Quite in opposition to the context, Chrysostom and Oecumenius refer it to *mental immaturity* (Rom. ii. 20; Hom. *Il.* v. 406, xvi. 46, *et al.*). — οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου] because he is not *sui juris*. Comp. Liban. *in Chrys.* p. 11 D, in Wetstein. — κύριος πάντων

¹ Baumgarten-Crusius, indeed, appeals to the proof adduced by Götting (*Gesch. d. Röm. Staatsverf.* pp. 109, 517), that Gaius, I. 55. 65, 189, comp. Caes. *Bell. Gall.* vi. 19, mentions the existence of a higher grade of the *patria potestas* among the Galatians. But in this way it is by no means shown that the time of majority was, after the *death* of the father, dependent on the settlement which he had previously made.

ὧν] *although he is lord of all*, namely *de jure, in eventum*, as the *heir-apparent* of all the father's goods. Consequently neither this nor the preceding point is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the father is still alive (as Hofmann and others have objected). Comp. Luke xvi. 31. — The κληρονόμος νήπιος represents, not the people of *Israel* (Wieseler); but, according to the connection with iii. 29 (comp. iv. 3), *the Christians as a body*, regarded in their earlier *pre-Christian* condition. In this condition, whether Jewish or Gentile, they were the *heir-apparent*, according to the idea of the divine predestination (Rom. viii. 28 ff.; Eph. i. 11; John xi. 52), in virtue of which they were ordained to be the *Israel of God* (vi. 16), the true σπέρμα of Abraham.

Ver. 2. Ἐπίτροπος means here not *guardian* (ὀρφανῶν ἐπίτροπος, Plat. Legg. p. 766 C; Dem. 988. 2; Xen. Mem. i. 2. 40; 2 Macc. xi. 1, xiii. 2, xiv. 2; comp. also the rabbinical אפוטרופוס in Schoettgen, Hor. p. 743 f.), as it is explained by all who look upon the father as dead (see, however, on ver. 1), but *overseer, governor*, and that without any more special definition (Herod. i. 108; Pind. Ol. i. 171; Dem. 819. 17; Xen. Occ. 21. 9; and very frequently in classical authors); it is neither therefore to be taken (as in Matt. xx. 8; Luke viii. 3) as synonymous with οἰκονόμος (which would give a double designation without ground for it), nor as equivalent to παιδαγωγός (which would be an arbitrary limitation). The term denotes *any one*, to whose governorship the boy is assigned by the father in the arrangement which has been made of the family affairs; and from this category are then specially singled out the οἰκονόμοι, the superior slaves appointed as managers of the household and property (Luke xvi. 1), on whom the νήπιος was dependent in respect to money and other outward wants. — ἄχρι τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ πατρός] *Until the appointed time of the father*, until the term, which the father has fixed upon for releasing his son from this state of dependence. ἡ προθεσμία, *tempus praestitutum*, does not occur elsewhere in the N. T., but is frequent in classical authors. See Wetstein; also Jacobs, Ach. Tat. p. 440.

Ver. 3. Ἡμεῖς] embraces Christians generally, the *Jewish and Gentile Christians together*. In favour of this view we may

decisively urge, (1) the sense of *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* (see below); (2) ver. 5, where the first *ἵνα* applies to the Jewish Christians, but the second, reverting to the first person, applies to Christians generally, because the address to the readers which follows in ver. 6 represents these as a whole, and not merely the Jewish Christians among them, as included in the preceding *ἵνα τὴν νίθεσίαν ἀπολάβωμεν*; lastly, (3) that the *οὐκέτι* and *τότε*, said of the Galatians in vv. 7 and 8, point back to the state of slavery of the *ἡμεῖς* in ver. 3. Therefore *ἡμεῖς* is not to be understood as referring either *merely* to the *Jewish Christians* (Chrysostom and most expositors, including Grotius, Estius, Morus, Flatt, Usteri, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Wieseler); or—as Hofmann in consistency with his erroneous reference of iii. 29 to the Gentile readers holds—to “the Old Testament church of God, which has now passed over into the New Testament church;” or to the Jewish Christians *pre-eminently* (Koppe, Rückert, Matthies, Olshausen); or, lastly, even to the *Gentile Christians* alone (Augustine). — *ὅτε ἡμεν νήπιοι*] characterizes, in terms of the prevailing comparison, the *pre-Christian condition*, which, in relation to the Christian condition of the same persons, was their *age of boyhood*. Elsewhere Paul has represented the condition of the Christians *before* the Parousia, in comparison with their state *after* the Parousia, as a time of boyhood. See 1 Cor. xiii. 11; Eph. iv. 13. — *ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ἡμεν δεδουλ.*] corresponds, as application, to the *οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου . . . ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους ἐστὶ καὶ οἶκον*. The word *στοιχεῖον*—which denotes primarily a stake or peg standing in a row, then a *letter* of the alphabet (Plat. *Theæt.* p. 202 E; Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 1; Arist. *Poet.* 20. 2; Lucian, *Jud. voc.* 12), then, like *ἀρχή*, *element* (see Rudolph on *Ocell.* p. 402 ff.)—means here at all events *element*,¹ which signification has developed itself from the idea of a *letter*, inasmuch as a word is

¹ A point on which almost all expositors agree. Yet Luther, 1519, following the precedent of Tertull. c. *Marc.* v. 4, adopted the signification of *letters*: “pro ipsis literis legis, quibus lex constat. . . . *Mundi* autem vocat, quod sint de iis rebus, quae in mundo sunt.” So also in 1524, and at least to a similar effect in 1538. More recently Michaelis has also explained it as *letters*; holding that the acts of the Levitical law were intended, because, taken as a whole, they had preached the gospel by anticipation. Similarly Nösselt, *Opusc.* II. p. 209, takes

a series of the letters which form it (Walz, *Rhetor.* VI. p. 110). In itself, however, it might be used either in the *physical* sense of *elementary substances*, which Plato (Ruhnk. *ad Tim.* p. 283) calls also γένη (2 Pet. iii. 10, 12; Wisd. vii. 17, xix. 18; 4 Macc. xii. 13; Plat. *Tim.* p. 48 B, 56 B, *Polit.* p. 278 C; Philo, *de Opif. m.* p. 7, 11, *Cherub.* p. 162; Clem. *Hom.* x. 9), as it frequently occurs in Greek authors applied to the so-called *four elements* (comp. Suidas, *s.v.*), or in the *intellectual* sense of *rudimenta, first principles* (Heb. v. 12; Plut. *de pueror. educ.* 16; Isocr. p. 18 A; Nicol. *ap. Stob.* xiv. 7. 31; see Wetstein). In the latter sense the verb στοιχειοῦν was used to signify the instruction given to catechumens; *Constitt. ap.* vi. 18. 1, vii. 25. 2. Comp. our expression the *A, B, C* of an art or science.¹ In the *physical* sense—in which it is used by later Greek authors for designating the *stars* (Diog. L. vi. 102; Man. iv. 624; Eustath. *Od.* p. 1671, 53)—it was understood by most of the Fathers: either as by Augustine (*de civ. D.* iv. 11), who thought of the Gentile adoration of the heavenly bodies and of other nature-worship; or as by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Ambrose, Pelagius, who referred it to the Jewish observance of new moons, feasts, and Sabbaths, which was regulated by the course of the moon and sun. So, combining the Gentile and Jewish cultus, Hilgenfeld, p. 66 (comp. in his *Zeitschr.* 1858, p. 99; 1866, p. 314), who ascribes to the apostle the heterogeneous idea of “sidereal powers of heaven,” that is, of the stars as powerful animated beings (comp. Baur and Holsten); and Caspari (in the *Strassb. Beitr.* 1854, p. 206 ff.), in whose view Paul is supposed to have placed Mosaism in the category of star and nature worship; and likewise Reithmayr, although without such extravagances. But because the expression does not apply either merely to the circumstances of the heathen, or merely to those of the Jewish, cultus (see, on the contrary, vv. 8–10),—to the latter of which it is in the physical

στοιχεῖα as signs (Arist. *Eccl.* 652, where it is used for the shadow of the plate on the sun-dial; comp. Lucian, *Gall.* 9, *Cronos.* 17), holding that the Jewish ceremonies are thus named because they prefigured the future Christian worship. These views are all erroneous, because the expression στοιχεῖα τ. κόσμου applies also to *Gentile* habits.

¹ Comp. generally, Schaubach, *Commentat. quid στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in N. T. sibi velint*, Meining. 1862.

sense not at all suitable, for the Jewish celebrations of days and the like were by no means a star-worship or other (possibly unconscious) worship *of nature*, under which man would have been in bondage, but were an imperfect worship *of God*—and because the context suggests nothing else than the contrast between the imperfect and the perfect religion, as well as also on account of the correlation to *νήπιοι*, the physical sense of *στοιχεῖον* is altogether to be rejected.¹ Besides, it would be difficult to perceive why Paul, if he had thought of the stars, should not have written *τοῦ οὐρανοῦ* instead of *τοῦ κόσμου*. Hence Jerome (also *τινές* in Theophylact, and Gennadius in Oecumenius, p. 747 D), Erasmus, Castalio, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, and most of the later expositors, though with various modifications, have correctly adhered to the sense *rudimenta disciplinæ*, which alone corresponds to the notion of the *νηπιότης* (for the *age of childhood* does not get beyond *first principles*). The *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* are the *elements of non-Christian humanity* (*κόσμος*; see 1 Cor. vi. 2, xi. 32, *et al.*), that is, the elementary things, the immature beginnings of religion, which

¹ With strange arbitrariness Schulthess (*Engelwelt*, pp. 113, 129) has recently anticipated Hilgenfeld in re-asserting this sense; holding that the *stars* are meant, but that Paul is glancing at the Jewish *ministry of angels* (Job xxxviii. 7 (!)). More thoroughly Schneckenburger (in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1848, p. 445 ff.) has again defended the physical reference (*elements of the visible world*). Comp. Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 323. In this interpretation the law must be excepted (as is done by Holsten) from the *στοιχεῖα*,—an exception which is forbidden by the whole connection with ch. iii., and is also inconsistent with the concrete instances in vv. 8 and 10; see above. Neander also—who, however, introduces the idea of the *sensuous forms of religion*—would retain the physical reference, which is decidedly assumed by Lipsius (*Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 83), who specially commends the interpretation of Hilgenfeld; whilst Messner (*Lehre d. Ap.* p. 226) agrees in substance with Neander, holding that *διδουλ. ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* is “the dependence of the religious consciousness on the earthly, sensuous, perishable things, of which this earthly *κόσμος*, as to its fundamental elements, consists.” But why, then, the restriction “as to its *fundamental elements*?” And the idea of perishableness is *imported*. Ewald understands by it the *elements of the world*, into the whole of which life must be brought through the spirit, and unity and meaning through God; it comprehends the Jewish observances as to meats and days, as well as the heathen star-worship. Yet how unsuited to popular apprehension (as pertaining to natural philosophy) would the whole expression thus be! an enigmatic designation for the heathen worship, and an unsuitable one for the Jewish cultus, which is based on divine precept. As to the way in which Hofmann understands the material elements of the world, see the sequel.

occupy the minds of those who are still without the pale of Christianity. Not having attained to the perfect religion, the *κόσμος* has still to do with the religious elementary state, to which it is in bondage, as in the position of a servant. Rudiments of this sort are expressly mentioned in ver. 10; hence we must understand the expression, not in a onesided fashion as the elementary *knowledge*, the beginnings of religious *perception* in the non-Christian world (comp. Kienlen, in the *Strassb. Beitr.* II. p. 133 ff.)—with which neither the idea of the relation as *slavery*, nor the inclusion of the Jewish and Gentile worships under one category would harmonize—but as the *rudimenta ritualia*, the *ceremonial character of Judaism and heathenism*,¹ with which, however, is also combined the corresponding imperfection of religious knowledge. Comp. Col. ii. 8, 20. Against the explanation, “*religious elementary things of the world*,” the objection has been made, that this idea is not suitable either to Judaism, in so far as the latter was a divine revelation, or even to heathenism, which, according to Paul, is something foreign to religion; see especially Neander. But the latter part of the objection is erroneous (Acts xvii. 22, 23); and the former part is disposed of, when—in the light of the pretensions put forth by the apostle’s opponents, which were chiefly based on the ceremonial side of the law—we take into account the relative character of the idea *rudimenta*, according to which Judaism, when compared with Christianity as the absolute religion, may, although a divine institution, yet be included under the notion of *στοιχεῖα*, because destined only for the *νήπιοι* and serving a transitory propaedeutic purpose. Comp. Baur, *Paulus*, II. p. 222, ed. 2; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 289; also Ritschl, *althath. K.* p. 73. Most of the older expositors, as also Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette (with many various and mistaken interpretations of *κόσμος*; see Wolf and Rückert *in loc.*), have referred the expression *merely to Judaism* (the law “as a means of training calculated only for the age of childhood,” de Wette, who is followed by Wieseler), whilst Koppe and Schott only allow the analogous nature of *ethnicism* to be included incidentally; but, besides what has been above remarked on *ἡμεῖς*,

¹ Comp. Schaubach, *l.c.* p. 9 ff.

these views are at variance with the idea of τοῦ κόσμου. This idea is, at all events, too *wide* to suit the *law*, which was given to the *people of Israel* only; whether it be taken as applying to *mankind generally* (de Wette, Wieseler), or to the *unbelieving portion of mankind*, in contrast to the *ἄγιοι* in a Christian sense.¹ Certainly it might appear unwise (see especially Wieseler) that Paul should have placed Judaism and heathenism in one category. But, in point of fact, he has to deal with *Judaistic* seductions occurring in churches chiefly *Gentile-Christian*: he might therefore, with the view of more effectually warning them and putting them to shame, so designate the condition of bondage to which by these seductions they were induced to revert, as to comprehend it in the same category with the *heathen* cultus, from the bondage of which they had been not long before liberated by Christianity. According to Hofmann, the *στοιχεῖα τ. κόσμου* are contrasted with the promise given to Abraham of the *κληρονομία κόσμου*, Rom. iv. 13. He supposes that out of the destruction of the *material elements of the present world* (2 Pet. iii. 10) the *οἰκουμένη μέλλουσα* (Heb. ii. 5) will arise, and that this will derive its nature and character from the *Spirit*, the communication of which is the beginning of the fulfilment of that promise. Israel, however, has been in bondage under the *material elements* of which the present world is composed, *inasmuch as in what it did and what it left undone it was subject to stringent laws, which had reference to the world in its existing materiality*; it had to conform itself to the things of this *corporeal* world, whilst the promise had been made to it that it should be lord of *all things*. Apart from the erroneous application of *ἡμεῖς* (see above), every essential point in this interpretation is *gratuitously introduced*. In particular, the contrast on which it is based—namely, that of the new world of the *αἰών* which is to come—is utterly foreign not only to

¹ Olshausen, feeling the difficulty which the idea of *κόσμος* puts in the way of the reference to Judaism, hits upon the arbitrary expedient of taking the expression to apply to the merely external and literal *way of apprehending* the O. T., which confines itself merely to the actions, without considering the idea involved in them. "This was the procedure of the Judaists, and in this shape the Old Test. appeared not merely as the *beginning* of divine life, but also as given over to the *world*," etc.

the whole context, but even to the words themselves; for, if Paul had had this contrast in view, he must, in order not to leave his readers wholly without a hint of it, have at least added a *τούτου* (1 Cor. vii. 31, i. 20, iii. 19; Eph. ii. 2) to *τοῦ κόσμου*.¹ It is, moreover, incorrect to discover in the *στοιχεῖα* the opposite of the future world, so far as the latter has its nature from the *Spirit*. The world of the *αἰὼν μέλλον*, as the new heaven and the new earth (2 Pet. iii. 13), must likewise be corporeally material, and must have its *στοιχεῖα*, although the *σχῆμα* of the old world will have passed away (comp. on 1 Cor. vii. 31). — *ἡμεν δεδουλωμ.*] may be taken either together, or separately; the latter is to be preferred, because it corresponds more emphatically to the *οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου* (ver. 1) and the *ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους ἐστι* (in ver. 2): *we were enslaved ones*.

Ver. 4. *Ὅτε δὲ ἦλθε τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου*] corresponds to the *ἄχρι τῆς προθεσμ. τοῦ πατρ.* (ver. 2). The time appointed by God, which was to elapse until the appearance of Christ (*ὁ χρόνος*)—consequently the pre-Messianic period—is conceived as a measure which was not yet full, so long as this period had not wholly elapsed (comp. Gen. xxix. 21; Mark i. 15; Luke xxi. 24; John vii. 8; Joseph. *Antt.* vi. 4. 1, *et al.*). Hence *τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου* is: *that moment of time, through which the measure of time just mentioned became full*. Comp. on Eph. i. 10, and Fritzsche *ad Rom.* II. p. 473.—On what *historical conditions* Paul conceived that counsel as to the fulness of time to depend (Theophylact: *ὅτε πᾶν εἶδος κακίας διεξεληθούσα ἡ φύσις ἢ ἀνθρωπίνη ἐδεῖτο θεραπείας*. Baur: “when mankind was ripe for it;” de Wette: “conditioned by the need of certain preparations, or by the necessity of the religious development of mankind which had reached a certain point”), cannot, after his view of the destination of the law which intervened between the promise and its fulfilment (iii. 19, 24; Rom. v. 20), remain doubtful. Theophylact takes in substance the right view. The need had reached its height. Comp. Chrysostom, *ad Eph.* i. 10: *ὅτε μάλιστα ἐμελλον ἀπόλλυσθαι, τότε διεσώθησαν*. Without due ground Baur perceives here (see

¹ He does not add *τούτου* in Col. ii. 8, 20, just because the contrast suggested by Hofmann was far from his thoughts.

his *neut. Theol.* p. 173) the idea that Christianity proceeded from a principle *inherent in humanity*, namely, from the advance of the mind to the freedom of self-consciousness. — ἐξαπέστειλεν] *He sent forth from Himself.* Ver. 6; Acts vii. 12, xi. 22, xvii. 14, *et al.*; Dem. 251. 5; Polyb. iii. 11. 1, iv. 26. 2, iv. 30. 1, and frequently. The expression presupposes the idea of the personal pre-existence of Christ (see Rübiger, *Christol. Paul.* p. 16; Lechler, *apost. Zeit.* p. 50; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 316 ff.), and therewith at the same time His personal divine nature (Rom. viii. 3, 32; Phil. ii. 6; 2 Cor. viii. 9); so that *in reality* the apostle's idea coincides with the Johannean ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τ. Θεόν and Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, but is not to be reduced to the notion of "the ideal first man" (Hilgenfeld), whose human birth, on account of His pre-existence, is conceived by Paul as not without a certain Docetism.¹ This remark also applies against the view of Beyschlag referring it to the pre-existent *prototype* of man (*Christol. d. N. T.* p. 220 ff.), in connection with which the Messianic name of Son is supposed to be carried back from the historical to the pre-historical sphere. This is at variance with the express designation as πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως (Col. i. 15), which likewise forbids us to say, with Hofmann: "*By the very fact, that God has sent Him forth from Himself into the world, He is the Son of God.*" According to Col. i. 15, He is, even before the creation, in the relation of *Son* to the Father, as *begotten* by Him,—a relation, therefore, which could not be dependent on the subsequent sending forth, or given for the first time *along with* the latter. — γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός] so that *He was born of a woman*; the relation of the aorist participle is the same as in Phil. ii. 7 f. The reading γεννώμενον—attested only by min., and otherwise feebly, although recommended by Erasmus, adopted by Matthias, and defended by Rinck—is a correct interpretation (as to the meaning, but not as to the tense; see Phot. *Qu. Amphil.* 90), which also occurs at Rom. i. 3, in Codd. mentioned by Augustine. *Who* this γυνή was, every reader *knew*; we must not, however, say with Schott, following many of the older expositors, "de

¹ See, on the contrary, Rom. i. 3; indeed, Paul throughout is the very opposite of Docetism.

virgine sponsa dicitur" (comp. Augustine, *Serm.* 16 *de temp.*; Jerome, and others); but comp. Job xiv. 1; Matt. xi. 11. Nor is anything peculiar to be found in ἐκ (*"ex semine matris . . . non viri et mulieris coitu,"* Calvin; comp. Cornelius a Lapide, Estius, Calovius, and others; Theophylact, following Basil, Jerome, and others: ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς σῶμα λαβόντα); on the contrary, ἐκ is quite the *usual* preposition to express the being born (John iii. 6; Matt. i. 16; 1 Pet. i. 22, *et al.*; 3 Esr. iv. 16; 4 Macc. xiv. 14; frequently used also in classical authors with γίγνεσθαι). This very fact, that Christ, although the Son of God, whom God had sent forth from Himself, entered into this life as *man* (Rom. v. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 21; Acts xvii. 31) and—just as an ordinary man enters into temporal life—as *one born of woman*, Paul wishes to bring into prominence as the mode of carrying out the divine counsel. Comp. Rom. viii. 3; Phil. ii. 7. The supernatural *generation* which preceded the natural *birth* was not here in question; its mention would even have been at variance with the connection which points to Christ's humiliation: it is not, however, anywhere else expressly mentioned by the apostle, or certainly indicated as a consequence involved in his system (Weiss). Comp. on Rom. i. 3. Nor is it to be inferred from ἐξαπέστειλεν, in connection with the designation of Him who was sent forth as the *Son* (Hofmann, comp. also his *Schriftbew.* II. 1, p. 84); because, while it is assumed that as the Son of God He was already, before His incarnation, with God (ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν), the *mode* of His incarnation—*how He* was born κατὰ σάρκα ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυίδ (Rom. i. 3; comp. ix. 5; 2 Tim. ii. 8; Acts ii. 30)—is not defined. —γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον] Luther: "made under the law;" and so most expositors: *legi subjectum*. But it is arbitrary to take γενόμ. here in another sense than before;¹ and the vivid emphasis of the *twice-used* γενόμ. is thus lost. Hence Michaelis, Koppe, Matthies, Schott, de Wette, Lechler, rightly understand γενόμ. as *natum*. Thus also, in fact, "the beginning of an εἶναι ὑπὸ

¹ Viewed by itself, γίνεσθαι ὑπὸ with the *accusative*, in the sense *to be subject to*, is, in a linguistic point of view, quite as correct (1 Macc. x. 38; Thuc. i. 110. 1; Lucian. *Abdic.* 23) as with the *dative* (Herod. vii. 11; Xen. *Anal.* vii. 2. 3, vii. 7. 32; Thuc. vii. 64. 2).

νόμον" (Hofmann) is expressed, and expressed indeed *more definitely*. Paul desires to represent the birth of the Son of God not merely as an ordinary *human* birth, but also as an ordinary *Jewish* birth (comp. Heb. ii. 14-17); and he therefore says: "*born of a woman, born under the law*," so that He was subjected to circumcision and to all other ordinances of the law, like any other Jewish child. But God caused His Son to be born as an ordinary man and as an ordinary Israelite, because otherwise He could not have undergone death—either at all, or as One cursed by the law (iii. 13), which did not apply to those who were not Jews (Rom. i. 12)—and could not have rendered the curse of the law of none effect as regards those who were its subjects. Comp. Rom. viii. 3 f.; Heb. iii. 14 f. *For this reason*, and not merely on account of the contrast to τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ (Schott), Paul has added γενόμ. ἐκ γυν., γεν. ὑπὸ νόμ., as a characteristic description of the humiliation into which God allowed His Son to enter. See the sequel. — With respect, moreover, to the *perfect obedience* of Christ to the law, it was a preliminary condition necessary for the redeeming power of His death (because otherwise the curse of the law would have affected *Him even on his own account*); but it is not that which is *imputed* for righteousness: on the contrary, this is purely *faith in the ἱλαστήριον of His death*. See on iii. 13; Rom. iv. 5, 24, v. 6 ff., *et al.* The doctrine of the Formula Concordiae as to the *imputation* of the *obedientia Christi activa* (p. 685) is not borne out by the exegetical proof, of which our passage is alleged to form part; but the atoning death of Christ is the culminating point of His obedience towards God (Rom. v. 19; Phil. ii. 8; 2 Cor. v. 21), without the perfection of which He could not have accomplished the atonement; and the form which this obedience assumed in Him, in so far as He was subject to the law, must have been that of legal obedience (comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. 1, p. 130).

Ver. 5. The object for which God sent forth His Son, and sent Him indeed γενόμ. ἐκ γυναικ., γενόμ. ὑπὸ νόμον. — τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον] The Israelites are thus designated in systematic correspondence to the previous γενόμ. ὑπὸ νόμον. Comp. iii. 25, iv. 21, v. 18; Rom. vi. 14. — ἐξαγοράσῃ] Namely, as follows from τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον, *from the dominion of the law*, vv. 1-3

(in which its curse, iii. 11, is included), and that through His death, iii. 13. Erasmus well says: "dato pretio assereret in libertatem." — *ἵνα τὴν υἰοθεσ. ἀπολάβ.*] The aim of this redemption; for of this negative benefit the *υἰοθεσία* was the immediate positive consequence. But Paul could not again express himself in the *third* person, because the *υἰοθεσία* had been imparted to the Gentiles also, whereas that redemption referred merely to the Jews; but now both, Jews and Gentiles, after having attained the *υἰοθεσία* no longer *ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ἦσαν δεδουλωμένοι* (ver. 3): hence Paul, in the first person of the second sentence of purpose, speaks from the consciousness of the *common* faith which embraced both the *Jewish and the Gentile* portions of the Christian body, not merely from the Jewish-Christian consciousness, as Hofmann holds on account of *ἐστέ* in ver. 6. Comp. the change of persons in iii. 14. — The *υἰοθεσία* is here, as it always is, *adoption* (see on Eph. i. 5; Rom. viii. 15; and Fritzsche, *in loc.*),—a meaning which is wrongly denied by Usteri, as the signification of the word *allows* no other interpretation, and the context *requires* no other. Previously not different from *slaves* (vv. 1–3), as they were in the state of *νηπιότης*, believers have now entered into the entirely different legal relation towards God of their being *adopted* by Him as children. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 338 f. The divine *begetting* (to which Hofmann refers) is a *Johannean* view; see on John i. 12. In the *divine* economy of salvation the gracious gift of the *υἰοθεσία* was needed in order to attain the *κληρονομία*; while in the *human* economy, which serves as the figure, the heir-apparent becomes at length heir as a matter of course. Accordingly Paul has not *given up* (Wieseler) the figure on which ver. 1 ff. was based—a view at variance with the express application in ver. 3, and the uninterrupted continuation of the same in ver. 4; but he has merely had recourse to such a free *modification in the application*, as was suggested to him by the certainly partial difference between the real circumstances of the case and the figure set forth in vv. 1, 2. Comp. ver. 7. — *ἀπολάβ.*] not: that we might *again* receive, as is the meaning of *ἀπολαμβ.* very often in Greek authors (see especially Dem. 78. 3; 162. 17), and in Luke xv. 27; for before Christ

men never possessed the *υιοθεσία* here referred to (although the *old* theocratic adoption of the *Jews* was never lost, Rom. ix. 4): hence Augustine and others are in error when they look back to the sonship that was lost in *Adam*. Nor must we assume with Chrysostom, Theophylact, Bengel, and others, including Baumgarten-Crusius, Hofmann, and Reithmayr, that, because the *υιοθεσία* is promised, it is denoted by ἀπολάβ. as ὀφειλομένη, — a sense which is often conveyed by the context in Greek authors and also in the N. T. (Luke vi. 34, xxiii. 41; Rom. i. 27; Col. iii. 24; 2 John 8), but not here, because it is not the *υιοθεσία* expressly, but the κληρονομία (iii. 29, iv. 7), which is the object of the promise. As little can we say, with Rückert and Schott, that the sonship is designated as *fruit* (ἀπο = *inde*) of the work of redemption, or, with Wieseler, as fruit of the *death* of Jesus apprehended by faith: for while it certainly *is* so in point of fact, the verb could not lead to it without some more precise indication in the text than that given by the mere ἐξαγορ. On the contrary, ἀπολάβ. simply denotes: *to take at the hands of* any one, *to receive*, as Luke xvi. 25; Plat. *Legg.* xii. p. 956 D, and very frequently in Greek authors.

Ver. 6. A confirmation of the reality of this reception of sonship from the *experience of the readers*; for the ἐστé, which, after the foregoing more general statement, now comes in with its *individual* application (comp. iii. 26), does not refer to the Galatians as *Gentile Christians* only (Hofmann), any more than in iii. 26-29. — ὅτι] is taken by most expositors, following the Vulgate, as *quoniam* (Luther, Castalio, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, Semler, Morus, Rosenmüller, Paulus, Olshausen, Baumgarten - Crusius, de Wette, Baur, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, and others). And this interpretation (on ὅτι, *because*, at the beginning of the sentence, comp. 1 Cor. xii. 15; John xx. 29, xv. 19) is the most simple, natural, and correct; the emphasis is laid on υἱοί, which is therefore placed at the end: but because ye are *sons*, God has sent forth the Spirit of His Son, etc. He would not have done this, if ye had not (through the *υιοθεσία*) been υἱοί; thus the reception of the Spirit is the experimental and practical divine testimony to the sonship. *If not sons of God*, ye would not be the

recipients of the *Spirit* of His Son. The Spirit is the seal of the sonship, into which they had entered through faith—the divine *σημείον* attesting and confirming it; comp. Rom. viii. 16. See also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 340. Others (Theophylact, Ambrose, Pelagius, Koppe, Flatt, Rückert, Schott) take *ὅτι* as *that*, and treat it as an abbreviated mode of saying: “But that ye are sons, *is certain by this, that* God has sent forth,” etc. (comp. iii. 11). This is unnecessarily harsh, and without any similar instance in the N. T.; modes of expression like those in Winer, p. 575 f. [E. T. 774], and Dissen, *ad Dem. de Cor.* p. 205, are different. Wieseler takes it as equivalent to *εἰς ἐκεῖνο*, *ὅτι* (see on Mark xvi. 14; John ii. 18, ix. 17, xi. 51, xvi. 19; 1 Cor. i. 26; 2 Cor. i. 18, xi. 10): “*as concerns the reality* (*ἐστέ* is to have the emphasis) *of your state as sons.*” But this would unnecessarily introduce into the vivid and direct character of these short sentences an element of dialectic reflection, which also appears in Matthias’ view. Hofmann handles this passage with extreme violence, asserting that *ὅτι* *δέ* is an elliptical protasis,—the completion of which is to be derived from the apodosis of the preceding period, from *ἐξαπέστ.* in ver. 4 onward,—that *ἐστὲ υἱοί* is apodosis, and that the following *ἐξαπέστ. κ.τ.λ.* is the further result connected with it. In Hofmann’s view, Paul reminds his (Gentile) readers that they are *for this reason* sons, *because* God has done that act *ἐξαπέστειλεν κ.τ.λ.* (ver. 4), and because He has done it in the way and with the design stated in ver. 4 f. This interpretation is *at variance with linguistic usage*, because the supposed elliptical use of *ὅτι* *δέ* does not anywhere occur, and the analogies in the use of *εἰ* *δέ*, etc., which Hofmann adduces—some of them, however, only self-invented (as those from the epistles of the apostle, 2 Cor. ii. 2, vii. 12)—are heterogeneous. And how abruptly *ἐξαπέστ. ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ.* would stand! But, as regards the *thought* also, the interpretation is unsuitable; for they are sons, etc., *not* because God has *sent* Christ, but because they have *become believers* in Him that was sent (iii. 26; John i. 12); it is not that fact itself, but their faith in it, which is the cause of their sonship and of their reception of the Spirit; comp. iii. 14. To refer the sending of the Spirit to the *event of Pentecost* (as Hofmann does), by which

God caused His Spirit to initiate "*a presence of a new kind*" in the world, is entirely foreign to the connection; comp., on the contrary, iii. 2, v. 14. — ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ.] for it is τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ Θεοῦ, 1 Cor. ii. 12. Observe the symmetry with ἐξαπέστ. κ.τ.λ. in ver. 4. The phrase conveys, in point of form, the solemn expression of the *objective* (ver. 4) and *subjective* (ver. 5) certainty of salvation, but, in a dogmatic point of view, the like personal relation of the Spirit, whom God has sent forth from Himself as He sent forth Christ. — τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ] So Paul designates the Holy Spirit, because he represents the reception of the Spirit as the proof of *sonship*; for the Spirit of the Son cannot be given to any, who are of a different nature and are not also υἱοὶ Θεοῦ. Comp. Rom. viii. 9. But the Holy Spirit is the *Spirit of Christ*, inasmuch as He is the divine principle of Christ's self-communication, by whose dwelling and ruling in the heart Christ Himself (comp. on 2 Cor. iii. 17) dwells and rules livingly, really, and efficaciously (ii. 20) in the children of God. See on Rom. viii. 9, 14. Comp. the Johannean discourses as to the self-revelation and the coming of Christ in the Paraclete. — ἡμῶν] The change of persons arose involuntarily from the apostle's own lively, experimental consciousness of this blessedness. Comp. Rom. vii. 4. — κράζον] The strong word expresses the matter as it was: *with crying* the deep fervour excited by the Spirit broke forth into appeal to the Father. Comp. Rom. viii. 15; also Ps. xxii. 3, xxviii. 1, xxx. 8; Baruch iii. 1, iv. 20. *The Spirit Himself* is here represented as crying (it is different in Rom. *l.c.*), because the Spirit is so completely the active author of the Abba-invocation, that the man who invokes appears only as the organ of the Spirit. Comp. the analogy of the opposite case—the crying of the unclean spirits (Mark i. 26, ix. 26). — Ἀββὰ ὁ πατήρ] The usual view taken by modern expositors,¹ following Erasmus and Beza, in this passage, as in Rom. viii. 15 and in Mark xiv. 36, is, that ὁ πατήρ is appended as an *explanation* of the Ara-

¹ See the usual view of the *ancient* expositors, following Augustine, in Luther. "Abba pater cur geminatur, cum grammatica ratio non appareat, placet vulgata ratio mysterii, quod idem Spiritus fidei sit Judaeorum et gentium, duorum populorum unius Dei." Comp. Calvin and Bengel.

maic *Abba* for Greek readers (so Koppe, Flatt, Winer, Rückert, Usteri, Schott); along with which stress is laid on the "*child-like sound*" of the expression, so foreign to the Greek readers (Hofmann). But see, against this view, on Rom. viii. 15. No; 'Αββᾶ, the address of Christ the Son of God to His Father, which had been heard times without number by the apostles and the first believers, had become so established and sacred in Christian prayer that it had assumed the nature of a *proper name*, so that the deep and lively emotion of the consciousness of sonship could now superadd the appellative ὁ πατήρ; and the use of the *two in conjunction* had gradually become so habitual (Bengel appropriately remarks, "*haec tessera filiorum in Novo Testamento*"), that in Mark xiv. 36, by an *hysteron proteron*, they are placed even in the mouth of Christ. In opposition to this view, which is adopted by Hilgenfeld and Matthias, it has been objected by Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 140, that ὁ πατήρ expresses exactly the same as the Aramaic ܐܒܝܐ, and that, if ܐܒܐ had assumed the nature of a *proper name*, this name would very often have occurred in the N. T. and afterwards instead of Θεός; and people would not have said constantly 'Αββᾶ ὁ πατήρ, but also 'Αββᾶ ὁ Θεός. But these objections would only avail to confute our view, if it were maintained that 'Αββᾶ had become *in general* a proper name of God (as was ܐܠܗ in the O. T. and the other names of God), so that it would have been used at *every kind* of mention of God. The word is, however, to be regarded merely as a name *used in prayer*: only *he who prayed* addressed God by this name; and just because he was *aware* that this name was an original appellative and expressed the paternal character of God, he added the purely appellative corresponding term ὁ πατήρ, and in doing so satisfied the *fervour* of his feeling of sonship. This remark applies also to Wieseler's objection, that 'Αββᾶ *could only* have continued to be used as an appellative. It might become a name just as well as, for instance, *Adonai*, but with the consciousness still remaining of its appellative origin and import. Moreover, that the address in prayer 'Αββᾶ ὁ πατήρ took its rise among the Greek *Jewish-Christians*, and first became habitual among *them*, is clear of itself on account of the Hebrew *Abba*. It is

to be remarked also, that, according to the Rabbins, analogous emotional combinations of a Hebrew and a Greek address, which mean quite the same thing, were in use. See *Erub.* f. 53. 2: מרי כירי (*mi domine, mi κύριε*). Comp. *Schemoth rabb.* f. 140. 2: קירי מרי אבי. See Schoettgen, *Hor.* p. 252. Fritzsche's view is, that the 'Αββὰ of prayer, which had through Christ's use of it become sacred and habitual, was so frequently *explained* on the part of the teachers of the Gentile Christians, as of Paul, by the addition of ὁ πατήρ, that it had become a *habit* with these teachers to say, 'Αββὰ ὁ πατήρ. But this would be a mechanical explanation which, at least in the case of Paul, is *à priori* not probable, and can least of all be assumed *in a case* where the fervid emotion of prayer¹ is exhibited. Paul would have very *improperly* allowed himself to be ruled by the custom. Wieseler contents himself with the *strengthening of the idea* by two synonymous expressions, but this still fails to explain why πάτερ, πάτερ (comp. Soph. *O. C.* 1101), or πάτερ ὁ πατήρ ἡμῶν (comp. κύριε ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν, Ps. viii. 2), is not said, just as κύριε, κύριε, and the like. — On the nominative with the article, as in apposition to the vocative, see Krüger, § 45. 2. 7.

Ver. 7. "Ωστε] Inference from vv. 5 and 6. — οὐκέτι] *no longer* as in the pre-Christian condition, when thou wast in bondage to the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου. — εἰ] The language, addressing every reader, not merely the Gentile readers (Hofmann), advances in its individualizing application: ver. 5, ἀπολάβωμεν; ver. 6, ἔστέ; ver. 7, εἰ. Comp. v. 26, vi. 1. — εἰ δὲ υἱὸς, καὶ κληρονόμος] *But if thou art a son* (and not a slave, who does not inherit from his master), *thou art also an heir*, as future possessor of the Messianic salvation, and art so (not in any way through the law, but) *through God* (διὰ Θεοῦ; see the critical notes), who, as a consequence of His adoption of thee as a son, has made thee also His *heir*. To *Him* thou art indebted for this ultimate blessing, to be attained by means of sonship. This διὰ Θεοῦ cannot also apply to υἱός (Hofmann), so that ἀλλ' should include all the

¹ And let it be noticed, that in *all* the three passages where 'Αββὰ ὁ πατήρ occurs (Rom. viii. 15; Gal. iv. 6; Mark xiv. 36), the *most fervid* tone of prayer prevails.

rest of the verse in one sentence. With εἰ δέ a new sentence begins. Otherwise Paul must have written: ἀλλ' υἱὸς, υἱὸς δὲ ὦν καὶ κληρονόμος. Rückert unjustly blames the apostle for having, in εἰ δὲ υἱὸς, καὶ κληρ., departed from the right track of his thoughts, because in ver. 1 he had started at once from the idea of κληρονόμος. But in ver. 1 the apostle, in fact, has not started from the *Messianic* idea of κληρονόμος, but from its lower analogue in civil life. With respect to the *legal* aspect of the conclusion itself, εἰ δὲ υἱὸς, καὶ κληρ. (comp. Rom. viii. 17),—in which, by the way, the father is conceived as dividing the inheritance during his lifetime,—the idea is not based on the *Jewish* law of inheritance,¹ according to which the (legitimately born) sons alone,² if there were such,—the first-born among these taking, according to Deut. xxi. 17, a double portion,—were, as a rule, intestate heirs (see Keil, *Archäol.* II. § 142; Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 238 f.; Saalschütz, *M. R.* p. 820 f.). The apostle's idea is founded on the intestate succession of the *Roman law*, with which Paul as a Roman citizen was acquainted, as in fact it was well known in the provinces and applied there as regarded Roman citizens. Comp. also Fritzsche, Tholuck, and van Hengel, on Rom. viii. 17. According to the Roman law sons and daughters, whether born in marriage or adopted children (and Paul conceives Christians as belonging to the latter class), were intestate heirs. It is evident in itself, and from iii. 28, that υἱός, which Paul used here on account of its correlation with δοῦλος, does not, in the popular mode of expression, exclude the female sex. On the whole of this subject, see C. F. A. Fritzsche, *utrum Pauli argumentatio Rom. viii. 17 et Gal. iv. 7, Hebraeo an Romano jure aestimanda sit*, in *Fritzschor. Opusc.* p. 143 ff. To assume a mere allusion to *general human* laws of succession (Wieseler) is not sufficient; for Paul has very distinctly and clearly conceived and designated the υἱότης of the Christian as a relation of *adoption*, which presupposes for his conclusion as to the heirship a *special* legal reference, and not merely the general

¹ So Grotius, who says: "Jure Hebr. filii tantum haeredes, sed sub illo nomine indicantur omnes fideles cujusque sint sexus." The fact that Christians are the *adopted children* of God, is decidedly opposed to this.

² In Prov. xvii. 2 nothing is said of adoption.

and vague correlation of the ideas of childship and heirship. The clear precision of his thought vouches for this, and it ought not to be evaded by declaring such a legal question even *foolish* (Hofmann),—a dogmatical judgment which is all the more precipitate, as the specific Johannean idea of the divine *begetting* of the children of God (comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 717 ff.) can by no means be found in the Pauline *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας*¹ (see on Rom. viii. 15). Besides, *υἰοθεσία* is, and after all remains, nothing else than the quite definite legal idea of *adoption*, which *separates* the *υἱοὶ εἰσποιητοί* or *θετοί* (Pollux, iii. 21) from those begotten or *γνησιοί*.

Ver. 8. Ἀλλά] Nevertheless, how fearfully at variance is your present retrograde attitude with the fact of this divine deliverance from your previous lost condition! This topic is dealt with down to ver. 11. Observe that ἀλλά introduces the two corresponding relations τότε μέν and νῦν δέ *in conjunction*.² — τότε] then; reminds the readers of the past time, in which they were still δούλοι (ver. 7). — οὐκ εἰδότες Θεόν] Cause of the ἐδουλεύσατε which follows. In the *non-knowledge of God* (for οὐκ εἰδότες forms one idea) lies the fundamental essence of the *heathenism*, to which the apostle's readers had mostly belonged. Comp. 1 Thess. iv. 5; Acts xvii. 23, 30, *et al.* As to the relation of the thought to Rom. i. 20 f., see on that passage. — ἐδουλεύσατε] The aorist simply designates the state of bondage then existing as now at an end, without looking at its duration or development. See Kühner, II. p. 73 f. — τοῖς φύσει μὴ οὖσι θεοῖς] to the gods, who by nature however are not so! For, in the apostle's view, the realities which were worshipped by the heathen as gods, were not gods, but demons. See on 1 Cor. x. 20. In his view, therefore, their nature was not divine, but at the

¹ The adoption into the state of children takes place on God's part along with justification, and is on man's part certain to the believing self-consciousness, to which the πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας also attests it. Beyschlag (*Christol.* p. 222) wrongly holds that the communication of the Spirit is itself the υἰοθεσία. No, those who receive the Spirit are already believing, justified, and thereby υἱόθετοι, and obtain through the Spirit the testimony that they are υἱοί,—a testimony which agrees with that of their own consciousness, συμμαρτυρεῖ, Rom. viii. 16.

² But so, that the thought introduced by καὶ (ver. 9) is the main thought. Comp. Baeumlein, *Partikell.* p. 163.

same time not of *mere mundane matter* (Ewald) (comp. Wisd. xiii. 1 ff.); it was *demoniac*,—a point which must have been well known to the Galatians from his oral instruction. — The *negation denies subjectively*, from the apostle's view. Comp. 2 Chron. xiii. 9 : ἐγένετο εἰς ἱερέα τῷ μὴ ὄντι Θεῷ.

Ver. 9. Γνόντες Θεόν] *After ye have known God* through the preaching of the gospel. Olshausen's opinion, that εἰδότες denotes more the merely external knowledge *that* God is, while γνόντες signifies the inward essential cognition, is shown to be an arbitrary fancy by passages such as John vii. 37, viii. 55; 2 Cor. v. 16. — μᾶλλον δέ] *imo vero*, a corrective climax (Rom. viii. 34; Eph. v. 11; Jacobs, *ad Ach. Tat.* II. p. 955; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* iii. 13. 6; Grimm, on Wisd. viii. 19), in order to give more startling prominence to the following πῶς ἐπιστρέφετε κ.τ.λ., as indicating not a mere falling away from the knowledge of God, but rather a guilty opposition to Him. — γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ Θεοῦ] *after ye have been known by God*. This is the *saving* knowledge, of which on God's part men become the objects, when He interests Himself on their behalf to deliver them. Into the *experience* of having been thus graciously known by God the Galatians were brought by means of the divine work which had taken place in them, anticipating their own volition and endeavour—the work of their calling, enlightenment, and conversion;¹ so that they therefore, when they *knew* God, became in that very knowledge aware of *their being known* by God,—the one being implied in the other—through their divinely bestowed admission into the fellowship of Christ.² See on 1 Cor. viii. 3, xiii. 12; also Matt. vii. 23. Hofmann desires the condition of the *acceptance* of grace to be mentally supplied; but this is arbitrary in itself, and is also incorrect, because those,

¹ Hence in point of *fact* Theophylact (following Chrysostom) rightly explains: προσληφέντες ὑπὸ Θεοῦ. Because of *God's* knowing them *they* have known God; consequently not, "proprio Marte vel acumine sui ingenii vel industria, sed quia Deus misericordia sua eos praevenierit, quum nihil minus quam de ipso cogitarent," Calvin.

² Comp. Ignat. *ad Magnes.* interpol. 1 : δι' οὗ (through Christ) ἔγνωτι Θεόν, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐγνώσθητι. Similarly, in an opposite sense, *ad Smyrn.* 5 : οἱ τινες ἀγνοοῦντες ἀρνοῦνται (abnegant), μᾶλλον δὲ ἠρνήσαν (abnegati sunt) ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (by Christ).

who are the objects of God's gracious knowledge, are already known to Him by means of His *πρόγνωσις* as the *creditori* and are ordained by Him to salvation (see on Rom. viii. 29 f.). But the *literal* sense *cognoscere* is not to be altered either into *approbare, amare* (Grotius and others), or into *agnoscere suos* (Wetstein, Vater, Winer, Rückert, Usteri, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, and others); nor is it to be understood in the sense of Hophal: *brought to the knowledge* (Beza, Er. Schmidt, Cornelius a Lapide, Wolf, Nösselt, Koppe, Flatt, and others); nor can we, with Olshausen, turn it into the being penetrated with the love wrought by God, which *only follows* upon the being known by God, 1 Cor. viii. 3. Lastly, there has been introduced, in a way entirely un-Pauline, the idea of the self-recognition of the Divine Spirit in us (Matthies), or of the consciousness of the identity of the human and the divine knowing (Hilgenfeld). On the deliberate change from the active to the passive, *γνόντες, γνωσθέντες*, comp. Phil. iii. 12. Luther, moreover, appropriately remarks, "*non ideo cognoscuntur quia cognoscunt, sed contra quia cogniti sunt, ideo cognoscunt.*" — πῶς] "*interrogatio admirabunda*" (Bengel), as in ii. 12. — πάλιν] does not mean *backwards* (Flatt, Hofmann), as in Homer (see Duncan, *Lex.* ed. Rost, p. 886; Nägelsbach z. *Ilias*, p. 34, ed. 3),—a rendering opposed to the usage of the N. T. generally, and here in particular to the *πάλιν ἄνωθεν* which follows; it means *iterum*, and refers to the fact that the readers had previously been already in bondage to the *στοιχία*, namely, most of them as *heathen*. Now they turn indeed (*ἐπιστρέφετε*, *present tense*, as in i. 6) to the *Jewish* ordinances; but the *heathen and Jewish* elements (on the latter, see Heb. vii. 18 f.) are *both* included in the category of the *στοιχία τοῦ κόσμου* (see on ver. 3), so that Paul is *logically correct* in using the *πάλιν*; and the hypothesis of Nösselt (*Opusc.* I. p. 293 ff.; comp. Mynster in his *kl. theol. Schr.* p. 76; Credner, *Einl.*, and Olshausen), that the greater part of the readers had been previously proselytes of the gate, is entirely superfluous, and indeed at variance with the description of the pre-Christian condition of the Galatians given in ver. 8; for according to ver. 8, the great mass of them must have been purely *heathen* before their conversion,

because there is no mention of any intermediate condition between τότε and νῦν. According to Wieseler (comp. also Reithmayr), πάλιν is intended to point back to their *conversion to Christ*, so that the turning to the στοιχεῖα is designated as a second renewed *conversion* (ἐπιστρέφετε), namely, *in pejus*. This would yield an ironical contrast, but is rendered impossible by the words οἷς πάλιν ἄνωθεν δουλ. θέλετε. Wieseler is driven to adopt so artificial an explanation, because he understands the στοιχεῖα as referring to the *law* only; and this compels him afterwards to give an incorrect explanation of οἷς. — ἀσθενῇ κ. πτωχά] because they cannot *effect* and *bestow*, what God by the sending of His Son has effected and bestowed (ver. 5). Comp. Rom. viii. 3, x. 12; Heb. vii. 18. — πάλιν ἄνωθεν] for those reverting to Judaism desired to *begin again from the commencement* the slave-service of the στοιχεῖα, which they had abandoned; ἀρχαῖς προτέραις ἐπόμενοι, Pind. *Ol.* x. 94. Comp. *Wisd.* xix. 6. Not a pleonasm, as πάλιν ἐκ δευτέρου (Matt. xxvi. 42), πάλιν αὐτίς (Hom. *Il.* i. 59), or δεύτερον αὐτίς (Hom. *Il.* i. 513); but the repetition is represented as *a new commencement* of the matter, as ἐκ νέας αὐτίς ἀρχῆς (Plut. *solert. anim.* p. 959), and πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς (Barnab. *Ep.* 16). It is just the same in the instances in Wetstein. The οἷς is, however, the simple dative as in ver. 8 and usually with δουλεύειν; it is not equivalent to ἐν οἷς (Wieseler), with δουλ. used absolutely. — θέλετε] *ye desire*, ye have the wish and the longing for, this servitude! Comp. ver. 21.

Ver. 10. Facts which vouch the ἐπιστρέφετε πάλιν κ.τ.λ. just expressed. — The *interrogative* view, which Griesbach, Koppe, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Hilgenfeld, following Battier (*Bibl. Brem.* VI. p. 104), take, has been again abandoned by Usteri, Schott, and Wieseler; and Hofmann prefers the sense of sorrowful *exclamation*. But the continuance of the reproachful interrogative form (ver. 9) corresponds better to the increasing pitch of surprise and amazement, and makes ver. 11 come in with greater weight. — παρατηρεῖσθε] Do ye already so far realize your θέλετε? Ye take care, *sedulo vobis observatis*, namely, to neglect nothing which is prescribed in the law for certain days and seasons. Comp. Joseph. *Antt.*

iii. 5. 5: παρατηρεῖν τὰς ἐβδομάδας; also Dio Cass. liii. 10 (of the observance of a law). The idea *superstitiose* (Winer, Bretschneider, Olshausen, and others) is not implied in παρα, nor the *praeter fidem* which Bengel finds in it. — ἡμέρας] Sabbaths, fast and feast days. Comp. Rom. xiv. 5, 6. — μῆνας] is usually referred to the *new moons*. But these, the feast-days at the beginning of each month, come under the previous category of ἡμέρας. In keeping with the other points, παρατηρεῖσθαι μῆνας must be the *observance of certain months as pre-eminently sacred months*. Thus the *seventh month* (Tisri), as the proper sabbatical month, was specially sacred (see Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 469 f.; Keil, *Archäol.* I. p. 368 ff.); and the fourth, fifth, seventh, and tenth months were distinguished by special fasts. — καιρούς] מועדים, Lev. xxiii. 4. The holy *festal seasons*, such as those of the Passover, Pentecost, and the Feast of Tabernacles, are meant; “quibus hoc aut illud fas erat aut nefas,” Erasmus. — ἐνιαυτούς] applies to the *sabbatical years* (see, as to these, Ewald, p. 488 ff.; Keil, p. 371 ff.), which occurred *every seventh year*, but not to the *jubilee years*, which had, at least after the time of Solomon, fallen into abeyance (Ewald, p. 501). But that the Galatians were at that time in some way actually celebrating a sabbatical year (Wieseler), cannot be certainly inferred from ἐνιαυτ., which has in reality its due warrant as belonging to the consistency and completeness of the *theory*. On the whole passage, comp. Col. ii. 16, and Philo, *de septenar.* p. 286. — From our passage, moreover, we see how far, and within what limits, the Galatians had already been led astray.¹ They had not yet adopted *circumcision*, but were only in danger of being brought to it (v. 2, 3, 12, vi. 12, 13). Nothing at all is said in the epistle as to any *distinction of meats* (comp. Col. *l.c.*), except so far as it was implied in the observance of days, etc. Usteri (comp. Rückert) is of opinion that Paul did not mention circumcision and the distinction of meats, because he desired to represent the present religious attitude of his readers as analogous to their *heathen* condition. But, accord-

¹ De Wette very arbitrarily considers that the present tense denotes, not the *reality* then present, but only the necessary consequence of the πιστοτρ. and δευλ. εἰλετε, conceived as being already present.

ing to the comprehensive idea of the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*, even the mention of circumcision and the distinctions of meats would have been in no way inappropriate to the *πάλιν ἄνωθεν*. Olshausen quite arbitrarily asserts that the usages mentioned stand by *synecdoche* for all.

Ver. 11. *Φοβοῦμαι ὑμᾶς, μήπως κ.τ.λ.*] not *attraction* (Winer, Usteri, Olshausen, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Buttmann), because, if this had been the case, *ὑμεῖς* must have been the subject of *μήπως κ.τ.λ.* (Plat. *Legg.* x. p. 886 A: *φοβοῦμαί γε τοὺς μοχθηροὺς . . . μή πως ὑμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν.* *Phaedr.* p. 232 C, *φοβούμενοι τοὺς μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένους, μὴ χρήμασιν αὐτοὺς υπερβάλλονται.* Diod. Sic. iv. 40; Thuc. iv. 1. 1; Xen. *Anab.* iii. 5. 18, vii. 1. 2; Soph. *Trach.* 547): see the passages in Winer, p. 581 ff. [E. T. 781 f.]; Krüger, *gramm. Unters.* III. p. 162 ff.; Kühner, II. p. 611. On the contrary, *φοβοῦμαι ὑμᾶς* is to be taken by itself, and *μήπως κ.τ.λ.* as a more precise definition of it: “*I am afraid about you, lest perhaps I,*” etc. Comp. Plat. *Phaedr.* p. 239 D: *τοιούτου σώμα οἱ φίλοι . . . φοβούνται* (are apprehensive about it). Soph. *O. R.* 767: *δέδοικ’ ἐμαυτὸν . . . , μὴ πολλ’ ἄγαν εἰρημέν’ ᾗ μοι.* It is not without cause that Paul has added *ὑμᾶς*, but in the consciousness that his apprehension had reference not to *his own interests* (his possibly fruitless labour, taken by itself), but to *his readers*; *they themselves* were the object of his anxiety, *their deliverance, their salvation*. The mode of expression is analogous also in a *hostile* sense, e.g. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 18: *ἐφοβούντο τὸν Θηραμένην, μὴ συρρυνείησαν πρὸς αὐτὸν οἱ πολῖται.* Thuc. iv. 8. 5: *τὴν δὲ νῆσον ταύτην φοβούμενοι, μὴ ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸν πόλεμον σφίσι ποιῶνται.* — *εἰκῇ*] *without saving result* (iv. 11; 1 Cor. xv. 2), because ye are in the course of falling away from the life of Christian faith, which through my labours was instituted among you. — *κεκοπίακα*] *Perfect indicative*; for the thought was before the apostle’s mind, that this case had actually occurred. Hermann, *ad Eur. Med.* 310, Elmsl.; Winer, p. 469 [E. T. 631]; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 84 E. — *εἰς ὑμᾶς*] *for you*; *εἰς* denotes the *reference* of the toilsome labour which he had undergone to the Galatians. Comp. Rom. xvi. 6. — Luther (1524), moreover, aptly remarks on ver. 11: “*Lacrymas Pauli haec verba spirant.*”

Ver. 12.¹ After this expression of anxiety, now follows the exhortation to return, and with what cordiality of affection ! “Subito . . . ἡθῆ καὶ πάθη, argumenta conciliantia et moventia admovet,” Bengel. — γίνεσθε ὡς ἐγὼ, ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς ὑμεῖς] is explained in two ways,—*either* as a summons to give up Judaistic habits, *or* as a summons to love. The *correct* interpretation is : “*Become as I*, become free from Judaism as I am, *for I also have become as you* ; for I also, when I abandoned Judaism, thereby became as a Gentile (ii. 14 ; Phil. iii. 7 f.), and placed myself on the same footing with you who were then Gentiles, by non-subjection to the Mosaic law. Now render to me the *reciprocum*, to which love has a claim.” So Koppe, Winer, Usteri, Neander, Fritzsche, de Wette, Hilgenfeld. This interpretation is not only in the highest degree suitable to the thoughtful delicacy of the apostle—who might justly (in opposition to Wieseler’s objection) represent his former secession from Judaism as a service rendered to his readers (as Gentiles), because he had in fact seceded to be *a converter of the Gentiles*—but is the only explanation in harmony with the words and the context. Ἐγενόμην must be supplied in the second clause, and to take it from γίνεσθε is just as allowable as in 1 Cor. xi. 1 (in opposition to Hofmann). Comp. Phil. ii. 5 ; and see generally, Krüger, § lxii. 4. 1 ; Winer, p. 541 f. [E. T. 728] ; Xen. *Anab.* vii. 7. 13 : προερῶν ἅπερ αὐτῶ. As to καὶ ἐγὼ, comp. on 1 Cor. xi. 1. Following Chrysostom, Theodoret and Theophylact, Erasmus (in his *Paraphrase*), Vatablus, Semler, and others, also Matthies, interpret : “*Become as I*, abandon Judaism ; *for I also was once* a zealous adherent of it *like you*, but have undergone a change.” But as ἐγενόμην is the only supplement which suggests itself in harmony with the context, Paul must have *written* the ἡμην, which on this view requires to be supplied (as Justin. *ad Graec.* ii. p. 40. *ed. Col.* γίνεσθε ὡς ἐγὼ, ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ ἡμην ὡς ὑμεῖς), and this ἡμην would in that case have conveyed the main element of the motive (*fui*, nec amplius sum). But as Paul has written, the point of the passage lies in his desire that his readers should become like unto him, as he also had become like to the readers. Schott (comp. Rosenmüller and Flatt) correctly supplies ἐγενό-

¹ As to vv. 12-20, see C. F. A. Fritzsche, in *Fritschior. Opusc.* p. 231 ff.

μην, but he again supplies ἐγενέσθε with ὑμεῖς: "siquidem ego quoque factus sum, quales vos facti estis, cum Jesu Christo nomen daretis, abjeci studia pristina Judaismi pariter atque vos olim abjecistis." Incorrectly, because this would presuppose that Paul was speaking to *Jewish Christians*, and because the motive, thus understood, could only have been of real avail as a motive in the event of Paul having been converted *later* than the Galatians. Jerome, Erasmus (in his *Annotationes*), Cornelius a Lapide, Estius, Michaelis, Rückert, interpret: "Become as I, lay aside Judaism, *for I also have lovingly accommodated myself to you*;" comp. Wieseler: "Because I also, *when I brought the gospel to you, from a loving regard toward you Gentiles put aside Jewish habits*" (ii. 14; 1 Cor. ix. 21). So also in substance Olshausen, Ellicott, Reithmayr, and others; similarly also Hofmann.¹ Against this view it may be urged, that, in Paul's working as an apostle to the Gentiles, his non-Judaistic attitude was *a matter of principle*, and not *a matter of considerate accommodation*, and that long before he preached to the Galatians. Besides, the result would be a dissimilar relation between the two members; for Paul cannot require the putting away of Jewish habits as a matter of affectionate consideration, but only as a Christian necessity. The reciprocity of what is to be done under *this* aspect is the point of the demand. According to Ewald, Paul says, "As Christians, follow ye entirely my example, because I too am a *simple Christian* and, strictly speaking, *not more than you*." But thus

¹ According to Hofmann, Paul says of himself *that he places himself on an equality with his Gentile readers* (inasmuch as, where his vocation requires it, he lives among the Gentiles as if he were not a Jew), and, on the other hand, requires of them *that they shall place themselves on an equality with him* (and therefore shall not live after the Jewish manner, but shall share his freedom from the law, after he has accommodated himself to their position aloof from the law). Hofmann insists, namely, on the supplying of γίνεσθαι (present), which, as well as γίνεσθε, he understands in the sense of *behaving and conducting themselves*. This sense, however, is not suitable, since the readers are really to *become different*, and not merely to *accommodate themselves* to another line of conduct; the γίνεσθαι would not therefore retain the same sense in the two halves of the verse. See also, in opposition to this view, Möller on de Wette. The use of γίνεσθαι in the sense of *se praeferre* is, however, in itself linguistically admissible (see Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 7. 4), but not in conformity with the proofs adduced by Hofmann; as to which Dissen, *ad Dem. d. Cor.* p. 239 f., takes the correct view.

the very idea that was most essential (a simple Christian) would not be expressed. Others, including Luther, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Calovius, Wolf, Bengel, Zachariae, and Morus, find the sense: "*Love me, as I love you.*" But how could the reader discover this in the words, since Paul has not yet said a word as to any deficiency of love to him? Beza and Grotius wrongly appeal to the mode of designating one who is beloved as an *alter ego*, an idea which ὡς ἐγὼ and ὡς ὑμεῖς do not at all convey. — ἀδελφοί, δέομαι ὑμῶν] The language of softened and deeply moved love. The words are to be referred not to the *sequel* (Luther, Zeger, Koppe, and others), in which there is nothing besought, but to the previous summons, with which he *beseeches* them to comply. — οὐδέν με ἠδικήσατε] suggests a motive for granting his entreaty γίνεσθε ὡς ἐγὼ, by recalling their relation to him, as it had stood at the time when he first preached the gospel to them: "How should ye not grant me this entreaty, since ye have done no injury to me (and certainly therefore in this point just asked for, will not vex me by non-compliance); but ye know," etc. According to Chrysostom, Theophylact, Augustine, Pelagius, Luther, Calvin, Estius, Windischmann, and others, including Winer, the words are intended to give an assurance that the previous severe language had not flowed from displeasure and irritation against his readers. But Paul has in fact already changed, immediately before, to the tone of love; hence such an assurance here would come in too late and inappropriately. Nor would the οὐδέν με ἠδικήσατε, which on account of the connection with ver. 13 evidently applies to the period of his first visit, necessarily exclude a subsequent offence; so that the "*igitur non habui, quod vobis irascerer*" (Winer), which has been discovered in these words, is not necessarily implied in them. The *temporal* reference of the οὐδέν με ἠδικήσατε, which is definitely and necessarily given by ver. 13, excludes also the view of Beza, Bengel, Rückert, Ewald, and others, that Paul represents the vexation occasioned to him by the relapse of his readers as having not occurred ("all was forgotten and forgiven," Ewald), in order to encourage them by this *meiosis* to a compliance with the γίνεσθε ὡς ἐγὼ. Lastly, those interpretations are incorrect, which, in spite of the enclitic με, lay an antithetic

emphasis on the latter; as that of Grotius ("*me privatim*"), that of Rettig in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, p. 109 (not me, *but God and Christ*), and that of Schott (*nihil mihi nocuistis, vobis tantum*). Nor is Hofmann's view more correct: that Paul, taking occasion by a passage in the (alleged) epistle of his readers, desired only to say to them that the οὐδέν με ἡδικήσ. *was not enough*; instead of having *merely* experienced *nothing unbecoming* from them, he could not but expect more at their hands, for which reason they ought to recall what their attitude to him had been at his first visit to them. In this view what is supposed to form the train of thought is a purely gratuitous importation, with the fiction of a letter written by the Galatians superadded; and the assumed strong contrast to the sequel must have been marked by a μέν after οὐδέν (as to Plat. *Rep.* p. 398 A, Hartung, *Partik.* I. p. 163, forms a right judgment), or by ἀλλά instead of δέ, in order to be intelligible. — On ἀδικεῖν with accusative of the person and of the thing, comp. Acts xxv. 10; Philem. 18; Wolf, *Lept.* p. 343; Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 6. 7.

Vv. 13, 14. Contrast to the preceding οὐδέν με ἡδικ. Comp. Chrysostom: "Ye have done nothing to injure me; but ye doubtless know, that I on account of weakness of the flesh preached the gospel to you the former time, and that ye," etc. — δι' ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός] The only correct explanation, because the only one agreeable to linguistic usage, is that adopted by Platt, Fritzsche, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, and others, also by Winer, *Gramm.* p. 373 [E. T. 499], *on account of* weakness of the flesh:¹ so that it is clear, that on Paul's first journey through Galatia (Acts xvi. 6) he was compelled by

¹ Bengel also translates correctly: "*propter infirmitatem*," but erroneously explains that the weakness was not indeed "*causa praedicationis ipsius*," but "*adjumentum, cur P. efficacius praedicaret, cum Galatae facilius rejicere posse viderentur*." Similarly, but still more incorrectly, Schott, who detects an "*acumen singulare*" in Paul's saying: "*per ipsam aegritudinem carnis doctrinam divinam vobis tradidi*;" for the fact that Paul, although sick, had preached very zealously, had been of great influence in making his preaching more successful. In this interpretation everything is mistaken: for διὰ must have been used with the *genitive*; the "*ipsam*" and the thought of *successful* preaching are quite gratuitously imported; and the whole of the alleged "*acumen*" would be completely out of place *here*, where Paul wishes to remind his readers of their *love* then shown to him, and *not* of the efficacy of his preaching.

reason of bodily weakness to make a stay there, which properly did not form a part of his plan; and that during this sojourn, forced on him by necessity, he preached the gospel to the Galatians. *How* he suffered, and *from what cause*, whether from natural sickness (comp. 2 Cor. xii. 7),¹ or from ill-treatment which he had previously endured on account of the gospel (comp. Gal. vi. 17), we do not know. The mention of an *involuntary* or rather *quite unpremeditated* working among the Galatians is not *opposed* to the apostle's aim (as Rückert objects), but *favourable* to it; because the love which received him so heartily and joyfully must have been all the greater, the less it depended on the duty of befitting gratitude for a benefit *previously* destined for the recipients, and for exertions made expressly on their account. Many others have understood *διά* as denoting the apostle's *condition*: "*amidst bodily weakness*," which is then referred by some, and indeed most expositors, following Chrysostom and Luther, to *persecutions and sufferings*, by others to his *insignificant appearance* (Calvin), by others to *sickness* (Rückert, Matthies, Olshausen, Ewald; comp. also in Jerome), and by others even to *embarrassment and perplexity* on account of the strange circumstances (Baumgarten-Crusius). But in this case *διά* must have been used with the *genitive* (see Matthiae, p. 1353; Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* I. p. 138); for expressions such as *διὰ δῶμα*, *διὰ νύκτα*, *διὰ στόμα*, *δι' αἰθέρα*, κ.τ.λ., in which *διά* denotes *stretching through*, are *merely poetical* (see Schaefer, *ad Mosch.* 4. 91; Bernhardt, p. 236 f.; Kühner, II. p. 282). We should be obliged to think of the *occasioning* state (as in *διὰ τοῦτο*, *διὰ πολλά*, κ.τ.λ.), which would just bring us back to our interpretation. Hence we must reject also the explanation of Grotius: "*per varios casus, per mille pericula rerum perrexi, ut vos instituerem.*" Others still have gone so far as to refer *δι' ἁσθ. τῆς σαρκός* to weakness of the *Galatians*, to which Paul *accommodated himself*. So Jerome, Estius, Hug, and Rettig *l.c.* p. 108 ff.: "*I have preached to you on account of the weakness of your flesh*," which is supposed to mean: "I have in my preach-

¹ In respect to 2 Cor. *l.c.*, Holsten, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*, 1861, p. 250 f., conceives it to refer to epileptical disturbances of the circulatory and nervous system, such as occur among *visionaries*. Comp. his *Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 85.

ing had respect to the infirmity of your flesh." Utterly mistaken: because Paul must necessarily have added a modal definition to εὐγγ. (even if it had only been an οὕτως), or must have written κατ' ἄσθ. instead of δι' ἄσθ.; moreover, ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου in ver. 14 shows that Paul meant the ἀσθένεια τῆς σαρκός to apply to himself. — τὸ πρότερον] may mean either: *earlier*, at an earlier time, so that it would be said from the standpoint of the present (Thuc. i. 12. 2: τὴν νῦν Βοιωτίαν, πρότερον δὲ Καδμηΐδα γῆν καλουμένην, Isocr. *de pace*, § 121 and Bremi *in loc.*), which in relation to the past is the later time (John vi. 62, vii. 51, ix. 8; 2 Cor. i. 15; 1 Tim. i. 13; 1 Pet. i. 14; Heb. x. 32; LXX. Deut. ii. 12; 1 Chron. ix. 2; 1 Macc. xi. 27); or *the former time*, so that the same fact (the preaching) took place twice (Heb. iv. 6, vii. 27). It is interpreted in the former sense by Usteri and Fritzsche, and in the latter by Koppe, Winer, Rückert, Matthies, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Wieseler, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Hofmann, and others.¹ The latter is the correct view, so that τὸ πρότερον presupposes a *second* sojourn of the apostle among the Galatians. For if he had preached among them only once, τὸ πρότερον would have been quite an idle, superfluous addition. But Paul adds it just in order to denote quite distinctly his *first* visit, during which he founded the churches (Acts xvi. 6): at his *second* visit (Acts xviii. 23), the happy experiences which he had enjoyed τὸ πρότερον were not repeated in such full measure; the churches were already tainted by Judaism. Comp. *Intro.* § 2, 3. Fritzsche, indeed, maintains that vv. 18, 19 imply that Paul before the composition of the epistle had only *once* visited the Galatians; but see on ver. 19.

Ver. 14. Still dependent on ὅτι, as is logically required by the contrast to οὐδέν με ἥδικ., which is introduced by οἶδατε δὲ, ὅτι. — τὸν πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου κ.τ.λ.] As to the reading ὑμῶν, see the critical notes. The sense is: *that ye were put to the proof as respected my bodily weakness* (namely, as

¹ The older expositors, translating it *jam pridem* (Vulgate), or *prius* (Erasmus, Beza, Calvin), or *antea* (Castalio), do not for the most part attempt any more precise explanation. Luther: "*for the first time.*" Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact do not give any explanation of τὸ πρότ.

to your receiving and accepting my announcements, demands, etc., notwithstanding this my suffering and impotent appearance; see the antithesis, ἀλλ' ὥς κ.τ.λ.); *this proof ye have not rejected with disdain and aversion, but on the contrary have submitted yourselves to it so excellently, that ye received me as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus.* The καί is not *and yet* (Koppe, Winer, Matthies), but the simple *and*, continuing the address (οἴδατε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.). — ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου] is the more precise definition of τὸν πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν, specifying *wherein* the readers had to undergo a trial,—namely, in the fact of Paul's having then preached to them in such *bodily weakness*. Comp. Plat. *Phil.* p. 21 A: ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα, *upon thee we would make the trial*. Hom. *Il.* xix. 384, πειρήθη . . . ἐν ἔντεσι. Comp. also βασανίζεσθαι ἐν, Plat. *Pol.* vi. p. 503 A. Hence ἐν τῇ σαρκί did not require the connecting article, as it is in reality blended with τὸν πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν so as to form one idea. See on iii. 26. And the *definition of the sense* of ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου is derived from δι' ὑσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός in ver. 13. Fritzsche, *l.c.* p. 245, objects to the sense which is given by the reading ὑμῶν: 1. *sententiam ab h. l. abhorrere*. But how aptly does the *negative* assertion, that the Galatians, when they were put to the trial by the apostle's sickness, did not despise and reject this trial, correspond with the positive idea, that, on the contrary, they have received him as an angel of God! And how suitable are the two ideas together to the previous οὐδέν με ἡδικήσατε! 2. *Sententiam verbis parum aptis conceptam esse; expectaras καλῶς ὑπεμείνατε*. But this καλῶς ὑπεμείνατε is in fact most exhaustively represented by the negative and positive testimony *taken together*; the negative testimony expresses the *acceptance*, and the positive the *standing*, of the πειρασμός. 3. *The sense does not suit the following ἀλλ' . . . ἐδέξασθέ με*. But even with the adoption of the reading ὑμῶν the rejection of the apostle is in point of *fact* negatived; hence τὸν πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν . . . ἐξεπτύσατε cannot be inappropriate to the ἐδέξασθέ με which follows. Lachmann (comp. Buttman in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 379) makes καὶ τὸν πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν ἐν τ. σ. μ. dependent on οἴδατε (placing a colon after ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου), whereby the flow of the discourse is quite unnecessarily broken. — ἐξεπτύσατε] expresses the sense

of ἐξουθ. figuratively and by way of climax, adding the idea of detestation. Comp. Rev. iii. 16, and the Latin *despuere*, *respuere*. So forcible an expression of the negative serves to give the greater prominence to the positive counterpart which follows. In the other Greek writers, besides the simple πτύειν (Soph. *Ant.* 649. 1217), there occur only καταπτύειν τινός, ἀποπτύειν τινά (4 Macc. iii. 18; Eur. *Troad.* 668, *Hec.* 1265; Hes. ἔργ. 724), and διαπτύειν τινά (in Philo also παραπτύειν) in this *metaphorical* sense (see Kypke, II. p. 280; Ruhnck. *Ep. crit.* p. 149; Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 17); but ἐκπτύειν is always used in the *proper* sense (Hom. *Od.* v. 322; Aristoph. *Vesp.* 792; Anthol. Theodorid. 2; Apoll. Rhod. 478), as also ἐμπτύειν τινί (Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 17). Even in the passage quoted by Kypke, Plut. *de fort. vel virt. Alex.* I. p. 328, it is used in the *proper* sense, because ὥσπερ χαλινόν stands beside it. We are bound to acknowledge this deviation from the Greek usage, and it must be considered as caused by ἐξουθ., as in fact Paul is fond of repeating, not without emphasis, compounds presenting the same preposition (ii. 4, 13; Rom. ii. 18, xi. 7, *et al.*). — ὡς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν] a climax added *asyndetically* in the excitement of feeling, and presenting to a still greater extent than ὡς ἄγγελ. Θεοῦ (Heb. i. 4; Phil. ii. 10; Col. i. 16) the high reverence and love with which he had been received by them, and that as a *divine messenger*. Comp. Matt. x. 40; John xiii. 20. Observe also, that even among the Galatians Paul doubtless preached in the first instance to the *Jews* (whose loving behaviour towards the apostle was then shared in by the Gentiles also); hence the comparison with an *angel* and with *Christ* in our passage is in keeping with the apostle's historical recollection, and does not render it at all necessary to assume an ὕστερον πρότερον in the representation, which would thus anticipate the already Christian view.

Note.—According to the *Recepta τ. περ. μου τὸν ἐν τ. σ. μ.*, or, as the first *μου* has special evidence against it, according to the reading τὸν περ. τὸν ἐν τ. σ. μ., the explanation must be: “*My bodily temptation ye have not despised or disdainfully rejected*,” that is, “Ye have not on account of my sickness, by which I have been tried of God, rejected me, as the bodily impotence

in which it exhibited me to you might have induced you to do." Taken by itself, this sense, and the mode of expressing it, would be suitable enough (in opposition to Wieseler), even without the hypothesis, based on ἐξέπτ., of some *nauseous* sickness (in opposition to Fritzsche).

Ver. 15. *Of what nature, then, was your self-congratulation?* A sorrowful question! for the earnestness with which the Galatians had then congratulated themselves on the apostle's account, contrasting so sadly with their present circumstances, compelled him to infer that that congratulation was nothing but an effervescent, fleeting, and fickle excitement. Hence the reading *ποῦ οὖν* (see the critical notes) is a gloss in substance correct; comp. Rom. iii. 27. Others explain it: *On what was your self-congratulation grounded? Why did you pronounce yourselves so happy?* So Bengel, Koppe, Winer, Matthias, and Schott.¹ In this case *qualis* would have to be taken in the peculiar sense: *how caused*, which, however, would require to be distinctly suggested by the context. Others still, as Erasmus, Luther, Beza, Piscator, Calovius, Wolf, and including Baumgarten-Crusius, Hilgenfeld, Reiche, Wieseler, interpret: "*How great* (comp. Eph. i. 14) therefore was your congratulation! how very happy you pronounced yourselves!" But then the ὥστε in ver. 16 would be deprived of its logical reference, which, according to our interpretation, is contained in τίς οὖν ὁ μακαρ. ὕμ. And the words would, in fact, contain merely a superfluous and feeble exclamation. — The μακαρισμός (comp. Rom. iv. 6, 9), with which ὕμῶν stands as the genitive of the *subject* (comp. Plat. *Rep.* p. 590 D), and not as the genitive of the *object* (Matthias),—for the object is obvious of itself,—refers to the circumstance that they had congratulated *themselves*, not that they had been congratulated by *Paul and others* (Jerome, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius), or even that *they* (the Galatians) had congratulated *the apostle* (Estius, Locke, Michaelis). See the sequel. The word, synonymous with εὐδαιμονισμός, is never equivalent to μακαριότης (Erasmus, Luther, Piscator, Homberg, Calovius, comp. Olsh.).

¹ Schott, in opposition to the context, and all the more strangely seeing that he does not even read ἡ, but merely supplies it, lays stress upon this ἡ: "*illo tempore, nunc non item;*" comp. Oecumenius.

— μαρτυρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν κ.τ.λ.] justification of the expression just used, ὁ μακαρισμὸς ὑμῶν. — τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς κ.τ.λ.] A description of the overwhelming love, which was ready for any sacrifice. Such proverbial modes of expression, based upon the high value and indispensableness of the eyes (Prov. vii. 2; Ps. xvii. 8; Zech. ii. 8; Matt. xviii. 9; and comp. Vulpius and Doering, *ad Catull.* i. 3. 5), are current in all languages. Nevertheless, Lomler (in the *Annal. d. gesammt. theol. Lit.* 1831, p. 276), Rückert, and Schott have explained the passage quite *literally*: that Paul had some *malady of the eyes*, and here states that, if it had been possible, the Galatians would have given him their own sound eyes. But considering the currency of the proverbial sense, how arbitrarily is this view hazarded, seeing that nowhere else do we find a trace of any *malady* of the eyes in the apostle!¹ Rückert and Schott, indeed, found specially on εἰ δυνατόν, and maintain that, to express the meaning of the ordinary view, Paul must have written: “if it had been *necessary*.” But *in any case* the idea was a *purely imaginary* one, and as a matter of fact *practically impossible* (ἀδύνατον); if Paul, therefore, had said: “if it had been *necessary*,” he would at any rate have expressed himself *unsuitably*. Besides, εἰ δυνατόν expresses the self-sacrificing love *in a yet far stronger degree*. And, if Paul had not spoken *proverbially*, the whole assurance would have been so *hyperbolic*, that he certainly could not have stood sponsor for it with the earnest μαρτυρῶ ὑμῖν. — ἐξορύξ.] the standing word for the extirpation of the eyes. See Judg. xvi. 21; 1 Sam. xi. 2; Herod. viii. 116; Joseph. *Antt.* vi. 5. 1; Wetstein, *in loc.* — ἐδώκατέ μοι] namely, *as property*, as a love-pledge of the most joyful self-sacrificing devotedness, not *for use* (Hofmann, following older expositors),—a view which, if we do not

¹ Lomler and Schott trace back the alleged disease of the eyes to the blindness at Damascus, and identify it with the σκόλοψ (2 Cor. xii. 7). The latter idea is just as mistaken as the former. For the σκόλοψ was, in the apostle's view, an operation of *Satan*, whereas the blindness at Damascus arose from the effulgence of the celestial *Christ*. And this blindness, as it had arisen supernaturally, was also supernaturally removed (Acts ix. 17, 18). That a chronic malady of the eyes should have been left behind, would be entirely opposed to the analogy of the N. T. miracles of healing, of which a *complete cure* was always the characteristic.

explain it of a disease of the eyes in the apostle's case, leads to a monstrous idea. *Without* ἄν (see the critical notes) the matter is expressed as more indubitable, the condition contained in the protasis being rhetorically disregarded. See Hermann, *ad Soph. El.* 902; *de part. ἄν*, p. 70 ff.; Bremi, *ad Lys. Exc.* IV. p. 439 f.; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 198 C; Buttmann in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1858, p. 490. But Ellendt (*Lex. Soph.* I. p. 125) well remarks, "Sed cavendum, ne in discrimine utriusque generis, quod pertenuē est, constituendo argutemur."

Ver. 16. [Ὡστε] *Accordingly*; the actual state of things which, to judge from the cooling down—which that painful question (τίς οὖν ὁ μακαρισμὸς ὑμῶν;) bewails—in the self-sacrificing love depicted in vv. 14, 15, must have superseded this love, and must now subsist.¹ The words contain a profoundly melancholy exclamation: "Accordingly, that is my position; I am become your enemy!" etc. So great a change has the relation, previously so rich and happy in confidence and love, experienced *by the fact that it is my business to speak the truth to you* (mark the *present* participle ἀληθεύων). This conduct which I pursue towards you, instead of confirming your inclination towards me and confidence in me, has taken them away; I have become your *enemy*! To place (with Matthias) a note of interrogation after γέγονα, and then to take ἀληθ. ὑμῖν as an exclamation (an enemy, *who tells you the truth!*), breaks up the passage without adequate ground. Utterly groundless, illogical, and unprecedented (for the ὥστε of an inferential sentence always follows the sentence which governs it) is the inversion forced upon the apostle by Hofmann, who makes out that ὥστε κ.τ.λ. is dependent on ζηλοῦσιν ὑμᾶς: "*so that I am now your enemy, if I tell you truth, they court you*;" it is the result of these courtings, that, when the apostle agreeably to the truth tells his converts (as in i. 8 f.) what is to be thought about the teaching of his opponents (?), he thereby

¹ ὥστε cannot specify a reason, as Wieseler thinks, who, anticipating ver. 17, explains: "For no other reason than because ye pronounced yourselves so happy on my account, am I (according to the representation of the false teachers) become your enemy," etc. Wieseler therefore takes ὥστε, as if it had been διὰ τοῦτο.

comes to stand as their enemy. In this interpretation the special reference of ἀληθεύων ὑμῖν is purely gratuitous. To explain the ὥστε *consecutivum* with the *indicative* the simple rule is quite sufficient, that it is used *de re facta*; and the emphasis of the relation which it introduces lies in its betokening the *quality* of the preceding, to which the *consecutivum* refers. Comp. Ellendt, *Lcx. Soph.* II. p. 1012: "Rem *qualis* sit, addita *rei consequentis significatione* definit." Hofmann increases the arbitrary character of his artificial exposition by subsequently, in ver. 17, separating οὐ καλῶς from ζηλοῦσιν ὑμᾶς, and looking upon these words as an opinion placed alongside of ὥστε ἐχθρ. ὑμ. γέγ., respecting this mode of courting. His interpretation thus presents at once a violent combination and a violent separation. — ἐχθρὸς ὑμῶν] The context permits either the *passive* sense: *hated by you* (de Wette, Windischmann, and older expositors), or the *active*: *your enemy* (Vulgate, Beza, Grotius, and many others; also Rückert, Matthies, Schott, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Hofmann); the latter, however, so taken that ἐχθρ. ὑμῶν γέγονα is said in accordance with the (altered) *opinion of the readers*. This active interpretation is to be preferred, because the usage among Greek authors (and throughout in the N. T. also) in respect to the substantive ἐχθρός *with the genitive* is decisive in its favour (Dem. 439. 19. 1121. 12; Xen. *Anab.* iii. 2. 5, *de venat.* 13. 12; Soph. *Aj.* 554). From the time of Homer, ἐχθρός means *hated* only with the *dative* (Xen. *Cyrop.* v. 4. 50; Dem. 241. 12. 245. 16; Lucian, *Sacrif.* 1; Herodian. iii. 10. 6), which either stands beside it or is to be mentally supplied (Rom. v. 10, xi. 28; Col. i. 21). — γέγονα] To *what time* does this change (*having become*), which by the *perfect* is marked as *continuing*, refer? It did not occur in consequence of the *present epistle* (Jerome, Luther, Koppe, Flatt, and others), for the Galatians had not as yet read it; nor *at the first visit*, for he had then experienced nothing but abundant love. It must therefore have taken place *at the second visit* (Acts xviii. 23), when Paul found the Galatian churches already inclined to Judaism, and in conformity with the truth could no longer praise them (for only ἐπαινέτης τοῦ δικαίου ἀληθεύει, Plat. *Pol.* ix. p. 589 C), but was compelled

to blame their aberrations. — ἀληθεύων ὑμῖν] For "*veritas odium parit*" (Terent. *Andr.* i. 1. 40), and ὀργίζονται ἅπαντες τοῖς μετὰ παρρησίας τ' ἀληθῆ λέγουσι (Lucian, *Abdic.* 7). As to ἀληθεύειν, to *speake the truth*, see on Eph. iv. 15.

Ver. 17. The self-seeking conduct of the Judaizing teachers (i. 7), so entirely opposed to the ἀληθεύων ὑμῖν. The fact that *they are not named* is quite in keeping with the emotion and irritation of the moment; "nam solemus suppresso nomine de iis loqui, quos nominare piget ac taedet," Calvin. — ζηλοῦσιν ὑμᾶς] that is, they exert themselves urgently to win you over to their side; they pay their court to you zealously. So, correctly, Erasmus, Castalio, Er. Schmid, Michaelis, and others, including Flatt, Winer, Usteri, Schott, Fritzsche, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Ewald, Wieseler, and Hofmann. For the contrast to the behaviour of the apostle harmonizes well with this sense; which is also accordant with linguistic usage, since ζηλόω with the accusative means *to be zealous about a person or thing*, and obtains in each case the more precise definition of its import from the context; Dem. 1402. 20. 500. 2; Prov. xxiv. 1; Wisd. i. 12; 1 Cor. xii. 31; and see Wetstein. Next to this interpretation comes that of Calvin, Beza, and others, including Rückert (comp. Vulgate: *acmulantur*): *they are jealous of you* (2 Cor. xi. 2; Ecclus. ix. 1). Taking it so, it would not be necessary to conceive of Paul and his opponents under the figure of wooers of the bride (the bridegroom being Christ; see on 2 Cor. xi. 2), of which nothing is suggested by the context; but it may be urged against this explanation, that ἵνα αὐτοὺς ζηλοῦτε is not appropriate in the same sense. This remark also applies to the interpretation of Koppe and Reithmayr, following Ambrose, Jerome, and Theodoret: "*they envy you* (Acts vii. 9), are full of an envious jealousy of your freedom;" and to that of Chrysostom and Theophylact: *they vie with you* (comp. Borger); ζῆλος μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὅταν τις ἀρετὴν μιμηταί τινος, ζῆλος δὲ οὐ καλὸς, ὅταν τις σπεύδῃ ἐκβαλεῖν τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν κατορθοῦντα (Theophylact). The *factitive* explanation: *they make you to be zealous* (Matthias), is opposed to linguistic usage, which only sanctions παραζηλόω, and not the simple verb, in this sense. — οὐ καλῶς] *not in a morally fair, honourable*

way, as would have been the case, if it had been done for your real good. — ἐκκλείσαι] *To exclude*;¹ they desire to *debar you*; in this lies the *wickedness* of their ζῆλος. The question which arises here, and cannot be set aside (as Hofmann thinks): *Exclude from what?* is answered by the emphatic αὐτοῦς which follows, namely, *from other teachers*, who do not belong to their clique.² These "other teachers" are naturally those of anti-Judaizing views, and consequently Paul himself and his followers; but the hypothesis that Paul *only* is referred to ("a me meique communione," Winer; so also Luther, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, Kypke, Michaelis, Rückert, Olshausen, Reiche, and others) is the less feasible, as the very idea of ἐκκλείσαι in itself most naturally points to a plurality, to an association. Since the αὐτοῦς which follows applies to the false teachers as *teachers*, we must not conceive the *exclusion* (with Borger and Flatt) as *from the whole body of Christians*, nor (with Schott) as *from all Christians thinking differently*; comp. Hilgenfeld: "*from the Pauline church-union.*" It is arbitrarily taken by Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and Theophylact, as *exclusion from the state of true knowledge*; by Erasmus and Cornelius a Lapide, from *Christian freedom*; by Luther (1519), *a Christo et fiducia ejus*; by Matthies, from *the kingdom of truth* (comp. Ewald: from *genuine Christianity*); by Wieseler and Reithmayr, from *the kingdom of heaven*; by Matthias, from *salvation by faith*. All interpretations of this nature would have needed some more precise definition. Koppe falls into a peculiar error: "*a consuetudine et familiaritate sua arcere vos volunt*" (ii. 12). — ἵνα αὐτοὺς ζηλοῦτε] As ἵνα is used here with the present

¹ Syr. translates *includere*, and consequently read ἐγκαλιῖσαι. This would mean: *they desire to include you* in their circle, so that ye should not get free from them and come to associate with other teachers. Thus, in point of fact, the same sense would result as in the case of ἐκκλείσαι, only regarded from a different point of view. Fritzsche's reference of ἐγκλ. to the *legis Mos. carcerem* is not suggested by the context. The reading is altogether so weakly attested, that it can only be looked upon as an ancient error of transcription.

² The wish expressed by Erasmus in his *Annot.*: "*Utinam hodie nulli sint apud Christianos in quos competat hæc Pauli querimonia!*" is still but too applicable to the present day.

indicative, it cannot mean *in order that*;¹ but must be the particle of *place*, *ubi* (Valckenaer, *ad Herod.* ix. 27: ἵνα δοκέει κ.τ.λ.). This *ubi* may, however, mean either: *in which position of things* ye are zealous *for them* (my former explanation), as in 1 Cor. iv. 6 (see on that passage, and Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 839); or, in its *purely local* sense: "they wish to debar you *there*, *where* you are zealous *for them*,"—namely, in the *Judaistic circle*, in which it is *they themselves* who are zealously courted by you, whose favour you have to seek, etc. The latter view, as the simplest, is to be preferred. On the usual explanation of ἵνα as a *particle of design*, recourse is had to the assumption of an abnormal construction of degenerate Greek (Winer, Olshausen, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Hofmann, Reithmayr, and others); or of a mistake on the part of the author or of the transcriber (Schott); or, with Fritzsche, to the reading ζηλωτε (which only 113 and 219** have). But all these makeshifts are quite as arbitrary as the assumption of a faulty formation of mood (Rückert, Matthies). The interpretation of ἵνα as *ubi* is based not on an "exaggerated philological precision,"² but on a linguistic necessity, to which the customary interpretation, yielding certainly a sense appropriate enough in itself, must give way, because the latter *absolutely* requires the *subjunctive* mood.

Ver. 18. Paul knew that the state of things mentioned in ver. 17 was but too assuredly based upon reality. So long as he had been with them (on the first occasion, and still even during his short second visit), the Galatians had shown *zeal in that which was good*, viz. in the *actual case*: *zeal for their apostle and his true gospel*, as was their duty (consequently what was

¹ Ζηλωτες is not the *Attic future* (Jatho). See Winer, p. 72 [E. T. 88]; Buttmann, p. 33. In Thuc. ii. 8. 3, and iii. 58. 4, ἐλευθεροῦσι and ἐρημοῦσι are *presents*; see Krüger *in loc.*

² As Hilgenfeld thinks, who appeals in favour of ἵνα, *ut*, with the indicative to Clem. *Hom.* xi. 16: ἵνα μηδὲν τῶν προσκυνουμένων ὑπῆρχαν. This is certainly not "philological precision," but inattention to linguistic fact; for in this Clementine passage the quite customary ἵνα, *ut*, is used with the indicative of the *preterite*, "quod tam fit, quando ponitur aliquid, quod erat futurum, si aliud quid factum esset, sed jam non est factum," Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 630 f.; Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 850 f.; Kühner, II. § 778. With regard to the respective passages from Barnabas and Ignatius, in support of ἵνα with the present indicative, see on 1 Cor. iv. 6.

morally right and good). But after his departure this zeal veered round in favour of the Judaizing teachers and their doctrine. Hence the apostle continues, giving a gentle reproof, and for that reason expressing the first half of the sentence merely in a general form: "*Good, however, is the becoming zealous in a good thing always, and not merely during my presence with you;*" that is, "It is good when zealous endeavours are *continuously* applied in a good cause, and *not merely*," etc. The chief emphasis rests on this πάντοτε with its antithesis. The special *form*, in which Paul has clothed his thought, arises from his inclination for deliberately using the same word in a modified shade of meaning (Rom. xiv. 13; 1 Cor. iii. 17, *et al.*; comp. Wilke, *Rhetor.* p. 343 f.). But the very *point* of this mode of expression requires that ζηλοῦσθαι should not be taken in a sense *essentially different* from the correct view of it in ver. 17; consequently neither as *invidiose tractari* (Koppe), nor as *to endure envy* (Rückert), which, besides, cannot be conveyed by the simple passive. In Usteri's view Paul intends to say, "How much was I not the object of your ζήλος (zeal and interest), when I was with you! But if it should cease again so soon after my departure from you, it must have lost much of its value." But the very καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ παρεῖναι με πρὸς ὑμᾶς plainly shows that Paul did not conceive *himself* as the object of the ζηλοῦσθαι; in order to be understood, he must have added this με to ζηλοῦσθαι, since there was no previous mention of *himself* as the object of the ζήλος. This objection also applies to the view of Reiche, although the latter takes it more distinctly and sharply: "*Bonum, honestum et salutare* (vi. 9; 1 Cor. vii. 1; 1 Thess. v. 21), *vero est, expeti aliorum studio et amore, modo et consilio honesto, ἐν καλῷ* (conf. 2 Cor. xi. 2; Θεοῦ ζήλω), *idque continuo ac semper πάντοτε, nec tantum praesente me inter vos.*" But ἐν καλῷ¹ cannot mean "*modo et consilio honesto*" (this is expressed by καλῶς in ver. 17); it denotes the *object* of the ζηλοῦσθαι, and that conceived of as the *sphere* in which the ζηλοῦσθαι takes place. Schott interprets, unsuitably to the καὶ μὴ μόνον κ.τ.λ.

¹ Ἐν καλῷ, used adverbially, means either at the fit time (Plat. *Pol.* ix. p. 571 B; Xen. *Hell.* iv. 3. 5) or at the suitable place (Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 25), and in general, *fully* (see Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* II. p. 643), but does not occur in the N. T.

which follows: "Laudabile est, quovis tempore appeti vel trahi ad partes alicujus, si agitur de bono et honesto colendo." So also, in substance, de Wette, with relation to the passive demeanour of the Galatians, and with an extension of the idea of the verb: "*It is, however, beautiful to be the object of zealous attention in what is good,*" by which are indicated the qualities and advantages on account of which people are admired, loved, and courted.¹ Similarly Ewald: "It is beautiful to be the object of zealous love in what is beautiful," ζηλοῦσιν and ζηλοῦτε in ver. 17 being understood in a corresponding sense. But this interpretation also does not harmonize with the καὶ μὴ μόνον κ.τ.λ. which follows; and hence Ewald changes the idea of ζηλοῦσθαι into that of *being worthy* of love, and consequently into the sense of ζηλωτὸν εἶναι. Hofmann over-refines and obscures the correct apprehension of the passage, by bringing ver. 18, in consequence of his erroneous reference of ὥστε ἐχθρὸς κ.τ.λ. (see on ver. 16), into connection with this sentence, considering the idea to be: "Just as his person had formerly been the object of their affection, it ought to have remained so, instead of his now being their enemy in consequence of the self-seeking solicitude with which his opponents take pains about them if he speaks to them the truth. For in his case the morally good had been the ground, on account of which he had been the object of their loving exertion," etc. The earlier expositors,² as also Olshausen and Matthias (the latter in keeping with his factitive interpretation of the active), mostly take ζηλοῦσθαι as *middle*, in sense equivalent to ζηλοῦν, with very different definitions of the meaning,³ but inconsistently with the *usus loquendi*.

¹ Theophylact (comp. also Chrysostom and Theodoret) has evidently understood the passage substantively, just as de Wette: τοῦτο αἰνέσσεται, ὡς ἄρα ζηλωτοὶ ἦσαν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τῇ τελειότητι. Linguistically unobjectionable. Comp. Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 19: ἱπαινομένους κ. ζηλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων. Sympos. 4. 45; Hiero, 1. 9; Eur. Alc. 903; Soph. El. 1016; Aesch. Pers. 698; Plat. Gorg. p. 473 C, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος. See generally, Blomf. Gloss. Aesch. Prom. 338; Pierson, ad Moer. p. 169.

² Not all. The learned Grotius has evidently understood it *passively*: "Rectum erat, ut semper operam daretis, ut ego a vobis amari expeterem; est enim hoc amari honestum." Also Michaelis (comp. Er. Schmidt): "It is good when others court our favour." Both interpretations come very near to that of Usteri.

³ Erasmus, Paraphr.: "Vidistis me legis ceremonias negligere, nihil prae-

Ver. 19. This verse is not to be attached to the preceding (Bos, Bengel, Knapp, Lachmann, Rückert, Usteri, Schott, Ewald, Hofmann),—a construction which makes this earnest, touching address appear awkward and dissimilar in character to what is previously said,—but the words are to be separated from what precedes by a full stop, and to be joined with what follows, the tender affection of which is quite in harmony with this loving address. Difficulty has been felt as to δέ in ver. 20 (which therefore is omitted in Chrysostom and some min.); but only from inattention to the Greek use of δέ after the address, when the writer turns to a new thought, and does so with a tacit antithesis, which is to be recognised from the context. It is found so not merely with questions (Hom. *Il.* xv. 244; Plat. *Legg.* x. p. 890 E; Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 13, ii. 1. 26; Soph. *O. C.* 323. 1459), but also in other instances (Herod. i. 115; Xen. *Anab.* v. 5. 13, vi. 6. 12). Here the slight antithetic reference lies, as the very repetition of παρῆναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς indicates, in his glancing back to καὶ μὴ μόνον κ.τ.λ., namely: “Although zeal in a good cause ought not to be restricted merely to my presence with you, I yet would wish to be now present with you,” etc. The δέ of the *apodosis*, which Wieseler here assumes, is not suitable, because ἤθελον δέ κ.τ.λ. does not stand in any kind of antithesis to τεκν. μου οὗς πάλ. ὠδίνω κ.τ.λ.; and besides, no connected construction would result from it; for the idea: “Because ye are my children . . . I would wish,” does not correspond

dicare praeter Christum, aemulabimini praesentem. Si id rectum erat, cur nunc absente me vultis alios aemulare in iis, quae recta non sunt?” Luther, 1524: “Bonum quidem est aemulari et imitari alios, sed hoc praestare in re bona semper, nunquam in mala, non tantum me praesente, sed etiam absente.” Comp. Calvin: “Imitari vel eniti ad alterius virtutem.” Beza: “At noster amor longe est alius; vos enim bonam ob causam non ad tempus, sed semper, non solum praesens, sed etiam absens absentes vehementissime complector.” Locke (in *καλῶ masculinē*): “Vos amabatis me praesentem tanquam bonum, fas itaque est idem facere in absentem.” Bengel: “Zelo zelum accendere, zelare *inter se.*” Morus: “Laudabile autem est, sectari praeceptorem in re bona semper, neque solum,” etc.; substantially, therefore, as Erasmus. Others interpret in various ways. Olshausen: “Paul desires to make known that he finds the zeal of the Galatians in itself very praiseworthy, and certainly would not damp it; and he therefore says, that the being zealous is good if it takes place on account of a good cause, and is maintained not merely in his presence, but also in his absence.” So already Calovius and others.

with the words. According to Hilgenfeld, that which the address is intended to introduce (viz. to move the readers to return) is wholly *suppressed*, and is supposed to be thereby the more strikingly suggested. Comp. also Reithmayr. But the affectionate tenor of the wish which follows in ver. 20 harmonizes so fully with the tender address in ver. 19, that that hypothesis, which Calvin also entertained ("hic quasi moerore exanimatus in medio sententiae tractu deficit"), does not seem warranted. Nevertheless Buttmann also, *neut. Gr.* p. 331, assumes an anacoluthon. — *τεκνία μου*] The word *τεκνία*, so frequent in *John*, is not found elsewhere in *Paul's* writings. But Lachmann and Usteri ought not to have adopted (following B F G &*) the reading *τέκνα*, since it is just in this passage, where Paul compares himself to a mother in childbirth, that the phrase "*my little children*" finds a more special motive and warrant than in any other passage where he uses *τέκνα* (1 Cor. iv. 14; 2 Cor. vi. 13: comp. also 1 Tim. i. 18; 2 Tim. ii. 1). — *οὗς*] The well-known *constructio κατὰ σύνεσιν*. Winer, p. 133 [E. T. 176]. — *πάλιν ὠδίνω*] whom I *once more travail with*. Paul represents himself, not, as elsewhere (1 Cor. iv. 15; Philem. 10), as a *father*, but in the special emotion of his love, as a *mother* who is in travail, and whose labour is not brought to an end (by the actual final birth) until nothing further is requisite for the full and mature formation of the *τεκνίον*. So long as this object is not attained, according to the figurative representation, the *ὠδίνειν* still continues.¹ Bengel remarks very correctly: "*Loquitur ut res fert, nam in partu naturali formatio est ante dolores partus.*" The *point of comparison* is the *loving exertion, which perseveres amidst trouble and pain in the effort to bring about the new Christian life*. This metaphorical *ὠδίνειν* had been on the first occasion easy and joyful, ver. 13 ff. (although it had not had the full and lasting result; see afterwards, on *ἄχρις οὗ κ.τ.λ.*); but on this second occasion it was severe and painful, and on this account the word *ὠδίνω* is

¹ Heinsius, Grotius, Koppe, Rückert, and others, erroneously hold that *ὠδίνειν* here means to be *pregnant*, which it *never* does, not even in the LXX., Isa. xxvi. 17; Ps. vii. 15; Song of Sol. viii. 5; Philo, *quod Deus immut.* p. 313 B; Plat. *Theæt.* p. 148 C, 210 B. On *ὠδίνω* with the accusative of the person, comp. *parturire aliquem*, Isa. li. 2; Song of Sol. viii. 5; Eur. *Iph. A.* 1234.

chosen (and not *τίκτω* or *γεννῶ*), which, however, is also appropriate to the earlier act of bearing intimated in *πάλιν*, since the idea of pains is essential to the conception of a birth, however slight and short they may be. The *sense*, when *stripped of figure*, is: "My beloved disciples! at whose conversion I am labouring for the second time with painful and loving exertion, until ye shall have become maturely-formed Christians." This continuous *οὖς πάλιν ὠδίνω* is to be conceived as *begun*, so soon as Paul had learned the apostasy of his readers and had commenced to counteract it; so that his operations during his second visit (comp. *ἀληθεύων ὑμῖν*, ver. 16) are thus also included: hence we cannot, with Fritzsche (*l.c.* p. 244) and Ulrich (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1836, p. 459), consider vv. 18, 19 as intimating that Paul had only *once* visited Galatia. According to Wieseler, *πάλιν ὠδίνω* is intended to express the idea of the *παλιγγενεσία*, Tit. iii. 5; Paul had regenerated his readers already at their conversion, and here says that he is *still continuously* occupied in their regeneration, until they should have attained the goal of perfection on the part of the Christian — similarity with Christ. This is incorrect, because *πάλιν* must necessarily denote a *second* act of travail on the part of *Paul*. Paul certainly effected the regeneration of his readers on occasion of the first *ὠδίνειν*, which is presupposed by *πάλιν*; but because they had relapsed (i. 6, iii. 1, iv. 9 f., *et al.*), he must be *for the second time* in travail with them, and not merely *still continuously* (an idea which is not expressed) their *regenerator*, so that the idea of the *πάλιν*, the repetition, would be on the part of the *readers*. Theophylact (comp. Chrysostom) aptly defines the sense of *πάλιν ὠδίνω* not as that of a continued *ἀναγέννησις*, but as that of *πάλιν ἐτέρας ἀναγεννήσεως*. The sense, "whose regeneration I am continuing," would have been expressed by Paul in some such form as *οὖς οὐ παύομαι ἀναγεννῶν* or *οὖς ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναγεννῶ*. — *ἄχρις οὗ μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν*] A *shadow* is thus thrown on the result of the *first* conversion (birth), which had undergone so sudden a change (i. 6). The reiterated labour of birth is not to cease until, etc. This meaning, and along with it the emphasis of the *ἄχρις οὗ κ.τ.λ.*, has been missed by Hofmann, who, instead of referring *πάλιν* to *ὠδίνω* only, ex-

tends it also to ἄχρις οὗ κ.τ.λ. In connection with the general scope of the passage, however, the stress is on μορφωθῇ: "until Christ shall have been *formed*, shall have attained His due conformation, in you," that is, *until ye shall have attained to the fully-formed inner life of the Christian*. For the state of "Christ having been formed in man" is by no means realized "*so soon as a man becomes a Christian*" (Hofmann), but, as clearly appears from the notion of the ἄχρις οὗ, is the *goal of development* which the process of becoming Christian has to *reach*. When this goal is attained, the Christian is he *in whom Christ lives* (comp. on ii. 20); as, for instance, on Paul himself the specific form of life of his Master was distinctly stamped. So long, therefore, as the Galatians were not yet developed and morally shaped into this complete inward frame, they were still like to an immature embryo, the internal parts of which have not yet acquired their normal shape, and which cannot therefore as yet come to the birth and so put an end to the ὠδίνειν. In the Christian, Christ is to inhabit the heart (Eph. iii. 17): in him there is to be the νοῦς of Christ (1 Cor. ii. 16), the πνεῦμα of Christ (Rom. viii. 9), the σπλάγχνα of Christ (Phil. i. 8); and the body and its members are to be the body and members of Christ (1 Cor. vi. 13, 15). All this, which is comprehended in the idea Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, is in our passage rendered intelligible by the representation that Christ is to be *formed* in us, or to become present in the life-form corresponding to His nature. This view is not different in reality, although it is so in the mode of representation, from that of spiritual transformation after the *image* of Christ (2 Cor. iii. 18); for, according to our passage, *Christ Himself* is in Christians the subject of the specific development. Bengel moreover, well remarks: "*Christus, non Paulus, in Galatis formandus.*" — μορφώω] occurs here only in the N. T.; but see LXX. Isa. xlv. 13 (ed. Breit.); Symmachus, Ps. xxxiv. 1; Arat. *Phaen.* 375; Lucian, *Prom.* 3; Plut. *de anim. generat.* p. 1013; Theophr. *c. pl.* v. 6, 7. See also Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* VI. p. 345.

Ver. 20. As to the connection of thought of the δέ with ver. 18, see on ver. 18. — ἥθελον] namely, if the thing were possible. Comp. Rom. ix. 3; Acts xxv. 22. See Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Gorg.* p. 235; Kühner, II. p. 68; Fritzsche, *ad Rom.*

II. p. 245. — ἄρτι] *just now, presently* (see on i. 9), has the emphasis. — ἀλλάξαι τὴν φωνήν μου] The emphasis is on ἀλλάξαι. But in harmony with the context (see vv. 16, 18, and the foregoing ἄρτι), this *changing* can only refer to the *second visit* of the apostle to the Galatians, not to the language now employed in his letter, as many expositors think.¹ Erroneously, therefore—and how sharply in opposition to the previous affectionate address!—Ambrosius, Pelagius, Wetstein, Michaelis, Rosenmüller, Rückert, Baumgarten-Crusius, take the sense to be: *to assume a stern language of reproof*. Hofmann also erroneously holds that Paul means the (in oral expression) *more chastened tone* of a *didactic statement*—aiming at the bringing the readers back from their error—after the strongly excited style in which, since the word θαυμάζω in i. 6, he had urged his readers, as one who had already been almost deprived of the fruit of his labours. As if Paul had not previously, and especially from iii. 6 to iv. 7, written didactically enough; and as if he had not also in the sequel (see immediately, ver. 21, and chap. v. and vi. down to the abrupt dismissal at the end) urged his readers with excitement enough! The supposition, however, which Hofmann entertains, that Paul has hitherto been answering a *letter* of the Galatians, and has just at this point *come to the end of it*, is nothing but a groundless hypothesis, for there is no trace of such a letter to be found in the epistle. No; when Paul was for the second time in Galatia, he had spoken sharply and sternly, and this had made his readers suspect him, as if he had become their enemy (ver. 16): hence he wishes to be now with them, and *to speak to them with a voice different from what he had then used*, that is, to speak to them in a *soft and gentle tone*.² By this, of

¹ So also Zachariæ (who is followed by Flatt): “to lay aside my present mournful language, and to adopt that of tenderness and contentment.” In this case Paul must have used δύνασθαι; for unless his readers had improved in their conduct, it would have been *impossible* for him to speak contentedly. Bengel, in opposition to the idea of ἀλλάξαι: “molliter scribit, sed mollius loqui vellet.” Jerome explained the passage as referring to the exchange of the *vox epistolica* for the *vivus sermo* of actual presence, which might have more effect in bringing them back *ad veritatem*.

² Not exactly *weeping*, as Chrysostom thinks: ποιῆσαι καὶ δακρύα καὶ πάντα εἰς ὁρῆν ἐπισπάσασθαι.

course, he means not any deviation in the substance of his teaching from the ἀληθεύειν (ver. 16), but a manner of language betokening tender, mother-like love. A wish of self-denying affection, which is ready and willing, in the service of the cause and for the salvation of the persons concerned, to change form and tone, although retaining φωνὰν ψευδέων ἀγνωστόν (Pind. *Ol.* vi. 112). The latter was a matter of course in the case of a Paul, willingly though he became all things to all men; comp. on 1 Cor. ix. 22. Many other expositors, as Theodoret, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, Estius, Koppe, Borger, Winer, Matthies, Schott, de Wette, understand it as: *to speak according to the circumstances of each case, with tenderness and affection to one, with severity and censure to another.* Comp. Corn. a Lapide: “ut scilicet quasi mater nunc blandirer, nunc gemerem, nunc obsecrarem, nunc objurgarem vos.” But this cannot be expressed by the mere ἀλλάξαι τ. φ., which without addition means nothing more than *to change* the voice (comp. ἀλλάττειν χώραν, Plat. *Parm.* p. 139 A; εἶδος, Eur. *Bacch.* 53; χρῶμα, Eur. *Phoen.* 1252; στολὰς, Gen. xxxv. 2), that is, to assume *another* voice, to let oneself be heard *otherwise*, not *differently*. See Artem. ii. 20, iv. 56; Dio Chrysostom, lix. p. 575, in Wetstein. Comp. Rom. i. 23; Wisd. iv. 11, xii. 10; frequently in the LXX. Paul must have added either a more precise definition, such as εἰς πολλοὺς τρόπους, εἰς μορφὰς πλείονας (Lucian, *Vit. Auct.* 5), or at least some such expression as πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν (Acts xxviii. 10), πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον (1 Cor. xii. 7), πρὸς διάκρισιν καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ (Heb. v. 14). Fritzsche incorrectly interprets it: *to adopt some other voice, so that ye may believe that ye are listening to some other teacher, and not to the hated Paul.* What a strange, unseemly idea, not at all in keeping with the thoughtful manner of the apostle! According to Wieseler, the sense intended is: *to exchange my speaking with you*; that is, to enter into *mutual discourse* with you, in order most surely to learn and to obviate your counter-arguments. But in this view “*with you*” is a pure interpolation, although it would be essentially requisite to the definition of the sense; and ἀλλάσσειν λόγους, to say nothing of ἀλλ. φωνήν, is never so used. What Wieseler means is expressed by ἀμείβεσθαι τινα λόγοις

(Hom. *Od.* iii. 148, *et al.*), προσδιαλέγεσθαι τινι (Plat. *Theact.* p. 161 B), συζητεῖν τινι, or πρὸς τινα (Acts vi. 9; Luke xxii. 23), λόγους ἀντιβάλλειν πρὸς (Luke xxiv. 17), δοῦναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον (Plat. *Rep.* p. 531 E). — ὅτι ἀποροῦμαι ἐν ὑμῖν] justifies the wish of ἀλλάξαι τὴν φων. μου. The usual interpretation is the correct one: *I am perplexed about you*; ἐν ὑμῖν is to be taken as in the phrase θαρρῶ ἐν ὑμῖν, 2 Cor. vii. 16, so that the perplexity is conceived as inherent in the readers, dependent on their condition as its cause (comp. also i. 24). The perplexity consists in this, that he at the time knows no certain ways and means by which he shall effect their re-conversion (ver. 19); and this instils the wish (ὅτι) that he could now be present with them, and, in place of the severe tone which at the preceding visit had had no good effect (ver. 16), could try the experiment of an altered and milder tone. The form ἀποροῦμαι is, moreover (comp. ἀπορηθεῖς, Dem. 830. 2, and ἀπορηθήσεται, Eccclus. xviii. 7), to be taken *passively* (as a middle form with a passive signification), so that the state of the ἀπορεῖν is conceived of as produced on the subject, passively (Schoemann, *ad Isaëum*, p. 192). Fritzsche, *l.c.* p. 257, holds the sense to be: "*Nam haeretis, quo me loco habeatis, nam sum vobis suspectus.*" Thus ἐν ὑμῖν would be *among you*, and ἀποροῦμαι: *I am an object of perplexity*, according to the well-known Greek use of the personal passive of intransitive verbs (Bernhardy, p. 341; Kühner, II. p. 34 f.). Comp. Xen. *de rep. Lac.* xiii. 7: ὥστε τῶν δεομένων γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἀπορεῖται, Plat. *Soph.* p. 243 B, *Legg.* vii. p. 799 C. But the sense: "*sum vobis suspectus*" is *interpolated*, and there is no ground for deviating from the use of ἀποροῦμαι throughout the N. T. (2 Cor. iv. 8; Luke xxiv. 4; Acts xxv. 20; John xiii. 22); as, indeed, the idea "*sum vobis suspectus*" cannot give any suitable motive for the wish of the ἀλλάξαι τὴν φωνήν, unless we adopt Fritzsche's erroneous interpretation of ἀλλάξαι. To disconnect (with Hofmann) ἐν ὑμῖν from ἀποροῦμαι, and attach it to ἀλλάξ. τ. φωνήν μου, would yield an addition entirely superfluous after παρῆναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, and leave ἀποροῦμαι without any more precise definition of its bearing. And the proposal to attach ὅτι ἀπορ. ἐν ὑμῖν as protasis to the following λέγετέ μοι (Matthias) would have the effect of giving

to the λέγ. μοι, which stands forth sternly and peremptorily, an enfeebling background.

Vv. 21-30. Now, at the conclusion of the theoretical portion of his epistle, Paul adds a quite peculiar antinomistic disquisition,—a *learned Rabbinico-allegorical argument derived from the law itself*,—calculated to annihilate the influence of the pseudo-apostles with their own weapons, and to root them out on their own ground.

Ver. 21, without any connecting link, leads most energetically (λέγετέ μοι: “urget quasi praesens,” Bengel) at once *in mediam rem*. On the λέγετέ μοι, so earnestly intensifying the question, comp. Bergler, *ad Aristoph. Acharn.* 318. — οἱ ὑπὸ νόμον κ.τ.λ.] *Ye who wish to be under the law*. This refers to the Judaistically inclined readers, who, partly Gentiles and partly Jewish Christians, led astray by the false teachers (i. 7), supposed that in faith they had not enough for salvation, and desired to be subject to the law (ver. 9), towards which they had already made a considerable beginning (ver. 10). Chrysostom aptly remarks: καλῶς εἶπεν οἱ θέλοντες, οὐ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀκολουθίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀκαίρου φιλονεικίας τὸ πρᾶγμα ἦν. — τὸν νόμον οὐκ ἀκούετε;] *Hear ye not the law?* Is it not read in your hearing? Comp. John xii. 34; 2 Cor. iii. 14. The public reading of the venerated divine Scriptures of the law and the prophets, after the manner of the synagogues (Rom. ii. 15; Acts xv. 21; Luke iv. 16), took place in the assemblies for worship of the Christian churches both of Jewish and of Gentile origin: they contained, in fact, the revelation of God, of which Christianity is the fulfilment, and an acquaintance with them was justly considered as a source of the Christian knowledge of salvation; for its articles of faith (1 Cor. xv. 3 f.) and rules of life (Rom. xiii. 8-10, xv. 4) were to be κατὰ τὰς γραφάς. Now the *hearing* of the law must necessarily have taught the Galatians how much they were in error. Hence this question expressive of astonishment,¹ which is all the stronger and consequently all the more appropriate, the more simply we allow

¹ Hofmann (comp. also his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 57) deals with our passage in an unwarrantable and intolerably violent manner by writing “(as relative), but makes the summons (*tell me, ye who, wishing to be under the law, do not hear the*

ἀκούετε to retain its primary literal signification. Hence we must neither explain it (with Winer; comp. Matthies) as *audisse, i. e. nosse, notum habere* (see Heind. *ad Plat. Gorg.* p. 503 C; Ast, *ad Plat. Legg.* i. p. 9; Spohn, *Lectt. Theocr.* i. p. 25); nor, with Jerome and many others, including Morus, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Borger, Flatt, Schott, Olshausen, as *to understand* (comp. on 1 Cor. xiv. 2), which Paul conceives as the hearing of the πνεῦμα speaking behind the γράμμα (so Holsten, *z. Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 382); nor, with Erasmus, de Wette, Ewald, Wieseler, Hofmann, as ἀκούειν τινος, *to give attention*, that is, to bestow moral consideration (rather, *to have an ear for*, as 1 Cor. xiv. 2; Matt. x. 14; John viii. 47). — νόμος is used here in a twofold sense (comp. Rom. iii. 19): it means, in the first place, the *institute of the law*; and secondly, the *Pentateuch*, according to the division of the Old Test. into *Law, Prophets, and Hagiographa*. See on Luke xxiv. 44. The repetition of the word gives emphasis.

Ver. 22. Γάρ] now gives the explanation of and warrant for that question, by citing the history, narrated in the law, of Ishmael and Isaac, the two sons of the ancestor of the theocratic people. See Gen. xvi. 15 f., xxi. 2 f. — ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης] *by the (well-known) bondswoman, Hagar*. See Gen. xvi. 3. As to the word itself (which might also denote a *free maiden*), see Wetstein, I. p. 526 f.; Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 259 f. — ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθ.] *Sarah*.

Ver. 23 presents the relation of diversity between the two, in contrast to the previously mentioned relation of similarity, according to which they both were sons of Abraham. — κατὰ σάρκα] *according to the flesh*, so that the birth was the result of a natural carnal intercourse. Differently in Rom. i. 3, ix. 5. — γεγέννηται] *is born*; the *perfect* realizes the historically existing relation as present. — διὰ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας] *through the (well-known) promise*, Gen. xvii. 16, 19, xviii. 10; Rom. ix. 9. This must not, however, be rationalized (with Grotius, Rosenmüller, and others) into “*per eam vim extraordinariam,*

law) to be only prepared for by ver. 22 ff., and that which Paul had in view in the λίγιστί μοι of ver. 21 to follow at length in ver. 30. The address runs on simply and appropriately, and affords no occasion for any such intricacy.

quam Deus promiserat," which does violence to the history in Genesis, as above; nor, with Hofmann, to the effect that the *promise*, with which Abraham had been *called*, was *realized in the procreation itself*; but it is to be definitely explained in accordance with the tenor of the words and with Gen. xxi. 1: "*by virtue of the promise he is born*," so that in his procreation (Matt. i. 2; Luke iii. 34) the divine promise made to his parents, which had assured them of the birth of a son, was the procuring cause of the result, which would not have occurred without such an operation of the power of the divine promise (Gen. xviii. 14), seeing that the two parents were in themselves incapable of the procreation of Isaac; for Sarah was barren, and both were already too old (Gen. xviii. 11; Rom. iv. 19). Comp. Chrysostom.

Ver. 24. "*Ἀτινα*] *quippe quae, quae quidem*, taking up the recorded facts under the point of view of a special *quality*. — *ἐστὶν ἀλληγορούμενα*] *are of allegorical import*. The word *ἀλληγορεῖν*, not occurring elsewhere in the N. T., means *ἄλλο ἀγορεύειν*, *so to speak* (to set forth, to relate), *that another sense is expressed than the words convey*; which further meaning lies concealed behind the immediate meaning of what is said. Hesychius: *ἀλληγορία ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ ἀκουόμενον ὑποδεικνύουσα*. Comp. Quinctil. viii. 6; see Plut. *Mor.* p. 363 D, *Athen.* ii. p. 69 C; Philo, *de migr. Abr.* p. 420 B; Joseph. *Antt. prooem.* 4. In the *passive*: *to have an allegorical meaning*,¹ Schol. Soph. *Aj.* 186; Porph. *Pyth.* p. 185; Philo, *de Cherub.* I. p. 143; and see generally, Wetstein.² The understanding of the O. T. history in an allegoric sense was, as

¹ Not: to be the object of allegorical *conception* (Hofmann). The allegorical sense is *a priori* contained and given in the facts which stand recorded; they have, contained in them, the allegorical *import* which is only *exhibited* by the explanation. If *ἰστὶν ἀλληγ.* were to be taken, not in the sense of *being expressed*, but in that of *being conceived* as such, which is certainly found in Plutarch, Synesius, and elsewhere, Paul must have written *ἀλληγορεῖται*, or the verbal adjective *ἀλληγορητός*. Moreover, *ἀλληγορεῖν* is related to *ἀνίστασθαι* as *species* to *genus*; but Hofmann arbitrarily asserts that the latter requires for its interpretation *wit*, the former *understanding*. *ἀνίστασθαι* includes *every* obscure or veiled discourse (Herod. v. 56; Plat. *Rep.* p. 332 B, and frequently; Soph. *Aj.* 1187; Eur. *Ion.* 430; Lucian, *V. H.* i. 2), whether it be in an allegorical form or not, and whether it require *wit* or not.

² In the older Greek, *allegory* was termed *ἰκάνειν* (see Plut. *de aud. poet.* p. 19 E), Plato, *de Rep.* p. 378 D; Xen. *Symp.* 3. 6; Ruhnke. *ad Tim.* p. 200 f.).

is well known, extremely prevalent among the later Jews. *Synops. Sohar.* p. 25. 1: "Quicumque dicit narrationes legis alium non habere sensum, quam illius tantum historiae, istius crepet spiritus." See generally, Döpke, *Hermeneut.* I. p. 104 ff.; Gfrörer, *Gesch. d. Urchristenth.* I. i. p. 68 ff. But on account of the Rabbinical training in which Paul had been brought up (comp. Tholuck in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1835, p. 369 ff.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 295 f.), and on account of his truthful character, nothing else can be assumed than that *he himself* was convinced that what he related contained, in addition to its historical sense, the allegorical import set forth by him; so that he did not intend to give a mere *argumentum κατ' ἀνθρώπου*, but ascribed to his allegory the cogency of objective proof. Hence he has raised it into the keystone of his whole antinomistic reasoning, and has so earnestly introduced (ver. 21) and carried it out, that we cannot hold (with Schott) that it was intended to be an *argumentum secundarium, quod insuper accederet*. But in the view of a faith not associated with Rabbinical training, the *argument* wholly falls to the ground as a real *proof* (Luther says that it is "too weak to stand the test");¹ while the *thing* proved is none the less established independent of the allegory, and is merely illustrated by it. "Nothing can be more preposterous than the endeavours of interpreters to vindicate the argument of the apostle as one objectively true." Baur, *Paulus*, II. p. 312, ed. 2. — αὐταὶ] namely, Hagar and Sarah; for see afterwards ἥτις ἐστὶν Ἀγαρ. Hence not equivalent to ταῦτα, sc. τὰ ἀλληγορούμενα

¹ We must be on our guard against confounding the idea of the *allegory* with that of the *type* (1 Cor. x. 6, 11; Rom. v. 14; comp. Heb. ix. 24; 1 Pet. iii. 21), as Calvin and many others have done: "a familia Abrahae similitudo ducitur ad ecclesiam; quemadmodum enim Abrahae domus tunc fuit vera ecclesia, ita minime dubium est, quin praecipui et prae aliis memorabiles eventus, qui in ea nobis contigerunt, nobis totidem sint typi." Also Tholuck (*d. A. T. im N. T.* p. 39, ed. 6) and Wieseler understand ἀλληγορούμενα as equivalent to τυπικῶς λεγόμενα. But even Philo, *de opif. m.* I. p. 38. 10, puts the type not as equivalent, but only as similar to the allegory; and Josephus, *Antt. prooem.* 4, speaks of Moses as speaking in a partly allegorical sense, without intimating that he intended *historical types*. The allegory and the type are contrasted on the one hand with that which is only πλάσματα μύλων, and on the other hand with that which is said ἐξ εὐθείας (directly, expressly). But neither does a type necessarily rest on allegorical interpretation, nor does the allegory necessarily presuppose that what is so interpreted is a type; the two may be independent one of the other. Thus, e.g.,

(Calovius and others), as is assumed, in order not to admit here an *εἶναι σημαντικόν*. — *εἰσι*] namely, allegorically, and so far = *signify*. Comp. Matt. xiii. 20, 38, *et al.* — *δύο διαθήκαι*] *two covenants*, not: *institutions*, declarations of will (Usteri), or generally “arrangements connected with the history of salvation” (Hofmann), any more than in iii. 15. The characteristic of a covenant, that there must be two parties, existed actually in the case of the *διαθήκαι* (God and the men, who were subject to the law,—God and the men, who believe in Christ). Comp. 1 Cor. xi. 25. — *μία μὲν ἀπὸ ὄρους Σινᾶ*] *One proceeding from Mount Sinai*, which was instituted on Mount Sinai, and therefore issues from it. Instead of *ἀπό*, the mere genitive might have been used (Bernhardy, p. 223), but the former is more definite and descriptive. The *μὲν* is without any corresponding *δέ* (Kühner, II. p. 430), for in none of the cases where *δέ* subsequently occurs is it correlative to this *μὲν*. In *point of fact* the contrast anticipated in *μία μὲν* certainly follows in ver. 26, but not in conjunction with *μὲν*; see what is said on ver. 26. — *εἰς δουλείαν γεννώσα*] *bringing forth unto bondage*, that is, placing those who belong to this covenant, by means of their so belonging, *in a state of bondage*, namely, through subjection to the Mosaic law. See ver. 1 ff. The notion of a *mother* has caused the retention of the *figurative* expression *γεννώσα*. — *ἥτις ἐστὶν Ἀγαρ*] *ἥτις, quippe quae*, is neither predicate (Bengel) nor attributive definition (*as that διαθήκη, which Hagar is*; so Hofmann), as if it were written *Ἀγαρ οὔσα*; but it is the allegory of the name of Hagar, in Philo, *Alleg.* II. p. 135. 29, is anything but typology. See the passages themselves in Wetstein. At any rate, the allegory has a much freer scope, and may be handled very differently by different people; “potest aliud aliud et argutius fingere et veri cum similitudine suspicari; potest aliud tertius, potest aliud quartus, atque ut se tulerint ingeniorum opinantium qualitates, ita singulae res possunt infinitis interpretationibus explicari.” Arnobius. The *type* is a real divine preformation of a N. T. fact in the O. T. history. Comp. on Rom. v. 14; also Tholuck, *l.c.* p. 47 ff. But one fact signifies another *allegorically*, when the ideal character of the latter is shown as figuratively presenting itself in the former; in which case the significant fact needs not to be derived from the O. T., and the interpretations may be very various. Comp. Kleinschmidt in the *Mecklenb. theol. Zeitschr.* 1861, p. 859. Matthias, in the interpretation of our passage, abides by the wider idea of “*figure*,” but this does not satisfy the strict idea of the *allegorical*, so far as this is the expression of an inner, deeper significance,—of an *ἐπίρωσι νοούμενον*.

subject, just as *ἀτινα* and *αὐται*, and also *ἡτις* in ver. 26. The name, not as yet expressed, is now *emphatically* added. The Sinaitic covenant is that which Hagar is in the history referred to—is allegorically identical with Hagar.

Ver. 25. The *ἡτις ἐστὶν Ἀγαρ*, just said, has now a reason assigned for it, *from the identity of the name "Hagar" with that of Mount Sinai*. *Τὸ γὰρ Ἀγαρ . . . Ἀραβία*, however, is not to be placed in a parenthesis, because neither in the construction nor in a logical point of view does any interruption occur; but with *συστοιχεῖ δέ* a new sentence is to be commenced. "*This covenant is the Hagar of that allegorical history—a fact which is confirmed by the similarity of the name of this woman with the Arabian designation of Mount Sinai. Not of a different nature, however,—to indicate now the corresponding relation, according to which no characteristic dissimilarity may exist between this woman and the community belonging to the Sinaitic covenant, because otherwise that ἡτις ἐστὶν Ἀγαρ would be destitute of inner truth—not of a different nature, however, but of a similar nature is Hagar with the present Jerusalem, that is, with the Jewish state; because the latter is, as Hagar once was, in slavery together with those who belong to it.*" This paraphrase at the same time shows what importance belongs to the position of *συστοιχεῖ* at the head of the sentence. — *τὸ γὰρ Ἀγαρ Σινᾶ ὄρος ἐστὶν ἐν τ. Ἀραβ.*] That the name *Hagar* (τὸ Ἀγαρ denotes this; see Eph. iv. 9; Kühner, II. p. 137) accorded with the Arabic name of Sinai, could not but be a fact welcome to the allegorizing Paul in support of his *ἡτις ἐστὶν Ἀγαρ*. Comp. John ix. 6. — He now writes *Σινᾶ ὄρος*, and not *ὄρος Σινᾶ* as in ver. 24, because Ἀγαρ and Σινᾶ are intended to stand in juxtaposition on account of the coincidence of the two names. In Arabic ⁵¹¹حجر means *lapis*; and although no further ancient evidence is preserved that the Arabs called Sinai *κατ' ἐξοχήν* the stone,¹ yet Chrysostom in his day says that in their native tongue the

¹ We may add that حجر occurs elsewhere as a geographical proper name in *Arabia Petraea*. Thus the Chald. Paraphr. always gives the name ܡܕܢܚܐ to the wilderness called in the Hebr. ַמִּדְבָּר. As to the town حجر, which is, however, to be pronounced *Hidschr* and not *Hadschr*, and, on account of its too remote

name Sinai was thus interpreted; and indeed Büsching, *Erdbesch.* V. p. 535, quotes the testimony of Harant the traveller that the Arabs still give the name *Hadschar* to Mount Sinai,—a statement not supported by the evidence of any other travellers. Perhaps it was (and is) merely a *provincial* name current in the vicinity of the mountain, easily explained from the granitic nature of the peaks (Robinson, I. p. 170 f.), with which also the probable signification of the Hebrew סִינַי, the *pointed* (see Knobel on *Ex.* p. 190), harmonizes,¹ and which became known to the apostle, if not through some other channel previously, by means of his sojourn in Arabia (i. 17). Comp. also Ewald, p. 495; Reiche, p. 63. It is true that the name of Hagar (הָגָר) does not properly correspond with the word حِجْر (تِجْر), but with هَجَرَ *fugit*; but the allegorizing interpretation of names is too little bound to literal strictness not to find the very *similarity* of the word and the substantial resemblance of sound enough for its purpose, of which we have still stronger and bolder examples in Matt. ii. 23, John ix. 6. Beza, Calvin, Castalio, Estius, Wolff, and others, interpret, “for Hagar is a type of Mount Sinai in Arabia;”² but against this view the neuter τὸ Ἀγὰρ is decisive. — ἐν Ἀραβίᾳ] not in Arabia

site, cannot come into consideration here (in opposition to Grotius and others), see Ewald, p. 493 f., and *Jahrb.* VIII. p. 290.

¹ As to the mineralogical beauty of the mountain, see Fraas, *Aus d. Orient geolog. Beobacht.* 1867.

² At the same time Calvin and others remark on ἐν Ἀραβίᾳ: “hoc est extra limites terrae sanctae, quae symbolum est aeternae haereditatis.” This reference is also discovered by Wieseler, who, with Lachmann, reads only τὸ γ. Σινὰ ὅπου ἱσταν ἐν τ. Ἀραβ., “for the Sinai mountain lies beyond the Holy Land, and indeed in Arabia, where also the alien Hagar is at home.” In his view, Paul meant to say that, through their *alien* nature, the Sinaitic διαθήκη and Hagar showed themselves to answer to each other,—namely, as intervenient elements in the history of salvation. But this Paul *has not* said; the substance of it would have to be read *between* the lines. How very natural it would have been for him at least to have written, instead of or in addition to ἐν τ. Ἀραβ., ἐξω (or μακρὰν ἀπὸ) τῆς γῆς Χαναάν, in order thus at least to give some intimation that the *alien character* was the *point*! This also applies against the view of Hofmann (comp. also his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 70 f.), who likewise follows the reading omitting Ἀγὰρ, and agrees in substance with Wieseler’s explanation, taking Mount Sinai as contrast to Sion, and Arabia as contrast to the land of promise. Comp. also, in opposition to this exposition, which imports elements wholly gratuitous, Ewald, *Jahrb.* X. p. 239.

situm (Schott and older expositors)—for how idle would be this topographical remark¹ in the case of a mountain so universally known!—nor equivalent to ἀραβιστί, so that Ἀραβ. would be an adjective and διαλέκτω would have to be supplied (Matthias); but: in *Arabia* the name *Hagar* signifies the Mount *Sinai*.² So Chrysostom, Theophylact, Luther ("for *Agar* means in *Arabia* the Mount *Sinai*"), Morus, Koppe, Reiche, Reithmayr, and others. — συστοιχεῖ] The *subject* is, as Theodore of Mopsuestia rightly has it, *Hagar*, not *Mount Sinai* (Vulgate, Jerome, Ambrose, Chrysostom and his followers, Thomas, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Estius, Wolf, Bengel, and others; also Hofmann now),—a view which runs entirely counter to the context, according to which the two *women* are the subjects of the allegorical interpretation, while τὸ γὰρ Ἀγαρ Σινᾶ ὄρος ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ Ἀραβ. was merely a collateral remark by way of confirmation. Incorrectly also Studer and Usteri, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius (also Hofmann formerly), Windischmann, Reithmayr, hold that the subject is still μία μὲν ἀπὸ ὄρους Σινᾶ, the *Sinaitic constitution*. In this way there would be brought out no *comparison* at all between the subject of συστοιχεῖ and the present Jerusalem; and yet such, according to the signification of συστοιχεῖν (see afterwards), there must necessarily be, so that in δουλεύει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. lies the *tertium comparationis*. The *Sinaitic διαθήκη* is not of a *similar nature* with the present Jerusalem, but is itself the constitution of it; on that very account, however, according to the allegorical comparison *Hagar* corresponds to the present Jerusalem. συστοιχεῖν means to stand in the same row (see Polyb. x. 21. 7, and Wetstein); that is, here, to stand in the same category (συστοιχία, Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 5, pp. 986, 1004), to be of the same nature and species, σύστοιχον εἶναι (Theophr. c. pl.

¹ Which is not (with Bengel) to be brought into an antithetical relation to συστοιχεῖ δὲ (the *Mount Sinai* is indeed situated in *Arabia*, but corresponds, etc.), as if it were accompanied by a μὲν (and with the adoption of Lachmann's reading); for in this case the allegorical signification of the *Hagar* would not be based on any ground.

² Observe that the apostle does not at all wish to say that *Hagar* is in the *Arabic language generally* the name of *Sinai*; but, on the contrary, by ἐν τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ he characterizes that name as a name used in the country, provincial. Hofmann unjustly finds in the words according to our reading "absurdity."

vi. 4. 2 ; Arist. *Metcor.* i. 3 ; Lucian, *q. hist. conser.* 43). Consequently: *Hagar belongs to the same category with the present Jerusalem*, is of a like nature with it (comp. Polyb. xiii. 8. 1: ὁμοία καὶ σύστοιχα), has in common with it the same characteristic relation, in so far namely that, as Hagar was a bond-woman, the present Jerusalem with its children is also in bondage. See below. Thus συστ. expresses the *correspondence*. But it is incorrect to take it as: *she confronts as parallel* (Rückert, Winer).¹ This must have been expressed by ἀντιστοιχεῖ (Xen. *Symp.* 2. 20, *Anab.* v. 4. 12 ; comp. ἀντίστοιχος, Eur. *Andr.* 746, and ἀντιστοιχία, Plut. *Mor.* p. 474 A). Many of those who regard Sinai as the subject (see above) interpret: "*it extends as far as Jerusalem*" (Vulgate, Jerome, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Wolf, and others). This would have to be more exactly defined with Genebrardus, *ad Ps.* cxxxiii. 3, following out the literal meaning of the word συστοιχεῖ: "*perpetuo dorso sese versus Sionis montes exporrigit.*" But even granting the geographical reality of the description, and setting aside the fact that Sinai is not the subject, Paul must have named, instead of τῇ νῦν Ἱερουσ., *Mount Zion*. Hofmann, in reference to the position of Sinai in Arabia and of Jerusalem in the land of promise, interprets the expression *locally* indeed, but as indicative of the *non-local* relation, that the present Jerusalem belongs to the same category with the mountain although Arabian, which has it side by side *on the same line in the order of the history of salvation*. An artificial consequence of the geographical contrast introduced as regards ἐν Ἀραβ., as well as of the erroneous assumption that Mount Sinai is the subject. At the same time a turn is given to the interpretation, as if Paul had written συστοιχεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ νῦν Ἱερουσ. — τῇ νῦν Ἱερουσαλήμ] does not stand in contrast to the *former Salem* (Erasmus, Michaelis), but in Paul's view means the present Jerusalem *belonging to the pre-Messianic period*, as opposed to

¹ Comp. also Wieseler: "corresponds to it ; not, however, at a *like*, but at a *different* stage," whereby the idea of a *type* is expressed. This view is not to be supported by Polyb. x. 21. 7, where συζυγοῦντας καὶ συστοιχοῦντας διαμένειν means to *remain in rank and file* ("servare ordines secundum παραστάτας et ἱσθιάτας," Schweighäuser), so that as well the συζυγοῦντες as the συστοιχοῦντες always form one row with one another.

ἡ ἄνω Ἱερουσ. (ver 26), which after the *παρουσία* will take its place. See on ver. 26. Moreover, the present Jerusalem and its children ("inhabitants;" see Matt. xxiii. 37, Ps. cxlix. 2) represent *the Israelitic commonwealth and its members*. Comp. Isa. xl. 2. — δουλεύει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] namely, to the Mosaic law. The bondage to *Rome* (Pelagius) is not, according to the context, referred to either alone (Castalio, Ewald) or *jointly* (Bengel). The subject is ἡ νῦν Ἱερουσ., and not Ἀγαρ (Cornelius a Lapide, Grotius, and others). Looking at the usage both of classical authors and the N. T., there is nothing surprising in the *change* of subject (Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Gorg.* p. 510 C; Winer, p. 586 [E. T. 787 f.]). Lachmann (also Ewald) has incorrectly placed the words δουλεύει . . . αὐτῆς in a parenthesis.

Note.—If the reading of Bengel and Lachmann, τὸ γ. Σινᾶ ὄρος ἐστὶν ἐν τ. Ἀραβ., be adopted, the interpretation would simply be: "*for the Sinai-Mount is in Arabia*;" so that ἐν τῇ Ἀραβ. would serve to support the allegorical relation of Hagar to Sinai, seeing that Hagar also was *in Arabia* and the ancestress of the Arabians. This certainly forms a ground of support much too vague, and not befitting the dialectic acuteness of the apostle. In the case of the *Recepta* also, ἐν τῇ Ἀραβ., taken as a *geographical* notice, is so superfluous and aimless, that Schott's uncritical conjecture, treating the words τὸ γ. Ἀγ. ὄρ. Σ. ἑ. ἐν τ. Ἀραβ. as a double gloss, is not surprising. Bentley, who is followed by Mill, *Proleg.* § 1306, even wished to retain nothing of the passage but τὸ δὲ Ἀγαρ συστοιχεῖ τῇ νῦν Ἱερουσ. κ.τ.λ. Against the interpretation of ἐν τῇ Ἀραβ. by Wieseler and Hofmann, see above.

Ver. 26. But altogether different from the position of the present Jerusalem is that of the *upper Jerusalem*, which is *free*; and *this upper Jerusalem* is our mother. — δέ] places the ἄνω Ἱερουσ. in contrast with the previous τῇ νῦν Ἱερουσ. The μία μὲν of ver. 24 has been left, in consequence of the digression occasioned by the remarks made in ver. 25, without any correlative to follow it (such as ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα),—an omission which is quite in harmony with the rapid movement of Pauline thought. Comp. Rom. vii. 12, *et al.*; also Rom. v. 12. He leaves it to the reader to form for himself the second part of the allegorical interpretation after the similarity of the first, and only adduces so much of it as is directly suggested by the contrast of the just characterized τῇ νῦν Ἱερουσ. He

leaves it, therefore, to the reader to supply the following thought: "But the other covenant, which is allegorically represented in this history, is the covenant instituted by Christ, which brings forth to freedom: this is Sarah, who is of the same nature with the upper Jerusalem; for the latter is, as Sarah was, free with its children, and to this upper Jerusalem we Christians as children belong." — ἡ δὲ ἄνω Ἱερουσαλήμ] is neither the *ancient* Jerusalem, the Salem of Melchizedek (Oeder, Michaelis, Paulus), nor *Mount Zion*, which is called in Josephus ἡ ἄνω πόλις (see the passages in Ottii *Spicil. ex Josepho*, p. 400 f.), as among the Greeks the Acropolis at Athens was also so named (Vitranga, Elsner, Mill, Wolf, Rambach, Moldenhauer, Zachariae). Both interpretations are opposed to the context, and the former to linguistic usage.¹ The contrast between heaven and earth elsewhere conveyed by ἄνω, as used by Paul (Phil. iii. 14; Col. iii. 2), is found here also, since ἡ νῦν Ἱερ. is the *earthly* Jerusalem. It is true that this contrast would have been more accurately expressed if, instead of τῇ νῦν Ἱερουσ., he had written τῇ κάτω Ἱερουσ. (ירושלים של מטה); but in using the νῦν he thought of the *future* Jerusalem as its contrast (Heb. xiii. 14), and afterwards *changed* his mode of representation, by conceiving the future as the *upper*: for it is the *heavenly* Jerusalem, called by the Rabbins ירושלים של מעלה, which, according to Jewish teaching, is the archetype in heaven of the earthly Jerusalem, and on the establishment of the Messiah's kingdom is let down to earth, in order to be the centre and capital of the Messianic theocracy, just as the earthly Jerusalem was the centre and capital of the ancient theocracy. Comp. Heb. xi. 10, xii. 22, xiii. 14; Rev. iii. 12, xxi. 2. See generally Schoettgen, *de Hieros. coelest.* in his *Horae*, p. 1205 ff.; Meuschen, *N. T. ex Talm. ill.* p. 199 ff.; Wetstein, *in loc.*; Bertholdt, *Christol.* p. 211 ff.; Ewald, *ad Apoc.* p. 11, 307. And as previously the present Jerusalem represented the Jewish divine commonwealth, so here the upper Jerusalem represents the *Messianic theocracy*, which before the

¹ ἄνω always means *above*. When it appears to mean *olim*, it denotes the ascending line of ancestry, as e.g. in Plat. *Legg.* ix. p. 880 B: ἡ πατρὶς ἡ ἱερὴ ἐνωσίς. *Theact.* p. 175 B *al.*; the earlier time lying behind being regarded as higher (Polyb. v. 6. 1, iv. 2. 3, iv. 50. 3).

παρουσία is the *church*, and after the *παρουσία* is the glorious *kingdom of the Messiah*. With justice, accordingly, the church on earth (not merely the "*ecclesia triumphans*") has at all times been deemed included in the heavenly Jerusalem (see Luther, and especially Calovius, *in loc.*); for the latter is, in relation to the church, its *πολίτευμα*, which is in heaven (Phil. iii. 20). The heavenly completion of the church in Christ ensues at the *παρουσία*, in which Christ who rules in heaven will manifest in glory the life—hitherto hidden with Him in God (see on Col. iii. 3 f.)—of the community, which is the body and *πλήρωμα* of Him its Head (Eph. i. 22 f.). Thus the church on earth is already the theocracy of the heavenly Jerusalem, and has its *πολίτευμα* in heaven; but this its *κληρονομία* is, until the *παρουσία*, only an ideal and veiled, although in hope *assured*, possession, which at the second coming of the Lord at length attains objective and glorious realization. It is, however, by no means to be asserted that Paul entertained the sensuous Rabbinical conceptions of the heavenly Jerusalem (see Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. p. 839 ff.); for he nowhere presents, or even so much as hints, at them, often as he speaks of the *παρουσία* and the consequences connected with it. In his view, the heavenly Jerusalem was the national setting for the idea—founded on the exalted Christ as its central point—of *the kingdom of the Messiah before and after its glorious realization*. — *ἐλευθέρα ἐστίν*] that is, independent of the Mosaic law (opposite of the *δουλεύει* in ver. 25), in free, moral self-determination, under the higher life-principle of the Spirit (Rom. viii. 2; 2 Cor. iii. 17). — *ἥτις ἐστὶ μήτηρ ἡμῶν*] correlative with the above-mentioned *μετὰ τῶν τέκν. αὐτῆς*; hence, if Paul had wished to lay the stress upon *ἡμῶν* (Winer, Matthias), he must have made this evident by the marked position *ἥτις ἡμῶν μήτ. ἐ*. The emphasis lies rather on *ἥτις*, that is, *she who*, etc. (comp. on ver. 24), *quippe quæ libera Hierosol.* To this Jerusalem as our *πολίτευμα* we Christians belong, as children to their mother (Phil. iii. 20; Eph. ii. 19). In bondage, it would not be our mother. Hofmann interprets differently: "the freedom of this Jerusalem may be seen in her children." But this would be a correlative *retrospective conclusion*, since Paul

has neither written *ὅτι* (but *ἵτις*), nor has he expressed himself participially *οὕσα μήτ. ἡμ.* *μήτηρ* without the article is *qualitative*. That *ἡμῶν* applies to the Christians *generally*, including also the Gentile Christians, is obvious of itself from the context, and does not require the addition of *πάντων* in the *Textus receptus*, which is defended by Ewald (in opposition to Reiche), to make it evident.

Ver. 27. Proof from Scripture¹ that no other than *this*, the *free Jerusalem* (*ἡτις*), is our mother. This, namely, is according to Paul the subject addressed, the *unfruitful* one, because Sarah—who, according to the allegory, answers to the heavenly Jerusalem—was, as is well known, barren. The *historical* sense of the prophecy (Isa. liv. 1, exactly according to the LXX.) is the joyful promise of a great increase to the depressed people of God in *its state of freedom* after the Babylonian exile. The desolate, uninhabited Jerusalem, which had become like an unfruitful wife, is summoned to rejoice, because it—and in this light, certainly, it is poetically compared with itself as a second person (in opposition to Hofmann)—is to become more populous, more rich in children, than formerly, when it was the husband-possessing spouse (of Jehovah). The *fulfilment* of this Messianic prophecy—*Messianic* because pervaded by the idea of the victorious theocracy—is discerned by Paul in the great new people of God, which belongs to the *ἄνω Ἱερουσαλήμ*, to this Sarah in the sense of the fulfilment, as its mother. Before the emergence of the Christian people of God, this heavenly Jerusalem was still unpeopled, childless; it was *στεῖρα, οὐ τίκτουσα, οὐκ ὠδίνουσα, ἔρημος* (*solitaria*, that is, in conformity with the contrast: without *conjugal* intercourse), consequently quite the Sarah of the allegory, before she became the mother of Isaac. But in and with the emergence of the Christian people of God, the *ἄνω Ἱερουσαλήμ* has become a fruitful mother, rejoicing over her wealth of children, richer in children than *ἡ νῦν Ἱερουσαλήμ*, this mother of the ancient people of God, which hitherto, like Hagar, had been *πῆλζ, ἡ ἔχουσα τὸν ἄνδρα*.

¹ For this Scriptural proof, the particular passage Isa. liv. 1 is selected with great skill and true tact, since the *ἄνω Ἱερουσαλήμ* is the allegorical counterpart of *Sarah*, this *στεῖρα ἡ οὐ τίκτουσα κ.τ.λ.*

This *ἀνὴρ* is God (not the law, as Luther interprets), whose relation to the theocratical commonwealth of the old covenant is conceived as conjugal intercourse. In virtue of this idea, the relation of God to the *νῦν* *Ἱερουσαλήμ*—the latter regarded as a woman *ἡ ἔχουσα τὸν ἄνδρα*—is the counterpart of the relation of Abraham to the *παιδίσκη* Hagar, whose descendants came into life *κατὰ σάρκα*. On the other hand, the relation of God to the *ἄνω* *Ἱερουσαλήμ*—the latter likewise regarded as a woman, who, however, had hitherto been *στεῖρα κ.τ.λ.*—is the counterpart of the relation of Abraham to the free Sarah, whose far more numerous descendants were children of promise (ver. 28). Comp. Rom. ix. 8. — *ἡ οὐ τίκτουσα*] not for the *past participle* (Grotius and others), but expressing the *state of the case as it stands*: “*which does not bear*,” the consequence of *στεῖρα*, *sterilis*, unfruitful, as Sara was *יְרֵבָא*. In the same way afterwards, *ἡ οὐκ ὠδίνουσα*. — *ῥῆξον*] *φωνήν* is usually supplied. For *many* instances of *ῥήγνυμι φωνήν* or *αὐδήν* (Eur. *Suppl.* 710), to unchain the voice, that is, to *speak aloud*, see Wetstein, *in loc.*; Loesner, *Obs.* p. 333; Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* X. p. 385, XI. p. 57, XII. p. 131. Comp. the Latin *rumpere vocem* (Drakenborch, *ad Sil. It.* iv. 528). But since the verb *alone* is never thus used, it is safer to derive the supplement from what has preceded; hence Kypke and Schott correctly supply *εὐφροσύνην* (*rumpere jubilum, begin to rejoice*), not because *יְרֵבָא יְרֵבָא* stands in the Hebrew (Schott), but because *εὐφροσύνην* flows from the previous *εὐφράνθητι*;¹ “*rejoice, let it break forth*.” The opposite is *ῥήγνυμι κλαυθμόν* (Plut. *Per.* 36), *ῥήγν. δακρύων νάματα* (Soph. *Trach.* 919). — *στεῖρα κ.τ.λ.*] applies in the connection of the original text to Jerusalem, and is also here necessarily (see ver. 26)—according to the Messianic fulfilment of the prophecy, in the light of which Paul apprehends the Scriptural saying—to be referred to Jerusalem, but to the *ἄνω* *Ἱερουσαλήμ*, *ἣτις ἐστὶ μήτηρ ἡμῶν*, whereas the *ἡ ἔχουσα τὸν ἄνδρα* which is placed in comparison with it is the *νῦν* *Ἱερουσαλήμ*. See above. Chrysostom and his successors, Bengel and others, consider that the words *στεῖρα κ.τ.λ.* apply to the *Gentile Christians* (she who had the husband being the *Jewish church*);

¹ The LXX. probably did not read *יְרֵבָא*.

but against this view it may be urged that that *ἡτις ἐστὶ μήτηρ ἡμῶν*, which refers to *all* Christians, is to be proved by ver. 27. — *πολλὰ . . . μᾶλλον ἢ*] not used instead of *πλείονα ἢ*, which would leave the *multitude* of children entirely undetermined; but it affirms that *both had many children*,—the *solitary one*, however, the *greater* number: for numerous are the children of the *solitary one in a higher degree than* those of her who possessed the husband. So the LXX. has rightly understood the Hebrew כְּבִימִים כְּבִימִים.

Ver. 28. It is not till ver. 29 that a *new* thought is entered on; hence ver. 28 is to be regarded as a remark explaining the *fulfilment* of the prophetic utterance, which has its actual realization in *the case of Christians*, and is to be annexed to ver. 27 (by a semicolon). So correctly, in opposition to the usual separation from ver. 27, Hofmann, Ewald, Wieseler. — But the *Christians* (*ὑμεῖς* individualizing; see the critical notes) *are the many children of that spiritual Sarah, the heavenly Jerusalem!* — *κατὰ Ἰσαάκ*] *After the manner of Isaac*; comp 1 Pet. i. 15; and see Wetstein and Kypke, also Heindorf, *ad Plat. Gorg.* p. 225 f. — *ἐπαγγελίας τέκνα*] *ἐπαγγ.* is emphatically prefixed: children of Abraham, who are not so by carnal descent like Ishmael, but *by promise*. So, namely, as Isaac was born to Abraham *in virtue of the promise* (ver. 23), are Christians by means of divine promise also children of Abraham, in virtue of the fact that they were promised by God to Abraham as *τέκνα*; without which promise, having reference to them, they would not stand in the relation of sonship to Abraham. Comp. Rom. ix. 8. We must not on account of ver. 23 explain the expression here, any more than in Rom. ix. 8 (see *in loc.*), as *liberi promissi* (Winer and others).

Vv. 29, 30. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this their higher state of sonship, these *spiritual* children of Abraham are persecuted by the *bodily* children of Abraham, as was formerly the case with Isaac and Ishmael; but (ver. 30) how wholly without ultimate success is, and, according to the Scripture, must be, this persecution! This is not a collateral trait (Holsten), but the consolatory practical result in which the allegory terminates—its *triumphantly joyful conclusion*. Comp. on ver. 31. — *τότε*] *then*, namely, at that time when the alle-

gorically-significant history came to pass. — ὁ κατὰ σάρκα γεννηθεῖς] see ver. 23. — ἐδίωκε] *persecuted*. It is true that in Gen. xxi. 9 Ishmael is designated only as a *mock*er (of Isaac).¹ But Paul follows the *tradition*, which, starting from the basis of that statement, went further. See Beresch. R. liii. 15: "Dixit Ismael Isaaco: eamus et videamus portionem nostram in agro; et tulit Ismael arcum et sagittas, et jaculatus est Isaacum et prae se tulit ac si luderet." According to Hofmann, Paul in the word διώκειν probably intends a *running after* Isaac wantonly to *annoy* him (just as the partisans of the law followed after the believing Gentiles in order to annoy them, v. 10, 12). Quite unsupported by any historical evidence, and very inappropriate to the *παράσσειν* of the Judaists (of which there is no mention here at all); comp. i. 7. — τὸν κατὰ πνεῦμα] *him that is born according to the Spirit*, that is, him who was born in consequence of the intervening agency of the Holy Spirit (for the divine πνεῦμα, as the principle of the divine promise, is instrumental in the efficacy of the latter). By means of the *vis carnis* Isaac could not have been born, but only by means of the *vis Spiritus divini*, which, operative in the divine promise, furnished at his procreation (Rom. iv. 17 ff.) the capacity of generation and conception. In fact, therefore, τὸν κατὰ πνεῦμα conveys the same idea as τὸν διὰ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας γεννηθέντα, ver. 23. The explanation: *per singularem efficacitatem Dei* (Schott), compares things which are in their nature different (Luke i. 35), and is not verbally accurate. And Hilgenfeld unnecessarily assumes (comp. Bengel) that the expression is to be explained by a blending together of the ideal reference of the allegory to the Christians, and of its historical basis. — οὕτω καὶ νῦν] So also now the children of Abraham according to the flesh (the Jews) persecute those who are Abraham's children κατὰ πνεῦμα (Christians, ἐπαγγελίας τέκνα, ver. 28). Comp. 1 Thess. ii. 15. This οὕτω καὶ νῦν does not exclude any kind of persecution which the Christians suffered at the

¹ The idea that Paul, in using *ιδίωκε*, really intended nothing more than this *mocking* ("nulla enim persecutio tam molesta esse nobis debet, quam dum impiorum ludibriis videmus labefactari nostram vocationem," Calvin), is not in harmony with the comprehensive sense of the word.

hands of the Jews; but that which is intended must have been actual *persecutions*, such as those to which the Christians as a body were so generally at that time subjected by the Jews, and not the *ταράσσειν* on the part of the Judaists (Hofmann; see on *ἐδίωκε*). — *ἀλλὰ τί λέγει ἡ γραφή;*] triumphantly introduces the divine certainty of the want of success, which will attend this *διώκειν*, to the destruction of the persecutors themselves. Observe how the importance of the utterance is brought out more vividly by the *interrogative* announcement. Comp. Rom. iv. 3, x. 8, xi. 2, 4; Dissen, *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 186, 347; Blomfield, *Gloss. ad Aesch. Pers.* 1013. The quotation is from Gen. xxi. 10, almost exactly following the LXX. Instead of *μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ μου Ἰσαάκ* in the LXX. (which therefore D* E? F G, codd. of the Itala, and some Fathers read also here), Paul has written *μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἐλευθέρας*, not accidentally, but in order to give prominence to the contrast, which significantly refers back to the chief point of the allegory (comp. ver. 22). — *ἔκβαλε κ.τ.λ.*] The words of Sarah to Abraham (which, however, in Gen. xxi. 12 are expressly approved by God and confirmed with a view to fulfilment), requiring the expulsion of Hagar and her son *from the house*. From this, looking to the scope of the allegory, the Galatians are to infer the exclusion of the non-free Jews, who were now persecuting the free Christians, from the people of God. This exclusion already actually exists even in the present *αἰών*, in so far as the true Israel which is free from the law (the *Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, vi. 16) has taken the place of the ancient people of God, and will attain its perfect realization at the *παρουσία*, when none but the free Christian family of God will share in the *κληρονομία* of eternal Messianic salvation. Comp. iii. 18, 29. According to Hofmann (comp. also his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 71), the meaning is, that as Abraham *separated* Ishmael from Isaac, so also the readers are to *dismiss from among them*, as unentitled to share in their inheritance, those who desired to force upon them their own legalism; the Christian body ought to remain *undisturbed* by such persons. This weakening of the idea is impossible with a correct conception of *διώκειν* in ver. 29; the *sure divine Nemesis* against the persecutors must be meant—the divine *ἐκδίκησις* (Luke

xviii. 7 f.; comp. 2 Thess. i. 6, 8). — οὐ γὰρ μὴ κληροῦ.] prefixed with great emphasis; the son of the bond-woman *shall assuredly not inherit*. Comp. Gen. xxv. 5 f. As to the exclusion, according to the Israelite law, of the children of a concubine from the right of inheritance, see Selden, *de success. ad leg. Hebr.* p. 28; Saalschütz, *M. R.* p. 831; Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 266.

Ver. 31 is usually looked upon as the keystone, as the final result of *the previous discourse*. “Applicat historiam et allegoriam, et summam absolvit brevi conclusionem,” Luther, 1519. But so taken, the purport of ver. 31 appears to express far too little, and to be feeble, because it has been already more than once implied in what precedes (see vv. 26, 28). We do not get rid of this incongruity, even if with Rückert we prefer the reading ἡμεῖς δέ, also approved by Hofmann (see the crit. notes), and assume the tacit inference: “consequently the inheritance cannot escape us, expulsion does not affect us.” For, after the whole argument previously developed, any such express application of ver. 30 to Christians would have been entirely superfluous; no reader needed it, in order clearly to discern and deeply to feel the certainty of victory conveyed in ver. 30; hence ver. 31 would be halting and without force. No; *ver. 31 begins a new section*. Comp. Lachmann, de Wette, Ewald, Hofmann. The allegorical instruction, which from ver. 22 onwards Paul has given, comes to a close forcibly and appropriately with the triumphant language of Scripture in ver. 30; and now Paul will follow it up by the exhortation to stand fast in their Christian liberty (v. 1). But first of all, as a basis for this exhortation, he prefixes to it the proposition—resulting from the previous instruction—which forms the “pith of the allegory” (Holsten), and exactly as such is fitted to be the theoretical principle placed at the head of the practical course of action to be required in the sequel, ver. 31. This proposition is then followed by τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἡλευθέρωσεν, v. 1, which very forcibly serves as a medium of transition to the direct summons στήκετε οὖν. “*Therefore, brethren,—seeing that our position is such as results from this allegory,—we are not children of a bond-woman (like the Jews), but of the free woman; for freedom Christ has made us free: stand therefore fast,*” etc.

CHAPTER V.

Ver. 1. τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ, ἣ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἡλευθέρωσε, στήκετε] So Griesb. (reading, however, Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς), Rück., Tisch., Wieseler. But Elz., Matth., Winer, Rinck, Reiche, read τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ οὖν, ἣ Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἡλευθέρωσε, στήκετε. Lachm., followed by Usteri, reads τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἡλευθέρωσεν. στήκετε οὖν, which was also approved of by Mill, Bengel, Griesb.; and Winer does not reject it. Scholz gives τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ, ἣ Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἡλευθέρωσε, στήκετε οὖν. Schott lastly, following Rinck, joins τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ, ἣ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἡλευθέρωσεν to iv. 31, and begins the new sentence with στήκετε οὖν. So also Ewald. Lachmann's reading, which is also followed by Hofmann, must be held to be the *original* one: (1) because amidst the numerous variations it has a decided preponderance of testimony in its favour, for ἣ is wanting in A B C D* **ς** and 8 min., Dam., and οὖν after στήκετε is written in A B C D* (in the Greek) F G **ς** and some 10 min., Copt. Goth. Aeth. Boern. Vulg. ms. Cyr. Bas. ms. Aug. Ambrosiast.; (2) because from it the origin of the rest of the readings can be explained easily, naturally, and without prejudice to the witnesses—namely, from the endeavour to connect τῇ ἐλευθ. ἡμ. X. ἡλευθ. immediately with iv. 31. Thus in some cases τῇ was merely changed into ἣ (F G, It. Vulg. Goth. and Fathers); in others ἣ was inserted before ἡμᾶς (Griesb.), allowing τῇ to remain. The relative thus introduced led others, who had in view the right connection with στήκετε, either to omit the οὖν (after στήκετε), which the presence of the relative rendered awkward (E, Vulg. It. Syr. p. Fathers; Griesb., Rück., Tisch.), or to place it immediately after ἐλευθερίᾳ (C*** K L, min., Fathers; Elz.). Lastly, the transposition Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς was an involuntary expedient to place the subject first, but is condemned by the decisive counter-weight of the evidence. It is a dubious view which derives the different readings of our passage from the accidental omission in writing of H before Ημας (Tisch., Wieseler), especially since very ancient witnesses, in which ἣ is wanting, read not ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς, but Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς (as C L **ς***** Marcion, Chrys.).—Ver. 3. πάλιν] is wanting in D* F G, 73, 74, 76, It. Chrys. Theophyl. Victorin. Jerome, Aug. Ambrosiast. The omission is caused by the similarity of the παντι which follows. — Ver. 7. ἐνχοψε] The

Elz. reading ἀίεκοψε is opposed to all the uncials and most min., and is therefore rightly rejected by Grot., Mill., Bengel, Matth., Lachm., Tisch., Reiche, whereas Usteri sought very feebly to defend it. — The τῇ which follows is wanting in A B s*. But the article forms a necessary part of the idea (comp. ii. 5, 14), and the omission must be looked upon as a mere error in copying. Without just ground, Semler and Koppe consider the whole τῇ ἀλ.ηθ. μὴ πείθεσθαι to be not genuine; and the latter is disposed, instead of it, to defend μηδενὶ πείθεσθε, which is found in F G, codd. Lat. in Jer. and some vss. and Fathers, after πείθεσθαι, but is manifestly a gloss annexed to the following ἡ πεισμονὴ κ.τ.λ. Still more arbitrarily, Schott holds the whole of ver. 7 to be an inserted gloss. — Ver. 9. ζυμοῖ] D* E, Vulg. Clar. Germ. codd. Lat. in Jer. and Sedul., and several Fathers, read δολοῖ. Approved by Mill. and Valck. *Schol.* II. p. 178. An interpretation, because in this passage the leaven represents something corrupting (otherwise in Matt. xiii. 33). Comp. on 1 Cor. v. 6. — Ver. 14. ἐν ἐνὶ λόγῳ] Marcion (in Epiph. and Tert.) read ὑμῖν, and D* E F G, It. Ambrosiast. have ἐν ὑμῖν ἐν ἐνὶ λόγῳ. Marcion's reading is of antinomistic origin (hence he also omitted the following ἐν τῷ); but the ὑμῖν introduced by it became subsequently blended with the original text. — πληροῦται] Defended by Reiche; but A B C s, min., Marcion (in Epiph. and Tert.) Damasc. Aug. read πεπλήρωται. Justly; the meaning of the perfect (which is also adopted by Lachm., Rück., Schott, Tisch.) was not apprehended by mechanical transcribers. — σεαυτὸν] Elz., Matth., Schott, read ἑαυτὸν. Certainly in opposition to A B C D E K s, min., and Greek Fathers; but the pronoun of the second person was very likely to occur to the copyists (in the LXX. Lev. xix. 18, there is the same variety of readings), and indeed the final letter of the foregoing ὡς might easily lend support to the σεαυτὸν: hence ἑαυτὸν is to be restored, in opposition to Griesb., Scholz, Lachm., Tisch., and others. Comp. on Rom. xiii. 9. — Ver. 17. ταῦτα δέ] Lachm. and Schott read ταῦτα γάρ, following B D* E F G *, 17, Copt. Vulg. It. and some Fathers. Looking at this preponderance of attestation, and seeing that the continuative δέ might easily appear more suitable, γάρ is to be preferred. — Ver. 19 f. μοιχείᾳ] is wanting before πορν. in A B C s*, min., and many vss. and Fathers; 76, 115, Epiph. Chrys. Theophyl. have it after πορνεία. In opposition to Reiche, but with Griesb., Lachm., Scholz, Schott, Tisch., and others, it is to be deleted, since it has been introduced, although at a very early date (It. Or.), most probably by the juxtaposition of the two words in other passages (Matt. xv. 19; Mark vii. 21; comp. Hos. ii. 2), well known to the transcribers. — ἔρεις, ζῆλοι]

Lachm. and Tisch. have the singular, following weighty evidence; the plurals were introduced in conformity to the adjoining. — Ver. 21. *φόνος*] is wanting in B α , 17, 33, 35, 57, 73, and several Fathers, but in no version. Rejected by Mill, Seml., and Koppe, bracketed by Lachm., deleted by Tisch. On account of the similarity of sound with the preceding word it might just as easily be omitted, as it might be added from Rom. i. 29. Hence the preponderance of witnesses determines the point, and that in favour of the retention.

CONTENTS.—Exhortation to steadfastness in Christian freedom, and warning against the opposite course. If they allowed themselves to be circumcised, Christ would profit them nothing, and they would be bound to the law as a whole; by legal justification they would be severed from Christ and from grace, as is proved by the nature of Christian righteousness (vv. 1–6). Complaint and warning on account of the apostasy of the readers, respecting whom, however, Paul cherishes good confidence; whereas he threatens judgment against the seducers, whose teaching as to circumcision is in no sense his (vv. 7–12). A warning against the abuse, and an exhortation to the right use, of Christian freedom, which consists in a demeanour actuated by mutual love (vv. 13–15); whereupon he then enters into a detailed explanation to the effect that the Holy Spirit, and not the flesh, must be the guiding power of their conduct (vv. 16–25). After this, special moral exhortations begin (ver. 26).

Ver. 1. *Τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν*] On this reading, see the critical notes. The sentence forms, with iv. 31, the basis of the exhortation which follows, *στήκετε οὖν κ.τ.λ.* See on iv. 31. *For freedom*, in order that we should be free and should remain so, that we should not again become subject to bondage, *Christ has set us free* (iv. 1–7), namely, from the bondage of the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* (iv. 3). The dative *τῇ ἐλευθ.* is therefore *commodi*, not *instrumenti*. Comp. also Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 155; Holsten, Hofmann, Reithmayr. By so taking it, and by attending to the *emphasis*, which lies not on *Χριστός*, but on the *τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ* following immediately after *τῆς ἐλευθέρως* in iv. 31, we obviate entirely the objection of Rückert (comp. Matthies and Olshausen) that Paul must

have written: *X. ἡμᾶς ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡλευθέρωσεν*, or *εἰς ἐλευθ.*, or *τῇ ἐλευθ. ταύτῃ*, or *ἣν ἔχομεν*, or some other addition of the kind. — *στήκετε οὖν*] *stand fast therefore*, namely, in the freedom, which is to be inferred from what goes before; hence the absence of connection with *τῇ ἐλευθ.* does not produce any obscurity or abruptness (in opposition to Reiche). On the absolute *στήκετε*, which obtains its reference from the context, comp. 2 Thess. ii. 15. — *καὶ μὴ πάλιν κ.τ.λ.*] *and be not again held in a yoke of bondage*. Previously they had been (most of them) in the yoke of heathenism; now they were on the point of being held in the yoke of Mosaism (only another kind of the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*). The yoke is conceived as laid on the neck: Acts xv. 10; Ecclus. li. 26; Dem. 322. 12; Hom. *H. Cer.* 217. As to *πάλιν*, comp. on iv. 9. *δουλείας* denotes the characteristic *quality* belonging to the yoke. Comp. Soph. *Aj.* 924: *πρὸς οἷα δουλείας ζυγὰ χωροῦμεν*. Eur. *Or.* 1330; Plat. *Legg.* vi. p. 770 E: *δούλειον ζυγόν*, *Ep.* 8, p. 354 D; Dem. 322. 12; Herod. vii. 8. — *ἐνέχεσθαι*, with the *dative* (Dem. 1231. 15; 2 Macc. v. 18; 3 Macc. vi. 10) or with *ἐν* (Dem. 1069. 9), is the proper expression for those who are *held* either in a *physical* (net or the like) or *ethical* (law, dogma, emotion, sin, or the like) restriction of liberty, so that they cannot get out. See Kypke *in loc.*, and Markland *ad Lys.* V. p. 37, Reisk. Here, on account of the idea of a *yoke*, the reference is *physical*, but used as a figurative representation for that which is *mental*, which affects the *conscience*.

Note.—If we take the reading of the *Recepta*, and of Griesbach and his followers (see the critical notes), we must explain it: “*In respect of the freedom, [therefore], for which Christ has set us free, stand fast, and become not again, etc.*!”—so that *τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ* is to be taken like *τῇ πίστει* in 2 Cor. i. 24 and Rom. iv. 20, and *ᾧ* as the *dative commodi* (Morus, Winer, Reiche). *ᾧ* might also (with the Vulgate, Luther, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Rückert, Schott, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, and many others) be taken as *ablative* (instrumentally): “*qua nos liberavit*,” after the analogy of the classical expressions *ζῆν βίῳ*, *ῥῆσαι ὕδατι κ.τ.λ.* (Bernhardy, p. 107; Lobeck, *Paral.* p. 523 ff.), and of the frequent use both in the LXX. and the N. T. (Winer, p. 434 [E. T. 584]) of “cognate” nouns in the *dative*. But this mode of expression does not occur elsewhere with Paul, not even in 1 Thess. iii. 9. According

to Schott, Ewald, and Matthias, who join it to iv. 31 (see the critical notes), we get the meaning: "*We are not children of a bond-maid, but of the free woman through the freedom, with which Christ made us free; stand fast therefore.*" Thus τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἣ ἡμᾶς Χριστ. ἡλευθ. becomes a self-evident appendage; and Χριστός receives an emphasis, just as in iii. 13, which its position does not warrant.

Ver. 2. Paul now in a warning tone reveals to them the fearful danger to which they are exposed. This he does by the address ἴδε in the singular (comp. Soph. *Trach.* 824), exciting the special attention of every individual reader, and with the energetic, defiant interposition of his personal authority: ἐγὼ Παῦλος, on which Theophylact well remarks: τὴν τοῦ οἰκείου προσώπου ἀξιοπιστίαν ἀντὶ πάσης ἀποδείξεως τίθησι. Comp. 2 Cor. x. 1; Eph. iii. 1; Col. i. 23 — ἐὰν περιτέμνησθε] To be pronounced with special emphasis. The readers stood now on the very verge of obeying *thus far*—and therefore to the utmost—the suggestions of the false apostles in taking upon them the yoke of the law, after having already consented to preliminary isolated acts of legal observance (iv. 10). — Χριστὸς ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ὠφελήσει] comp. ii. 21. Χριστὸς is emphatically placed first, and immediately after περιτ. Chrysostom, moreover, aptly remarks: ὁ περιτεμνόμενος ὡς νόμον δεδοικὼς περιτέμνεται, ὁ δὲ δεδοικὼς ἀπιστεῖ τῇ δυνάμει τῆς χάριτος, ὁ δὲ ἀπιστῶν οὐδὲν κερδαίνει παρὰ τῆς ἀπιστουμένης. On such a footing Christ cannot be Christ, the Mediator of salvation. Paul's judgment presupposes that circumcision is adopted, not as a condition of a holy life (Holsten), but as a *condition of salvation*, which was the question raised among the Galatians, ii. 3, 5; Acts xv. 1, xvi. 3. Comp. Lechler, *apost. Zeitalt.* p. 248. The *future*, ὠφελήσει, which is explained by others (de Wette, Hofmann, and most) as referring to the consequence generally, points to the nearness of the Parousia and the decision of the judgment. Comp. ver. 5: ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης, just as previously the idea of the κληρονομία in iv. 30.

Ver. 3. With regard to the judgment just expressed, Χριστὸς οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήσει, Paul now, with increasing emotion (μαρτύρομαι, παντὶ ἄνθρ. περιτ.), gives an explanation (vv. 3, 4) which clearly discloses the entire certainty of this

negation. — The *δέ* is not *potius* (Schott), because it is not preceded by any antagonistic assertion, but is the *autem* which leads on to more detailed information (Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 845). — *μαρτύρομαι*] in the sense of *μαρτυρῶ*, as in Acts xx. 26; Eph. iv. 17; Joseph. *Bell.* iii. 8. 3; and also Plat. *Phil.* p. 47 D), while in classical authors it usually means *to summon as a witness* and *obtestor*. Paul *testifies* that which with divine certainty he *knows*. The context does not warrant us to supply *θεόν*, with Bretschneider and Hilgenfeld. — *πάλιν*] not *contra* (Erasmus, Er. Schmid, Koppe, Wahl; comp. Usteri), which is never its meaning (see Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 166 f.), but *again*, not however in the sense that ver. 3 is described as a repetition of what was said in ver. 2 (Calvin, Castalio, Calovius, Wolf, Zachariae, Paulus, and others), which it is not; nor in the sense that Paul is thinking merely of the *testifying in itself*, and not of its *purport* (Hofmann; comp. Fritzsche, Winer, de Wette),—an interpretation which cannot but be the less natural, the more necessarily that which is attested *πάλιν* stands in essential inner connection with the axiom which had been previously expressed ("*probatio est proximae sententiae sumta ex loco repugnantium*," Calvin); but in the sense that Paul *calls to the remembrance* of his readers *his last presence among them* (the second), when he had already orally assured them of what he here expresses (Moldenhauer, Flatt, Rückert, Olshausen, Wieseler). Comp. on i. 9, iv. 16. — *παντὶ ἀνθρ. περὶ*.] stands in a climactic relation to the foregoing *ὑμῖν*, remorselessly embracing *all*: *to every one* I testify, so that no one may fancy himself excluded from the bearing of the statement. According to Chrysostom and Theophylact, with whom Schott and others agree, Paul has wished to avoid the appearance *κατ' ἔχθραν τὰντα λέγεσθαι*; but in this view the whole climactic force of the address is misunderstood. — *δλον*] has the emphasis; comp. Jas. ii. 10. Circumcision binds the man who accepts it to obey the *whole* law, because it makes him a full member of the covenant of the law, a proselyte of righteousness, and the law requires from those who are bound to it its entire fulfilment (iii. 10). Probably the pseudo-apostles had sought at least to conceal or to weaken this true and — since no one is able wholly to keep the law

(Acts xiii. 38, xv. 10; Rom. viii. 3)—yet so fearful consequence of accepting circumcision, as if faith in Christ and acceptance of circumcision might be compatible with one another. On the contrary, Paul proclaims the decisive *aut . . . aut*. The state of the man who allows himself to be circumcised stands in a relation *contradictory* to the state of grace (comp. Rom. vi. 14 f., xi. 6).

Ver. 4. But whosoever is justified through the law—a way of justification which necessarily follows from the already mentioned obligation—is separated from Christ, etc. A complete explanation is thus given as to the *Χριστὸς ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ὠφέλησει*. Asyndetic (without δέ), and reverting to the second person, the language of Paul is the more emphatic and vivid. — *κατηργήθητε*] In the first clause the stress is laid upon the dread *separation* which has befallen them, in the second on the *benefit* thereby lost,—a striking alternation of emphasis. The pregnant expression, *καταργεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τινος* (comp. Rom. ix. 3; 2 Cor. xi. 3; see generally, Fritzsche *ad Rom.* II. p. 250), is to be resolved into *καταργεῖσθαι καὶ χωρίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τινος*, that is, *to come to nothing in regard to the relation hitherto subsisting with any one, so that we are parted from him*. Just the same in Rom. vii. 2, 6. Hence the sense is: *your connection with Christ is annulled, cancelled*; ἀπεκόπητε, Oecumenius. Justification by the law and justification for Christ's sake are in truth *opposita* (works—faith), so that the one *excludes* the other. — *οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε*] *ye who are being justified through the law*. The directly assertive and present *δικαιοῦσθε* is said from the mental standpoint of the subjects concerned, in *whose* view of the matter the way of salvation is this: “through the law, with which our conduct agrees (comp. iii. 11), we become just before God.” Hence the concrete statement is not to be weakened either by taking *δικαιοῦσθαι* in the sense of *ζητεῖν δικαιοῦσθαι*, ii. 17 (Rückert, Baumgarten-Crusius, and earlier expositors), or by attributing a *hypothetical* sense to *οἵτινες* (Hofmann, who erroneously compares Thuc. v. 16. 1). Whomsoever Paul *hits* with his *οἵτινες κ.τ.λ.*, he also *means*. — *τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε*] that is, *ye have forfeited the relation of being objects of divine grace*. The opposite: *ὑπὸ χάριν εἶναι* (Rom. vi. 14), to which divine grace faith has led (Rom.

v. 2). On the figurative ἐκπίπτειν, comp. 2 Pet. iii. 17; Plut. *Gracch.* 21: ἐκπεσεῖν καὶ στερεεσθαι τῆς πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὐνοίας, Polyb. xii. 14. 7; Lucian, *Cont.* 14; Ecclus. xxxi. 4. Whoever becomes righteous by obedience to the law, becomes so no longer by the grace of God (δωρεάν, Rom. iii. 24), but by works according to desert (Rom. iv. 11, 16, xi. 6); so that thus his relation of grace towards God (which is *capable of being lost*) has *ceased*.

Ver. 5. Ground *e contrario* for the judgment passed in ver. 4 on those becoming righteous by the law; derived, not generally from what makes up the essence of the Christian state (Hofmann), but specially from the specific way in which *Paul and those like him* expect to be justified. The reasoning presupposes the certainty, of which the apostle was conscious, that the ἡμεῖς are those who are *not* separated from Christ and have *not* fallen from grace. — ἡμεῖς] *we*, on our part: “qui a nobis dissentiunt, habeant sibi,” Bengel. — πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως] is not (with Luther) to be considered as one idea (“*Spiritu, qui ex fide est*”), since there is no contrast with any other spirit, but rather as *two* points opposed to the ἐν νόμῳ in ver. 4: “*by means of the Spirit, from faith, we expect,*” etc.; so that the Holy Spirit is the divine *agent*, and faith in Christ is the subjective *source* of our expectation. On πνεύματι, comp. Rom. vii. 6, viii. 4, 15 f., Eph. i. 13 f., ii. 22, *et al.*; and on ἐκ πίστεως, comp. ii. 16, iv. 22, Rom. i. 17, iii. 22, ix. 30, x. 6, *et al.* We must not therefore explain πνεύματι either as the *spirit of man simply* (with Grotius, Borger, Fritzsche, and others), or (comp. on Rom. viii. 4) as the *spiritual nature of man sanctified* by the Holy Spirit (Winer, Paulus, Rückert, and others; comp. Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hofmann); but similarly to ver. 16, as the *objective πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, which is the divine principle of spiritual life in Christians, and which they have received ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως (iii. 2, 5, iv. 6). And the Holy Spirit is the divine mainspring of Christian hope, as being the potential source of all Christian sentiment and Christian life in general, and as the earnest and surety of eternal life in particular (2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5; Eph. i. 14; Rom. viii. 11, 23). — ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχ.] ἀπεκδέχεσθαι (Rom. viii. 19, 23, 25; 1 Cor. i. 7; Phil. iii. 20; 1 Pet. iii.

20) does not indeed denote that he who waits *is wholly spent* in waiting (Hofmann), but rather (comp. generally Winer, *de verb. compos.* IV. p. 14) the persistent *awaiting*, which does not slacken until the time of realization (C. F. A. Fritzsche in *Fritzschor. Opusc.* p. 156). The genitive *δικαιοσύνης* is not *appositionis* (Wieseler), so that the sense would be: "the *righteousness hoped for by us*," the genitive with *ἐλπίς* never being used in this way; but it is the genitive *objecti*: *the hope of being justified*, namely, in the judgment, where we shall be declared by Christ as righteous. At variance with the context, since justification *itself* is in question (see ver. 4), others understand it as the genitive *subjecti*, as that *which righteousness has to hope for*,¹ that is, the *hoped for reward of righteousness*, namely, eternal life. So Pelagius, Beza, Piscator, Hunnius, Calovius, Bengel, Rambach, Baumgarten, Zachariae, Koppe, Borger, Paulus, Windischmann, Reithmayr, and others; comp. also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* pp. 333, 341. The fact that the *δικαιοσύνη* itself—that is, the righteousness of *faith*, and not that of a *holy life* (Holsten)—is presented as something *future*, need not in itself surprise us, because during the temporal life it exists indeed through faith, but may nevertheless be lost (see vv. 2, 4), and is not yet a *definitive* possession, which it only comes to be at the judgment (Rom. viii. 33 f.). In a corresponding way, the *νόθεσία*, although it has been already entered upon through faith (iii. 26, iv. 5), is also the object of hope (Rom. viii. 23). This at the same time explains why Paul *here* speaks in particular of an *ἐλπίς δικαιοσύνης*; he thereby indicates the difference between the *certainty of salvation* in the consciousness (Rom. viii. 24) of the true Christians, and the confidence, dependent upon works, felt by the legally righteous, who say: *ἐν νόμῳ δικαιούμεθα*, because in their case the becoming righteous is something in a continuous *course of growth* by means of meritorious obedience to the law. Lastly, the expression *ἀπεκδέχασθαι ἐλπίδα* is not to be explained by the

¹ Hofmann, in fact, arrives at the same result, although he rejects the interpretation of the genitive as the *gen. subjecti*: "To wait for the *blessing of righteousness* already prepared for him, *which constitutes the substance of his hope*,"—consequently for the *στίφανος* of his *δικαιοσύνη*, 2 Tim. iv. 8 (see Huther in *loc. ed.* 3).

supposition that Paul, when he wrote ἐλπίδα, had it in his mind to make ἔχομεν follow (Winer, Usteri, Schott),—an interpretation which is all the more arbitrary, because there is no intervening sentence which might divert his thought,—but the hope is treated *objectively* (comp. on Col. i. 5; Rom. viii. 24; Heb. vi. 18), so that ἀπεκδέχεσθαι ἐλπίδα belongs to the category of the familiar expressions ζῆν βίον, πιστεύειν δόξαν (Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 501 ff.). Comp. Acts xxiv. 15: ἐλπίδα . . . ἦν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι προσδέχονται, Tit. ii. 13; Job ii. 9; Isa. xxviii. 10; 2 Macc. vii. 14; Eur. *Alc.* 130: νῦν δὲ τίς ἔτι βίου ἐλπίδα προσδέχωμαι; Dem. 1468. 13: ἐλπίδα . . . προσδοκᾶσθαι. The Catholic doctrine of the *gradual increase of righteousness* (*Trident.* vi. 10. 24, Döllinger) is entirely un-Pauline, although favoured by Romang, Hengstenberg, and others. Justification does not, like sanctification, develop itself and increase; but it has, as its moral consequence (iv. 6), sanctification through the Spirit, which is given to him who is justified by faith. Thus Christ is to us δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ἁγιασμός, 1 Cor. i. 30.

Ver. 6. Warrant for the ἐκ πίστεως: *for in Christ Jesus*, in fellowship with Christ (in the relation of the ἐν Χριστῷ εἶναι), *neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail*; the fact of a man being or not being circumcised is of no influence, *but faith, which is operative through love, sc. ἰσχύει τι*. The τι ἰσχύει is to be left in the same general and unlimited form in which it stands. Circumcision and uncircumcision are circumstances of no effect or avail in Christianity. And yet they were in Galatia the points on which the disturbance turned! On the *faith active in love*, which is the effective saving element in the state of the Christian, comp. 1 Tim. i. 5; 1 Thess. i. 3; 1 Cor. xiii.; also Jas. ii. 22. By means of this faith man is καινὴ κτίσις, vi. 15. Bengel well says: "Cum fide conjunxit ver. 5, *spem*, nunc *amorem*; in his stat totus Christianismus." How very necessary it was for the Galatians that prominence should be given to the activity of faith *in love*, may be seen from vv. 15, 20, 26. The *passive* view of ἐνεργουμ., which is given by the Fathers and many Catholics, such as Bellarmine, Estius, Reithmayr, in whom the interest of dogmatic controversy against the Protestants came

to a great extent into play, is erroneous, because *ἐνεργεῖσθαι* in the N. T. is *always middle* (*vim suam exserere*). See on 2 Cor. i. 6; Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* vii. 6, II. p. 18. It does not mean, "*having been rendered energetic through love*" (Reithmayr), but *working* through love, expressing thereby its vital power. Moreover, our passage is not at variance with justification *solely* by faith: "*opera fieri dicit ex fide per caritatem, non justificari hominem per caritatem*," Luther. Comp. Calovius: "*Formatam*¹ etiam fidem apostolus refellit, cum non per caritatem *formam* suam accipere vel *formari*, sed per caritatem *operosam* vel *efficacem* esse docet. Caritatem ergo et opera non fidem *constituere*, sed *consequi* et ex eadem *fluere* certum est." It must, however, be observed that love (the opposite of all selfishness) must be, from its nature, the continuous *moral medium* of the operation of faith in those who are thereby justified,² 1 Cor. xiii. 1 ff. Comp. Lipsius, *Rechtfert.* p. 192; Romang, in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1867, p. 90 ff., who, however, concedes too much to the idea of *fides formata*.

Vv. 7-9. How naturally—and, in conformity with the apostle's lively emotion, asyndetically—the utterance of this axiom of the Christian character and life, which the readers had formerly obeyed, is followed by disapproving surprise at the fact that they had not remained faithful to it (ver. 7), and then by renewed warning against the false teachers, based on the ungodly nature (ver. 8) and the destructive influence (ver. 9) of their operations! — *ἐτρέχετε καλῶς*] that is, your Christian behaviour—your Christian life and effort—was in course of excellent development. A figurative mode of presenting the activity of spiritual life very frequently used by the apostle. Comp. ii. 2; Phil. iii. 11. — *τίς ὑμᾶς ἐνέκοψε*] A question of surprise (comp. iii. 1): *who hindered you?* Comp. 1 Thess. ii. 18; Rom. xv. 22; 1 Pet. iii. 7. In Polyb. xxi. 1. 12 it is used with the dative. So also Hippocr. pp. 28, 35; for it means properly: to make an incision. — *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι*] *from obeying the truth*, that is, the true gospel,

¹ The "*fides formata*" is also found here by Bisping, and especially Reithmayr, following the *Trid. Sess.* vi. 7, *de justif.* See, on the other hand, *Apol. Conf. Aug.* p. 81 f.

² Comp. also Dorner, *Gesch. d. prot. Theol.* p. 232 ff.

according to which faith alone is that which justifies. *μή* is employed, as usual, after verbs of hindering. See Hermann, *ad Vigcr.* p. 810 f.; Pflugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 867; Winer, p. 561 [E. T. 755]. The *infinitive* with *μή* denotes that which, so far as the will of the hinderer is concerned, shall not take place. — *ἡ πεισμονὴ κ.τ.λ.*] After the surprise comes the *warning*. *ἡ πεισμονή* occurs again only in Apoll. *Synt.* p. 195. 10, in Eustath. (*Il.* ι, p. 637. 5, *a*, pp. 21, 26, *et al.*; see Wetstein), and in the Fathers (Ignat. *ad Rom.* 3 *interpol.*; Just. Mart. *Ap.* I. 53, p. 87; Epiph. *Haer.* xxx. 21; Chrysostom, *ad 1 Thess.* i. 4). Whether, however, the word is to be understood *actively*, as *persuasion*, or *passively*, as *compliance*, is a point which must be decided in the several passages by the context. In this passage it is understood as *persuasion* by MSS. of the Itala (*suasio*), Vulgate (*persuasio*), Erasmus, Castalio, Calvin, Beza, Cornelius a Lapide, Wolf, Michaelis, Zachariae, Koppe, Borger, Flatt, Paulus, Usteri, Schott, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Matthias, Holsten, and others; on the other hand, Chrysostom (*οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκάλεσαν ὑμᾶς ὁ καλῶν, ὥστε οὕτω σαλεύεσθαι*), Oecumenius (*τὸ πεισθῆναι τοῖς λέγουσιν ὑμῖν περιτέμνεσθαι*), Theophylact (*τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ἀπατῶσιν*), Luther (1519 and 1524; but in 1538, and in his translation: *such persuasion*), and others, including Morus, Winer, Rückert, Matthies, Ols-hausen, Reiche, Hofmann, Reithmayr, explain it as *compliance*,¹ which, however, does not fit the word used absolutely. The latter rather yields the thought: *The persuasion is not of your caller*, is not a thing proceeding from God (see, on the contrary, 2 Cor. xi. 15). Paul would have this applied to the mode of operation of the pseudo-apostles, who worked upon the Galatians *by persuasion* (talking over), so that they did not remain obedient to the truth, but turned *ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος αὐτοὺς ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ* to an *ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον* (i. 6). If it were to be taken as *compliance*, some more precise definition must have been appended;² because compliance is

¹ This view serves to explain the omission of the *οὐκ* in D*, min., Cod. lat. in Jer. and Sedul. Clar. Germ. Or. (once), Lucifer. Theodoret also appears not to have read it, as he gives the explanation: Ἱδιοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ καλεῖν, τὸ δὲ πείθεσθαι τῶν ἀκούοντων.

² At least *ὑμῶν*, which is actually read by Syr. Erp. codd. in Jer. Lucif. Aug. Ambrosiast. Sedul. Arm. has *αὕτη γὰρ πεισμονή*. Vömel and Hofmann

ungodly not in itself, but only according to the nature of the demand, the motive, and the moral circumstances generally. Some have made it to mean *credulitas* (Estius, Winer, Baumgarten-Crusius, and others), but the sense of the word is thus altered. The *talking over*, however, did not need anything added, since it is *of itself*, in matters of faith at any rate, objectionable; hence it was very superfluous in Luther, Grotius, and many others, to take the article as *demonstrative*. Moreover, the active sense is excellently adapted to the designation of God by ὁ καλῶν ὑμᾶς, inasmuch as the *talking over* is a mode of operating on men characteristically different from the divine *calling*: the former not befitting the divine dignity like the latter; the former bound up with human premeditation, art, and importunity, taking place ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις (1 Cor. ii. 4), counteracting free self-determination, and so forth. Comp. Soph. *Fragm.* 744, Dind.: δέινον τὸ τᾶς Πειθοῦς πρόσωπον. Aesch. *Agam.* 385: βιάται δ' ἅ τάλαινα πειθῶ. Bengel, Morus, and de Wette understand it as *obstinacy* (the "clinging to prejudices," de Wette), making it correspond with the foregoing τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι. So also Ewald, although translating it as *self-confidence*, and comparing πίσυνος. But the passages cited above from Eustathius do not make good this signification; and, in particular, *Od.* x. p. 785. 22, is quite improperly adduced in its favour (see Reiche, p. 79 f.). Reiche, preferring the signification *compliance*, takes the sentence as *asking* indignantly: "Annon assensus, obsequium veritati praestandum e Deo est, qui vos vocavit?" But why should Paul have expressed this by the singular word *πεισμονή* not used by him elsewhere, and not by the current and unambiguous πίστις or ὑπακοή τῆς πίστεως? By employing the latter, he would, in fact, have also suited the foregoing πείθεσθαι. — The καλῶν ὑμᾶς is neither *Christ* (Theophylact, Erasmus, Michaelis, and others) nor *the apostle* (Locke, Paulus),

seek to remove the indefiniteness by reading instead of the article the relative ἥ: *which* obedience. But, according to this view, ἡ πεισμ. must have been correlative to the foregoing πείθεσθαι (comp. *Wisd.* xvi. 2), and this consequently must have been defined not negatively, but positively, somewhat as if Paul, instead of τῇ ἀληθ., μὴ πείθεσθαι, had written ἐτέρῃ εὐαγγελίῳ πείθεσθαι. But having written τ. ἀληθ. μὴ πείθεσθαι, he must, in correlation with μὴ πείθεσθαι, have continued relatively with ἡ ἀπειθεία.

but *God*. See on i. 6. The *present* participle is not to be understood of a *continuing* call "*ad resipiscentiam*" (Beza),—a view at variance with the constant use of the absolute *καλεῖν* (i. 6, v. 13; Rom. viii. 30, *et al.*); nor does it represent the calling as lasting up to the time of their yielding compliance against the truth (Hofmann), which would be an idea foreign to the N. T. (i. 6; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 386 f.); but it is to be taken *substantivally*, *your caller*, the definition of the time being left out of view. Comp. 1 Thess. v. 24; Winer, p. 331 [E. T. 444]. God, the *caller* to everlasting salvation, has assigned to every one, by calling him at his conversion (Phil. iii. 14), the "*normam totius cursus*" (Bengel). — *μικρὰ ζύμη κ.τ.λ.*] The meaning of this proverbial warning (see on 1 Cor. v. 6) is: "If the false apostles have, by means of their persuasion, succeeded in making even but a small beginning in the work of imparting to you erroneous doctrines or false principles, this will develop itself to the corruption of your whole Christian faith and life." So, taking the figure with reference to *doctrine*, in substance also Chrysostom, Theophylact (who, however, explain *μικρὰ ζύμη* too specially of *circumcision*), Luther, Calvin, Cornelius a Lapide, and many others, including Flatt and Matthies. It is true that the dogma of his opponents was in itself fundamentally subversive (as Wieseler objects); but its *influence* had not yet so far developed itself, that the *ζύμη* might not have been still designated relatively as *μικρά*. Others interpret it as referring to *persons*: "*vel pauci homines perperam docentes possunt omnem coetum corrumpere*," Winer (comp. Theodoret, Jerome, Augustine, Erasmus, Grotius, Estius, Locke, Bengel, Borger, Paulus, Usteri, Schott, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Hofmann, Windischmann, Reithmayr, and others); but against this it may be urged that the *number* of the false teachers, as it is in itself a matter of indifference, and does not acquire greater significance through their having intruded themselves from without, remains also unnoticed throughout the epistle, and the point in question was solely the *influence of their teaching* (comp. *πείσμονή*), which was the leaven threatening to spread destructively. Comp. i. 7 ff., iii. 1.

Ver. 10. After the warning in vv. 8, 9, Paul now assures

his readers how he cherishes confidence in them, that their sentiments would be in conformity with this warning; but those who led them astray would meet with punishment. — ἐγώ] with emphasis: *I on my part*, however much my opponents may think that they have won over your judgment to their side. Groundlessly and arbitrarily Rückert affirms that what Paul *says* is not altogether what he *means*, namely, “I indeed have done all that was possible, so that I may be allowed to hope,” etc. — εἰς ὑμᾶς] *towards you*. Comp. Wisd. xvi. 24. Usually with the dative or ἐπὶ. — ἐν κυρίῳ] *In Christ*, in whom Paul lives and moves, he feels also that his confidence rests and is grounded. Comp. Phil. ii. 24; 2 Thess. iii. 4; Rom. xiv. 14. — οὐδὲν ἄλλο] is referred by most expositors, including Luther, Calvin, Winer, Rückert, Matthies. Schott, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Ewald, to the previous purport of the epistle generally as directed against Judaism. But what is there to warrant this vague reference? The warning which immediately precedes in vv. 8, 9 (not ver. 7, to which Wieseler, Hofmann, and others arbitrarily go back) has the first claim to have οὐδὲν ἄλλο referred to it, and is sufficiently important for the reference. The antithesis ὁ δὲ παράσσω also suits very appropriately the subjects of that warning, ἡ πεισμονή and ζύμη, both of which terms characterize the action of the seducers. Usteri interprets: that ye will not allow *any other than your hitherto subsisting* sentiments.” No, *a change*, that is, a correction of the sentiments previously existing, is precisely what Paul hopes for. — φρονήσετε] ye will have no other *sentiments* (the practical determination of thought). The *future* (comp. vi. 16) refers to the time when the letter would be received. Hitherto, by their submissiveness towards those who were troubling them, they seemed to have given themselves up to another mode of thinking, which was not the right one (ἄλλο, comp. Lys. in *Eratosth.* 48; ἕτερος is more frequently thus used, see on Phil. iii. 15). — ὁ δὲ παράσσω ὑμᾶς] The *singular* denotes not, as in 2 Cor. xi. 4, the *totum genus*, but, as is more appropriate to the subsequent ὅστις ἂν ᾖ, the *individual* who happened to be the troubler *in each actual case*. Comp. Bernhardt, p. 315. The idea that the apostle refers to the *chief person* among his opponents, who was well

known to him (Erasmus, Luther, Pareus, Estius, Bengel, Rückert, Olshausen, Ewald, and others; comp. also Usteri),—formerly even guessed at by name, and identified with Peter himself (Jerome),—has no warrant in the epistle. See, on the contrary, even ver. 12, and compare i. 7, iv. 17. — ὅστις ἂν ᾗ] is to be left entirely general: *without distinction of personal position*, be he, when the case occurs, who he will. The reference to *high repute* (Theodoret, Theophylact, Luther, Estius, and many others; including Koppe, Flatt, Rückert, de Wette) would only be warranted, if ὁ παράσσω. applied definitely to some particular person. — τὸ κρίμα] the *judicial sentence* κατ' ἐξοχήν, that is, the condemnatory sentence of the (impending) last judgment. Comp. Rom. ii. 3, iii. 8; 1 Cor. xi. 29. Of *excommunication* (Locke, Borger) the context contains nothing.¹ — βαστάσει] the judicial sentence is conceived as something *heavily laid on* (2 Kings xviii. 14), which the condemned one *carries away* as he leaves the judgment-seat. The idea of λαμβάνειν κρίμα (Rom. xiii. 2; Jas. iii. 1; Luke xx. 47, *et al.*) is not altogether the same.

Ver. 11. *But I, on my part.* The Judaistic teachers, whom the apostle thus confronts, had (see Chrysostom), as is evident from our passage—with the view of weakening the hindrance, which among Pauline churches they could not but encounter in the authority of the apostle opposing them—alleged (perhaps making use of Timothy's circumcision, Acts xvi. 3, for this purpose) that Paul himself still (in other churches) preached *circumcision*; that is, that, when Gentiles went over to Christianity, they should allow themselves to be circumcised. This calumny (comp. also Hilgenfeld in his *Zeitschr.* 1860, p. 216 ff.) was sufficiently absurd to admit of his dismissing it, as he does here, with all brevity, and with what a striking experimental proof! *But if I am still preaching circumcision, wherefore am I still persecuted?* For the persecution on the part of the Jews was based on the very fact of the *antagonism to the law*, which characterized his preaching of the *Crucified One*. See the sequel. — εἰ περιτομὴν ἔτι κηρύσσω] Paul might also have

¹ Jatho also explains the word as referring to this and other ecclesiastical penalties. But it was not the manner of the apostle to call for the discipline of the church in so indirect and veiled a fashion (comp. 1 Cor. v.).

said, εἰ π. ἐ. ἐκίρυσσόν, τ. ἐ. ἐδιωκόμην ἄν, for he means what *objectively* is not a real matter of fact. But he transfers himself directly into the *thought of his opponents*, and just as directly shows its absurdity; he assumes the reality of *what his opponents asserted*, and then by the apodosis annuls it as preposterous: hence the sense cannot be, as it is defined by Holsten, that his persecution on account of no longer preaching circumcision had not, possibly, the alleged pretext of making the Gentiles complete members of the theocracy, but only the one motive of national vanity and selfishness, to annul the offence of the cross.¹ — The emphasis is laid on περιτομήν; but ἔτι, *still* (see Schneider, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 449 C), does not convey the idea that Paul, *as apostle*, had formerly preached circumcision. For although the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit produced in none of the apostles at once and absolutely the laying aside of all religious error previously cherished, but led them forward by gradual and individual development into the whole truth (see Lücke's apt remarks on John ii. 10, p. 501); yet in the case of Paul especially, just because he was converted in the midst of his zealotry for the law, the assumption that he had still preached the necessity of circumcision for salvation, and had thus done direct homage to the fundamental error opposed to the revelation of God in him (i. 15), and to His gospel which had been revealed to him (i. 11 f.), would be quite *unpsychological*. And in a *historical* point of view it would be at variance with the decidedly antinomistic

¹ Holsten has, in a special excursus (z. *Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 337 ff.), acutely explained his interpretation, and endeavoured to vindicate it. At the close he puts it in this shape: "Paul wishes to denounce to the Galatians the *secret*, unexpressed ground of his persecution on the part of his opponents: '*I, dear brethren, am only persecuted because I no longer preach circumcision; for, if I still preach it as the divine will, why am I still persecuted?* — *Thus indeed is the offence of the cross annulled!*'" But still Paul must have had some special inducement for positing, in εἰ κ. τ. λ., a notoriously non-real case as a logical reality; and this inducement could only be found in the corresponding accusation of his opponents. Otherwise it would be difficult to see why he should not have thrown his language into such a form, that the protasis should have begun either with εἰ and the imperfect or with ὅτι (*because*), and the expression of the apodoses should have undergone corresponding modification. According to Holsten's view, the words have a dialectic enigmatical obscurity, which, looking at the simplicity of the underlying idea, would be without motive.

character of his whole apostolic labours as known to us (comp. Acts xxi. 21), as well as with the circumstance that the requirement of circumcision in the case of the Gentile Christians, Acts xv., came upon the apostolical church as something quite new and unheard of, and therefore produced so much excitement, and in fact occasioned the apostolic conference. In a purely exegetical point of view, moreover, such an assumption is not compatible with *τι ἔτι διώκομαι*, because we should thereby be led to the inference that, so long as Paul preached circumcision, he had *not* been persecuted; and yet at the very beginning of his Christian labours he was persecuted by the Jews (Acts ix. 24 f.; 2 Cor. xi. 32 f.). Rückert (comp. Baumgarten-Crusius and de Wette) is of opinion that in using *ἔτι* they only mean to say that Paul, although he preached Christ, required *that, notwithstanding this, they should still allow themselves to be circumcised*. Comp. Olshausen, who refers *ἔτι* to the *inferiority of the tendency*. But in Olshausen's view, the reference to an earlier *κηρύττειν περιτομῇν* still remains unremoved; and in that of Rückert, the *ἔτι* is unwarrantably withdrawn from the apostle and passed over to the side of those to whom he preached. Even if (with Hofmann¹) we understand the *ἔτι* as in contradistinction to the earlier time, *when the preaching of circumcision had been of general occurrence and had been in its due place*, the reference of this *ἔτι* is transferred to a *general practice of the earlier time*, although, according to the words of the apostle, it clearly and distinctly assumes *his own* previous *κήρυσσειν περιτ.* The *correct* view is the *usual* one, adopted also by Winer, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Wieseler, that *ἔτι* points back to the *period before the conversion of the apostle*. Certainly the objection is made (see Reithmayr and Hofmann), that Paul at

¹ According to Hofmann, the apostle's meaning is, "that they would have no longer any cause for persecuting him, so soon as his preaching of Jesus Christ should be that, which it is not—a continuance of the preaching of circumcision at the present time." This is also unsuitable, because *ἵ* would introduce a *sumtio facti*, and that indeed in the view of Paul himself. Certainly *ἵ* with the present indicative might be so put; but in the apodosis the optative with *ἄν* must have been used, as is the case in the passages compared by Hofmann himself (Xen. *Anab.* vii. 6. 15, v. 6. 12. See also *Memor* ii. 2. 3; Bornemann, *ad Sympos.* 4. 10, 5. 7; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 487).

that time, as a Jew among Jews, and coming in contact with Jewish Christians only, had no occasion at all to preach circumcision. But looking at our slight acquaintance with the circumstances of the apostle's pre-Christian life, this conclusion is formed much too rashly. For, as *ζηλωτής* for God and the law (Acts xxii. 3; comp. Gal. i. 14; Phil. iii. 5), Saul, who was an energetic and (comp. Acts xxii. 4, 5) esteemed Pharisaic Rabbi, might often have had occasion enough to preach and to defend circumcision, partly in the interest of proselytizing, and partly also in polemic conflict with Christians in and beyond Judaea, who maintained that their faith, and not their circumcision, was the cause of salvation. — *τί ἔτι διώκομαι*;] This *ἔτι* also, which by most (including de Wette and Wieseler) is taken as *logical*, as in Rom. iii. 7, ix. 19, cannot without arbitrary procedure be understood otherwise than as *temporal*: "Why am I *yet always* persecuted?" Why have they *not yet ceased* to persecute me? They could not but in fact have seen how groundless this *διώκειν* was! — *ἄρα κατήργηται κ.τ.λ.*] *ἄρα* is, as always, *igitur, rebus sic se habentibus* (if, namely, I still preach circumcision). Paul gives information concerning the foregoing question,—how far, namely, there no longer existed any cause, etc.: *thus therefore is the offence of the cross done away*, that is, the occasion for the rejection of the gospel, which is afforded by the circumstance that the death of Christ on the cross is preached as the only ground of salvation (1 Cor. i. 23; Phil. iii. 18). If Paul had at the same time preached circumcision also as necessary to salvation, then would the Jew have seen his law upheld, and the cross would have been inoffensive to him; but when, according to his decisive principle, ii. 21, he preached the death of the cross as the end of the law (iii. 13; Rom. x. 3, *et al.*), and rejected all legal righteousness—then the Jew took offence at the cross, and rejected the faith. Comp. Chrysostom and Theophylact. To take it as an *interrogation* (Syr., Bengel on ver. 12, Usteri, Ewald, and others)—with which the accentuation might have been *ἄρα* (comp. on ii. 17)—appears logically not inappropriate after *τί ἔτι διώκομαι*, but yields a less *striking* continuation of the discourse.

Ver. 12. The vivid realization of the doings of his opponents,

who were not ashamed to resort even to such falsehood (ver. 11), now wrings from his soul a strong and bitterly sarcastic wish¹ of holy indignation: *Would that they, who set you in commotion, might mutilate themselves!* that they who attach so much importance to circumcision, and thereby create commotion among you, might not content themselves with being circumcised, but might even have themselves emasculated! On *ὄφελον* as a *particle*, see on 1 Cor. iv. 8. “Omnino autem observandum est, ὡφελον (as to the form ὄφελον, see Interpr. *ad Moer.* p. 285 f.) non nisi tum adhiberi, quum quis optat, ut fuerit aliquid, vel sit, vel futurum sit, quod non fuit aut est aut futurum est,” Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 756. It is but very seldom used with the *future*, as Lucian, *Soloec.* 1. See Hermann *l.c.*; Graev. *ad Luc. Sol.* II. p. 730. — *καί*] the *climactic* “*even*,” not that of the corresponding relation of retribution (Wieseler), in which sense it would be only superfluous and cumbrous. — ἀποκόψονται] denotes *castration* (Arrian, *Epict.* ii. 20. 19), either by incision of the *vena seminalis* (Deut. xxiii. 1) or otherwise. See the passages in Wetstein. Comp. ἀπόκοπος, *castrated*, Strabo, xiii. p. 630; ἀποκεκομμένος, Deut. xxiii. 1. Owing to *καί*, which, after ver. 11, points to something more than the circumcision therein indicated, this interpretation is the only one suited to the context: it is followed by Chrysostom and his successors, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Cajetan, Grotius, Estius, Wetstein, Semler, Koppe, and many others; also Winer, Rückert, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Olshausen, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Hofmann, Reithmayr, Holsten; comp. Ewald, who explains it of a still more complete mutilation, as does Pelagius, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and others. In opposition to the context, others, partly influenced by an incorrect aesthetical standard (comp. Calovius: “*glossa impura*”), and sacrificing the middle signification,—which is always reflexive in Greek prose writers (Kühner, II. p. 19), and is also

¹ According to Hofmann, indeed, it is “*quite earnestly meant*,” and is supposed to contain the thought that “their perversity, which is now rendered dangerous by their being able to appeal to the revealed law, would thereby assume a shape in which it would cease to be dangerous.” How arbitrarily the thought is imported! And yet the wish, if *earnestly* meant, would be at all events a *silly* one. For a similar instance of a bitterly pointed saying against the Judaistic overvaluing of circumcision, see Phil. iii. 2

to be maintained throughout in the N. T. (Winer, p. 239, [E. T. 316]),—have found in it the sense: “*exitium* imprecatur impostoribus” (Calvin, acknowledging, however, the word as an allusion to circumcision; Calovius, and others); or have explained it of the *divine extirpation* (Wieseler); or: “may they be *excommunicated*” (Erasmus, Beza, Piscator, Cornelius a Lapide, Bengel, Michaelis, Zachariae, Morus, Baumgarten-Crusius, Windischmann, and others);¹ or: “may *all opportunity* of perverting you be *taken* from them” (Elsner, Wolf, Baumgarten); or: “may they *cut themselves off from you*” (Ellicott). — ἀναστατοῦν] stronger than παράσσειν, means here *to stir up* (against true Christianity), *to alarm*. Comp. Acts xvii. 6, xxi. 38. The word, used instead of the classic ἀνάστατον ποιεῖν, belongs to the later Greek; Sturz, *dial. Mac.* p. 146.

Ver. 13. “It is with justice that I speak so indignantly against those men; for *ye*, who are being worked upon by them to bring you under the bondage of the law, have received God’s call to the Messianic kingdom for an object entirely different,—in order that *ye* may be free.” Thus the apostle again reminds his readers of the great benefit already indicated in ver. 1, but now with the view of inculcating its single necessary moral limitation. — ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ] *that ye should be free*; ἐπι used of the ethical *aim* of the καλεῖν. Comp. 1 Thess. iv. 7; Eph. ii. 10; Soph. *Oed. C.* 1459: τᾶξίωμ’ ἐφ’ ᾧ καλεῖς. — μόνον μὴ κ.τ.λ.] Limiting exhortation. But the verb, which is obvious of itself (τρέπετε, perhaps, or even ἔχετε), is omitted, the omission rendering the address more compact and precise. Comp. Matt. xxvi. 5; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* 338. This also corresponds (in opposition to Hofmann’s groundless doubt) to the usage of the Greeks after the prohibitory μὴ. See Heindorf, *ad Plat. Prot.* p. 315 B; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 153; Klotz *ad Devar.* p. 669; Winer, p. 554 f. [E. T. 745]. — εἰς

¹ Luther, in his translation, rendered it: *to be extirpated* (thus like Calvin); in his Commentary, 1519, he does not explain it specially, but speaks merely of a curse which is expressed. In 1524, however, he says characteristically: “Si omnino volunt circumcidi, opto, ut et absceindantur et sint eunuchi illi amputatis testiculis et veretro, i. e. qui docere et gignere filios spirituales nequeunt, extra ecclesiam ejiciendi.” On the other hand, in the Commentary of 1538, he says quite simply, “allusit . . . ad circumcisionem, q. d. cogunt vos circumcidi, utinam ipsi funditus et radicitus excindantur.”

ἀφορμὴν τῇ σαρκί] *for an occasion to the flesh*; do not use your liberty so that it may serve as an occasion for the non-spiritual, psychico-corporeal part of your nature to assert its desires which are contrary to God. Comp. Rom. vii. 8. As to σάρξ in the ethical sense, see Rom. iv. 1, vi. 19, vii. 14; John iii. 6. — ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλ. ἀλλήλ.] but let love (through which your faith must work, ver. 6) be that by means of which ye stand in a *relation* of mutually rendered service. An ingenious juxtaposition of *freedom* and *brotherly serviceableness* in that freedom. Comp. Rom. vi. 18, 22; 1 Cor. ix. 19; 1 Pet. ii. 16; 2 Pet. ii. 19. The *special* contrast, however, which is here opposed to the *general* category of the σάρξ, has its *ground* in the circumstances of the Galatians, and its *warrant* in what is about to be said of love in ver. 14.

Ver. 14.¹ Reason assigned for the διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης κ.τ.λ. just said: *for the whole law is fulfilled in one utterance*; that is, compliance with the whole Mosaic law has taken place and exists, if one single commandment of it is complied with, namely, the commandment, "*Love thy neighbour as thyself*." If, therefore, ye through love serve one another, the whole point in dispute is thereby solved; there can no longer be any discussion whether ye are bound to fulfil this or that precept of the law,—ye have fulfilled the whole law. "Theologia brevissima et longissima; brevissima quod ad verba et sententias attinet, sed usu et re ipsa latior, longior, profundior et sublimior toto mundo," Luther. ὁ πᾶς νόμος (comp. 1 Tim. i. 16; Acts xix. 7, xx. 18; Soph. *El.* 1244; *Phil.* 13; Thuc. ii. 7. 2, viii. 93. 3; Krüger, § 50. 11. 12) places the *totality* of the law in contradistinction to its *single utterance*. The view of Hofmann, that it denotes the *law collectively as an unity, the fulfilment of which existing in the readers they have in the love* which they are to show, falls to the ground with the erroneous reading, to which it is with arbitrary artifice adapted; and in particular, ὁ πᾶς νόμος means not at all the *law as unity*,

¹ Hofmann reads the verse: ὁ γ. πᾶς νόμος ἐν ὑμῖν πληροῦται ἀγαπήσεως κ.τ.λ. A form of the text so destitute of attestation (Tertullian alone has *in vobis instead of ἐν ὑμῖν* λόγου), that it is simply equivalent to a (very strange) *conjecture*. Also the omission of ἐν τῷ is much too feebly attested. In the text, followed above, A B C N agree

but *the whole law*:¹ comp. also 2 Macc. vi. 5; 3 Macc. vi. 2 *et al.*; Herod. i. 111. In point of fact, the phrase does not differ from ὅλος ὁ νόμος, Matt. xxii. 40. Without alteration in the sense, the apostle might also have written πᾶς γὰρ ὁ νόμος, which would only have made the emphasis fall still more strongly on πᾶς. — πεπλήρωται] As to the reading, see the critical notes. The *perfect* denotes the fulfilment as complete and ready to hand, as in Rom. xiii. 8. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Estius, Baumgarten, Semler, Morus, Rückert, Matthies, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Wieseler, and others, have correctly explained πληροῦσθαι of *compliance* with the law; for the explanation *comprehenditur* (Erasmus, Castalio, Luther, Calvin, Rambach, Michaelis, Zachariae, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Winer, Usteri, Olshausen, Reiche, and others), that is, ἀνακεφαλαιοῦνται (which, however, in Rom. xiii. 9 is *distinguished* from πληροῦσθαι), is at variance with the universal usage of πληροῦν τὸν νόμον in the N. T. (comp. ἐκπιμπλάναι τ. νόμον, Herod. i. 199; so also Philo, *de Abrah.* I. p. 36). See vi. 2; Matt. iii. 15; Rom. viii. 4, xiii. 8; Col. iv. 17. The thought is the same as in Rom. xiii. 8, ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἕτερον νόμον πεπλήρωκε, and xiii. 10, πλήρωμα νόμον ἢ ἀγάπη. Grotius interprets πληρ. in the same way as in Matt. v. 17: “sicuti rudimenta implentur per doctrinam perfectionem.” This interpretation is incorrect on account of πᾶς, and because a commandment of *the Mosaic law itself* is adduced. — ἐν τῷ that is, in the saying of the law; see Winer, p. 103 [E. T. 135].—ἀγάπησεις] Lev. xix. 18. Respecting the imperative *future*, see on Matt. i. 21; and as to ἐαυτόν used of the *second person*, see on Rom. xiii. 9; Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* IX. p. 447. On the *idea* of the ὡς ἐαντ., see on Matt. xxii. 39. Comp. Cic. *de Legg.* i. 12: “Nihilo sese plus quam alterum homo diligit.” The *neighbour* is, for the *Christian* who justly (Matt. v. 17) applies to himself this Mosaic commandment, his *fellow-Christian* (comp. ver. 13, ἀλλήλοις, and see ver. 14), just as for the Jew it is his fellow-

¹ [This is an approximate rendering of the passage, the meaning of which is not, to me at least, very clear. Hofmann seems to have been conscious of this want of clearness, for in his revised edition just issued he has considerably altered his mode of expression, but still leaves the matter somewhat obscure.—ED.]

Jew. But how little this is to be taken as *excluding* any other at all, is shown not only by distinct intimations, such as vi. 10, 1 Thess. iii. 12, 2 Pet. i. 7, but also by the whole spirit of Christianity, which, as to this point, finds its most beautiful expression in the example of the Samaritan (Luke x.); and Paul himself was a Samaritan of this kind towards Jews and Gentiles. — The question, how Paul could with justice say of the *whole* law that it was fulfilled by love towards one's neighbour, is not to be answered, either by making νόμος signify the *Christian* law (Koppe), or by understanding it only of the *moral law* (Estius and many others), or of the *second* table of the Decalogue (Beza and others; also Wieseler; comp. Ewald), or of every divinely *revealed law in general* (Schott); for, according to the connection of the whole epistle, ὁ πᾶς νόμος cannot mean anything else than the *whole Mosaic law*. But it is to be answered by placing ourselves at the lofty spiritual standpoint of the apostle, from which he regarded all other commandments of the law as so thoroughly subordinate to the commandment of love, that whosoever has fulfilled *this* commandment stands in the moral scale and the moral estimation just as if he had fulfilled the *whole* law. From this lofty and bold standpoint everything, which was not connected with the commandment of love (Rom. xiii. 8–10), fell so completely into the background,¹ that it was no longer considered as aught to be separately and independently fulfilled; on the contrary, the *whole* law appeared already accomplished in *love*, that is, in the state of feeling and action produced by the Spirit of God (ver. 22 f.; Rom. xv. 30), in which is contained the culminating point, goal, and consummation of all parts of the law.² The idea thus amounts to an *impletio totius legis dilectione formata*, by which the claim of the law is satisfied (ver. 23). The view of Hofmann, that here the law comes into consideration only *so far as* it is not already *fulfilled* in faith; that for the *believer* its requirement consists in the *command-*

¹ Especially the precepts as to *cultus*, in the apostle's view, were included among the στοιχεῖα τοῦ νόμου, iv. 3.

² Therein lies the essence of the so-called *tertius usus* of the law, the further development of which is given in the Epistle to the Romans. Comp. Sieffert, in the *Jahrb. f. D. Theol.* p. 271 f.

ment of love, and even the realization of this is already *existing in him*, so that he has only to *show* the love wrought in him by God—simply emanates from the erroneous form of the text and the wrong interpretation of ver. 14 adopted by him. That the apostle, moreover, while adducing *only* the commandment of *love towards one's neighbour*, does not exclude the commandment of *love towards God* (comp. Matt. xxii. 37 f.), was obvious of itself to the Christian consciousness from the necessary connection between the love of God and the love of our neighbour (comp. 1 John iv. 20; 1 Cor. viii. 1, 3). Paul was induced by the scope of the context to bring forward the latter only (vv. 13, 15).

Ver. 15. Δάκνετε καὶ κατεσθίετε] A climactic figurative designation of the *hateful working of party enmity*, in which they endeavoured mutually to *hurt* and *destroy* one another. Figurative expressions of this nature, derived from ravenous wild beasts, are elsewhere in use. See Maji *Obs.* II. p. 86; Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* VIII. p. 230; Wetstein, *in loc.* κατεσθίειν is not, however, to be understood (with Schott) as *to gnaw*, but must retain the meaning which it always has, *to eat up*, *to devour*. See on 2 Cor. xi. 20; Hom. *Il.* ii. 314, xxi. 24, *Od.* i. 8, *et al.*; LXX. Gen. xl. 17; Isa. i. 7; Add. ad Esth. i. 11. Observe the *climax* of the three verbs, to which the *passive* turn of the final result to be dreaded also contributes: μὴ ὑπὸ ἀλλήλων ἀναλωθῇτε] *lest ye be consumed one of another—consumamini*; that is (for Paul keeps by his figure), lest through these mutual party hostilities your life of Christian fellowship be utterly ruined and destroyed. What is meant is not the ceasing of their status as *Christians* (Hofmann), in other words, their apostasy; but, by means of such hostile behaviour in the very bosom of the churches, there is at length an utter end to what constitutes the *Christian community*, the organic life of which is mutually destroyed by its own members.

Ver. 16. With the words "*But I mean*" (iii. 17, iv. 1) the apostle introduces, not something new, but a deeper and more comprehensive exhibition and discussion of that which, in vv. 13-15, he had brought home to his readers by way of admonition and of warning—down to ver. 26. Hofmann is wrong in restricting the illustration merely to what follows after ἀλλά,

—a view which is in itself arbitrary, and is opposed to the manifest correlation existing between the contrast of flesh and spirit and the ἀφορμή, which the free Christian is not to afford to the flesh (ver. 13). — πνεύματι περιπατεῖτε] *dative* of the *norma* (κατὰ πνεῦμα, Rom. viii. 4). Comp. vi. 16; Phil. iii. 16; Rom. iv. 12; Hom. *Il.* xv. 194: οὔτι Διὸς βέομαι φρέσιν. The subsequent πνεύματι ἄγεσθε in ver. 18 is more favourable to this view than to that of Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* I. p. 225, who makes it the *dative commodi* (*spiritui divino vitam consecrare*), or to that of Wieseler, who makes it *instrumental*, so that the Spirit is conceived as *path* (the idea is different in the case of διὰ in 2 Cor. v. 7), or of Hofmann, who renders: “*by virtue of the Spirit.*” Calovius well remarks: “*juxta instinctum et impulsum.*” The *spirit* is not, however, the *moral nature of man* (that is, ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, ὁ νοῦς, Rom. vii. 22, 23), which is sanctified by the Divine Spirit (Beza, Gomarus, Rückert, de Wette, and others; comp. Michaelis, Morus, Flatt, Schott, Olshausen, Windischmann, Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 389), in behalf of which appeal is erroneously (see also Rom. viii. 9) made to the contrast of σάρξ, since the *divine πνεῦμα* is in fact the power which overcomes the σάρξ (Rom. vii. 23 ff., Rom. viii. 1 ff.); but it is *the Holy Spirit*. This Spirit is given to believers as the divine principle of the Christian life (iii. 2, 5, iv. 6), and they are to obey it, and not the ungodly desires of their σάρξ. Comp. Neander, and Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, I. p. 453, ed. 5. The absence of the article is not (in opposition to Harless on *Eph.* p. 268) at variance with this view, but it is not to be explained in a *qualitative* sense (Hofmann), any more than in the case of θεός, κύριος, and the like; on the contrary, πνεῦμα has the nature of a *proper noun*, and, even when dwelling and ruling in the human spirit, remains always *objective*, as *the Divine Spirit*, specifically different from the *human* (Rom. viii. 16). Comp. on vv. 3, 5, and on Rom. viii. 4; also Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 78. — καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκὸς οὐ μὴ τελέσητε] is taken as *consequence* by the Vulgate, Jerome, Theodoret, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, Estius, Bengel, and most expositors, including Winer, Paulus, Rückert, Matthies, Schott, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Hofmann, Reithmayr; but by others, as Castalio, Beza, Koppe, Usteri, Baumgarten-Crusius,

Ewald, in the sense of the *imperative*. Either view is well adapted to the context, since afterwards, for the illustration of what is said in ver. 16, the relation between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is set forth. But the view which takes it as *consequence* is the only one which corresponds with the usage in other passages of the N. T., in which *οὐ μὴ* with the aorist subjunctive is always used in the sense of confident *assurance*, and not *imperatively*, like *οὐ* with the *future*, although in classical authors *οὐ μὴ* is so employed. “*Ye will certainly not fulfil the lust of the flesh*,—this is the moral blessed consequence, which is *promised* to them, if they walk according to the Spirit.” On *τελεῖν*, used of the actual carrying out of a desire, passion, or the like, comp. Soph. *O. R.* 1330, *El.* 769; Hesiod, *Scut.* 36.

Ver. 17. *Ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τ. σάρκος*] The foregoing exhortation, with its promise, is elucidated by the remark *that the flesh and the Spirit are contrary to one another in their desires*, so that the two cannot together influence the conduct. — As here also *τὸ πνεῦμα* is not the *moral nature of man* (see on ver. 16), but the *Holy Spirit*,¹ a comparison has to some extent incorrectly been made with the variance between the *νοῦς* and the *σάρξ* (Rom. vii. 18 ff.) in the still unregenerate man, in whom the moral will is subject to the flesh, along with its parallels in Greek and Roman authors (Xen. *Cyr.* vi. 1. 21; Arrian. *Epict.* ii. 26; Porphyry. *de abst.* i. 56; Cic. *Tusc.* ii. 21, *et al.*), and Rabbins (see Schoettgen, *Hor.* p. 1178 ff.). Here the subject spoken of is the conflict between the *fleshly* and the *divine* principle in the

¹ De Wette wrongly makes the objection, that in the state of the regenerate this relation of conflict does not find a place, seeing that the Spirit has the preponderance (vv. 18, 24). Certainly so, if the regeneration were complete, and not such as it was in the case of the Galatians (iv. 19), and if the *concupiscentia carnis* did not remain at all in the regenerate. That *πνεῦμα* here denotes the *Holy Spirit*, is confirmed by ver. 22. The difference of the conflict in the unconverted and in the regenerate consists in this,—that in the case of the former the *σάρξ* strives with the better moral will (*νοῦς*), and the *σάρξ* is victorious (Rom. vii. 7 ff.); but in the case of the regenerate, the *σάρξ* strives with the Holy Spirit, and man may obey the latter (ver. 18). In the former case, the creaturely power of the *σάρξ* is in conflict with the likewise creaturely *νοῦς*, but in the latter with the divine uncreated *πνεῦμα*. De Wette was erroneously of opinion that here Paul says briefly and indistinctly what in Rom. vii. 15 ff. he sets forth clearly; the view of Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 389, is similar.

regenerate. The relation is therefore different, although the conflict in itself has some similarity. Bengel in the comparison cautiously adds, "*quodammodo.*" — ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται] As to the reading γάρ, see the critical notes. It introduces a *pertinent further illustration* of what has just been said. In order to obviate an alleged tautology, Rückert and Schott have placed ταῦτα γ. ἀλλ. ἀντίκ. in a parenthesis (see also Grotius), and taken it in the sense: "for they are *in their nature* opposed to one another." A gratuitous insertion; in that case Paul must have written: φύσει γὰρ ταῦτα ἀλλ. ἀντίκ., for the bare ἀντίκειται after what precedes can only be understood as referring to the actually existing conflict. — ἵνα μὴ κ.τ.λ.] is not (with Grotius, Semler, Moldenhauer, Rückert, and Schott) to be joined to the first half of the verse, — a connection which is forbidden by the right view of the ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλ. ἀντίκ. as not parenthetical—but to the latter. ἵνα expresses the *purpose*, and that not the purpose of *God* in the conflict mentioned—which, when the will is directed towards that which is good, would amount to an ungodly (immoral) purpose—but the purpose of those *powers contending* with one another in this conflict, in their mutual relation to the moral attitude of man's will, which even in the regenerate may receive a twofold determination (comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 361 f.). In this conflict both have the purpose that the man should not do *that very thing* (ταῦτα with emphasis) which in the respective cases (ἅν) he *would*. If he would do what is good, the *flesh*, striving against the Spirit, is *opposed to this*; if he would do what is evil, the *Spirit*, striving against the flesh, is *opposed to that*. All the *one-sided* explanations of ἃ ἂν θέλητε, whether the words be referred to the *moral* will which is hindered by the flesh (Luther, Erasmus, Calvin, Estius, Morus, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Usteri, Rückert, Schott, de Wette; also Baumgarten-Crusius, Holsten, and others), or to the *sensual* will, which is hindered by the Spirit (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Beza, Grotius, Neander),¹ are set aside by the fact that ἵνα μὴ κ.τ.λ. is connected with the preceding ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλ. ἀντίκ.,

¹ Comp. also Ewald, "in order that ye, according to the divine will expressed on the point, may not do that which ye possibly might wish, but that of which ye may know that God desires and approves it."

and this comprehends the mutual conflict of *two* powers.¹ Winer has what is, on the whole, the correct interpretation: “τὸ πνεῦμα impedit vos (rather *impedire vos cupit*), quo minus perficiatis τὰ τῆς σαρκός (ea, quae ἡ σὰρξ perficere cupit), contra ἡ σὰρξ adversatur vobis, ubi τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος peragere studetis;” and so in substance Ambrose, Oecumenius, Bengel, Zachariae, Koppe, Matthies, Reithmayr, and others; Wieseler most accurately. This more precise statement of the conflict (ταῦτα . . . ταῦτα ποιῆτε) might indeed in itself be dispensed with, since it was in substance already contained in the first half of the verse; but it bears the stamp of an emphatic and indeed solemn exposition, that it might be more carefully considered and laid to heart. In Hofmann’s view, ἵνα μὴ κ.τ.λ. is intended to express, as the aim of the conflict, that the action of the Christian is not to be *self-willed* (“springing from himself in virtue of his own self-determination”); and this, because he cannot *attain to rest* otherwise than by allowing his conduct to be determined by the Spirit. But setting aside the fact that the latter idea is not to be found in the text, the conception of, and emphasis upon, the *self-willed*, which with the whole stress laid on the being *self-determined* would form the point of the thought, are arbitrarily introduced, just as if Paul had written: ἵνα μὴ ἂν αὐτοὶ (or αὐτοὶ ἑμεῖς, Rom. vii. 25, or αὐθαίρετοι, or αὐτογνώμονες, αὐτόνομοι, αὐτόβουλοι, or the like).

Ver. 18. If, however, of these two conflicting powers, the *Spirit* is that which rules you, in what blessed freedom ye are then! Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 17; Rom. viii. 2 ff. — πνεύματι ἄγεσθε] See on Rom. viii. 14. Comp. also 2 Tim. iii. 6. — οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ νόμον] namely, *because then the law can have no power over you*; through the ruling power of the Spirit ye find yourselves in such a condition of moral life (in such a *καινότης ζωῆς*, Rom. vi. 4, and πνεύματος, vii. 6), that the law has no power to censure, to condemn, or to punish anything in you. Comp. on Rom. viii. 4. In accordance with ver. 23, this explanation is the only correct one; and *this* freedom is the true *moral* freedom from the law, to which the apostle here, in accordance with ver. 13, attaches importance. Comp. 1 Tim. i. 9. There is less accuracy in the usual interpretation (adopted by Winer,

¹ Comp. Ernesti *Urspr. der Sünde*, I. p. 89.

Rückert, Matthies, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius; comp. de Wette): ye no longer *need* the law; as Chrysostom: τίς χρεία νόμου; τῷ γὰρ οὐκ ὅθεν κατορθοῦντι τὰ μείζω τοῦ χρεία παιδαγωγοῦ; or: you are free from the *outward constraint* of the law (Usteri, Ewald); comp. also Hofmann, who, in connection with his mistaken interpretation of ver. 14, understands a *subjection to the law* as a requirement coming *from without*, which does not exist in the case of the Christian, because *in him* the law collectively as an unity is fulfilled.

Vv. 19–23. The assertion just made by Paul, that the readers as led by the Spirit would not be under the law, he now illustrates more particularly (δέ), by setting forth the entirely opposite moral states, which are produced by the flesh and by the Spirit respectively (vv. 22 f.): the former exclude from the Messiah's kingdom (are therefore abandoned to the curse of the law), while against the latter there is no law.

Ver. 19. Φανερά δὲ κ.τ.λ.] *Manifest, however* (now to explain myself more precisely as to this οὐκ ἔστὲ ὑπὸ νόμον), open to the eyes of all, evidently recognisable as such by every one, *are the works of the flesh*, that is, those concrete actual phenomena which are produced when the flesh, the sinful nature of man (and not the Holy Spirit), is the active principle. The δέ (in opposition to Hofmann's objection) is the δέ *explicativum*, frequently used by Greek authors and in the N. T. (Winer, p. 421 [E. T. 553]; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 1. 1). That one who is led by the Spirit will *abstain from* the ἔργα which follow, is obvious of itself; but Paul does not state this, and therefore does not by δέ make the transition to it, as Hofmann thinks, who gratuitously defines the sense of φανερά as: "well known to the Christian *without law*." On φανερός, *lying open to cognition, manifestus*, see van Hengel, *ad Rom.* I. p. 111. The list which follows of the ἔργα τῆς σαρκός contains *four* approximate divisions: (1) *lust*: πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσ., ἀσέλγ.; (2) *idolatry*: εἰδωλολατρ., φαρμακ.; (3) *enmity*: ἔχθραι . . . φόνοι; (4) *intemperance*: μέθαι, κῶμοι. — ἀκαθαρσία] *lustful impurity* (lewdness) *generally*, after the special πορνεία. Comp. Rom. i. 24; 2 Cor. xii. 21. — ἀσέλγεια] *lustful immodesty and wantonness*. See on Rom. xiii. 13. Comp. 2 Cor. xii. 21; Eph. iv. 19; 1 Pet. iv. 3; 2 Pet. ii. 7.

Ver. 20. *Εἰδωλολατρεία*] is not to be considered as a species of the *sins of lust* (Olshausen); a view against which may be urged the literal sense of the word, and also the circumstance that unchastity was only practised in the case of *some* of the heathen rites. It is to be taken in its *proper* sense as *idolatry*. Living among Gentiles, Gentile Christians were not unfrequently seduced to idolatry, to which the sacrificial feasts readily gave occasion. Comp. on 1 Cor. v. 11. — *φαρμακεία*] may *here* mean either *poison-mingling* (Plat. *Legg.* viii. p. 845 E; Polyb. vi. 13. 4, xl. 3. 7; comp. *φαρμακός*, Dem. 794. 4) or *sorcery* (Ex. vii. 11, 22, viii. 3; Isa. xlvii. 9, 12; Rev. ix. 21, xviii. 23, xxi. 8; Wisd. xii. 4, xviii. 13; comp. *φάρμακα*, Herod. iii. 85; *φαρμακεύειν*, Herod. vii. 114). The latter interpretation is to be preferred (with Luther, Grotius, Estius, Koppe, Winer, Usteri, Schott, de Wette, Ewald, Wieseler, Hofmann, and others), partly on account of the combination with *εἰδωλολατρεία* (comp. Deut. xviii. 10 ff.; Ex. xxii. 18), partly because *φόνου* occurs subsequently. Sorcery was very prevalent, especially in Asia (Acts xix. 19). To understand it, with Olshausen, specially of *love-incantations*, is arbitrary and groundless, since the series of sins of lust is closed with *ἀσέλγεια*. — The particulars which follow as far as *φόνου* stand related as special manifestations to the more general *ἐχθραί*. On the *plural*, comp. Herod. vii. 145; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 10. — *ζῆλος*, Rom. xiii. 13; *jealousy*, 1 Cor. iii. 3, 2 Cor. xii. 20, Jas. iii. 16. — The distinction between *θυμός* and *ὀργή* is, that *ὀργή* denotes the *wrath in itself*, and *θυμός*, the *effervescence* of it, *exasperation*. Hence in Rev. xvi. 19, xix. 15, we have. *θυμὸς τῆς ὀργῆς*. See on Rom. ii. 8. — *ἐριθείαι*] *self-seeking party-cabals*. See on Rom. ii. 8; 2 Cor. xii. 20. — *διχοστασίαι, αἱρέσεις*] *divisions, factions* (comp. 1 Cor. xi. 18 f.). On *αἵρεσις* in this signification, which occurs only in later writers (1 Cor. xi. 19; Acts xxiv. 5, 14), see Wetstein, II. p. 147 f. Comp. *αἵρετιστής*, *partisan*, Polyb. i. 79. 9, ii. 38. 7. Observe how Paul, having the circumstances of the Galatians in view, has *multiplied* especially the designations of *dispeace*. Comp. Soph. *O. C.* 1234 f. According to 1 Cor. iii. 3 also, these phenomena are works of the *flesh*.

Ver. 21. *Φθόνου, φόνου*] *paronomasia*, as in Rom. i. 29;

Eur. *Troad.* 736. — κῶμοι] *revellings, comissationes*, especially at night; Herm. *Privatalterth.* § 17. 29. Comp. Rom. xiii. 13; 1 Pet. iv. 3; Plat. *Theaet.* p. 173 D: δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι. *Symp.* p. 212 C; Isaeus, p. 39. 21: κῶμοι καὶ ἀσέλγεια. Herod. i. 21: πίνειν κ. κῶμῳ χρεέσθαι ἐς ἀλλήλους. Jacobs, *Del. epigr.* iv. 43: κῶμον κ. πάσης κοίρανε παννυχίδος. — καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις] *and the things which are similar to these* (the whole matters mentioned in vv. 20, 21). "Addit et iis similia, quia quis omnem lernam carnalis vitae recenseat?" Luther, 1519. — The *προ* in *προλέγω* and *προεῖπον* is the *beforehand* in reference to the *future realization* (Herod. i. 53, vii. 116; Lucian. *Jov. Trag.* 30; Polyb. vi. 3. 2) at the *παρουσία*; and the *past προεῖπον* reminds the readers of the instructions and warnings orally given to them, the tenor of which justifies us in thinking that he is referring to the first *and* second sojourn in Galatia. — *πράσσοντες*] those who *practise* such things; but in ver. 17 ποιῆτε: *ye do*. See on Rom. i. 32; John iii. 20. — βασιλείαν Θεοῦ οὐ κληρονομ.] Comp. 1 Cor. vi. 9 f., xv. 50; Eph. v. 5; Jas. ii. 5; and generally, Rom. vi. 8 ff. Sins of this kind, therefore, exclude the Christian from the kingdom of the Messiah, and cause him to incur condemnation, unless by *μετάνοια* he again enters into the life of faith, and so by renewed faith appropriates forgiveness (2 Cor. vii. 9, 10; Rom. viii. 34; 1 John ii. 1 f.; observe the *present* participle). For the having been reconciled by faith is the preliminary condition of the new holy life (Rom. vi), and therefore does not cancel responsibility in the judgment (2 Cor. v. 10; Rom. xiv. 10).

Ver. 22. ὁ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος] essentially the same idea, as would be expressed by τὰ δὲ ἔργα τοῦ πνεύματος—the moral result which the Holy Spirit brings about as its fruit. Comp. Pind. *Ol.* vii. 8: καρπὸς φρενός, *Nem.* x. 12, *Pyth.* ii. 74; *Wisd.* iii. 13, 15. But Paul is fond of *variety* of expression. Comp. Eph. ii. 9, 11. A *special intention*¹ in the

¹ Chrysostom thought that Paul had used *καρπός*, because good works were not, like evil works, brought about by ourselves alone, but also by the divine *φιλανθρωπία*. Comp. also Holsten, who, however, makes the distinction sharper. Luther and many others, including Winer, Usteri, Schott: because it is *beneficent* and *praiseworthy* works which are spoken of. Matthies: because that whereby the Spirit proves His presence, is, in and by itself, directly fruit and

choice cannot be made good, since both *ἔργα* and *καρπός*¹ are in themselves *voces mediae* (see on *καρπός* especially, Rom. vi. 21 f.; Matt. vii. 20; Plat. *Ep.* 7, p. 336 B), and according to the context, nothing at all hinged on the indication of organic development (to which Olshausen refers *καρπός*),—a meaning which, moreover, would have been conveyed even by *ἔργα*, and without a figure,—or of the proceeding from an inner impulse (de Wette). The *collective* (Hom. *Od.* i. 156, and frequently) *singular καρπός* has sprung, as in Eph. v. 9, from the idea of internal unity and moral homogeneity; for which, however, the *singular ἔργου* (see on vi. 4) would also have been suitable (in opposition to the view of Wieseler).—That *φῶς* and *πνεῦμα* are not to be considered as identical on account of Eph. v. 9, see on Eph. *l.c.* — *ἀγάπη*] as the main element (1 Cor. xiii.; Rom. xii. 9), and at the same time the practical principle of the rest, is placed at the head, corresponding to the contrast in ver. 13. The selection of these virtues, and the order in which they are placed, are such as necessarily to unfold and to present to the readers the specific character of the *life of Christian fellowship* (which had been so sadly disturbed among the Galatians, ver. 15). Love itself, because it is a *fruit* of the Spirit, is called in Rom. xv. 30, *ἀγάπη τοῦ πνεύματος*. — *χαρά*] is the holy joy of the soul, which is produced by the Spirit (see on Rom. xiv. 17; 1 Thess. i. 6; comp. also 2 Cor. vi. 10), through whom we carry in our hearts the consciousness of the divine love (Rom. v. 5), and thereby the certainty of blessedness, the triumph over all sufferings, etc. The interpretations: *participation in the joy of others* (Grotius, Zachariae, Koppe, Borger, Winer, Usteri), and *a cheerful nature towards others* (Calvin, Michaelis), introduce ideas which are not in the text (Rom. xii. 15). — *εἰρήνη*] *Peace* with others. Rom. xiv. 17; Eph. iv. 3. The word has been understood to mean also *peace with God* (Rom. v. 1), and *peace with oneself* (de Wette and others); but against enjoyment. Reithmayr mixes up various reasons, including the very groundless suggestion that in *καρπός* there is implied the acknowledgment of *man's joint part* in the production.

¹ Comp. the clear passage in the LXX. Prov. x. 16, where *ἔργα* and *καρποί* alternate in exactly the opposite sense: *ἔργα δικαίων ζωὴν ποιεῖ, καρποί δὲ ἀσβῶν ἁμαρτίας*.

this interpretation it may be urged, that *this* peace (the peace of reconciliation) is *antecedent* to the further fruits of the Spirit, and that εἰρήνη κ.τ.λ. is evidently correlative with ἔχθρα κ.τ.λ. in ver. 20, so that the εἰρήνη Θεοῦ (see on Phil. iv. 7) does not belong to this connection. — μακροθυμία] *long-suffering*, by which, withholding the assertion of our own rights, we are patient under injuries (βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν, Jas. i. 19), in order to bring him who injures us to reflection and amendment. Comp. Rom. ii. 4; 2 Cor. vi. 6. The opposite: ὀξύθυμία, Eur. *Andr.* 728. — χρηστότης] *benignity*. 2 Cor. vi. 6; Col. iii. 12. See Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 140 ff. — ἀγαθωσύνη] *goodness*, probity of disposition and of action. It thus admirably suits the πίστις which follows. Usually interpreted (also by Ewald and Wieseler): *kindness*; but see on Rom. xv. 14. — πίστις] *fidelity*.¹ Matt. xxiii. 23; Rom. iii. 3; and see on Philem. 5. — πραΰτης (see on 1 Cor. iv. 21): *meekness*. The opposite: ἀγριότης, Plat. *Conv.* p. 197 D, in Greek authors often combined with φιλάνθρωπία. — ἐγκράτεια] *self-control*, that is, here *continence*, as opposed to sins of lust and intemperance. Eccus. xviii. 30; Acts xxiv. 25; 2 Pet. i. 6; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 1: ἀφροδισίων κ. γαστρὸς ἐγκρατέστατος.

Ver. 23. Just as τὰ τοιαῦτα in ver. 21 (*haec talia*: see Engelhardt, *ad Plat. Lach.* p. 14; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 5. 2), τῶν τοιούτων in this passage is also *neuter*, applying to the virtues previously mentioned among the fruits of the Spirit (Irenaeus, Jerome, Augustine, Pelagius, Calvin, Beza, yet doubtfully, Castalio, Cornelius a Lapide, and most expositors), and not *masculine*, as it is understood by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Erasmus, Luther, Grotius, Bengel, and many of the older expositors; also by Koppe, Rosenmüller, Rückert, Hofmann.² It is, moreover, quite unsuitable to assume (with Beza, Estius, Rosenmüller, Flatt, and others) a μείωσις (*non adversatur, sed commendat*, and the like; so also de Wette); for Paul wishes only to illustrate the οὐκ

¹ De Wette, Wieseler, Reithmayr, take it as *confidence*, the opposite to distrust, 1 Cor. xiii. 7. But the *substantive* does not occur in this general sense in any other passage of the N. T.

² So also Bäumlein, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, p. 551 f. The objection that the singular ὁ καθ' ἑαυτὸν in ver. 22 forbids the *neuter* interpretation (Hofmann), is quite groundless both in itself and because καθ' ἑαυτὸν is *collective*.

εἶναι ὑπὸ νόμον, which he has said in ver. 18 respecting those who are led by the Spirit. This he does by first exhibiting, for the sake of the contrast, the works of the flesh, and expressing a judgment upon the doers of them; and then by exhibiting the fruit of the Spirit, and saying: "*against virtues and states of this kind there is no law.*" Saying this, however, is by no means "more than superfluous" (Hofmann), but is intended to make evident how it is that, *by virtue of this their moral frame*, those who are led by the Spirit are not subject to the Mosaic law.¹ For whosoever is so constituted that a law is not against him, over such a one the law has no power. Comp. 1 Tim. i. 9 f.

Ver. 24. After Paul has in ver. 17 explained his exhortation given in ver. 16, and recommended compliance with it on account of its blessed results (vv. 18–23), he now shows (continuing his discourse by the transitional δέ) how this compliance—the walking in the Spirit—has its ground and motive in the *specific nature of the Christian*; if the Christian has crucified his flesh, and consequently lives through the Spirit, his walk also must follow the Spirit. — τὴν σάρκα ἐσταύρωσαν] not: they *crucify* their flesh (Luther and others; also Matthies); but: *they have crucified it*, namely, when they became believers and received baptism, whereby they entered into moral fellowship with the death of Jesus (see on ii. 19, vi. 14; Rom. vi. 3, vii. 4) by becoming νεκροὶ τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ (Rom. vi. 11). The symbolical idea: "*to have crucified the flesh*," expressés, therefore, the having renounced all fellowship of life with sin, the seat of which is the flesh (σάρξ); so that, just as Christ has been objectively crucified, by means of entering into the fellowship of this death on the cross the Christian has *subjectively*—in the moral consciousness of faith—crucified the σάρξ, that is, has rendered it entirely void of life and efficacy, by means of faith as the new element of life to which he has been transferred. To the Christians *ideally* viewed, as here, this ethical crucifixion of the flesh is something *which has taken place* (comp. Rom. vi. 2 ff.), but *in reality* it is

¹ The fundamental idea of the whole epistle—the freedom of the Christian from the Mosaic law—is thus fully displayed in its *moral* nature and truth. Comp. Sieffert, in the *Jahrb. f. D. Theol.* 1869, p. 264.

also something *now taking place* and *continuous* (Rom. viii. 13; Col. iii. 5). The latter circumstance, however, in this passage, where Paul looks upon the matter as completed at conversion and the life thenceforth led as ζῆν πνεύματι (ver. 25; comp. ii. 20), is not to be conceived (with Bengel and Schott) as standing *alongside of* that ideal relation,—an interpretation which the historical aorist unconditionally forbids. — σὺν τοῖς παθήμ. κ. ταῖς ἐπιθυμ.] *together with the affections* (see on Rom. vii. 5) *and lusts*, which, brought about by the power of sin instigated by the prohibitions of the law (Rom. vii. 8), have their seat in and take their rise from the σάρξ, the corporeo-psychical nature of man, which is antagonistic to God; hence they must, if the σάρξ is crucified through fellowship with the death of the Lord, be necessarily crucified *with it*, and could not remain alive. Comp. on ver. 17; Rom. vii. 14 ff. The ἐπιθυμίαι are the more special sinful lusts and desires, in which the παθήματα display their activity and take their definite shapes. Rom. vii. 5, 8. The affections excite the feelings, and hence arise ἐπιθυμίαι, in which their definite expressions manifest themselves; τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰούση δυνάμει δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα, Plat. *Crat.* p. 419 D. Comp. 1 Thess. iv. 5.

Ver. 25. If the Christian has crucified his flesh, it is no longer the ruling power of his life, which, on the contrary, proceeds now from *the Holy Spirit*, the power opposed to the flesh; and the obligation thence arising is, that the *conduct* also of the Christian should correspond to this principle of life (for otherwise what a self-contradiction would he exhibit!) — εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι] introduced *asyndetically* (without οὖν), so as to be more vivid. The emphasis is on πνεύματι, as the contrast to the σάρξ: If after the crucifying of the flesh we owe our life to *the Holy Spirit*, by which is meant the life which sets in with conversion, through the παλιγγενεσία (Tit. iii. 5) —the life of the new creature, vi. 15. Comp. Rom. vi. 4 ff., vii. 5 f., viii. 9; 2 Cor. iii. 6; Gal. ii. 20. — The *first* πνεύματι is *ablative*; the *second*, emphatically placed at the commencement of the apodosis, is the expression of the *norma* (ver. 16). Comp. vi. 16; Phil. iii. 16; Rom. iv. 12. στοιχεῖν (comp. also Acts xxi. 24) is distinguished from περιπατεῖν in

ver. 16 only as to the figure; the latter is *ambulare*, the former is *ordine procedere* (to march). But both represent the same idea, the moral conduct of life, the firm regulation of which is symbolized in *στοιχεῖν*.

Ver. 26. *Special* exhortations now begin, flowing from the general obligation mentioned above (vv. 16, 25); first *negative* (ver. 26), and then *positive* (vi. 1 ff.). Hence ver. 26 ought to begin a new chapter. The address, *ἀδελφοί* (vi. 1), and the transition to the second person, which Rückert, Schott, Wieseler, make use of to defend the division of the chapters, and the consideration added by de Wette, that the vices mentioned in ver. 26 belong to the works of the flesh in ver. 20, and to the dissension in ver. 15 (this would also admit of application to vi. 1 ff.), cannot outweigh the connection which binds the *special* exhortations together. — *κενόδοξοι*] *vanam gloriam captantes*. Phil. ii. 3; Polyb. xxvii. 6. 12, xxxix. 1. 1. Comp. *κενοδοξεῖν*, 4 Macc. v. 9, and *κενοδοξία*, Lucian. *V. H.* 4, *M. D.* 8. See Servius, *ad Virg. Aen.* xi. 854. In these warnings, Paul refers neither merely to those who had remained faithful to him (Olshausen), nor merely to those of Judaistic sentiments (Theophylact and many others), for these partial references are not grounded on the context; but to the circumstances of the Galatians generally at that time, when boasting and strife (comp. ver. 15) were practised on both sides. — Both the *γινώμεθα* in itself,¹ and the use of the first person, imply a forbearing mildness of expression. — *ἀλλήλους προκαλ., ἀλλήλοις φθονοῦντες*] contains the *modus* of the *κενοδοξία*: *challenging one another* (to the conflict, in order to triumph over the challenged), *envying one another* (namely, those superior, with whom they do not venture to stand a con-

¹ *Fiamus*. The matter is conceived as already in course of taking place; hence the *present*, and not the *aorist*, as is read in G*, min., *γινώμεθα*. The Vulgate and Erasmus also correctly render it *efficiamur*. On the other hand, Castalio, Beza, Calvin, and most expositors, incorrectly give *simus*. Against *efficiamur* Beza brings forward the irrelevant dogmatic objection: "*atqui natura ipsa tales nos genuit*," which does not hold good, because Christians are *regenerate* (ver. 24). Hofmann dogmatically affirms that forbearing mildness is out of the question. It is, in fact, implied in the very expression. Comp. Rom. xii. 16; 2 Cor. vi. 14; Eph. v. 17. And passages such as iv. 12 are in no way opposed to this view, for they are *without negation*; comp. Eph. v. 1, Phil. iii. 17.

test). On προκαλεῖσθαι, *to provoke*, see Hom. *Il.* iii. 432, vii. 50. 218. 285; *Od.* viii. 142; Polyb. i. 46. 11; Bast. *ep. crit.* p. 56, and the passages in Wetstein. — φθονεῖν governs only the *dative* of the person (Kühner, II. p. 247), or the accusative *with the infinitive* (Hom. *Od.* i. 346, xviii. 16, xi. 381; Herod. viii. 109), not the mere accusative (not even in Soph. *O. R.* 310); hence the reading adopted by Lachmann, ἀλλήλους φθον. (following B G*, and several min., Chrysostom, Theodoret, ms., Oecumenius), must be considered as an error of transcription, caused by the mechanical repetition of the foregoing ἀλλήλους. — The fact that ἀλλήλ. in both cases precedes the verb, makes the *contrariety to fellowship* more apparent, ver. 13.

CHAPTER VI.

Ver. 2. ἀναπληρώσατε] Lachm. and Schott read ἀναπληρώσετε, following B F G, 33, 35, and several vss. and Fathers. Looking at this amount of attestation, to which the vss. give special weight (including Vulg. It.), and considering that the imperative might readily have been occasioned by the preceding imperatives, the aorist form being involuntarily suggested by the similar future form, the future is to be preferred.—Ver. 10. ἐργαζόμεθα] A B L, min., Goth. Oec. read ἐργαζόμεθα. Approved by Winer, but too feebly attested, especially as hardly any version is in favour of it. A mere error in transcribing, after the preceding indicatives θερίσομεν and ἔχομεν. Looking at the frequent confusion of ω and ο, we must also regard as a copyist's error the reading in ver. 12 of διώκονται, adopted by Tisch., and attested by A C, etc., instead of διώκωνται (B D, etc.). — Ver. 12. μῆ] is, with Lachm. and Tisch., following decisive testimony, to be placed after Χριστοῦ. — Ver. 13. περιτεμνόμενοι] B L, many min., also vss. and Latin Fathers, read περιτεμνημένοι.¹ Recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. and Scholz, and approved by Rinck and Reiche. And justly; the preterite is absolutely necessary, as the Judaistic *teachers* are meant. The present has crept in as a mere mechanical error of the transcribers, who had just previously written περιτέμνεσθαι, and perhaps also recollected v. 3.—Ver. 14. τῷ before κόσμῳ is omitted by Lachm. on weighty evidence; but it might be readily suppressed, owing to the preceding syllable γω, especially as the article might be dispensed with, and κόσμος just before was anarthrous.—Ver. 15. ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ οὔτε] B, 17, Arm. Aeth. Goth. Chrys. Georg. Syncell. Jer. Aug. Ambrosiast., have merely οὔτε γὰρ (Syr. Sahid., οὐ γάρ). Approved by Mill, Seml., Griesb., Rinck, Reiche; adopted by Bengel, Schott, Tisch. Justly; the Recepta is manifestly an amplifying gloss, derived from v. 6. — ἐστίν] Elz. and Matth. read ἰσχύει, against decisive evidence. Derived from v. 6. — Ver. 16. στοιχήσουσιν] A C* D E F G, 4, 71, Syr. utr. Sahid. It. Cyr. Victorin. Jer. Aug. Ambrosiast., read στοιχοῦσιν. Approved

¹ In favour of this may probably be reckoned also F with περιτεμνήμοι, and G with περιτεμνημένοι, which betray through the wrongly written η perfect forms.

by Griesb., placed in the margin by Lachm., adopted by Tisch. But the present suggested itself most readily to the unskilled transcribers, and what ground could these have had for the alteration into the future?—Ver. 17. κυρίου is omitted before Ἰησοῦ in A B C*, s, 17, 109, Arr. Aeth. Arm. Vulg. ms. Petr. Alex. Suspected by Griesb., omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. A frequent addition, in this case specially derived from ver. 18; hence several witnesses add ἡμῶν.

CONTENTS.—Continuation of the special admonitions begun in v. 26 (vv. 1–5); then an exhortation to Christian morality in general, with allusion to its future recompense (vv. 6–10). A concluding summary, in the apostle's own handwriting, of the chief polemical points of the epistle (vv. 11–16); after which Paul deprecates renewed annoyance, and adds the benediction (vv. 17, 18).

Ver. 1. Loving (ἀδελφοί) exhortation to a course of conduct opposed to κενοδοξία. — ἐὰν καὶ προληφθῇ κ.τ.λ.] Correctly rendered in substance by the Vulgate: “etsi praeoccupatus fuerit homo in aliquo delicto.” The meaning is: “if even any one (ἄνθρωπος, as in ver. 7, and 1 Cor. xi. 28, iv. 1, et al.) shall have been overtaken by any fault,—so, namely, that the sin has reached him more rapidly than he could flee from it (1 Cor. vi. 18, x. 14; 1 Tim. vi. 11; 2 Tim. ii. 22). So Chrysostom, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Beza, and most expositors, including Rückert and de Wette; and in substance also Wieseler, who, however, explains προλ. figuratively of a snare, in which (ἐν) one is unexpectedly (προ) caught.¹ There is, however, no intimation of this figure in the context (καταρτίζετε); and to explain ἐν the quite common instrumental use amply suffices, according to which the expression is not different from the mere dative. In a mild and trustful tone Paul conceives the sin, which might occur among his Galatians, only as “peccatum praecipitaniae;” for this is, at any rate, intimated by προληφθῇ. On προλαμβάνειν, to overtake, comp. Xen. Cyn. 5, 19; 7, 7; Theophr. H. pl. viii. 1. 3; Polyb. xxxi. 23. 8; Diod. Sic. xvii. 75; Strabo, xvi. p. 1120. In ἐὰν καὶ the emphasis is laid on εἰ (if even, if nevertheless); see Klotz, ad Devar. p. 519; Baeuml. Partik. p. 151. Others (Grotius,

¹ Comp. Goth. “gafaháidau,” that is, caught.

Winer, Olshausen, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Hofmann) have explained *προληφθῆ* as *deprehensus fuerit, is seized*; but against this view it may be urged that, as the word cannot be used as merely equivalent to the simple verb, or to *καταληφθῆ* (John viii. 4), or *ἐγκαταληφθῆ* (Aeschin. *Ctes.* p. 62. 17), no reference for the *προ* can be got from the context.¹ Even in Wisd. xvii. 17, *προληφθεῖς* means *overtaken, surprised* by destruction. And the *καί* does not require that interpretation, because, while it *might* belong to *προληφθῆ* (Klotz, p. 521; Kühner, § 824, note 1), so as to mean *also actually caught* (comp. 1 Cor. vii. 17), or, by way of climax, *even caught*, it does not necessarily belong to it. — *ὑμεῖς οἱ πνευματικοί*] Paul thus puts it to the consciousness of *every reader* to regard *himself* as included or not: *ye, the spiritual*, that is, *who are led by the πνεῦμα ἅγιον*. The opposite: *ψυχικοί, σαρκικοί* (1 Cor. ii. 13 f., iii. 1). In the case of *δυνατοί*, Rom. xv. 1, the circumstances presupposed and the contrast are of a different character. Those very *πνευματικοί* might readily be guilty of an unbrotherly exaltation and severity, if they did not sufficiently attend to and obey the leading of the Spirit towards meekness. — *καταρτίζετε*] *bring him right*, into the proper, normal condition; *διορθοῦτε*, Chrysostom. Comp. on 1 Cor. i. 10. A *figurative* reference to the setting of dislocated limbs (Beza, Hammond, Bengel, and others) is not suggested by the context. — *ἐν πνεύματι πραότητος*] *through the Spirit of meekness*, that is, through the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* producing meekness. For *πνεῦμα* should be understood, not with Luther, Calvin, and many others, of the *human spirit* (1 Pet. iii. 4), of the tendency of feeling or tone of mind (Rückert, de Wette, Wieseler, and others), but of the Holy Spirit, as is required by the very correlation with *πνευματικοί*. See on 1 Cor. iv. 21. But among the manifold *καρπὸς*

¹ Grotius strangely interprets: "*deprehensus antequam haec epistola ad vos veniat.*" Winer introduces more than the text warrants: "*etiamsi quis antea apprehensus fuerit in peccato, eum tamen (iterum peccantem) corrigite.*" Paul must have expressed this by *ἴαν καὶ πάλιν ληφθῆ*. Olshausen affirms that by *προ* the *λαμβάνεσθαι* is indicated as taking place *before* the *καταρτίζειν*. But this relation of time was so obvious of itself, that it would have been strange thus to express it. Hofmann interprets not more aptly: "*ere he repents of the sin*;" as if this idea could only be thus mentally supplied! Luther appropriately remarks, "*if a man should somehow be overtaken by a fault.*"

τοῦ πνεύματος (v. 22), *πραύτητος* brings prominently forward the very quality which was to be applied in the *καταρτίζειν*. In that view it is the "character palmarius hominis spiritualis," Bengel. — *σκοπῶν σεαυτὸν κ.τ.λ.*] *looking* (taking heed) *to thyself lest*, etc. Comp. *Soph. Phil.* 506. In *Plat. Theæt.* p. 160 E, *Luke xi.* 35, it is differently used. Comp. *Buttmann, neut. Gr.* p. 209. There is here a transition to the *singular*, giving a more individual character to the address; just as we frequently find in classical authors that, after the plural of the verb, the singular of the participle makes the transition from the aggregate to the individual. See *Bernhardy*, p. 421; *Lobeck, ad Soph. Aj.* 191. *Erasmus* aptly remarks that the singular is "*magis idoneus ad compellendam uniuscujusque conscientiam.*" There is therefore the less ground for considering these words as an apostolical *marginal note* (*Laurent*). — *μὴ καὶ σὺ πειρ.*] *lest thou also* (like that fallen one) *become tempted*, enticed to sin,—wherein the apostle has in view the danger of the enticement being *successful*. Comp. *1 Cor. vii.* 5. *Lachmann* places a full stop after *πραύτητος*, and connects *σκοπῶν . . . πειρασθῆς* with the words which follow; a course by which the construction gains nothing, and the connection actually suffers, for the reference of *καὶ σὺ* to *τὸν τοιοῦτον* is far more natural and conformable to the sense than the reference to *ἀλλήλων*.

Ver. 2. *ἀλλήλων*] emphatically prefixed (comp. v. 26), opposed to the habit of selfishness: "*mutually, one of the other bear ye the burdens.*" *τὰ βάρη*, however, figuratively denotes the *moral faults* (comp. ver. 5) pressing on men with the sense of guilt, not everything that is oppressive and burdensome generally, whether in the domain of mind or of body (*Matthies, Windischmann, Wieseler, Hofmann*),—a view which, according to the context, is much too vague and general (vv. 1, 3, 5). The *mutual bearing* of moral burdens is the *mutual, loving participation in another's feeling of guilt*, a weeping with those that weep in a *moral point of view*, by means of which moral sympathy the pressure of the feeling of guilt is reciprocally lightened.¹ As to this *fellowship in suffering*, comp. the

¹ Theodore of Mopsuestia, in *Cramer's Cat.* (and in *Fritzsche*, p. 129), well remarks that the bearing of one another's burdens takes place, ὅταν διὰ παραίनेσις

example of the apostle himself, 2 Cor. xi. 29. It is usually taken merely to mean, *Have patience with one another's faults* (Rom. xv. 1); along with which several, such as Rosenmüller, Flatt, Winer, quite improperly (in opposition to ἀλλήλων, according to which the burdened ones are the very persons affected by sin) look upon βάρη as applying to faults by which a person becomes burdensome to *others*. But the command, thus understood, would not even come up to what was required in ver. 1, and would not seem important and high enough to enable it to be justly said: καὶ οὕτως ἀναπληρώσετε τὸν νόμον τ. Χρ.—*and in this way* (if ye do *this*) *ye will entirely fulfil the law of Christ*, the law which Christ has given, that is, the sum of all that He desires and has commanded by His word and Spirit, and which is, in fact, comprehended in the *love* (v. 13 f.) which leads us to *serve* one another. What Paul here requires, is conceived by him as the *culminating point* of such a service. He speaks of the νόμος of Christ in relation to the Mosaic law (comp. v. 14), which had in the case of the Galatians—and how much to the detriment of the sympathy of love—attained an estimation which, on the part of Christians, was not at all due to it; they desired to be ὑπὸ νόμον, and thereby lost the ἔννομον Χριστοῦ εἶναι (1 Cor. ix. 21). A reference at the same time to the *example* of Christ, who through love gave Himself up to death (Rom. xv. 3; Eph. v. 2) (as contended for by Oecumenius and Usteri), is *gratuitously* introduced into the idea of νόμος. The compound ἀναπληρ. is, as already pointed out by Chrysostom (who, however, wrongly explains it of a common fulfilment *jointly and severally*), not equivalent to the simple verb (Rückert, Schott, and many others), but more forcible: *to fill up, to make entirely full* (the law looked upon as a measure which, by compliance, is made full; comp. v. 14), so that nothing more is wanting. Comp. Dem. 1466. 20: ὦν ἂν ἐκλείπτετε ὑμεῖς, οὐχ εὐρήσετε τοὺς ἀναπληρώσοντας. 1 Thess. ii. 16; Matt. xiii. 14. See Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 228 f.; Winer, *de verbor. cum praeapos. compos. in N. T. usu*, III. p. 11 f. The thought therefore is, that without this moral bearing of one another's burdens, the fulfilment of the law of

καὶ χρηστότητος ἐπικουφίξετε αὐτῶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἁμαρτήματος συνειδήσεως βιβαρημένην.

Christ is not complete; *through* that bearing is introduced what *otherwise* would be *wanting* in the ἀναπλήρωσις of this law. And how true this is! Such self-denial and self-devotion to the brethren in the ethical sphere renders, in fact, the very measure of *love* full (1 Cor. xiii. 4 ff.), so far as it may be filled up at all (Rom. xiii. 8).

Ver. 3. *Argumentum e contrario* for the preceding καὶ οὕτως ἀναπληρ. τ. ν. τ. Χρ.; in so far as the fulfilment to be given *in* such measure to this law is impossible to moral conceit.—*For if any one thinks himself to be something*, imagines himself possessed of peculiar moral worth, so that he conceives himself exalted above such a mutual bearing of burdens, *while he is nothing*, although he is in reality of no moral importance, *he is*, so far from fulfilling the law of Christ, *involved in self-deception*. — On εἶναι τι, and the opposite μηδὲν εἶναι, nullius momenti esse (comp. Arrian. *Epict.* ii. 24: δοκῶν μὲν τι εἶναι, ὦν δ' οὐδείς), comp. ii. 6, and see on Acts v. 36; 2 Cor. xii. 11; Locella, *ad Xen. Eph.* p. 143. As to μή with the participle, see Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 301. If μηδὲν ὦν be attached to the apodosis (Michaelis, Baumgarten, Morus, Jatho, Hofmann), the effect is only to weaken the judgment which is expressed in it, because it would contain the fundamental statement (*since he is nothing*), in which the εἶναι. φρεναπ. is already obviously involved, and consequently, as the first portion of the affirmation in the apodosis, would anticipate the latter portion of it and take away its energetic emphasis. This is not the case, if the “being nothing” belongs to the antithetical delineation of conceited pretension in the protasis, where it is appropriate for the completeness of the case supposed. Moreover, μηδὲν ὦν is really applicable in the case of *every one*, Luke xvii. 10; Rom. iii. 23; 1 Cor. iv. 7, *et al.* — φρεναπατᾶ] denotes deception in the judgment, here in the *moral* judgment; the word is not preserved in any other Greek author. But comp. φρεναπάτης, Tit. i. 10; Ignat. *Trall. interpol.* 6; Etym. M. 811. 3.

Ver. 4. But men ought to act in a way entirely different from what is indicated by this δοκεῖ εἶναι τι. “His own *work* let every man prove, and then” etc. — The emphasis lies on τὸ ἔργον (which is *collective*, and denotes the totality of the

actions, as in Rom. ii. 7, 15 ; 1 Pet. i. 17 ; Rev. xxii. 12), opposing the *objective* works to the *subjective* conceit. — δοκιμαζέτω] not: *probatum reddat* (Beza, Piscator, Rambach, Semler, Michaelis, Rückert, Matthies), a meaning which it never has (comp. on 1 Cor. xi. 28), but: *let him try*, investigate of what nature it is. — καὶ τότε] *and then*, when he shall have done this (1 Cor. iv. 5), not: when he shall have found himself approved (Erasmus, Estius, Borger, and others). — εἰς ἑαυτὸν μόνον τὸ καύχημα ἔξει, κ.τ.λ.] does not mean, *he will keep his glorying for himself* (comp. Hilgenfeld), that is, *abstinebit a gloriando* (Koppe) ; for although ἔχειν may, from the context, obtain the sense of *keeping back* (Hom. *Il.* v. 271, xxiv. 115 ; Eur. *Cycl.* 270), it is in this very passage restricted by καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον to its simple meaning, *to have* ; and καύχημα is not equivalent to καύχησις, but must retain its proper signification, *materies gloriandi* (Rom. iv. 2 ; 1 Cor. v. 6, and always). Nearest to the view of Koppe in *sense* come those of Winer: “non tantas in se ipso reperiet laudes, quibus apud alios quoque gloriatur;” of Usteri: “then will he have to glory towards himself alone, and not towards others,”—a delicate way of turning the thought: “then he will discover in himself faults and weaknesses sufficient to make him think of himself modestly;” and of Wieseler, “he will be silent toward others as to his καύχημα.” But in accordance with the context, after the requirement of self-examination, the most natural sense for εἰς (on account of the antithesis, εἰς ἑαυτὸν—εἰς τὸν ἕτερον) is: *in respect to, as regards* ; moreover, in the above-named interpretations, neither the singular nor the article in τὸν ἕτερον obtains its due weight. The sentence must be explained: *then will he have cause to glory merely as regards himself, and not as regards the other* ; that is, then will he have cause to boast merely in respect of good of his own, which he may possibly find on this self-examination, and not in reference to the other, with whom otherwise he would advantageously compare himself. Castalio aptly remarks: “probitas in re, non in collatione;” and Grotius: “gaudebit recto sui examine, non deteriorum comparatione,”—as, for instance, was done by the Pharisee, who compared himself with robbers, adulterers, etc., instead of simply trying his own action, and not boasting

as he looked to others, whom he brought into comparison. Comp. Calvin and others; also Reithmayr. *καύχημα* with the article denotes, not *absolute glory* (Matthies), which no one has (Rom. iii. 23), but the *relevant* cause for the *καυχᾶσθαι* which he finds in himself, so far as he does so, on that trial of his own work. It is therefore the *καύχημα*, supposed or conceived by Paul, as the result of the examination in the several cases; Bernhardt, p. 15. This relative character of the idea removes the seeming inconsistency with vv. 3 and 5 (in opposition to de Wette), and excludes all untrue and impious boasting; but the taking *καύχημα ἔχειν ironically* (against which Calvin justly pronounces), or as *mimesis* (Bengel and others; also Olshausen: "a thorough self-examination reveals so much in one's own heart, that there can be no question of glory at all"),¹ is forbidden even by *καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον*. Hofmann interprets, although similarly in the main, yet without irony, and with a more exact unfolding of the purport: "*while otherwise he found that he might glory as he contrasted his own person with others, he will now in respect to the good which he finds in himself, seeing that he also discovers certain things in himself which are not good, have cause to glory only towards himself—himself, namely, who has done the good, as against himself, who has done what is not good.*" But in this interpretation the ideas, which are to form the key to the meaning, are gratuitously imported; a paraphrase so subtle, and yet so clumsy, especially of the words *εἰς ἑαυτὸν μόνον*, could not be expected to occur to the reader. More simply, but introducing a different kind of extraneous matter, de Wette interprets: "*and then he will for himself alone (to his own joy) have the glory (if he has any such thing, which is evidently called in question) not for others (in order thereby to provoke and challenge them).*" But how arbitrary it is to assign to *εἰς* two references so entirely different, and with regard to *καύχημα* to foist in the idea: "if he has *aught such*!" A most excellent example of the *εἰς ἑαυτὸν*

¹ So in substance Chrysostom and Theophylact hold, that Paul has spoken *συγκαταβατικῶς*, in order to wean his readers gradually from the habit of glorying; ὁ γὰρ ἐπιθεὶς μὴ τοῦ πλεονάζειν ὡς ὁ Φαρισαῖος, κατακαυχᾶσθαι, παχίως καὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἰναβρύνεσθαι ἀποστήσεται, Theophylact. Comp. Oecumenius, according to whom the substantial sense is: *ἑαυτοῦ καταγνώσεται, καὶ οὐχὶ ἑτέρων*.

υόνον τὸ καύχημα ἔχειν is afforded by Paul himself, 2 Cor. x. 12. Comp. 2 Cor. i. 12 ff.

Ver. 5. Reason assigned, not for the summons to such a self-examination, but for the negative result of it, that no one will have to glory *εἰς τὸν ἑτερον*: *for every one will have to bear his own burden*. No one will be, in his own consciousness, free from the moral burden of his own sinful nature, which he has to bear. The *future* does not apply to the *last* judgment, in which every one will render account for his own sins (Augustine, *c. lit. Petil.* iii. 5; Luther), and receive retribution (Jerome, Theodoret, Erasmus, Calvin, Grotius, Calovius, Estius, Bengel, Michaelis, Borger, Rückert, and others; comp. also Hofmann),—a view which, without any ground in the context, departs from the sense of the same figure in ver. 2, and also from the relation of time conveyed in ἔξει in ver. 4; but it denotes that *which will take place in every man after the self-examination referred to in ver. 4*: he will, in the moral consciousness, namely, produced by this examination, bear his own burden; and that will preclude in him the desire of glorying *εἰς τὸν ἑτερον*.—The distinction between βάρος and φορτίον (which is not *diminutive*) consists in this, that the latter denotes the burden in so far as it is *carried* (by men, beasts, ships, waggons; hence *freight, baggage*, and the like), while the former denotes the burden as *heavy and oppressive*; in *itself* the φορτίον may be light or heavy; hence: φορτία βαρέα (Matt. xxiii. 4; Eccus. xxi. 16), and ἑλαφρα (Matt. xi. 30); whereas the βάρος is always burdensome. The expression is *purposely* chosen here from its relative character.

Ver. 6. In contrast to the referring of every one *to himself* (vv. 4, 5), there is now, by the κοινωνεῖτω δέ, which is therefore placed emphatically (in opposition to Hofmann) at the beginning, presented a *fellowship* of special importance to a man's own perfection, which he must maintain: *Fellowship, on the other hand, let him who is being instructed in the doctrine* (κατ' ἐξοχήν, in the gospel; comp. 1 Thess. i. 6; Phil. i. 14) *have with the instructor*¹ *in all good* (ver. 10), that is, let the

¹ The question, whether the persons here meant were permanent teachers of the church, or itinerant evangelists, is to be answered by saying that neither of these two kinds of teachers is excluded. For although at that time there were

disciple make common cause (endeavour and action) with his teacher in everything that is morally good. So, following Marcion (?) (in Jerome) and Lyra, in modern times Aug. Herm. Franke (in Wolf), who, however, improperly connects ἐν πᾶσι ἀγαθοῖς with κατηχοῦντι, Hennicke, *de nexu loci Gal.* vi. 1-10, Lips. 1788; Mynster, *kl. theol. Schr.* p. 70, Matthies, Schott, Keerl, *Diss. de Gal.* vi. 1-10, Heidelb. 1834, Trana, Jatho, Vömel, Matthias; also not disapproved by Winer. Usually, however (as by Winer, Rückert, Usteri, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Wieseler, Hofmann, Reithmayr, and others), there is found in the words a summons to *liberality towards the teachers*, so that ἐν πᾶσι ἀγαθοῖς is taken as referring to the communication of *everything good* (Ewald), or more definitely, of all *earthly good things* ("in omni facultatum genere, ut usu venit," Bengel), or of *good things of every kind* (Ellicott, Hofmann); and κοινωνεῖτω is taken either *transitively* (so usually, also by Ewald), as if the word were equivalent to κοινοῦν (as to the distinction between the two, see especially Thuc. i. 39. 3): *communicet* (which, however, cannot be conclusively established in the N. T., not even in Rom. xii. 13; and in the passages from Greek authors in Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* III. p. 81, and Bremi, *ad Aeschin.* p. 317, Goth. it is to be referred to the idea: "*to share with any one*"), or *intransitively* (so Usteri, de Wette, Wieseler): "*let him stand in fellowship*," namely by communication, or in the sense of the *participation* in the teacher, which is perfected ἐν πᾶσι ἀγ. (Hofmann, comparing Rom. xv. 27). But against the whole of this interpretation may be urged: (1) the singular want of connection of such a summons, not merely with what goes before,¹ but also with what fol-

no διδασκαλοὶ specially instituted except the presbyters (see on Eph. iv. 11), there were nevertheless members of the church endowed with the χάρισμα διδασκαλίας, who devoted themselves to the function of continuous instruction in their churches. Rom. xii. 7.

¹ The connection with *what goes before* might be *dispensed with*, for Paul might (through δι) have passed on to a fresh subject. Winer, indeed, conceives the connection to be: "cum vv. 4, 5 ea tetigisset, quae *priva* sibi quisque habere debeat, nunc ad haec descendere, quae cum aliis *communicanda* sunt" (comp. Erasmus, *Paraphr.*). But, with the precept of *liberality* towards teachers, so entirely alien to what goes before, this connection appears forced; and it would be better to forego any connecting link with what precedes (Rückert) than to

lows,¹ wherein Paul inculcates Christian morality generally. (2) Since in vv. 1-5 *moral* faultiness was the point in question, the reference which most naturally suggests itself for ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς is a reference to *moral* good. (3) At the conclusion of this whole section in ver. 10, ἐργαζώμεθα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ., τὸ ἀγαθόν is nothing else than the *morally* good. (4) The requirement itself, to communicate with the teacher *in all good things*, would, without more precise definition (Luther, 1538: Paul desires simply, "*ut liberaliter eos alant, quantum satis est ad vitam commode tuendam*,"—an idea which is not suggested in the passage), be so indeterminate and, even under the point of view of the possession as common property, Acts iv. 32 (de Wette), which we do not meet with in Paul's writings, so little to be justified, that we cannot venture to attribute it—thus thrown out without any defining limitation—to the apostle, least of all in a letter addressed to churches in which misinterpretations and misuse on the part of anta-

bring out an illogical relation of the contrast. De Wette discovers a satisfactory connection with vv. 1-5 in the circumstance that there, as here, the apostle has in view defects of Christian social life. This, however, is to specify not a connection, but merely a logical category. According to Ewald, the previous counsels are to be conceived as for the most part addressed to the Pauline teachers of the Galatians, and Paul therefore now adds a word as to the correct behaviour of the non-teachers also. But the former idea is assumed without ground in the text, which speaks quite *generally*. According to Wieseler the conception is, that the care for worldly maintenance was a species of the βάρη (ver. 2), which the readers were to relieve them of in return for their being instructed in the word. But those βάρη are necessarily of a *moral* nature, burdens of *guilt*. According to Hofmann, Paul has previously exhorted every one to serve his neighbour with *that which he is*, and now exhorts every one to employ *that which he possesses*, as his Christian position requires. A scheme of thought purely artificial, and gratuitously introduced.

¹ The sequel down to ver. 10 is indeed referred by Luther (most consistently in 1538) and others, including Olshausen and de Wette, with more or with less (Koppe, de Wette, Hilgenfeld) consistency, to the *behaviour towards the teachers*, by the despising of whom God is mocked, the support of whom is a sowing of seed for spiritual objects, etc. But looking at the general nature of the following instructions, which there is not a word to limit, how arbitrary and forced is this view! Not less far-fetched and forced is the explanation of Hofmann, who considers that, because by means of the κοινωμένοι κ.τ.λ. the teacher is enabled to attend to his own business, Paul in vv. 7 ff. warns against the erroneous opinion that people might, without danger to the soul, deal lightly with that κοινωμένοι κ.τ.λ.; that by means of this κοινωμένοι people devote that which they possess to the Spirit, etc.

gonistic teachers were to be apprehended. Through the stress laid by Wieseler on the spiritual *counter-service* of the teacher (comp. also Hofmann), the expression ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς, seeing that it must always involve that which is to be given by the disciples to their teacher, is by no means reduced to its just measure (the bodily maintenance as recompense for the πνευματικά received, 1 Cor. ix. 11; Phil. iv. 15); whilst Ewald's interpretation, "communication *in all good things*,"¹ cannot be linguistically vindicated either for κοινων. or for ἐν (= ο, according to *Sprachl.* p. 484 f.). Paul would have said perhaps: κοινὰ ποιῶ τῷ κ. πάντα ἀγαθά, or something similar in correct Greek. The objection raised against our interpretation (see Rückert, Usteri, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler), that it is difficult to see why this particular relation of disciple and teacher should be brought into prominence, is obviated by the consideration that this very relation had been much disturbed among the Galatians by the influence of the pseudo-apostles (iv. 17), and this disturbance could not but be in the highest degree an obstacle to the success of their common moral effort and life. But in reference to de Wette's objection that κοινωνεῖν, instead of μιμεῖσθαι, is a strange expression, it must be observed that Paul wished to express not at all the idea of μιμεῖσθαι, but only that of the Christian κοινωνία between disciple and teacher. The disciple is not to leave the sphere of the morally good to the teacher alone, and on his own part to busy himself in other interests and follow other ways; but he is to strive and work in common with his teacher in the same sphere. In this view, the expression is (in opposition to Hofmann's objection) neither too wide nor too narrow. Not too wide, because the sphere of moral good is one and the same for teachers and learners, and it is only the concrete application which is different. Not too narrow, because moral fellowship in Christian church-life finds its most effective lever in the fact that learner and teacher go hand in hand in all that is good. — ὁ κατηχούμενος τὸν λόγον] Comp. Acts xviii. 25. It is self-evident that Paul means only the relation to true, *Pauline* teachers. — ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς] the sphere, *in which*

¹ Comp. Grotius: "*per omnes res bonas*, i. e. non per alimenta tantum, sed et alia obsequia et officia."

common cause is made. Comp. Matt. xxiii. 20. A classical writer would say, *πάντων ἀγαθῶν* (Heb. ii. 14; Plat. *Rep.* p. 464 A; Soph. *Trach.* 543), or *εἰς πάντα ἀγαθά* (Plat. *Rep.* p. 453 A), or even *περὶ πάντων ἀγ.* (Polyb. xxxi. 26. 6). On the plural *τὰ ἀγαθά*, as applied to moral good, comp. John v. 29; Matt. xii. 35; Ecclus. xi. 31, xvii. 7, xxxix. 4, xiii. 25; and frequently in Greek authors. Paul might also have written *ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ* (Col. i. 10); but *ἐν πάσιν ἀγαθοῖς* is more comprehensive. The dative *τῷ κατηχ.* is the *dativus communionis* everywhere common (Dem. 142, ult. 789. 2).

Ver. 7. A warning to the readers, in respect to this necessary moral fellowship, not to allow themselves to be led astray (by the teachers of error or otherwise), with very earnest reference to the divine retribution. This nearest and easy connection makes it unnecessary to refer back to the whole of the section from ver. 1 onward (Wieseler). — *μὴ πλανᾶσθε*] See on 1 Cor. vi. 9. — *Θεὸς οὐ μυκτηρίζεται*] *God is not sneered at*, that is, *mocked*; He does not submit to it. See the sequel. This *mocking of God* (a more forcible expression of the idea *πειράζειν Θεόν*) takes place on the part of him who, by immoral conduct, practically shows that he despises God and accounts nothing of His judgment. On *μυκτηρίζειν*, properly, *to turn up the nose* (comp. Horat. i. 6. 5; *Ep.* i. 19. 45), and then to *deride*, comp. Sueton. *Claud.* 4: *σκώπτειν καὶ μυκτηρίζειν*. Sext. Emp. *adv. math.* i. 217; Job xxii. 19; Prov. i. 30, xii. 8; 3 Ezr. i. 51. Comp. also *μυκτήρ*, Diog. L. ii. 19; Lucian. *Prom.* 1; *μυκτηρισμός*, 2 Macc. vii. 39; and *μυκτηριστής*, Athen. iv. p. 182 A, v. p. 187 C. — *ὁ γὰρ ἐὰν σπείρῃ κ.τ.λ.*] Proof for *Θεὸς οὐ μυκτηρίζεται*. The identity between the kind of seed sown and the kind of fruit to be reaped from it (*τοῦτο*, *this*, and nothing else; for instance, from the sowing of weeds no wheat) is a figurative expression for the equivalent relation between moral action in the temporal life and the recompense at the judgment. Comp. 2 Cor. ix. 6. The same figure is frequently used as to recompense, Hos. viii. 7; Job iv. 8; Prov. xxii. 8; Ecclus. vii. 2; Plat. *Phaedr.* p. 260 D; Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 4; Plut. *Mor.* p. 394 D; Cic. *de orat.* ii. 65: “*ut sementem feceris, ita metes.*”

Ver. 8. *Ground assigned* for the foregoing proposition. "So it is, *since in fact* the two opposite *sorts of ground* which receive the seed will also yield two opposite kinds of *harvest*." In the words $\delta\ \epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \sigma\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\eta\ \alpha\upsilon\theta\rho.\ \tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \kappa.\ \theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ Paul, as was required by the matter which he would figuratively present (*evil—good*), has conceived two different classes of seed, with two sorts of recipient soil likewise essentially different; one class comprises all the kinds of seed which are sown to a man's own flesh, the other class includes all those which are sown to the Holy Spirit. He who scatters the former class of seeds, and therefore sows to his own flesh, will from this soil, which he has furnished with the corresponding seed, reap corruption, etc. Therefore we have not here any *alteration* in the figure, by which Paul leaves the description of the *seed*, and passes over to that of the *soil* (Rückert, Hofmann, according to whom it is only this alteration which explains the connection with ver. 6), but a *proof* that the state of the case, *in accordance with the two kinds of soil* which come into view, will not be other than is said in ver. 7. Observe the $\delta\tau\iota$, for the most part neglected by expositors, which is not explanatory, but *causative* ("quoniam," Vulgate). — $\delta\ \sigma\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\omega\upsilon\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \tau.\ \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha\ \epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon$] that is, he who is minded and acts so that his own flesh—his sinfully-determined corporeo-psychical nature (comp. v. 16 f.)—is the element conditioning and prompting his thoughts and actions. $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon$ is added, because afterwards an *objective* principle, $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, is opposed to this selfish *subjective* principle.¹ The idea that $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \tau.\ \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha\ \epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon$ applies to *circumcision* (Pelagius, Schoettgen; comp. Rückert and also Usteri) is entirely foreign to the context. — $\phi\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu$] *corruption, destruction* (Rom. viii. 21; Col. ii. 22; 2 Pet. ii. 12; LXX. Ps. cii. 4; Wisd. xiv. 12; Thuc. ii. 47; Plat. *Pol.* viii. p. 546 A; and frequently), that is, here,

¹ Luther (1519 and 1524), with strange arbitrariness, holds that Paul desires to obviate the thought "*de seminatione masculi in carnem feminae*." But in 1533 he consistently abides by the reference to the attitude towards the teachers, and explains: "qui nihil communicat ministris verbi, *sed se solum bene pascit et curat*, id quod caro suadet," etc. Comp. Calovius and others; also Hofmann: he who *applies that which he possesses to his own flesh*, in order to gratify its desires. We may add that the Encratites made use of our passage (see Jerome) as a ground for rejecting sexual intercourse and marriage; holding that he who takes a wife sows to the flesh, etc.

in accordance with the contrast of *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, the *eternal ἀπόλεια*.¹ But the suggestion that *φθοράν* is used in reference to the *corruptibility* of the flesh (Winer, Schott, Reithmayr, and others; comp. also Chrysostom and Theodoret) cannot be entertained, because the true Christians who die before the *παρουσία* partake the lot of corruption, and the point of time for the harvest is conceived as not earlier than the nearly approaching *παρουσία* (ver. 9), in which either *φθορά* or *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* will be the result of the *judgment*. According to de Wette, Paul has chosen this expression in order to denote the *perishableness of carnal aims*, and at the same time their destructive consequences for the soul. This is arbitrary. The general idea of *φθοράν* obtains its more precise definition simply from *ζωὴν αἰών*. Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 17; 2 Pet. ii. 12. — ὁ δὲ σπείρων εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα] No more than in chap. v. does τὸ πνεῦμα here mean *the higher nature of man* (Rückert, Schott, and most expositors; also Ernesti *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 60, II. p. 90 f.), but (so also Wieseler and Hofmann) it denotes *the Holy Spirit*. Jerome aptly remarks, that for this very reason Paul did not again add *ἐαυτοῦ* (which Ernesti would arbitrarily again *supply*). The less, therefore, the ground for misapplying the passage in favour of the meritoriousness of good works. The sense, when divested of figure, is: “he who is minded and acts so that the Holy Spirit is the element which determines and prompts him.” — ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος θερίσει κ.τ.λ.] At the *παρουσία*. See also Rom. viii. 11, 15–17; 2 Cor. v. 5; Eph. i. 14. *φθορά* and *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* are conceived as the two kinds of *produce* which shall have sprung up from the two different *sorts of recipient soil*.

Ver. 9. Encouragement, not to become weary in that which is meant by *this second kind of sowing*; τὸ καλὸν ποιοῦντες is the same as would be figuratively expressed by εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα σπείροντες. The *autem* (δέ), which simply marks the transition to this summons, cannot be attached to the exhortation in ver. 6, as appending to it another (Hofmann). — ἐκκακῶμεν] As to this form, and the form *ἐγκακ*. (Lachmann, Tischendorf), see on 2 Cor. iv. 1. On the “*levis paronomasia*” (Winer) in *καλόν*

¹ The same thought is expressed in Rom. viii. 13: εἰ κατὰ σὰρκα ζῇτε, μίλλετε ἐκ ποθέσκειν. Comp. ver. 23.

and ἑκκακ., comp. 2 Thess. iii. 13. He who loses moral *courage* (ἐκκακεῖ) loses also moral *strength* (ἐκλύεται). — *καιρῷ γὰρ ἰδίῳ*] at the time expressly destined for the reaping (Matt. xiii. 30), by which is meant the time of the *παρουσία*, which man must await with perseverance in what is good. Comp. 1 Tim. vi. 15; Tit. i. 3. — *μὴ ἐκλυόμενοι*] *not becoming weary* (Matt. xv. 32; Mark viii. 3; Heb. xii. 3; 1 Macc. iii. 17; Wetstein, I. p. 426; Loesner, p. 336), which is not to be understood of the not becoming fatigued *in the reaping*,¹ a contrast being therein discovered either with the *toils of the harvest proper* (Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius), or with the labour of *sowing* (Usteri; the two ideas are combined by Chrysostom, Clarius, and others). Either form of the contrast would yield a description of the eternal harvest, which would be feeble, superfluous, and almost trifling, little in harmony with the thoughtful manner of the apostle elsewhere. We may add, that it is not the *nature* of the harvest (which was obvious of itself from ver. 8), but the *time* of the harvest, which constitutes the point on which the *μὴ ἐκκακ.* is *grounded*; and therefore on *καιρῷ ἰδίῳ* Calvin aptly remarks, “*Spe igitur et patientia suum desiderium sustineant fideles et refrenent.*” Hence *μὴ ἐκλυόμεν.* is rather to be taken as: *if we do not become weary* in doing good. See Photius in Oecumenius, p. 766 D, and Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, and nearly all modern expositors. This denotes the present state, by which the *future* harvest is conditioned. It involves not a clumsy repetition (Usteri), but a reiterated setting forth of the condition, urgently emphasizing its importance, by means of a correlate word which closes the sentence with emphatic earnestness. Comp. Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* I. p. 336. Nor would *μὴ ἐκλυθέντες* have been more correct (Rückert, Hofmann), but on the contrary: “*videndum, quod quoque loco tempus vel ferri possit,*” Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 773. Ewald’s explanation: *undeniably*, that is, *necessarily*, is without support from linguistic usage. Hofmann incorrectly makes *μὴ ἐκλυόμενοι* begin a new sentence; for Paul always places *ἄρα οὖν* at the

¹ Thus expressing the idea: “*Nulla erit satietas vitae aeternae,*” Calovius. This is the meaning also of Luther’s translation: “*without ceasing*” (Vulgate, *non deficientes*); comp. Estius.

commencement. but here he would have fully preserved the emphasis of *μὴ ἐκλ.*, if instead of *ἄρα οὖν* he had written merely *οὖν*, or merely *ἄρα*.

Ver. 10. Concluding exhortation of the section of the epistle which began at ver. 6, inferred from the preceding *καιρῷ γὰρ ἰδίῳ θερίσομεν μὴ ἐκλ.* (*ἄρα οὖν*). The specialty of this exhortation lies in *ὥς καιρὸν ἔχομεν*, which is therefore emphatically prefixed: *as we have a season suitable thereto* (for instances of *καιρὸν ἔχειν*, *opportunitum tempus habere*, see Wetstein). This seasonable time will have elapsed, when the *παρουσία* sets in; we must therefore utilize it as ours by the *ἐργάζεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν*. The same idea as the *ἐξαγοράζεσθαι τ. καιρὸν* in Eph. v. 16; Col. iv. 5. Hofmann introduces the idea, that there will come for the Christians, even before the *παρουσία*, an "*hour of temptation*," in which they can only (?) *withstand evil, but not bestow good one on another*. This idea is in opposition to the context in ver. 9, and is nowhere else expressed; and its introduction rests on the incorrect explanation of *ἐργάζ. τὸ ἀγαθόν* as referring to beneficence, and on the wrong idea that the doing good will become impossible. — *ὥς* is the usual *as*, that is, *as corresponds with and is suitable to this circumstance, that we καιρὸν ἔχομεν*. Comp. Luke xii. 58; John xii. 35; Clement, 2 Cor. 9: *ὥς ἔχομεν καιρὸν τοῦ λαθῆναι, ἐπιδῶμεν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ θεραπεύοντι Θεῷ*. Others, likewise retaining the signification "*as*," interpret: *prout habemus opportunitatem*, that is, when and how we have opportunity. Thus Knatchbull, Homberg, Wolf, Zachariae, Hilgenfeld. For this, indeed, no conditional *ἂν* would be necessary; but how weak and lax would be the injunction! Besides, *καιρὸν* has obtained, by means of ver. 9, its quite definite reference. Others take *ὥς* as *causal* (Heindorf, *ad Gorg.* p. 113; Matthiae, p. 1511). So Koppe, Paulus, Usteri (*because we have time and opportunity*), de Wette; also Winer, who, however, does not decide between *quoniam* and *prout*. But *ὥς*, in the sense of *because*, is nowhere to be found in Paul's writings (not even in 2 Tim. i. 3). Most expositors explain it as *so long as* (so Flatt, Rückert, Matthies, Schott, Olshausen), which, however, it never means, not even in Luke xii. 58. — *τὸ ἀγαθόν*] the *morally good*, not the *useful* (Olshausen). Not

merely the article, but also the use of the expression by Paul, in definite connection with ἐργάζεσθαι, as applying to morality active in works (Rom. ii. 10; Eph. iv. 28), ought to have prevented the interpretation of τὸ ἀγαθόν, at variance with the context, as *benefits* (Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Estius, and many others, including Schott, de Wette, and Wieseler). Hofmann's interpretation ("do good towards others"), in more general terms evading the definite idea, amounts to the same thing. The ἀγαθόν in this passage is the same as τὸ καλόν in ver. 9. That which is *good* is also that which is morally *beautiful*. Comp. especially Rom. vii. 18 f. — πρὸς] *in relation to, in intercourse with*. see Winer, p. 378 f. [E. T. 505]; Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* III. p. 698; Bernhardt, p. 265. — τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως] *the associates in the faith, believers*. οἰκείος, primarily *inmate of the house*, comes to be used generally in the sense of *special appertaining to* (comp. LXX. Isa. lviii. 7), without further reference to the idea of a house. So with the genitive of an abstract noun, as οἰκείοι φιλοσοφίας (Strabo, I. p. 13 B), γεωγραφίας (Strabo, I. p. 25 A), ὀλυγαρχίας (Diod. Sic. xiii. 91), and the like in Wetstein, p. 236; Schweigh. *Lex Polyb.* p. 401. Comp. τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖα, 2 Macc. xv. 12; τὰ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖα, Dem. 1117. 25. The πίστις is the *Christian* faith; those who belong to it are the πιστεύοντες. The opposite would be: τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους τῆς πιστ. The idea that the *church* is the οἶκος Θεοῦ (1 Tim. iii. 15; Heb. iii. 2, v. 6, x. 21; 1 Pet. iv. 17) is improperly introduced here, in order to obtain the sense: "*qui per fidem sunt in eadem atque nos familia Domini*" (Beza; comp. Estius, Michaelis, and others, also Schott and Olshausen, Wieseler, and Ewald, who limits the idea to the same *church*). For τῆς πίστεως conveys the complete definition of τοὺς οἰκείους; and the sense mentioned above must have been expressed by some such form as τοὺς ἡμῶν οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως (comp. Phil. ii. 30, *et al.*; Winer, p. 180, rem. 3 [E. T. 239]). Paul might also simply have written πρὸς τοὺς πιστεύοντας; but the expression οἰκείους τ. π. suggests a *stronger motive*. Among the πᾶσι, in relation to whom we have to put into operation the morally good, *those who belong to the faith* have the chief claims—because these claims are based on the special *sacred duty of fellowship* which it involves—in preference to

those who are *strangers* to the faith, although in respect even to the latter that conduct is to be observed which is required in Col. iv. 5, 1 Thess. iv. 12.

Note.—If the reading ἐργαζόμεθα (see the critical notes), which is followed by Ewald, were the original one, the indicative would not (with Winer in his *Commentary*, but not in his *Gramm.* p. 267 [E. T. 355]) have to be taken as a stronger and more definite expression instead of the *hortative subjunctive* (*do we therefore the good*), since this use of the *present indicative* (Jacobs, *ad Ach. Tat.* p. 559, *ad Delect. epigr.* p. 228 ; Heindorf, *ad Gorg.* p. 109 ; Bernhardt, p. 396) in non-interrogative language (John xi. 47) is foreign to the N. T., although opportunities for it often presented themselves. The interpretation of the whole sentence as an *interrogation* has been rightly given up by Lachmann (also at Rom. xiv. 19), because so complete an interruption by a question does not occur elsewhere in Paul's writings, and the addition μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως indicates that the passage is of the nature of an assertion, and not of a question. ἐργαζόμεθα τὸ ἀγαθόν would represent the matter as *actually taking place* (*we do it, we hold it so, it is our maxim*), and would thus belong to the *ideal* delineation of Christian life common with the apostle ; which might indeed be highly appropriate in its place at the conclusion of a discourse as a note of triumph, but here, in immediate connection with mere exhortations and injunctions, would be somewhat out of place.

Vv. 11–18. Final section of the epistle in the apostle's own handwriting. The main points of controversy are here briefly summed up : then in ver. 17 a repetition of molestations is deprecated, and ver. 18 concludes with the farewell blessing.

Ver. 11. Not “an *odd* verse,” the purport of which is “a *singular whim*” (Usteri) : on the contrary, in accordance with his well-known manner in other passages (1 Cor. xvi. 21 ; Col. iv. 18 ; 2 Thess. iii. 17), *Paul adds to the letter, which up to this point he had dictated* (comp. Rom. xvi. 22), *the conclusion from ver. 11 onward in his own handwriting*.¹ By means of these *autograph* endings the epistles indicated their *authentic* character. See 2 Thess. ii. 2, iii. 17. But this close of our *epistle*, as stringently comprehending all its main points once

¹ From 2 Thess. iii. 17 it is to be assumed that Paul closed *all* his epistles with his own hand, even when he does not expressly say so.

more, was intended to catch the eyes of the readers as *something so specially important, that from ver. 12 to the end the apostle wrote it with very large letters*,¹ just as we, in writing and printing, distinguish by letters of a larger size anything that we wish to be considered as peculiarly significant. To this point, and consequently to the quite special importance of the addition now made at the end, not by the hand of the amanuensis, but by his own hand in large writing, Paul calls the attention of his readers, and says: "*See with how great letters I have written* (the sequel, from ver. 12) *to you with my own hand!*" Neither ἴδετε (in opposition to Rückert and Schott) nor ἔγραψα (in opposition to Usteri) is at variance with the reference to what follows; for Paul, following the custom of letter-writers, has in his mind not the present point of time, when he is *just about* to write, but *the* point of time, when his readers have received the letter and consequently *see* what and how *he has written* (Philem. 19, 21; 1 John ii. 14, 21; Acts xv. 27, xxiii. 30, Rom. xvi. 22; Thuc. 1. 1 *in.*; Isocr. *ad Demoniac. in.*). Just in the same way in Philem. 19, ἔγραψα τῇ ἐμῇ χειρὶ points to *what follows*. In keeping with this is the similarly common use of ἐπεμψα, "*respectu habito temporis, quo alter donum accipiebat*," Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 9. 25; comp. Krüger, § 53. 10. 1. Holsten, Voemel, Matthias, Windischmann, Reithmayr, agree with our view. Grotius also ("*sua manu scripsit omnia, quae jam sequuntur*"), Studer, and Laurent refer the words to what follows. Grotius, however, contrary to the *usus loquendi*, explains πηλίκους as *how much*, thus making Paul call attention to the *length* of his autograph conclusion; and Studer understands it as referring to the *unshapeliness* of the letters (in opposition to this, see below); whilst Laurent (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1864, p. 644 ff., and in his *neut. Stud.* p. 125. 5),

¹ The principal emphasis is on the word πηλίκους, which is therefore placed apart; the secondary stress lies on τῇ ἐμῇ χειρὶ. It may, however, be doubtful whether Paul wrote *merely* ver. 12 with larger letters, and the sequel with his own hand but in his ordinary mode of writing, or whether he continued the large characters down to ver. 16 or to ver. 18. The internal connection of vv. 12-16, the uniform solemn tone of these verses down to their solemn conclusion, and the abrupt character of ver. 17, all unite in inducing us to adopt the *second* view.

against the signification of the word, adheres to the *qualibus* of the Vulgate, and is of opinion that Paul wrote this conclusion of the letter in the *cursive* character. Usually, however (as also by Ewald, Wieseler, Hofmann), ver. 11 is referred to the whole epistle, which Paul had written with his own hand,¹ *πηλίκους* being explained (with Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Cajetan, Estius, Winer, Rückert, Usteri, Hilgenfeld) as referring to the *unshapeliness of the letters*,² arising from want of practice in writing Greek; or *πηλίκ. γράμμ.* being explained as: *what a large letter* I have written to you. So most expositors, including de Wette and Hofmann. But against this latter view—although the epistle, notwithstanding 1 Pet. v. 12, Heb. xiii. 22, would no doubt be long enough for an *autograph* one—may be urged the very use

¹ In adopting this view various grounds have been guessed for its autograph composition. Pelagius: "that Paul desired to show that *he was not afraid!*" Ambrosiaster, comp. Augustine and Michaelis: "that he desired to prove the *genuineness of the epistle.*" Chrysostom (who, moreover, assumes in addition the cause assigned by Pelagius), Luther, Calvin, Calovius, and many others: "that his intention was to show the Galatians his *earnest care* for them, to make them attentive in reading, and the like." Hilgenfeld: "that he *attached so much importance* to the epistle." Ewald: "that *Timothy had not been with him just at the time* when he composed the epistle; and he thus wished, in the postscript written at a somewhat later period, to make excuse for the large inelegant letters in which the epistle had been written." Hofmann: "that the autograph writing was intended to *bring the apostle as it were vividly before the eyes of his readers.*" Hofmann is also of opinion that Paul had not elsewhere written with his own hand, that he might not needlessly curtail the time for procuring his bodily maintenance. As if the *dictating* to the pen of another would not have involved just as much loss of time! Tertius and Timothy were hardly shorthand writers. Or is Paul supposed to have been occupied in tent-making *during the time* when he was dictating his letters, which presuppose so much abstraction and concentration of mental labour?

² This is not, as is often stated, the view of Jerome, who, on the contrary, specifies this view only to reject it, and assumes that down to ver. 11 the epistle was written by the amanuensis, but after ver. 11 by Paul himself in very large characters, in order that his readers should recognise his genuine handwriting and at the same time his solicitous care for them. Jerome therefore comes nearest to our view, but introduces into the *πηλίκους* purposes which have no natural connection with the largeness of the characters, and could not, without further intimation, have been understood by the reader. Theodore of Mopsuestia explains it better, likewise understanding *πηλίκους γράμμους* correctly (*μειζοσιν ἰχρήσατο γράμμασιν*), and specifying as Paul's object that he, *μίλλων καθάπτεισθαι τῶν ἰκανῶν*, wished to intimate that he neither *ἐρρυθρᾷ οὔτε ἀρνηῖται τὰ λεγόμενα*.

which it assumes of *γράμματα* for *ἐπιστολή*,¹ since Paul elsewhere always calls an epistle *ἐπιστολή* (1 Cor. v. 9, xvi. 3; 2 Cor. iii. 1 f., x. 10; 2 Thess. ii. 2, iii. 14, 17); and, on the other hand, he just as constantly uses the word *γράμμα*, in the *singular* (Rom. ii. 27, 29, vii. 6; 2 Cor. iii. 6) and *plural* (2 Cor. iii. 7), to express the idea of a *letter* of the alphabet; and also the decisive consideration that the employment of the *dative* (*instrum.*) instead of the *accusative* (Acts xxiii. 25; Rom. xvi. 22; 2 Pet. iii. 1) would be quite in opposition to all usage.² The *dative* would only be suitable if, instead of *ἔγραψα*, *παρεκάλεσα* perhaps, or some suitable word, followed. Against the *former* interpretation, which refers the word to the *unshapeliness* of the letters, it may be urged that the idea of *ἀμορφία* is arbitrarily *introduced* into *πηλικοίς*, as this quality is by no means an *essential* characteristic of *large* letters; secondly, that the charge of want of practice in writing Greek cannot be proved. The native of Tarsus and Roman citizen, who from his youth had enjoyed a learned training in Jerusalem, where the Greek language was very current among the Jews (see Hug, *Einl.* II. § 10)—the man who handled with so much delicacy and skill the Greek literary language, who was familiar with the works of the Greek poets (see on Acts xvii. 28), and who was in constant intercourse with Greek Jews and Gentiles,—is it to be thought that such an one should not have possessed even the humble attainment of writing Greek without making the letters of an unshapely size? In Wieseler's

¹ Taking the word by itself, there can be no doubt that *γράμμα* (*scriptum*, 2 Tim. iii. 15, John v. 47) may, according to the context, mean *epistle*, so that in the plural it would denote *epistolae* (Acts xxviii. 21, and often in Greek authors), but may also apply to a *single* epistle. Thus, for instance, Thuc. vii. 8. 3, where *ἐπιστολή* is used shortly before; Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 5. 26, where *ἐπιστολή* occurs immediately after; Xen. *Eph.* ii. 5 and Locella *in loc.* Comp. also Luke xvi. 6; 1 Macc. iv. 10, 14; Ignat. *Rom.* 8, *ad Polyc.* 7.

² Quite irrelevantly Hofmann compares the usage of combining a verb with the abstract noun derived from it in the *dative* (Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 159); and just as irrelevantly the expression *εἰπεῖν λόγῳ*, Matt. viii. 8 (see on this passage), Luke vii. 7. Not even that use of *εἰπεῖν λόγῳ*, in which it may denote *to deliver as an orator* (Krüger on Thuc. i. 22. 1), would here be analogous. Only such phrases as, e.g., *χρυσοῖς γράμμασι γράφειν*, to write with *golden letters*, Lucian. *Alec.* 43; *μεγάλῳ γράμμ. ἀναγράφειν*, to write down in *large letters*, *Gymn.* 22; *γράμμασιν Ἑλληνικοῖς*, Luke xxiii. 38, Elz.; *φοινικίῳ γράμμ.*, Soph. *Fragm.* 460 D, really correspond.

view, the *large* letters were very *legible* (for the public reading of the epistle); and in calling attention to this circumstance, Paul desires to bring into prominence his great love for his readers, which shuns no trouble on their account. But even thus the matter would amount only to a trifle. The Galatians were in possession of far greater proofs of his love than the size of the characters in his own handwriting, which, besides, might be something very different from legibility.

Ver. 12.¹ *All those whose wish and will are directed to making a fair show in the flesh*, that is, to the having a specious appearance, while they are involved in fleshly habits,—*this class of men force circumcision upon you, and they do so solely for the reason that they may not bring on themselves persecution on account of the cross of Christ.* This persecution they would incur on the part of the Jews, if they preached the cross of Christ and at the same time *rejected circumcision*; whereas, by *insisting on circumcision*, they disarmed the zeal of the Jews for the law (comp. on v. 11), and removed from the cross of Christ all occasion of their experiencing persecution for it (note the critically correct position of the *μή*). In order to understand the passage rightly, we must note that the emphasis is on *ἐνπροσωπήσαι* (not on *ἐν σαρκί*): they desire to combine a *pleasing exterior* with an unspiritual, carnal state of life, in which they really are. Thus is characterized the *hypocritical* conduct of these people, whose jesuitry makes them resemble the *τάφοις κεκονιαμένοις* (Matt. xxiii. 27; comp. Acts xxiii. 3). Comp. 2 Cor. v. 12. So many as belong to this *dissembling class*, they constrain you to be circumcised! — *ἐνπρόσωπος*] *speciosus facie*, sometimes applied to actual beauty of person (as Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 10), and sometimes to a mere specious appearance (as Herod. vii. 168; Dem. 277. 4; Lucian. *Herm.* 51), is very commonly used among Greek authors (comp. Gen. xii. 11); but *ἐνπροσωπεῖν* is not preserved elsewhere in the literary language. In Dion. Hal. iii. 11 we find *ἐνπροσωπία*; in Symmachus, Ps. cxli. 6, *ἐνπροσωπίσθησαν*. Comp. *φαινοπροσωπεῖν*, Cic. *Att.* vii. 21, xiv. 21; *σεμνοπροσωπεῖν*, Arist. *Nub.* 363. — *ἐν σαρκί*] is the element of the sinful nature of man

¹ As to vv. 12-16, see the excursus of Holsten, *z. Evang. d. Paul u. Petr.* 343 ff.

(ver. 8, iii. 3, v. 17), in which, instead of being renewed and refined by the Holy Spirit, those hypocrites are found living, and at the same time endeavour to give to themselves a good colouring which would prepossess the opinion of others in their favour. The juxtaposition of the words, "*to look fair in the flesh,*" reveals the *moral contradiction* in their nature, and delineates their whole portraiture, as if with one sharp touch, indignantly, vigorously, and appropriately. The words are usually explained: "those who desire to be well-pleasing *by means of outward carnal things, such as circumcision and the observance of the ceremonial law generally,*" Rückert; comp. Beza, Gomarus, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Winer, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Olshausen, and others. Of course *ἐν σαρκί* might, *ex adjuncto*, obtain the sense, *by means of circumcision and observance of the law* (comp. Rom. ii. 28); but in this passage the context suggests no ground for thinking of anything else than that which was just shortly before meant by *σάρξ*, in the contrast drawn between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα*. Comp. Wieseler. And how feeble and inexpressive, when placed at the commencement of so energetic a passage, would be the description of the misleaders which this interpretation would yield! Holsten interprets in a similar way, but developes the sense more accurately, and takes *ἐν σαρκί* as the sphere in which the *ἐνπρ.* manifests itself, "all who desire a fair show *in the fleshly domain*;" this applies in the concrete to *circumcision*, which could have true significance only as a sign of inward righteousness (Rom. iii. 25 f.), but to which these persons adhered "*for its fair show of righteousness.*" But it is not until ver. 13 that *σάρξ* obtains its reference in harmony with the text to *circumcision*; in respect to which, moreover, the idea, that *circumcision is the seal of righteousness*, is not at all intimated in the connection of our passage. Lastly, Chrysostom and his successors, Erasmus, Calvin, Estius, Grotius, and others, have assigned to *ἐν σαρκί* the unmeaning sense *παρ' ἀνθρώποις*; and Hofmann has arrived at the trifling interpretation, that the idea meant was "*a pleasing cheerfulness of outward appearance, springing from and testifying to a natural amiability, to which the opponents of the apostle aspired: they would fain appear with the expression of natural amiability.*"

Thus the description of the opponents placed at the head of this final outburst, so full of holy severity and indignation, would simply amount to the assertion of an amiable *bonhomme* by which they were impelled. Holsten justly designates this view as *inconceivable*. — ἀναγκάζουσιν] they are occupied with, busy themselves in, forcing circumcision upon you. See Bernhardt, p. 370. As to the idea of ἀναγκάζ. see on Matt. xiv. 22. Comp. ii. 3, 14. — μόνον ἵνα] *merely from the* (self-interested) *motive, that they, etc.* — τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ] that is, *on account of* the cross of Christ, because they preach Christ as *crucified*. The instrumental dative denotes the cause of the persecution. See Rom. xi. 20; 2 Cor. ii. 12; Bernhardt, p. 101 f.; Winer, p. 202 f. [E. T. 270]. So most expositors, including Rückert, Matthies, Usteri, Schott, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Hofmann. But others explain the words according to the idea of the παθήματα Χριστοῦ (see on 2 Cor. i. 5; Col. i. 24): “*ne participes fiant suppliciorum Christi,*” Winer; comp. Jerome, Luther, Grotius, Semler, Michaelis, Koppe, Morus, de Wette, Ewald. The evident reference to v. 11¹ is decidedly opposed to this interpretation, even apart from the singular nature of the idea τῷ σταυρῷ διώκεσθαι (Paul would have written ταῖς θλίψεσι or the like).

Ver. 13. They have no other design than merely that stated in ver. 12 (ἵνα τῷ σταυρῷ κ.τ.λ.). For so far from its being their aim, by the enforcement of circumcision, to re-establish the observance of the law among you, *not even the circumcised* (who are in question) *themselves*, for their own part, *keep the law*, but δι’ ἀνθρωπίνην φιλοτιμίαν ταῦτα πάντα γίνεται ὑπὲρ ἀρεσκείας τῶν ἀπίστων, Chrysostom. — οἱ περιτετμημένοι] is said contemptuously, and with indignation, of the fraternity of the false apostles, of whom it might at least have been

¹ Holsten holds the peculiar view, that what is in v. 11 expressed *objectively*, receives here a *subjective* turn: “*in order that they (those who are offended) should no more be persecuted through (the offence at) the cross.*” The σταυρὸς τ. x. had, in his view, been to the Jewish Christians an *obscure point*, and in presence of the Pauline churches a *painful wound*, by the recollection of which they were, in a metaphorical sense, *persecuted*. But what plain reader would have been able to unriddle a sense so enigmatically wrapped up—a sense which Paul might easily have expressed in clear words?

expected that they themselves would combine obedience to the law with their being circumcised.¹ Comp. Stallbaum, *ad Enthyphr.* p. 12; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 613. But the ground for their non-observance of the Mosaic law is conceived by Paul to be, neither their distance from Jerusalem (Theodoret and others; also Schott), nor the general impossibility of a complete fulfilment of the law (Jerome, Estius; comp. Usteri),—both of which would be exculpatory, and wholly unsuited to the idea of the worthlessness of the persons concerned,—but *the hypocritical badness of these people* (comp. ver. 12). It

¹ As at any rate the false teachers are meant, and these were *Jewish Christians*, the reading *περιτιμνόμενοι* is plainly absurd. They were, in fact, not subjected to circumcision (Reithmayr), but *circumcised*, and could not therefore be designated, “according to their quality as Jews” (Moeller on de Wette), as *περιτιμνόμενοι* (*present*). See especially Reiche, p. 93. The idea that these people were formerly *Gentiles*, part of whom were still *on the point* of accepting circumcision, and that their *adherents* are included (de Wette), is quite as unhistorical (see Acts xv. 1, 5; 2 Cor. xi. 22; Acts xi. 20–22) as the makeshift of Hilgenfeld is groundless: that among those false teachers (“the circumcision-people”) the act of circumcision had still *continued*, not merely outwardly in the reception of the newly-born and proselytes (in that case Paul must have said *οἱ περιτέμνοντες*), but also inwardly, by virtue of the significance ascribed to it. In his *Zeitschr.* 1860, p. 220, Hilgenfeld appeals to *οἱ περιτιμνόμενοι* in the *Act. Petr. et Pauli*, 63; but wrongly, because there (see the sequel) the subject is moral circumcision. The view of Neander is also mistaken, p. 366. According to Wieseler and Matthias, who likewise read *περιτιμνόμενοι*, the *περιτιμνόμενοι* were those among the *Galatian Gentile Christians*, who, led away by the pseudo-apostles, *allowed themselves to be circumcised*. In that case we must with these expositors make the seducers themselves, the pseudo-apostles, the subject of *ἐίλουσιν*. But this view is intolerable; how could Paul enable the reader to guess this change of subject? The subject of *φυλάσσω* must also be the subject of *ἐίλουσιν*, or else Paul must have written as awkwardly as possible. Consequently the subject of both the verbs can only be the false apostles, who, however, were *περιτεμνημένοι*, and not *περιτιμνόμενοι*.—Hofmann and Holsten are of opinion that the present participle is intended to denote the *Jews generally*, inasmuch as *circumcision was in use* among them. Against this view it may be decisively urged, that the subjects of the following *ἐίλουσιν* can be no other than *οἱ περιτιμνόμενοι*, and thus likewise the Israelites generally (as Hofmann consistently explains it); nevertheless these *ἐίλοντες* (ver. 13) must necessarily be the very same as those to whom the *ἐίλουσιν* in ver. 12 applies, and therefore not the Jews generally, but the *Judaistic adversaries*. Moreover, to these only is the *οἰδί*, *not even*, suitable, which presupposes in those concerned a *higher degree* of obligation than in the case of others who were bound to obey the law. The forced expedient of Holsten is highly arbitrary: that Paul included the false teachers (consequently, according to our reading and interpretation, the *περιτεμνημένοι*) in the category of those *circumcising themselves* (and therefore the *περιτιμνόμενοι*).

is true that, amongst the Jews generally, notwithstanding their self-conceit, there was a deficiency in their obedience to the law (Rom. ii. 17-23); but an observance of the law might have been expected at all events from these *περιτετμημένοι*, who were such champions for circumcision and insisted on it so much (ver. 12). Yet *not even they themselves*, etc. — *ἵνα ἐν τῇ ὑμετ. σαρκὶ καυχ.*] The *σάρξ* is not to be here taken again in an ethical sense, as in ver. 12 (Wieseler, comp. Ewald); but, according to the close and definite connection with *περιτέμνεσθαι*, it must be taken as referring to the *corporeal nature*, so far as it is in it that circumcision takes place (Eph. ii. 11; Col. ii. 13). The emphasis is, however, on *ὑμετέρα*; ¹ hence Olshausen is the more wrong in finding a contrast—which is quite out of place here—to the *souls*, which those false teachers ought to have sought after. The antithetic element of *τῇ ὑμετ.* lies in the conceit of the *περιτετμημένοι* as to *their own* circumcision, as the correlate of which the circumcision of the *Galatian Gentile Christians*, to be effected by them, was to be the subject of their boasting. But this sentence of purpose is *parallel* to the *ἵνα τῷ σταυρῷ κ.τ.λ.* contained in ver. 12, seeing that the pseudo-apostles in fact by this intended boasting—of their diffusion of theocratic Judaism by the circumcision of Gentile Christians which they procured—thought to avert the persecutions of the Jews; Theophylact: *ἵνα ἐν τῷ κατακόπτειν τὴν ὑμέτεραν σάρκα καυχῇσονται ὡς διδάσκαλοι ὑμῶν καὶ μαθητὰς ὑμᾶς ἔχοντες.* It is a *καυχᾶσθαι*, in the face not of *heathenism* (Holsten), but of the *non-Christian Judaism*, from whose side the persecution on account of the cross of Christ (ver. 12) was threatened.

Ver. 14. By way of contrast, not to the *national vanity* of the Jews (Hofmann, in accordance with his interpretation of ver. 13), but to the *καυχᾶσθαι* which the *pseudo-apostles* had in view, Paul now presents *his own principle*: “*from me, on the other hand, far be it to glory, except only in the cross of Christ.*” — *ἐμοὶ μὴ γένοιτο καυχ.*] *mihī ne accidat, ut glorier.* On this deprecating expression with the *infinitive*, comp. LXX. Gen.

¹ Not on *σαρκί* (Matthias, Holsten), as if Paul had written *τῇ σαρκὶ ὑμῶν*. Comp. 2 Cor. viii. 8, Rom. xi. 31, 1 Cor. xv. 31, where the pronoun, rarely used by Paul, is likewise emphatic.

xliv. 7, 17; Josh. xxii. 29, xxiv. 16; 1 Macc. xiii. 5, 9, 10; Ignat. *Eph.* 12; Xen. *Cyr.* vi. 3. 11: ὦ Ζεῦ μέγιστε, λαβεῖν μοι γένοιτο αὐτόν, *Anab.* i. 9. 18; Dem. xxxiii. 25; Ellendt, *Lxx. Soph.* I. p. 366. — In the words εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ down to κόσμῳ, observe the defiant enthusiasm, which manifests itself even in the fulness of the expression. How very different the conduct of the opponents, according to ver. 12! Nothing but the *cross of Christ* is to be the subject of *his καυχᾶσθαι*; nothing, namely, but the redemption accomplished on the cross by Christ constituted the basis, the sum, and the divine certainty of his faith, life, hope, action, etc. Comp. Phil. iii. 7 ff.; 2 Cor. v. 15 ff.; 1 Cor. i. 23, ii. 2, *et al.* Thus it is a truly apostolic *oxymoron*: καυχᾶσθαι ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ. The cross is “τὸ καύχημα τῶν καυχημάτων,” Cyril. — δι’ οὗ ἐμοὶ κόσμος ἐσταύρ. κἀγὼ τῷ κόσμῳ] reveals the *cause* why he may not glory in anything else: “*through whom the world is crucified to me, and I (sc. ἐσταύρωμαι) unto the world,*” that is, “by whose crucifixion is produced the result, that no internal fellowship of life longer exists between me and the world: it is dead for me, and I for it.” By Calvin, Bengel, Winer, Usteri, Hofmann, Holsten, Matthias, Reithmayr, and others, δι’ οὗ is referred to the *cross*. But it is more pertinent to refer it to the fully and triumphantly expressed subject immediately preceding, τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Vulgate, Erasmus, Beza, Luther, and many others, including de Wette, Ewald, Wieseler): *through whom*, that is, according to the context, *by means of whose crucifixion*. This effect is dependent on the inward fellowship with the death of Christ (ii. 19 f.; Rom. vi.) commenced by faith, and maintained by the Holy Spirit. By this fellowship Paul is transplanted into an entirely new relation of life, and feels that all the previous interests of his life are now stripped of their influence over him, and that he is now completely independent of them. Comp. Phil. iii. 7 ff. — ἐμοί] *for me*, denotes the ethical reference of the relation. See Bernhardt, p. 84. — κόσμος (without the article; see Winer, p. 117 [E. T. 153]) finds its explanation from ver. 15 (οὔτε περιτομή, οὔτε ἀκροβυστία), namely, *the organic totality of all relations aloof from Christianity*, looked upon, indeed, as a *living power*, which exercises authority and sway over the

unconverted, but in the case of the converted has become *dead* through his admission into the fellowship of faith and life with the crucified Lord; that is, has ceased to influence and determine his thoughts, feelings, and actions. Thus the world is crucified to him by means of the crucifixion of Christ. Comp. Col. ii. 20; Eph. ii. 2 f.; 1 Cor. vii. 31, 33, 34; Jas. iv. 4; 1 John ii. 15 f. — *καὶ γὰρ τῷ κόσμῳ*] for the cessation of the *mutual* fellowship of life is meant to be expressed, and the matter to be thus wholly exhausted. Comp. 1 Cor. vi. 13; 2 Thess. i. 12; “*nec malis illius territor, nec commodis titillor, nec odium metuo, nec plausum moror, nec ignominiam formido, nec gloriam affecto*,” Erasmus, *Paraphr.*

Ver. 15. *Γάρ*] introduces an explanatory reason assigned, not for the *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ* (Hofmann, Matthias, Reithmayr, and others), which has already received its full explanation in the relative sentence *δι’ οὗ κ.τ.λ.*, but for the just expressed *δι’ οὗ ἐμοὶ κόσμος κ.τ.λ.* This relation of his to the world cannot indeed, according to the axiom *οὔτε περιτομή κ.τ.λ.*, be other than that so expressed. In justification of this reference of *γάρ*, observe that *περιτομή* and *ἀκροβυστία* comprehend the *two categories of worldly relations apart from Christianity*, which had so prominently re-asserted themselves in those very Galatian disturbances (comp. v. 6). *For neither circumcision availeth, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature:*¹ that is, “for it is a matter of indifference whether one is circumcised or uncircumcised; and the only matter of importance is, that one should be created anew, transferred into a new, spiritual condition of life.” As to the form and idea of *καινὴ κτίσις*, see on 2 Cor. v. 17. As *characteristics* of the *καινὴ κτίσις*, we find, according to ii. 20, the *ζῆν δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός*; according to iii. 27, the “having put on Christ;” according to v. 6, *πίστις δι’ ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη*; according to Eph. ii. 10, the *περιπατεῖν ἐν ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς*; and according to 1 Cor. vii. 19, *τήρησις ἐντολῶν Θεοῦ*. In the new man (Col. iii. 10), Christ

¹ It is stated by Syncell. *Chron.* p. 27 (ed. Bonn, p. 48), and Phot. *Amphil.* 183, that Paul derived this utterance from the apocryphal *Apocalypsis Mosi*. It is possible that the same thought occurred in that book; but it is certain that Paul derived it from his own inmost consciousness. It may have passed from our passage into the *ἀποκάλυψις Μωϋσέως*. Comp. Lücke, *Einkl. in d. Offenb. Joh.* I. p. 232 f.

determines all things; the new man is *σύμφυτος τῆς ἀναστάσεως* of Christ (Rom. vi. 5), set free by the Spirit from the law of sin and of death (Rom. viii. 2), a child and heir of God (Rom. viii. 16 f.). That this principle, moreover, was that of the *Christian* point of view, was self-evident to the reader; without again adding *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, as in v. 6 (see the critical remarks), Paul has rendered this Christian axiom the more striking by setting it down *in an absolute form*. It stands here as his concluding signal of triumph.

Ver. 16. The heart, full of the great truth in ver. 15, has now a wish of blessing for all who follow it in their conduct. The simple *and*, carrying on the train of thought and linking it with ver. 15, serves to express this wish. A reference to ver. 14, so as to connect our verse with the wish therein contained (Hofmann), is not required by *καί*, and is forbidden by the importance of ver. 15, which would in that case have to be reduced to a mere parenthetical insertion. — The emphasis lies not on *τούτω*, but on *τῷ κανόνι* (comp. on 1 Cor. xv. 19); for it is the very *canonical* character of the saying in ver. 15 which has to be brought out: "who shall walk according to the *guiding line*, which is herein given." We are prohibited from assigning to *κανών* the *non-literal* meaning *rule, maxim* (as is usually done; see Schott *in loc.*), by the figurative *στοιχῆσουσιν*, which requires the *literal* meaning *guiding line* (2 Cor. x. 13 ff.), that is, in this passage, *a line defining the direction of the way*; as such, the maxim expressed in ver. 15 is *placed before* them. As to *στοιχεῖν*, comp. on v. 25. The *anacoluthic nominative* *ὅσοι κ.τ.λ.* has rhetorical emphasis, directing the whole attention of the readers first to the subject in itself which is under discussion. Comp. on Matt. vii. 24, x. 14; John i. 12; Acts vii. 40. The *future* *στοιχῆσ.* (comp. v. 10) applies to the time of receiving the letter (comp. *τοῦ λοιποῦ*, ver. 17). Paul hopes that the letter will have a converting and strengthening effect upon many readers, but makes the question, *who* should be warranted in applying to himself the concluding blessing, depend on the result. — *εἰρήνη ἐπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔλεος*] *sc. εἴη*,¹ *welfare* (וְשָׁלוֹם; see on

¹ Taken as a *wish* of blessing, the thought harmonizes more naturally with the *conclusion* of the epistle, than if it is taken as an *affirmation* (de Wette, *ἔσται*

Eph. vi. 23 ; John xiv. 27) *on them, and mercy* (Tittm. *Synon.* p. 69 f.). Comp. 1 Tim. i. 2 ; 2 Tim. i. 2 ; Jude 2 ; 2 John 3, in which passages ἔλεος *stands first*. Here it *follows after*, not because Paul intended at first to write εἰρήνη only (so, arbitrarily, Olshausen), nor because in ἔλεος he had specially in view the day of judgment (Hofmann), which indeed is expressly added in 2 Tim. i. 18, but because he has *thought of* the effect produced before the producing cause. *What welfare* it is that Paul wishes—namely, all *Messianic welfare*—is obvious of itself. The peace of reconciliation *forms a part* of it. ἔλεος is, moreover, to be considered as *neuter*, because Paul *throughout* so uses it (even in Tit. iii. 5 it is neuter, according to decisive testimony); although the neuter form, which very often occurs in the LXX., is but very rarely found in classical authors. See Dindorf, *ad Diod.* iii. 18 ; Kühner, I. p. 396, c. ed. 2. — In ἐπ' αὐτούς is implied the idea that welfare and mercy *come down upon* them from heaven. Comp. Luke ii. 25, 40, iv. 18 ; 2 Cor. xii. 9 ; Mark i. 10 ; Acts xix. 6, *et al.* — καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ Θεοῦ] That this is a reminiscence of Ps. cxxv. 5, cxxviii. 6 (Theophylact, Erasmus, and others ; also Rückert, Schott, de Wette, Reiche), could only be assumed without dealing arbitrarily, if, instead of καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσρ. τοῦ Θεοῦ, Paul had written: εἰρήνη ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ! which, after the instruction given by him in iv. 21 ff., he *might* have written without any danger of misunderstanding. Still less can the expression be referred to Ps. lxxiii. 1 ; for which purpose Hofmann employs an impossible interpretation of the Hebrew text of the passage. The *Israel of God*, that is, as contrasted with Jacob's bodily descendants as such (comp. Rom. ix. 6 ; 1 Cor. x. 18 ; Phil. iii. 3), the *Israelites who belong to God as His own*, and therefore form the real people of God ideally viewed (comp. also John i. 48), are at any rate *the true Christians*.¹ But according as καὶ is taken

or ἵστιν). Chrysostom and Theophylact appear to have supplied ἔσται ; but Theodoret takes it as *wish*: ἐπηύξατο τὸν ἔλεον κ. τὴν εἰρήνην.

¹ Not the *Jews* (Morus), nor even the *pious Jews*,—those, namely, who have not rejected the gospel out of stubbornness, and permit the hope of their coming to recognise the rule expressed in ver. 15 (Reiche, p. 97 f.). The apostle, according to his whole system, could not understand under the ideal Israel of God any others than *believers* (iii. 7, 29, iv. 26 ; Rom. ix. 6-8). To him the καὶ ἵστιν

either as *explanatory* or as *conjunctive*, we may understand either the true Christians *in general*, *Jewish and Gentile Christians* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Luther, Calvin, Pareus, Cornelius a Lapide, Calovius, Baumgarten, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Borger, Winer, Paulus, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Wieseler, and others), or the truly converted *Jews* (Ambrosiaster, Beza, Grotius, Estius, Schoettgen, Bengel, Rückert, Matthies, Schott, de Wette, Ewald, Reithmayr, and others; Usteri does not decide). If we adopt the latter interpretation, we must either (with Grotius, Schott, Bengel, Ewald) refer the foregoing ὅσοι and αὐτούς to the Gentile Christians,—a view which is, however, decisively at variance with the universal ὅσοι, and with the description excluding any national reference, τῷ κανόνι τούτῳ στοιχ. — or (with Rückert, Matthies, de Wette, Reithmayr, and others) we must explain the train of thought as follows: “Salvation be upon all true Christians, *and more especially* (to mention these in particular; see on Mark i. 5, xvi. 7) on all true Jewish Christians!” But however near Paul’s fellow-countrymen were to his heart (Rom. ix. 1), he not only had no ground in the context for bringing them forward here so specially; but any such distinction would even be quite improperly introduced — especially in the deeply-impassioned close of the letter — in presence of churches which consisted principally of Gentile Christians and had been involved by Jewish interference in violent controversies. And even apart from this, no reader to whom the teaching of the apostle as to the true Israelites was familiar (and see iii. 7, iv. 21 ff.) could think that τὸν Ἰσρ. τοῦ Θεοῦ referred to Jewish Christians *only*; this would be opposed to the *specific* conception of Paul on this point. We must adhere, therefore, to the *explanative* view of καί as the *correct* one (1 Cor. iii. 5, viii. 12, xv. 38; John i. 16), *and indeed, namely*, so that it introduces an appropriate, more precise description (Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 145 f.; Winer, p. 407 [E. T. 545 f.]) of the subjects previously characterized. Hofmann is wrong in objecting that the

πίστις in ver. 15 was not conceivable otherwise than as necessarily conditioned by *faith* (iii. 28; Eph. ii. 10); hence he could not expect of any Jew not yet converted, however pious he might be as an observer of the law, that he would walk according to the canon of ver. 15.

exegetical *καί* is always *climactic*; see Hermann *ad Viger.* p. 838. Moreover, the designation of all those, who shall walk according to that entirely anti-Jewish rule of conduct, as *the Israelites of God*, forms as it were the final triumph of the whole epistle over the Judaistic practices, the very aim of which was to assert the title of the *Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα* to the heritage of salvation. Hofmann is entirely mistaken in his view that *καί* is *even*, and that the Israel of God are the *Jew-Christians*, so that Paul expresses the idea that he desired to include even these in his wish. It was, indeed, obvious that in *ἐπ' αὐτούς* they could *not* be, and were not intended to be, *excluded*; but Paul was neither so unwise nor so devoid of tact as expressly to state that self-evident point, as if there could possibly be any doubt about it. By adding this last word, he would only have offended the theocratical point of honour (Rom. i. 16). Lastly, Matthias also is wrong in supposing that *καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσρ. τοῦ Θεοῦ* begins the new sentence (ver. 17): "*And concerning the Israel of God henceforth let no man,*" etc. This interpretation ought to have been prevented by the solemn repetition of the preposition, which indeed on the second occasion would acquire quite a different sense (*concerning*).

Ver. 17. *Τοῦ λοιποῦ*] occurring only here in the N. T., very frequent in other authors; not *ceterum*, so that it would be a *formula abruptendi* (Bengel, Zachariae, and others), equivalent to *τὸ λοιπόν* (2 Cor. xiii. 11; Eph. vi. 10; Phil. iii. 1, *et al.*), but the genitive of *time* (Kühner, II. p. 189): *posthac, henceforward* (Xen. *Anab.* v. 7. 34, vi. 4. 11; Plat. *Legg.* vii. p. 816 D, *Demos.* p. 385 B; Herod. ii. 109; and the passages in Wetstein); and that as denoting "*repetitionem ejusdem facti reliquo tempore*" (Hermann *ad Viger.* p. 706). The sense *posthac* might also have been expressed by the *accusative* (*τὸ λοιπόν*, Matt. xxvi. 41; Mark xiv. 41; 1 Cor. vii. 29; Xen. *Anab.* ii. 2. 5, iii. 2. 8; Soph. *Trach.* 907, 917); but in this case a *repetitio perpetua* would be meant (Hermann, *l.c.*). Comp. Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* ii. 2. 5. Calvin explains: "*as for the rest,*" *i.e. praeter novam creaturam*. Comp. Wieseler: "*quod restat.*" In this case, either the genitive would stand *absolutely*: "*as concerns what remains*" (*ὃ δὲ λοιπόν*, 1 Cor. iv. 2), see

Heind. *ad Charm.* p. 89 ; Matthiae, p. 815 ; or it would be dependent on κόπους. But, looking at the frequent use of τοῦ λοιποῦ as a particle of time, both these explanations would be very unnecessarily far-fetched. This remark also applies to the view of Hofmann, who strangely attaches τοῦ λοιποῦ, notwithstanding the want of an antithetical particle, as genitive of the object to κόπους, and conceives Ἰσραὴλ as again supplied : *on account of the Israel, which is not the Israel of God.* Respecting that Israel, in the apostle's view, he has not to inquire whether it will be injured through the labour to which he is called. As if any such cold, remorseless renunciation could be justly attributed to the apostle who held his συγγενεῖς κατὰ σάρκα so painfully dear (Rom. ix. 1 ff., x. 1), and strove in every possible way to gain them (1 Cor. ix. 20). But from the hostile annoyances and vexations, which the reader would readily understand to be referred to in these words, the apostle desires to remain henceforward exempt ; and this he demands with apostolic sternness. — ἐγὼ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] the emphasis is on ἐγὼ : it is not the teachers who are hostile to me, these men afraid to suffer (ver. 12), but *I* who bear, etc. στίγματα (στίγμα is paroxytone ; see Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 406) signifies *marks branded or etched in*, which, usually consisting of letters (Lev. xix. 28), were put on the body (especially on the forehead and hands) in the case of slaves, as the device of their masters ;¹ of soldiers, as the badge of their general ; of criminals, as a sign of their offence ; and among some oriental nations also, as a token of the divinity which they worshipped (3 Macc. ii. 29 ; and Grimm *in loc.*). See Wetstein, p. 237 f. ; Lipsius, *Elect.* ii. 15 ; Deyling, *Obss.* III. p. 423 ff. ; Spencer, *Legg. rit.* ii. 14. 1 ; Ewald, *in Apocal.* p. 151 f. Here Paul has had in view the marks borne by *slaves* :² for, according to the

¹ In the *East* ; but among the Romans only in the case of slaves who were suspected or had run away (as a sign of the latter offence, they were by way of punishment branded with Φ or F. U. G.).

² Not of *soldiers*, as Grotius (comp. Calvin), and Potter, *Arch.* II. p. 7, think ; for this must have been suggested by the context. Wetstein understands *sacras notas* (Herod. ii. 113 : στίγματα ἱερά), so that Paul represents Christ “*ut Deum, quem τὸν κύριον κατ’ ἰσχὴν vocat.*” But these *sacrae notae* are only found among *particular* nations, such as the Persians and Assyrians (Plut. *Lucull.* p. 507 E ; Lucian, *de Dea Syra*, 59 ; comp. also what is related in

immediate context (vv. 14, 18), Christ is present to his mind as the *Lord*; and also in 2 Cor. xi. 23 he discerns, in the ill treatment which he has suffered, the proof that he is *διάκονος Χριστοῦ*. Comp. also Rev. vii. 3. The *genitive* *Ἰησοῦ* denotes therefore the *Ruler*, whose servant Paul is indicated to be by his *στίγματα*; and because in this case the feeling of fellowship with the concrete person of his Master has thoroughly pervaded him, he does not write *Χριστοῦ*, but *Ἰησοῦ* (comp. on 2 Cor. iv. 10). Others have explained: "*notae corporis tales, quales ipse Christus gestavit*" (Morus, comp. Borger); but against this it may be urged that Paul has not made use of a word which of itself conveys a complete idea (such as *τὴν νέκρωσιν*, 2 Cor. iv. 10), but has used the significant *στίγματα*, which necessarily prompts the reader to ask *to whom* the person marked (*στιγματίας*, also *στιγματοφόρος*, Polyaen. *Strat.* i. 24) is described *as belonging*. Therefore *Ἰησοῦ* is not (with Gomarus and Rückert) to be considered as *genitive auctoris*. — But what was it that Paul bore in his body as the *στίγματα Ἰησοῦ*? *The scars and other traces of the wounds and mal-treatment, which he had received on account of his apostolic labours.*¹ For in the service of Christ he had been maltreated (2 Cor. xi. 23), and that so that he *must* have retained scars or similar indications (see 2 Cor. xi. 24, 25). Some expositors have, however, believed that Paul adduces these *στίγματα* by way of contrast to the scar of circumcision (Erasmus in his *Annot.*, Beza, Schoettgen, Grotius; comp. Bengel and Michaelis); but this idea is arbitrarily introduced, and in its paltriness alien to the lofty self-consciousness which these words breathe. — Lastly, as regards the sense in which the reference of *γάρ* is to be taken, many expositors explain it, with Grotius: "*satis aliunde habeo, quod feram.*" So, in substance, Vatablus, Bengel ("afflicto

Herod. ii. 113 about a temple of Hercules in Egypt, and in the *Asiatic Researches*, vii. p. 281 f., about the Indians); hence so foreign a custom would not be likely to suggest itself to the apostle, nor could it be understood by his readers without some more special indication.

¹ Not as Luther, 1519 and 1524, following Augustine, thought: the taming of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit; against which the *ἐν τῷ σώματι μου* is itself decisive. In the Commentary of 1538, he understands "*plagas corpori suo impressas et passiones, deinde ignita tela diaboli, tristitiam et pavores animi,*" which thus throws together very different elements outward and inward.

non est addenda afflictio"), Morus, Winer. But what a feeble reason to assign would this be, either as fretful or as even bespeaking compassion, and wholly repugnant at all events to the proud feeling of being *marked* as the δοῦλος of Christ! (comp. 2 Cor. xi. 23 ff.) And the ἐγώ, so full of self-consciousness in opposition to the false teachers, is inconsistent with this view. No; Paul means ("veluti trophæa quaedam ostentans," Erasmus, *Paraphr.*) to say: for *I* am one who, by being marked as the servant of Christ, is in possession of a *dignity*, which may justly exempt him from any repetition of molestations (such as had vexed him on the part of the Galatian churches).—On βαστάζω, comp. Chrysostom: οὐκ εἶπεν ἔχω, ἀλλὰ βαστάζω, ὥσπερ τις ἐπὶ τροπαίοις μέγα φρονῶν.

Ver. 18. Ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου κ.τ.λ.] See on i. 6. — μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν] *sc. εἴη.* A special *design*, on account of which Paul did not write merely μεθ' ὑμῶν (1 Cor. xvi. 23; Col. iv. 18; 1 Thess. v. 28), or μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν (2 Cor. xiii. 13; Phil. iv. 23; 2 Thess. iii. 18; Tit. iii. 15), is indeed assumed by many expositors (that Paul desired once more to indicate that salvation does not come from the σάρξ; Chrysostom, Theophylact, Beza, and others; also Rückert, Usteri, Schott, Olshausen), but cannot be made good; especially as also in Philem. 25 (and 2 Tim. iv. 22), instead of the persons simply, we find that with greater significance and fervour the *spirit* of the persons (so also at the close of the Epistle of Barnabas) is named, because it is on the πνεῦμα of man (the higher principle of life with the νοῦς; see on Luke i. 46; Rom. i. 4, viii. 10; 2 Cor. ii. 13, *et al.*) that the grace of Christ works (Rom. viii. 10, 16), when the Spirit of Christ takes up His abode in the human spirit and so confers His χαρίσματα. Paul *might* also have written μετὰ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμ. (comp. 2 Cor. xii. 15; 1 Pet. i. 9, 22, ii. 11, 25); but even in that case the gracious operation of Christ would have to be conceived as issuing from the seat of self-consciousness (the πνεῦμα of man). — ἀδελφοί] The epistle, in great part so severe, ends with a mode of address which still breathes unaltered love (1 Cor. xvi. 24).

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