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COMMENTARY  
ON  
ST. PAUL'S  
EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

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Translated from the Third Improved and Enlarged Edition,

BY THE

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MANCHESTER.

*IN TWO VOLUMES.*

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# COMMENTARY ON THE ROMANS.

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## INTRODUCTION.

**T**HE first intimation of the existence of a Christian church in Rome is furnished by the Roman epistle itself. Now, since the epistle supplies no explicit details as to the origin and founding of the church; since, also, the account contained in the Acts, ch. xxviii., of Paul's first visit to Rome, as well as the Pauline epistles written during the Roman imprisonment, passes by this subject in silence, while the later statements of ecclesiastical writers are demonstrably untenable, the history of the *rise* of the Roman church is enveloped in an obscurity which can only be relieved by resorting to probable conjectures. According to Acts ii. 10, there were present at the first Pentecost in Jerusalem ἐπιδημοῦντες Ῥωμαῖοι, *advenae Romani*, who listened to the testimony of Peter's first apostolic discourse, the fundamental fact of church history. Of these Roman Jews or proselytes, gathered in the Jewish metropolis to observe the feast, some possibly belonged to the three thousand who were added on that day, and who, returning to Rome, bore with them and transplanted into western soil the first germs of the gospel. Later also additional seed-corn might be brought over, since even at an earlier period still, considering the active and universal intercourse which Rome maintained in that age, the uninterrupted union subsisting between the Roman synagogue and the temple of Jerusalem, and the frequent journeys of Roman Jews on trade and pilgrimage to and from Jerusalem, news of the appearance of Israel's Messiah may have been carried to Rome, especially by Jewish Christians. This may be pronounced possible, not improbable, nay, probable in a high degree. But even if it were established beyond question, such a fact would in no wise suffice to account for the existence of an



independent, well-compact, organized church, such as the Roman epistle supposes. A sporadic lay testimony must be carefully distinguished from the express work of founding churches, which, according to all the statements of the New Testament, was carried on only by evangelical teachers, by the apostles or disciples and helpers connected with and dependent on apostles.

The Romish tradition, whose formation we can trace step by step, names, as is well known, the Apostle Peter as founder of the Roman church. He is said to have come to Rome in the second year of the reign of the Emperor Claudius (42 A.D.), and to have been the first bishop there for five-and-twenty years before his death. But this is to be set down as a mere fable, rejected by Protestant theology on numerous and sufficient grounds,—a fable with which, apart from all else, the very existence as well as the substance of the Roman epistle stands in direct contradiction. If, according to Rom. xv. 20, it was Paul's fundamental principle to preach the gospel only where Christ's name was not yet named, in order not to build on another man's foundation (2 Cor. x. 15, 16), then, supposing the Roman church to be Peter's own creation and work, he would not, even before the composition of the Roman epistle, have often resolved to come to Rome in order to exercise there his apostolic office, Rom. i. 13, xv. 22; comp. Acts xix. 21. This resolve certainly he had not made before the time that he entered on European soil. But this took place about ten years after Peter, according to the fable referred to, made his appearance as apostle and bishop of the Romans. Since, then, from that period Paul could no longer, in harmony with his own fundamental principles, keep Rome in view as the goal of his apostolic toil, he could never have done so at all, and therefore in the passages cited must openly contradict either himself or the Romish fable. Even the composition of an epistle to serve instead of his personal toil must under such circumstances appear to us inconceivable, especially of an epistle which in no way refers to or is influenced by Peter's labour and teaching, either past or still going on, nay, of one which, in the numerous greetings of ch. xvi., that imply an intimate acquaintance with the teachers and members of the Roman church, contains no greeting for bishop Peter, who, according to the fable, was then resident in Rome. If, then, Peter did not found the Roman church (another question, nowise dependent on this, is, Whether at a

later time he came to Rome and there died a martyr's death?), no other apostle founded it, because no other is mentioned in history, and whatever reason tells against its founding by Peter tells against its founding by any other.

But, next, it must be admitted as exceedingly probable that the evangelical teachers who gathered together the scattered Christians already existing in Rome, added to their number by preaching the gospel, established a formally organized Christian church, and took it under their direction and care, and who are therefore to be regarded as the real founders of the Roman church, were disciples of the Apostle Paul. It is only natural that the church of the Gentile capital—Rome—should owe its existence, indirectly at least, to the labours of the *Gentile* apostle. To him the founding of the first Christian church in Europe was entrusted as a foremost object of his peculiar mission labour. Accordingly, by means of his disciples and helpers he transplanted a branch of this labour of his to Rome, while to the rest of the apostles, and hence to the apostolic men associated with them, the Gentile world, like the European field of toil, was foreign ground.

In the Roman epistle itself are some not insignificant items that support this view. On this supposition the sending of the epistle is most easily explained, since Paul thus entered on *another man's* labour in the least degree. Nay, he must have felt himself called upon to affix his apostolic seal to that faith of the Roman church which was the fruit of his spiritual influence, and thus by a systematic exposition of evangelical doctrine found the church in a certain sense over again. Indeed, it may be said that if the other Gentile churches enjoyed the privilege of institution by the apostle's personal presence and preaching, the Roman church received a full equivalent for this in the contents and significance of the epistle addressed to it, which was, as it were, a supplementary charter of institution. The church, then, that is really and truly based upon the apostolic doctrine contained in the Roman epistle may call itself the genuine Roman church with greater justice than the one that relies upon the fabled institution by Peter in person. Moreover, it is probable that in the sixteenth chapter—in Aquila and Priscilla, who held a church assembly in their house, in Epaenetus the ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀσίας, in Andronicus and Junias the συναιχμαλώτοις of Paul (in addition to the doubly significant ἐπίσημοι ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις), in Urbanus

the apostle's *συνεργός*—we have a list of persons who, as former disciples and helpers of Paul, stood at that time in special esteem in Rome as directors and leaders of the church, and who therefore without doubt had taken a prominent part in the actual founding of the church. Ch. xvi. 17 also, which expresses approval of the doctrine they have received, and guards it against the efforts of Judaistic false teachers, intimates the Pauline character of the doctrine lying originally at the foundation of the Roman church. Comp. also Méyer's *Comment. on Ep. to Rom.* I. p. 24.

As concerns the *composition* of the Roman church, it is certain that, like probably all Christian churches outside Palestine, it was made up in part of Jewish, in part of Gentile Christians. Only in allusion to Jewish Christians could Paul, iv. 1, describe Abraham as *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν*, and the tendency characterized, ch. xiv., points decisively to Judaistic scrupulosity and prejudice. But in xi. 13, 25, 28, 30, Gentile Christians are expressly addressed, while from xv. 7 ff. it follows that the church was composed of both elements. In the same way it may be conjectured as matter of course that the number of Gentile Christians *preponderated*; for this may be set down as the ordinary, if not the invariable condition of Christian churches in Gentile lands, where probably the churches consisted altogether or principally of Gentile Christians, but seldom altogether, or even in a preponderant degree, of Jewish Christians. That no other relation obtained in Rome, follows from ch. ix.–xi. of this epistle; for certainly it would have seemed very strange to the Roman church for the apostle to have described believing Israelites as a *λεῖμμα κατ' ἐκλογὴν χάριτος*, in contrast with the abounding numbers of believers of Gentile race, if the opposite relation had obtained before their eyes and in their midst. But in fact the majority of Gentile Christians in Rome was so decisive, that Paul, designating the church *a parte potiori*, could directly address it as a church of believers of the Gentile world, as he does, i. 5, 6, 13–15 (comp. the comment on these passages). In the same way he says, xv. 15, 16, he has written as *λειτουργὸς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη*. (Comp. Neander, *Planting of Christian Church*, etc., I. 280 ff.)

A confirmation of the view now advanced may also be found in Acts xxviii. 16 ff.; for the want of acquaintance which the leaders of Roman Judaism there manifest with regard to the existence of a Christian church in Rome, goes to show that but

few Jews had attached themselves to the new doctrine and community. Still, although this was, comparatively speaking, the case, we are compelled to suppose the numbers of the church considerable enough, especially taking into account the extent and importance it had attained at the time when the Roman epistle was despatched (i. 8, xvi. 19), to make it inconceivable that the Roman Jews could be in a state of entire ignorance as to the existence of a Christian church within the walls of their own city. We must therefore examine somewhat more closely the difficulty confronting us here.

The hypothesis of Olshausen (p. 44 ff. of his *Commentary*) is to the effect that the Roman Jewish Christians had been led by the persecution of the Jews under the Emperor Claudius to accentuate plainly and strongly the distinction between themselves and the Jews, so that in consequence of this anti-Judaistic, strongly Pauline tendency they had entirely dissolved their connection with the synagogue, and in this way remained altogether unknown to the Jews who subsequently returned to Rome after the abrogation of the decree. But this has found no favour, as a conjecture with nothing to recommend it, and insufficiently supported by proof. The tendency of the Jewish Christians in Rome, as this is presented to us ch. xiv., cannot be reconciled with this opinion.

According to the old conception, to which Tholuck has returned (in the previous editions, no longer in the fifth), the *πρῶτοι τῶν Ἰουδαίων* are supposed merely to have assumed this want of acquaintance with the Roman Christian church hypocritically, and to have grossly deceived Paul in shameful fashion, in order more effectually to draw out his views. But the text of the Acts gives no countenance whatever to such a supposition. For even if the Jews in Rome were constantly hearing news of the famous, or, according to their notions, infamous Gentile Apostle Paul, it was still possible for them to say with truth: *Ἡμεῖς οὔτε γράμματα περὶ σοῦ ἐδεξάμεθα ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰουδαίας, οὔτε παραγενόμενός τις τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἀπήγγειλεν ἢ ἐλίλυσέ τι περὶ σοῦ πονηρόν*, ver. 21. This refers only to an official letter from the Jewish community in Palestine, and to information brought by Jewish travellers to Rome respecting the recent events in Jerusalem and Caesarea. As Paul began his voyage far ou in autumn, after the shipwreck wintered in Malta, and then, with

the reopening of the spring voyaging season, arrived at Rome, it might easily happen that he even anticipated the evil tidings about him, which we may presume would be sent from Palestine.

Greater difficulty arises in connection with the words of the Jewish *proceres*, ver. 22: Ἀξιοῦμεν δὲ παρὰ σοῦ ἀκοῦσαι, say they: ἃ φρονεῖς περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης γνωστόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν, ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἀντιλέγεται. But here also the existence of this sect in Rome, and its being known to the synagogue leaders, are not directly denied and precluded. Meyer very justly observes (I. 27 of his *Commentary*) that the Jewish leaders exercising judicial reserve simply have no inducement, without special cause, to speak before the strange prisoner as to the position of the Christian body which existed in Rome itself. With him agrees Tholuck, § 2, p. 13. But we believe that the reasons of this reserve may be specified more definitely. As is well known, Suetonius says, in his life of Claudius, c. 25: "Judaeos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes." This seems to allude to disputes between Jews and Christians as to whether Jesus should be acknowledged as the Messiah. But even supposing only the commotions to be meant which were occasioned by the Messianic expectations of the Jews (although both views may be combined, since the Jews, excited by their political Messianic ideas, and thus become objects of suspicion to the Roman authorities, might easily allow themselves to be carried away to fierce disputes and persecutions of the Jewish Christians, on account of the latter interpreting the promises of the new King David in a spiritual sense, and applying them to Jesus), in any case the severity of the imperial decree of banishment must after their return have cooled their zeal, and rendered them more cautious and reserved in publishing both their own Messianic hopes and the difference on this subject of their own faith from that of Christians. Hence we find that when Paul, directly after that interview with the leaders, preaches the gospel to the Roman Jews who came to him in his own dwelling, and declares to unbelievers, with menacing severity, that the salvation of God would pass over to the Gentiles, the Jews do not, as at other times (Acts xxii. 21, 22), rise with passionate outcries against language so intolerable to them, but go away in peace and quiet: καὶ ταῦτα αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος, it is said, ver. 29: ἀπῆλθον οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, πολλὴν ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς συζήτησιν.

On the present occasion, then, the *πρῶτοι τῶν Ἰουδαίων* behave to Paul in harmony with these circumstances. They believe they must be the more cautious, as the apostle complains to them of the injustice done him by their Palestinian brethren, and informs them that the Roman procurator was desirous to acquit him, but the obstinacy of the Jews had compelled him to appeal to Caesar, vv. 17–19. Finding themselves without information from Palestine, and fearing, possibly, that the Jews there had gone too far, and that Paul, the supposed foe of the Jews, might easily turn the incident to the injury of the Jewish interest (on which account he even deems it necessary expressly to assure them that he had not appealed to Caesar as having an accusation to bring against his nation, ver. 19, an assurance which might easily augment their suspicion still further), they thought it most prudent for the present to treat him with forbearance, and cautiously draw out further explanations as to their own relation to the Christian sect. They say what is true; they had received no special and explicit accounts respecting him and the events mentioned by him, and they knew that the Christian sect was everywhere spoken against. They go so far as to appoint him a day when he is to expound his doctrine to their companions in faith at greater length. But they pass over in silence—what they do not deem it necessary and prudent to speak of—their own views as to the Christian faith, as well as their attitude to the Roman Christian community, which, moreover, from fear of the Roman authorities, was not one of outward hostility.<sup>1</sup> In this way, in our judgment, the account of the Acts may be brought into perfect harmony with the Roman epistle, and no real discrepancy exists which can be used to throw suspicion on the credibility of the Acts, or of ulterior conclusions.

<sup>1</sup> Meyer supposes there is no need of our supposition, that the Jewish proceres were made more timid and reserved by the Claudian measure. But it seems to us that without some motive arising from without, the restraint put on the hate inflaming the hearts of the Jews against the gospel, cannot well be reconciled with the character of the Jewish leaders of the apostolic age. The idea that the Chrestus of Suetonius was a Jewish rebel in Rome, who actually bore this name, by which the historical basis of our hypothesis is said to be taken away, far better deserves to be called a mere fanciful assumption, than that, so constantly held and so naturally suggested, of the identity of Chrestus and Christus. Besides, if there had been a rebel Chrestus, who incited the Jews to an *assidue* tumultuari, would nothing further be known of him in history? Moreover, in conformity with all the historical circumstances, he could be nothing but a false *Messiah*.

As concerns the *time* and *place* of the composition of the Roman epistle, comparisons of passages in this epistle with passages in the Acts and Corinthian epistles lead to a certain, generally received result. According to Rom. xv. 25–28, Paul had just made a collection in Macedonia and Achaia for the poor Christian community in Jerusalem, and was about to take it there, and thence, after the task was finished, journey by way of Rome to Spain. We are thus remitted to Acts xix. 21 (comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 1–7; 2 Cor. ix. 4, xii. 20–xiii. 2), where we read: *ὥς δὲ ἐπληρώθη ταῦτα, ἔθετο ὁ Παῦλος ἐν τῷ πνεύματι, διελθὼν τὴν Μακεδονίαν καὶ Ἀχαΐαν πορεύεσθαι εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ, εἰπὼν* "Ὅτι μετὰ τὸ γενέσθαι με ἐκεῖ, δεῖ με καὶ Ῥώμην ἰδεῖν. This journey through Macedonia to Achaia, on which he entered after the tumult, excited in Ephesus by the goldsmith Demetrius, is narrated, Acts xx. 1, 2. According to ver. 3, he remained at that time three months in Achaia, and then entered on his last journey to Jerusalem (ver. 16). There awaited him, as he knew, plots, afflictions, and bonds, vv. 22, 23. With this agrees Rom. xv. 30, 31, where he requests the Romans to pray that he may be delivered from the hands of the unbelievers in Judaea. Without doubt, then, the writing of the Roman epistle falls within this last three months' stay in Achaia, which took place during his third missionary journey. That he should have written an epistle of such compass and such significance while he was actually engaged on the journey to Jerusalem, especially considering the haste with which the journey was performed, Acts xx. 16, is of itself exceedingly unlikely. In that case, too, he would probably have mentioned to the Romans, in the passage Rom. xv. 30, the plots which began directly on his setting out from Achaia, and which compelled him to change his route, Acts xx. 3. In the last place, he would scarcely on the journey itself have again expressed the confident hope of coming to Rome, seeing that, amid the presages echoing everywhere in the churches of persecutions and sufferings awaiting him at Jerusalem, the prospect of doing this must ever have grown fainter and fainter, Acts xx. 23–25, xxi. 10–13. Now, if Paul wrote the Roman epistle before his departure for Jerusalem, during the last three months' abode in Achaia, we are constrained, on inquiring more closely into the place of composition, to fix our thoughts at once on Coriuth, which city, according to

the passages quoted from the Corinthian epistles, Paul had selected for the longer term of residence during that period; and Corinth is indirectly pointed out as the place of composition by the Roman epistle itself. To this points the commendation of the deaconess Phoebe of Cenchrea the Corinthian port, and probably the bearer of the epistle, Rom. xvi. 1, as well as the greeting from his host Gaius, xvi. 23, comp. with 1 Cor. i. 14, and from Erastus the city treasurer, xvi. 23, comp. with Acts xix. 22, but especially with 2 Tim. iv. 20. This correct inference is drawn already in the subscription to the Roman epistle, which names Corinth as the place of composition. This being so, the year 58 or 59 A.D. may be fixed, according to the most likely computation, as the year of composition, about five or six years after Paul had begun his missionary exertions on European soil, and the Roman church by the labours of his disciples had reached a settled condition. Comp. also Wieseler, *Chronologic des apostolischen Zeitalter*, pp. 371–374.

But, further, this was the most appropriate moment in the historical development of the life and official labours of Paul for sending an epistle to the Romans. His missionary activity in the east had reached its termination, Rom. xv. 19, 23. By bringing the loving gift of the Gentile Christians to the Jewish Christians of Palestine, he wished to cement and ratify the bond of the union which he had established between the Jewish and Gentile world by means of one and the same gospel. Then his purpose was to take the soil of the far west as his field of labour, *ibid.* ver. 24. Finding himself at this central point of his official activity, he felt the longing, as well as the need, to place himself in more direct association than before with the Roman Christian church. The delicate tact with which love had endowed him, and which he displayed so surely and to such good purpose in all conditions of life, led him also to this step. He was next to show himself in Rome. This he could not do as a stranger, and personally unknown. He must first of all assure the church there, as he does at the beginning and close of his epistle, how much he bears them on his heart, how he long ago determined to visit them, and had only hitherto been hindered; for they might easily think it strange that the apostle of the Gentile world thus far seemed to take such little interest in them—the church of the metropolis of the Gentile world. He must prepare



their hearts to receive him, and this the more since he intended even now to spend but a short time with them. While, as already remarked, he did not regard his labour there as an intrusion on another's office, Rome stood in less need of a long stay on his part, because there the light of the gospel was already set on a candlestick, and the fervour of his love and of his sacrificial zeal urged him to the far west—to Spain—in order to impart the blessings of the gospel above all to those to whom news of it had not yet come. Thus he desired to send on to the Romans an equivalent for a longer stay, which he supposed himself unable to grant them.

But by these circumstances the *contents* of his epistle were already marked out. The epistle was to be a substitute for Paul's personal preaching in Rome (comp. on i. 15). Hence it contains, as no other does, a systematic doctrinal exposition of the specifically Pauline gospel. As this gospel was revealed to him, the former Pharisee and zealot for the law, as deliverance from the yoke of the law, and by this very means as a breaking down of the wall of division which separated the Jewish and Gentile worlds, as a reconciliation, justification, and new creation of both into one body in Christ Jesus, so now, in the results of his practical official labours, it had approved itself such in his eyes. Standing at this great point of division in his labours, and glancing back over his peculiar experience hitherto,—an experience the inward and outward aspects of which supported, carried on, and richly developed one the other,—if his object were to comprehend in one large general view that gospel of his which had been shaped in this way, he could exhibit it in no other form than the one lying before us in the Roman epistle.

The absorption and elevation, as well of heathenism, which had no sanction of law, as of Judaism, which had such sanction, as inadequate manifestations of the religious life, into the gospel which brings justification and holiness, into Christianity as the absolute and all-sufficient form of religion,—this is the theme of his epistle, as he expounds it under every aspect, ch. i.—viii. But this conception of the gospel was to be realized by degrees in historical fact, for the divine determination must inevitably find its fulfilment. Everything which might tend, in reference to the course of development hitherto, to disturb and dim this confidence, must nevertheless, in harmony with the lofty plan of the

God who holds in His hand the threads of history, and weaves them, not after the pattern of human, but after the paradeigma of divine wisdom, serve in the end the accomplishment of His original purpose of grace. The rejection of the gospel on the part of the people destined for its enjoyment paved the way for its transition to the Gentile world, whence, its mission there fulfilled, it was to return to Israel. Christianity, thus speaks this sacred and genuine philosophy of history, is the ideal, as it is the real goal, of all human progress. Its destiny is not merely to absorb into itself the Jewish and Gentile *faiths*, but also to draw to itself the Jewish and Gentile *worlds*. This is the purport of ch. ix.-xi.,<sup>1</sup> which chapters, therefore, are not to be regarded as an incidental "historical corollary" (Tholuck, de Wette), but constitute an essential, integral element in the exposition of the principal subject, which is thus unfolded as well in conformity with its ideal as its historical purport.

A directly *polemical* aim against erroneous tendencies in the church is not to be supposed in this first *dogmatic* main division of the epistle. The contest waged everywhere is with Judaistic justification by works opposing itself to the doctrine of justification by God's grace in Christ, whose representatives, in rhetorical fashion, are introduced and addressed in person, ii. 1 ff., 17 ff., ix. 19 f. The contest is nowhere with Pharisaic Jewish Christians seeking to impose the Mosaic law on Gentile Christians as an essential means, along with faith in Christ, of justification. Thus the didactic Roman epistle stands in a similar relation to the polemic Galatian epistle, as the Ephesian to the Colossian epistle. The exhortation also to mutual forbearance, to spare and deal gently with the weak, contained (ch. xiv.-xv. 13) in the second *hortatory* main division, beginning with ch. xii., suggests merely practical scrupulousness and perplexity on the part of the Jewish-Christian portion of the church, not at all an aggressive attitude of the same towards the Gentile Christians with a view to bring them into subjection to the Mosaic Nomos. We have here, then, merely an apostolic exhortation, similar to the one in 1 Cor. viii. and in x. 23-33 (Neander, I. 290), not a polemic corresponding to the one in the Galatian epistle. Ch. xvi. 17, 18 of this epistle indeed contains a positive allusion to Judaistic false teachers; but these had manifestly gained no footing in the church, which therefore

<sup>1</sup> Compare, however, the appendix to ch. xi.

is simply warned against them, while the apostle speaks hopefully of its *ὑπακοή*, ver. 19, and anticipates a speedy breakdown of the attempt, ver. 20. Had these false teachers already exerted a baneful influence within the church, certainly the apostle would not have mentioned them in so cursory a way at the end of the epistle. But no doubt the positive exposition, which the dogmatic portion of the epistle gives as to the real nature of the gospel in relation to the Jewish legal standpoint, furnishes at the same time the surest bulwark against such attempts. Moreover, such a subordinate purpose is nowise precluded by the principal aim of the epistle. Rather is it not without good ground to be maintained with regard both to the peculiar antithetical form of the exposition and to the relations of the Roman church already indicated. Still this is included in a cursory and subordinate manner, without on this account coming into prominence, and cannot be accepted as the *real* cause of the epistle being written, just as little as the exhortations of the second portion can be so regarded, which, besides the direct, may also contain many indirect allusions to the particular condition of the church, and yet are not to be deemed important enough to have determined the apostle to write the epistle. But least of all can the casual journey of Phoebe to Rome be here taken into account. Neither would this have induced the apostle to write, if he had had no other reason for writing; nor would he have lacked some one to carry the epistle, even if Phoebe had not made the journey. Here the opportunity should not be confounded with the occasion.<sup>1</sup>

The similarity of contents in the Roman and Galatian epistles favours the opinion, that even in the first the apostle carries on a direct polemic against the legal tendency of a Jewish-Christian party. But, on the other hand, observation of the difference in the kind and form of the exposition which obtains in the two epistles leads to the conviction that this directly polemical aim is foreign to the Roman epistle, containing as it does merely a

<sup>1</sup> Th. Schott, *d. Römerbrief seinem Endzwecke und Gedankengange nach ausgelegt*, Erlangen 1858, has ascribed to the apostle a special personal design in the composition of the epistle: "namely, that being now on the point of proceeding with his Gentile mission-work in the far west, Paul wished to gain for his labours a fixed point of support in the Roman church, and on this account wished to instruct the Romans as to the significance and justification of the step, and to inspire them with full confidence regarding it; for which reason he exhibits to them in detail the nature and principles of his work." See, on the contrary, Meyer, I. 33.

general, positively dogmatic exposition of salvation in Christ, in contrast with the ruin to which the Jewish and Gentile world out of Christ is exposed. At most, it contains but an indirect warning against the falsely nomistic conflicts which emerge so readily in the Christian church, and also in particular against attacks of the kind menacing the Roman church from without. This may be described, on the whole, as the common result of modern exegesis, as far as concerns the interpretation of the general contents of this epistle. But this interpretation has been strongly opposed by Dr. Baur in his work, *Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ*, London 1873. According to Baur, *Jewish Christians*, among whom undoubtedly an anti-Pauline bias began to show itself very early, formed the chief constituent of the Roman church. They had taken offence at Paul's ministry, observing that its result was the reception of the Gentiles in ever-increasing numbers into the Messianic kingdom, while Israel as a people remained shut out of that kingdom. This appeared to them like a disparagement of the Jews, like unrighteous treatment of them, like a contradiction of the promises given to the Jews as God's people. On the contrary, they denied that the same way of salvation lay open to the Gentiles as to the Jews. The question brought forward now, therefore, was no longer, as before, whether the Gentiles might be admitted into the Christian community only as proselytes of Judaism, or only on condition of submitting to circumcision; but this, whether the Gentiles as Gentiles are to be admitted,—whether their reception, already begun and ever widening in extent, is not to be looked upon as an unrighteous act to the Jews, and an infringement of their privileges? They asserted, accordingly, that the Christian salvation has merely a particular, not a universal design; that participation in the grace of the gospel depends upon a national prerogative, not on a universal human need. Now it is against this assertion the apostle contends in ch. ix.—xi. of the Roman epistle, which chapters, accordingly, constitute the main division of the entire epistle, to which ch. i.—viii. stand only as introduction. Paul, it is said, works out the general positions, that neither Gentiles nor Jews had any claim to salvation in Christ, since it only comes to sinful man as a gift of free grace (a position which is applied ch. ix.—xi.); that accordingly the reception of the Gentiles, which was withstood on the part of the Jewish Christians, and was supposed

to imply an unrighteous depreciation of the Jews, is on the contrary the fault only of the Jews themselves, in supposing that they could make good rightful claims based upon descent and observance of the law, instead of upon faith in the preaching of the gospel. The Jewish Christians had discovered in the universalism of the apostle a preference given in an unrighteous way to the Gentiles to the detriment of the Jews. Against this the apostle maintains, that since, as far as righteousness comes into question, everything depends on faith, or on the *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*, the putting of the Jews below the Gentiles is simply the fault of their own unbelief. Hence the epistle of the apostle to the Romans is not to be viewed as a dogmatic treatise issuing spontaneously, but as a vindication of his apostolic office, of the peculiar mission committed to him as Gentile apostle, called forth by Jewish-Christian opposition; and the cause of the apostle's writing is to be sought, not in a friendly attitude on his part, but one partly polemic, partly apologetic. Baur, *Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ*, I. part 2. With him also agrees Schwegler, comp. his *Nachapost. Zeitalter in den Hauptmomenten seiner Entwicklung*, Tübingen 1846, I. p. 285 ff., and Volkmar, *die Röm. Kirche*, 1857, p. 7 ff.

Now this interpretation certainly hangs well with the theory which Dr. Baur has advanced respecting primitive Christianity in general. According to this novel theory, the creature of ingenious criticism and combination, and maintained by sacrificing the genuineness of the greater portion of the New Testament, not merely the Judaistic false teachers, but the entire body of the apostles and Jewish-Christian churches of their age, are supposed to have been entangled in a narrow-minded, Judaistic particularism, in opposition to which Paul, the Gentile apostle, with his universalistic tendency, appeared as an innovator, and with which he was engaged in unceasing conflict. This is not the place to enter upon a minute examination of this mode of view in general. We limit ourselves here to a brief criticism of that branch of it which meets us in the interpretation of the Roman epistle just characterized.

Now, first of all, it is difficult for an unprejudiced reader to shake off the conviction, rising so clearly before the mind, that i. 16, 17 enunciates the proper theme of the epistle, which from that point up to ch. viii. is then expounded under every

aspect. In this conviction, accordingly, agree all interpreters of all ages without exception. It would appear, then, more simple to regard ch. ix.-xi. as a natural and fitting supplement, than ch. i.-viii. as a mere introduction to the theme first announced, ch. ix.-xi. We have seen, moreover, that ch. ix.-xi. may even keep its independent position as an integral constituent of the entire doctrinal exposition,<sup>1</sup> without its being raised, with Dr. Baur, into the main division of the epistle, from which alone the cause, theme, and construction of the epistle can be rightly understood. In any case, we should have expected at the beginning an indication of this presumed cause, which would have made the course and connection of the apostle's reasoning clear to the reader. But no such indication is contained, ch. ix.-xi. For while the apostle speaks there, indeed, of Jews who would be righteous by works, and who withstood faith in the gospel, he nowhere speaks of Jewish Christians who wished to prevent the Gentiles entering into the Messiah's kingdom. Wherefore no interpreter hitherto has been able to find such indication, not even the author of the *Commentaria in XIII. Epistolas Paulinas*, appended to the works of Ambrose, to whom Dr. Baur refers (I. 367). Ambrosiaster simply compares, as many interpreters after him have done, the tendency of the Roman Christians with that of the Galatian false teachers ("hi sunt," he says, "qui et Galatas subverterant"); but of a particularism excluding the Gentiles as such he knows nothing. Nowhere does there exist a vestige of historical proof that the Jewish Christians, either in the apostolic age or afterwards, ever adopted such a notion. And this position appears the more unwarranted, as such a standpoint would have flatly contradicted Old Testament prophecy, which foretold in the clearest terms the reception of the Gentile world into the theocracy, their participation in the Messianic kingdom. A narrow interpretation might, perhaps, discover in the prophecies of the old covenant, on account of the Old Testament veil of mystery under which they delineated the character of the Messianic age, the intimation that the Gentile world must submit to the Mosaic nomos, if it was to share in the Messianic salvation; but no intimation whatever could be discovered of a rejection of the Gentiles in favour of

<sup>1</sup> Comp. also Huther, *Zweck und Inhalt der 11 ersten Capitel des Römerbriefes*, Schwerin 1846, p. 24 f.

the solely privileged Jews.<sup>1</sup> This latter claim was in and of itself thoroughly beside the mark and unnecessary. For, with the reception of the Mosaic nomos on the part of the Gentiles, Judaism in fact attained to all rights and honours which it could ever claim, and fully satisfied narrow-minded Jewish particularism, which thus in reality rejoiced in a triumph at once over heathenism and Christianity. Dr. Baur concedes that even the Roman Jewish Christians had sought and taught a justification by works of the law. Now, was not this doctrine sufficient to negative the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith, to narrow the gate of God's kingdom for the Gentiles, to widen it for the Jews? No other opposition, then, to Pauline universalism is even conceivable than that which all Judaistic false teachers and sects actually adopted. Besides, it is such an opposition alone that the apostle combats in the Roman epistle. He contends only against righteousness by works, not against a designed exclusion of the Gentile world altogether; and, indeed, against the

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Baur, indeed, says, p. 331, that the participation of the Gentiles in the grace of the gospel appeared to the Jews like a disparagement of the Jews, *as long as Israel as a nation did not partake in this grace*; yet he, presently, lets even this qualification drop, and everywhere else describes their particularism as one without conditions. Even Schwegeler, *ibid.* p. 289, allows that Dr. Baur has taken the purpose of the Roman epistle somewhat too narrowly, when he simply finds in it an apology for the Pauline missionary labours, and that on this view the first portion of the epistle is a disproportionate sacrifice of strength. It is, perhaps, more correct, according to him, to take the design of the epistle somewhat more generally, as an apology for Pauline Christianity in its entirety, than as a systematic treatise against Jewish Christianity. Still more moderately, though just as defective, and in consistency with his Catholic opinion of the founding of the Roman church by Peter, Thiersch, *die Kirche in apostolischen Zeitalter*, p. 166: "Paul seeks to lead forward the Jewish Christian church, consisting simply of followers of Peter, from its, not heretical indeed, but somewhat backward standpoint, to such a rich insight into the work of redemption as will entirely dispel the anxiety and fear which adherence to the Mosaic law as a condition of salvation might still foster." Pretty much in agreement with Schwegeler, van Hengel expresses himself respecting the aim and purport of this epistle, *Interpretatio Epistolae Pauli ad Romanos*, Fascic. I. 1854. Comp. p. 20: "Magis certe mihi cum Schweglero arridet, quod Bauro visum est, auctorem ad suum, qui dicitur, *Universalismum Romae* defendendum Epistolam scripsisse argumenti Apologetici." P. 21: "Ergo his Christi sectatoribus Epistolam scripsit, cujus majori in parte habituri essent, quo ad refellendas Judaeorum argutias adjuvantur ipsique perversis opinionibus et scrupulis liberarentur." P. 22: "Nec tamen Apostoli consilium omnino assecutos esse puto, qui, uti jam Oecumenius, *in gentium exterarum vocatione ad Christi communionem* causam cernere nolint, unde omnis disputatio quodammodo pendeat, iis etiam in locis, quorum argumentum alius generis esse videatur."

work-righteousness of Judaism, not against the work-righteousness of the Jewish Christian portion of the Roman church. Had the Roman Jewish Christians followed this course, he would have attacked it directly, and have withstood them as he did the Galatian false teachers and the Galatian churches, and no consideration of any kind whatever would have induced the Gentile apostle to treat gently a tendency striking at the very root of the gospel. For the rest, the same view must be held if the Roman church had adopted not the ordinary Galatian exclusivism, but the one described by Bauer; for this, so far from being, as Dr. Bauer supposes, gentler, was harsher than the Galatian form, seeing that it excluded even the conditional admission of the Gentile world to the Messianic salvation. If now, on the other hand, we are reminded (Baur, I. 331) that Paul did not in Rome, as in Galatia, see his own work overthrown, and had not to encounter opposition to his apostolic authority as directly hostile; that here he had not to do with a church that was going back, but with a church, as he might hope, advancing from imperfection to perfection,—it is obvious to rejoin that in that case Paul would the more decisively and fearlessly have repelled false teachers so misleading the church, and would have plainly and forcibly admonished and warned the church itself. But here, indeed, everything returns to the starting-point, namely, to the hypothesis that not only the Judaistic heresy of the apostolic age, but apostolic Jewish Christianity in general, was merely a particularism holding righteousness by works. But could such a standpoint have been assumed even by the *δοκοῦντες εἶναι τι*, by James, Cephas, or John, Paul would without fail have encountered it with his fearless *ἀντίθεμα ἔστω*: Comp. also Fritzsche, *Com. tom. II.* pp. 238–240.

As concerns, finally, the *authenticity* of this epistle, this is irrefutably established both by the unanimous testimony of Fathers, and even of heretics, and by the ineffaceable stamp of the apostolic spirit which it bears on its face. Hence, with the exception of the superficial attacks of the English Evanston (*The Dissonance of the Four generally received Evangelists*, 1792, p. 259 ff.), long ago laid to rest, and “the frivolities” [Meyer] of Bruno Bauer, whose critical radicalism could only be satisfied by calling in question the whole of the Pauline epistles, it has never been even contested. Even Dr. Baur (*Paul.* p. 256) reckons



the Roman epistle, along with the Galatian and two Corinthian epistles, among the Homologoumena, while certainly he classes the remaining nine Pauline epistles with the Antilegomena, so that, after all, his concession reminds us of Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. Of the *integrity* of the epistle, especially of the genuineness of ch. xv. and xvi., we shall treat in the proper place.

## CHAPTER I.

Vv. 1-7. *The Salutation*.—The type of greeting lying at the basis of this salutation would run in the ordinary form: *Παῦλος Ῥωμαίοις χαίρειν*. The way in which the apostle amplifies and remodels this gives us to see by anticipation that the gospel is not one among many common forms, but is spirit and life entering into the common form, but in order to transform it. The salutation is more copious than that of the other Pauline epistles, the apostle having to introduce himself for the first time to the church of the imperial metropolis, which he has neither founded nor as yet visited. But he introduces himself as a God-ordained apostle (ver. 1), an apostle of the gospel of the Son of God and Son of man, the gospel which he intends in the following pages to proclaim, and which was confirmed by the teaching of prophets and the fact of the resurrection (vv. 2-4), and, indeed, as apostle of the Gentiles (ver. 5), of whom the Romans are a part (ver. 6). Thus at once and at the same time the genuine as well as the personal character of his authority and obligation to write the epistle stands clearly forth.

Ver. 1. *Παῦλος*] This originally Gentile name (the Latin Paulus, in accordance with the frequent interchange of *ρ* and *λ*, identical with the Greek *παῦρος*, Hom. *Il.* ii. 675) is found *along with* the Jewish *Σαῦλος* (שאול) first of all (Acts xiii. 9) on the apostle's first missionary journey among the Gentiles. From that point onwards it appears exclusively, both in the Acts and the Pauline epistles, *instead of* the latter. From that time then, as apostle of the Gentiles, Paul allied himself with them, even in his outward appellation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "In circumcissione nomen *Sauli* Ebraeum ipsi datum esse, dubium non est; et fieri potuit, ut Pauli nomen, cum ab aliis ita vocaretur, lubentius usurparit, *tum* quia notius et communius, *tum* ut vocabulum lubentius Graeci ac Romani, quibus id gratiosum ac familiare, agnoscerent, quorum se doctorem profitebatur, *tum* quod circumcisio jamjam abroganda penitus fuerit, doctrina imprimis hujus apostoli, pleneque in ejus locum surrogandus baptisumus, synagoga Judaica cum honore

—δοῦλος Ἰ. Χριστοῦ] denotes in the superscription, as epithet to the *nomen proprium*, not the general relation of servant, in which all Christians stand to Christ their Lord, but the special relation of office, of service in the kingdom of Jesus Christ. However, δοῦλος and the following ἀπόστολος form no tautology. The idea of δοῦλος is more general, that of ἀπόστολος more special; the former is more precisely defined by the latter. The δοῦλος is not necessarily ἀπόστολος, he may also be προφήτης, εὐαγγελιστής, ποιμήν, and διδάσκαλος. The O. T. *נָבִיא* *נָזִיר* also is not merely prophet, but may be king, priest, etc. Thus between δοῦλος and κλητὸς ἀπόστολος a gradation finds place, the ἀπόστολος taking the highest rank among the N. T. δούλοις.

—κλητὸς ἀπόστολος] all apostles were directly called to their office, but Paul was so called (Acts ix. 6, 15, xxii. 21, xxvi. 16–18; Gal. i. 1, 12). That he who came in later, when he wishes to authenticate his apostleship, should lay special stress on this κλήσις is only natural, without any intentional comparison of his apostolic position being thereby kept in view. On ἀπόστολος comp. Acts xxii. 21: ἐγὼ εἰς ἔθνη μακρὰν ἐξαποστελῶ σε; xxvi. 17: εἰς οὓς νῦν σε ἀποστέλλω.

—ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ] The calling to the apostolate has its aim and purport in being set apart to the work of proclaiming the gospel, which is the function of the apostolate. Both these, κλήσις and ἀφορισμός, meet in the self-same moment of the conversion narrated Acts ix., and the ἀφορισμός has a permanence, reaching to the time when the epistle was written. Hence the perfect ἀφωρισμένος. The idea of setting apart approaches in meaning what we now call “ordination.” There is no allusion to the eternal counsel of God, for ἀφορίζεσθαι is not of itself equivalent to προορίζεσθαι, and the addition ἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μου (Gal. i. 15) is wanting here. Nor is reference made

sepulta,” Calovius on the passage. On the other side, Jerome early remarks, *De Vir. Ill.* 5: “A primo ecclesiae spolio, proconsole Sergio Paulo, victoriae suae trophaea retulit, erexitque vexillum, ut Paulus diceretur e Saulo.” Yet this memorable incident of the conversion of the proconsul Sergius Paulus may be regarded as the first occasion, not as the real reason, of the permanent change of name. According to Augustine, the assumption of the name Paulus = exiguus, was the outcome of Pauline humility (1 Cor. xv. 9; Eph. iii. 8). But this at most could only have been one of several inwardly determining factors. According to Wieseler on Gal. i. 1, the apostle as a Roman citizen had both names, Paulus Saulus, from the time of his birth (comp. Alexander Jannaens, Johannes Marcus, Jesus Justus), and used the first instead of the second after he began his labours as Gentile apostle.

to the act of calling on the part of the Antiocheian church (Acts xiii. 2), as many expositors, not without appearance of reason, have supposed (comp. ἀφορίσατέ μοι there), for the ἀφορισμός is a direct one, and answers better to προσκέκλημαι there mentioned. εἰς εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ] *for the gospel of God*, not in order to believe in it, but in order to proclaim it. εἰς, in, *for*, is a particle of purpose; θεοῦ is genit. causae, not object., for God is the author, not the purport of the saving proclamation. The latter is Christ, as is expressly said, vv. 3, 4. So also εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ (Rom. xv. 16; 1 Thess. ii. 2, 8, 9; 1 Pet. iv. 17, etc.).

Ver. 2. The gospel is the primitive truth, proclaimed beforehand by most credible witnesses, laid up in duly attested writings. Καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑμᾶς εὐαγγελιζόμεθα τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας ἐπαγγελίαν γενομένην, says the same apostle (Acts xiii. 32). Thus the significance and glory of the gospel receive special emphasis, while in this and the following verses, up to ver. 5, the sacred dignity of the apostolic office is made clearly to appear. ὁ προεπηγγείλατο] It was not so much the gospel, the news concerning Christ (although this is included, x. 15), as Christ Himself, or redemption, that God caused to be proclaimed before through the prophets. The expression is therefore concise, and the relative ὃ refers to the contents of the gospel.

—διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ] Not only the four great and twelve minor prophets are meant, nor the order of prophets in general commencing with Samuel, but all men by whom prophecies bearing on Christ are found recorded in the O. T. covenant Scriptures, ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις. Moses also and David accordingly belong to these προφηταῖς. Γραφαὶ ἅγαι are not: *passages* of Holy Scripture; but either: *the* holy writings, or: holy writings. The absence of the article says nothing against the first interpretation, for γραφαὶ ἅγαι are a self-defined unicum, like θεός, πνεῦμα ἅγιον, νόμος; nor yet the circumstance that *direct* prophecies at least are not found in *all* writings of the O. T., for the Holy Scriptures were regarded as a single volume, one and indivisible. Yet the general spirit of the passage is more in favour of the last meaning, for the glory of the gospel could only be set forth by *characterizing* the medium of its prophetic announcement of old. This is the sure and honourable medium of *holy writings*. But by this is meant the entire O. T., consisting of holy writings.

Ver. 3. περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ] In accordance with the order of

words and grammar, to be connected with *προεπηγγέλματο*, not with *εὐαγγέλιον* (ver. 1), although certainly as to substance the object of the latter is meant to be here specified. Ver. 2, therefore, is not to be made a parenthesis. *υἱὸς θεοῦ* is not to be taken as a mere Messianic official title, but invariably denotes with our apostle a metaphysical relation of Christ to the Father. The subject spoken of is the *υἱὸς μονογενὴς παρὰ πατρίς*, John i. 14, the *υἱὸς ἰδίου*, Rom. viii. 32. As such, above all, it was needful He should be *demonstrated*, ver. 4. We have here the same antithesis of the humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ as ix. 5, which passage alone is decisive of the meaning of *υἱὸς θεοῦ* in the present one. Comp. the description of the *υἱὸς τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ*, Col. i. 13–17.

—*τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ*] As son of David is He born, according to the promises of the prophets. Only as such is He one *γενόμενος*, one born in time, one that came into existence (Gal. iv. 4), for as Son of God He is the eternally existent one. Nevertheless, this eternally existent Son of God became a son of David, not by change of His unchangeable Godhead,—we must never forget that only in the pantheistic system has the limitation of the illimitable a meaning,—but by the assumption and elevation of humanity into the unity of His divine person. The incarnate Son of God being only one, the expression is permissible: the Son of God is born of the seed of David. But He is born of the seed of David as born of the Virgin Mary, David's daughter. Thus the seed of David remained withal the seed of the *woman* promised in the protevangelium. To concede to the apostle the conception of the metaphysical divine sonship, and to deny to him faith in the birth of God's Son of the Virgin, is to impute to him a conception dogmatically inconceivable.

—*κατὰ σάρκα*] *σὰρξ* signifies here the entire human nature, made up of *σῶμα* as well as of a lower and higher *ψυχή*. This nature is described by the characteristic sign of its visible, sensuous manifestation. In the same sense stands in John i. 14: *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*, not essentially different from: God became man, comp. Rom. ix. 5. The ethical element of the sinfulness of the *σὰρξ* is not included here, for Christ did not appear *ἐν σαρκὶ ἀμαρτίας*, but only *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἀμαρτίας*. But probably the weakness and frailty of the *σὰρξ* is meant to be emphasized, although even His frail human nature is glorified as one that sprang, in accordance with the promise, *ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ*.

Ver. 4. τοῦ ὀρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει, κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης, ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν] By the asyndeton τοῦ γενομένου . . . τοῦ ὀρισθέντος, the second parallel clause is made specially prominent. ὀρίζειν τινά τι, to designate one for something, to appoint, to establish, constituere, creare. Thus in all N. T. passages, Luke xxii. 22; Acts ii. 23, x. 42, xi. 29, xvii. 26, 31; Heb. iv. 7. Hence, when Chrys. and Theophyl. explain ὀρισθέντος by δειχθέντος, ἀποδειχθέντος, ἀποφανθέντος, βεβαιωθέντος, κριθέντος, this must be taken as explaining the sense rather than the word. Christ is *proved, demonstrated*, the Son of God, in so far as by the resurrection from the dead He is *established* as such before men, or in the conviction of men. Parallel at all points is the thought Acts xiv. 33. Κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης furnishing a manifest antithesis to κατὰ σάρκα, it appears unnatural to co-ordinate ἐν δυνάμει, κατὰ πνεῦμα, and ἐξ ἀναστάσεως, and oppose them equally to κατὰ σάρκα, by which method of construction Christ is said to be demonstrated the Son of God "in power, according to the spirit and by the resurrection." The familiar antithesis of σὰρξ and πνεῦμα compels us rather to interpret: He is Son of David, κατὰ σάρκα; Son of God, κατὰ πνεῦμα. The words ἐν δυνάμει must then be joined either with ὀρισθέντος or with υἱοῦ θεοῦ. If, following the first method of construction, we wished to interpret: "by the power of God," we should need the addition θεοῦ (2 Cor. xiii. 4; 1 Cor. vi. 14), or look for an expression like διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρός (Rom. vi. 4). But if the wish were to take ἐν δυνάμει adverbially in the sense of potenter, evidentius: "who is manifested in expressive fashion, powerfully, strikingly," then τοῦ ἐν δυνάμει ὀρισθέντος would certainly have seemed the best arrangement of the words, and one less liable to misconstruction. Accordingly, we think the connection with υἱοῦ θεοῦ the most simple and natural. "Id est," says Melanchthon, "declaratus est esse filius Dei potens," "who is established," i.e. "proved, manifested a Son of God in power." If, then, the σὰρξ designates the lower, human nature, the πνεῦμα can only serve as a designation of the higher, divine principle in Christ.<sup>1</sup> Therefore the reference

<sup>1</sup> Comp. the contrast of πνεῦμα and σὰρξ, to denote the divine and human natures of Christ, in Gregory Naz. *Orat.* xxxix. 13, p. 685; xxxviii. 13, p. 671, cited by Ullmann, *Gregory of Nazianzum the Divine*, pp. 398, 400. Cyprian, also, *De Idolorum Vanitate*, speaking of the incarnation, says: "Carnem Spiritus sanctus induitur."

cannot here be to the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, which, in dogmatic phraseology, is the third Person in the Godhead, neither as that Spirit spoke through the prophets and testified of the divine sonship of Christ; nor as Christ Himself, as Messiah, was anointed with it without measure; nor as He, after His glorification by the resurrection, poured forth this *πνεῦμα* upon His people. Besides, the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* is never elsewhere in the New Testament designated by *πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης*, and the latter expression forbids the interchange. Rather is *πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης* here nothing but the higher, heavenly, divine nature of Christ, according to which, or in which, He is the Son of God. Here there is ascribed to the Son of God a spiritual essence, for *πνεῦμα ὁ θεός* (John iv. 24) also refers to Him, and in 2 Cor. iii. 17 He is Himself called *τὸ πνεῦμα*; while according to Heb. ix. 14, He offered Himself to God *διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου*. *ἁγιωσύνης* is genit. qualitatis, and indicates the nature of the *πνεῦμα* more precisely. *Ἀγιωσύνης* itself must be distinguished from *ἁγιασμός*: it means *holiness* (2 Cor. vii. 1; 1 Thess. iii. 13), not *sanctification*. But the reason why the apostle here calls the Son of God a *υἶον θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει*, and His higher nature a *πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης*, seems to be nothing but this: that with the *σάρξ*, the human nature ascribed to Him, the idea of infirmity and sinfulness is inevitably associated, though the latter, as observed, does not lie in the word in this passage. But, as matter of fact, though the Son of God had subjected Himself to the *ἀσθενεία σαρκός*, and appeared *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, He was and remained *υἶος θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης*, and by the resurrection, as a triumph over death and sin, He declared Himself the almighty, living, and holy Son of God, to whom all power is given in heaven and earth, that He may give eternal life to those whom the Father has given Him (Matt. xxviii. 18; John xvii. 2). For the rest, with this passage is to be compared the similar idea (1 Tim. iii. 16): *θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι*, and also the mutual contrast of *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* (1 Pet. iii. 18).

—*ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν*] The *ἐκ* may be taken either as a temporal or causal particle (comp. Jas. ii. 18): *since* or *by* the resurrection from the dead is Christ manifested the Son of God. The causal sense is to be preferred, the apostolic preaching pointing everywhere to the resurrection of Jesus Christ as the ground of faith in His divine Sonship (Acts ii. 24, xiii. 30 ff.,

xvii. 3, 31, xxvi. 23). This evidence, as matter of fact, it supplied, according to John ii. 19, x. 18. It corroborated Christ's testimony concerning Himself, the substance of which was His divine Sonship. ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν cannot grammatically be the same as ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν. Moreover, it is not the future resurrection of the dead that is meant; but Christ's resurrection is the resurrection of the dead itself, in so far as in His resurrection ours is involved,—in so far as His resurrection represents the general resurrection in a concrete case (Acts iv. 2, xvii. 32, xxiii. 6, xxvi. 8, 23; 1 Cor. xv. 12).

—Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν] is not to be joined with ἐξ ἡναστάσεως νεκρῶν, as is done in the Itala and Vulgate, but to be taken as in apposition to τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ver. 3; but τοῦ γενομένου, up to νεκρῶν, is not on this account to be parenthesized. This Son of God and of David is the historical person Jesus Christ,—the man Jesus, the Messiah (Χριστός), the common Lord of the church, whose δοῦλος, in the stricter sense, the apostle is, which fact is once more brought out (ver. 5) in fuller detail and more special definition. But ἡμῶν is not therefore to be applied exclusively to the apostles, for Christ is Lord of all, even as all believers are His δοῦλοι (Eph. vi. 6; 1 Cor. vii. 22). At the same time, the solemn addition Ἰ. Χρ. τ. κ. ἡμ. furnishes an easy point of connection with what follows.

Ver. 5. δι' οὗ] The formula διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ represents Christ as mediator of a relation, the primary cause of which is θεὸς πατήρ. The medium (διά) is accordingly to be distinguished from the *causa principalis* (ὑπό), xv. 15.

—ἐλάβομεν] refers not to all the apostles, but to Paul alone; for πάντα τὰ ἔθνη expressly were to be the Gentile apostle's peculiar sphere of action; and in what follows, his object is simply to establish *his own* authority for writing to the Romans, who belong to these ἔθνη. The original meaning of the plural: "I and my equals," passed out of use even in profane writers.

—χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν] The καί is explicative: grace, namely apostleship. There was no occasion to speak of converting grace, comp. xv. 15, 16. Elsewhere, too, the apostle views his toilsome office, on account of its meaning and aim, as a gift of God's grace (Eph. iii. 2, 3, 7, 8). By saying χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν instead of χάριν ἀποστολῆς, the grace manifested in the bestowal of the apostleship is put forward in an independent and striking way,—



the reverse of "the fulness and force of the discourse" being *weakened* by this interpretation [Meyer].

—εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως] εἰς, particle of purpose: I received the grace of the apostolate for the obedience of faith, *i.e.* that obedience of faith might arise, be established. Similarly, ver. 1, ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλιον. Πίστεως may be taken as *genit. auctoris*: obedience to God, that faith requires or effects. But the apostle is not an apostle in order to establish this obedience, but in order to establish faith in the gospel itself, of which obedience is a necessary and immediate consequence. Πίστις, not ὑπακοή, forms the theme of the Roman epistle. Again, we may take πίστεως as *genit. appositionis*: obedience consisting in faith. No doubt faith is an act of obedience to God's Word. Hence the phrases: ὑπακούειν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ, Rom. x. 16; 2 Thess. i. 8: ἀπειθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ; or τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ, 1 Pet. ii. 8, iv. 17. But it does not seem in place for the apostle to introduce a characteristic property of faith, where all that was required of him, in harmony with the aim of his epistle, was to declare that his office consisted in bringing all the world into subjection to faith itself. Therefore the preference belongs to the interpretation which regards πίστεως as *genit. obiectivus*: in order to establish obedience to faith. The grammatical connection is justified by 2 Cor. x. 5: ἡ ὑπακοὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ; 1 Pet. i. 22: ἡ ὑπακοὴ τῆς ἀληθείας; the mode of expression itself, by Acts vi. 7: ὑπακούειν τῇ πίστει. But then the meaning of πίστις, questionable in the New Testament: *dogmatic faith*, "fides quae creditur, doctrina Christiana," is not to be accepted. Rather πάντα τὰ ἔθνη are to become obedient to subjective faith; whereupon, no doubt, subjective faith is to be conceived, as often, made objective as a power (xvi. 26; Gal. i. 23).

—ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσι] The connection with the words just preceding is the most natural, in the sense of ἵνα γένηται ὑπακοὴ πίστεως ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, "that obedience to faith may be produced among all Gentiles." Πάντα τὰ ἔθνη are not all *nations*, inclusive of the Jews, as in Matt. xxviii. 19, but all *Gentiles*. The apostle never describes himself as apostle of *Jews* and Gentiles alike. Expressly and repeatedly he characterizes his call, especially in the Roman epistle, as that of the *Gentile* apostle (i. 13 ff., xi. 13, xv. 16). Thereby all activity among the Jews is not absolutely precluded, but *denominatio fit a parte potiori*.

—ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ] The connection with πίστεως is,

for grammatical reasons, untenable, for we do not say *πίστις ὑπέρ τινος*. The connection with *χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν* is more unlikely than that with *εἰς ὑπακοήν . . . ἔθνεσιν*, "that submission to faith may be brought about among all Gentiles for the sake (for the glorifying) of His name" (Acts xv. 26, xxi. 13). In Acts ix. 15, *ὄνομα* serves metonymically as a designation of the person or thing itself, inasmuch as in the name its characteristic features are expressed.

Ver. 6. *ἐν οἷς ἐστε καὶ ὑμεῖς*] The Romans also belonging to these *ἔθνη*, to whom the commission of the apostle applies, is the reason of his writing to them.

—*κλητοὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*] The apostle elsewhere invariably ascribes the act of calling to God the Father (viii. 30, ix. 24; 1 Cor. i. 9, vii. 15, 17; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. ii. 14; 2 Tim. i. 9). Therefore *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* in this passage is probably to be taken, not as *genit. causae*, but as the genitive of belonging to, and thus the meaning is to be paraphrased: the called of God, who belong to Jesus Christ. Here also (vv. 5, 6, as in vv. 3, 4) the sign of parenthesis is to be erased, as needlessly, and contrary to the end in view, breaking the coherence and flow of thought.

Ver. 7. *πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ . . . ἀγίοις*] After concluding the intervening thoughts,—so rich and so naturally linked together (vv. 2–6),—the apostle now completes the proper address of the epistle: *Παῦλος, δούλος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, κλητὸς ἀπόστολος, πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀγαπητοῖς θεοῦ, κλητοῖς ἀγίοις. χαίρειν* or *εὖ πράττειν*, elsewhere commonly occurring among the Greeks, forms the simple address to a salutation; but it is not absolutely necessary. Here the substance of *χαίρειν* appears in the following *χάρις ὑμῖν κτλ.* as an independent sentence and invocation of blessing of richer fulness. *πᾶσι* addresses the epistle simply to the entire Roman church, without secondary reference to the distinction of natives and foreigners (ver. 8 forbids all thought of the latter), or of known and unknown. "To all believers belonging to the church in Rome." But Paul says not simply *πιστοῖς*, but, putting emphasis on the objective glory of the Christian position, *ἀγαπητοῖς θεοῦ, κλητοῖς ἀγίοις*] These are the privileges ascribed and pertaining, once to the Old Testament, now to the New Testament covenant people, the true *Ἰσραὴλ θεοῦ*. Christians are *ἀγαπητοὶ θεοῦ* in Christ *τῷ ἡγαπημένῳ*, Eph. i. 6, and *κλητοὶ ἅγιοι*, 1 Cor. i. 2, *i.e.* set apart

from the world by a holy calling, and consecrated to God, ἐν Χριστῷ, who for their sake sanctified Himself (John xvii. 19), and ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, whose temple they are (1 Cor. vi. 11). "Non ideo vocati sunt," says Augustine, "quia sancti erant, sed ideo sancti effecti, quia vocati sunt," comp. יִשְׂרָאֵל קָרָאָהֶם (Zeph. i. 7).

—Χάρις ὑμῶν καὶ εἰρήνη] *sc.* εἴη. These words, though corresponding to the χαίρειν used elsewhere in the form of salutation (Acts xv. 23, xxiii. 26), have in the apostle's mouth, as the change and remodelling of the form expressly show, a more profound, inner, spiritual meaning. εἰρήνη, our peace with God, is a consequence of the χάρις, the grace, the peace that God made with us in Christ. Comp. Wieseler on Gal. i. 3, p. 19, only that εἰρήνη is understood of peace within *and* without, though still *in the main* of *inward* peace with God.

—ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] It is wrong to make κυρίου, like ἡμῶν, depend on πατρὸς. Against this tells 2 Tim. i. 2; Tit. i. 4. Rather is the preposition ἀπὸ to be repeated in thought before κυρίου. The equalization of θεὸς πατήρ and κύριος Ἰησοῦς, with respect to the bestowal of χάρις and εἰρήνη, belongs to the indirect but decisive proofs of the divinity of Christ. It is conceded that God is here, as ever, to be conceived as *causa principalis*; Christ, as *causa medians*; but no creature can impart χάριν καὶ εἰρήνην in the way of real communication, but only in the way of announcement. Just as in Gal. i. 1, in the words διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ θεοῦ πατρὸς, God, like Christ, is considered as *mediator* of salvation, or more specially as mediator of the apostolate; so here, in ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, Christ, like God, is considered as the *source* of grace and peace, although the one in a medial, the other in a primary manner.—God is πατήρ ἡμῶν in so far as we have obtained *υἰοθεσία* through Christ. For the υἱὸς θεοῦ, becoming the δοῦλος θεοῦ, procured for us *υἰοθεσία*, but for Himself the authority of κύριος in relation to the church.

Vv. 8–17. *Preface* and *theme* of the epistle. Declaration of his thanks for the far-famed faith of the Romans, of his remembrance of them in prayer, and his wish to come to them, because he is under obligation to preach the gospel to them as to all Gentiles. Of this gospel, on account of its glorious power and efficacy, he is not ashamed, for it reveals the righteousness that

avails before God, the righteousness that comes from faith (ver. 8). The gratitude which the apostle bears in his heart for the faith of all churches, as he declares in the opening of nearly all his epistles, affords a glimpse into his apostolic heart, and shows how justly he could boast of the *μέριμνα πασῶν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν*, 2 Cor. xi. 28.

—*πρῶτον μὲν*] *primum quidem*, first of all. The remainder should have been introduced by an *εἴτα* or *ἔπειτα* δέ, but in the press of thoughts rushing one upon another this is omitted (iii. 2; 1 Cor. xi. 18; also Acts i. 1).

—*τῷ θεῷ μου*] is best explained by Acts xxvii. 23: *οὐ εἰμί, ὃ καὶ λατρεύω*; 1 Cor. i. 4; Phil. iv. 19; Philem. 4.

—*διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*] All thanksgivings of the Christian are presented through Jesus Christ, inasmuch as, of all benefits for which he has to render thanksgiving, Christ is the medium (vii. 25; Col. iii. 17). Oecum. strikingly observes: *αὐτὸς γὰρ ἡμῖν αἴτιος τῆς εἰς τὸν πατέρα εὐχαριστίας, ὁ καὶ προσλαβόμενος ἡμᾶς καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι πρὸς ἐκείνον καταλλάξας*. Thus Christ is not to be conceived, with Orig. and others, as mediating bearer of the thanksgiving.

—*ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ*] is an hyperbolic expression, as xvi. 19; comp. 1 Thess. i. 8; John xii. 19. But, undoubtedly, even in the apostle's days, the gospel had been preached in the entire civilised world known at that time; and the fact of a Christian church having been established in Rome, the imperial capital, could not have remained unknown to the other churches. Moreover, the apostle gives thanks that the faith of the Romans is renowned throughout the world, not for its own sake, but inasmuch as this bears witness to the sterling and illustrious character of their faith. That he here gives thanks for the *πίστις* of the Romans, not also for their *ἀγάπη*, as in Col. i. 4, or their *γνώσις*, as in 1 Cor. i. 5, arises from the general tenor of his epistle (vv. 12, 17). For the rest, Calvin rightly: "*Praedicatam in toto orbe fidem Romanorum, intelligamus omnium fidelium ore, qui de ipsa recte et sentire et pronuntiare poterant.*"

Ver. 9. The thanksgivings just uttered are the outflow of the apostle's unceasing interest in the Romans, by which again the reality and genuineness of his thanksgiving is attested.

—*μάρτυς . . . θεός*] comp. the forms of oath, Phil. i. 8; 2 Cor. i. 23, xi. 31; 1 Thess. ii. 5. Even the extrajudicial oath

springing from a holy motive, and directed to a holy purpose, is permitted. The law and its Fulfiller (Matt. v. 33 ff.) forbid only the false oath and reckless, needless swearing. To give to the church, for the purpose of strengthening its confidence in himself, a ratification of his declarations and his doctrine, his truthfulness and sincerity, is reason sufficient to the apostle for an assertion in the form of oath.

—ὃ λατρεύω ἐν τῷ πνεύματί μου ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ] These words add force to the truth of his affirmation, for he will not insult God, whom he so faithfully serves in the gospel, by a lie. And if he is a servant of *the gospel* from *the heart*, he will naturally take the most vivid interest in the churches established through the gospel. But Paul serves God ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ, not by believing in it, but by preaching and diffusing it. ἐν indicates the sphere in which his service is carried on. τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ is *genit. object.*: “the gospel of His Son, *i.e.* which has the Son of God for its content and matter,” in distinction from εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ, ver. 1, = περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ver. 3. The gospel proceeds from God the Father, and the subject of which it treats is God the Son. ἐν τῷ πνεύματί μου is not at all intended to define the apostle’s service as a service in spirit and in truth, in opposition to the vain idol service of the Gentiles, or empty ceremonial service of the Jews; but expresses, like ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μου, the sincerity of his service in opposition to hypocritical show (Eph. v. 19, vi. 6).

—ὥς] not = ὅτι, but serves to indicate the mode or degree: *how* unceasingly (Phil. i. 8; 2 Cor. vii. 15; 1 Thess. ii. 10). Those who erase the comma after ποιούμεαι, and place it after προσευχῶν μου, regard πάντοτε as intensifying ἀδιαλείπτως = *assidue semper, assiduissime*. But in that case we should have expected the words to stand: ὥς ἀδιαλείπτως πάντοτε κτλ. In this sense, at all events, the comma stands better after πάντοτε: ὥς ἀδιαλείπτως μνεῖαν ὑμῶν ποιούμεαι πάντοτε κτλ. But we get the easiest and most natural division by joining πάντοτε, not with what precedes, but with what follows, so that the comma remains after ποιούμεαι, and πάντοτε belongs to δέόμενος.

—μνεῖαν ὑμῶν ποιούμεαι] To be added in thought: in my prayer, when praying, as is spontaneously understood, and as ver. 10 intimates (Phil. i. 3; 1 Thess. i. 2).

Ver. 10. A particular form of this μνεῖα is the desire to come

to them. ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν μου] ἐπί, with the genitive, as often, a preposition of temporal definition (Matt. i. 11). In my prayers, which I make in general, and therefore with reference to you (Eph. i. 16; 1 Thess. i. 2; Philem. 4). The apostle speaks here of the special seasons of prayer in which he brought before the Lord his requests, as well as the interests of all churches; for it was impossible to remember the Romans in every separate intermediate petition.

—εἵπως] *si forte* expresses the modest reserve of the request.

—ἤδη ποτέ] *tandem aliquando*, seeing that I have desired it already so long (Phil. iv. 10). εὐδοῦν τινά, *to lead one by a good path*, the passive εὐδοῦσθαι = *to get a good path*, then = *to have good success, to prosper*. The passive always stands in this last, metaphorical sense (1 Cor. xvi. 2; 3 John 2). Besides, there was no motive here for requesting a *good path*, but only, in general, success in coming to them. Sense: if perchance at last I might be so successful. The infinitive ἐλθεῖν then depends on εὐδοκηθῆσομαι, not on δεόμενος.

—ἐν τῇ θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ] to whom all the good subordinate *their* wills (Acts xviii. 21; Rom. xv. 32; 1 Cor. iv. 19, xvi. 7; Jas. iv. 15). ἐν, inasmuch as the θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ embraces within itself the prosperous issue, the εὐδοῦσθαι, referred to.

Ver. 11. The ground (γάρ) of the request stated ver. 10 is the desire to visit the church, in order to be of use to it. ἐπιποθῶ] The preposition ἐπί is not used to give strength to ποθεῖν, which already expresses fervent longing. ἐπιποθεῖν τι may simply mean πόθον ἔχειν ἐπὶ τι. But this analysis does not apply in xv. 23.

—ἵνα τι μεταδῶ χάρισμα ὑμῖν πνευματικόν] 1 Thess. ii. 8. The usual construction is μεταδιδόναι τινί τινος. We must not here think of special miraculous gifts (1 Cor. xii.). Neither would such a purpose be identical with the one stated ver. 15; nor, again, is στήριχθῆναι the necessary result of receiving such χαρίσματα, which the apostle himself subordinates (1 Cor. xiii.) to the χάρισμα of love, ascribing to them nothing but a relative worth. The χάρισμα or δώρημα, which the apostle desires to impart to them, consists rather in the πίστις, ἀγάπη, ἐλπίς, γνώσις, etc., implanted by the preaching of the gospel. But it is πνευματικόν, as produced by the πνεῦμα ἅγιον, as whose organ the apostle regards himself, and therefore carries in it the nature

of this πνεῦμα. Paul adds modestly a τί: some spiritual gift. Luther: something of a spiritual gift. The words τὸ . . . χάρισμα . . . πνευματικόν are made the more emphatic by the words (μεταδῶ . . . ὑμῖν) inserted between.

—εἰς τὸ στηριχθῆναι ὑμᾶς] The apostle says not: εἰς τὸ στηρίζειν ὑμᾶς, for this becomes God alone (xvi. 25). He is only the instrument, hence the passive, Acts xvi. 5. Further, the Romans needed strengthening only, not the first work of instruction and grounding in truth.

Ver. 12. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι] elucidates the words εἰς τὸ στηριχθῆναι ὑμᾶς, whose meaning the apostle qualifies and restricts, not merely, as Erasmus says, in a “pia vafrieties et sancta adulatio,” but, withal, in genuine humility.

—συμπαρακληθῆναι] παρακαλεῖν τινά, *to call one near* (Acts xxviii. 20). The design of this call may be a request or address. Hence the meaning: *to request or persuade one*. The purport of this address, converse, persuasion, may be comfort or admonition. Hence παρακαλεῖν τινά, *to comfort one*, thus Matt. v. 4: μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες· ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακληθήσονται; or: *to admonish one*, thus Acts ii. 40: διεμαρτύρατο καὶ παρεκάλει, λέγων· Σώθητε ὑπὸ τῆς γενεᾶς τῆς σκολιᾶς ταύτης. Hence also παρακαλεῖν, παράκλησις often has the meaning of *admonitory instruction*, Acts xiii. 15; 1 Thess. ii. 3; Tit. i. 9: παρακαλεῖν ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῇ ὑγιαίνουσῃ. Finally, comforting, admonitory address comprehends quickening and strengthening, on which account παρακαλεῖν, *to quicken*, occurs as synonym of στηρίζειν, *to confirm* (1 Thess. iii. 2; 2 Thess. ii. 17). This last sense is peculiarly appropriate in this passage as an exposition of στηριχθῆναι: “but this is, to be strengthened, quickened together.” To συμπαρακληθῆναι, neither ὑμᾶς nor yet ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐμαυτόν is to be supplied, which both συμ- and ἐν ὑμῖν, *among you*, forbid. Rather is Paul to be considered the subject, in which case, no doubt, a stricter style of writing would have required the express insertion of ἐμέ: “that I may be quickened with you and among you.”

—διὰ τῆς ἐν ἀλλήλοις πίστεως, ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐμοῦ] “*through the mutual faith of you and me*.” ἐν ἀλλήλοις not differing from ἀλλήλων, the apostle employs ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐμοῖ, which more readily enters into direct dependence on πίστεως, not ὑμῖν τε καὶ ἐμοί. But the apostle can say that he wishes to be

quickened among the Romans through their *mutual, common* faith, because he says that he wishes to be quickened *with them* (συμ-). Thus they also are certainly to be quickened, he through their, they through his, faith. *The apostle's* invigoration forming the chief point of the verse, in keeping with this ὑμῶν is set before ἐμοῦ. Moreover, this arrangement of words bespeaks the delicacy and fine feeling of the apostle.

Ver. 13. Not content with the desire to see them, he has often already resolved to come to them, but hitherto has been hindered. οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν] A form of notice or communication often met with in the Pauline epistles (xi. 25; 1 Cor. x. 1, xii. 1; 2 Cor. i. 8; 1 Thess. iv. 13). In the same sense Phil. i. 12: γινώσκειν δὲ ὑμᾶς βούλομαι. The communication thus introduced is always of importance for the readers. In this passage the frequency of his resolve indicates the sincerity and earnestness of his desire to visit them, and by mutual intercourse edify himself and them.

—ἀδελφοί] the usual apostolic address, the dignity of the apostolic office resting on the basis of a common brotherhood of faith. The former, therefore, is only dwelt on and vindicated when some practical purpose compels, never in the interests of hierarchical ambition.

—πολλάκις] *when* the apostle first formed this purpose, and how often, cannot be determined. From xv. 23 it follows that he first had it in mind many years before writing the epistle.

—καὶ ἐκωλύθη ἄχρι τοῦ δεῦρο] is to be viewed as a parenthesis, since the following ἵνα . . . σχῶ must be joined with the preceding ὅτι πολλάκις . . . ὑμᾶς. The parenthetical καί, = the simple *and* of sequent thought, is not of itself identical with the adversative καίτοι or δέ, although the latter might also have been used. ἐκωλύθη, the obstacles to the journey, proceeded neither from Satan, as in 1 Thess. ii. 18, nor from the Holy Spirit, as in Acts xvi. 6, 7, but as Paul himself says, Rom. xv. 20–23 (comp. 2 Cor. x. 15), from his desire to preach the gospel in regions where it had not yet penetrated. “Magis urgebat necessitas locorum, in quibus Christus erat ignotus,” Grotius. δεῦρο elsewhere an adverb of place, here only in the N. T. of time.

—ἵνα τινὰ καρπὸν σχῶ] Paul says not, that I may do you good (ἔχειν, not = παρέχειν), but: that I may have fruit. In



the ardour of his zeal for the gospel, he regards the results of his preaching among the churches as his own harvest-fruit (as to *κάρπος*, comp. John iv. 36, xv. 5; Phil. i. 22), as his own acquisition. This *κάρπος* was to him *εἰς καύχημα εἰς ἡμέραν Χριστοῦ*, Phil. ii. 16; *δόξα καὶ χαρά*, 1 Thess. ii. 20. But he modestly adds a *τινά*. *ἔχειν*, *to have, to possess*, is not of itself equivalent to *κτᾶσθαι, εὐρίσκειν, to obtain*, although the apostle might have used these expressions just as well.

—*καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν, καθὼς καὶ ἐν*] The doubling of the comparative *καί* is caused by the animation of the language. *καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν, καθὼς* alone was enough, or *ἐν ὑμῖν, καθὼς καί*, Matt. xviii. 33; Col. iii. 13. To *καθὼς καί* we must supply *καρπὸν ἔχω. ἔθνεσιν*] *Gentiles*, not *nations*, as ver. 14 shows. No doubt, according to Acts xxviii., the apostle preaches the gospel first in Rome; yet is this course of action, as elsewhere, only subordinate and preliminary. It paves the way for preaching among the Gentiles (Acts xxviii. 28).

Ver. 14. To preach the gospel in Rome is not only the Gentile apostle's wish, but his duty. *Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι* is a division of the entire world known to antiquity, made from the standpoint of Greek civilisation. Originally it was only = Greeks, and those of strange tongue or foreigners; then with the secondary notion of the cultured in mind and habit, and the intellectually and morally uncultured barbarians. Doubtless the Greeks classed the Jews, as, later, even Philo does explicitly, with the *βαρβάρους*. But this is altogether opposed to the mode of view of the sacred writers, with whom the distinction in religion is so much more significant than the different degrees of culture, that they divided the entire community of nations into *Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ ἔθνη*, iii. 29, ix. 24. Without doubt, then, from his standpoint, the apostle, in the distinction of *Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι*, referred only to the Gentile world. Besides, according to Gal. ii. 7, he was not *ὀφειλέτης* to the Jews. *Σοφοί τε καὶ ἀνόητοι* elucidates still more definitely the meaning of the expression *Ἕλλ. καὶ βαρβ.*, which, used in the first instance merely as a designation of diverse nationality, is applied by Paul withal to diverse degrees of culture. This addition was the more needful, because, after the importation into Italy of the Greek language and culture, the Romans no longer, as formerly, reckoned themselves among the *βαρβάρους*, but yet could not, without qualification, be justly

called "Ἕλληνες."<sup>1</sup> But Paul evidently, as ver. 16 intimates, reckons the Romans among the σοφοῖς. One sees no real reason why, if he only wanted to say in general: "I am a debtor to *all* nations," he should have selected the particular national division "Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι. Likewise, it does not seem in place to apply σοφοί and ἀνόητοι only to individuals on the ground that ἀνόητοι might have been found among the Greeks, as well as σοφοί among the barbarians. The latter, at least the Greeks, whose point of view the apostle adopts in his division, would not have conceded, and as to the first he says himself (1 Cor. i. 22) of the Greek nation in general: "Ἕλληνες σοφίαν ζητοῦσιν.

—ὁφειλέτης εἰμί] as is self-evident, without its being expressly supplied: εὐαγγελίσασθαι or τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, ver. 15. The apostle regards the preaching of the gospel as a debt which he owes to the Gentiles, for in the obligation to do this his divinely instituted office consists (1 Cor. ix. 16, 17; 2 Cor. iv. 5).

Ver. 15. οὕτω] *thus*, in such circumstances, in such a capacity, *i.e.* as debtor to the "Ἑλλ. τ. κ. βαρβ. κτλ. As regards meaning then οὕτω = in consequence, comp. the καὶ οὕτω, Acts vii. 8; 1 Cor. xiv. 25.

—τὸ κατ' ἐμέ πρόθυμον] Some expositors take πρόθυμον as a substantivised adjective = προθυμία: "as far as lies in me (τὸ κατ' ἐμέ) there is readiness," for ἐστί is understood spontaneously (2 Cor. viii. 11). But even if τὸ πρόθυμον may stand instead of ἡ προθυμία, the use of the neuter of the adjective *without* the article for the substantive (πρόθυμον for προθυμία) would be without example. Others explain τὸ κατ' ἐμέ as the subject, πρόθυμον as the predicate: "that which concerns me is ready," *i.e.* I, for my part, am ready. But this use of the form τὸ κατ' ἐμέ for the substantive pronoun cannot be verified. The apostle would then probably have written τὸ κατ' ἐμέ, πρόθυμος, *sc.* εἰμί, "as far as depends on me, I am ready." Accordingly, it only remains to join together τὸ πρόθυμον, and to take κατ' ἐμέ as a paraphrase of the genitive (comp. Eph. i. 15): τὸ κατ' ἐμέ πρόθυμον = ἡ προθυμία μου. But then κατ' ἐμέ is perhaps to be made specially emphatic, in allusion to the hindrances mentioned before. "The readiness depending on *me* exists to preach the gospel to you also," *i.e.* on *my part* readiness exists, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Cic. *De Fin.* ii. 15: "a quo non solum Græcia et Italia, sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est."

—καὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ] Although you belong to the σοφοῖς, this causes me no scruple, as one ὀφειλέτης τῶν σοφῶν.

—εὐαγγελίσασθαι] “latet his propositio: *Scribam, quae coram vellem dicere, de Evangelio,*” says Bengel.

Ver. 16. The apostle feels no scruple about preaching in Rome also, for (γάρ) he is not ashamed of the gospel even before the wise Romans. At a later time he calls upon Timothy to manifest a similar spirit in the imperial capital (2 Tim. i. 8). In Gal. vi. 14, he even *boasts* of the cross of Christ that formed the substance of the gospel.<sup>1</sup> The Lord Himself warns His disciples against this false shame (Mark viii. 38). That the gospel is a *μωρία* to the σοφοῖς Paul declares (1 Cor. i. 22, 23). He is there speaking of the Greeks. He had proved this for himself in the metropolis of Greek worldly wisdom (Acts xvii. 18, 32). But just as little as he had been ashamed of the gospel in Athens or Corinth, is he ashamed of it at Rome. Ashamed of the gospel? The consciousness of its peculiar glory forbids it. Thus with the words δύναμις γάρ, up to the end of ver. 17, he passes over to the proper subject of the epistle. As here he calls the gospel, so in the passage quoted above (1 Cor. i. 24) he calls Christ Himself θεοῦ δύναμιν καὶ θεοῦ σοφίαν.

—τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ] The words τοῦ Χριστοῦ are wanting in the best manuscripts. There is found for them in other copies the reading τοῦ θεοῦ, or τοῦτο, or αὐτοῦ. They are accordingly to be regarded as unauthentic, and transferred to this place from passages like xv. 29; 1 Cor. ix. 12, etc.

—δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστίν] “a power originating with God, proceeding from God.” Or rather with still greater directness and force: “a power belonging to God, a power of God in which He manifests His energy.” The genitive, therefore, is better taken as *genit. possess.* than as *genit. auctoris*. In the same sense the apostle says, 1 Cor. i. 18: ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ (= τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) τοῖς μὲν ἀπολλυμένοις μωρία ἐστί, τοῖς δὲ σωζομένοις ἡμῶν δύναμις θεοῦ ἐστι. But the gospel is God’s power, in so far as it is not a mere word of man, explaining and proclaiming God’s works of redemption, but is God’s Word really efficacious in conversion. It is the ῥῆμα θεοῦ that is μάχαιρα τοῦ πνεύματος, Eph. vi. 17, it is the sword that is the Spirit. It is God’s Word as the bearer and

<sup>1</sup> But we are not in the present passage to suppose a meiosis, or, with Seb. Schmidt,

a “negatio quae contrariam vehementem affirmationem includit.”

channel of God's Spirit (1 Thess. ii. 13 ; Heb. iv. 12, 13). But of course it is this only in so far as it is the preaching of God's justifying grace in Christ, the grace which is realized by faith. Form and substance may not here be severed.

—*εἰς σωτηρίαν*] As Paul here calls the gospel a *δύναμις θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν*, so Jas. i. 21 describes it as *λόγον δυνάμενον σώσαι*. *σωτηρία* is *deliverance* from every necessity, danger, and affliction, comp. Luke i. 71: *σωτηρία ἐξ ἐχθρῶν*, Acts vii. 25, Jude 5, of the *σωτηρία* experienced by the people of Israel through Moses ; Acts xxvii. 34, Heb. xi. 7, Jas. v. 15, of saving of bodily life. But the ruling idea in the N. T. is that of *spiritual* deliverance. This consists of itself in *σώζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*, Matt. i. 21, or *ἐν ἀφέσει ἁμαρτιῶν*, Luke i. 77, which is identical with *λογίζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην*, Rom. iv. 6, 7. As such, it is at the same time exemption from the *ὀργὴ θεοῦ*, Rom. i. 18, from *θάνατος*, 2 Cor. vii. 10, and from *ἀπώλεια*, Phil. i. 28 ; Luke xix. 10. Thus salvation has in the first place a negative side ; but with this the positive is inseparably interwoven, for pardon of sin, removal of wrath and death, is not imaginable without the bestowal of grace, of righteousness, and life. The *σωτηρία*, further, is one already realized, Luke xix. 9 : *σήμερον ἡ σωτηρία τῷ οἴκῳ τούτῳ ἐγένετο* ; Acts xiii. 26 : *ὁ λόγος τῆς σωτηρίας ταύτης* ; 2 Cor. vi. 2 : *ἰδοὺ, νῦν ἡμέρα σωτηρίας*, also Eph. ii. 5 ; 2 Tim. i. 9 ; Tit. iii. 5 ; 1 Pet. iii. 21. But salvation now realized is only completed in the future life. As the positive side is implied in the negative, so the future is implied in the present relation. These are, so to speak, spontaneously responsive chords. In many passages the present and future elements may even be equally probable, possibly in 2 Pet. iii. 15 ; Jude 3. Finally, in several passages *σωτηρία* is referred only to completed deliverance, only to *future* salvation. So 1 Thess. v. 8 : *ἐλπὶς σωτηρίας*, and *περιποίησις σωτηρίας* ; Heb. i. 14 : *κληρονομεῖν σωτηρίαν*, v. 9, ix. 28 ; 1 Pet. i. 5, 9 : *σωτηρία ἐτοιμία ἀποκαλυφθῆναι ἐν καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ* and *τὸ τέλος τῆς πίστεως, σωτηρίαν ψυχῶν* ; comp. Matt. x. 22 ; 2 Tim. ii. 10, iv. 18. In the present passage also this last, stricter conception of *σωτηρία* is to be maintained. The gospel is a power that mediates eternal salvation (= future blessedness), ver. 16, because it reveals righteousness that avails before God, for the former is conditioned by the latter. This acceptance is favoured first of all by ch. v., where, after the nature of the

δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐκ πίστεως has been described (iii. 21—iv. 25), the nature of salvation is expounded as consisting in the ἐλπίς τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ, ver. 2. Just as in i. 17 the idea of ζωή, embodied in ζήσεται, is manifestly related in meaning to or synonymous with that of σωτηρία, ver. 16, so we see this ζωή described as future, v. 17, when it is said of the righteous: ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύσουσι. But, above all, v. 21 is to be regarded as favouring our acceptance, since there the sentence ἵνα . . . ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ διὰ δικαιοσύνης εἰς ζῶν αἰώνιον may be regarded as a concluding recapitulation of the subject announced, i. 16, 17. With this agrees viii. 24, where the apostle in the words τῇ γὰρ ἐλπίδι ἐσώθημεν represents σωτηρία as future, as in x. 10, where present δικαιοσύνη is expressly distinguished from future σωτηρία, and xiii. 11, where the period of salvation is pictured as coming nearer and nearer. Comp. also 1 Cor. xv. 1: τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ εὐηγγελισάμην ὑμῖν, ὃ καὶ παρελάβετε, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἐστήκατε, δι' οὗ καὶ σώζεσθε.

—παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι] σωτηρία exists only for πίστις, but on this condition it is universal.

—Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἑλληνι] the universality of σωτηρία stands opposed to Jewish particularism. Paul strengthens this still further by Ἰουδαίῳ τε καὶ Ἑλληνι. But he does not in this deny the divinely-ordained priority of the Jews. Rather by the πρῶτον he expressly acknowledges it. πρῶτον alludes not merely to the order of time in the gospel being invariably preached first to the Jews (Luke xxiv. 47; Acts xiii. 46), for we should thus get a meaning pretty nearly as good as none at all. Rather it denotes, as ii. 9, 10 proves, an order of rank. πρῶτον *primum* = *potissimum*. The order of time in preaching is itself grounded on Israel's divinely-instituted order of rank (iii. 1, 2). Only to Israel had God bound Himself by promise (ix. 4, xv. 8). To the Gentiles He was discharging no debt, but exercising spontaneous compassion (xv. 9). They were not κατὰ φύσιν κλάδοι, but παρὰ φύσιν ἐγκεντρισθέντες εἰς καλλιέλαιον. They bore not the root, but the root bore them (xi. 16–25). Thus the Messiah was sent to the nation of promise, and only through it and in it to the Gentile nations (Matt. xv. 24, 26, 27). Of this priority of Israel no nation has reason to complain; for it was the means of bringing salvation to all mankind, inasmuch as only in this way was it possible to preserve on earth a central fire of truth from which the light of the gospel might be diffused. Moreover, in Christ is

a like amount of grace for all, and thus the disparity is again done away (Rom. x. 12 ; Gal. iii. 28, 29 ; Col. iii. 11). Finally, "Ελλην is here to be taken in a wider sense, in contrast to 'Ιουδαίος, as ver. 14 in contrast to βάρβαρος. Under this title the Greek-speaking Gentile world is embraced as representing the entire Gentile world (Acts xiv. 1 ; 1 Cor. x. 32, etc.).

Ver. 17. The gospel is a δύναμις εἰς σωτηρίαν, because (γάρ) it reveals the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, only the righteous being able to claim future salvation. δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ] The δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is not here, as in iii. 5, an attribute of God, neither His righteousness, nor His truthfulness, nor His goodness ; for these do not in any sense proceed from the faith of man (ἐκ πίστεως), comp. iii. 22, and are in no respect dependent on it. Rather this conditioning of δικαιοσύνη by πίστις indicates what the subjoined O. T. citation (ὁ δίκαιος . . . ζήσεται) confirms, that δικαιοσύνη here denotes a quality in man, or a relation in which he stands.<sup>1</sup> In this case the genitive may be regarded as *genit. auctoris*, like ἐκ θεοῦ, as in Phil. iii. 9, τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην, expressly stands. But there the ἐκ θεοῦ is occasioned by the contrast of ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην. A decisive reason *against* this acceptation may not be forthcoming. But it seems to us, from the analogy of Rom. ii. 13, iii. 20, Gal. iii. 11 : δίκαιον εἶναι, δικαιούσθαι (i.e. to have the δικαιοσύνη here described) παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, that the interpretation : *righteousness that is such with God, that God holds or views as such*, is still more appropriate and more in harmony with the context. Luther : *righteousness which avails before God*. Grammatically this meaning is certified by Jas. i. 20 : ὁργὴ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ οὐ κατεργάζεται. In this case the genitive is either the genitive of objective reference, or even of subjective belonging to ; for this righteousness belongs to God in so far as it is what it is only by His judgment, avails as such with Him.

<sup>1</sup> This tells also against the view advanced by Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, p. 625 ff., and received by Ortlough, who follows him here as almost everywhere, *Römerbr.* p. 43, according to which δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ denotes something which is primarily God's own, a righteousness restored, realized by God, which is proclaimed through the N. T. ministry, and becomes ours by faith. But such an objective righteousness, restored in Christ, could be revealed *only ἐν εὐαγγελίῳ*, not also ἐκ πίστεως, as is said in the present verse through both at once. The gospel would reveal it, and faith receive it as revealed, but faith would not itself reveal it. And how could such a righteousness be called (iii. 22) a δικαιοσ. θ. διὰ πίστεως 'I. x.? That in this a purely subjective righteousness, peculiar to man only, not to God, is meant, the expository δικαιοῦμενοι δωρεάν, ver. 24, shows.

The definition: righteousness availing before God, at all events blends more readily than the other: righteousness proceeding from God, with the forensic, declaratory elements of the Pauline doctrine of justification. And in the statement of the very subject of the epistle we look for the greatest possible clearness of expression. iii. 23, 26, 30 proves nothing against this acceptation. *Δικαιοσύνη θεου* consequently, as already said, is that quality of righteousness, that righteousness of man which God accepts as such, which avails as such before God. Its dogmatic conception will become apparent from the subsequent exposition.

—*ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται*] It is revealed in the gospel, inasmuch as the very news brought by the gospel is what the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* consists in and how it is obtained. *Ἀποκαλύπτεται*, comp. iii. 21: *πεφάνερωται*. It has become manifest (*πεφάνερωται*), because it is revealed through the gospel (*ἀποκαλύπτεται*). The present tense marks the unbroken continuance of the evangelic proclamation. Only the gospel discloses the way, once concealed, to *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωτηρία*. The previous testimony through the prophets is but the promise of a way to be opened hereafter, not the glad news of the opening itself accomplished, *ἐπαγγελία*, not *εὐαγγέλιον*. The revelation of pre-Christian days is as to its nature a revelation of law, in which prophecy, even as to its form coming forth under an O. T. veil of mystery, appears merely as a precursor of the N. T. revelation of grace.

—*ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν*] *sc. οὐσα* or *γινομένη*, for it is to be joined with *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. The reason of *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* coming first is the practical importance of this conception. But it is not to be explained: *from faith to faith*, in the sense of referring to the growth of faith; for the apostle is treating of justification that springs from faith, not of the *growth* of faith, on which justification of itself does not depend. It might be better explained: the *δικ. θεοῦ* is revealed as coming from faith, in order that it may be believed, *εἰς πίστιν* = *ut fides habeatur*. But such an addition pretty nearly amounts to nothing. If righteousness, availing before God, arises from faith, it is self-evident that it is meant to be believed. Besides, on grammatical grounds, *εἰς πίστιν* for *εἰς τὸ πιστεῦσθαι* could scarcely be justified. The only interpretation then remaining is: the righteousness availing before God is revealed as coming from faith unto faith. *πίστις* is the condition of *δικαιοσύνη*, even as it is the organ appropriating

δικαιοσύνη. In this way the import and significance of πίστις is made prominent. εἰς πίστιν, *for faith*, is thus as to meaning = εἰς τοὺς πιστεύοντας, iii. 22; Gal. iii. 22. Similarly Occumen. early interpreted: ἀπὸ πίστεως ἄρχεται καὶ εἰς τὸν πιστεύοντα λήγει, *sc. δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, only that for λήγει it would be better to say ἔρχεται.<sup>1</sup>

—καθὼς γέγραπται] That the righteousness availing before God comes from faith, is confirmed by the prophetic testimony of the O. T. This is evinced the truth of the declaration, ver. 2: ὁ προεπηγγεिलाτο διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἀγίαις. The passage cited is taken from Hab. ii. 4. In the original text it runs: יְהִי יְחַיֶּה בְּאֵמֶן דִּיכָרִי. The LXX. translate (after the various reading יְחַיֶּה בְּאֵמֶן): ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως μου ζήσεται. Paul, after the original text, omitted μου. On the correctness of the translation: the righteous shall live through his *faith* (not: through his *uprightness*), as well as on the present passage in general, comp. Delitzsch, *der Proph. Habakuk*, p. 51 ff. The punctuation after πίστεως (ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως, ζήσεται), not in correspondence with the Hebrew text, which most modern expositors assume, does not of itself appear necessary, and accordingly, for the sake of conformity to the original text, not admissible. That righteousness comes by faith, may be demonstrated not only by the fact that life is adjudged to him who is righteous by faith (ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως), but also by the fact that it is said the righteous (ὁ δίκαιος) has life only by *faith* (ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται). The emphasis lies plainly on πίστις. Comp. also Wieseler on Gal. iii. 11, p. 252 f. For the connection of ἐκ πίστεως with ζήσεται, Heb. x. 38 also is decisive. Moreover, if the connection were with δίκαιος, one would have expected to see the words arranged: ὁ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δίκαιος. The δέ is only transferred from the LXX. But Delitzsch justly remarks, *ibid.* p. 50: "The apostle brings nothing to this passage that it does not contain. All that he does is to set its meaning—that the life of the righteous comes from faith—in the light of the New Testament." The Pauline quotation is the more warranted, as Habakkuk, like Isaiah, brings into

<sup>1</sup> Zwingli's interpretation is a strange one: "trust in the true, faithful God" = ἐκ πίστεως εἰς τὸν πιστόν. Similarly Mehring: "by faith in faithfulness." When he commends this interpretation for its great naturalness, it is remarkable that no one hit upon it before. But such a change in the meaning of πίστεως could be the less conceived in the present connection, as justifying faith is not faith in God's faithfulness, but in God's grace and compassion.



comparison with each other the lower deliverance from exile and the higher Messianic deliverance. Thus to him also justifying and sanctifying faith is faith in the salvation of redemption. Accordingly the theme of the epistle, enunciated vv. 16, 17, is as follows: "The righteousness that avails before God comes to all men from faith only, and only this righteousness of faith has *σωτηρία* for its result."

That faith only brings righteousness availing before God, follows from the fact that all men are sinners. As such, they are not able by their own works to lay claim to divine righteousness as a reward, but only by faith to flee for refuge to divine grace. That all men are sinners the apostle proves from ch. i. 18 to ch. iii. 20, that accordingly only faith in the gospel is left them as the sole means of salvation, ch. iii. 21–31. But as in ver. 16 of this chapter it is said that *πίστις* brings *σωτηρία* to Jews in the same way as to Gentiles, so he proves afterwards that, since Jews, like Gentiles, are considered as sinners, destitute of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, they have no *σωτηρία* to expect, but instead are exposed to the *ὀργή* and *δικαιοκρισία τοῦ θεοῦ*. He gives the proof of this as to the Gentile world, ch. i. 18–32; as to the Jewish world, ch. ii.–iii. 20. *Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἕλληνας πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι* (iii. 9) is the theme of this entire train of reasoning, which falls into two distinct parts. The apostle commences with the Gentile world, whose sinfulness was more obvious to sight, and then passes over to the Jewish world, as to which proof was necessary that, although in possession of the *λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ*, and in spite of their supposed *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, they were in no respect better than the Gentile world. This false *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων* gave him the most apt point of transition to the delineation of the true *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*.

Ver. 18. The righteousness that avails before God comes from faith, because men being *ἀσεβεῖς* and *ἄδικοι*, unless they flee for refuge to *πίστις*, they have only the *ὀργή θεοῦ* to expect. *ἀποκαλύπτεται*] in antithetical relation to *ἀποκαλύπτεται* (ver. 17). *Ἀποκαλύπτειν*, *to reveal something hidden*, always refers, like the subst. *ἀποκάλυψις* in the N. T., when God is the revealing subject, to an *extraordinary* revelation through miraculous acts, through the words of prophets and apostles, or inwardly through the Spirit of God. The proof of this an examination of every

*clavis* will supply. By ἀποκάλυψις, then, is not denoted a revelation of nature, history, reason, or conscience, as this is effected in accordance with the regular or natural laws of the universe or of the human spirit; for what is revealed through these powers is simply a φανερόν, no μυστήριον ἀποκεκρυμμένον in need of ἀποκάλυψις.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, ἀποκαλύπτεται in the present passage also can only express such an extraordinary, supernatural manifestation. The ἀποκάλυψις here meant takes place, as ii. 5 also proves, ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως καὶ δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ. The present tense, then, is to be taken as future, and is used because the judgment-day is described as a matter of fact, whose occurrence is absolutely certain. Comp. Luke xvii. 30 : ἢ ἡμέρᾳ ὃ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀποκαλύπτεται. This interpretation is found first in the Greek exegetes, Chrysost., Theodor., Theophyl., and Oecumen. A doubt certainly arises here, that in this way the strict correspondence between ἀποκαλύπτεται (ver. 18) and ἀποκαλύπτεται (ver. 17) is done away. According to this correspondence, the present tense seems in this verse also to denote a *continuous* divine act of revelation. On this account it will be more correct to think of the whole series of precursory and preparatory apocalypses of wrath, which find their goal and their completion in the final, absolute apocalypse at the Parousia. To this series belongs the expulsion from Paradise, the Deluge, the Dispersion of Nations, and Division of Tongues. As universal judgments affecting the entire human race, these are foreshadowings and prophetic types of the final judgment. But the same holds good of all revelations of wrath and justice accomplished among and upon Israel. They are all directed against the apostasy of the nation from the true God and its abandonment to idolatry, in which, so to speak, the original sin of all mankind was represented and received punishment. Hence also the terrible revelation on Sinai begins with the prohibition of idolatry. Other expositors, also understanding ἀποκαλύπτεται of an extraordinary revelation, refer it to the revelation ἐν εὐαγγελίῳ. But apart from all objections to the view itself, in that case the supple-

<sup>1</sup> Meyer (i. 74) calls this interpretation of the biblical conception of divine ἀποκάλυψις a mistaken one, Mehring also agreeing with him. But I must still abide by it, because all the striking passages in which *God* is the revealing subject express it with the clearest certainty. Comp. Er. Schmid, Ταμιῶν, ed. Bruder, s.v. ἀποκαλύπτειν and ἀποκάλυψις. That in the present passage also a *supernatural* revelation is spoken of, the ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ intimates.

ment ἐν αὐτῷ to ἀποκαλύπτεται could not be left out. Again, the ἀποκάλυψις θεοῦ, here spoken of, is not to be found in the surrender to sinful lusts (vv. 24, 26, 28); for this surrender is no ἀποκάλυψις effected through miraculous acts, through the Word or Spirit of God, and although those Gentile lusts are indeed a *propter peccati*, they are, on the other hand, *peccata* that still await the ἀποκ. ὀργ. or the κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ (ii. 2). Other interpretations, such as that of the revelation through the inner light of reason and conscience, or through sudden destruction rained down from heaven, and the like, are still less to the point.

—ὀργή θεοῦ] Just as little as ἀγάπη is *manifestation* of love is ὀργή *manifestation* of wrath, as *metonymia causae pro effectu* = κόλασις, τιμωρία. Rather does ὀργή denote an inner modification of the divine nature itself, the inwardly energetic antagonism and repellent force of its holiness in relation to human sin, which divine affection without doubt finds its expression in the infliction of punishment.

—ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ] where is the seat of the Omniscient, Holy, Almighty, Omnipresent God, whence therefore proceeds every judgment of God (Ps. lxxvi. 8), whence, too, the Judge of the living and the dead will descend (Phil. iii. 20). The words are to be joined with ἀποκαλύπτεται, not with ὀργή or θεοῦ, because then the article would not be omitted before ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ (Luke xi. 13).

—ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν] ἀσέβεια a religious, ἀδικία an ethical conception, a distinction to be firmly held here, where both words are found together. The first denotes irreligiosity, godlessness, idolatry (2 Pet. ii. 5; 2 Tim. ii. 16); the second, immorality, wickedness, heathen vices, ver. 29: *πεπληρωμένους πάσῃ ἀδικίᾳ*. ἀσέβεια = sins against the first, ἀδικία = sins against the second table. Thus even in ἀδικία, in the stricter sense, an indirect religious reference is not wanting. But the subjoined ἀδικία in this verse embraces a wider sphere, denotes deviation from the divine norm in general (1 John i. 9; 1 Pet. iii. 18; Acts xxiv. 15), and alludes to οὐχ ὡς θεὸν δοξάζειν ἢ εὐχαριστεῖν, ver. 21. On πᾶσα, Theophylact remarks, after Chrysost.: ἡ μὲν ἀληθὴς λατρεία καὶ ἡ εὐσέβεια μία, ἡ δὲ ἀσέβεια πολυσχιδής. But this distinction is more worthy of note on its own account than as an explanation of the word in the present passage. Πᾶσα is simply = *every possible, all and every* (ver. 29).

—*ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων*] *ἀλήθεια* here is not the special truth of the gospel, but, as the following verses suggest, the true knowledge of God, such as is obtained through contemplation of His works. *κατέχειν* either = *to hold fast, firme tenere* (1 Cor. xv. 2; 1 Thess. v. 21), or: *to hold back, to hinder, impedit* (2 Thess. ii. 7). Here clearly the latter, for the Gentiles had not held fast the truth, but, according to ver. 21, lost it. Oecumen. strikingly explains *κατέχειν* by *καλύπτειν, γνώμης πονηρίᾳ ἐπισκοτίζειν*, as Philo also mentions, *Opp. I. p. 1, τοὺς μυθικοῖς πλάσμασι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπικρύψαντας*. The corrupt heart is a hindrance to knowledge entering into the spirit, and, in addition, checks its continuance and active development. Every religious error has a moral root, wherefore Holy Scripture invariably charges its guilt upon the conscience of man. *ἐν ἀδικίᾳ* not = *ἀδίκως*, for that to hinder the truth is unrighteous is self-evident, but to be taken instrumentally: *through unrighteousness*. Finally, in the words *ἀνθρώπων τῶν κτλ.* the apostle expresses himself quite generally; but still, as ver. 19 ff. shows, he is thinking of the Gentiles, and of them exclusively, for he passes on to describe the Jews only in ii. 1.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 19 gives the reason for which God's wrath justly falls on the men who hinder the truth by unrighteousness. *διότι*] contracted from *δι' ὃ τι, propter quod, quam ob rem, wherefore*, in the beginning of a sentence like the Latin *quare = therefore*. But in the N. T. *διότι* never stands in this meaning, but always *διό*. Rather is *διότι* there invariably used in the sense of *διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι, propter hoc quod, quia, because*, which in the beginning of a sentence spontaneously passes over into the meaning: *for*. So here, for the apostle's language has more demonstrative force if we put a period before *διότι*.

—*τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ*] In classical Greek *γνωστός* for the most part means: *knowable; γνωτός, known*. But in the Hellenistic

<sup>1</sup> Meyer justly observes that the designation *ἀνθρώπων* is intended to make apparent the *audacity* of this God-opposing conduct. Mehring has vainly tried to prove, in opposition to the clearly apparent meaning of the description which is immediately subjoined, and which is applicable *only* to the Gentiles, that the apostle (vv. 18-32 of the first chapter) has the Jews just as much as the Gentiles in view. The apostle commences with the delineation of Gentile idolatry as the universal *human* sin, the original sin of *man* in general. Israel was the people of God taken out of this general mass of humanity by positive revelation. As far as they fell into idolatry they had ceased to be Israel and become a Gentile people. And this was not at all the characteristic of the strongly anti-pagan Judaism of that age.

dialect of the N. T. γνωτός does not occur. In the LXX. and the N. T. only is γνωστός found, and, indeed, without exception, as the Lexicons prove, in the sense: *known*, as *e.g.* Luke ii. 44; John xviii. 15; Acts i. 19, xv. 18, xxviii. 22. In the same way ἄγνωστος, *unknown* (Acts xvii. 23). Τὸ γνωστόν τοῦ θεοῦ is therefore not = *that which may be known of God* (ὅπερ δυνατόν ἐστι γνωσθῆναι, Oecumen.). Besides, this would give an inappropriate and withal wrong meaning. For neither was the question in hand here what could and could not be known respecting the divine essence, nor, moreover, did the Gentiles in point of fact know everything respecting God which it was possible to know, seeing that, as the apostle himself presently says, they only had access to what is disclosed as to God's essence through nature and reason, not what is disclosed through revelation. Τὸ γνωστόν τοῦ θεοῦ is then = *that which is known respecting God*, *i.e.* what is known respecting God through the universal revelation of nature and reason, what all men know respecting God, in distinction from what is received through special revelation. This interpretation appears so pertinent and natural that we need seek no other.

—ἐν αὐτοῖς] *in them*, ii. 15: ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, *in their consciousness*, which interpretation also suits the subjoined αὐτοῖς ἐφάνέρωσε and νοούμενα καθορᾶται (ver. 20). Therefore not: *among them*.

—ἐφάνέρωσε] through the creation of the world and the bestowal of the νοῦς, which, from observation of the works of nature, is able to arrive at certain knowledge of God. Paul says φανεροῦν, not ἀποκαλύπτειν, because the former may also denote a revelation mediated by natural means, the latter only one mediated supernaturally by God. This verse, then, is to be rendered: *the knowledge of God (quod notum est de Deo = notitia Dei, the objective γνώσις θεοῦ) is manifest in them (= γινώσκουσι τὸν θεὸν φανερώς*. Luther: for that it is known that there is a God, is manifest in them), *for God manifested it to them*.

Ver. 20. Indication to what extent God has revealed the knowledge of Himself. The mark of parenthesis is to be erased, the passage supplying a confirmatory explanation of the foregoing, no mere subordinate thought by way of digression. τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ] not so much: *His invisible essence*, which would be τὸ ἀόρατον, as rather: *His invisible attributes* (hence the plural). Doubtless in point of fact both are identical, the attributes constituting the

divine essence. God is *ἀόρατος*, in so far as He is hidden from the senses, 1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 16; and Philo, *De Monarch.*: *ὁ ἀόρατος καὶ μόνῃ διανοίᾳ κατάληπτος*.

—*καθορᾶται*] the invisible is seen,—an oxymoron, which is explained and softened by the addition *νοούμενα*. It is perceived, that is, not with the bodily eyes, but with the eyes of the spirit. It is perceived with the *νοῦς*, with the reason. *καθορᾶν* is chosen with special fitness, because it is mediated by the *ποιήματα*, the works perceptible by sense. *καθορᾶν* often in the sense of *ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν*, *pervidere*, i.e. *clare videre*, *perspicere*. So perhaps here also.

—*τοῖς ποιήμασι*] *dativus instrumenti* to be joined with *καθορᾶται*. *πᾶν, ποίημα*, that which is produced by creation, *τὰ ποιήματα*, the entire sum of created products. Accordingly, God's historical dealings are not to be thought of. The revelation here meant takes place from the earliest beginning of things (*ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου*), therefore before even the opening of human history, and reveals, above all, the *αἰδῖος δύναμις*, which comes forth with special distinctness in the observation of *nature*. Add to this that history, in which human freedom, and consequently wickedness, forms a significant factor, could not be so absolutely described as *ποίημα θεοῦ*. God's invisible attributes become visible with the reason through His works.

—*ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου*] since the creation of the world. *ἀπό*, particle of temporal definition (*inde a*, Matt. xxiv. 21; Mark x. 6; Rom. xv. 23). Therefore not: *through the creation of the world*, which would make a useless tautology with *τοῖς ποιήμασι*. Also *κτίσις κόσμου* = *καταβολὴ κόσμου*, is not: *ἀπὸ κτίσεως*, in the sense of: *through creation*. But through the *act* of creation (*κτίσις κόσμου*), invisible in itself, the existence of God cannot be apprehended.

—*ἡ τε αἰδῖος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης*] *His eternal power as well as His Godhead*, apposition to *τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ*. *Ἀίδιος*, from *αἰέ*, *eternal*, not to be confounded with *αἰδής*, *invisible*. That the universe has an absolute cause, not identical with the world itself, is an irrefragable postulate of the human reason, which abides as an innate, latent principle in the soul, and by contemplation of the works of creation is developed and comes forth into consciousness. But this absolute cause of the world determines itself first of all as *eternal omnipotence*, because in the survey of nature man is struck, above everything, with the contrast

between its vastness and glory, pointing to the *δύναμις* of the Creator, and the transitory, perishable character, the dependence and limitation, of all finite existence which we are yet compelled to deny of the Author of that existence, and the contrast leads us to the conception of His *αἰδῖος δύναμις*. The pantheistic interpretation of the idea of God is not, indeed, expressly controverted by the apostle. It is only the result of speculative refinement, the philosophical expression of practical apostasy from fellowship with the personal God, and of a state of actual self-surrender to the impersonal spirit of the world and nature. Unbiased contemplation of the world cannot adopt the monstrous opinion that the cause of a world fashioned after wise designs, a world which comes to its highest flower and bloom in the self-conscious spirit of man, is an unconscious force, a blindly-working energy. The "I" must needs call the cause of its existence "Thou," for "*nihil est in effectu quod non prius fuerit in causa.*" The apostle here, so to speak, employs the cosmological and physico-theological or teleological argument for the existence of God, which certainly, as an argument for the existence of the *personal* God, only possesses absolute demonstrative force and cogency for the human spirit that is unobscured by sin and clearly conscious to itself of the significance of its own personality. Upon the *Old Testament* allusions to the visibility in His works of creation of the eternal God in Himself invisible, comp. Umbreit, *Der Brief an die Römer auf dem Grunde des A. T.'s ausgelegt*, p. 202 ff. — *Θειότης*, from *θεῖος*, *divinitus*, *divinity*, to be distinguished from *θεότης*, *deity*, *deity*. *Θειότης* in the N. T. only here, *θεότης* only Col. ii. 9. The *Θειότης* of God consists in the complex of His divine attributes, to which belongs His *αἰδῖος δύναμις*. This, as the element in the knowledge of God first suggested by contemplation of the world, is made specially prominent. The *eternal power* of God, and *in general* (καί) His entire *Θειότης*, are perceived mentally through the *ποιήματα*. The *καί* subjoined to the *τε* implies the notion of cumulation and climax, comp. Aeschyl. Theoph. 54 : τὸ δ' εὐτυχεῖν, τόδ' ἐν βροτοῖς θεός τε καὶ θεοῦ πλέον. With *δύναμις καὶ Θειότης*, comp. Cic. *Quaest. Tusc.* i. 43 : "*vis (δύναμις) et natura divina (Θειότης).*"

— *εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους*] so that they are inexcusable, i.e. knowing God's invisible nature through His works, they are inexcusable for hindering the truth by unrighteousness. It

is not to be explained: *that they may be inexcusable*, because the next verse does not prove the divine intention to render them inexcusable, but simply establishes the fact of their inexcusableness. For the rest, the telic acceptance does not of itself necessarily involve unconditional predestination. It is possible that the divine purpose itself has come to pass on condition and in foresight of self-incurred, guilty rejection of the means for truly knowing God presented in creation. As comments on the meaning of this verse, expositors give the following striking quotations:—Aristot. *De Mundo*, c. 6: *πάση θνητῇ φύσει γενόμενος ἀθεώρητος ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται ὁ θεός*; Cic. *De Divin.* ii. 72: “esse praestantem aliquam, aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam, admirandamque hominum generi, pulcritudo mundi, ordoque rerum coelestium cogit confiteri;” Tuscul. i. 29: “Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, *ut Deum non vides*; tamen, *ut Deum agnoscis ex ejus operibus*, sic ex memoria rerum, et inventione et celeritate motus, omnique pulcritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis agnoscito.” Comp. also Wisd. Sol. xiii. 1–10, as well as οὐκ ἀμάρτυρον ἑαυτὸν ἀφήκεν, Acts xiv. 17 and xvii. 25–27. Further, when the apostle makes the idea of God come into existence through rational observation of the works of creation, he does not thereby exclude the mediating agency of the word of divine primeval revelation, which gives the meaning of these works, and trains the human spirit to understand them. Directly that this agency has answered its purpose,—the development of the pure knowledge of God,—supposing the heart only to continue in its normal attitude towards God, this knowledge may even of itself retain its original purity through constant contemplation of nature and the teaching of unadulterated tradition.

Ver. 21. The reason of the inexcusableness of men lies in the fact that, in spite of their true knowledge of God, they yet in heart turned away from God, and thus obscured the knowledge which had its abode within them. διότι] *for*, as in ver. 19.

—γινόντες τὸν θεόν] not: when they *might have* known God, also certainly not, though grammatically possible: when they *had* once known God, but: when or although they *knew* God. The partic. aor. here, as often, coincides as to its temporal incidence with the notion of the verb finit. ἐδόξασαν. The part. praes. γινώσκοντες then was not called for. The former wrong acceptations had their origin in the mistaken notion that Paul could



not at one and the same time attribute to the Gentiles correct knowledge of God and obscuration of the same by apostasy to idolatry. But this is the very meaning of *τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατέχειν*, on which Bengel observes: "veritas in mente nititur et urget: sed homo eam impedit,"—as well as of *τὸ γνωστὸν τ. θ. φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς*. In fact, in heathenism the correct idea of God is ever present. This is proclaimed in the unceasing effort on the part of heathenism to raise itself out of the multiplicity, limitation, and moral imperfection of its pantheon to the conception of a single, unlimited, holy Being. In its idea of the one true God—an idea standing above it and in its background, an idea ever emerging and ever disappearing—polytheism carries in its bosom the sentence of its own condemnation. Comp. Tertullian's treatise, *de Testimonio Animæ*, and Nägelsbach, *Die homerische Theologie*, pp. 11–70, especially pp. 12, 37.

—ὡς θεόν] *i.e.* as possessor of the *ἀίδιος δύναμις καὶ θειότης*.

—ἐδόξασαν] *sc.* αὐτόν. They gave Him not the *δόξα* due to Him for His divine attributes, on which account the apostle on his part (ver. 25), in opposition to idolatry, concludes with the doxology due to God.

—ἐὐχαρίστησαν] *sc.* αὐτῷ. As the divine attributes in and of themselves summon *δοξάζειν*, so their relation to man, or the benefits flowing through them to man, summon *εὐχαριστεῖν*. But he that gives not God the *δόξα* due to Him, and withholds from Him *εὐχαριστία*, by this aversion of heart forfeits also the true knowledge of God; for the knowledge of God has its abiding root only in loving fellowship with Him. Hence *ἀλλ' ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν*] *ματαιοῦσθαι* = *μάταιον γένεσθαι*, the Heb. *לִבְיָדָה* = *to become foolish*. Elsewhere also the apostle ascribes *ματαιότης τοῦ νοός* to the Gentiles, Eph. iv. 17. Comp. 1 Pet. i. 18 with reference to the fact that *τὰ μάταια* Acts xiv. 15, answering to the Heb. *לִבְיָדָה* Jer. ii. 5, serves to denote worthless idols. The man who forsakes the true God, unable to remain without God, takes what is worthless for his God, and thus becomes a *μάταιος*, Ps. cxv. 8. *Διαλογισμοί* ever figure in the N. T. as *πονηροί, κακοί*, because denoting spiritual functions of the *natural* man. They are now *cogitationes, thoughts* (Matt. xv. 19); now *ratiocinationes, reasonings, reflections* (Luke v. 22); now *dubia, doubts* (Luke xxiv. 38). Here the first, there being no ground for supposing a special reference to the

*ratiocinationes*, the *reasoned conclusions* of philosophers. Besides, in this way the features characterizing the origin of heathenism universally would, it is evident, be confined within too narrow limits.

—καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδιά] expresses a climax. Their *καρδιά* was *ἀσύνετος*, because their *διαλογισμοί*, which have their roots in the *καρδιά*, the centre of spiritual life (Matt. xv. 19), had become *μάταιοι*, and in addition this *ἀσύνετος καρδιά* was enveloped in *σκότος*, *i.e.* they sank to the lowest depth of spiritual darkness.

The apostle then does not regard heathenism as the first and necessary stage in the development of the religious consciousness, from which mankind by degrees raised itself by progressive spiritual culture to the pure, monotheistic conception of God. Rather, on the contrary, heathenism presents itself to him as an apostasy of the human spirit from the primitive, unsullied knowledge of God,—an apostasy brought about by guilty alienation of the heart from God. Mankind did not ascend from degradation to honour, but fell from honour to degradation. Only on such principles, then, can a true Christian philosophy of religion be built. If heathenism is not an apostasy, Christianity is not a restoration. Finally, the apostle regards apostasy to idolatry as an act common to all mankind before Christ. Hence he expresses himself in the aorist *γόνυτες οὐκ ἐδόξασαν*. The successive generations are severally and jointly responsible for the act of the primitive heathen generation; or rather the consciousness of God, which on the one hand is perpetually renewed through the revelation of nature and reason, is on the other subject to a process of perpetually renewed obscuration. This *ἀλήθεια*, *ἐπίγνωσις θεοῦ*, continually asserting itself in the *σκότος* and *ἄγνοια* of heathenism (Eph. iv. 18; Acts xvii. 30), but yet continually overborne, is the accusing religious conscience of heathenism. Comp. also on the entire picture of Gentile immorality, ver. 20 ff.; Wisd. Sol. xiii.—xv. Meyer justly observes, with reference to Nitzsch and Bleek, that the reminiscence in this section of the book of Wisdom, both collectively and in details, is unmistakeable (i. 83). We add: a significant argument for retaining the Apocrypha.

Ver. 22 summarizes the preceding *ἐματαιώθησαν . . . καρδιά*, adding at the same time a new element of their *μωρία*, namely,

φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοί], φάσκειν, *dictitare, prae se ferre, to assert, pretend*. So also Acts xxiv. 9, xxv. 19, and Rev. ii. 2, according to the *lectio recepta*. The apostle does not here mean exclusively philosophers, nor exclusively the wise and cultured in general, although his statement holds good of all these in an eminent degree; but he has in view as well the chief representatives of wise conceit and cultured pride universally among Gentile nations — Indians, Egyptians, Greeks. Even heathenism deemed itself σοφία in comparison with the μωρία of God's truth.

—ἐμωράνθησαν] *i.e.* μωροὶ ἐγένοντο, 1 Cor. i. 20, iii. 19.

Ver. 23. Consequence or expression of the ματαιότης, of the σκότος and μωρία. ἤλλαξαν] The Greeks say ἀλλάσσειν τί τινος or ἀντί τινος; Paul: ἀλλάσσειν τί ἐν τινι, ver. 25, like the Heb. בִּיחַדִּי. The ἐν is instrumental, *permutare rem per rem* or *re*. With the contents of this verse, comp. Ps. cvi. 20: καὶ ἠλλάξαντο τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν ἐν ὁμοιώματι μόσχου ἔσθοντος χόρτον, and Jer. ii. 11: ὁ δὲ λαὸς μου ἠλλάξατο τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ.

—τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ] The δόξα θεοῦ, הַדָּבָר הַקָּדוֹשׁ, is the result of the complex of His attributes discoverable from the revelation of nature (ver. 20). In the enjoyment of these perfections, which are raised far above everything finite, God has δόξα, *glory*, which symbolically makes itself known in the effulgent light of the manifested God streaming forth everywhere. But God is called ἀφθαρτος in antithesis to φθαρτὸς ἄνθρωπος, as also His immortality of itself distinguishes Him in characteristic fashion from the mortal creation, 1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 16: ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν.

—ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνης] is no empty pleonasm, but: *the likeness of the image* = the likeness found in the image, in so far as the image possesses the likeness of that which it represents. As in the Greek *cultus* the image of φθαρτὸς ἄνθρωπος was chiefly worshipped, so in the Egyptian was the εἰκὼν πετεινῶν καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἑρπετῶν, as is shown in the worship of Ibis, Apis, and snakes; Wisd. xiii. 10: ἀπεικάσματα ζώων. See similar classifications of the animal creation, Gen. i. 28, 30; Acts x. 12. This verse may at the same time intimate, or at least it may be here remarked, how man, in the folly of unnatural idolatry, completely reversed all primitive, divinely-fixed order, seeing that, himself created in God's image, he re-made God after his own image, and installed as lord of the animal world, Ps. viii. 7–9, he degraded

himself to be its servant and suppliant. The adoration of images of men and beasts on the part of the Gentile people, the statues being held partly themselves to be gods, partly inhabited by gods, was indeed the lowest depth of polytheistic *μωρία*. Nevertheless even the most refined worship of natural forces symbolized by these images, or pantheistic absorption into the primal force, which carries and comprehends these forces within itself, was but an imaginary *σοφία*, in principle not really different from the former *μωρία*. Inwardly estranged from the true God, man fell a prey to the powers of nature and human life, a grosser or more refined idolater.

The consequence of idolatry is immorality, consisting partly in the vice of unnatural lust, vv. 24-27, partly in other offences of every kind, vv. 28-32. Ver. 24. διὸ καί] *Wherefore also*; as, that is, they had dishonoured God, so God also (καί) gave them up, etc. καί notes a corresponding relation here between sin and punishment, in Phil. ii. 9 between righteousness and approving recompense.

—παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεός] Chrysostom's interpretation: τὸ παρέδωκεν ἐνταῦθα εἶπεν ἐστι, and Theodoret's: τὸ παρέδωκεν ἀντὶ τοῦ συνεχώρησε τέθεικε, are not adequate, for παραδιδόναι means not: *to permit*, εἶν, Acts xiv. 16, ἐξαποστέλλειν, Ps. lxxxi. 12, but *to give up, surrender*. The consequences of his apostasy from God are no longer in man's own power; but as God orders, decrees, and judges, they arise in forms of sin the most diverse, Ps. lxix. 27. No doubt these sins are developed only through the withdrawal of God's Spirit from fallen man, not through His direct action. Still in this withdrawal and its issues, that is, in the entrance upon a path of unrestrained crime and vice, the avenues to which God opens and levels for man, a positive divine infliction of punishment takes place, comp. Ps. lxxxi. 12; Isa. vi. 10; Mark iv. 12; 2 Thess. ii. 11; Ecclus. iv. 19: ἐὰν ἀποπλανηθῇ, ἐγκαταλείψει αὐτὸν καὶ παραδώσει αὐτὸν εἰς χεῖρας πτώσεως αὐτοῦ. "Traditi sunt," says Calvin, "a Deo non *effective*, nec solum *permissive*, nec tantum ἐκβατικῶς, sed δικαστικῶς et judicialiter." But yet we may speak of the *result* of a divine working, just in so far as God carries out His own penal decree. God could prevent the outbreak of sin, but He does not, at least not always, but so orders His arrangements that within them sin comes to a head inwardly and outwardly, in order that by

repentance or judgment it may be punished. Comp. Hengstenberg, *die Authentie des Pentateuchs*, II. p. 462 ff., on the hardening of Pharaoh. In Eph. iv. 19 it is said of the Gentiles, *ἐαυτοὺς παρέδωκαν τῇ ἀσελγείᾳ εἰς ἐργασίαν ἀκαθαρσίας πάσης*, which may easily be reconciled with *παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεός*. *Peccatum* is withal *poena peccati*. "The curse of an evil deed is, that it must continually bring forth evil."

—*ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν αὐτῶν*] is not to be made dependent on *παρέδωκεν* in such a way that it = *εἰς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας* or *ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις*, which might be vindicated grammatically as a Hebraistic construction; for ver. 26: *παρέδωκεν εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας*, and ver. 28: *παρέδωκεν εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν*, prove that in the present verse also *παρέδωκεν εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν* are to be joined together. Therefore *ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τ. κ. αὐτ.* is to be interpreted: *in the lusts of their hearts*, when in their hearts they had given themselves up to lusts; comp. *ἐν τῇ ὀρέξει αὐτῶν*, ver. 27. The admittance and encouragement of sinful lusts in their hearts, which followed inevitably from their apostasy from God and abandonment to creature-idolatry, is thus represented as their own act. On the other hand, the outbreak of these lusts in shameful vice is represented as a divine ordinance, a divine judgment.

—*εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν*] here specially, as in Gal. v. 19, Eph. iv. 19, etc., pollution by fleshly crimes, sensual impurity. This sense is made good by the following words:—*τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς*] Infinitive of purpose (not of result, as in Acts vii. 19), *in order that their bodies*, etc. That the divine intention is here made prominent is shown by ver. 26, where the *πάθη ἀτιμίας*, to which God abandoned them, resume the *ἀτιμάζεσθαι* of this verse. On this infinitive of purpose introduced by the article in the genitive, comp. Winer, p. 408. Among the numerous N. T. examples, comp. Acts xxvi. 18; Rom. vi. 6; 1 Cor. x. 13; Heb. x. 7. Or *τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι* might also be taken as the genitive of more exact definition depending on *ἀκαθαρσίαν*, as a designation of that in which the impurity consists = *impuritati, quae cernebatur in*, impurity in becoming dishonoured. *ποιεῖν* (ver. 28) also is the *epexegetical* infinitive. *Ἀτιμάζεσθαι* never occurs as middle, invariably as passive. So therefore here. This passive condition of being given up is likewise expressed by *πάθη ἀτιμίας*, ver. 26. The passive signification is here specially appropriate,

because in this way their vices are represented not as their own act, but as a divine judgment under which they lie. But if ἀτιμάζεσθαι is passive, not middle, then we must read αὐτῶν, not αὐτῶν. ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, not : *on themselves*, but = ἐν ἀλλήλοις, *on or among one another, reciprocally*. This—in the N. T. not infrequent—use of ἑαυτῶν for ἀλλήλων (comp. e.g. Mark x. 26 ; John xii. 19 ; 1 Thess. v. 13 ; Jude 20) is to be explained by the consideration that the persons are viewed as a single totality, and made to think, speak, act in reference to themselves, though this can only really come to pass through the reciprocal conduct of individuals to each other. At the same time, by ἐν ἑαυτοῖς here the penalty of shameful abuse of their bodies, inflicted on mankind for their apostasy from God, is pointed out as merited and *self-incurred*. This reciprocal abuse of their bodies is more precisely described vv. 26, 27. Accordingly, here already it is unnatural lust that is meant. The apostle strikingly lays emphasis above all on *this* vice, in which the correspondence between divine punishment and human sin is brought out with special clearness. They who had degraded the Lord God Himself beneath man to the image of a beast, are now themselves in turn fallen beneath the beast. “On deification of nature what is unnatural follows,” Besser. As matter of fact, the vice here alluded to is characteristically heathen, one too specially widespread in that age, one which in the entire circumference of Christendom in its most corrupt state occurred but sporadically, and was practised but by stealth, but was never palliated, still less approved by public opinion. Moreover, it is to be noted that the apostle here describes the prevalence of vice as the inevitable consequence of idolatry, to which the many licentious rites and festivals of heathendom bear emphatic witness. Vicious indulgence within the pale of the Christian church is *apostasy* from Christianity, and accordingly gains ground as apostasy and lapse into idolatry gain ground. On the other hand, vicious indulgence within the pale of heathendom is a *natural sequence* of idolatry. See the O. T. law against paederasty, Lev. xviii. 22, xx. 13 ; comp. 1 Cor. vi. 9 ; 1 Tim. i. 10.

Ver. 25. The reason of the divine judgment is once more brought forward, the contents of vv. 21–23 being summarised, and the διό, ver. 24, commented on. οἵτινες] *ut qui, quippe qui, as those who, whosoever*. The indefinite relative ὅστις, properly :

*qui*, scilicet *aliquis*, i.e. *aliquis qui*, characterizes the class to which some one belongs, and therefore serves to specify the reason.

—μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει] as to the construction, see on ver. 23. The compound μετήλλαξαν, *exchanged*, is more emphatic than the simple ἤλλαξαν, *changed*, ver. 23. The ἀλήθεια τοῦ θεοῦ might be understood, agreeably to ver. 18, of the truth relating to God, the true knowledge of God, θεοῦ being *genit. object.*, or, which ver. 19 favours, of the truth communicated by God Himself, in which case θεοῦ is *genit. auctoris*. But it seems preferable, for the sake of parallelism with ver. 23 (comp. ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ there), to interpret τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ, *the truth, the reality, the true nature of God*, in which case, as commonly, *abstract.* stands *pro concreto*, and τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ, as respects *sense*, is not really different from τὸν ἀληθινὸν θεόν (1 Thess. i. 9). Τὸ ψεῦδος then denotes τοὺς ψευδεῖς θεούς, as in Heb. also ἱεῖς, *lits.* serves to denote idols (Isa. xlv. 20 ; Jer. iii. 10, xiii. 25). As striking parallels, have been quoted from Philo, *De Vita Mosis*, the following passages : ὅσον ψεῦδος ἀνθ' ὅσης ἀληθείας ὑπηλλάξαντο. — οὐ τὸν ἀληθῆ θεὸν καταλιπόντες τοὺς ψευδωνύμους ἐδημιούργησαν, φθαρταῖς καὶ γενηταῖς οὐσίαις τὴν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου πρόσρησιν ἐπιφημίσαντες. “Pro Deo vero sumserunt imaginarios,” Grotius. Deeply stirred by the shamefulness of the thing, the apostle characterizes the guilt of idolatry still further in the words καὶ ἐσεβάσθησαν] i.e. τὴν κτίσιν. σεβάζεσθαι (in the N. T. an ἅπαξ λεγόμεν.), occurring in later Greek for σέβεσθαι (comp. Matt. xv. 9 ; Mark vii. 7 ; Acts xiii. 43, 50, etc.), refers to inward reverence of spirit, whereas καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει] refers to the outward service of God. Under κτίσις, properly, *creation* as an act (ver. 20 ; Mark xiii. 19), then the *creature*, as here, viii. 39, 2 Cor. v. 17, Gal. vi. 15, everything of a created nature is included,—gods in heaven represented in human shape, their material images, as well as beasts on earth.

—παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα] *more than the Creator, above the Creator*, yet not as if they had revered the Creator along with the creature, and only revered the latter more than the former ; for the apostle here describes an utter apostasy of heathenism from the true God. On the contrary, the preference of one to another implies the exclusion of the one put second, so that παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, as regards its *meaning*, is identical with *praeterito*

or *relicto creatore* (comp. xiv. 5 : ὃς μὲν κρίνει ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν, and Luke xiii. 2). The interpretation *contra creatorem*, in opposition to the Creator, is less appropriate, because the apostle, in his present exposition, pictures heathenism not as hostile opposition to God, but as an exchange of the true God for false gods, of the Creator for the creature.

—ὅς ἐστιν εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. Ἀμήν.] εὐλογητός, ἡγιός, often interchanged with εὐλογημένος, means : *praised*, not : *worthy of praise*, or : *to be praised* ; comp. Harless, *Comm. zum Eph.* p. 5. God is called, κατ' ἐξοχὴν : ὁ εὐλογητός (Mark xiv. 61). This is His unchanging title. He is and abides One who is praised, the Holy One of Israel, He that dwells amid the praises of Israel, though the Gentiles refuse Him this honour. Here we have a doxology to the Father in opposition to the idolatry of the Gentiles, in ch. ix. 5 a doxology to the Son in opposition to the rejection of Christ by the Jews.

Ver. 26. As ver. 25 recurs to ver. 23 in order to expand its contents, so does ver. 26 (and 27), coupling on to ver. 25, to ver. 24. διὰ τοῦτο] namely, ὅτι ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα. It resumes διό, ver. 24.

—εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας] as regards the sense = πάθη ἀτιμίζοντα. The genitive is *genit. qualitatis*. As the Gentiles had robbed God of τιμή, so He gave them up to ἀτιμία. ἐπιθυμία, having arrived at undisputed sway, brings forth πάθος, in which man is a helpless slave to ἐπιθυμία. πάθη ἀτιμίας then = *affectus ignominiosi*, shameful, i.e. shame-inflicting passions or lusts (Col. iii. 5 ; 1 Thess. iv. 5).

—αἱ τε γὰρ θήλειαι αὐτῶν] The expression θήλειαι, ἄρσενες is used, not γυναῖκες, ἄνδρες, because here the simple physical allusion to sex comes exclusively into view = their *females*, their *males*. The unnatural vice of the women is put first as the more shameful. "Pudorem praeposterum ii fere postulant," says Bengel, "qui pudicitia carent : Gravitas et ardor stili judicialis proprietate verborum non violat verecundiam." Nevertheless, the apostle from chaste reserve glides rapidly over the description in this as over that in the following verse. As to this so-called Lesbian vice of the women called τριβάδες, by Tertullian *frictrices*, comp. Lucian : ἐταιρικοὶ διάλογοι 5 : τοιαύτας γὰρ ἐν Λέσβῳ λέγουσι γυναῖκας, ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελούσας αὐτὸ πᾶσχειν, γυναιξὶ δὲ αὐτὰς πλησιαζούσας, ὥσπερ ἄνδρας, and : ἐγεννήθη



μὲν ὁμοία ταῖς ἄλλαις ὑμῖν ἡ γνώμη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶ μοι. Martial, *Epigr.* xc. 5 : "Mentiturque virum prodigiosa Venus."

—μετήλλαξαν] answering to μετήλλαξαν, ver. 25.

—τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν] as τῆς θηλείας is added, ver. 27, so here perhaps τοῦ ἄρσενος should be supplied. Or, even without addition, φυσικὴ χρῆσις may signify natural sexual intercourse.

—εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν] namely, χρῆσιν ἀλλήλων.

Ver. 27. ὁμοίως τε καὶ] Adequate critical authorities support the reading ὁμοίως δὲ καί, which Griesbach has approved and Lachmann received. Thus, no doubt, an anacoluthon arises, but a very slight and passable one, and one not uncommon in classical Greek: "For *both* their women—but *also* the men likewise burned." Ὅμοίως δὲ καί, ὡσαύτως δὲ καί is a form occurring with remarkable frequency in the N. T., and the anacoluthon hence arising might very easily induce the copyist to change δέ into τέ, or, as is done in some codices, omit it altogether. We must therefore read ὁμοίως δὲ καί, not ὁμοίως τε καί. If, moreover, with Meyer, we take τὲ γάρ, ver. 26, in the sense of *for—indeed*, the anacoluthon in this verse would vanish.

—οἱ ἄρρενες] The Ionic form ἄρσενες, read by some manuscripts here, is to be received, both because it is the one in almost invariable use in the N. T. and also for the sake of uniformity (comp. ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσι in the next clause).

—ἐξεκαύθησαν] stronger than the simple form, comp. πυροῦσθαι 1 Cor. vii. 9. Like the Latin *exardescere*, it is a not uncommon metaphor to denote the strength of passion, especially of *libido*, of *impotentia amoris*.

—ἐν τῇ ὁρέξει αὐτῶν] *in their lust*, conformably to the condition of sensual appetite in which they found themselves, comp. ver. 24 : ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν αὐτῶν.

—ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσι] This juxtaposition of words expresses a special emphasis.

—τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην] *the well-known*, or *the accustomed*, or *the definite shame* here meant. Hence the article. But shame stands here in the sense of shameful lust. Ἀσχημοσύνη, turpitude, opposite of εὐσχημοσύνη, xiii. 13. Κατεργάζεσθαι, *sensu bono*, v. 3, vii. 18, xv. 18 ; Phil. ii. 12 ; *sensu malo*, as here, ii. 9, vii. 8, 13, 15, 17, 20 ; in a neutral sense, 2 Cor. vii. 10, according to

the *lect. rec.* signifies, in distinction from the simple ἐργάζεσθαι, like the Latin *perpetrare*, to bring to pass, to perform, to accomplish.

—καὶ τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν] This retribution consisted in the very κατεργάζεσθαι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην, in being given up to πάθη ἀτιμίας, not at all merely in the fatal consequences of sensual sins; for the *peccatum* here characterized, as the entire exposition from ver. 24 onward evinces, is itself conceived as *poena peccati*, ἀντιμισθία.

—ἦν ἔδει] *sc.* αὐτοὺς ἀπολαβεῖν, which was inevitable, which was due to them, namely, according to the order of God's punitive justice, such as is intimated, vv. 24, 26, 28, in διὸ παρέδωκεν.

—τῆς πλάνης αὐτῶν] This aberration is depicted vv. 21–23. It consists in idolatry.

—ἐν ἑαυτοῖς] as in ver. 24 = ἐν ἀλλήλοις, but with the same reflexive emphasis as there. The reciprocal instruments of lust are now reciprocal instruments of punishment. The vice described in this verse was especially prevalent in that age, as many passages of ancient writers testify. With incredible shamelessness, offensive even in such an age, was it practised by Nero, as Suetonius relates, *Ner. cc. 28, 29*: “Puerum Sporum, exsectis testibus, etiam in muliebrem naturam transfigurare conatus, cum dote et flammeo per solennia nuptiarum celeberrimo officio deductum ad se, pro uxore habuit.” And: “Suam quidem pudicitiam usque adeo prostituit, ut contaminatis paene omnibus membris novissime quasi genus lusus excogitaret: quo, ferae pelle contextus, emitteretur e cavea, virorumque ac feminarum, ad stipitem deligatorum, inguina invaderet: et cum affatim desaevisset, conficeretur a Doryphoro liberto: cui etiam, sicut ipsi Sporus, ita ipse denupsit, voces quoque et ejulatus vim patientium virginum imitatus.”

As a punishment for their apostasy, God gave them up, not merely to unnatural sensuality, which Paul first of all adduced as a sin as abnormal as it is enormous, as the culminating point of specifically heathen sin, but also to all other vices which are now given in detail, vv. 28–32. “Quia unum hactenus specimen illud execrabile proposuit,” says Calvin, “quod vulgare quidem inter multos, non tamen omnium commune erat, hic incipit enumerare vitia, quorum nemo immunis reperiatur. Nam etsi in singulis non simul emineant omnia, sunt tamen alicujus ex illis conscii sibi omnes: ut pro se quisque argui possit non obscurae pravitatis.” Herewith must be borne in mind the canon of

James: "Ὅστις γὰρ ὅλον τὸν νόμον τηρήσει, πταισεί δὲ ἐν ἐνί, γέγονε πάντων ἔνοχος, ii. 10. Melanchthon's words are also worthy of note: "Accusat autem utrosque, videlicet hos, qui externa delicta habuerunt, et illos, qui etsi non habuerunt externa delicta, tamen habent immunda corda et conscientia idololatriæ aut aliis peccatis. Ita in prædicatione poenitentiae legem interpretamur, ut intelligatur, non solum argui externa delicta, sed præcipue immunditiem et impietatem cordium."

Ver. 28. καί] couples on a new element in the exposition, the enumeration of all other heathen vices.

—καθώς] not: *because*, but: *quæ ad nodum, just as*. The punishment corresponds to the guilt.

—οὐκ ἔδοκίμασαν] *they thought not fit, non operæ pretium duxerunt*. Δοκιμάζειν in the first place: *to prove, test*, then: *to approve, deem fit*, 1 Cor. xvi. 3; 1 Thess. ii. 4.

—τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει] ἐπίγνωσις is *plena et accurata cognitio* (*Erkenntniss*), complete and accurate knowledge, in distinction from γνῶσις (*Kenntniss*), knowledge. But ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει is not = ἐπιγινώσκειν, but signifies: *to have* God in complete knowledge, in the sense of *to retain, hold fast*; Deum in accurata cognitione habere, i.e. tenere, comp. Jas. ii. 1, in contrast with κατέχειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ, ver. 18. The Gentiles had known God, ver. 21, but had wilfully fallen away to idols, ver. 22 f., and thus forfeited correct knowledge of God.

—εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν] Paronomasia on ἔδοκίμασαν: "they deemed not *worthy*—an *unworthy*, base, worthless mind. ἀδόκιμος from δέχομαι, *unacceptable, reprobate*. This is its exclusive and invariable meaning (1 Cor. ix. 27; 2 Cor. xiii. 5; 2 Tim. iii. 8; Tit. i. 16). The active sense: "qui judicare nequit, judicii expers," can only be arbitrarily supposed, for ἀδόκιμος does not come from δοκιμάζειν. Not only the paronomasia, but also the repetition of ὁ θεός, lays stress on the correspondence of the retribution. As to νοῦς, comp. Delitzsch, *Bibl. Psych.* p. 212: "That by virtue of which man thinks and determines himself, the thinking and willing faculty in him, is νοῦς." In ver. 20 the element of theoretical knowledge dominates, here that of practical will; so that νοῦς, as frequently, = mind, disposition.

—ποιεῖν] epexegetical infinitive.

—τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα] We must not here introduce the distinction of the Stoics, according to which τὸ καθήκον denotes *officium*

*medium, commune*, while τὸ κατόρθωμα denotes *officium perfectum*, comp. Cic. *de Off.* i. 3; so that the meaning would be: the Gentiles had not even discharged *common duties*. Apart from the irrelevance of such a foisting in of special philosophical school-distinctions, particularly in a description quite general in form, it must manifestly in this case have been said: μηδὲ ποιεῖν τὰ καθήκοντα. τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα are *indecora, inhonesta*, *that which is unseemly, unbecoming*. The subjective negation (μή) is occasioned by the infinitive construction, “*facere quae (si quae) essent indecora*,” 1 Tim. v. 13. On the other hand, Eph. v. 4: τὰ οὐκ ἀνήκοντα = ἃ οὐκ ἀνήκεν, comp. Winer, pp. 603, 610.

Ver. 29. πεπληρωμένους πάσῃ ἀδικίᾳ] The accusative πεπληρ., like the following μεστούς, ψιθυριστάς κτλ., joins on to the subject which has to be supplied to the infinitive ποιεῖν. ἀδικία is the generic conception which comprehends under it all the following vices as its species. πληροῦν with the dative (instrum.) again, 2 Cor. vii. 4, in the classics also, elsewhere in the N. T. *c. genit.*, Luke ii. 40; Acts ii. 28, v. 28, xiii. 52; Rom. xv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 4; also πληροῦσθαι ἔκ τινος, John xii. 3; ἐν τινι, Eph. v. 18; τι, Col. i. 9.

—πορνείᾳ] apparently, according to the evidence of weighty critical authorities, some of whom omit, some transpose it, to be erased as unauthentic. Criticism on *internal* grounds gives here but a doubtful judgment. Having depicted the sin of unnatural lust, Paul may next have commenced his *catalogus vitiorum* with the mention of common πορνεία; but, on the other hand, copyists, missing this *vitium*, may also have inserted it in the text. Supposing it omitted, there is no reason for thinking its absence strange, seeing that, as is self-evident, common πορνεία certainly exists where the uncommon form is so widely prevalent; but again the inclusion of πονηρία in ἀδικία is in any case easy and undisputed.

—πονηρία, πλεονεξία, κακία] The order of words varies in manuscripts, versions, and quotations by the Fathers. The most probable arrangement is the one which Lachmann follows on good authority: ἀδικία, κακία, πονηρία, πλεονεξία, because then the first three conceptions form a related series, and between the first and second words on one side (ἀδικία, κακία), and the third and fourth on the other (πονηρία, πλεονεξία), a sort of assonance finds place. κακία, *viciousness, vitiositas*; opposite of ἀρετή, Eph.

iv. 31; Col. iii. 8; Tit. iii. 3. *πονηρία*, *malignity*, *malitia*, malice, Matt. v. 45, vii. 11; Acts iii. 26. The same order is found 1 Cor. v. 8. *πλεονεξία*, *covetousness*, as the outcome of *κακία* and *πονηρία*, ready to inflict injury on another, to rob him of his goods.

—*μεστοὺς φθόνου, φόνου, ἔριδος, δόλου, κακοηθείας*] Upon the enumeration of forms of wickedness in general follows that of special offences. On *πεπληρωμένους* and *μεστούς*, comp. Seneca, *de Ira*, ii. 8, who introduces his picture of the sinful corruption of that age with the words: "Omnia sceleribus ac vitiis plena sunt." *φθόνου, φόνου* are joined together for the sake of rhythm, Gal. v. 21. *μεστός φόνου* is one who is ever brooding upon murder, who is filled with murderous thoughts, *φόνον μερμηρίζων*, Hom. *Od.* xix. 2; *κακοηθεία* in the N. T. an ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, opposite of *εὐηθεία* = *maliciousness*, *malicious craft*. According to others = *a malignant nature*, respecting which Aristotle says (*Rhet.* ii. 13): ἔστι γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολάμβανειν πάντα. From *ἔρις*, as from *φθόνος*, *φόνος* easily results, like *δόλος* from *κακοηθεία*. All these trespasses are the outflow of a heart embittered against one's neighbour.

Ver. 30. *ψιθυριστάς*] *susurronee*, *whisperers*, *secret slanderers*.

—*καταλάλους*] to speak evil of some one, *to slander in general*.

—*θεοστυγεῖς*] in accordance with established and invariable usage only in the passive meaning: *God-hated*, i.e. *abandoned transgressors*. It stands not inaptly before *ὑβριστάς* and *ὑπερηφάνους*, for man's *ὑβρις* and *ὑπερηφανεῖα* especially attract the ἔχθρα θεοῦ. Comp. 1 Pet. v. 5: ὁ θεὸς ὑπερηφάνους ἀντιτάσσεται, and 1 Tim. i. 13, where Paul calls himself τὸν πρότερον ὄντα βλάσφημον καὶ διώκτην καὶ ὑβριστήν. Of the Jews, as such *ὑβρισταῖς*, it is said, 1 Thess. ii. 15, they are θεῷ μὴ ἀρέσκοντες. Comp. further Jas. iv. 6; Luke i. 51 f. The Vulgate also renders in this passage: "Deo odibiles." The active meaning: "*Dei osiores*," is, indeed, found along with the passive in *θεομισῆς*, although even this is somewhat disputed; but in the case of *θεοστυγῆς* it is altogether without proof. The active would, indeed, have this advantage, that thus a *specific* offence would be adduced in the series of *specific* sins; but with this disadvantage, that in the present catalogue of sins there is no other instance of a trespass against *God*. On the contrary, in this catalogue merely the consequences of the ungodliness previously described

are depicted. We have here a detailed list of sins against the second table as consequences of sins against the first.

—*ὑβριστὰς, ὑπερήφάνους, ἀλαζόνας*] divers forms of *superbia*. The *ὑβριστής* in his arrogance actually subjects others to insolent treatment. The *ὑπερήφανος*, in self-complacent conceit of his own excellences, looks down on them with scorn (*ἡ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν αὐτοῦ καταφρόνησις* is the description of Theophr. *Charact.* 34). The *ἀλαζών, vaniloquus, gloriosus*, brags of his own, for the most part imaginary excellence, without directly ill-treating or despising others. Therefore: *insolent, haughty, braggarts*. In 2 Tim. iii. 2 also *ἀλαζόνες* and *ὑπερήφανοι* are placed together.

—*ἐφευρετὰς κακῶν*] Expositors quote Tac. *Ann.* iv. 11: "Sejanus . . . facinorum repertor;" Virg. *Aen.* ii. 161: "scele-rumque inventor Ulixes;" and 2 Macc. vii. 31, where Antiochus Epiphanes is called *πάσης κακίας εὐρετής*. Such inventive genius in villany denotes a peculiarly high degree of wickedness.

—*γονεύσιν ἀπειθεῖς*] 2 Tim. iii. 2. The sin against the first commandment with promise (Eph. vi. 2), a commandment written in the heart even of the Gentiles.

Ver. 31. *ἀσυνέτους*] probably inserted simply for the sake of the paronomasia with the following *ἀσυνθέτους*. *Ἀσύνετος* is one without *σύνεσις*, חֲנֹף (Isa. xxix. 14), one who both in what he does and leaves undone is not guided by intelligent conviction, Luther's "Mr. Unreason going head foremost" (*Hans Unvernunft, mit dem Kopf hindurch*), comp. Eccclus. xv. 7.

—*ἀσυνθέτους*] *covenant-breakers* or *unsociable*. The last meaning seems here preferable, because it stands in natural association with the three following notions—*ἀστόργους, without affection*; *ἀσπόνδους, implacable*; *ἀνελεήμονας, unmerciful*. Still, without doubt, in *ἀσυνθέτους* the meaning *covenant-breakers* is better borne out by usage than the meaning *unsociable*. *Ἀσπόνδους* omitted by Lachmann, according to important and numerous authorities, is at least to be deemed critically doubtful. It may have been transferred here from 2 Tim. iii. 3.

The above enumeration of different offences, which were current among the Gentiles, is nowise arranged in strictly systematic order. Still there is found in it, as we have seen, a gradual progress from the general to the special, a manifold interweaving of related ideas, as well as some combinations suggested by verbal rhythm. The crime of positive ungodliness and sinful sensual

lust is specified, for the reasons already stated. The entire series of sins named in these verses rests either upon perverted self-love or upon the want of right love of one's neighbour. Similar catalogues of sin are found 2 Cor. xii. 20; Gal. v. 19-21; Eph. v. 3, 4; 1 Tim. i. 9, 10; 2 Tim. iii. 2-4. The accidental order of the arrangement intimates that all sins, which can ever occur to one's mind, are mutually related. It is, as it were, the opening of a sackful of sins, when it is all accident how the single grains fall out.

Ver. 32. Justly has Reiche, in the *Comm. Crit. in N. T.* tom. I. p. 1 ff., vindicated the *lectio recepta* of this verse against the manifold variants. οὔτινες] comp. on ver. 25 = τοιούτους τινὰς οἷ, tales homines qui.

—τὸ δικάϊωμα τοῦ θεοῦ] i.e. τὸ δεδικαιωμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, the judicial decree of God, *lex, decretum, statutum Dei* (Luke i. 6; Rom. ii. 26, viii. 4; Rev. xv. 4). The LXX. render ρῆ, ῥῥῥ, מִצְוָה, מִשְׁפָּט, מִשְׁפָּטִים, פְּקָדִים, by δικάϊωμα, δικαιώματα.

—ἐπιγινόντες] they knew, knew perfectly, see on ver. 28. This knowledge was communicated to them through the law of conscience (ii. 14 f.). Just as the darkness of idolatry was rebuked by the light of the knowledge of God implanted by nature, so the natural consciousness of the moral law passed sentence of condemnation on the transgressions of heathenism. Comp. *Formula Concordiae Sol. Decl.* II. p. 657: "Humana ratio seu naturalis intellectus hominis obscuram aliquam notitiae illius scintillulam reliquam habet, quod sit Deus, et particulam aliquam legis tenet (Rom. i. 19 sqq.)." See an example of the Gentiles' knowledge as to the divine Δίκη, Acts xxviii. 4.

—ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πρῶσσοντες ἄξιοι θανάτου εἰσίν] is enclosed in brackets without reason. It gives the contents of the divine δικάϊωμα. That bodily death is the wages of sin was unknown to heathenism, as well as that for the least of the offences mentioned by the apostle the penalty of death is decreed (although the Draconian legislation placed itself at this absolute standpoint). But heathenism had a general knowledge of their criminality, as well as of the future retribution awaiting the evil-doer. This doctrine was involved in the heathen myth of Hades and its punishments. Comp. Aesch. *Eumen.* v. 259-265:

Ὅφει δὲ κεῖ τις ἄλλον ἥλιτεν βροτῶν,  
Ἥ θεὸν ἢ ξένον τιν' ἀσεβῶν,

Ἡ τοκέας φίλους,  
 ἔχονθ' ἕκαστον τῆς δίκης ἐπάξια.  
 Μέγας γὰρ Αἰῶς ἐστὶν εὐθινοῦς βροτῶν,  
 Ἐνερθε χθονὸς,  
 Δελτογράφῳ δὲ πάντ' ἐπωπᾶ φρενί.

Accordingly *θάνατος* is to be interpreted of the *mors aeterna* inflicted by God's punitive justice on the sins of men (ii. 8, 9, vi. 16, 21, 23, viii. 13).

—οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ ποιοῦσι] which might have found comparative justification in the allurements of evil desire, rashness, and the like, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνενδοκοῦσι τοῖς πράσσουσι] wherein is exhibited the highest degree of inexcusable depravity. Here is found personal delight in evil without personal temptation to it. *συνενδοκεῖν*, to give *consent*, Luke xi. 48; Acts viii. 1. Such consent consists partly in inward delight, partly in approval by word. The theoretical defence of paederasty, revenge, and similar things, to be found in the writings of the heathen, is included here. "Pejus est *συνενδοκεῖν*; nam qui malum patrat, sua sibi cupiditate abducitur, etc.; sed qui *συνενδοκεῖ*, corde et ore, malitiae fructum habet ipsam malitiam, eaque pascitur, et suum reatum alieno cumulat, aliosque in peccando inflammat. Pejor est, qui et se et alios, quam qui se unum perimit," Bengel. *πράσσειν*, to *pursue*, *practise*, is stronger than *ποιεῖν*, to *do*; comp. ii. 3, vii. 15, xiii. 4, and in John iii. 20 f. the antithesis of ὁ φαῦλα πράσσων and ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. But the fact that the apostle in this verse describes the offences which he himself represents as the punishment of idolatry, as at the same time crimes worthy of death, shows that the ἀποκάλυψις ὀργῆς, spoken of ver. 18, cannot consist in the Gentiles being abandoned to those offences, but, as observed, is to be contemplated as a positive revelation of wrath whose final consummation is still future. Further, if the ὀργή is to be revealed not only against ἀσέβεια, but also against ἀδικία, it cannot be exhaustively manifested in surrender to ἀδικία itself. The order in which Gentile abominations are here treated is found also in Tit. ii. 12. Idolatry offends against the εὐσεβῶς, unnatural lust against the σωφρόνως, and the remaining offences against the δικαίως ζῆν there spoken of.



## CHAPTER II.

VER. 1. Διό] namely, because thou knowest the δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ, that they who do such things are worthy of death (i. 32). The ἀναπολόγητον εἶναι (i. 20) also is based upon conscious sinning against better knowledge. It is not so much the act of judging simply that renders inexcusable, as judging in another the sin that one himself commits, as is further explained in this verse.

—ὦ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων] That the apostle here has the Jews already in view, is evinced by the tenor and connection of the entire chapter (comp. especially, vv. 13, 17). He does not say at the outset ὦ Ἰουδαῖε, but uses the general, yet reproachful form of address, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, answering to ἀνθρώπων, i. 18. The Jews must have felt convinced in their own conscience that they were pointed at here, for κρίνειν was just their specific national sin. The arrow struck home all the more surely, as they could not help pressing it into their heart with their own hand. The Jews, presuming on their possession of the law and their holiness of works, condemned the Gentiles who were sunk in idolatry and gross outward sins. They called them ὁ ἔθνος ἁμαρτωλούς, ἔθνος ἁμαρτωλῶν, Tob. xiii. 6; Gal. ii. 15. This passion on the part of the Jews for condemning others gives the apostle an excellent vantage-ground for the judgment that he has to pass upon them. κρίνειν here denotes an unauthorized, merciless judging, as in Matt. vii. 1; Jas. iv. 11.

—ἐν ᾧ] neither instrumental: *co quod* = *by this, that*, still less temporal: *co tempore quo*, but: *in qua re, wherein*, in what thing, in what point (xiv. 22), corresponding to τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πράσσεις. On τὰ αὐτά comp. vv. 17–24. However the sins of Jews and Gentiles differed in form of manifestation, their nature was the same. The final word of the verse

—ὁ κρίνων] has a certain emphatic keenness of edge, which is altogether lost in the less attested-reading ἃ κρίνεις, after which the Vulgate and Luther translate.

Ver. 2. οἶδαμεν δέ] *But we know, i.e. but it is certain, known.* The persons who know are not the Jews specially, but men in general.

—κατὰ ἀλήθειαν] *in conformity with the rule of truth, οὐ γάρ ἐστι προσωποληψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*, ver. 11. This proposition: But we know that the divine judgment without respect of person is passed (ἐστὶν ἐπὶ, Acts iv. 33), in accordance with the rule and requirement of truth and righteousness, upon those that are guilty of such heathen abominations, prepares the way for what follows, that therefore the Jew, guilty of the same, cannot cherish the hope, on the ground of his being Abraham's seed and no Gentile, of escaping this divine judgment; for this were *παρὰ ἀλήθειαν*, not *κατὰ ἀλήθειαν*.

Ver. 3. λογίζῃ δέ] but fanciest thou in spite of this, although God, as we know, judges according to truth? etc. *λογίζεσθαι*, from *λόγος*, *computatio*, calculation = to make a calculation, *calculos subducere*. But the calculation may be right or wrong. Hence *λογίζεσθαι*, *censere*, to judge, or *opinari*, to suppose, fancy (xiv. 14; 2 Cor. x. 2). Here the latter, as it is the false confidence of the Jews that is combated.

—τοῦτο] namely, ὅτι σὺ ἐκφύξῃ κτλ. *τοῦτο*, like the Latin *hoc*, points emphatically to what follows (Acts xx. 29; 2 Cor. x. 11).

—σύ] with emphasis: *thou* above others, *thou* as a Jew. Strikingly has the Rabbinical saying been quoted: רַבִּי הָיָה שֶׁלֹא יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ הִיגְבִּיל. All Israel has part in the *αἰὼν μέλλων*. Comp. John the Baptist's rebuke of the Pharisaic Jews (Matt. iii. 7–9; Luke iii. 7, 8).

—ἐκφύξῃ] *φεύγει*, *fugit reus omnis*: *ἐκφεύγει*, *effugit*, *qui absoluitur*, says Bengel. But here the question is not so much of absolution as rather of imagined exemption from the divine judgment.

—Ver. 4. ἤ] puts another case. Thinkest thou, presuming on thy high descent and thy possession of the law, that thou wilt escape judgment; or (ἤ), relying on God's forbearances hitherto, despisest thou His goodness that leads thee to repentance, dreaming forsooth that temporary security is a pledge of final impunity? Thus misjudging and making light of the holy purpose of the divine goodness, thou slumberest in dangerous security in sin, instead of rousing thyself to saving repentance.

—τοῦ πλούτου] common with Paul as a designation of the abundance and vastness of the divine glory, goodness, and grace (ix. 23, xi. 33 ; Eph. i. 7, ii. 7, iii. 16 ; Phil. iv. 19 ; Col. i. 27). By the substantive *πλοῦτος*, the idea of the fulness of the divine goodness is made to stand out with more independence and impressiveness than by the adjectival designation *χρηστότης πλουσία*.

—τῆς χρηστότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνοχῆς καὶ τῆς μακροθυμίας] is intended to set forth exhaustively the comprehensiveness of the divine goodness (Ex. xxxiv. 6). *χρηστότης*, *goodness*, makes itself known in imparting benefits (Luke vi. 35 ; Rom. xi. 22 ; Eph. ii. 7 ; Tit. iii. 4). *ἀνοχή*, for which one codex reads *ἀναβολή* as a marginal gloss, *patience*, *indulgence*, in the N. T. only again iii. 25 (from *ἀνέχεσθαι*, to hold oneself aloft, hold oneself erect, hold out, endure), bears wrong in hope of improvement, instead of at once prosecuting one's right. The synonym *μακροθυμία*, *long-suffering*, the Heb. מְסִיחַ דָּם, is the opposite of *ὀξύθυμία*, and denotes the gentleness that does not in instant wrath avenge wrong-doing (Jas. i. 19 : *βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν*), but delays punishment, and thus affords the sinner space for repentance (ix. 22 ; Matt. xviii. 26, 29). As here we find *ἀνοχή καὶ μακροθυμία* combined in order to exhaust a single idea, so in Col. i. 11 *ὑπομονὴ καὶ μακροθυμία* ; Jas. v. 10 *κακοπαθεία καὶ μακροθυμία* ; comp. also Eph. iv. 2 : *μετὰ μακροθυμίας ἀνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων*.

—καταφρονεῖς] The divine goodness is despised, when, not caring for its purpose, one is led by it to wanton sin instead of to repentance (Ecclus. v. 4—9).

—ἀγνοῶν] not = not being willing to know, but = not knowing. Certainly this meaning readily glides into the other : not considering, *non reputans*, *non considerans*, for what I do not consider I do not know at the moment when I do not consider it, Acts xxiii. 5 : *οὐκ ᾔδειν* = I knew not at the moment, *i.e.* I considered not. Mark ix. 32 ; Luke ix. 45 : *ἀγνοεῖν τὸ ῥῆμα*, *not to know the saying* = not to know *its import*, *its meaning* = *not to understand*. But even in these passages *ἀγνοεῖν* at bottom retains its primary import, *not to know*, although this, in accordance even with the mode of expression current among us, may properly interchange with the other, *not to consider*, *not to understand*. In the present passage there is no need to depart from the radical meaning. The ignorance here spoken of as self-incurred is also guilty ignor-

ance. But this guilty ignorance of the purpose of divine grace leads to a despising of that grace in actual fact. "Miratur Paulus hanc ignorantiam," Bengel.

—τὸ χρηστόν] = ἡ χρηστότης, comp. τὸ δυνατόν, ix. 22.

—εἰς μετάνοιαν] μετάνοια, *change of mind*, consists both in an inward turning away from unrighteousness (hence μετάν. ἀπὸ ἔργων νεκρῶν, Heb. vi. 1; comp. μετανοεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας, Acts viii. 22; μετανοεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, Rev. ii. 22), and in an inward turning to righteousness (hence ἡ εἰς τὸν θεὸν μετάνοια, Acts xx. 21; comp. μετανοήσατε καὶ ἐπιστρέψατε, Acts iii. 19; μετανοεῖν καὶ ἐπιστρέφειν ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, Acts xxvi. 20). From this inward act follow next ἔργα ἄξια τῆς μετανοίας, *ibid.*; καρποὶ ἄξιοι τῆς μετανοίας (Luke iii. 8). But such a μετάνοια is εἰς ζωὴν, Acts xi. 18; εἰς σωτηρίαν, 2 Cor. vii. 10.

—ἄγει] *guides, leads*, not *de conatu*: *it would lead*. Paul speaks of the very act of leading, whose objective reality is not done away by the subjective resistance of man. "Ducit suaviter, non cogit necessitate," says Bengel. With the purport of this verse comp. 2 Pet. iii. 9. At the same time there is involved a refutation of the doctrine of predestination; for it is expressly asserted that even they should and could repent on whom κατάκριμα will one day fall. Their condemnation, therefore, is not predestinated *absoluto decreto*, comp. ver. 5.

Ver. 5. The goodness of God leads thee to repentance, but thou by thy impenitence heapest up to thyself wrath. κατά] *pro, according to, by virtue of*.

—ἀμετανόητος] in an active sense: that cannot grieve, that is inaccessible to repentance, contrast with εἰς μετάνοιαν σε ἄγει, ver. 4.

—θησαυρίζεις] instead of πλοῦτος τῆς χρηστότητος, thou gatherest for thyself a θησαυρὸς ὀργῆς, comp. Deut. xxxii. 32–35, and LXX. Prov. i. 18: θησαυρίζουσιν ἑαυτοῖς κακά.

—σεαυτῷ] *for thyself, to thy own ruin*.

—ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς] either to be joined closely with ὀργήν: wrath on the day of wrath, *i.e.* wrath that breaks forth on the day of wrath, Winer, p. 519, or to be connected with θησαυρίζεις, so that a brevilocuence, common in Greek, occurs, and we must interpret accordingly: thou heapest up wrath εἰς ἡμέραν ὀργῆς, so that it bursts forth ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς, comp. Matt. x. 15; Luke xxiii. 42; Jas. v. 3: ὡς πῦρ ἐθησαυρίσατε ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις. Verbs of motion, construed with ἐν, "indicate at the same time the

result of the motion, that is *rest*," Winer, p. 514. On account of the close succession and repetition of ὀργῆς after ὀργήν, the first connection is more emphatic. "Δεινότης, sermonis magna vi," remarks Bengel. The ἡμέρα ὀργῆς is called הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה, Zeph. ii. 2, 3; הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה, Ezek. xxii. 24; also briefly הַיּוֹם, Ezek. xiii. 5; Joel i. 15. In the N. T. it is revealed that this day is deferred till the return of the Messiah (1 Thess. i. 10; 2 Thess. i. 6-10; Rev. vi. 17).

—καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως καὶ δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ] Lachmann, on the evidence of the older uncials, reads καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ. But this looks like an explanatory gloss upon the more difficult καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως καὶ δικαιοκρισίας τ. θ., whereas for the interpolation of καί, if it were originally absent, there was no sufficient reason. The accumulation of genitives cannot be accepted as such a reason, none of them being superfluous, and the sentence remaining clear and intelligible. Besides, by the co-ordination of the three substantives ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως καὶ δικαιοκρισίας the language becomes more stately, befitting a delineation of the judgment-day.<sup>1</sup> But then ἀποκάλυψις cannot of itself be the ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, because in that case Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ must have been appended (1 Cor. i. 7, 8; 2 Thess. i. 7; 1 Pet. i. 7, 13; Rev. i. 1). The object revealed, then, is either the shameful deeds or thoughts of men hitherto concealed (ver. 16), or, which is preferable, and to which the glossarial reading points, God's δικαιοκρισία itself, which was hitherto, as ver. 14 intimates (comp. i. 18), hidden from men.

Ver. 6. ὃς ἀποδώσει ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ] this will take place, as the context indicates, ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως καὶ δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ. The apostle thus speaks, not in the way of abstract hypothesis, but of concrete assertion. He speaks not from the standpoint of the law, that has been abolished by the gospel, but from the standpoint of the law in so far as it has been ratified by the gospel (iii. 31). He says not what God would do were He to proceed in accordance with the primal rule and standard of the law, but what, proceeding according to that rule, He will actually do. καθ' ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ also, ver. 7, alludes to the holy conflict actually going on, which is to be crowned with ζωὴ αἰώνιος. It cannot be said, "the general sense required the specific Christian rule to be put entirely

<sup>1</sup> Reiche also, *Comm. Crit. in N. T.* tom. I. pp. 13-16, defends the reading accepted by us as correct.

out of view, and only the universal one to be brought forward, because the universal *necessity* of justification by faith is first to be established, iii. 23 ff.;" for, to say nothing of the fact that already (ver. 16) Jesus Christ is named as the judge, already also (vv. 28, 29) ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαίῳ and περιτομή καρδίας ἐν πνεύματι are spoken of, where yet we shall not be willing to concede that the apostle speaks only of what was to be, not of what may be and even actually is. Nay, this περιτομή καρδίας was already known to believers of the old covenant, for they did such ἔργα ἀγαθὰ as are referred to in this passage. That the doctrine, God will as matter of fact give to every one according to his works, contradicts neither the biblical doctrine of salvation in general, nor the Pauline doctrine of justification in particular, is made clear by many declarations of Scripture, not only of the O. but also of the N. T. (even of Paul himself), which plainly and incontestably embody this truth. Comp. LXX. Ps. lxii. 12 : ὅτι σὺ ἀποδώσεις ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ; Prov. xxiv. 12 : ὃς ἀποδίδωσι ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ; Matt. xvi. 27 : μέλλει γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔρχεσθαι ἐν τῇ δόξῃ κτλ., καὶ τότε ἀποδώσει ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν αὐτοῦ; xxv. 31-46; 2 Cor. v. 10 : τοὺς γὰρ πάντας ἡμᾶς φανερωθῆναι δεῖ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ βήματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα κομίσηται ἕκαστος τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, πρὸς ᾧ ἔπραξεν, εἴτε ἀγαθόν, εἴτε κακόν; Gal. vi. 7-9; Eph. vi. 6, 8; Col. iii. 24; Rev. ii. 23 : καὶ δώσω ὑμῖν ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα ὑμῶν; xx. 12 : καὶ ἐκρίθησαν οἱ νεκροί . . . κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, xxii. 12. Protestant exegetes accordingly acknowledge that the present passage also may be referred to the good works of the regenerate. "Paul," says Melancthon, "non tribuit justificationem operibus, sed describit justos a posteriori, hoc est a fructibus, quales sint." Calov remarks : "Secundum opera fiet ἀπόδοσις, non vero secundum merita operum, nec propter opera. Cum retributurum Deum secundum opera dicit (apostolus), recte utique contra Pontificios observant nostrates, aliud esse secundum opera, id est, secundum testimonium operum, aliud vero propter opera, id est propter meritum operum aliquid reddere. Recte etiam notant, nusquam dici διὰ τὰ ἔργα propter opera, sed κατὰ τὰ ἔργα secundum opera : quia opera erunt quidem manifesta δικαιοκρισίας regula, non autem proportionata meritorum norma. Nec minus observatur probe a nostris, quod S. S. non utatur verbo ἀντιδόσεως, quod ad mercedem proprie dictam quadam specie trahi posset, sed

ἀποδόσεως, quod *generale* est, ac tum etiam locum habet, cum Deus ex gratia non merita nostra, sed sua dona coronat." Comp. Joh. Gerhard, *loc. theol.* l. xviii. c. viii. *de meritis bonorum operum*, § 115 f.: "Ex fide bene operamur et nos Christo vere insitos esse demonstramus; in iisdem operibus, tanquam in via, ad ultimam vitae aeternae possessionem ambulantes, eandem ex gratia per fidem tandem consequimur: quo sensu illud ζητεῖν τὴν δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν καθ' ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ accipiendum erit, si ad renatos transferatur, sicque bona opera erunt *via regni*, non *causa regnandi*, ut Bernhardus loquitur." Nevertheless, in order perhaps more easily to dispose of the Catholic doctrine of merit, they did not hold firmly by this—in our opinion correct—view, but maintained that Paul speaks here only more *legis*, that we have here only a *sententia legalis* which receives its correction from the doctrine of grace in the gospel. Melancthon early gave the preference to this view, and the rest of the Lutheran exegetes followed him, as well as most modern expositors of the epistle. But when one of the latter goes so far as to broach the opinion that Paul forgets and contradicts himself, ascribing here, in opposition to his doctrine of justification, to righteousness of character, such as man is able by his own strength to manifest, what elsewhere he ascribes only to the righteousness of faith,—or even that by the side of the *via regia*, which is *per fidem*, he marks out also a *semita* which conducts some Jews and Gentiles to salvation *per honestatem*, then indeed such an assertion, in presence of a Roman epistle, does not deserve a serious reply. The interpretation advocated by us is held, without any wavering in favour of the other, by Calvin. "Porro," he says, "in hac sententia non tantum est difficultatis quantum vulgo putatur. Reprobtorum enim malitiam justa ultione si puniet Dominus, rependet illis quod meriti sunt. Rursum quia sanctificat, quos olim statuit glorificari, in illis quoque bona opera coronabit, sed non pro merito. Neque id evincetur ex hac sententia, quae tametsi praedicat, quam mercedem habitura sint bona opera, nequaquam tamen, quid valeant, vel quid debeatur illis pretii, pronunciat. Stulta autem consequentia est, ex mercede statuere meritum." Strikingly is the latter point illustrated by the *Apologie*, art. iii. ed. Müller, p. 148: "But Scripture calls eternal life a reward; not that God is bound to give eternal life in return for works, but that eternal life being given on other grounds, nevertheless our works and

trials are recompensed with it, although the treasure is so great that God could not owe it us in return for our works. Just as when the inheritance or all the means of a father are given to a son, and are a rich recompense and reward of his obedience, while nevertheless he receives not the inheritance on account of his merit, but the father bestows it on him as a father. Hence it is reason enough for eternal life being called a reward, that by it the evils we suffer and the works of love we do are recompensed, although it is not thereby merited. For recompense is of two kinds, one that is due, another that is not due. As when the emperor confers an estate on a servant, the servant's toil is thereby recompensed, and yet the toil does not merit the estate, but the servant owns that it is a free gift. God, then, does not owe us eternal life; but nevertheless when He gives it to believers for Christ's sake, our suffering and work are thereby recompensed." Good works of themselves establish no *meritum*, but come into view in the judgment merely as *signa et testimonia fidei justificantis et salvantis propter meritum Christi*. More than this, they are not even themselves absolutely perfect, but the imperfection ever cleaving to them is not taken into account for the sake of Christ's merit alone. Comp. also Steiger on 1 *Pet.* p. 164 ff.

Ver. 7. Luther: "Namely, praise and honour and immortal being to those who with patience in good works seek after eternal life." Thus he joins together *ζητοῦσι ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, takes it in apposition to *τοῖς μὲν καθ' ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ*, and makes *δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν* depend on *ἀποδώσει*, in which case the apposition drags heavily,—or, rather, with a still more intolerable hyperbaton he construes *τοῖς μὲν καθ' ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ ζητοῦσι ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, (*ἀποδώσει*) *δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν*. The simplest mode of connection, and the one followed by most expositors, is plainly this—to make *ζωὴν αἰώνιον* depend on *ἀποδώσει*, ver. 6, and erasing the comma after *ἀγαθοῦ*, to join *τοῖς μὲν . . . ζητοῦσι*. If the comma is inserted, *δόξαν . . . ζητοῦσι* is in apposition to *τοῖς . . . ἀγαθοῦ*. But the expression *οἱ καθ' ὑπομονὴν ἔργ. ἀγ.*, *sc. ὄντες*, is not adequately borne out by *οἱ κατὰ σάρκα ὄντες* Rom. viii. 5, and the apostle would then certainly, in conformity with ver. 8, have written: *τοῖς μὲν . . . ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ δόξαν—ζητοῦσι*.

—*καθ' ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ*] indicates the norm or principle, in accordance with which they act in striving after *δόξα*, etc.



ἔργον ἀγαθόν is the object to which ὑπομονή refers, Luke viii. 15 : καρποφορεῖν ἐν ὑπομονῇ; Heb. xii. 1 : τρέχειν δι' ὑπομονῆς. Ὑπομονή, *perseverantia, endurance*. Thus, 1 Thess. i. 3 : ἡ ὑπομονὴ τῆς ἐλπίδος. Ἔργον in the singular is used collectively, as in Gal. vi. 4; Jas. i. 4 : ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω; Rev. xxii. 12. It is the entire united life-work, made up of many separate works.

—δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν ζητοῦσι] “Quod autem dicit,” remarks Calvin, “fideles in bonis operibus persistendo gloriam et honorem quaerere, non significat eos alio aspirare, quam ad Dominum, aut aliquod eo superius praestantiusve expetere: sed ipsum quaerere nequeunt, quin simul ad regni ejus beatitudinem contendant, cujus descriptio sub horum verborum periphrasi continetur.” Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 58. Such are described as do not, like the Jews, seek honour from men, but seek it from God (John v. 44). The triple description δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν serves adequately to set forth the fulness and glory of ζωὴ αἰώνιος. With δόξα comp. Matt. xiii. 43 : τότε οἱ δίκαιοι ἐκλάμψουσιν, ὡς ὁ ἥλιος, ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῶν; with τιμή comp. συμβασιλεύσομεν 2 Tim. ii. 12. In 1 Pet. i. 7 also, as here, δόξα καὶ τιμή are joined together. Believers share in that δόξα καὶ τιμή (Heb. ii. 7), which itself consists in a participation in the δόξα καὶ τιμή of God (1 Tim. i. 17). The element of ἀφθαρσία stands forth independently, which gives it greater emphasis than if it were simply added as an adjectival qualification of δόξα καὶ τιμή. As to the word itself comp. 1 Cor. xv. 53, also 1 Cor. ix. 25, where the στέφανος ἀφθαρτος, and 1 Pet. i. 4, where the κληρονομία ἀφθαρτος is mentioned. But ζωὴ αἰώνιος, in which these particular elements combine as in their common whole, is clearly conceived only as future.

Ver. 8. τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας] *sc. οὖσιν*, comp. ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας John xviii. 37; so also οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, οἱ ἐκ νόμου, οἱ ἐκ πίστεως Rom. iii. 26, iv. 12, 14. Οἱ ἐξ ἐριθείας are such as have their origin, so to speak, from ἐριθεία, and therefore have its characteristics in them, the same notion that is expressed elsewhere by τέκνον, υἱός, comp. υἱοὶ τῆς ἀπειθείας, Eph. ii. 2, v. 6; Col. iii. 6, in contrast with τέκνα ὑπακοῆς, 1 Pet. i. 14. Ἐριθεία is to be derived from ἐριθεύομαι, like παιδεία from παιδεύω, δουλεία from δουλεύω, ἀλαζονεία from ἀλαζονεύομαι. But ἐριθεύω comes from ὁ, ἡ ἔριθος, which in its original signifi-

cation = *mercenarius*, *mercenaria*, *hircing*, *day-labourer*, *hired servant*. Hence ἐριθεύειν, ἐριθεύεσθαι, *to serve for hire*. But the substantive ἐριθεία occurs in classical Greek only in Aristotle, in the sense: *passion for intrigue, party spirit*. This meaning might perhaps be adopted in the other passages, 2 Cor. xii. 20, Gal. v. 20, Phil. i. 16, ii. 3, Jas. iii. 14, 16, but in the present one yields no suitable sense. On this account the old Greek exegetes, from Origen to Oecumenius, interpreted ἐριθεία by φιλονεικία, *contentio*, *contentiousness*. So, too, Luther: "To those who are quarrelsome!" It would then designate their opposition to the truth, and מְרֵה בִּיהוָה, Ps. v. 11, Hos. xiv. 1; מְרֵה אֶת־פִּי יְהוָה, Num. xx. 24, xxvii. 14, 1 Sam. xii. 15, may be compared, which the LXX. render in the latter passage (comp. Deut. xxi. 20) by ἐρίζειν, ἐρεθίζειν. As respects this meaning of the word ἐριθεία, *contentiousness*, *stubborn resistance*, it may perhaps be explained either by a misunderstanding of the etymology, ἐριθεία being derived wrongly from ἔρις, ἐρίζω, or, as is more probable, by the affinity of the notion of *party spirit* with that of *contentiousness*, *stubborn resistance*; as e.g. Ps. ii., the princes form a party to withstand the Lord and His anointed. In explanation of the choice of this expression, striking reference has been made to the well-known characteristic φιλονεικία of the Jews. With this Justin M. reproaches them in *Dial. c. Tryph.*, where he calls them φιλερίστους, φιλερίδας in contrast with φιλαλήθεις, and accuses them of φιλεριστεύειν, ed. Otto, II. 212 D, 228 D, 390 E, 412 E. From the first their ingrained love of controversy displayed itself in opposing the truth. It is true the apostle speaks (vv. 7, 8) not only of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles; but, in keeping with the contents of this chapter, he has the Jews chiefly in view, and in relation even to οἱ ἐξ ἐριθείας the Ἰουδαῖός τε πρῶτον holds good. Also in *Ignat. ad. Philad.* c. 5, where it is said: παρακαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς μηδὲν κατ' ἐριθείαν πρᾶσσειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ χριστομαθίαν, as the sequel of the discourse shows, ἐριθεία is not *passion for intrigue, partisanship*, but *Judaizing contentiousness*. Meyer objects that the explicative supplement καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι — ἀδικία expressly proves<sup>1</sup> that Paul "has before his mind the strict and

<sup>1</sup> So in former editions; but in later ones he speaks of the addition, not as "explicative," but merely as "further describing these men," and says, not that it "proves," but merely that it "quite allows." Mehring arbitrarily enlarges the notion of "party spirit" to "endeavouring to advance oneself and outstrip others,"

proper sense of the word *partisanship*, and it is therefore unwarrantable to base the common but linguistically erroneous explanation on the affinity between the notions of partisanship and contentiousness." As if *disobedience to the truth* were not a far apter illustration of *contentiousness*, in the sense of contentious resistance and obstinacy against the truth, than of *partisanship*, *partisan conduct*.

—καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, πειθομένοις δὲ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ] The καὶ is explicative, the nature of ἐριθεία being now more definitely characterized. It just consists in stubborn opposition to the truth. ἀληθεία and ἀδικία appear here as it were personified, and obedience is yielded and refused them (Gal. v. 7). But ἀληθεία in this passage is revealed truth in distinction from ἀληθεία, i. 18. ἀληθεία and ἀδικία are opposed to each other also in 1 Cor. xiii. 6; 2 Thess. ii. 12. From the biblical point of view truth involves righteousness, and unrighteousness falsehood. Hence we read, Eph. iv. 24, of the δικαιοσύνη τῆς ἀληθείας, and 2 Thess. ii. 10 of the ἀπάτη τῆς ἀδικίας. "*Veritas continet justitiam: et injustitia connotat mendacium*," Bengel. We say ἐπιφέρειν, but not well ἀποδιδόναι ὀργὴν καὶ θυμόν. Hence, perhaps, arose the change of construction, so that to ὀργὴ καὶ θυμός an ἔσται is to be supplied. In contrast with ζῶν αἰώνιον, one would have expected κόλασιν or ὄλεθρον αἰώνιον instead of ὀργὴ καὶ θυμός. This is not so much a *metonymia causae pro effectu*, in so far as ὀργή works κόλασις, as that in the ὀργὴ θεοῦ falling on man a main element of the κόλασις itself is found. θυμός *exandescencia*, strong passion, vehement feeling, intensifies the notion of ὀργή, like ὁ θυμός τῆς ὀργῆς, Rev. xvi. 19, xix. 15. *Ira et exandescencia* is not really different from *ira et vehemens quidem*.

Ver. 9 along with ver. 10 contains an emphatic resumption of vv. 7, 8. The order is reversed, and the unrestricted universality of the recompense made specially prominent. Penal menace is in the first place and in accumulated phraseology repeated, because the very purpose in the whole of the context is,

stated more exactly: "endeavouring to advance oneself in God's sight by displacing or supplanting others." In this case it would be better to abide by the meaning "work for hire, mercenariness," which would be strikingly applicable to the Jews, only that of course it supplies no *antithesis* to κατ' ἰσχυρ. ἔργ. ἀγ. δέξ. ζηντιῶ, v. 7.

by threatened judgments, to alarm the natural man and lead him to acknowledgment of his sin.

—*θλίψις καὶ στενοχωρία*] *sc. ἔσται*. That *στενοχωρία* expresses a higher degree of distress than *θλίψις*, is shown by 2 Cor. iv. 8: *ἐν παντὶ θλιβόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐ στενοχωρούμενοι*. *στενοχωρία* is a *θλίψις* from which there is no way of escape. In both words the element of external calamity is not to be sundered from that of internal suffering, although in *θλίψις* the former, in *στενοχωρία* the latter predominates. *θλίψις καὶ στενοχωρία* are found connected, as here, so also LXX. Isa. viii. 22 (for the Heb. *הַצָּרָה וְהַצָּרָה*), xxx. 6 (*הַצָּרָה וְהַצָּרָה*); Rom. viii. 35.

—*ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου*] By a Hebraism *דָּבָר עַל־כָּל־אָדָם* is *πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀνθρώπου*, *every soul of man = every person*. So too xiii. 1: *πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις ὑποτασσέσθω*; Acts ii. 41, 43, iii. 23 (*πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἥτις ἄν*, from Deut. xviii. 19: *כָּל־נַפְשׁ וְנֶפֶשׁ*, where the LXX. have *ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὃς ἐάν*), vii. 14, xxvii. 37. Thus, in the present passage, no special reference is intended to the soul as the suffering part. This would have required *ἐπὶ ψυχὴν παντὸς ἀνθρώπου* or *ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπων*. Statistics also speak of the number of "souls" instead of "men" or "inhabitants." But Mehring well observes that the justification of the phrase lies in the fact that the soul, as the sole subject of feeling, is the real man.

—*τοῦ κατεργαζομένου τὸ κακόν*] The present tense expresses persistence in evil-doing. *κατεργάζεσθαι*, *perficere, to accomplish*, intensifying the notion of *ἐργάζεσθαι*, comp. on i. 27.

—*Ἰουδαίου τε πρῶτον*] The priority of Israel, comp. on i. 16, consisting in *πιστευθῆναι τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ*, iii. 2, is also a ground of special responsibility in judgment. The measure of opportunity determines the measure of guilt (Amos iii. 2; Matt. xi. 22; Luke xii. 47, 48).

Ver. 10. The apostle had spoken (ver. 7) of those who seek *δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν*. He now says that they shall attain what they seek, namely, *δόξα καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εἰρήνη*. *εἰρήνη* stands in contrast with *θλίψις καὶ στενοχωρία*. But the apostle is speaking in this passage both of the Jews and Gentiles before Christ (for even among the latter were always found those to whom the *ἐπαγγελίαι τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ* applied, as, passing by Melchizedek, a Rahab, Ruth, a Naaman, Cornelius, and others prove), and of the Jews and Gentiles of his own day, for,

indeed, in the whole of the chapter he has to do with the Jews as his contemporaries. Further, among such believing Israelites and *φοβουμένοις τὸν θεόν* the preaching of Christ found instant response and welcome, so that their faith in the *ἐρχόμενος* was raised, transfigured, and perfected into faith in the *ἐλθών*. But Paul as yet keeps the advent of Christ in the background, and carries his description of paganism and Judaism (ch. i.-ii.) only up to the time of this advent, irrespective of the specifically new elements of the Christian revelation of salvation. On this account the colours and tints of the picture are taken throughout with masterly, sure, and delicate tact simply from the mental sphere of paganism and Judaism.

Ver. 11 states the ground of the universality (asserted vv. 9, 10) of divine retribution, in opposition to Jewish particularism, which assigned punishment only to Gentiles, reward only to Jews, and accordingly must have found the *Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον*, ver. 9, and *καὶ Ἑλληνι*, ver. 10, specially offensive. But the apostle, in keeping with the starting-point of the chapter, refutes here, as vv. 12, 13 indicate, specially the first illusion of the absolute impunity of the Jews; in vv. 26, 27, the second illusion of their exclusive title to reward.

—*οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ προσωποληψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*] Deut. x. 17; 1 Sam. xvi. 7; 2 Chron. xix. 7; Job xxxiv. 19; Acts x. 34, 35; Gal. ii. 6; Eph. vi. 9; Col. iii. 25; 1 Pet. i. 17. The phrase *πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν*, whence *προσωποληψία*, answering to the Heb. *נִפְתָּח פָּנָיו* (Steiger on 1 Pet. p. 162 f.), is not found in classical Greek. The *πρόσωπον* of man is his outward appearance in birth, position, work, etc. *λαμβάνειν* is = to receive, accept, regard. Only an unjust judge regards the person in the sense stated, a just judge looks only at the case. Thus in spite of the distinction in rank and order of succession, obtaining between Israel and the Gentiles, the ground and nature of divine retributive righteousness remains unchanged.

Ver. 12. *ὅσοι γὰρ ἀνόμως ἤμαρτον*] i.e. the Gentiles, *ἀνόμως* = *χωρὶς νόμον*, without being in possession of the law, 1 Cor. ix. 21: *οἱ ἄνομοι*. The *νόμος* here, as follows of itself, is the *νόμος Μωϋσέως*, the apostle ascribing even to the Gentiles (vv. 14, 15) a natural law of morality. In every passage, without exception, *νόμος*, without qualification, denotes the positive law revealed through Moses. Deviations from this meaning, like *νόμος πίστεως*,

iii. 27; νόμος ἁμαρτίας, vii. 23; νόμος δικαιοσύνης, ix. 31; νόμος Χριστοῦ, Gal. vi. 2; νόμος ἐλευθερίας, Jas. ii. 12,—are indicated and justified by the appended adjectival definition itself. Elsewhere ἄνομος is not one who has no νόμος, but one who acts in opposition to law (Mark xv. 28; Acts ii. 23; 2 Thess. ii. 8; 1 Tim. i. 9; 2 Pet. ii. 8).

—ἀνόμως καὶ ἀπολοῦνται] *shall also perish without law*, i.e. although not judged by the rule of the law, they shall still perish. The first ἀνόμως stands in contrast with ἐν νόμῳ, the second in contrast with the διὰ νόμου of the second clause = οὐκ ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον, οὐ διὰ νόμου ἀπολοῦνται. ἀπολοῦνται at once forbids us to suppose a mitigation of the penal judgment on the Gentiles, as if ἀνόμως meant: *not by the severity of the Mosaic law*. Ἀπόλλυσθαι forms the antithesis to σώζεσθαι, i. 16. To accept the notion of absolute annihilation, *in nihilum redigere*, flatly contradicts biblical eschatology. The apostle says ἀπολοῦνται, not κριθήσονται, just because it takes place ἀνόμως; but κρίσις always refers to a νόμος as its rule. The καί before ἀπόλλυσθαι intimates that ἀπόλλυσθαι follows from ἁμαρτάνειν of necessity, or at least is in exact proportion to it. The ἁμαρτία corresponds with the ἀπώλεια. Therefore not: without law they sinned, also without law they shall perish. This would be, as Mehring observes, καὶ ἀνόμως, not καὶ ἀπολοῦνται.

—καὶ ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον] ἐν νόμῳ, *with the law*, in possession of the law, *sc.* ὄντες, comp. iii. 19: οἱ ἐν νόμῳ. νόμος denoting the Mosaic law, i.e. an object the only one of its kind, the article may be omitted, since without it the substantive is unequivocally defined (Winer, p. 148).

—διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται] κρίνειν is used here to denote a condemning judgment, a κρίμα whose result is κατὰ κρίμα, because those to be judged are transgressors of law. In κριθήσονται perhaps an aggravation of punishment is indicated. Where *sin* is, there also is the *punishment* of death. This holds good equally for Gentiles and Jews, for God punishes sinners without regard to persons. Gentiles, as sinners, *perish*; Jews, as sinners, are *judged*. If they claim priority, this is their priority above the Gentiles. Thus not only is πᾶσα ψυχή, but also Ἰουδαίου τε πρῶτον, ver. 9, vindicated.

Ver. 13 corroborates the latter half of ver. 12: ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ

ἡμαρτον, διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται, in opposition to the pharisaically-minded Jews, who fancied that they were exempted from judgment by mere possession of the law. The parenthesizing of ver. 13 is to be rejected, as this verse contains a principal idea closely linked with ver. 12.

—οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τοῦ νόμου] The article here before νόμου, as in the subjoined words οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου, is apparently to be expunged, with Lachmann, on the preponderant authority of the oldest uncials. We should not say so well: *the hearers of the law*, as rather: *the readers of the law*. But the Jews acquired their knowledge of the law by hearing it read in the synagogue every Sabbath (John xii. 34; Acts xv. 21; 2 Cor. iii. 14; Gal. iv. 21; Jas. i. 22 ff.). *The hearers* (subst. not part.) aptly describes their standing characteristic.

δικαιωθήσονται] corresponding to δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ in the first clause: they shall be declared just before God's tribunal. δικαιοῦν, the Heb. דִּיּקֵי, is, as this passage at once proves, *terminus forensis*: *to declare just*, not: *to make just*, for doers of the law are already just, they are not made such first by God. δικαιοῦν from δίκαιος, after the analogy of τυφλοῦν and other verbs in ὦν derived from adjectives of the second declension, in accordance with etymology, doubtless = *to make just*. Nevertheless, as the usage of the LXX. and the N. T. prove, we must add in thought: *by declaring*. So also the Roman says: "*alicui virtutem tribuere*;" and the German: "*Jemanden fromm machen, Jemanden zum Diebe machen*." See the complete evidence for the forensic meaning of δικαιοῦν, especially in *articulo justificationis*, in my *Thätigen Gehorsam Christi*, pp. 85–110. Comp. also Wieseler on Gal. ii. 16. Whether or not there are such perfect ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου the apostle does not say in this passage, but only opposes the true standard to the false standard of the Jews, that ἀκροαταὶ τοῦ νόμου are just before God. The entire reasoning of the Roman epistle tends to this conclusion, that no man is by nature such a ποιητὴς τοῦ νόμου, or can be. Wherefore δικαίωσις comes not ἐκ νόμου, but ἐκ πίστεως. The ποιεῖν of the νόμος is nothing but the subsequent result of the foregoing δικαίωσις; but doubtless in the strength of justifying grace this is possible (vv. 26, 27; Jas. i. 22–25). "*De jure itaque loquitur apostolus*," remarks Calov, "*non de facto, quod lex perfectissimam obedientiam, non solum externam, sed etiam internam, imo summam totius naturae*

*integritatem* exigit. Tales autem legis factores non dari hic ex instituto docet: ut concludat neminem per legem justificari."

Ver. 14. The Gentiles, although they have not the revealed law, yet testify, by their acting in harmony with law, that they are a law to themselves. — The most natural and obvious connection of this verse is manifestly with ver. 13. There are some interpreters who would find in this verse the idea that the devout among the heathen, through obedience to the precepts of the natural law of conscience, might become acceptable to God. But this interpretation must be set down as an utterly abortive parapherneneia. First of all, this meaning can be found in the apostle's words only in the most arbitrary way. All that he says is: "The Gentiles also have a law," and confirms this further in ver. 14. But he does not say: "The Gentiles also, by following the law, become just before God." Moreover, such a proposition contradicts not only the fundamental conceptions of the Pauline doctrine of sin and justification in general, but also in particular the whole tenor of the exposition i. 18—iii. 20, whose very theme is *οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς*, iii. 10; *πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι*, iii. 9. To involve the apostle in such self-contradictions is not only to have no conception of a book of *Holy* Scripture, but no conception even of Pauline precision of thought. Other interpreters understand the Gentiles being justified through observance of the law of conscience, as hypothetical merely. "The Jews shall be justified, not by hearing, but only by doing the law; the Gentiles also shall be justified in this way." In this case merely the condition on which justification depends, not its actual existence, or merely a rule of imputation in the case of the Gentiles, is supposed to be established. But apart from objections drawn from the imperfect nature of the Gentile law of conscience in relation to the revealed νόμος, even this sense is, just as little as the former one, to be got from the apostle's words. To obtain it the explanation is given: "The Jews shall be justified, not by hearing, but by doing the law. This holds good of the Gentiles also, for the Gentiles also have a law." But in this the thought, to which the confirmatory γάρ of ver. 14 is referred, "this holds good of the Gentiles also," is arbitrarily foisted in. The thought: "The Jews become righteous only by doing the law, for the Gentiles are a law to themselves,"



is absolutely unintelligible, and it becomes no one, for the purpose of giving it a meaning, to supply at pleasure: "This holds good of the Gentiles also." For these reasons other interpreters would not refer this 14th verse back to ver. 13 at all, but take it as giving the reason for the first half of the 12th verse, namely, for the words *ὅτι ἀνόμως ἥμαρτον, ἀνόμως καὶ ἀπολούνται*. "The Gentiles perish *ἀνόμως*, for although they are *ἄνομοι*, they nevertheless have a *νόμος* by which they are rightly judged." Very truly has it been remarked against this view that it is very arbitrary, when in the entire course of the reasoning *γάρ* always refers to what immediately precedes, to refer *ὅταν γάρ*, ver. 14, to ver. 12, and to explain away ver. 13 (although containing a most striking confirmation of the second half of ver. 12) by a parenthesis. Certainly as a parenthesis must ver. 13 in any case be taken according to the interpretation in question. Manifestly the apostle must in that case have developed his thoughts in the following order: "They who sinned without law shall also perish without law; for although *ἄνομοι*, they have yet a *νόμος*. They who sinned in the law shall be judged by the law; for not hearers, but doers of the law are just." But if ver. 13 is to be taken as confirming the second half of ver. 12, not parenthetically, ver. 14, as confirming the first half of ver. 12, must necessarily have been introduced by some such form as *ὁμοίως δὲ καί*, instead of by *ὅταν γάρ*. — We must therefore abide by the view that ver. 14 contains the confirmation of ver. 13. But then it can only confirm the words of the 13th verse: *οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἄκροαταὶ τοῦ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*. "Not hearers of the law are just before God, for the Gentiles also have a law, *i.e.* for the Gentiles also are *ἄκροαταὶ τοῦ νόμου*." The Jews were filled with pride and conceit in their possession of the law, their hearing and knowledge of the law. In this they held their superiority to the Gentiles to consist. The apostle shows how futile is this superiority, since mere knowledge of the law cannot be denied even to the Gentiles. This exposition harmonizes also with the entire strain of this second chapter; for everywhere (vv. 1, 9, 10, 11, 26, 27) the apostle aims at reducing to nothing the illusive prerogative of the Jews above the Gentiles. Hence he begins the third chapter with the question rising naturally out of the exposition of the second: *τί οὖν τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου*; But then it follows as matter of course from this intimate con-

nection of ver. 14 with ver. 13, that no parenthesis can be begun with ver. 14.<sup>1</sup>

—*ὅταν*] puts a case whose occurrence is described as possible: *in case that = as often as* (Matt. xv. 2; John viii. 44; 1 Cor. xiv. 26).

—*ἐθνη*] Luther rightly: *the Gentiles*. The article before the substantive may be dispensed with when an adjectival definition follows, comp. ix. 30. Even without such addition *ἐθνη* may be referred to the entire Gentile world, and as a self-defined totality stand without the article (iii. 29; Luke xxiv. 47; Steiger on 1 Pet. i. 10; Huther and de Wette on 1 Pet. ii. 4). Others translate indefinitely: *Gentiles*. So *e.g.* Meyer: Gentiles among whom the supposed case occurs. Comp., too, Hofmann, *Schriſtbeweis*, I. p. 567, and van Hengel here. But here the subject is not merely individual Gentiles, but the totality of Gentiles. If the absence of the article is pressed, we must interpret: "Men who are Gentiles," in which case their collective whole would still be contemplated. *All* Jews boast of possessing the law. The apostle shows that in this *all*, not merely *individual*, Gentiles are their equals. The delineation of morals given in the first chapter is not in contradiction with this; for the life of the Gentile world,

<sup>1</sup> In spite of Meyer's adverse comments, I am still unable to depart from the view given in the text. I do not understand how vv. 14, 15 can establish the *regulative principles* of justification through the law (*οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται*, ver. 13) in respect to the Gentiles; for even if the Gentiles fulfilled their νόμος γραπτός ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, they would still not be ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου to whom the δικαιοσύνη τοῦ could be due, because the natural law of conscience is still but a *substitute* for the revealed law, and contains the chief command of the latter, the command of love, it at all, in any case in a very imperfect form and obscure shape. But nothing but ἀγάπη is the πλήρωμα νόμου, xiii. 10. — What Meyer advances against this objection of mine in subsequent editions leaves the matter just where it was. The question is not, that really neither the Jews fulfil the revealed law, nor the Gentiles the law of conscience, and therefore neither of the two, as matter of fact, is justified through the fulfilment of His law; but the question is that in the case of the Gentiles even the *possibility* does not exist, which Meyer's exposition supposes, of being *justified* through perfect fulfilment of their imperfect law. But when Meyer calls the exposition given by me in the text arbitrary, because it refers γάρ, ver. 14, not to the assertion directly preceding (*οἱ ποιηταὶ τ. νόμ. δικαιωθ.*), ver. 13, but to the purely negative sentence (*οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἀκραταὶ τ. νόμ. δικ. παρὰ τ. θεῶν*), which merely served to prepare the way for this assertion, it is to be remarked that this negative sentence really contains the *main* thought of ver. 13, which suggests the positive assertion as a natural antithesis. The Jews were judged by the law (ver. 12), *for* the mere possession of the law does not, as they fancy, exempt them from judgment. — The objections of Mehring, based on utter misunderstanding, nay, an entire perversion of my view, need no refutation for the thoughtful reader.

even in its deepest degeneracy, was regulated by rules and principles having the sanction of law, and the individual Gentile, even though belonging to the most corrupt class, still could not absolutely break with all conduct framed in harmony with law.

—τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα] not τὰ νόμον μὴ ἔχοντα, in order to mark more distinctly the contrast of μὴ νόμον ἔχειν and φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖν.

—φύσει] not, as some expositors wish, to be joined with the foregoing τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα, but with the following τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῇ. The first mode of connection makes φύσει flat and pleonastic, if it can be said at all of the revealed law which comes only θέσει that any one has it φύσει. But φύσει has the force of *natura duce*, without being impelled thereto by command from without: without undergoing the discipline of the Mosaic law, Schol. *Matt.*, φύσει, τουτέστι τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἐπόμενα λογισμοῖς.

—τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῇ] *do what belongs to the law*, what is contained in the law, observe the precepts of the law. Paul says not τὸν νόμον ποιεῖν, as in ver. 13, or τὸν νόμον τελεῖν, as in ver. 27, but τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖν. Thus they keep not the νόμος in its profound inner sense (vii. 14) and entirety, but observe particular, outward commands in it—one this, another that. They have ἔργα νόμου, like the Jews who still are not on this account ποιηταί, but only ἀκροαταὶ τοῦ νόμου. The plural ποιῶσιν instead of ποιῇ, which Lachmann has received, appears to be a grammatical correction.

—οὗτοι] referring to ἔθνη τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα νόμον, a current *constructio ad sensum* (*Matt.* xxviii. 19; *Acts* xxvi. 17). It resumes with energy ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα in the sense of οἱ τοιοῦτοι, *such men*, they who do the commands of the law without having the law.

—ἐαυτοῖς εἰσι νόμος] *are the law to themselves*, or: are to themselves instead of the law—they give the law to themselves. Interpreters quote *Aristot. Eth. Nicom.* iv. 14: ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἐαυτῷ. But it is not to be rendered, with Luther: they are *a* law to themselves, but: are *the* law to themselves; for νόμος is always, as already observed, the Mosaic law, and what the apostle wishes to intimate is just this, that in their possession of the Mosaic law the Jews have no precedence over the Gentiles. But the apostle here characterizes the import of

the νόμος from the standpoint of the Jews; what the νόμος was to them, the entire series of external commands, though relating to moral conduct, this in point of fact the Gentiles also possessed. But the deeper spiritual nature of the νόμος remained a mystery to both alike, to Jews as to Gentiles.

Ver. 15. οἷτινες] *quippe qui, as those who, who indeed, they who*, introduces the explanation and confirmation of ἐαυτοῖς εἰσι νόμος. Hence to be taken in a directly causal sense: *for they*, i. 25.

—ἐνδείκνυνται] *manifest, make known*, namely, by their very τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖν, ver. 14, not by the μαρτυρία τῆς συνειδήσεως adduced immediately afterwards. Apart from all else there is no logical cogency in saying: "The Gentiles who do the works of the law are the law to themselves, for they show their inward possession of the law by the existence of the testimony of conscience."

—τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου] is most simply interpreted as corresponding to τὰ τοῦ νόμου, ver. 14. The singular is collective, as in ver. 7, embracing the entire sum of the ἔργα νόμου in a unity. But the work of the law or the works of the law are written in their hearts, in so far as they confess themselves bound by the law.

—γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν] The emphasis rests on ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, in contrast with the stone tables on which the decalogue, or even with the rolls on which the entire Mosaic law, was recorded. By their acting in harmony with law, the Gentiles show that they possess the law recorded, not indeed on stone and parchment, but on their *heart*, and so far are the law to themselves.

—συμμαρτυροῦσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως] *their conscience at the same time bearing witness*, namely, that the work of the law is written on their heart, that they are the law to themselves. Two witnesses, then, testify to the Gentiles' possession of the law: first, their acting in accordance with law; secondly, the existence of conscience in them. *συμμαρτυρεῖν* retains its primary signification: *una testari, to testify at the same time*, namely, at the same time with τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖν, in which the first ἐνδειξις consists. By *συνείδησις* here can only be understood conscience *consequens* so called, conscience *antecedens* being the νόμος γραπτὸς ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις. That they have in their hearts a consciousness of the demands of the moral law, they indicate first by their acting in accordance with law, and again by their conscience passing judg-

ment on their acts. The nature of this *συνείδησις* is brought to light in the following words.

—*καὶ μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων*] *the thoughts accusing or excusing*, and by the very fact that conscience manifests itself in these judicial acts, bear witness to the presence of *νόμος γραπτὸς ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις*. As the words *καὶ μεταξὺ . . . ἀπολογουμένων* contain the exegesis of *συμμαρτ. . . . συνειδήσεως*, the *καί* is to be taken explicatively. *μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων*, *one among another*. There takes place, as it were, a dialogue between the thoughts, one accusing, the other acquitting. Thus we get the meaning: *one to another, alternatim, reciprocally*. *τῶν λογισμῶν*, *the thoughts*, as the individual actions of the *συνειδήσις*, the employment of the latter in the way of reflection upon the case lying at any time before it. *κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων* is used absolutely. The object of the accusation or acquittal is the act brought before the critical tribunal of the conscience. *ἢ καί*, *or even*. Thus the conscience will find more to accuse than acquit. From this it is evident how far the apostle is from identifying *τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖν*, ver. 14, with *πλήρωμα νόμου*, xiii. 10. Despite the partial obedience to law on the part of the Gentile world, the main function of conscience in every particular individual will consist in accusing his acts.—*Indirectly*, then, vv. 14, 15 certainly contain an illustration of the first clause of ver. 12, for that the Gentiles perish, although *ἄνομοι* is based upon the fact of their having in the law of conscience a substitute for the *νόμος*.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, in the close of ver. 15 the thought of the predominance of the condemning activity of conscience is made specially emphatic. Hence it was natural for the apostle, with ver. 16, to return to the thought, already floating before his eyes in vv. 12, 13, of the day of final judgment.

Ver. 16. The witness of conscience, spoken of in ver. 15, referred to moral conduct in the present life. But as the apostle was describing it, the thought was borne vividly in upon his mind in the way indicated, how this would manifest itself most decisively in the general judgment. On this account he passes

<sup>1</sup> In so far Calov's remark holds good: "Scopus autem Apostoli est convincere gentes, quod non defuerint ipsis media cognoscendi, quodque inexcusabiles sint, etiamsi solo naturae lumine instructi, atque id conclusio etiam Apostoli probat, nimirum gentiles citra legem scriptam peccantes, citra legem condemnandos esse, ex sola naturae lege."

on to the latter without so much as indicating the change in the course of thought by varying the phraseology, as by *καὶ τοῦτο μάλιστα*, Winer, p. 707.<sup>1</sup> Therefore ver. 16 is to be joined directly with ver. 15. To connect it with ver. 12 or ver. 13 is not allowable. For apart from the fact that no parenthesis begins, as we have seen, with ver. 13 or ver. 14, and therefore ver. 15 cannot close one, in ver. 16 after so long a digression some sign of the resumption should have been found. But yet the reference to the future final judgment can begin neither with *ἐνδείκνυνται*, ver. 15, nor with *συμμαρτυρούσης*, nor with *καὶ μετὰξὺ ἀλλήλων*. In the first case we should have expected, for the sake of clearness, either *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὅτε κρινεῖ κτλ.* to come first, or to see the future of the verbs used (*ἐνδείκνυσθαι, συμμαρτυρεῖν, κατηγορεῖν*). Further, we saw that with *ἐνδείκνυνται* logical sequence compels us to supply: by *ποιεῖν τὰ τοῦ νόμου*. And if we desired to begin the reference to the future with *συμμαρτυρούσης*, the ratification by the testimony of conscience in the present life would be passed over in a very strange and inappropriate manner. In the last place, the natural, strict, and exegetical reference to the *μαρτυρία τῆς συνειδήσεως* forbids us to take the words *κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων* in the future sense. Rightly says Calvin: "Observe autem, quam erudite describat conscientiam, quum dicit nobis venire in mentem rationes, quibus, quod recte factum est, defendamus: rursus quae nos flagitiorum accusent ac redarguant. Rationes autem istas accusandi ac defendendi ad diem Domini confert: non quia sint tunc primum eemersurae, quae assidue nunc vigent ac officium suum exercent: sed quia sint *tunc quoque* valiturae, ne quis ut frivolas et evanidas contemnat." But we are not on this account to take *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ*, ver. 16, for *εἰς ἡμέραν*. Rather is the purport of vv. 15, 16 to be paraphrased: "that the Gentiles have a law written in their hearts is testified, not only by their conduct being conformed to law, but also by their conscience and their thoughts which reciprocally accuse or justify even now, but especially in the day of final judgment." Still, with this is not to be supplied: *even now, but especially*; but *κατηγορεῖν* and *ἀπολογεῖσθαι*, first of all contemplated as present now, awaken withal the idea of the future *κατηγορία* and *ἀπολογία*, the *participia praesentis* realizing the future in a more vivid manner. How conscience in particular

<sup>1</sup> So in the fifth edition; in the sixth he adopts another construction.

decisively and powerfully exercises its judicial office, Wisd. v. 13, 14 describes.

—τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων] are not the λογισμοί mentioned in the previous verse, for these are not the object of judgment, but themselves assent to God's judgment, especially in so far as they make κατηγορία. Further, τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων denotes not exclusively the secret *dispositions* of men, as in 1 Cor. iv. 5, xiv. 25, where τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς καρδίας is expressly said, but secret *deeds* are meant as well, comp. Eph. v. 12: τὰ κρυφῇ γινόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν; 2 Cor. iv. 2: τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς αἰσχύνης; Luke viii. 17: οὐ γάρ ἐστι κρυπτὸν, ὃ οὐ φανερὸν γενήσεται. The hidden things of men: τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, are thus all things in the inward and outward life that either are not known to others at all, or not known according to their moral character. But no doubt the phrase is selected on suggestion of, and with reference to, λογισμοί, ver. 15, because these are hidden things that come to light in the day of judgment, and because they also bring before their tribunal not only open, but also, and indeed chiefly, secret deeds and purposes.

—κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου] "Suum appellat ratione ministerium," says Calvin. "Plane sicut ego hoc omnibus populis annuntiabo," explains Grotius, comp. 2 Tim. ii. 8. Even the announcement of the judgment day is a part of supernatural revelation. Comp. Mehring here.

—διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] the Mediator of grace, as of *judgment* (John v. 22; Acts x. 42, xvii. 31; 1 Cor. iv. 5; 2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 1). But then the substance of the thoughts developed vv. 14–16 contains, of course without design, not only a further expansion of οἵτινες τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιγινόντες, i. 32, but also above all a complement to i. 19, 20. The revelation of nature and reason is the medium to the Gentiles of knowledge of *God*; but they have withal a knowledge of *law* of which the medium is the consciousness implanted within them. Doubtless both these are obscured by sin, but even their remnants suffice to leave them without excuse in God's sight. The knowledge of God surviving condemns their idolatry; the knowledge of law surviving condemns their immoral life.

Ver. 17 recurs to ver. 13. Not hearers of the law are just before God, ver. 13, for knowledge respecting the law pertains even to the Gentiles, vv. 14–16; but if thou boastest of this know-

ledge, hearing, and possession of the law, and yet art a transgressor of the law, thy boasting is vain and futile, and will therefore avail thee nothing towards the righteousness that God regards, vv. 17-24. Everything said in this chapter hitherto in a certain sense paves the way for this last section, vv. 17-24, in which the apostle attacks the Jews openly, lays bare their sins, and shows that they are no better than the Gentiles. εἰ δέ] The apodosis commences with ver. 21. After the protasis: "If thou knowest the law and boastest of it," one would have expected the apodosis: "wherefore transgressest thou the law?" But with ver. 21 begins an easy change of construction, occasioned by the accumulation of protases, as the resumptive οὖν, usual in such an anacoluthon, intimates. Winer: "The simple apodosis which Paul had in his thoughts was perhaps this: *thou oughtest then thyself to act according to law.* But he expands this thought, proceeding antithetically, in such a form that in the words διδίσκων, κηρύσσων, βδελυσσόμενος, allusion is made to the contents of the protasis."<sup>1</sup> The reading ἰδέ or ἴδε, after which Luther translated, instead of εἰ δέ, which, moreover, is attested by external authorities, either arose from the itacism (comp. Jas. iii. 3), or is a designed correction for the purpose of avoiding the anacoluthon.

—Ἰουδαῖος] After the return from the Babylonian exile the name of the whole people of Israel, Neh. ii. 16, v. 17; withal a title of honour in distinction from the Gentiles, Gal. ii. 15; Rev. ii. 9, iii. 9.

—ἐπονομάζῃ] not: *thou art surnamed*, but: *thou art named*; for ἐπονομάζειν τινά τι may be resolved into ὀνομάζειν ἐπὶ τινά τι, and then does not differ from ὀνομάζειν τινά τι, comp. LXX. Gen. iv. 17, xxv. 26.

—ἐπαναπαύῃ τῷ νόμῳ] = πέποιθας ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, Phil. iii. 4: πεποιθέναι ἐν σαρκί, denotes the confidence, the reliance and trust of the Jews in the outward possession of the law, on which they, as it were, reposed. So Mic. iii. 11: וַיִּשְׁכְּבוּ בְּתֵי עֲלֵי; LXX.: καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν κύριον ἐπανεπαύοντο. Comp. 1 Macc. viii. 12: μετὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπαναπανομένων αὐτοῖς συνετήρησαν φιλίαν. The article before νόμῳ in the present passage is wanting in good manuscripts, and, with Lachmann, is probably to be omitted, as in ver. 13.

<sup>1</sup> Winer, p. 711. (The quotation in Philippi is from a former edition.)



—καυχᾶσαι ἐν θεῷ] *Thou boastest of God*, as one who is the Father and covenant God of Israel exclusively. The apostle does not question this priority in the abstract (comp. ix. 4; Gen. xvii. 7; Jer. xxxi. 33), for in point of fact it furnished matter for genuine *καύχῃς* (Isa. xlv. 25; Jer. ix. 24). But the Jews forfeited even this priority. “Haec igitur non cordis gloriatio sed linguae jactantia fuit,” says Calvin. On the uncontracted form *καυχᾶσαι*, comp. Winer, p. 90. The preposition ἐν indicates the sphere in which the boasting is carried on, or that *wherein* the boasting *rests*, after the analogy of *χαίρειν, τέρπεσθαι ἐν*. Manifestly in the words Ἰουδαῖος ἐπονομ.—ἐπαναπ. νόμῳ—καυχ. ἐν θεῷ a gradation finds place.

Ver. 18. γινώσκεις τὸ θέλημα] namely, as is self-evident (xii. 2), αὐτοῦ, which is omitted, not as Bengel suggests from regard to Jewish εὐλάβεια, which shrank from uttering the divine name, but to obtain a shorter clause in harmony with the rest.

—δοκιμάζεις τὰ διαφέροντα] so also in Phil. i. 10. δοκιμάζεις, either: *to prove*, or: *to approve*. τὰ διαφέροντα from διαφέρειν, *to excel* (Matt. vi. 26; Heb. i. 4), either=*that which excels*, or=*that which differs*. Therefore δοκιμάζεις τὰ διαφέροντα, either: *thou approvest that which excels*, or: *thou provest that which differs*, i.e. that which is right and wrong. The latter meaning seems here preferable. So already Theodoret rightly: ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις, δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν, and Theophylact: κρίνεις τί δέῃ πράξαι καὶ τί μὴ δέῃ πράξαι; comp. Heb. v. 14: διάκρισις καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ. Testing the difference between right and wrong is the result of knowledge of the divine will. No doubt with the other interpretation: *thou approvest the excellent* (so already the Vulgate: “*probas utiliora*”), a climax arises in relation to γινώσκεις τὸ θέλημα; but this at least does not appear *essential*. Luther follows the Vulgate, although rendering δοκιμάζεις by “*prove*,” “*thou provest what is best to be done*.”

—κατηχούμενος ἐκ τοῦ νόμου] Instruction in the law is the source of γινώσκεις τὸ θέλημα and of δοκιμάζεις τὰ διαφέροντα, because in the law itself both the will of God and the distinction of right and wrong, of pure and impure, are recorded. κατηχούμενος, *part. pres.*, not κατηχηθεῖς, for it is not youthful instruction, occurring but once, that is meant, but continuous instruction out of the law.

Vv. 19, 20. Relying on this their theoretical knowledge of the law, the Jews even set up as teachers of the Gentiles, whom they in their arrogance described as τυφλούς, as τοὺς ἐν σκότει, as ἄφρονas, and νηπίους. On the proselytizing of the Jews, and the judgment passed on it by the Lord, comp. Matt. xxiii. 15. πέποιθίς τε σεαυτὸν κτλ.] The *accus. cum infinit.* puts forward the subject (σεαυτὸν) with emphasis. Else it might also have read: πέποιθίς τε ὁδηγὸς εἶναι τυφλῶν, or: πέποιθίς τε ὅτι ὁδηγὸς εἶ τυφλῶν.

—ὁδηγὸν εἶναι τυφλῶν] comp. Matt. xv. 14: ὁδηγοί εἰσι τυφλοὶ τυφλῶν. The τυφλοί here are not the illiterate Jews, ὁ ὄχλος ὁ μὴ γινώσκων τὸν νόμον, John vii. 49, the רשעים עמ, for from ver. 17 onwards Paul is describing the assumption of *all* Jews. Further, here apparently we are not so much to think of proselytes, although even to them predicates as little honourable were applied, as of the Gentiles who were to be made proselytes.

—φῶς τῶν ἐν σκότει] comp. Matt. iv. 16: ὁ λαὸς ὁ καθήμενος ἐν σκότει.

—παιδευτὴν ἀφρόνων] not: a chastiser of the ungodly, so that ἄφρων would have to be taken like the Hebrew לָמַד, foolish in the sense of ungodly, but as the synonyms τυφλοί, οἱ ἐν σκότει, νηπιοὶ intimate = an educator, a teacher of the foolish.

—διδάσκαλον νηπίων] those not of age, of course not in years, but in mind, are meant, 1 Cor. iii. 1; Gal. iv. 3; Eph. iv. 14. The accumulation of synonyms (τυφλοί, οἱ ἐν σκότει κτλ.) strengthens the description, and brings out the assumption of the Jews in keener relief.

—ἔχοντα τὴν μόρφωσιν τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ νόμῳ] The participle is to be resolved: *ut qui habeas*. Paul is speaking here in the person of the Jews who seek to justify their bearing to the Gentiles, although at the same time he on his part does not deny that the law really contains what they find in it. Hence μόρφωσις here cannot be taken in the sense of *specics, appearance, shadow*, in opposition to reality and truth. Rather is μόρφωσις (primarily, *the act of imagining*, then *the result of this act = image, figure*) synonymous with τύπος, vi. 17; ὑποτύπωσις, 2 Tim. i. 13 = *the form, the impressed figure, the real impression, the forma quae rem exprimat*; comp. Cic. *de Off.* i. 29: *forma officii*. Among the

Greeks, *μόρφωμα*. In the LXX. also *μόρφωσις* is not found. The article before *μόρφωσις* denotes that it is a form corresponding to the reality, the form absolutely, not merely a one-sided, defective form. *γνώσις*, like *ἀλήθεια*, in the objective sense, 1 Tim. vi. 20. *γνώσις*, *complete knowledge*, is here no doubt of itself the well-known truth, but by the addition of *ἀλήθεια* it is specially distinguished as *truthful knowledge*. Thus the truth is not contained in the law as an abstract idea, but in such concrete form and shape as man can perceive. On the opinion of the Jews respecting the law, comp. Ecclus. xxiv. 23–29.

Ver. 21 begins the apodosis, which, falling into distinct co-ordinate clauses, concludes only with ver. 23. These five members of the apodosis are most expressively taken, with the Greek exegetes, with Griesbach, Lachmann, *et al.*, as interrogatory sentences. If the emphasis is not to be lost, they must at least be taken in the form of an apostrophe. With this passage comp. LXX. Ps. l. 16 ff.: *ἵνατί οὐ διηγή τὰ δικαιώματά μου, καὶ ἀναλαμβάνεις τὴν διαθήκην μου διὰ στόματός σου; σὺ δὲ ἐμίσησας παιδείαν καὶ ἐξέβαλες τοὺς λόγους μου εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω· εἰ ἐθεώρεις κλέπτην, συνέτρεχες αὐτῷ, καὶ μετὰ μοιχῶν τὴν μερίδα σου ἐτίθεις.—σεαυτὸν οὐ διδάσκεις;*] *i.e.* thou appliest not thy teaching to thyself, as thy corrupt life shows. Paul adduces three instances of this moral corruption, *κλέπτειν, μοιχεύειν, ἱεροσυλεῖν*, on which Bengel not inaptly remarks: “atrocissime peccas in proximum, te ipsum, Deum. Ad gentes Paulus ostenderat peccata primum contra Deum, deinde contra se, deinde contra alios, nunc ordinem invertit: nam peccata contra Deum, in gentibus apertissima sunt, in Judæo non item.”

—ὁ κηρύσσων μὴ κλέπτειν] *κηρύσσειν*, כְּרַז, *to proclaim aloud, to preach*; μὴ κλέπτειν, *not to steal, i.e.* that one must or should not steal. But a *δεῖν* or *ἐξεῖναι* is not on this account to be supplied. Rather there is implied in *κηρύσσειν* itself (comp. *λέγειν*, ver. 22) the notion of *commanding*. On the construction, comp. Winer, p. 405.

Ver. 22. With ὁ λέγων μὴ μοιχεύειν, *μοιχεύεις*, comp. the history of the adulteress and the Pharisees, John viii. 3–9. ὁ βδελυσσόμενος τὰ εἰδωλα] the Jews called the idols of the heathen עֲצָבוֹת, Ezek. xx. 7; תַּבַּלְתִּים, 2 Kings xxiii. 13; βδελύγματα, 1 Macc. vi. 7.

—*ἱεροσυλεῖς*] Luther: "thou robbest God of what is His," on which he comments: "Thou art a robber of God, for it is God's glory which all who would be holy through works take from Him." Similarly Calvin: "sacrilegium simpliciter est profanatio divinae majestatis;" Bengel: "quia Deo non das gloriam, quae proprie Dei est." But as *κλέπτειν*, *μοιχεύειν*, denote particular outward offences in the proper sense, *ἱεροσυλεῖν* here is scarcely meant to be taken in this improper, general, spiritual sense. Others, accordingly, have supposed a reference to an indirect dishonouring of Jehovah by robbing His temple at Jerusalem. "Thou art horrified at idols, as if God's honour were thy sole concern, and yet robbest thou God's temple?" Appeal has been made to Mal. i. 8–14, iii. 8–10, Joseph. *Antt. Jud.* viii. 3. 5 f., where examples of indirect temple-robbery are recorded. However, the opposition of *διδάσκειν* and *οὐ διδάσκειν*, of *μὴ κλέπτειν* and *κλέπτειν*, of *μὴ μοιχεύειν* and *μοιχεύειν*, requires us to assume as the opposite to *βδελύσσεσθαι τὰ εἰδωλα* a reference to Gentile idolatry. The complete antithesis would have been *ὁ βδελύσσομενος τὰ εἰδωλα τοῖς εἰδώλοις λατρεύεις*; but from the return of the Jews from exile, idolatry proper no more lifted up its head among them. On this account Paul selects the sin next in criminality to idolatry,—robbery of Gentile idol-temples, by which the Jews, despite their horror of idols, nevertheless, from greed of the temple-vessels and treasures, really defiled themselves with the idolatrous images of Gentile temples; thus, according to their own views, entering into unhallowed fellowship with idols, and even indirectly participating in idol-worship, comp. 1 Cor. x. Thus in the words *ὁ βδελυσσόμενος τὰ εἰδωλα, ἱεροσυλεῖς*, sharp reproach and keen irony are implied. *ἱεροσυλεῖν* in our passage was early applied by Chrys., Theoph.,<sup>1</sup> and Oecum. to the robberies committed by Jews in heathen temples. They are followed by the majority of modern expositors. Such *ἱεροσυλεῖν* was expressly and strictly forbidden in the law (Deut. vii. 25). That it nevertheless occurred in those days has been concluded from Acts xix. 37; Joseph. *Antt.* iv. 8. 10. Probably it took

<sup>1</sup> Theoph. remarks well: *ἱεροσυλίαν λέγει τὴν ἀφαίρσιν τῶν ἀνατιθεμένων τοῖς εἰδώλοις. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ βδελύσσοντο τὰ εἰδωλα, ἀλλ' ὅμως τῇ φιλοχρηματίᾳ τυραννοῦμενοι ἤπτοντο τῶν εἰδωλικῶν ἀναθημάτων δι' εὐσχροκερδίαν*, save that he limits *ἱεροσυλεῖν* too narrowly to the purloining of the *ἀναθήματα*.

place more commonly than we are in a position to prove from the accounts that have come down to us. By *κλέπτειν, μοιχεύειν, ἱεροσυλεῖν*, then, the apostle describes the sins of robbery, adultery, and sacrilege that were both openly current among the Jews, and practised still more frequently in secret, nay, were perpetrated under the hypocritical mask of devotion (Matt. xxiii. 14). Still he certainly did not exclude cognate forms of evil, such as evil desire and inclination to these sins.

Ver. 23. The apostle having mentioned by name three special offences, sums up his description of the Jewish violation of the law in the words of this verse: "To sum up briefly, Thou who makest boast of the law, dishonourest thou God by transgressing the law?" Certainly the language becomes still more impressive if this concluding verse be taken, not as a question, but as an apostrophe or categorical declaration. *ὃς ἐν νόμῳ καυχᾶσαι*] comp. ver. 17: *καυχᾶσαι ἐν θεῷ*. In Bar. iv. 3, the *νόμος* is called the *δόξα* of Israel; and in ver. 4 it is said: *μακάριοι ἐσμὲν Ἰσραὴλ ὅτι τὰ ἀρεστὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῖν γνωστά ἐστιν*; comp. Ps. cxlviii. 19, 20.

—*τὸν θεὸν ἀτιμάζεις*] The antithesis of *ἐν νόμῳ καυχᾶσαι* and *τὸν θεὸν ἀτιμάζεις* is explained by the fact that the *νόμος* is a *νόμος θεοῦ*. God may be dishonoured by the *παράβασις νόμου* in a twofold sense; first, in that the transgressor of the law robs God of the honour accruing to Him from obedience to the law; and again, which is the chief point here, in that he is the cause of others reproaching the true God, seeing that they judge of His nature and law by the moral character of His servants. "Quomodo et hodie," says Calvin, "Christum dehonestant per evangelii transgressionem, qui de ejus doctrina otiose garriunt, quam interim effreni ac libidinosi vivendi forma proculcant" (comp. 2 Pet. ii. 2). The opposite is found Matt. v. 16: *οὕτω λαμψύτω τὸ φῶς ὑμῶν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥπως ἴδωσιν ὑμῶν τὰ καλὰ ἔργα, καὶ δοξάσωσι τὸν πατέρα ὑμῶν τὸν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς*. On the other hand, from the wickedness of the Jews, the Gentiles might readily infer the impurity of their law and of Jehovah the lawgiver.

Ver. 24. The apostle ratifies the reproach against the Jews, urged in ver. 23, by a declaration of Holy Scripture. The quotation is taken as regards form from Isa. lii. 5; as regards substance, from Ezek. xxxvi. 23. In the passage in Isaiah the

LXX. translate: δι' ὑμῶς διαπαντὸς τὸ ὄνομά μου βλασφημεῖται ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. The words δι' ὑμῶς and ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν are not found in the original text, but fall in with the sense of the context. But the context withal makes clear that the Lord in the prophet rebukes not the Jews, but the Gentiles who profaned the name of the Lord by their oppression of the Jews His people. In Ezekiel, on the other hand, it is said, ver. 21: τὸ ὄνομά μου τὸ ἅγιον, ὃ ἐβεβήλωσαν οἶκος Ἰσραὴλ ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. There the Jews are rebuked, because by their banishment, the necessary consequence of their sins, they afforded the Gentiles ground for disparaging the glory and honour of Jehovah, as if He were unable to protect His people. From this Paul derives the general truth, that every reproach of the people of Israel, not only the reproach on account of their humiliation in a state of servitude, but also that on account of their sins, is reflected upon the God of Israel. And without doubt, in the case lying before us in the prophet, the power of the God of Israel, and with His power His holiness, fell under reproach on account of His people's sins, for which reason He there declares that He will hallow His name anew; comp. also 2 Sam. xii. 14; Neh. v. 9; 1 Tim. vi. 1. On the καθὼς γέγραπται subjoined Bengel observes: "Convenienter hoc incisum hic in extremo ponitur, de re per se evidente: ponitur autem ob Judaeos" (ch. iii. 19). Paul, as the γάρ, found neither in the Hebrews nor in the LXX., shows, makes the prophet's utterance his own, and only afterwards indicates that it is a prophetic declaration by the formula of citation placed at the close.

Ver. 25. The apostle so far had disabused the Jews of the notion that the outward possession of the revealed law in and of itself conferred on them pre-eminence above the Gentiles, and intimated to them that, on the contrary, by their transgression of the law they were found in the same condemnation as the Gentiles. Now he proceeds to strip them of the last refuge to which they usually betook themselves, their illusive trust in the possession of circumcision. This was so great, that some Jews maintained the opinion that the circumcised need not expect and fear the torments of Gehenna. As the outward possession of the law avails thee nothing, rejoins the apostle, so circumcision avails thee nothing, if thou break the law. By that thy circumcision becomes uncircumcision, i.e. thou art regarded as a Gentile. No harder thing could be said to a Jew.

—περιτομή μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ, εἰν νόμον πρᾶσσης] The self-defined term *περιτομή* does not need the article, just as little as *νόμος*, ver. 12. Even in German (and in English) it is here best translated without the article *Beschneidung*, *circumcision*, as a descriptive introduction of that to which the Jews attached the greatest importance. But it is not to be taken metonymically for Judaism in general (ὁ Ἰουδαϊσμός), or synecdochically for the ceremonial law in general, but signifies circumcision as a sign of the covenant. γὰρ confirms the position assumed vv. 17–24. “As a transgressor of the law thou dishonourest God, and thus art without the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. To this circumcision, in which thou perchance placest thy trust, makes no difference, *for* circumcision is of advantage to him that keeps the law.” What the advantage of circumcision is, this was not the place to explain further. Paul explains (iii. 2, and especially iv. 11), that to devout and believing Israelites it was the sign and seal of divine grace. The possibility of the νόμον πρᾶσσειν meant here is attested by Ps. cxix.

—ἄκροβυστία γέγονεν] The Jews deemed the *præputium* *הֶזֶק* especially impure. That circumcision was to be reckoned uncircumcision, *i.e.* was to lose all the advantage which it was believed to impart to the circumcised over the uncircumcised, was for the proud Jews a doctrine full of humiliation. Expositors quote analogous passages from Schemoth Rabba, where, in genuine rabbinical style, it is said in a literal, as here it is said in a metaphorical sense: “Dixit R. Berechias: Ne haeretici et apostatae et impii ex Israelitis dicant: *quemadmodum circumcisi sumus, in infernum non descendimus*. Quid agit Deus Sanctus Benedictus? Mittit angelum et *præputia ipsorum attrahit* (comp. 1 Cor. vii. 18), *ita ut ipsi in infernum descendant*.” Comp. Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judenthum*, II. p. 339 f. γέγονεν is the present of completed action (1 Cor. xiii. 1).

Ver. 26 expresses the converse thought. “If the Jew transgress the law, his circumcision *eo ipso* has become uncircumcision, ver. 25; if the Gentile keep the law, his uncircumcision *eo ipso* has become circumcision, ver. 26.” This last thought is put in the form of an affirmative question, to intimate that not even the Jew could take exception to it. The inferential particle οὖν refers to the thought expressed ver. 25, that all depends on the observance of the law. ἡ ἄκροβυστία] *abstractum pro concreto* = ὁ ἀκρό-

**βυστος.** To this *nomen concret.*, which must be taken from the *nomen abstract.*, the following αὐτοῦ in ἡ ἀκροβ. αὐτοῦ refers. The converse case is found John viii. 44: ψεύστης ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ (namely, τοῦ ψεύδους); Winer, p. 181. Hengstenberg, *ibid.*, no doubt translates differently, referring αὐτοῦ to ψεύστης = he is a liar and a father of the liar (as a generic conception).

—τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ νόμου φυλάσσει] includes, like τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα, ver. 27, more than τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖν, ver. 14. There is expressed by it a perfect, not merely outward, but withal profoundly inward observance of the law. τὰ δικαιώματα, *decrees, statutes, ordinances, moral precepts*, comp. i. 32.

—εἰς περιτομὴν λογισθήσεται] comp. ix. 8; Acts xix. 27: λογίζεται τι εἰς τὸ (or ὥστε) εἶναί τι. Thus the preposition εἰς expresses the result of an act of bringing into account. Uncircumcision will be brought into account as circumcision, will be reckoned as circumcision, and indeed this will be done in the *judgment*. By the uncircumcised, if he observe the law, the same *σωτηρία* will be enjoyed as is destined for the circumcised. Comp. Matt. viii. 11: λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν, ὅτι πολλοὶ ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν ἥξουσιν, καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται μετὰ Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν; iii. 9: λέγω γὰρ ὑμῖν, ὅτι δύναται ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τῶν λίθων ἐγείρει τέκνα τῷ Ἀβραάμ; also 1 Cor. vii. 19; Gal. v. 6. In the present case the apostle speaks not merely in the abstract of a possibility which merely may become a reality. Rather he assumes, as in ver. 10, that cases actually occur in which Gentiles exhibit such observance of the law. But this only comes to pass in the strength of grace.<sup>1</sup> The declaration is accordingly to be referred to the so-called proselytes of the gate, the φοβούμενοι τὸν θεόν, comp. Acts xiii. 26, 36, and

<sup>1</sup> Those expositors who take vv. 6–10 merely as *sententia legalis*, suppose that in vv. 25–27 the apostle speaks merely hypothetically. Hence Calov describes the declaration before us as a *factio rhetorica*. But that the apostle has in view cases really occurring, vv. 28, 29 especially seem to intimate. When Meyer calls our reference to proselytes of the gate thoroughly arbitrary, and Tholuck describes it as a far-fetched makeshift (comp. also Schott, *Römerb.* p. 178), it is to be replied that these are thoroughly arbitrary suppositions which are not far to seek. With our exposition of vv. 6–10 and vv. 25–29, Besser also agrees in *Bibelstunden zum Römerbriefe*. To the unregenerate, carnal Jew, the principle of this verse is certainly meant to be a *sententia legalis* passing judgment on him; but this is a consequence of the fact that to him the picture of the true Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ θεοῦ, κατὰ πνεῦμα, forms an utter contrast.



Hengstenberg on John iii. 21. Next, it admits an application to the Gentile Christians as well, since the Jewish Christians, as the Galatian epistle especially shows, were not all free from the notion that the Gentile Christians should submit unconditionally to outward *περιτομή*, in order to attain the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. The *ἀκροβυστία* of which Paul speaks in this verse is not *ἐν τῷ φανερῷ, ἐν σαρκὶ περιτομή*, but in truth a *περιτομή καρδίας, ἐν πνεύματι*, vv. 28, 29. To vv. 25, 26 the saying of Rabbi Lipmann supplies a parallel: "verum illi nesciunt, quod fides non posita sit in circumcisione, sed in corde. Quicumque vero non credit, illum circumcisio Judaeum non facit; qui vero recte credit, is Judaeus est, etiamsi non circumcisisus."

Ver. 27. *καί*] Luther: "and will therefore." In this case *καί* is consecutive. Others take the passage as a reply to the question ver. 26, give an emphatic force to *κρινεῖ*, and render *καί, even, beside this*. In this case *καί* is intensive. Lachmann, *et al.*, less emphatically take ver. 27 as a continuation of ver. 26, put a comma after *λογισθήσεται*, and a note of interrogation after *παραβάτην νόμον*.

—*κρινεῖ*] comp. Heb. xi. 7: *πίστει . . . Νῶε . . . κατεσκεύασε κιβωτόν· δι' ἧς κατέκρινε τὸν κόσμον*; Wisd. iv. 16: *κατακρινεῖ δὲ δίκαιος καμὼν τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσεβεῖς*. Grotius rightly interprets: "comparatione sui tuam culpam evincet," "by his righteousness he will expose thy unrighteousness and guilt." *κρινεῖ* at the close alludes, by way of rebuke, to *κρίνεις*, ver. 1. The relation will be inverted.

—*ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία*] = *οἱ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκρόβυστοι*. *Uncircumcision by nature*, but which (this is the contrast to be added in thought) is a *περιτομή ἐν πνεύματι*. As to its natural outward character, it is an *ἀκροβυστία*; as to its spiritual inward character, a *περιτομή*.

—*τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα*] therefore the reference may be also to a perfection of good works in the regenerate, certainly not in the Catholic sense of the phrase, but simply in so far as the spiritual element in them is taken into consideration, and the carnal imperfection that cleaves to them, for the sake of the righteousness of faith that hides it, is not brought into account. Comp. Matt. v. 48: *ἔσσεσθε οὖν τέλειοι*; Phil. iii. 15; Col. iv. 12; John xvii. 23; 1 John ii. 5: *ἀληθῶς ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ τετελείωται*; also Gal. v. 23; and yet Paul says

with the same truth, Phil. iii. 12 : οὐχ ὅτι ἤδη ἔλαβον, ἢ ἤδη τετελείωμαι.

—σὲ τὸν διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς παραβάτην νόμου] = σὲ τὸν τὸ γράμμα καὶ τὴν περιτομὴν ἔχοντα καὶ παραβαίνοντα τὸν νόμον. We should say : *with letter and circumcision*, although thou hast letter and circumcision. διὰ with the genitive, properly = *through*, denotes here, as often, the circumstances, situation in which some one is found doing or suffering something. The Greeks regard the circumstances under which anything takes place as the remoter cause of what takes place, because the circumstances in which we find ourselves usually influence the character of the action, modify and determine its distinctive qualities. Hence διὰ δακρύων, διὰ πένθους, *with tears, with grief*, comp. iv. 11, xiv. 20 ; 2 Cor. ii. 4, iii. 11 ; 1 John v. 6 ; Winer, p. 475. γράμμα, in allusion to the Mosaic law, never means in Paul anything but *letter*, in contrast with πνεῦμα, ver. 29, vii. 6 ; 2 Cor. iii. 6, 7. Here, therefore, it is the same. If the word stood simply for νόμος γεγραμμένος without further emphasis, why did the apostle say διὰ νόμου καὶ περιτομῆς ? As γράμμα denotes the external letter of the law, so περιτομή denotes external circumcision taking place only in the flesh. The Jews possessed merely γράμμα and περιτομή ἐν σαρκί, not πνεῦμα and περιτομή καρδίας, which the ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία spoken of by Paul possessed. To the former possession they attached the greatest value and yet were παραβάται νόμου, not considering περιτομή ὠφελεῖ, εἰν νόμον πράσσης. The purport of this verse, then, may be paraphrased as follows : “ The uncircumcised in flesh, whom thou as such despisest, but who keeps the law, and thereby proves that he is circumcised in heart, will judge thee who art in possession of the law and of circumcision in the flesh, to which thou attachest such value, and yet art a transgressor of the law ; whereas letter and circumcision were intended to remind thee of the duty of observing the law, and only on condition of this observance have any value.” Thus ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία stands opposed to διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς, as τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα does to παραβάτης νόμου. With the teaching of this verse, comp. Matt. xii. 41 : ἄνδρες Νινευῖται ἀναστήσονται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετὰ τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης, καὶ κατακρινούσιν αὐτήν, and ver. 42 : βασίλισσα Νότου ἐγερθήσεται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετὰ τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης, καὶ κατακρινεῖ αὐτήν.—The apostle (vv. 25–27) had ad-

vanced the doctrine that circumcision which breaks the law will be reckoned uncircumcision; on the other hand, uncircumcision which keeps the law, circumcision, and will come forward as the judge of law-breaking circumcision—that, therefore, circumcision simply is of no avail. This doctrine is supported (vv. 28, 29) by the assertion that real Judaism and true circumcision are nothing outward, but inward, of a nature not visible and carnal, but invisible and spiritual.

Ver. 28. The subject of the sentence is incomplete, and must be completed from the predicate. *Οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ* (sc. *Ἰουδαῖος*) *Ἰουδαῖος ἐστίν· οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ, ἐν σαρκὶ* (sc. *περιτομῇ*), *περιτομή* (ἐστίν). By *Ἰουδαῖος* in the second case the *Ἰουδαῖος ἀληθινός* is to be understood, as by *περιτομή* the *περιτομή ἀληθινή*.—*ἡ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ, ἐν σαρκί, περιτομή*] The words *ἐν σαρκί* are an exegesis of the words *ἐν τῷ φανερῷ*. Circumcision is visible, inasmuch as it is performed and perceptible in man's body. A similar depreciation of mere outward circumcision is found Eph. ii. 11: *ὑπὸ τῆς λεγομένης περιτομῆς ἐν σαρκὶ χειροποιήτου. ἐν τῷ φανερῷ περιτομή* lays stress on the element which peculiarly characterizes the *ἐν τῷ φανερῷ Ἰουδαῖος*, although in addition he is distinguished from the Gentile by ceremonial service also, knowledge of Jehovah and of His law, etc.

Ver. 29. Several modern expositors take *ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ* as subject, *Ἰουδαῖος* (sc. *ἐστίν*) as predicate; and in the same way *περιτομή καρδίας* as subject, *ἐν πνεύματι, οὐ γράμματι* (sc. *ἐστίν* or *γίνεται*) as predicate. "But he is a Jew who is so in secret, and circumcision of the heart takes place in spirit, not in letter." But first of all, the omission of *ἐστίν* indicates that the apostle wishes *ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος* to be connected together. Else he would have written, in keeping with ver. 28: *ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ, Ἰουδαῖος ἐστι*. And again his object, as the contrast with ver. 28 indicates, is not to teach that circumcision of the heart is carried out in spirit, not in letter, but that only heart-circumcision—spiritual, not literal in nature—is true circumcision. On these grounds we prefer the more generally accepted mode of connection, according to which *ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος* is the subject from which the predicate *Ἰουδαῖος ἐστίν* is to be taken, and just so *περιτομή καρδίας* the subject from which the predicate *περιτομή ἐστίν* is to be supplied. *ἐν πνεύματι, οὐ γράμματι* is then a definitive apposition to *περ. καρδίας*, as in ver. 28 *ἐν σαρκί*

is an expexegesis of ἐν τῷ φανερώ. As then (ver. 28) the imperfect subject is to be completed from the predicate, so conversely (ver. 29) the entire predicate is to be supplied from the subject, and accordingly to be construed: ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος (Ἰουδαῖος ἐστίν), καὶ περιτομὴ καρδίας, ἐν πνεύματι, οὐ γράμματι (περιτομή ἐστίν).—ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος] *a Jew is he who is so in secret, i.e. within, in disposition, comp. with τὰ κρυπτά*, ver. 16, and 1 Pet. iii. 4: ὁ κρυπτὸς τῆς καρδίας ἄνθρωπος. A similar contrast of the ἐν τῷ φανερώ and ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαϊσμός is depicted by the Lord in the Sermon on the Mount, Matt. vi., comp. especially vv. 6, 18. Such ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖοι and περίτμητοι τῇ καρδίᾳ were the believing fathers of the old covenant; such also were the Gentiles who adhered to the faith of the covenant-people. Expositors quote the analogous rabbinical saying: "Judaei in penetralibus cordis sedent."

—περιτομή καρδίας] Deut. x. 16: כָּבַדְתִּיךָ לֵבָבִי לַיהוָה, xxx. 6; Ezek. xliv. 7: לֵבָבִי לַיהוָה; Jer. iv. 4; Acts vii. 51; Col. ii. 11; Phil. iii. 3. Philo, too, describes circumcision as σύμβολον ἡδονῶν ἐκτομῆς. The περιτομή σαρκός had a twofold meaning: first, it was σφραγὶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως, iv. 11; and next, a sign of obligation to περιτομή καρδίας. The latter failing, it ceased to be σφραγὶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης, and lost its value altogether. Indeed, in the case of the unworthy, the sacrament ceases to be a sacrament, i.e. a means of salvation; not as to its objective nature, but as to its subjective advantage; comp. ver. 25, the contrast of περιτομή ὠφελεῖ and περιτομή ἀκροβυστία γέγονεν = οὐκ ὠφελεῖ.

—ἐν πνεύματι, οὐ γράμματι] Luther's note: "spirit means what God works in man beyond nature; letter means all action of nature." But here, without doubt, as in the parallel passages quoted on ver. 27, by πνεῦμα the πνεῦμα ἅγιον is to be directly understood; by γράμμα, the νόμος, in so far as it is outward letter, not fulfilled in the πνεῦμα. ἐν is to be taken instrumentally. The circumcision spoken of is one that takes place *in*, i.e. *through*, the Holy Spirit, not *through* the letter of the law. The law commands circumcision, and it takes place ἐν γράμματι, when it takes place simply in outward obedience to the law; ἐν πνεύματι, when the Holy Spirit circumcises the heart and purges it of its lusts (2 Cor. xiii. 3). The notion that the possession of the πνεῦμα ἅγιον could not be ascribed to believers of the O. T.

is refuted at once by Ps. li. 12. Whoever, with Luther, in most intimate experience simply sees in the psalms the liturgy of all saints, and from them has drunk the richest of spiritual comfort in time of trial, will be unable again to sympathize with views of the O. T. and its worthies so full of dishonour. *Πνεῦμα*, then, is here not, "in distinction from the Holy Spirit of Christianity," an undefined, vapour-like, though "living Spirit, coming from God and filling the soul of the true Jew." Just as little is it "the spirit of man" in which circumcision takes place, a meaning already expressed in *καρδίας*, and having against it the antithesis of *πνεῦμα* and *γράμμα*.

—οὗ] To interpret it as neut. = *cujus rei*, and refer it to the entire sentence describing (ver. 29) ideal Judaism and ideal circumcision, appears to us more difficult and improbable than the common interpretation of the relative as masc., and referring it to *Ἰουδαῖος*, who, moreover, even in *περιτομή καρδίας*, is to be contemplated as the one possessing such circumcision.

—ὁ ἔπαινος] comp. 1 Cor. iv. 5. The article marks out the praise as praise that is due, fitting, such as only God the *καρδιογνώστης* can bestow. But the Jews sought only praise, approval, and honour from men who look at what is outward, John v. 44, xii. 43. Rightly Oecum.: *τῆς γὰρ κρυπτῆς καὶ ἐν καρδίᾳ περιτομῆς οὐκ ἔσται ἐπαινέτης ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐτάζων καρδίας καὶ νεφροὺς θεός*.

## CHAPTER III

THE apostle has really brought to a close the first section of his exposition, dealing with the proposition: *Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἕλληνας πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν*, comp. ver. 9. He might at this point, as he does in this chapter, vv. 9–20, summing up once more the result and confirming it, especially in reference to the guilt of the Jews by Scripture testimonies, conclude this section. But he foresees the necessity of a digression, in order to obviate an objection naturally rising out of the previous exposition. It might seem by what is said in the second chapter, particularly vv. 25–29, as if Judaism implied no superiority whatever over heathenism,—a conclusion which would have exposed him to the just reproach that he disparaged the revelations made by the Lord to the people of Israel. On this account he now himself raises the question:

Ver. 1. *Τί οὖν τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου;*] The particle *οὖν* draws an inference from what precedes, especially ii. 28, 29, according to which only *spiritual* circumcision would avail, and the Gentile who fulfils the law would judge the Jew who possesses but breaks the law. Or we might refer *οὖν* to the entire exposition contained in ch. i. and ii. and its consequence, which is drawn out by Calov in the words: “*Si non minus Judaei, quam gentiles sub condemnatione sunt, vi peccati, quod demonstrat Apostolus, quid ergo praecipui habent Judaei prae gentibus? et quae est circumcisionis utilitas?*” Only that in the expressions *ὁ Ἰουδαῖος* and *ἡ περιτομή* the special allusion to the *conclusion* of the second chapter is unmistakeable. It will be best, then, to combine the more general and more special reference: If, now, Jews are sinners like the Gentiles, and it is no benefit to the Jew as a sinner to be a Jew and to possess the outward law. “If, now, matters stand thus.” *τὸ περισσόν*, *that which is over and above*, Matt. v. 37; *what is more, what is better* than another thing, Matt. v. 47 = *ἡ περισσεία*; LXX. Eccles. i. 3, vi. 8, *ἡ προτίμησις*, *ornamentum, decus, the pre-eminence*. The apostle makes this

objection in his own name. If it proceeded from another,—a Jew, Gentile, Jewish or Gentile Christian,—this would be indicated by an ἐρεῖς οὖν or otherwise, ix. 19, xi. 19; 1 Cor. xv. 35.

—ἢ τίς ἡ ὠφέλεια τῆς περιτομῆς;] a *subordinate* question in reference to the special value of circumcision, which is not separately answered in what follows. Respecting the advantage of circumcision, comp. iv. 11.

Ver. 2. Paul replies to his own question raised in ver. 1. πολὺ] namely, τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου ἐστίν. The apostle notices only the first part of the question; nor does he, as observed, return again to the ὠφέλεια τῆς περιτομῆς. This was the less called for, as περιτομή in reality is merely the seal of the λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ.

—κατὰ πάντα τρόπον] may be = *omnino, profecto, by all means, certainly, in every case*. Luther: “in truth, exceeding much.” But the following πρῶτον indicates that several points of pre-eminence floated before the apostle’s mind, that therefore κατὰ πάντα τρόπον = *omni ex parte, in every respect, in all points*.

—πρῶτον μὲν γάρ] Lachmann omits γάρ; but some copyists might easily, from reminiscences of πρῶτον μὲν, i. 8, pass it over in error. Elsewhere γάρ is wanting in manuscripts when μὲν γάρ appear in connection. Some expositors interpret πρῶτον: *primarium illud*, or: *præcipue*, or: *id quod præcipuum est*; so that the complete phrase would run: πρῶτον μὲν γάρ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι, *the principal one is this, that God committed to them this λόγια*. In this case the apostle intended from the first only to bring forward the principal one and pass by the rest in silence, thus avoiding the anacoluthon. But πρῶτον is better taken in the sense of *primum, in the first place*. The complete sentence then would run: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περισσεία ἐστίν, ὅτι, *for in the first place it is a privilege, that, etc.* In this case there should follow an εἶτα or ἔπειτα; but the apostle, turned aside by ver. 3 ff., lets this fall through, comp. i. 8; 1 Cor. xi. 18. This is quite in keeping with the apostle’s animated style and strain of thought. The objection raised by himself (vv. 3, 5) diverts him from the mention of further privileges. Add to this, that in fact in ὅτι ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ the chief privilege, comprising within itself most of the others, was instanced, and that the apostle was satisfied with repelling, simply in the form of suggestion, the reproach that he made light of the God-given privileges of Israel. For the same reason, in harmony with the

main aim of his argument, he employs the enumeration of these privileges to rebuke the unbelief, the unfaithfulness, and easy-going self-righteousness of the Jews. Moreover, a complete catalogue of Israel's privileges is found in ix. 4, 5.

—ὅτι ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ] = ὅτι ἔχουσι πιστεῦ-  
θέντα τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ, comp. 1 Cor. ix. 17; Gal. ii. 7; 1 Thess.  
ii. 4; 1 Tim. i. 11. Winer, p. 326: "When a verb which  
governs the dative or the genitive of the person (as πιστεύειν τινί,  
κατηγορεῖν τινος) is used in the passive, the Greeks are accustomed  
to make the noun which denotes the person the subject of the  
passive verb." We say πιστεύειν τινί τι, in the passive  
πιστεύεταιί τινί τι, but usually πιστεύεταιί τίς τι. οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι  
must be supplied as subject to ἐπιστεύθησαν from the collective  
ὁ Ἰουδαῖος, ver. 1. τὰ λόγια is accusative of object. The being  
entrusted with a thing implies the obligation of fidelity in taking  
care of the treasure entrusted. λόγιον, properly diminutive of  
λόγος, is used, both in classical and Hellenistic Greek, chiefly  
of utterances of the Deity. Comp. the rich collection of examples  
in Bleek on Heb. v. 12 in his commentary. The diminutive,  
perhaps, originally indicated the brevity which was a general cha-  
racteristic of oracles. The LXX. employ λόγιον for רִבְּרָא, אִמְרָא, אִמְרָא,  
always in reference only to an oracle of God, whether one of predic-  
tion or command the context decides. Ps. xix. 14 supplies only  
an apparent exception, since τὰ λόγια τοῦ στόματός μου there, as  
spoken through the Holy Spirit, may be regarded as at the same  
time λόγια θεοῦ. Philo also frequently uses the word of the  
oracles of God. In the N. T., in addition to the present passage,  
it is found in Acts vii. 38 of the νόμος Μωϋσέως; in Heb. v. 12 of  
the εὐαγγέλιον; in 1 Pet. iv. 11 of God's revealed word in general.  
The connection, therefore, decides as to the wider or narrower  
reference of the expression. In the present verse there is no  
reason to limit the λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ exclusively to the νόμος or  
exclusively to the ἐπαγγελίαι. τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ, without more  
precise definition, are rather to be referred generally to the oracles  
of God as a whole, treasured up in the O. T. writings and en-  
trusted to the care of the people of Israel. Chrysostom therefore  
rightly interprets: χρησμούς ἄνωθεν κατενεχθέντας. Without  
doubt the Messianic predictions belonged to these λογίοις θεοῦ,—  
nay, in a certain sense formed their most essential constituent and  
central point. Calvin therefore rightly interprets: "Oracula vocat



foedus, quod Abrahæ primo ejusque posteris divinitus revelatum, postea lege et prophetis consignatum ac explicatum fuit." And Calov: "Non modo oracula Messiam præmonstrantia vel ἐπαγγελίαι notantur, sed *universa λόγια* et eloquia Dei, tota V. T. Scriptura." The pre-eminence, then, of the people of Israel, mentioned here by the apostle, was an objective, not subjective one. As guardians of the divine revelations imparted to them, they were without question distinguished in the clearest manner from the Gentile world, inasmuch as the right use of these saving means might to them, as was actually the case with the believing fathers of the O. T., prove the medium of salvation. But the conversion of this objective pre-eminence, in the first instance more an advantage than a pre-eminence, into a subjective one, depended wholly on the right use of the means provided.

Ver. 3. τί γάρ;] *quid enim? for what? for how?* removes a difficulty lying in the way, and therefore confirms the preceding proposition, comp. i. 18. The complete form would run: τί γάρ ἐστίν; *for how stands the matter?*—εἰ ἠπίστησάν τινες] Most modern expositors refer this to the rejection of Jesus as Messiah on the part of the Jews. But, first of all, instead of the general τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ, ver. 2, we should then have expected the more special expression τὰς ἐπαγγελίας τοῦ θεοῦ. Again, up to this point Paul describes only Judaism absolutely, apart from its attitude to the gospel. Only with νυνὶ δέ, ver. 21, begins the delineation of the Christian period, where likewise the very mode of representation withal assumes a specifically Christian hue. We therefore prefer the view that the apostle here does not treat (as in ch. ix.—xi., comp. especially xi. 29–31) of the Jews' want of faith in the gospel of Christ, which, to pass by the connection, is not clearly enough suggested by the form of expression; but of their want of faith in Jehovah's O. T. revelations, in the λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ. In every age, in truth, Israel was a rebellious and idolatrous nation. Comp. also Mehring, p. 250. We are not, then, with Calov, to think at the same time of the period before and after Christ, but only of the first. The ἄπιστοι were really not τινές, but πολλοί; but perhaps τινές is used here not so much to soften the expression, as is done in xi. 17, where the apostle is opposing the presumption of the Gentiles, as rather in contempt or irony. "Quod non valde sub censum veniant," says Bengel. In contrast with the truthfulness of the divine word,

the host of unbelievers shows like a small, contemptible crowd. With this interpretation Mehring also agrees. ἀπιστεῖν, ἡ ἀπιστία αὐτῶν and ἡ πίστις τοῦ θεοῦ must all clearly be taken in the same sense. Now we may interpret either: *to be unfaithful, their unfaithfulness, the faithfulness of God*, or: *to be unbelieving, their unbelief, the trustworthiness of God*. We prefer the latter, because with the trustworthiness, *i.e.* truthfulness of God (τοῦ θεοῦ, *genit. subject.*), a synonym for the ἀλήθεια θεοῦ, the words γινέσθω ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής, ver. 4, harmonize. Rightly, therefore, Theophylact interprets τὴν πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ by τὸ πιστὸν τῶν ὑποσχέσεων αὐτοῦ, τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ ἀμετάθετον, although the ὑποσχέσεις are not *exclusively* meant. The sense, then, of this verse is: "Should the unbelief of the Jews overthrow the truthfulness of God so that His revelations are not to be trusted, and therefore cannot be regarded as a real means of salvation, or form a true ground of privilege to the nation to which they are given?" So little is this the case, that, on the contrary, in every age many of the Israelites found life through faith in the truthfulness of the divine covenant-revelations. "Ergo significat," says Calvin, "semper mansisse in gente quosdam, qui in promissionis fide stantes ab illa praeerogativa non exciderint." But *fides specialis* in the ἐπαγγελία includes in it *fides generalis* in the νόμος, the παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν. So far the entire O. T. revelation of God is to be regarded as a means of salvation, the law as a preparation, the promise as *actually* saving. And like πίστις, so also does ἀπιστία relate to this entire revelation, the undivided λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ. It is an unbelieving rejection, as well of the law as of the promises of God.

Ver. 4. μὴ γένοιτο] = הֲיִי, Gen. xliv. 17, Josh. xxii. 29, where also the LXX. render μὴ γένοιτο, 1 Sam. xx. 2, expresses negation accompanied with abhorrence, Luke xx. 16. It is accordingly the strongest form of denial: *minime vero*, God prevent, God forbid! Luther: "far be it!" a frequent deprecatory formula with Paul. It invariably deprecates an unseemly inference, put in the form of a question, from the preceding exposition. Accordingly it is found almost exclusively in the epistles containing a systematic doctrinal exposition, namely, in the Roman and Galatian epistles (Rom. iii. 6, 31, vi. 2, 15, vii. 7, 13, ix. 14, xi. 1, 11; Gal. ii. 17, iii. 21), in addition only in 1 Cor. vi. 15, and in the passage cited from the *Pauline* gospel of Luke. Moreover, the formula is not strange to later Greek.

—*γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής*] *γινέσθω* answers to *γένοιτο*. *Ναι*, let God become true, i.e. let the matter have this issue, that God is true, i.e. be deemed true. God becomes true when in the convictions of men He is acknowledged for what He is. Theophylact, then, rightly explains *γινέσθω* by *φανερύσθω*, *ἀποδεικνύσθω*, ver. 19; or among moderns, Matthias by *ὁμολογείσθω*. “Deum veracem dicit, non modo quia bona fide stare promissis paratus sit, sed quoniam opere implet, quidquid loquitur,” Calvin. As here *ἀληθής*, so in Tit. i. 2 God is called *ἀψευδής*.

—*πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης*] comp. Ps. cxvi. 11: *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης*. “Nunc de naturae vitio disputatur, non de gratia Dei, quae vitiis remedium est,” Calvin. If *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος* is by nature a liar, we cannot wonder if the *τινές*, who, according to ver. 3, by unbelief gave divine revelation the lie, were of themselves a great multitude.

—*καθὼς γέγραπται κτλ.*] The citation is taken *verbatim* after the LXX. from Ps. li. 4: “Against Thee only have I sinned, and done what is evil in Thy sight, *לְפָנֶיךָ בְּדָבָרְךָ בְּתַפְלִיתִי*, in order that Thou mayest be righteous in Thy speech, pure in Thy judgment.” As to the interpretation of the passage, comp. Hengstenberg on Ps. v. II. 193. David alleges the illustration of God’s righteousness as the end of his sin; for the sin no doubt belongs to man, but the *form* of the sin to God, who places the sinner in such circumstances as compel him to reveal his inward depravity in a definite manner. “In allusion to this co-operation of God, David says that he must needs have committed so heinous a sin in order that in the *judgment* which God held upon him, in the first instance through Nathan, His righteousness, purity, and holiness might be made known, and hence His name glorified and honour increased,” Heng. So also Gesenius in *Thesaur.* p. 1052: “eum in finem peccavi, ut illustretur justitia tua.” In this sense, then, Paul interprets the passage in the Psalms. Israel’s unbelief, he says, is so far from casting doubt upon the divine credibility, that, on the contrary, by its very means God alone is exhibited as true, man as a liar; since it was ordained by God, in order that by man’s unrighteousness God’s righteousness might receive striking illustration. With this view the objection of ver. 15 is in thorough keeping. From this interpretation it is clear that although the LXX. probably took *κρίνεσθαι* in the passive sense, Paul, in harmony with the original

text, understood it as middle in the intransitive sense: *litigare, to judge*, comp. LXX. Job xiii. 19; Isa. xliii. 26; Jer. ii. 35; Matt. v. 40; 1 Cor. vi. 1, 6. "In order that Thou mayest appear righteous when Thou passest sentence (*ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου* = *in sententia ferenda*), and overcome (despite man's opposition, appear as a righteous Judge) when Thou judgest." In any case, the exposition given is in closer accord with the strain of thought in the context than the reference of the passage quoted from the psalm to the preceding *confession* of sin = "Against Thee only have I sinned (this I confess), in order that Thou mayest appear righteous in Thy judgment." Nor is our interpretation in any respect inconsistent with the teleology of the O. T. On the contrary, Scripture everywhere regards the glorification of the divine name as the *ultimate* aim of every event. Sin, no doubt, contradicts the divine *voluntas antecedens*, but in virtue of the *voluntas consequens* it subserves the manifestation of the divine righteousness.—*νικᾶν, vincere*, used as often in *sensu forensi*, is stronger than *הִפִּיחַ*, to which in *substance* it corresponds.

The apostle should now properly, in conformity with *πρῶτον μὲν*, ver. 12, go on to adduce other privileges of the Jews. But the statements of vv. 3, 4 lead him to a digression, which is found in vv. 5–8. He had begun to set forth the privileges of the people of Israel, and along with this had shown that these objective privileges were so far from forming the ground of a subjective privilege, that, on the contrary, they served to aggravate Israel's guilt and responsibility. Thus God alone is glorified as the righteous and true covenant-God, not the rebellious and faithless people. But now, from this fact, considering the proud, litigious spirit of the people, he might look forward to a new objection, which he anticipates, starting it in his own name. If our unrighteousness, he says, sets in clear relief, as I have just shown, God's righteousness, wherefore then is God angry, and why does He punish sinners who by their sin contribute to His glory? Should we not in that case rather do evil that good may come, namely, that by this very means God may be glorified? Thus the apostle, as it were, himself points out to the self-righteous sinner the last hiding-place of self-righteousness for the very purpose of expelling him thence, and then anew and for ever binding him in fetters of accusation and judgment not to be broken.

Vv. 5, 6. εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην συνίστησι] The expressions ἀδικία and δικαιοσύνη are suggested by δικαιωθῆναι, ver. 4. The ἀδικία includes in it ἀπιστία, ver. 3, and ψεῦδος, ver. 4, as the δικαιοσύνη includes ἀλήθεια, ver. 4. The unrighteousness (ἀδικία) of man is the generic conception to which his unbelief and his falsehood belong as species. Just so the righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) of God is the genus in which His trustworthiness and truth are involved as species. ἡμῶν, looking back to πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ver. 4, is doubtless used in the name of all men; but Paul is thinking here, as there, mainly of the Jews, of whom he is specially treating. The opposed words, ἡμῶν θεοῦ, are placed emphatically side by side. συνίστημι = δείκνυμι, ἀποδείκνυμι, to show, demonstrate, verify (v. 8; 2 Cor. vi. 4, vii. 11; Gal. ii. 18). That our unrighteousness sets in relief God's righteousness, the apostle concedes. This he had expressly said ver. 4, as he does again ver. 21, just as in xi. 32 the display of the divine compassion is alleged as the end of sin. But now follows the false conclusion, which might easily be deduced from this position, introduced by the apostle's accustomed formula—τί ἐροῦμεν] *What should we say? What should we hence infer?* (vi. 1, vii. 7, viii. 31, ix. 14, 30).

—μὴ ἄδικος ὁ θεός] *Is not God unrighteous?* This inference, the meaning is, appears to result from the preceding premiss. μὴ in questions stands not merely where a negative answer is presupposed or expected, but also where there is the disposition to believe what the question appears to deny (Winer, pp. 641, 642; Matt. xii. 23, xxvi. 22; Luke iii. 15; John iv. 33, viii. 22). Certainly in the present passage the apostle asks but κατ' ἄνθρωπον, in the name of the ignorant, who are ready to draw such inferences. Therefore it is opposed to the context to render: *God is not unrighteous then?* so that the question leads us to expect a negative answer. Rather is μὴ here not substantially different from *nonne*. The affirmative answer to the interrogative μὴ is certainly no unconditional one. It may be better expressed: "this indeed is scarcely credible, and yet it seems so, and yet one cannot avoid this inference."

—ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργήν] not: *God, when He inflicts the wrath*, but: *God, who inflicts the wrath*, or: *the God who inflicts the wrath*. It is thus assumed as well known that God is one ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργήν. This is the force of the article before the

participle, Winer, p. 167. The article before ὀργή points out the wrath as a definite one, namely, the one issuing forth in the judgment, the judicial wrath of God spoken of i. 18, ii. 5, 8. With ἐπιφέρειν ὀργήν, comp. Phil. i. 16: ἐπιφέρειν θλίψιν; Jude 9: ἐπιφέρειν κρίσιν. But the apostle here has chiefly in mind the wrath impending over the nation of the Jews. ἄδικος and τὴν ὀργήν have the emphasis.

—κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω] *I speak after the fashion of a man, like a man, as man.* ἀνθρώπινον, in opposition to θεῖον, has the secondary notion of what is imperfect or sinful. So in 1 Cor. iii. 3 κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν stands as a parallel to σαρκικὸν εἶναι. The particular force of the Pauline formula κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω is determined by the context in each case. Gal. iii. 15: I give an example, taken from ordinary human life, in which is implied a condescension to man's imperfect power of comprehension. Similarly, Rom. vi. 19. I speak after the manner of men, who do not weigh their words with exact precision; I avail myself, so as to speak intelligibly and forcibly, of the harsher expression ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ. 1 Cor. ix. 8: Speak I only according to human opinion, which is untrustworthy and deceptive, or not also in accordance with God's law? In the present passage, finally, κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω: I speak as a man, who often speaks and judges of God and God's dealings in a rash, unworthy manner. This interpretation Theodoret's exposition does not preclude: οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, φησί, ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων τέθεικα λογισμούς. For when Paul talks after the manner of men, he certainly does not speak as a Christian and apostle, but as an ordinary man, *i.e.* as other unenlightened men are wont to talk.

—μὴ γένοιτο] an indignant rejection of the perverse inference.

—ἐπεὶ πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον] ἐπεὶ expresses the ground of this rejection. *For, if this were so = else, alioquin* (xi. 6; 1 Cor. v. 10, vii. 14), *how shall God judge the world?* The future (κρινεῖ) stands either for ethical possibility, Winer, p. 348, or is also to be taken as purely *future*, since it refers to an event actually occurring in the future. That God judges the world is admitted. But from this it follows that ground for the judgment exists, that wickedness is actually punishable. Closely examined, then, these words do not so much refute as repel a blasphemous objection, which, for its own sake, deserves no

refutation. Were God unrighteous, the apostle argues, when He is wroth at the unrighteousness of men, then would He not be so at all. But He is so, as follows from His admitted judgment of the world. Therefore sin merits wrath and punishment. For the apostle, the righteousness of God is so certain that He deems no proof of it necessary. Thus the words: *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω· μὴ γένοιτο· ἐπεὶ πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον*, which are to be read *uno tenore*, contain a provisional, parenthetic, indignant repudiation of *μὴ ἄδικος ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργήν*. The apostle's purpose in this is not to give such a refutation as would satisfy an opponent, but merely, in the most positive manner, to free himself from all complicity in such blasphemous language. Accordingly we should perhaps enclose, if anything at all, not so much *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω* merely, as *κατὰ . . . κόσμον* together in brackets, by which course the imperatively required connection of ver. 7 with ver. 5 is rendered easy. For the *believer* undoubtedly the reply given by the apostle is enough; for him the righteousness of God the judge of all is unalterably fixed (Gen. xviii. 25; Ps. l. 6; Isa. xi. 3, 4). But the daring objector whom the apostle has in view, if this reply were proposed to him, would, from his point of view, not shrink from the reply, either that God cannot be judge of the world if man's unrighteousness serves only to glorify the divine righteousness; or if He is, that then He is simply an unrighteous judge.

Vv. 7, 8. The apostle having cleared himself from suspicion of approving the false inference ver. 5 (*μὴ ἄδικος ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφ. τ. ὀρ.*), and at the same time for his *Christian* readers indicated the mode of its refutation, can now the more freely allow himself to amplify the inference but briefly stated in ver. 5. The *γάρ*, ver. 7, then recurs to ver. 5, and introduces a resumption and further confirmation of the false inference found there. "Is not God unrighteous in His wrath?" ver. 5. "For if His truth is glorified by my lie, why should I yet be judged as a sinner, ver. 7, and why rather should we not do evil that good may come?" ver. 8. It is impossible in vv. 7 and 8 to find either a confirmation of ver. 6, or a refutation of the false inference *μὴ ἄδικος κτλ.*, or even of the premiss *εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀδικία κτλ.*, ver. 5. Nay, the truth of this premiss is conceded by the apostle himself. The inference from this Paul does not *refute* in vv. 7 and 8, but *confirms*, as the literal sense of the verses clearly proves, and for

this very reason vv. 7 and 8 contain no confirmation of the refutation of this inference, no confirmation, that is, of *ὡς κρινεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον*, ver. 6.<sup>1</sup>—*ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ θεοῦ*] corresponds with *θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη*, ver. 5, but in place of this general conception puts the special one in allusion to *ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής*, ver. 4. From this we see that Paul is dealing with the Jew, who, on the ground that by his *ἀπιστία* in the *λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ* he glorifies the *ἀλήθεια τοῦ θεοῦ*, supposes that he has a right to impunity from punishment.

—*ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ψεύσματι*] corresponding with *ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν*, ver. 5, in allusion to *πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης*, ver. 4. The *ἐμῷ*, like the following *καὶ γὰρ*, indicates that the apostle puts himself in the place of the Jew, and speaks in his person. The *ἐμὸν*, *ἐγώ*, then, is individualizing, and by this individualization the language of the opponent gains in point and keenness. The older Attic form for *ψεῦσμα* is *ψεῦδος*.

—*ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ*] corresponds in a stronger form with *συνίστησι*, ver. 5. *ἐπερίσσευσεν* = *περισσὴ ἐγένετο*, *became great, glorious, superabundant*, or appeared so (2 Cor. iii. 9, viii. 2). God's truthfulness through my falsehood has become

<sup>1</sup> Meyer remarks on ver. 7 f.: "The *ἐπὶ ὧς κρινεῖ ὁ θεὸς τ. κόσ.* receives its *illustrative confirmation*; for as to the case of God, who would thus be *unrighteous*, and nevertheless is to *judge* the world, every ground for judging man as a sinner must be superseded by the circumstance already discussed, viz. that His truth has been *glorified* by man's falsehood (ver. 4 f.); and (ver. 8) as to the case of man himself, there would result the principle directly worthy of condemnation, that he should do evil in order that good might come." I would subscribe to this view of the confirmation of ver. 6, if I were not deterred by the *difficulty* of the line of thought thus arising. The thought not expressed, but merely *assumed* (ver. 6), that the God who judges the world is *righteous*, is said to be confirmed by the fact that the course which He follows in the general judgment would not be pursued by God if He were *unrighteous*. And even this main thought, "the *unrighteous* God would not so act," is (ver. 7) again not directly *expressed*. Against Meyer, comp. now Tholuck 5, Aufl. *ibid.* Following the lead of many older and modern expositors, Tholuck, and in the same way Umbreit, regard ver. 7 as a continuation and further confirmation of ver. 5. Taking *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον* up to *τὸν κόσμον* as a parenthesis (the marks of the bracket are not even necessary) is the less "a violent expedient," as the apostle in those words above all things merely wishes to free himself and his followers from the blasphemous inference; and then (ver. 7) he makes the perverse Jew, in whose name he speaks, anew and in an enlarged form repeat and confirm his inference in opposition to the disclaimer (ver. 6). The examination of the entirely novel interpretation given by Mehring of vv. 5-8 would lead us too far. In our judgment, this learned and profound exegete, wherever he enters alone upon a new, untrodden path of interpretation, only too readily falls into artificial and forced expositions. Comp. also his exposition of iii. 26, iv. 2, v. 15, 16, which certainly will find no followers.



exceedingly great, exceedingly abundant to His praise, *i.e.* my falsehood has richly contributed to the illustration of God's truth, and thus to His glory (2 Cor. iv. 15). The aorist indicates that the contribution to God's glory stands forth in the day of judgment as a historical fact.

—τί ἔτι καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἁμαρτωλὸς κρίνομαι ;] "Why am I also still (I, who yet contribute to God's glory) judged as a sinner?" Concerning the Gentiles, who, since they have no divine revelation, do not by their unbelief in it glorify God's truthfulness, it might indeed hold good that they are righteously judged. The expression κρίνομαι is perhaps suggested by κρινεῖ, ver. 6. We see from τί ἔτι καὶ γὰρ κρίνομαι ; how little the opponent regarded the refutation of his false inference contained in ver. 5 as a refutation affecting him. The sign of interrogation after κρίνομαι should be exchanged for a comma, the question introduced by τί being continued further. In the continuation, then, it should have run : καὶ τί μὴ ποιήσωμεν τὰ κακὰ ἵνα ἔλθῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ; Instead of this, the phrase, cursorily inserted, though not on that account to be bracketed : καθὼς βλασφημούμεθα καὶ καθὼς φασί τινες ἡμᾶς λέγειν, occasions a change of construction, so that now ποιήσωμεν is made, by means of an ὅτι, to depend on λέγειν. As to this attraction, not rare among the Greeks, by which a part belonging to the principal sentence is drawn to the dependent sentence, comp. Winer, p. 783 ; and with the recitative ὅτι introducing the direct statement, comp. John i. 20, xviii. 6.

—καθὼς βλασφημούμεθα] *i.e.* as if we did evil that good might come, in distinction from καθὼς φασί τινες ἡμᾶς λέγειν, as if we even advanced such a doctrinal principle. The apostle here makes reference to an impeachment and perversion of his teaching actually occurring. The utterance of this slander is somewhat explicable from statements like the one in Rom. v. 20, 21, the perverse application of which, vi. 1, Paul himself instantly disclaims (comp. also Rom. xi. 32 ; Gal. iii. 22). The plural βλασφημούμεθα, ἡμᾶς, in distinction from the singular ἐμῶ, καὶ γὰρ, ver. 7, indicates that Paul here is not representing the Jew, but speaking in his own name as apostle.

—τὰ ἀγαθὰ] namely, the glorifying of God's truthfulness.

—ὡν τὸ κρίμα ἐνδικόν ἐστιν] ὡν, not : of those who thus slander me, but : of those who intend to act thus, *i.e.* to do evil for a good end ; for it was necessary, as the connection proves,

to expressly rebuke these last in a solemn manner. Moreover, in the words *ὦν τὸ κρίμα ἔνδικόν ἐστιν* lies not so much a reply, which the apostle in moral indignation could not prevail on himself to give, as rather merely a fitting rebuke and energetic repudiation of the absurd and blasphemous inference with which he is dealing. He could the more readily content himself with this indignant correction, as the daring assertion that God is unrighteous in His wrath if He judges the unrighteousness which conduces to the glory of His righteousness, has now exposed its immoral and detestable consequence in the proposition: Let us do evil that good may come, with such revolting nakedness as to secure the condemnation of every judgment. God judges the world righteously, the apostle had said, ver. 6; but why am I still judged? the opponent had replied, ver. 7; now, ver. 8, it is self-evident that this judgment falls on him righteously. *κρινεῖ, κρίνομαι, κρίμα*, vv. 6, 7, 8, are used, then, in reference one to another. *κρίμα* is here also the sentence of condemnation passed on such evil-doers at the final judgment. *ἐνδικόν* = τὸ ἐν δίκῃ ὄν, *γιννόμενον*, in accordance with justice, Heb. ii. 2. Moreover, Paul elsewhere, instead of replying, repels with indignation the guilty pride which finds fault with God's judgments, and seeks to draw from them an excuse for sin, ix. 19-21. But Calvin gives in striking form the proper solution of the enigma embodied in this passage. "Neque vero," he says, "hanc impiam cavillationem responso dignatur apostolus: quam tamen optima ratione licebit retundere. Hoc enim tantum praetexit, Si Deus nostra iniquitate glorificatur, et nihil agere in vita hominem magis decet, quam ut Dei gloriam promoveat: peccandum ergo in ejus gloriam. At prompta est depulsio, Quod malum per se, non nisi malum parere potest. Nostro autem vitio quod Dei gloria illustratur, id non opus esse hominis, sed Dei: qui ut mirus est artifex, malitiam nostram subigere et alio traducere novit, ut praeter destinatum a nobis finem eam in gloriae suae incrementum convertat. Praescripsit nobis rationem Deus, qua velit a nobis glorificari, nempe pietatem, quae in verbi obedientia sita est. Hos limites qui transilit, Deum non honorare, sed contumelia magis afficere nititur. Quod aliter succedit, Dei providentiae ferendum est acceptum, non hominis pravitati, per quam non stat, quominus Dei majestas evertatur, nedum laedatur."

The apostle had now proved (ch. i.) the sinfulness of the

Gentiles, demonstrated (ch. ii.) that the Jews are in no respect better than the Gentiles, acknowledged (ch. iii. 1-8) the objective superiority of the Jews in the fact of their being entrusted with the revelations of God, by which it is apparent withal how little the Jews had on their part turned to advantage this God-given priority. Quite naturally now, reverting to ver. 1, he returns to the exposition given in the second chapter, and indeed does this with the question: whether, then, the Jews, despite their objective advantage, had a subjective pre-eminence? To this question he is compelled to reply in the negative, at the same time proving the sinfulness of Jews and Gentiles by means of O. T. testimonies. This argument he employs principally on behalf of the Jews, as this method of argument had no special force in the case of the Gentiles. But he employs it principally *against* the Jews. Of the sinfulness of the Gentiles the Jews were convinced even without this; but as concerns their own sinfulness, their obstinate passion for self-justification could only be brought to the dust by means of an authority acknowledged by themselves. This is the purport of vv. 9-20.

Ver. 9. τί οὖν;] *sc. ἐστίν*, Acts xxi. 22; 1 Cor. xiv. 15; or ἐροῦμεν, vi. 1, vii. 7. *What then? i.e.* what follows then? what takes place in consequence? how, therefore, stands the question? The same question of inference is found vi. 15, xi. 7.

—προεχόμεθα;] In consonance with demonstrable usage, προέχεσθαι has but two meanings. Either it is passive: *Are we surpassed?* In this case it cannot be, as supposed by some, a question of the Gentiles, who would be introduced here entirely without warning, and to whom Paul, in what he said concerning the Jews, had not given the slightest ground for such a question. Rather we should have had here a question of the insolent Jews: "Are we surpassed by the Gentiles? are we worse than the Gentiles?" But apart from the consideration that then Paul would have introduced the opponent's question by an ἐρεῖς οὖν instead of by τί οὖν, this was in no sense the contention of the apostle in what precedes. Not that the Gentile surpasses the Jew, but only that the Jew does not surpass the Gentile, was the position maintained by the apostle. Besides, what follows is altogether irrelevant as an answer to *this* question. First, it must have been said: οὐ μόνον Ἰουδαίους ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἕλληνας, or at least: Ἕλληνός τε καὶ Ἰουδαίους, but not: Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ

Ἑλληνας κτλ. Secondly, it would have been necessary anew to establish this in particular, that the Gentiles also are sinners; but not, as on the contrary is done first of all, that the Jews also are sinners. — But in the second place, *προέχεσθαι* may be taken as middle, in the sense of *to pretend, practise*. But against the rendering: *How then? Do we use a pretext? i.e. should we put forward a pretext?* it is first of all to be objected, that *προέχεσθαι* in this sense cannot be proved to be used absolutely, like *προφασίζεσθαι*. As little as in German it could be said *vor sich halten* (to hold before oneself) in the sense of *etwas vor sich halten* (to hold something before oneself) = to allege something in defence, could it be said in Greek *προέχεσθαι* in the sense of *προέχεσθαί τι*. In that case *τί οὖν προεχόμεθα*; must have been joined together: *what, then, can we put forward in defence?* But against this the *οὐ πάντως* tells, for then it must necessarily have stood *οὐδὲν πάντως*. But further, according to this interpretation, *προεχόμεθα* could only naturally refer to the pretext employed by the Jews, vv. 5 and 7. But these verses contain a secondary thought already dismissed and done with, and the apostle now manifestly reverts to the exposition contained in the second chapter; and finally, the answer given does not suit this interpretation, for it says that the Jews are sinners, not that they had and should desire no excuse for their sins.

Nowise satisfied, then, with the regular meanings of *προέχεσθαι*, we are compelled to attempt a modified use of the word. But then it is manifestly too harsh and arbitrary to attribute to the verb *προέχειν* the altogether alien sense: *to prefer*. *Are we preferred?* namely, on the part of God to the Gentiles. Rather is this the more easy and simple supposition—that the middle stands for the active, *προέχεσθαι* for *προέχειν*, in the ordinary sense of *antecellere, praestare*. Therefore *προεχόμεθα* = *προέχομεν, nun praestamus? nun antecellimus? Have we a pre-eminence? Have we any advantage?* namely, over the Gentiles. So, now, even Baur and Umbreit. Elsewhere also in later Greek the middle form is found instead of the active. Comp. Winer, p. 322; Kühner, § 398, 3; Tholuck on this passage; Harless on *Eph.* i. 23, p. 131 f. An express instance of this in the N. T. is furnished by Tit. i. 5, where (provided that, as we believe, the *lectio recepta* is correct, for the reading of Lachmann, *ἐπιδιορθώσης*, is perhaps only a grammatical correction) *ἐπιδιορθοῦσθαι* is used for

ἐπιδιорθῶν. With the present προεχόμεθα also may be compared Tit. ii. 7: σεαυτὸν παρεχόμενος, instead of σεαυτὸν παρέχων. But in the present passage the middle form is not used for the active without a slight modification of meaning, as in Tit. i. 5. Rather it may be interpreted: Have we any advantage *for ourselves*? Is the privilege of advantage *to us*? This interpretation is perfectly, nay, in regard to ver. 1, exclusively germane to the context. It is found already in Theophylact: ἔχομέν τι πλεον καὶ εὐδοκимоῦμεν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, ὡς τὸν νόμον καὶ τὴν περιτομὴν δεξάμενοι; and even the reading of some ancient codices, versions, and Fathers: τί οὖν προκατέχομεν (or κατέχομεν) περισσόν; (which also, in what follows, omit οὐ πάντως and γάρ), clearly at first merely a gloss on τί οὖν προεχόμεθα, presents the same interpretation. The Vulg. also has: *præcellimus eos*?

—οὐ πάντως] The most obvious rendering would be: *non prorsus, non plane, non quovis pacto, not entirely, not in every point*, as in 1 Cor. v. 10. But Paul's object, as what is directly subjoined shows, is not to say that the Jews, though not entirely, yet partially excel the Gentiles, but that they do not excel them at all. οὐ πάντως then = πάντως οὐ, 1 Cor. xvi. 12, *prorsus non, nullo pacto, not at all, not in any way*; Theoph.: οὐδαμῶς; Vulg. *nequaquam*. The οὐ holds good πάντως, Winer, p. 693. οὐ πάνυ also is used in the sense of *omnino non*. As, therefore, the objective pre-eminence, the περισσόν of the Jews, holds good κατὰ πάντα τρόπον, ver. 2; so a subjective pre-eminence, a πρόχειν of the same, holds good κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον.

—προητιασόμεθα] αἰτία like the Latin *causa, charge, accusation*. αἰτιάσθαι, *to accuse, to charge*. πρό, *before*, namely in ii. 1 ff. the Jews, in i. 18 ff. the Gentiles. Comp. προέγραψα, Eph. iii. 3. The compound προαιτιάσθαι does not occur again. The comma after γάρ is to be deleted, for Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἑλλήνας πάντας is not the accusative belonging to the infinitive, but the direct object of the verb προητιασόμεθα. "For we have before accused Jews and Gentiles one and all." The apostle could regard his charge as *established*. "Vera accusatio," says Calvin, "nonnisi ea est, quæ firmis validisque probationibus nititur: quemadmodum inter accusationem et convicium alicubi Cicero distinguit." πάντας does not stand hyperbolically for πολλούς, as is proved by οὐδὲ εἰς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἕως ενός, vv. 10, 12, and πᾶν στόμα, πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, πᾶσα σύρξ, vv. 19, 20. All the less can

ii. 14, 15 have been meant of the justification of particular Gentiles by means of moral works of the natural law. "Loquitur autem de omnibus hominibus præter Christum," says Melancthon, "ac de sanctis etiam quatenus sine misericordia considerantur. Porro exemplum de Judæis accommodandum est ad omnes omnibus temporibus qui versantur in bonis operibus moralibus." In this way the general mode of speech, found in the plural *προεχόμεθα*, is justified.

—*ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι*] specifies the matter of the charge = *τοῦ εἶναι ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν*, for we say *αἰτιάσθαι τινά τι* or *τινά τινος*. But it is still more simple, perhaps, to join *πάντας* with *εἶναι* as an *accus. c. infin.* depending on *προηησιασόμεθα* = we have before accused Jews and Gentiles, that they all, etc. With the expression: "To be subject to sin as to a master," comp. Matt. viii. 9. "*ὑπό* notat subjectionem tanquam *sub* tyrannidem *peccati*," Bengel. With the sentiment, comp. Rom. vii. 14: *ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός εἰμι, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, and John viii. 34: *πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, δούλος ἐστὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. In this expression *ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι* = *ἁμαρτωλὸν εἶναι*, though stronger, it is clearly manifest how Paul, in his delineation of the actual sins of the Gentile and Jewish worlds in the first and second chapters, has at the same time described the sinful principle lying at the basis of the various manifestations of sin, and holding sway over all mankind. From this point of view alone do the testimonies of David and Isaiah, which follow presently, prove what they are meant to prove. Properly, they picture the moral corruption of their own age; but in this moral corruption the inner and universal corruption of the human heart is reflected. In so far are the words a perpetual prophecy.

Vv. 10-12 are taken from Ps. xiv. 1-3. Paul cites rather freely after the translation of the LXX. The conjunction *ὅτι* serves to indicate quotation, somewhat like our colon or marks of quotation. *οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς*] The LXX., in conformity with the Heb. כִּי אֵין צַדִּיק אֶחָד, have *οὐκ ἔστι ποιῶν χρηστότητα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἕως ἑνός*. Altering the form more than the sense of the words, Paul puts for this *οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος*, both because *οὐκ ἔστι ποιῶν χρηστότητα* is repeated ver. 12 (although certainly in the Heb. and the LXX. the same expression occurs), and especially because *οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς* is eminently appropriate, summing up by anticipation the general result of the following Scripture

testimonies. The general result is just this, that all are devoid of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, because all are *ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν*. Rightly, therefore, Bengel remarks on the word *δίκαιος*: "aptum verbum, in sermone de justitia." The addition of the LXX., *οὐκ ἔστιν ἕως ενός*, for which Paul puts *οὐδὲ εἰς*, is found in the Heb. text for the first time in the third verse. Paul employs it here so early, in order at once distinctly to express the unrestricted universality of sinful corruption.

—*οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ συνιῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἐκζητῶν τὸν θεόν*] Ps. xiv. 2. The LXX., conformably to the Heb. text: *κύριος ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ διέκυσψεν ἐπὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τοῦ ἰδεῖν εἰ ἔστι συνιῶν ἢ ἐκζητῶν τὸν θεόν*. Paul at once states briefly the negative result of this divine search. *συνιῶν*, in Heb. *לְיָסֵדִים*, *wise, intelligent*, as elsewhere *לְיָסֵדִים*, in the sense: *pious, righteous*. On the other hand, *לְבָבִים*, *foolish*, is often found in the sense: *ungodly*. Piety is wisdom, both in its own nature and as ensuring salvation; ungodliness is folly, both in its own nature and as ensuring ruin. The participial form *συνιῶν* for the regular *συνιείς*, from *συνιέμι*, is derived from the root *συνιέω*. It is especially frequent in the LXX. Others accentuate, perhaps more correctly, *συνίων* from *συνιώ* (*ῶ* instead of *ῖμι*). Comp. Winer, p. 136, and Buttmann, *Ausf. Gr. Spr.* I. p. 543. *ἐκζητεῖν τὸν θεόν*, *יִתְחַלֵּץ אַחַר שְׂרָה*, *to seek after God* (*ἐκζητεῖν*, stronger than *ζητεῖν*), *to direct his thoughts to God, to concern himself about God*. Luther: *to inquire after God*. The article, omitted by some codices perhaps merely as a correction, serves to indicate the entire genus. "The pious man, the man who inquires after God, is not to be found." So Matt. xii. 35: *ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει τὰ ἀγαθὰ*, comp. Winer, p. 132. The following 12th verse corresponds exactly with Ps. xiv. 3, according to the LXX.

—*πάντες ἐξέκλιναν*] *all are turned aside, i.e. from the right way*. In the Hebrew: *כָּל הַיָּמִין*.

—*ἅμα ἡχρειώθησαν*] To *ἅμα* must be supplied in thought from what precedes—*πάντες* = *all together*, *יְהוָה*, *the entire mass* is depraved. *ἄχρεῖος*, *useless*; then in a moral sense: *worthless, good for nothing*, Matt. xxv. 30, *nequam, improbus*. From this *ἡχρειώθησαν*, in harmony with the Hebrew *יִהְיוּ לְרֵעָה*, *they are become worthless, are corrupt*.

—*οὐκ ἔστι ποιῶν χρηστότητα*] *χρηστός* forms a contrast with *ἄχρεῖος*. *χρηστότης*, commonly = *goodness, benignitas*; here = *honestas, virtus, virtue*, Heb. *יָדָבָר*.

—οὐκ ἔστιν] ποιῶν χρηστότητα to be repeated in thought.

—ἕως ἑνός] *up to one*—*i.e.* this one included, there is none who does good. Heb. וְיִשְׁׁרָאֵל, *even one*—*i.e.* thou wouldst not find one, even wert thou willing to be satisfied with one. οὐκ ἔστιν ἕως ἑνός is then = οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ εἰς. The Roman also says: “ad unum omnes improbi sunt”—*i.e.* the one included. Comp. LXX. Judg. iv. 16 : οὐ κατελείφθη ἕως ἑνός.

Ver. 10 thus treats of unrighteousness in general which is manifested as irreligion, ver. 11, and as immorality, ver. 12. The Scripture passages which follow treat of special forms of sin, partly in word, vv. 13, 14, partly in deed, vv. 15–17. The last scriptural testimony, reverting to the beginning, ver. 11, traces back individual sins to their source, the absence of the fear of God. The quotations, vv. 13–18, are found in editions of the LXX. as four verses of the fourteenth Psalm. But they are taken from other O. T. passages, and on the margin of the Codex Vatican of the LXX. are added to Ps. xiv. from the Roman epistle. In the Hebrew they are found only in *one* codex, manifestly translated into Hebrew by a Christian reader.

Vv. 13, 14. τάφος . . . ἐδολιούσαν] verbatim from Ps. v. 9 after the LXX.

—τάφος ἀνεωγμένος ὁ λάρυγξ αὐτῶν] “Their throat is an open grave.” The *Etymol. Mag.* distinguishes λάρυγξ δι’ οὗ λαλοῦμεν καὶ ἀναπνέομεν and φάρυγξ δι’ οὗ ἐσθίομεν καὶ πίνομεν ἐπειδὴ δύο πόροι εἰσὶ τοῦ λαιμοῦ. According to this it is not the gullet that is meant, the gullet as the organ of swallowing, by which they would be represented as bloodthirsty ἀνθρωποφάγοι; but the guttur, the throat as the organ of *speech*. So, too, λάρυγξ, LXX. Ps. cxlix. 6, cxv. 7; Job xxxiii. 2. Doubtless the original distinction soon disappears, and λάρυγξ and φάρυγξ are interchanged, so that Phavorinus is not wrong when he says: λάρυγξ καὶ φάρυγξ ταυτό. Comp. Job xxxiv. 3: λάρυγξ γεύεται βρώσιν. Only in the present passage λάρυγξ, the Heb. לַיִשׁ, retains its original meaning, as is proved by its juxtaposition with the other organs of *speech*, γλῶσσα, χεῖλη, στόμα, which are referred to simply as organs of *speech*. The *tertium comparationis* between the throat and an open grave is *destructiveness*. Their words and discourse threaten with ruin those who approach them, as a grave swallows up corpses. In Jer. v. 16 the quivers of the



Chaldeans, pregnant with destruction, are compared to an open grave.<sup>1</sup>

—ταῖς γλώσσαις αὐτῶν ἐδολιούσαν] *with their tongues they deceive*, Heb. וְהִפְּטוּ שְׂפָתָם, *they make smooth their tongues*—i.e. they flatter and feign so as the more easily to lead the unwary to their undoing. In the third pers. plur. of the historical tenses, the flexion *σαν* instead of *ον* is very often found in the LXX. and the Byzantines—e.g. Ps. lxix. 1, ἦλθοσαν instead of ἦλθον. So here ἐδολιούσαν according to the LXX., comp. Winer, p. 91. The imperfect (*they were deceiving*) denotes what still continued to take place.

—ἰὸς ἀσπίδων ὑπὸ τὰ χεῖλη αὐτῶν] from the LXX. Ps. cxl. 3. The whole verse there runs: ἠκόννησαν γλώσσαν αὐτῶν ὥσεί ὀφεως, ἰὸς ἀσπίδων ὑπὸ τὰ χεῖλη αὐτῶν. Adders' poison is an image of cunning and destructiveness combined. Bengel finds the cunning indicated in ὑπό, saying: "Sub labiis, nam in labiis mel est."

—ὦν τὸ στόμα ἀράς καὶ πικρίας γέμει] from Ps. x. 7, Heb. מִן הַמִּוֹרָא מְלֵא הָיָה הָלָא, "His mouth is full of cursing, and deceit, and oppression," LXX.: οὗ ἀράς τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ γέμει καὶ πικρίας καὶ δόλου. Thus they render מִוֹרָא, *deceit*, by πικρία, probably confounding it with מִרְרָא, *bitterness*, although again they add δόλου, and then leave ἦ untranslated. "*Os esse excecratione et amarulentia plenum*," says Calvin, "*quod vitium contrarium est superiori: sed intelligitur omni ex parte ipsos spirare malitiam. Si enim suaviter loquuntur, decipiunt, ac sub blanditiis venenum propinant: sin depromunt, quod habent in animo, illic prodit amarulentia et execratio.*" There have been mentioned, vv. 13, 14, the different instruments of speech,—*throat, tongue, lips, mouth*,—one and all lying at the service of unrighteousness, as ὅπλα ἀδίκιας, vi. 13, to be employed for a neighbour's destruction.

Vv. 15-17 are taken freely after the LXX. from Isa. lix. 7, 8. These read, with unimportant variations, agreeably to the original text: οἱ δὲ πόδες αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πονηρίαν τρέχουσι,

<sup>1</sup> Meyer well: "When the godless have opened their throats for lying and corrupting discourse, it is just as if a grave stood opened (observe the *perfect*), to which the corpse is to be consigned for decay and destruction. So certainly and unavoidably corrupting in their discourse." So now also Matthias. Less in harmony with the following description, Pelag. Beng. Estius: "Sicut sepulcrum patens exhalat tetrum et pestiferum foetorem, ita ex ore illorum impuri, pestilentes, noxiique sermones exeunt." In the same way Tholuck and Mehrling.

ταχινοὶ ἐκχέαι αἷμα, καὶ οἱ διαλογισμοὶ αὐτῶν διαλογισμοὶ ὑπὸ φόνων· σύντριμμα καὶ ταλαιπωρία ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ ὁδὸν εἰρήνης οὐκ οἶδασι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι κρίσις ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτῶν. The apostle omits ἐπὶ πονηρίαν τρέχουσι because it is already implied in ταχινοὶ ἐκχέαι αἷμα, and passes over the sentence καὶ οἱ διαλ. . . φόνων, because he is here treating, not of thoughts, but of deeds.

—σύντριμμα καὶ ταλαιπωρία ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτῶν] Where they have walked, or walk, are found only ruin and misery. In their paths are found only those whom they have plunged into ruin and misery.

—καὶ ὁδὸν εἰρήνης οὐκ ἔγνωσαν] A path in which they might be the means of diffusing happiness, they have never become acquainted with. They belong not to the εἰρηνοποιοῖς, they are accustomed to nothing but the exercise of hostility. The ὁδὸς εἰρήνης clearly supplies a contrast with the ὁδοῖς, in which σύντριμμα καὶ ταλαιπωρία are found. It is therefore not to be interpreted: They know not the way to peace, *i.e.* to their own salvation. Against this also tells the parallel addition of the LXX., taken from the original text: καὶ οὐκ ἔστι κρίσις ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτῶν, “and there is no judgment in their paths.”

Ver. 18. From Ps. xxxvi. 1, after the LXX. “The fear of God is not before their eyes;” *i.e.*, it is not the fear of God which they keep in view, by which they are guided in their dealings, Ps. xxvi. 3.—The question is, lastly, with what right the apostle, in the Scripture passages quoted, could find an assertion of the sinful condition of the whole world. Now Ps. xiv. 1–3 certainly contains such a universal reference. Comp. Hengstenberg, *Comm. on Ps.* vol. I. p. 205: “Paul justly puts this passage at the head of his proof; for the O. T. contains no passage in which the universality and depth of human corruption are painted in such vivid colours.” In the other psalms the enemies of the sacred psalmist are spoken of, “ubi in se ac suis,” remarks Calvin, “typum quendam regni Christi adumbrat; quare sub adversariis ejus repræsentantur nobis omnes, qui alieni a Christo ejus spiritu non aguntur.” Isaiah’s rebuke refers to Israel: “itaque accusatio ejus multo magis in gentes competit. Quid ergo?” continues Calvin, “His elogiis hominum naturam depingi, nihil dubium est: ut inde spectemus, qualis sit homo sibi relictus: quandoquidem Scriptura tales esse omnes testatur, qui non sunt Dei gratia

regenerati. Sanctorum nihilo melior foret conditio, nisi emendata esset in illis pravitas." But the *regenerati* most willingly and without murmuring invariably apply to themselves such Scripture accusations, in remembrance not only of their former natural state, but also of the sin still remaining in their flesh.

Ver. 19 seeks to strip the self-righteous Jew of the pretext, in which he was disposed to take refuge, that the scriptural declarations quoted, vv. 10-18, applied only to Gentiles, not to Jews. οἷδαμεν δέ] comp. ii. 2, introduces an acknowledged principle. The matter, the meaning is, is well known to all who are conversant with Holy Scripture.

—ὅτι ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει] On the principle: *a parte potiori fit denominatio*, ὁ νόμος serves here to designate the entire Old Testament; for the scriptural passages were taken, be it noted, from the Psalms and prophets, not specially from the Mosaic law.<sup>1</sup> Comp. John x. 34, xii. 34, xv. 25; 1 Cor. xiv. 21. Paul expressly uses this title here, not only because of the legal character of the citations, but also for the sake of the allusion to the immediately following τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ.

—τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ] οἱ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, *sc.* ὄντες, who are in the law (νόμος here in the strict and proper sense) as their sphere of life, *i.e.* the Jews, ii. 12. λέγειν refers more to the thoughts expressed, λαλεῖν to the utterance in words. "What the law contains (says, λέγει) it speaks (makes known, commands, λαλεῖ) to those who stand under it." Hence in Matt. ix. 33, Luke xi. 14, it can only be said ἐλάλησεν ὁ κωφός, not ἔλεγεν, because here the chief point is not the thoughts expressed, but only the utterance in words. Comp. Lücke, *Comm. John* II. p. 290, and Meyer on John viii. 43; Mark i. 34. The law speaks to those who are under the law, in order that they may walk by it, apply it to themselves. As matter of fact, the covenant-Scriptures were given to the covenant-people. Therefore the rebukes in those Scriptures were intended to apply to them. The rebukes to the Gentiles were indicated as such by the prophets, constituted a subordinate element in the entire code, and were not recorded directly for the benefit of the Gentiles but of Israel, for their own warning, that they might confess the justice of the Lord, that

<sup>1</sup> According to Hengstenberg, *ibid.*, the name of the *law* was transferred from the books of Moses to the other books of the O. T. not *a potiori*, but because the latter shared with the law its *normative* or *regulative import*.

they might be convinced of their own kindred unfaithfulness. The scriptural testimonies adduced, vv. 10-18, were doubtless intended to establish the guilt of the Jewish *and* Gentile world; but they were intended in particular to do this with respect to the Jews by the authority of the O. T., which they acknowledged, and above all to abase their pride. For the conviction of the Gentiles, the apostle, with wise regard to their point of view, had brought forward no testimony from Scripture, but dealt with them on the ground of the so-called light of natural reason, which was always summoning as a witness against them the remnant of that divine knowledge and conscience which in their own breast played the part of a standing accuser. Moreover, the Jews admitted the guilt of the Gentiles without allegation of scriptural testimonies. They needed, then, to be persuaded to apply the latter, not in any sense exclusively to the Gentiles, but, above all, to themselves.

—*ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ*] the mouth, not only of the Gentiles, but also of the Jews, who were especially prone to contradiction and boastfulness, ver. 27. *ἵνα*, not *ἐκβατικῶς*, so that, but *τελικῶς*, in order that, *eo consilio ut*. As a rule, the consecutive sense of the particle *ἵνα* is not demonstrable in the N. T. with certainty. Rather everywhere, indeed (with the exception of Rev. xiii. 13), we may be content with the telic acceptation. But,

less, it is often only a question of a different point of view, whether one and the same thing is represented as a purpose or a result. For this reason in several passages *ἵνα* is convertible with *ὥστε*, without being of itself the same in meaning, Winer, p. 573. On no ground is there reason in the present passage to deviate from the proper signification of the telic particle *ἵνα*. On the contrary, the real meaning here is: that which Scripture says, it says that every mouth may be stopped. In consonance with well-established biblical teleology, what is commonly to be taken by us as an effect or consequence of God's Word is often described as a purpose of God's Word itself, and still further of God, the author of that Word. The phrase *φράσσειν τὸ στόμα* is found in Heb. xi. 33; LXX. Ps. cvii. 42; Job v. 16.

—*καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ*] *ὑπόδικος* Theophylact explains by *κατάκριτος, ἀπαρρήσιastos*. It is = *ὑπὸ δίκην ὄν*, *punishable, liable to punishment*, and certainly in this case the punishment is due to God (*τῷ θεῷ*). *γένηται*, like *γινέσθω*, ver. 4. The penal liability doubtless actually exists

already, but it is first proved to be such by the testimony of the Word. *πάν στόμα, πᾶς ὁ κόσμος* stands, as Melanchthon says, "insigni figura et verborum emphasi." In *φράσσειν στόμα* and *ὑπόδικον γίνεσθαι* the judicial form of the expression is to be observed. "Metaphora a judiciis petita," says Calvin, "ubi reus, siquid habet ad justam defensionem, vices dicendi postulat, ut quae sibi imposita sunt purget: si vero conscientia sua premitur, silet ac tacitus expectat suam damnationem, suo jam silentio damnatus. Eundem sensum habet illa loquendi forma, Job xxxix. 34: Opponam manum meam ori meo. Dicit enim, etiamsi non destituatur aliqua excusationis specie, justificandi tamen omissa cura se Dei sententiae concessurum."

Ver. 20. The result arrived at, that every mouth must be stopped, and all the world be guilty before God, is finally, with a view to the complete abasement of Jewish pride in the law, confirmed by the doctrine that the *ἔργα νόμου* could not be the means of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, because the aim of the *νόμος* is not to justify, but to condemn the sinner. Thus the apostle has paved the way for a transition to the positive exposition of his subject, namely, that *δικαιοσύνη* is *ἐκ πίστεως*, i. 17.

—*διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου κτλ.*] As to *διότι*, comp. on i. 16. Here, too, it is not = *propterea*, *διό*, but = *propterea quod*, which case after *θεῶ*, ver. 19, only a colon or comma is put, or = *nam*. All the world is guilty before God, be those works of the law which they can produce for their justification fail to justify them. By *νόμος*, of course, is here to be understood, as everywhere, the positive Mosaic law, and the *ἔργα νόμου* answer to what the Rabbins call *מעשים המצוות*. But these are not merely works of the ceremonial law,—a notion which would result in a purely abstract partition of the indivisible general conception *νόμος*, just as un-Hebraistic as it is un-Pauline. The antithesis, in fact, is not that man cannot be justified before God through works of the ceremonial law, but through works of the moral law he may, which would be to do away with the essence and aim of redemption through Christ. Rather the works of the law stand, generally and without distinction, in antithesis to *faith*. The *νόμος*, then, is the complete revealed law in its unsevered unity. Nay, on the contrary, in this expression in Paul is found, though not an exclusive, yet a predominant reference to the *moral* law, to which, in truth, hitherto reference has chiefly been made,

ii. 18, 21 ff., 26 f. Only on account of this most essential moral constituent could the apostle bring the moral law of the Gentiles into comparison with the Mosaic law, ii. 14, 15, and say of the latter what he does say in iii. 20, 31, vii. 7.

*ἔργα νόμου*, then, is explained on the one hand: *works which the law effects*, which it wrests from man by its demands, i.e. works such as the unregenerate man who stands under the law is able to perform in the strength of his own free will; therefore outwardly, merely legal works, *ἔργα νεκρά* so called. In this case the genitive is *genitivus auctoris* or *causae*. Thus in the train of Augustine and Thomas Aq., Roman Catholic expositors, since the Reformation especially, but several modern Protestant expositors as well, and I myself in the two first editions of this commentary. So, too, Luther in his preface to the Roman epistle: "Thus inure thyself to the saying that it is one thing to do works of the law, and another to fulfil the law. Works of the law are everything in the law which man does or can do of his own free will and power. But since, among and along with such works, unloving and constrained obedience to the law remains in the heart, such works are all thrown away and useless." This St. Paul means (iii. 20) when he says: "By works of the law no man becomes righteous before God." To *ἔργα νόμου* in this sense, works which are done before conversion in the strength of the natural will, *ἔργα ἀγαθὰ, καλὰ* would stand in opposition, Rom. ii. 7; 2 Cor. ix. 8; Eph. ii. 10; Col. i. 10; 1 Tim. ii. 10; Tit. ii. 14, iii. 8, 14, works which are the fruits of regeneration, of the Spirit, and of faith. On this view, it was not altogether warrantable exegetically for the older Protestant expositors to assert that Paul, by the expression *ἔργα νόμου*, directly excluded from justification all works, not only those preceding conversion, but also those following it. The dogma is true in itself; but its exegetical confirmation lies not alone in the *ἔργα νόμου* being excluded from justification, but rather, as far as concerns the works of the regenerate, above all in this fact, that *ἔργα ἀγαθὰ* follow as the *consequence* of justification. Comp. Eph. ii. 10, where the *ἐπί* in *ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς* serves to indicate the final aim. But the consequence of a thing cannot itself form a constituent element of its nature. In the well-known Augustan Protestant doctrine: "*bona opera non praecedunt justificandum, sed sequuntur justificatum*," which is based upon profound

acquaintance with the Pauline doctrinal conception, it is likewise asserted that justification does not consist in *bonis operibus*, because the latter are the *consequentia* of the former. At all events, at the basis of that older interpretation of the expression ἔργα νόμου lay the implied truth that ἔργα ἀγαθά, when they are considered as a fulfilling of the law, *i.e.* when they are supposed to be a medium of justification, at that very moment are placed in relation to the law, measured by the standard of the law, and thus themselves become ἔργα νόμου, not, indeed, in the sense of *works effected and compelled by the law*, but in the sense of *works demanded by the law and in correspondence with the law*.

The latter, then, is the meaning assigned to the expression ἔργα νόμου by older Protestant and a number of modern interpreters, comp. especially, Wieseler on *Gal.* ii. 16, p. 194 ff. Accordingly ἔργα ἀγαθά are not merely works which, as purely outward works, cannot justify, even though in their sphere they are without defect (*Phil.* iii. 6); therefore, not merely works of the unregenerate man. But under this designation are included as well the ἔργα ἀγαθά, καλά of the regenerate, which likewise cannot justify, not only because they are themselves merely the consequence of justification by *faith*, but also because of themselves they are ever *imperfect*. All works demanded by God's law and in harmony with it, which any unregenerate or regenerate man whatever can bring forward, fail to justify him, because they are never a *perfect* fulfilment of the *spiritual* Nomos. This signification of ἔργα νόμου is advanced already by Luther on *Gal.* ii. 16: "Loquitur Paulus de universa lege, quod opus secundum totam legem factum non justificet. Ergo non occidere, non moechari, etc., sive fiat secundum naturam, secundum vires humanas, secundum liberum arbitrium, sive secundum donum Dei vel divinam virtutem, tamen non justificat. Possunt opera legis fieri aut ante justificationem aut post justificationem. Ante justificationem multi boni viri etiam inter gentiles praestiterunt legem et fecerunt egregia opera, et tamen per ea non sunt justificati. Post justificationem faciunt opera legis Petrus, Paulus et omnes christiani, sed per ea non justificantur, 1 Cor. iv. 4." In the same strain says Calov on the passage: "*Papistarum sophismata* ut expediuntur, observandum (1) per legem hic non intelligi ceremonialem legem, quasi *opera tantum ceremonialia* excludantur a justificatione; (2) per opera legis non intelligi *opera solis naturae viribus*

*facta* ; quia hic omnia excluduntur opera. Neque (3) per opera legis tantum *opera ante fidem sine Dei gratia facta* intelliguntur, quasi opera *ex fide facta* non excludantur a justificatione : sed apostolus indefinite *opera quævis* excludit." Comp., lastly, Joh. Gerhard, *loc. xvii. de Justif.* tom. vii. p. 187 : " Ubicunque absolute et simpliciter opera a justificatione excluduntur, ibi etiam renatorum opera exclusa intelliguntur. Renatorum opera sunt opera legis, quia Spiritus sanctus renatis proponit legem tanquam normam bonorum operum." Gal. v. 22, 23 : " Bona opera dicuntur *fructus Spiritus, contra quos non sit lex*, utique ergo sunt opera legis, *hoc est, a lege præcepta et legi conformia*." As the ground upon which justifying virtue is to be denied even to the good works of the regenerate, he lays down, p. 189 : " Ex operibus legis ideo negantur homines justificari, quia lex non potest perfecte impleri : lex spiritualis est, nos autem venundati sumus sub peccate, Rom. vii. 14. Atqui ipsi etiam renati non implent legem perfecte, ergo ipsorum etiam renatorum operibus deneganda est justificatio."

To this meaning of the phrase *ἔργα νόμου* we now give the preference over the one advocated by us formerly. It might seem, indeed, as if the apostle, in opposition to the unregenerate Jew whom out of Scripture he had just convicted of sin, by the *ἔργα νόμου*, which the Jew might perchance allege against him, understands only outwardly legal works. But this does not prevent the expression *ἔργα νόμου* in the abstract retaining its general meaning, if here it receives also its special application. Moreover, among the Israelites there were devout believers who had real *ἔργα νόμου* to show, whose works, as they still remained sinners, the apostle intimates must be excluded from the matter of their justification. And in the last place his Christian readers were to be led, by the written preaching of the Roman epistle, again and more thoroughly than heretofore, to make proof for themselves of the way of repentance and faith, in doing which it behoved them, above everything, to beware of bringing their own works, even though wrought by the Spirit, into the matter of justification. *ἔργα νόμου*, then, are all works required by God's law and in harmony with it, which, whether according to the case in hand they are merely outward works of the unregenerate, or truly good works of the unregenerate, do not justify before God, because in no case are they a *perfect fulfilment* of the law.



Wherefore it is said on one side, ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ, and on the other, οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται, ii. 13; for they who have ἔργα νόμου are still no ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου in the absolute sense of the word. But the genitive is the genitive of belonging to or remoter relation: "Works which belong to the law, which stand in relation to the law," Winer, p. 234. They stand in relation to the law just in so far as the law requires them and they correspond to the law, in which aspect the motive from which and the power by which (*liberum arbitrium* or *gratia Dei*) they are accomplished do not come into account. Especially decisive for the interpretation in question is the fourth chapter of our epistle. The divine oracle there quoted, which ascribes to Abraham δικαίωσις οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, ἀλλὰ διὰ πίστεως, was uttered when Abraham was already a believer, and engaged, as to his conduct, in works truly good and well-pleasing to God. And in the same sense the apostle there says that David excluded works from justification,—David, a man believing and devout, the man after God's heart. Finally, to the Apostle Peter and the Galatian Christian church Paul proposes as a rule of perpetual force even for them, ὅτι οὐ δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, Gal. ii. 16. For the rest, the expression ἔργα νόμου is found in characteristic fashion only in the Roman and Galatian epistles (Rom. iii. 28, ix. 31; Gal. ii. 16, iii. 2, 5, 10). But ἔργα without νόμου stands in the same sense (Rom. iv. 2, 6, ix. 11, xi. 6, and Eph. ii. 9; 2 Tim. i. 9; comp. the synonymous phrase, Tit. iii. 5).

—οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ] Ps. cxliiii. 2, LXX: ὅτι οὐ δικαιωθήσεται ἐνώπιόν σου πᾶς ζῶν. The negation belongs to the verb. "All flesh shall not be justified = no flesh, no one shall be justified, οὐδεμία σὰρξ, or οὐδεὶς δικαιωθήσεται." "A Hebraistic syntactical construction," Winer, p. 214. So e.g. Matt. xxiv. 22: οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθῃ πᾶσα σὰρξ. That δικαιοῦν has here its declaratory force is self-evident, for the righteousness which any one has from ἔργοις νόμου cannot be infused into him, but can only be declared to exist. But still further, ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ (not ὑπ' αὐτοῦ) indicates that here the only mention is of a judicial, declaratory act, a being just before the divine tribunal, i.e. of a *justum declarari*. The future δικαιωθήσεται stands either for moral possibility (comp. on ver. 6) or for the abstract future, in the sense: In every case where justification takes place, as

often as justification is in question. The latter interpretation is to be preferred on account of the analogous *δικαιώσει*, ver. 30. We are not to think of the time of the future general judgment, for the very reason that already, in the present state of existence, justification is invariably the immediate result of faith. *πάντα σὰρξ*, corresponding to *πάνς ὁ κόσμος*, ver. 19, and *πάνς ζῶν* (פֶּנֶאֶז) in the passage of the Psalms quoted, is used probably without special emphasis on the element of frailty in the *σὰρξ*. When the apostle says that by works of the law no one is justified before God, he does not mean that this holds good because no one has works of the law. On the contrary, the Jews had them and boasted of them, as Paul himself did before his conversion; for he says of himself in that period he was *κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ ἄμεμπτος*, Phil. iii. 6. Rather *ἔργα νόμου* do not justify, as observed, either because they are *ἔργα νεκρά*, Heb. vi. 1, ix. 14, or because, although *ἔργα ἀγαθὰ, καλὰ*, even as such they are imperfect. But then the apostle says not merely that no Jew, but quite generally, that no man attains justification availing before God by works of the law. At the same time, we are not to suppose that in the expression *ἔργα νόμου*, of itself so sharply limited, he included those works which the Gentiles did in conformity with their law of conscience, the deputy of the Mosaic *νόμος* (ii. 14, 15); and this the less, as undoubtedly he would not have said of the Gentiles' law of conscience that it effects *ἐπίγνωσιν ἁμαρτίας*; for this is only true of the *νόμος* in so far as it is *πνευματικός*, vii. 14. Rather is Paul discussing the supposition of the Jews, that by their *ἔργα νόμου* they attained the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, and that the Gentiles as *ἄνομοι* must first be placed under the *νόμος*, and do its *ἔργα*, in order before God to share like honour with them.<sup>1</sup> This supposition he combats by the assertion that no man by works of the law attains righteousness, neither the Jew who has *ἔργα νόμου*, nor the Gentile if he had them. At the same time it is self-evidently true, that if even the Jew is not justified by his works of law, far less will acts done in conformity with the natural law of conscience assist the Gentile in attaining to real, valid righteousness.

—*διὰ γὰρ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας*] Confirmation (*γάρ*) of the preceding principle. Works of law justify not, because the

<sup>1</sup> So now even Mehring, p. 307.

very nature of law is not to justify, but to impart the knowledge of sin. Comp. Gal. iii. 10. *ὅσοι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσὶν, ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσὶν.* "A contrario ratiocinatur," says Calvin, "non afferri nobis justitiam a Lege, quia convincit nos peccati et damnationis: quando ex eadem scatebra non prodeunt vita et mors." But the law works the knowledge of sin, because the more familiar a man becomes with it, and the more he takes it as his standard, the more, by its spiritual requirements of trust in God, fear of God, and love both of God and one's neighbour, it reveals to him the unspiritual, self-seeking, sensual elements of his nature, so that he ceases to boast of his Pharisaic righteousness and outward reputation, and instead, as a sinner, confesses himself guilty before God. Comp. vii. 7 ff. As to *ἐπίγνωσις*, see on i. 28. *Plena et accurata cognitio peccati* is at the same time *agnitio peccati*.

The apostle has now come to the end of one section of his exposition. We recapitulate the results arrived at so far. The theme of the epistle announces how all mankind can find righteousness and life only in faith in Christ. To establish this, it must first of all be proved that in mankind, in their natural condition, only sin and death are found. But mankind before Christ fell into two great divisions, Gentiles and Jews, whose prevalent sins took different forms of manifestation. The Gentiles were given up to idolatry, to corruption of religious truth, unnatural lusts, as well as to vice and crime of every kind. The light of divine knowledge and of conscience remaining in them could only serve to reveal to them their inexcusableness and the judgment of death hanging over them, and could not avail to secure righteousness acceptable to God. Over against them stood Israel, the people of revelation and covenant, proud in the possession, first, of the law as the source of all true knowledge of God and His will, and then of circumcision, as the sign of their covenant-relation to Jehovah, the only true God and Lord of the world. Puffed up with such gifts and endowments, the Jews claimed to instruct the Gentiles, the ungodly, lawless, uncircumcised. But by such conduct they simply passed judgment on themselves. For neither fewer nor smaller vices were current among them than among the Gentiles, and by their transgression of the law they brought it to pass that the name of God was blasphemed by the Gentiles, and that the law and covenant-sign stood as a wit-

ness against their untruthfulness and covenant-breaking. Therefore, like the Gentiles, they were given up to sin and death. The apostle depicts the religious and moral condition of the Gentile and Jewish world *of that age*. From this he excepts no single individual, and in point of fact in the national spirit and character prevalent in any age, every member of the nation without exception has a share. Every one contributes to this spirit, not only when as a child of his age he is infected, if not by all, yet by one or other of the sins universally diffused; but also when, through neglect of energetic protest, admonition, correction, and punishment, he does not meet it with opposition sufficiently decided. But Paul has to do not merely with the external manifestation, but, at the same time, with the inner essence which the manifestation reflects. Sinful acts, manifold and widely ramified, point back to sinful tendencies, of which they are manifestations. There is nothing external without an internal counterpart. At the root of illegal acts lies the illegal condition, the anomistic state of heart. Wherefore neither the legal rules by which Gentile life even in its deepest corruption was regulated and influenced, nor yet the works of law in which the Jews, in their zeal for God's worship, God's service, and the Mosaic Nomos, prided themselves, could be any reply to the apostolic catalogue of sins which to their confusion was held up before them. So little was this the case, that even where, which yet was not easily possible, Pharisaic legal strictness succeeded in avoiding every illegal *act*, and in carrying through a complete and faultless performance of outward works of law, in no wise was either righteousness acceptable at the divine tribunal attained, or implication in the universal corruption of sin cancelled. For God's eye pierces to the heart, and His lips of truth describe the sinful tendency as already a sinful act, a transgression of that law of His which requires obedience of heart and inclination. Hence the law, being of a spiritual nature, even to the legally righteous in the outward sense of the word, brings only knowledge of sin and death, not righteousness and life. But, then, if this is the invariable attribute and purpose of law, we see how the sinful condition of that particular age, with its visible acts and hidden tendencies, cannot at all be regarded as peculiar to *that age*—*i.e.* fortuitous and transitory. Rather as the separate sinful tendencies are the source of separate sinful acts, so the shifting sinful

tendencies themselves again lead back to an abiding sinful principle by which mankind is perpetually governed. Evil lusts lead back to evil lust as the universal source lying deepest and most secret of all, a source which in all ages proclaims its triumphant existence in special corrupt tendencies and acts in an endless variety of forms. Thus, in depicting the condition of the world in that age, the apostle withal gives us a picture of the universal condition of mankind. He thereby proved man's sinfulness and need of redemption in every age and without exception. If the moral character of his contemporaries was merely fortuitous, if it did not prove the permanent corruption of human nature, his entire train of reasoning misses its mark. For neither could he then have so confidently charged every individual without exception with sin, since a few here and there might in secret have kept themselves free from contamination, nor even would the actually fallen need redemption through Christ, but only, with the purity and integrity of their nature still remaining, a turning to repentance and righteousness of life by the spontaneous power of their own will. But least of all in that case was the atonement by Christ's blood an atonement for the sins of the whole world; for neither was it by any means proved that the possibly more moral races before Christ had needed it, and that the races after Him would need it, nor from this standpoint of an external moral atomism were there any means of proving it.

The apostle, then, having shown that all men are under sin, and therefore that the law cannot be a means of justification,—nay, that, on the contrary, it only mediates the knowledge of sin,—the second, real, main division of his epistle now opens, containing the positive exposition of his theme, laid down i. 16, 17, namely, that only *πίστις* mediates the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* and *σωτηρία*. This forms again a coherent whole, iii. 21 up to v. 11. In this chapter, first of all from ver. 21, the Pauline doctrine of justification itself is set forth, according to which righteousness availing before God comes without law through faith in the atoning death of Jesus. In the fourth chapter this doctrine is confirmed by the example of Abraham. In ch. v. 1–11 it is shown in the last place how the possession of *σωτηρία* and *ζωή* is the immediate fruit of this righteousness by faith, and therefore the indefeasible inheritance of the justified by faith.

Ver. 21. *νυνὶ δέ*] may be a mere logical particle of transition : *atqui, but then*, as in vii. 17 ; 1 Cor. vii. 14, xv. 20 ; or *νυνὶ* is an adverb of *time* = *ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ*, ver. 26, *hoc autem tempore, but at this time*, as vi. 22, xv. 23, 25. The latter view is to be preferred, because the apostle glances back not merely to ver. 20, but to the entire preceding exposition. In contrast with the pre-Christian period of heathenism and Judaism, in which only sin and the impossibility of attaining righteousness through works of the law were to be seen, stands now the picture of the Christian period, in which righteousness by faith, consisting in the forgiveness of sins, is provided without aid of the law, comp. Gal. iv. 4. "*Hitherto* it was so, *but now* it is otherwise."

—*χωρὶς νόμου*] Strikingly Luther: *without the assistance of the law, i.e. without its co-operation*. It forms the antithesis of *διὰ νόμου*, ver. 20, and is to be joined with *πεφανέρωται*, not with *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. With the new revelation of God's righteousness the law in no respect agrees. For the law reveals sin ; the gospel, righteousness. The law says: he that does me becomes righteous and blessed ; the gospel says: he that believes in me becomes righteous and blessed, x. 5 ff. The law demands and does not give, the gospel gives and does not demand. Since no one does or can do the law, only the gospel which gives freely without assistance of the law commanding, reveals righteousness acceptable to God.

—*δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*] see on i. 17.

—*πεφανέρωται*] *is made manifest*, the completed matter of fact ; *ἀποκαλύπτεται*, i. 17, *is being manifested*, the act still continuing. The *φανέρωσις*, *ἀποκάλυψις* stands in antithesis to the former concealment in the eternal divine counsel, xvi. 25 ; Eph. iii. 5, 9 ; 2 Tim. i. 9, 10 ; Tit. i. 2, 3.

—*μαρτυρουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν*] Acts xxviii. 23 ; Luke xxiv. 27. This new doctrine is withal the old doctrine testified previously, i. 2, and precisely as such is of unerring authority. *ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται* = the O. T. Matt. xxii. 40. Already Moses (iv. 3 ; Gal. iii. 8) and the prophets (i. 17 ; Acts x. 43) bore witness, that righteousness availing before God is attained through faith. In so far as the O. T. is in the main a covenant of law, the righteousness of faith is not revealed by it but by the N. T. ; but in so far as the old legal

covenant, by means of the evangelic promise embraced in it, already reaches forward beyond itself, it also bears witness to the righteousness of faith proclaimed through the gospel. As to the relative disclosure of the N. T. revelation of grace in the O. T. covenant-Scriptures, which is withal a relative concealment, the saying of Augustine holds good: "Novum T. in Vetere latet, Vetus in Novo patet." For the rest, Bengel rightly: "*Lex strictè* (namely, in *χωρὶς νόμου*) *et late* (in *ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου*) *dicitur.*"

Ver. 22 specifies by what means righteousness availing before God is mediated, namely, through faith in Jesus Christ.

—δικαιοσύνη δὲ θεοῦ] *God's righteousness, I say.* The principal idea is repeated, because it is now to be more precisely defined. As to δὲ in explanatory repetitions = *inquam, and that*, comp. Winer, p. 553; Phil. ii. 8. "God's righteousness, but God's righteousness through faith."

—διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] not ἡ διὰ πίστ. Ἰ. Χρ., either because δικαιοσύνη διὰ πίστεως is taken as *one* strictly connected idea = Righteousness-of-faith, or because δικαιοσύνη διὰ πίστεως recalls the formula δικαιοῦσθαι διὰ πίστεως, ver. 30; Gal. ii. 16; Winer, p. 155. Moreover, the article was here the less called for, as δικαιοσύνη is without it. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is *genitivus objectivus* = faith in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is the object or import of justifying faith (Mark xi. 22; Gal. ii. 20, iii. 22; Eph. iii. 12; Winer, p. 232).

—εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας] *sc. οὔσα*, whereas others prefer to erase the comma after Χριστοῦ, and to make εἰς πάντ. καὶ ἐπὶ πάντ. depend on πεφανέρωται.<sup>1</sup> The repetition of πάντας expresses unreserved universality. The righteousness of faith extends absolutely to all who believe, not simply to Jews, but just as much to Gentiles. It comes unto all (εἰς πάντας), and pours itself forth upon all (ἐπὶ πάντας) like a stream. On the accumulation of prepositions for the purpose of exhausting the idea in hand, comp. Winer, p. 521. καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας is wanting in several old mss., translations, and patristic quotations, on which account Lachmann has expunged these words from the text. But since they are not to be regarded as a gloss,

<sup>1</sup> But that this method of connection does *not* deserve the preference, Meyer rightly proves, "because the point at issue was not the mode of becoming manifest, but the specific characterizing of the righteousness itself that had become manifest."

of which εἰς πάντας, intelligible of itself, stood in no need, it is rather to be supposed that the omission of the words arose either from the eye of the transcriber wandering from the first πάντας to the second, or from an intentional correction, the sense being complete without καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας.

—οὐ γὰρ ἐστι διαστολή] namely, between Jews and Gentiles. The righteousness of faith extends to all without exception, for there is no distinction between one and another, because (ver. 23) all are sinners. "Et opponi debent hujusmodi particulae universales (πάντες)," says Melancthon, "periculosus cogitationibus de praedestinatione. Clare Deus offert omnibus remissionem peccatorum, omnes igitur audiamus hoc Evangelium, sciamus hoc Evangelium ad omnes pertinere, omnes amplectamur et erigamus conscientias his testimoniis."

Ver. 23. πάντες γὰρ ἡμαρτον] as was made good by the apostle in i. 18 up to iii. 19. The aorist describes the act of sin as a historical fact of the past. The perfect ἡμαρτήκασι = ὑφ' ἀμαρτίαν εἰσὶ would represent the sin as continuing with its consequences to the present.

—καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ] ὑστερεῖσθαι = ὑστερον γίνεσθαι, *posteriorem fieri, to be left behind in the race, to remain behind.* But as one that remains behind a thing is without it, ὑστερεῖσθαι in later Scripture passages means *destitui, carere, to lack, to be without*, and like all verbs of defect governs the genitive. Similarly λείπεσθαι τινος. Luther: "and lack the glory which they should have with God." In this case δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ, analogously with δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, stands for δόξα ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ, παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, "glory, honour that God deems such, that avails before God." Not really differing from this in meaning, others interpret: "they are without the honour that God gives, are without approval on God's part (τοῦ θεοῦ, as *genit. auctoris*)."

Just so John xii. 43: ἡ δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ, for which in John v. 44 ἡ δόξα ἡ παρὰ θεῷ stands. Accordingly, as we interpret δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, *righteousness availing before God*, or: *righteousness that God gives*, we shall prefer the one or the other of the interpretations given, which in substance do not differ. But the interpretation: *they are without glorying towards God*, is out of the question, for δόξα is *gloria*, not *gloriatio*. Glorying towards God is καύχησις or καύχημα πρὸς τὸν θεόν, ver. 27. But just as little is δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ to be referred to the future glory which God will give



in eternal life, as in v. 2, the apostle here manifestly treating of the desert of man in the present life.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the reference of the δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ to the divine image implanted originally is to be rejected, though most of the older Protestant and some modern expositors maintain it. For neither can δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ be rendered *likeness to God*, nor does the expression in the least degree suggest to any one a reference to a δόξα that is past, or the interpretation: "they are without the glory that God gave them in the beginning." But neither can δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ signify *God-like glory = image of God*. If the apostle had wished to express this idea, he would undoubtedly have written simply and intelligibly: καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τῆς εἰκόνης τοῦ θεοῦ. 1 Cor. xi. 7: εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ, furnishes no analogy sufficient to justify the reference of δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ in this passage to the divine image implanted originally. There man himself is called δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ; the subject is not, as here, the δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ which man ought to have.

Ver. 24. δικαιούμενοι] Luther: "and are justified without merit." But δικαιούμενοι is not = καὶ δικαιοῦνται, for the participle does not arbitrarily stand for the copula with the finite verb. Rather are we to interpret: "and are destitute of glory with God, being (since they are) justified freely;" Beza: "ut qui justificentur." Here, then, the idea of unworthiness (ὑστεροῦνται δόξης) figures as the principal idea, to which the idea of justification, upon which yet the principal emphasis lies, is subordinated as a secondary notion. Elsewhere the Greeks often annex the principal idea in a participial form to the *verbum finitum*, which is explained by their wealth in these forms, and by their fondness for participial constructions. Comp. Matthiä, *Ausf. Gr. Gram. Th.* II. § 557, p. 1097, 2. But we do not think that this mode of construction is chosen here without design and significance. Rather is it of such consequence to the apostle to annihilate all δόξα and all καύχησις in men, that from the first he so arranges the exposition of his doctrine of justification as to direct it to this end. For this reason, when it is finished, his first question, ver. 27, is: ποῦ οὖν ἡ καύχησις; All men are destitute of glory before God in two certainly closely

<sup>1</sup> Meyer justly observes that "the following δικαιούμενοι proves that the δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ cannot in reality be anything essentially different from the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, and cannot be merely future."

connected respects,—first, because they have all sinned; and secondly, because they are all justified in the way of gift. It cannot then be held that Paul would more plainly or correctly have written *καὶ δικαιούνται* instead of *δικαιούμενοι*.

—*δωρεάν*] *in way of gift, gratuitously, i.e. without payment or merit through works of law on our part.* Hence v. 17: *ἡ δωρεὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης*, and Eph. ii. 8: *θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον*. In this signification stands *δωρεάν*, Matt. x. 8; Rev. xxi. 6, xxii. 17. In the ordinary signification: gratis, without material payment, Matt. x. 8; 2 Cor. xi. 7; 2 Thess. iii. 8; finally, in the sense of *sine causa*, John xv. 25, and of *frustra*, Gal. ii. 21.

—*τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*] specifies the *efficient cause* of justification. Its cause is not the merit of man's fulfilment of the law, for it is vouchsafed *δωρεάν*. On the contrary, the cause is simply and solely the free, unmerited love of God, the love which in relation to the sinner manifests itself as *χάρις*. Respecting the antithesis of *χάρις* (or *ἔλεος*, Tit. iii. 5) and *μισθὸς ἔργων*, or *ὀφείλημα*, comp. iv. 4, xi. 6. But if man's being pronounced righteous depends on divine *grace*, it is *eo ipso* identical with absolution from the guilt of sin, with forgiveness of sins, just as in iv. 1–8 expressly *δικαίου, λογίζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην, ἀφιέναι τὰς ἀνομίας, ἐπικαλύπτειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας* are perfectly synonymous notions. "By the position of the words *τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι* (not *τῇ χάρι αὐτοῦ*) the divine grace is, in harmony with the notion of *δωρεάν*, emphasized precisely as the *divine*, opposed to all human co-operation," Meyer.

—*διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*] *sc. γενομένης.* "Contained and resting in Him, in His person, who has appeared as the Messiah (hence the *Χριστῷ* is placed first)," Meyer. Herewith the *means* are specified of which divine grace, as the efficient *cause*, made use in working out man's justification. *Ἀπολύτρωσις*, properly the redemption of captives in war by a ransom, or generally redemption by payment of a *λύτρον*. That in every passage, in which the subject is man's justification, which is mediated by an *ἀπολύτρωσις*, this strict signification of purchase, acquisition by payment of a price, is to be held fast, is evinced by the synonymous expressions *ἀγοράζειν*, 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23; *ἐξαγοράζειν*, Gal. iii. 13; *περιποιεῖσθαι*, Acts xx. 28; *λυτροῦσθαι*, Tit. ii. 14. But we must especially compare the Lord's declaration, Matt. xx. 28, Mark x. 45, that He came *δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν*

αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν, and the apostle's corresponding expression, 1 Tim. ii. 6: ὁ δὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων. But in Eph. i. 7 the purchase price is expressly mentioned by name, the αἷμα being pointed out as that which mediated ἀπολύτρωσις for us. Just so in the present passage, ver. 25. Comp. Rev. v. 9, and Steiger on 1 Pet. i. 18, p. 171 ff. of his commentary. But no doubt in other passages the notion of ἀπολύτρωσις is generalized into that of *liberation* in the abstract, without intervention of a purchase price, Luke xxi. 28; Rom. viii. 23; Eph. i. 14, iv. 30. If, then, we ask *from what* Christ redeemed us by payment of His blood, Eph. i. 7 gives the answer—from the guilt of *sin*; for there the nature of the ἀπολύτρωσις which we have in Christ is defined exegetically as consisting in ἄφεσις τῶν παραπτωμάτων. So, too, in this passage, where δικαίωσις is conceived as identical with ἄφεσις τῶν παραπτωμάτων, the *remission of sins* brought about through ἀπολύτρωσις. In unison with this is Gal. iii. 13, where the κατὰ τοῦ νομοῦ is described as the object of redemption. For the curse of the law is merely the manifestation of the guilt of sin. With the guilt of sin we are at the same time delivered from the *penalty* of sin, from the ὀργή τοῦ θεοῦ, which not only rests upon mankind now, Eph. ii. 3, but is also revealed hereafter, Rom. v. 9, 1 Thess. i. 10, as well as from death, temporal and eternal death, in which the curse and sentence of the law is finally executed, Rom. v. 17, 21. But with the *guilt* and *penalty* of sin we are finally ransomed from the *dominion* of sin and Satan, Tit. ii. 14, 1 Pet. i. 18, Acts xxvi. 18, Col. i. 13, although this element is not made prominent where the subject is the *direct* efficacy of ἀπολύτρωσις in *justification*. For the objective forgiveness of sin (δικαίωσις) is not in the mere abstract identical with the subjective extirpation of sin (ἀνακαίνωσις, ἁγιασμός). We can only contemplate deliverance from *Satan's* dominion as involved in δικαίωσις, in so far as Satan is called ὁ κατήγων τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡμῶν, ὁ κατηγορῶν αὐτῶν ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτός, Rev. xii. 10, and ὁ τὸ κράτος ἔχων τοῦ θανατοῦ, Heb. ii. 14. Comp. Col. ii. 14, 15. But then the *sense* in which the αἷμα Χριστοῦ may be regarded as the means of expiating sin is made clear to us in what follows. Here it only remains to be further noted, that if the apostle (ver. 22) makes the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ mediated διὰ τῆς πίστεως Ἰησοῦ

Χριστοῦ, but in the present verse διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, the two statements can only be reconciled thus—that ἀπολύτρωσις is to be considered the objective, πίστις the subjective medium of justification.

Ver. 25. Ἀπολύτρωσις was just mentioned by the apostle in general terms, but it was needful to define it with greater exactness as a redemption accomplished through αἷμα. The objective medium of justification being thus sufficiently characterized, the subjective medium πίστις could not remain unnoticed if the proposition of ver. 22 is to be exhaustively developed. In the last place, in the words εἰς ἔνδειξιν κτλ. the apostle indicates the divine purpose of this ἀπολύτρωσις διὰ τοῦ αἵματος.—ὃν προέθετο] προτίθεσθαι may mean: *to propose to oneself*, to determine, as in i. 13, Eph. i. 9, and then we should translate: “whom God predestined.” Then, perhaps, grammar would not imperatively require εἶναι ἱλαστήριον, for as we say προορίζειν, ἐκλέγεσθαι, we may, perhaps, also say προτίθεσθαι τινά τι, in the sense: “to predestine, choose one for something,” comp. Rom. viii. 29; Jas. ii. 5. But the connection points not so much to an eternal counsel of God, as rather to a fact realized in time, a reference confirmed by the following εἰς ἔνδειξιν κτλ. πρὸς ἔνδειξιν ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ. Accordingly, in this passage the only congruent interpretation is: *whom God set forth*. The middle signification of προτίθεσθαι need not on this account be given up. God set Him forth openly for Himself, His own righteousness being concerned in this act, comp. εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ. προτίθεσθαι is often used in profane writers in the sense of *spectandum proponere*, especially of exposing the dead. Interpreters quote Plato, *Phaed.* p. 115 E, ed. Beck: προτίθεσθαι νεκρόν; Thucyd. ii. 34: τὰ ὅσα προτίθεσθαι.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Despite the above explicit statements, Mehring maintains, p. 332, that I interpret προέθετο in this passage by “He predestined” (*sic!*), a proof of the incredible carelessness with which he has read my words. It is just as strange that he should say, p. 330, that ἱλαστήριον occurs altogether but three times in the O. T., whereas I have quoted six passages (and there are four besides), and that he should call my assertion, that the word everywhere means the expiatory covering of the ark, *wrong*, because in Num. xxv. 17 it is found as an adjective. On the contrary, this passage quoted by myself supports my assertion. If, when used adjectivally, it occurs only in connection with ἱπτίμα, as a substantive it has itself only the meaning of ἱλαστήριον ἱπτίμα. Comp. also further, Ex. xxv. 19–22, xxxvii. 9. If,

—*ἱλαστήριον*] the translation given by the LXX. of *הַבִּיטָה*, the name given to the cover of the covenant-ark in the O. T., Ex. xxv. 18, xxxi. 6, xxxv. 12, xxxvii. 6, 8; Num. vii. 89. Sometimes they add *ἐπίθεμα*, Ex. xxv. 17. When in Amos ix. 1 they render *רִיבָב* by *ἱλαστήριον*, without doubt they read *הַבִּיטָה* by a transposition of *ה* and *ב*, or believed that it should be so read. At variance with this constant and frequent use of the expression *ἱλαστήριον* for the Kapporeth of the covenant-ark, *ἱλαστήριον* is found only in Ezek. xliii. 14, 17, 20, as a translation of *הַלֵּךְ*, the ledge of the altar of burnt-offering. This rendering is explained perhaps by the fact that according to ver. 20 the Azarah also, like the Kapporeth, was to be sprinkled with the blood of reconciliation, or by the fact that the Azarah was the standing-place from which the sacrifice was offered up. In any other sense *ἱλαστήριον* is never used by the LXX. Therefore, as the passage in Ezekiel, standing by itself in the description of the *ideal* temple of Jerusalem, could not come into account, by the expression *ἱλαστήριον* every one must have been reminded at once of the Kapporeth of the covenant-ark. Hence it appears a piece of simple exegetical wantonness, without the most stringent necessity, to depart from this meaning, the only one verified by biblical idiom. The more so, as *ἱλαστήριον* (used also by Philo for the Kapporeth as the symbol of the *ἴλεω δυνάμει* of God) in the single passage where it occurs in the N. T. Heb. ix. 5, stands in this meaning fixed by usage. The objection raised in these days that Gentile-Christian readers would be unable to understand an allusion intelligible only to Jews, must be turned completely round. Even Gentile Christians, considering their familiarity with the O. T. in the translation of the LXX., by the word *ἱλαστήριον*, which, moreover, in this passage plainly alludes to a current O. T. notion, could be reminded of nothing else than the Kapporeth of the ark. In the next place, the word *ἱλαστήριον* in the present passage is taken in this sense both by the church Fathers and by most of the older Protestant exegetes (Luther: *Gnadenstuhl*, mercy-seat), some moderns agreeing. On

where the expiatory covering is introduced for the first time, Ex. xxv. 17, it is called for the sake of perspicuity *ἱλαστήριον ἐπίθεμα*, from that place onward in the following verse and everywhere, equally with the substantivised adjective *τὸ ἱλαστήριον*, sc. *ἐπίθεμα*, it means the expiatory (namely, instrument) = the expiatory instrument, the mercy-seat.

the other hand, most of the modern expositors, and those the most important, speak of this reference of *ἱλαστήριον* as untenable, if not as altogether absurd and out of the field. In the first place, it is asserted that the LXX. had translated *ἱλαστήριον* wrongly, because *כַּפֶּרֶת* is to be derived from the Kal *כָּפַר*, to cover, and means *operculum*, covering, not from the Piel *כִּפֵּר*, to expiate, reconcile. But this assertion is utterly groundless (comp. Bähr, *Symb. des mos. Cult.* I. p. 381). Were the word formed from the Kal, it must be *כַּפֶּרֶת*. If, then, the Kapporeth means in fact nothing else than *expiation*, *expiatory instrument*, it is arbitrary to assert that this symbolic signification sprang in the first instance from the translation of the LXX., and thence passed on to Philo. Not that it is to be supposed, on the other hand, that this meaning was as well known or familiar to the older Jews and the later non-Alexandrine Jews as it was to Paul and his readers. — It is asserted, further, that Paul must have written τὸ ἱλαστήριον with the article (not *ἱλαστήριον* without article), as here the *realized idea* of the ark-covering, τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἱλαστήριον, is meant. But does not this objection tell with the same force against the interpretation of the opponents who render *ἱλαστήριον*, *expiatory sacrifice*? or was not Christ in very deed the realized idea of expiatory sacrifice, the expiatory sacrifice κατ' ἐξοχήν? The truth is, that, as the only one of its kind, the Kapporeth stood in no need of the definite article; and even if we translate: *an* expiatory instrument, *a* mercy-seat, this may be quite well understood of a spiritual Kapporeth, the counterpart of the material one. The want of the article serves to characterize = He has been set forth by God in the character of a mercy-seat, *i.e.* as is self-evident, of a spiritual, real mercy-seat. Comp. *e.g.* the anarthrous ἐν υἱῷ, Heb. i. 1 = through One who is a Son. — It is said still further, that Christ, as Kapporeth, can only be regarded as conducing εἰς ἐνδειξιν χάριτος, not, as is declared in what follows, εἰς ἐνδ. δικαιοσύνης. But every means of expiation, precisely as a means of expiation by *blood*, is an exhibition of the divine righteousness, the Kapporeth not less than the sacrifice. — Finally, as concerns the objection, that it is incongruous to compare Christ, who shed His own blood, with the ark-cover sprinkled with *foreign* blood, this is the very difference that naturally follows in the antitype, and has justly been put down to this account. In the same way, in the Epistle to the Hebrews,

Christ, who offered His *own* blood, is represented as High Priest. The *tertium comparationis* is simply this, that Christ, sprinkled with blood, resembles the Kapporeth sprinkled with blood. In the same way that the latter, just as sprinkled with blood, covered the tables of the law contained in the ark, and in removing the curse of the law by means of the blood of reconciliation set forth God Himself as reconciled, is Christ, sprinkled with His sacrificial blood, the end of the law, Rom. x. 4; for as such He nailed the law to the cross, Col. ii. 14, and redeemed us from the curse of the law, Gal. iii. 13, and thus in Him we have not merely typical, but real reconciliation with God. As to how the Kapporeth of the ark symbolized the expiatory compassion of God, comp. Hengstenb. *die Auth. des Pent.* II. p. 642 ff. Further, Paul's comparison of Christ to the Kapporeth as the central point of the entire O. T. theocracy is a striking one. On the high significance of the latter, comp. Bähr, *ibid.* p. 387 ff.; p. 390 it is said: "The Kapporeth was then in any case an expiatory instrument; and if, among the various expiatory instruments which the Hebrews had, this one bore the very name of expiation, it must have been the expiatory instrument *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the first and most important." Hengstenberg says: "To the Kapporeth all sin and trespass offerings stood in the closest relation. It formed their objective base, a summons and obligation to present them. What took place outwardly but once a year in the great sacrifice on the day of atonement, the sprinkling of blood before the Kapporeth, took place spiritually in all sacrifices." Hence, according to Heb. iv. 16, it is the type of the heavenly *θρόνος τῆς χάριτος*. As such was it set up in the midst of the people encamped around the tabernacle, a token of grace, like the serpent lifted up in the wilderness, under the old covenant concealed in the Holy of Holies; under the new, revealed and visible to all. Hence the expression *προέθετο ὁ θεός*. The pride of the Jew in the law could not be more effectually humbled than by the allusion to the Kapporeth as covering the blood-besprinkled, curse-dealing law. — Thus we think we have vindicated the interpretation of the word *ἱλαστήριον*, formerly current, as the correct one.<sup>1</sup> Other expositors take the word as masculine, and translate: *reconciler*,

<sup>1</sup> According to Kahnis, *Die Lehre vom Abendmahl*, p. 66, we have done this conclusively. Our view is now accepted also by Tholuck, 5 Aufl.; Umbreit, p. 34; Ritschl, *Die Entst. der altk. Kir.* 2 Aufl. p. 85, Anm. 2; Besser, I. 192.

which would be *ἱλαστής*, or: *one reconciling*, which would be *ἱλασκόμενος*. Those who abide by the neuter meaning interpret either: *reconciliation*, which would be *ἱλασμός*, or: *a reconciliatory*, a propitiatory means in general. But the latter meaning is not established, and, besides, is far too abstract. The most popular modern acceptation of *ἱλαστήριον* is = *expiatory sacrifice*, after the analogy of *σωτήριον*, *sacrificium pro salute*, LXX. Ex. xx. 24, xxix. 28, as examples of which *ἱλαστήριον Ἀχαιοὶ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ τῇ Ἰλιάδι*, from Dio Chrys. and Hesychius, who explain *ἱλαστήριον* by *καθάρσιον*, are usually cited. But this does not prove the biblical use of *ἱλαστήριον* in the sense of *expiatory sacrifice*, since in Holy Scripture the word has another fixed meaning. Add to this that Scripture indeed says Christ presented Himself to God an expiatory sacrifice (Heb. ix. 14, 28; Eph. v. 2; John xvii. 19), but not, God offered or presented Him to mankind in sacrifice.<sup>1</sup> God does not offer or present the sacrifice, but the sacrifice is invariably offered or presented to God. We must therefore rest content with the position that the substantivised neuter of the adjective, which of itself has the general meaning of an expiatory, a propitiatory, in this passage retains its historically-fixed reference to the Kapporeth as the means of expiation *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. But Christ is set forth to all the world as the true Kapporeth, first of all in His public crucifixion, and again in the word of the gospel, whose echoes are ringing everywhere.

—*διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι*] The most obvious interpretation appears to be: "through faith resting on His blood," comp. Eph. i. 15: *πίστις ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ*; Col. i. 4. But it is more germane to the context to make the elements of *πίστις* and *αἷμα*, not hitherto mentioned, stand out with more significance and independence. This is done by putting a comma after *πίστεως*, taking *διὰ τῆς πίστεως, ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι* as

<sup>1</sup> When Meyer replies, "the idea that God gave Christ to death pervades the entire N. T.," it is still nowhere said that God offered Christ in *sacrifice*, which contradicts the very notion of sacrifice. And when Meyer in later editions answers: "Not that God thereby *offered* Christ in sacrifice, which is nowhere asserted, but that He *set forth* before the eyes of the universe Him who is surrendered to the world by the very fact of His offering Himself as a sacrifice in obedience to the Father's counsel, as such actually and publicly, namely, on the cross," still *this* setting forth takes place only through the word of proclamation, the preaching of the gospel, whereas here manifestly the reference is to the *actual* surrender of Christ as *ἱλαστήριον* on the part of God.



parallel definitions, and placing both in connection with *προέθετο*. God set forth Christ an *expiatory* covering, and this act is realized on its subjective side through *faith*, for only through faith does the individual make the expiation his own; on its objective side, in the *blood*, for only in the blood is the Kapporeth an instrument of *expiation*. *διὰ τῆς πίστεως, ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι* might also be connected with *ἱλαστήριον*. But the first mode of connection seems to introduce best the purpose of the act of setting forth directly subjoined (*εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*). By the very fact that the exhibition of Christ as a Kapporeth was mediated through *faith* and the *blood*, did God manifest His righteousness as the end of what He did. The blood here can, of course, be only the blood of the expiatory offering, which on the great day of atonement was also sprinkled on the Kapporeth in the most holy place. In this blood really lay the atoning virtue, according to Lev. xvii. 11. The animal destined for sacrifice takes the place of the guilty offerer. By imposition of hands the transference of sin and guilt to the head of the sacrifice is symbolized. In the blood-shedding of the slain victim is represented the execution of the penalty assumed by way of substitution. But this blood is destined for the Kapporeth, which only becomes a means of expiation when sprinkled with blood. The curse of the law, hidden beneath the Kapporeth, is covered and cancelled only by blood, the token of the life poured forth, of the transgressor's penal suffering and death endured, that death in which the curse of the law received its due. Hence it is said, Heb. ix. 22: *χωρὶς αἱματεκχυσίας οὐ γίνεται ἄφεσις*. As to the *substitutory* signification of sacrifice, comp. my *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, IV. 2, p. 247 ff.

—*εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*] The divine purpose of the exhibition of Christ as a Kapporeth by His blood = *ἵνα ἐνδείξηται τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ*, comp. Eph. ii. 7. Luther: "that He may give the righteousness which avails before Him." But this translation depends on a wrong conception of the subjoined words, which Luther renders: "in the forgiveness of sin, which had hitherto remained under divine forbearance." Paul did not write *διὰ τῆς ἀφέσεως τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων τῶν προγεγονότων ἐν τῇ ἁνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ*. Luther's interpretation we should regard as a superfluous repetition of the idea already expressed, ver. 21. Finally, the words *εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*, ver. 26, are

explained by the words εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον. Therefore δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ here can only denote, as in ver. 5, an immanent attribute of God, and then neither the *truthfulness* nor the *goodness* of God, which δικαιοσύνη does not mean, but His *righteousness*, namely, His *judicial, retributive righteousness*. If, as we have seen, δικαιοῦν, δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ = ἐκ θεοῦ or ἐνώπιον θεοῦ, has always in the act of justification a reference to the judicial righteousness of God, it is arbitrary to refer the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, operative in that act as an attribute of God, to His goodness (χάρις, ἔλεος, ἀγάπη, χρηστότης, φιλανθρωπία, which, as observed, δικαιοσύνη never signifies). Gurlitt, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit. Jahrg.*, 1840, p. 974. But it is just as arbitrary to explain the exegetical addition, ver. 26, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα κτλ. : "that He may be gracious, and *in grace* justify," etc. But then God made known His retributive justice in this way—by making the blood of the expiatory sacrifice the objective medium of man's justification. Only the death of the substituted victim could satisfy God's penal justice. The objection that God wished to display His righteousness merely *for the sake of men*, as the notion of ἐνδειξις suggests, is futile. The same might be said, according to Eph. ii. 7, of the divine grace. What God makes known to men has its ground in Himself. If in the sacrificial death of Jesus He makes known His righteousness, then His righteousness must have demanded this sacrificial death for its own sake. Had the purpose been merely a subjective one,—namely, the awakening of a sense of guilt in man (comp. de Wette here),—the surrender of Jesus to death, so far from being a proof of the divine righteousness, would have been a proof of His untruthfulness, in making it appear as if sin really claims a sacrifice which at bottom it does not claim, and of His arbitrariness in bringing about, or even merely permitting, the death of the innocent, without its being imperatively required in order to the absolution of mankind from guilt. Thus the reproach of harshness recoils with full force on this *subjective* theory of atonement. In the death of Jesus, accordingly, is exhibited an *objective* reconciliation of the divine righteousness and love, and, as far as the Anselmic doctrine of satisfaction rests on this basis, the reproach of grossly anthropopathic treatment is urged against it with injustice. In what its defects consist, on this comp. my *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, IV. 2, p. 87 ff. But then the apostle's discovering in the αἷμα of Christ

a manifestation of the divine righteousness rests upon this ground—that God's *grace* appears in justification in so far as it is bestowed on us without sacrifice on our part, but His *righteousness* in so far as the bestowal still is conditioned by a *sacrifice*, by the *αἷμα* of Christ. Doubtless this sacrifice, consisting in the surrender of the only-begotten Son, the well-beloved, Eph. i. 6, is withal a manifestation of the divine love, John iii. 16; but the *necessity* for the surrender was founded in the righteousness of God, which demanded retribution. It is not, indeed, the love of *good-will* that is procured for us through Christ, for this rests even upon the sinner, and sent Christ for his salvation, but the love of divine *complacency*, which is not consistent with the *displeasure* of the divine righteousness at sin. The love of divine complacency rests only upon Christ, the Just One, who appeased God's just displeasure at sin, and upon the man who is justified through faith in the righteous Propitiator. Christ then appeased not so much God's wrath against *sinners*, as rather God's wrath against *sin*, or God's wrath against sinners, not in so far as they are God's beloved creatures, but in so far as they are creatures tainted with the sin which is *displeasing* to God.<sup>1</sup>

—διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἀμαρτημάτων ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ] states the reason that determined God to the *ἐνδειξις* τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ. At the same time, this confirms the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη* just given. God having patiently borne with sins hitherto, cannot be a motive to reveal His goodness, but only to make known His righteousness. *πάρεσις*, here only in the N. T. = *prætermisio*, *neglectio*, *passing by*; so also *παριέναι*, Ecclus. xxiii. 2; similarly *ὑπεριδεῖν*, Acts xvii. 30, and *παρορᾶν*, Wisd.

<sup>1</sup> Meyer observes: "Moreover, the *ἐνδειξις* of the divine *righteousness*, which took place through the atoning death of Christ, necessarily presupposes the *satisfactio vicaria* of the *ἱλαστήριον*. Hofmann's doctrine of atonement (compensation) does not permit the simple and—on the basis of the O. T. conception of atoning sacrifice—historically definite ideas of vv. 25, 26, as well as the unbiassed and clear representation of the *ἀπολύτρωσις*, ver. 24 (comp. the *λύτρον ἀντί*, Matt. xx. 28, and *ἀντίλυτρον*, 1 Tim. ii. 6), to subsist along with it. On the other hand, these ideas and suggestions given in and homogeneously pervading the entire N. T., and whose meaning can by no means be evaded, exclude the theory of Hofmann, not merely in form but also in substance, as a deviation evading and explaining away the N. T. type of doctrine, with which the point of view of a '*befalling*'—the category in which Hofmann invariably places the death of Jesus—is especially at variance." And: "It is not to the *ecclesiastical* doctrine, but to Schleiermacher's, and partially also Mencken's subjective representation of it, that Hofmann's theory, although in another form, stands related." (Meyer, I. 180.)

Sol. xi. 23. On the other hand, *ἄφεσις* is *condonatio*, *forgiveness*. Sins temporarily passed over may be subsequently punished (comp. 2 Sam. xvi. 10–12, xix. 21–23, with 1 Kings ii. 8, 9, 44–46), but not sins absolutely forgiven. *προγεγονότα ἁμαρτήματα* are not those of individuals before conversion, but sins committed before the appearance and sacrificial death of Christ. The only question is, whether the sins of the O. T. covenant-people included under the law are meant, or the sins of all mankind before Christ. We believe the first, because Christ was described as the true Kapporeth by His blood, the Kapporeth that really blotted out the sins which were only covered in the form of promise by the typical Kapporeth in the Holy of Holies. But these were the sins of the people of Israel. This view also harmonizes with the avowed aim of the apostle, to humble Jewish pride in the law (comp. ver. 24 on *δικαιούμενοι δωρεάν*), and explains the special prominence of the *ἔνδειξις* of the divine *δικαιοσύνη*, which the Jews fancied they had satisfied by their *ἔργα νόμου*. In this sense the present passage would agree perfectly with Heb. ix. 15: *καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διαθήκης καινῆς μεσίτης ἐστίν, ὅπως θανάτου γενομένου εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων κτλ.*, and Acts xiii. 39: *ἀπὸ πάντων ὧν οὐκ ἐδυνήθητε ἐν τῷ νόμῳ Μωϋσέως δικαιωθῆναι, ἐν τούτῳ πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων δικαιούται*. In other places Christ is exhibited as one who by His sacrificial death abrogated the curse of the O. T. Nomos, Gal. iii. 13, Eph. ii. 15, Col. ii. 14, and this for the special purpose of redeeming those who are under the Nomos, Gal. iv. 5. But therewith by natural consequence the guilt of the Gentile world is blotted out, Gal. iii. 13; Eph. ii. 16. At the same time, with the abrogation of the Mosaic Nomos, not only is the obligation of its peculiar law binding on the conscience cancelled, but the absolute obligation, which, as it hitherto testified against the Jews, might also afterwards have testified against the Gentiles. But it is self-evident that with the abrogation of the Nomos as the perfect and therefore permanently binding revelation of the divine will, the guilt of mankind after Christ is abolished as well as that of mankind before Christ, John i. 29; 1 John ii. 2. Dogmatic truth of universal application is presented by the apostle in the form of a special historical exposition. When the apostle speaks of a passing over of the sins committed under the old covenant that necessitated a manifestation of God's

retributive justice, this of course does not preclude the occurrence even under the old covenant of relative and precursory revelations of God's punitive justice, but the highest and adequate disclosure of δικαιοσύνη took place only in the sacrificial death of the Son of God.—ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ is to be joined with διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν = διὰ τὸ παρίεναι τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ προγεγονότα ἁμαρτήματα ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ αὐτοῦ. The ἀνοχή of God, His *forbearance*, is to be distinguished from χάρις, His *grace*. The first delays sin's punishment, the latter cancels it entirely. From ἀνοχή proceeds the πάρεσις, from χάρις the ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν. The necessity of the ἔνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης is attested by the scorn and false interpretation of the divine ἀνοχή, of which, according to ii. 4, Israel had been guilty.

Ver. 26. πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ. contains a resumption of εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικ. αὐτοῦ, ver. 25, with the expressive addition of temporal definition, ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, when, therefore, the passing over of sins by divine forbearance has come to an end. The preposition εἰς is exchanged for πρὸς, perhaps merely for the sake of euphony, to avoid the threefold repetition of the latter (εἰς ἔνδειξιν κτλ., ver. 25 ; εἰς ἔνδειξιν κτλ., ver. 26 ; εἰς τὸ εἶναι κτλ., *ibid.*). The article received by Lachmann, πρὸς [τὴν] ἔνδειξιν, may possibly be genuine, alluding to the ἔνδειξις already mentioned.

—εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον] that He may be just—i.e. be acknowledged as such by men, comp. ver. 4. As to the teleological form of expression, see on ver. 19.

—καὶ δικαιῶντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ] As εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον is an exegesis of πρὸς (εἰς) ἔνδειξιν κτλ., so is καὶ δικαιῶντα a companion definition to δίκαιον. The emphasis rests on τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ. God manifests His righteousness, even in justification, in justifying, not the man who busies himself about works which do not satisfy the claims of His righteousness, but only the man who by faith appropriates Christ's righteousness, 1 John ii. 1. "Summum hic habetur paradoxon evangelicum, nam in lege conspicitur Deus *justus et condemnans*: in evangelio *justus* ipse et *justificans* peccatorem," Bengel. As to τὸν ἐκ πίστεως, comp. on τοῖς ἐξ ἐριθείας, ii. 8. Ἰησοῦ is wanting, indeed, in some codices, and varies in others; but it is to be regarded as genuine, on account of the implied reference of πίστις to Ἰησοῦν δίκαιον, which in any case must be supplied. Perhaps

in the particular manuscripts it has dropped out, after the analogy of vv. 28, 30.

We have here, then (vv. 24–26), a *scdes propria* of the Pauline doctrine of justification, a passage always acknowledged as such. We saw that of the divine attributes *χάρις* and *δικαιοσύνη* come into view as actively at work. The *ἀπολύτρωσις ἐν τῷ αἵματι Χριστοῦ* contains the mutual adjustment and reconciliation of these properties which the sin of man had placed in hostile relations. Through this *ἀπολύτρωσις* there is now procured for man *δικαίωσις*, consisting in *ἄφεσις τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*. The subjective medium by which this justifying grace, objectively provided and offered in Christ, is appropriated on man's part, is *πίστις*. We have still to investigate more closely this latter notion, both as to its nature and operation. *πίστις* in Scripture does not generally denote a mere intellectual acknowledgment of the truth of the doctrine of atonement, or of the contents of revelation. How could such a faith exercise an influence, transforming human nature, and raising it above itself, such as is everywhere ascribed to it in Scripture? How could it be a power overcoming the world, such as is described 1 John v. 4? Rather is such a faith merely the *πίστις νεκρά* spoken of in Jas. ii. 20, a possession common to men with demons, which therefore can only beget *φρίκη*, ver. 19, but cannot manifest its energy in *ἀγάπη*, Gal. v. 6. Faith which brings salvation, according to O. and N. T. Scripture, is nowhere a mere intellectual acknowledgment of the truth of revelation, but everywhere a trust of the heart upon a God-given promise of grace. *Πίστις* and *ἐπαγγελία* are everywhere inseparably interwoven. As such trust of the heart, the faith of all the heroes of faith under the old and new covenant is exhibited as to its nature, comp. the portrait of Abraham's faith and Heb. xi. The object of saving faith in general is any promise of divine blessing and gift. But the object of *justifying* faith in particular is the promise of the divine blessing and gift in Christ, of the forgiveness of sins procured through Him as the atoner, and provided in Him, as *δικαιούμενοι διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ*, ver. 24, alone proves. But then this saving, justifying faith itself is not a work of nature, but an effect of divine grace. Even the choicest fruit springing from nature is merely a work of law, and as such cannot justify. We should not be

justified *δωρεάν, τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*, ver. 24, if *πίστις* were the power still left in human nature of receiving by its own power the *ἀπολύτρωσις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. This act of reception, with its immediate effect, the regeneration of man's heart, is alone of such value that it would certainly detract from the unqualified worth of divine grace if it stood by the side of grace as a co-operating, meritorious factor. Further, Scripture says unreservedly : *τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς, σὰρξ ἐστὶ*, John iii. 6. But *πίστις* is not of a carnal, but spiritual nature. It is therefore *γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος*, *ibid.* Again, no one can come to Christ except the Father draw him, John vi. 44. But faith is nothing else than coming to Christ, than the result of the Father's drawing to the Son through the Spirit. Specially important for the understanding of the nature of faith as an effect of the Divine Spirit of grace is Eph. ii. 8-10. If faith is wholly a work of nature, or half a work of nature, neither has *χάριτί ἐστε σεσωσμένοι*, nor yet *οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν, θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον*, nor *ἵνα μὴ τις καυχῆσθῃται*, nor, finally, *αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἐσμεν ποίημα, κτισθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, its entire and unrestricted import. For in that case there is found at least a division of agency between grace and our merit, God's gift and our work; self-glorying is not abolished. We are then not God's work only, but our own as well; and we are not created by God alone, but with God are creators of our own righteousness availing before Him, and of our renewal in Christ Jesus. As an effect of God and of His *πνεῦμα*, faith is also expressly described in Rom. xii. 3; 1 Cor. xii. 3, 9; 2 Cor. iv. 13; Gal. v. 5. Justifying faith is therefore, as we have so far seen, a divinely-wrought reliance of the heart upon the reconciliation procured through Christ, or upon God's grace in Christ offered to us in the word of the gospel in the form of promise.

The further question is then asked, how far faith thus imparted can be the precise subjective means by which God's reconciling grace is appropriated. The answer is, in so far as, viewed as reliance upon Christ the Mediator, in its innermost essence and kernel it is nothing else than a renunciation of all work and merit of our own, or in so far as it is the Organon by which man, unrighteous in himself, lays hold upon the righteousness of Christ. Faith, in the specific evangelical sense of the word, means just nothing else than a reliance, not upon our own *ἔργα*

νόμον, but upon the ἀπολύτρωσις διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ. A promise can only be embraced by believing trust. Any other mode of apprehending the promised good is in the nature of things not to be conceived. But it is important to unfold still further the scriptural, genuinely Pauline idea which lies wrapped up in the abstract in this relation of Christ's objective work of atonement and man's subjective appropriation by faith; and in order to guard against any infringement upon the true evangelical doctrine of justification distinctly to bring out this point, that in the act of justification faith in no respect comes into consideration as to its peculiar moral quality and excellence, nor even in reference to the love and good works which issue from it. Were the renewal of the heart and life a co-ordinate ground of justification, how could this latter be described as consisting alone in the forgiveness of sins (Rom. iv. 7, 8), and, indeed, in a forgiveness of sins already fully purchased and provided in the redemption effected through Christ's blood (Eph. i. 7)? Thus faith in no way effects or completes forgiveness, but simply accepts it as it is offered. For this reason it may be said not only we are reconciled, but also we are justified, διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως, Rom. iii. 24. But if faith here come into consideration as the power of new birth to spiritual life, we should not be justified through the atonement pure and simple, faith which lays hold of the atonement adding nothing to it, but we should be justified through the new man in us as an effect and fruit of the atonement. Comp. Rom. v. 9, δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι. Faith then in a word justifies, not on account of its own worth, or on account of its moral effects, but solely on account of its object and import, on account of Christ's righteousness, which it lays hold of and makes its own. Only thus is the apostle's question (Rom. vi. 1) to be understood: τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ἐπιμενοῦμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ. If, along with justifying faith, its sanctifying and renewing power and efficacy were already to be taken into account, if so far it came not into view purely as the medium appropriating forgiveness of sins, this question has no meaning whatever. Only after he has completed his description of the justifying power of faith does the apostle in this epistle, from the sixth chapter onward, as elsewhere (comp. Gal. v. 13 ff.), describe faith's sanctifying power. If this last is the effect of the former, how can it at the same time be its



cause? If the sanctification of man is always imperfect, so that Scripture everywhere requires its growth, how can it be a help in supplementing in any way the perfection of Christ, which in justification is given us to make entirely our own, *i.e.* form a constitutive element of justification itself? If the new life of the regenerate is still constantly sullied by sin, 1 John i. 8, then this new life cannot be the ground, or even a joint-ground, of our perfect righteousness availing before God. This ground is simply and solely the holy and perfect sacrifice of Christ which becomes our possession through faith. Thus is demonstrated the scriptural truth of the Protestant doctrine of *imputatio justitiæ Christi*, of *justificatio per fidem*, not *propter fidem*, as well as of the Reformation *Shibboleth*—*sola fide*. In this formula, often called dead and stiff, to the soul instructed by God's word and Spirit in the nature of sin and grace, and really feeling its need of salvation and comfort, is thrown open the Holy of Holies of the evangelical faith.<sup>1</sup>

As, then, the apostle, in the very course of expounding his doctrine of justification (vv. 24–26), has given a glimpse here and there of a controversial reference to the pride of the Jews in the law, so, now that the exposition is finished, his purpose—hitherto kept back, and only indicated—of humbling the work-righteous Jew comes forth openly, and, so to speak, in the triumphant consciousness of a victory won (vv. 27–30).

Ver. 27. *ποῦ οὖν ἡ καύχησις;*] *Where then is the boasting?* See a similar form of question, 1 Cor. i. 20, xv. 55; Luke viii. 25; 2 Pet. iii. 4. In the *ποῦ* ("Particula victoriosa," Bengel) is implied, so to speak, a search after something that has disappeared. *οὖν* draws an inference from the doctrine of justification, expounded vv. 21–26, which has just made all *καύχησις* disappear. *ἡ καύχησις*, *gloriatio*, not *τὸ καύχημα*,

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Meyer, I. 169: "Every mode of conception which refers redemption and the forgiveness of sins not to a real atonement through the death of Christ, but subjectively to the dying and reviving with Him, guaranteed and produced by that death (Schleierm., Nitzsch, Hofm., and others, with various modifications), is opposed to the N. T.,—a mixing up of justification and sanctification." And, p. 181: "As to keeping the scriptural notion of imputed righteousness clear of all admixture with the moral change of the justified, see also Köstlin in the *Jahrb. für Deutsche Theol.* 1856, pp. 105 ff., 118 ff.; Gess, *ibid.* 1857, p. 679 ff., 1858, p. 713 ff., 1859, p. 467 ff.; compared, however, with the observations of Philippi in his *Glaubenslehre*, IV. 2, p. 237 ff., second edition."

iv. 2, *gloriandi materia*. The glorying itself, not merely the ground or object of glorying, has vanished, no doubt the former only because the latter. In full assurance of victory, the apostle sees even the most stubborn gainsayer put to silence. The article before *καύχῃσις* denotes a boasting that is known, often practised and heard, or often already brought forward and repelled, ii. 17, iii. 19. The *καύχῃσις*, therefore, obliquely rebuked everywhere from ch. ii. onward, may only be that of the Jews, not of men in general. Rightly then Theodoret, agreeing with Chrysost., Theophyl., Oecum., already explains ἡ *καύχῃσις* by τὸ ὑψηλὸν τῶν Ἰουδαίων φρόνημα. But the *καύχῃσις* of the Jews referred to their ἔργα νόμου, comp. Eph. ii. 9: οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, ἵνα μὴ τις καυχῆσθῃται; 1 Cor. i. 29. A striking example of such *καύχῃσις* is found, Luke xviii. 11 ff. The apostle acknowledges only a *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν κυρίῳ*, 1 Cor. i. 31; 2 Cor. x. 17; Gal. vi. 14.

—ἐξεκλείσθη] Theodoret: οὐκ ἔτι χώραν ἔχει. ἐκκλείειν, *to exclude*, i.e. either: not to admit one who is without, or: to turn out one who is within. Then metaphorically: *not to allow*, *non admittere*, or: *to put away*, *removere*. Here in the latter meaning, as in Gal. iv. 17.

—διὰ ποίου νόμου;] *sc. ἐξεκλείσθη*. By what law is all boasting excluded?

—τῶν ἔργων;] *of works? i.e. by the law that enjoins works?*

—οὐχί] not by this law; for, as the practice of the Jews shows, this fosters, although contrary to its aim and destination, which is to beget the knowledge of sin,—this fosters the legal pride and boasting of men. By its very nature the law may become, though not a cause, yet at least an occasion of false *καύχῃσις*; but the gospel not even the latter.

—ἀλλὰ διὰ νόμου πίστεως] *sc. ἐξεκλείσθη ἡ καύχῃσις*. “But by the law of faith,” i.e. by the law that enjoins faith. The apostle is fond of such sharp and stirring antitheses. The law of Moses is a νόμος ἔργων. The gospel is really the opposite of the νόμος, and yet it is a νόμος, but a νόμος πίστεως, a law that summons, not to works to be perfectly done, but to the grace of forgiveness to be received. Thus in i. 5 the apostle speaks of an ὑπακοή πίστεως, an obedience to faith, just as ἀπιστία is often described as ἀπειθεία, unbelief as disobedience to God’s word (comp. Heb. iii. 19 with iv. 6); and in 1 John iii. 23 it is said:

αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐντολὴ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα πιστεύσωμεν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κτλ. Therefore even in the association of νόμος and πίστεως the word νόμος retains the meaning *norm, obligatory rule of conduct*, and never means *doctrine*, comp. Rom. viii. 2 : νόμος πνεύματος and νόμος ἁμαρτίας; ix. 31 : νόμος δικαιοσύνης; Jas. i. 25, ii. 12 : νόμος ἐλευθερίας.

Ver. 28. λογιζόμεθα γάρ] The *textus receptus* reads οὖν instead of γάρ; but the latter reading has the greater weight of external authority on its side. λογίζεσθαι is not = συλλογίζεσθαι, *to conclude*, but = *to hold, to judge, censure*, ii. 3, viii. 18. The apostle represents his doctrine of justification as having gained universal assent through the preceding course of argument. λογίζεσθαι, then, implies the absence of doubt as to the objective truth and certainty of the doctrine held.

—δικαιούσθαι πίστει ἄνθρωπον χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου] The order of words πίστει δικαιούσθαι, which the *recepta* has, is supported by slighter authority, and looks like a correction for the purpose of emphasizing πίστις as the chief element. Still πίστει, standing as it does in the middle, may receive a sharper emphasis = with regard to *justification*, we judge that only by *faith* does man obtain it. πίστει, as the dative of instrumental cause, is essentially synonymous with, and only in form different from, διὰ πίστεως. Luther. through faith *alone*. Catholics have reproached him with falsifying Scripture, because *alone* is not found in the text; but with injustice. For as Paul knows but one way of justification under two forms, that by works of the law and that by faith, it follows that if one is expressly shut out, as it is here, the other *alone* remains. Comp. ἐὰν μὴ, Gal. ii. 16, and Luther's *Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen*, Erl. Ausg., Bd. 65, p. 108 ff.: "But they see not that it is implied in the meaning of the text; and if we are to Germanize it clearly and forcibly, it (*sola* or *solum*) is necessary. . . . But then I have not only relied on and followed idiom in adding *solum*, Rom. iii. [ver. 28], but the text and St. Paul's meaning require and imperatively demand it." Not only the church Fathers, but also a German Bible translation before Luther, Nürnberg 1483, and even two Italian ones, Genua 1476, Venedig. 1538: "per la sola fede," employed these *particula exclusiva* without objection in their days. Moreover, *sola fide* stands in the sense of *tantum fide*, not of *fide solitaria*, inasmuch as justifying faith is invariably attended by good works.

Hence Protestant theology said: "Fides sola justificat: at nec est, nec manet sola. Intrinsecus operatur et extrinsecus," or: "Fides, etsi nunquam sine operibus *est*, tamen sine operibus *justificat*." The objection that ἔργα νόμου are only works of the unregenerate, that the apostle excludes from justification these only, not the ἔργα ἀγαθά of the regenerate, has no force. By the endeavour to make his ἔργα ἀγαθά pass as the ground of justification, the regenerate man falls back to the legal position, seeks the complete fulfilment of the law not in Christ's work, but in his own good works, and thereby again stamps his ἔργα ἀγαθά, by the legal relation that he gives to them, as ἔργα νόμου. See on ver. 20, where, in addition, we have seen that the expression ἔργα νόμου already of itself, and directly, embraces the good works of the regenerate. We abide, then, by the decision of the *Formula Concordiae Epit.* iii. Affirm. vii.: "Credimus, docemus et confitemur, quod ad conservandam puram doctrinam de justitia fidei coram Deo necessarium sit, ut particulae exclusivae (quibus apostolus Paulus Christi meritum ab operibus nostris prorsus separat solique Christo eam gloriam tribuit) quam diligentissime retineantur, ut cum Paulus scribit: *Ex gratia, gratis, sine meritis, absque lege, sine operibus, non ex operibus*. Quae omnia hoc ipsum dicunt: *Sola fide in Christum justificamur et salvamur*. Eph. ii. 8; Rom. i. 17, iii. 24, iv. 3 seq.; Gal. iii. 11; Heb. xi." Comp. *Sol. decl.* III. p. 691, ed. Reoh. χωρίς excludes all co-operation of works in the act of justification. On the general ἄνθρωπον, *a man*, Chrys. remarks: τῇ οἰκουμένη τὰς θύρας ἀνοίξας τῆς σωτηρίας, φησὶν, ἄνθρωπον, τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα θεός.

Ver. 29. Supplementary proof of the correctness of the dogma, ver. 28, that only faith justifies, not works of the law. The proof is drawn from the consequence which would inevitably follow from the opposite supposition. If man became righteous by ἔργα νόμου, God would only be the God of the Jews, not also of the Gentiles, for He had given the νόμος only to the Jews. ἥ] introduces another supposition which must certainly stand good if the dogma, ver. 28, is wrong; comp. ii. 4.

—'Ιουδαίων ὁ θεὸς μόνον;] *sc. ἐστίν. εἶναί τινος, alicujus esse, to belong to some one*, Luke xx. 38; Gal. iii. 20. *Does God belong only to the Jews?* It is needless, then, to repeat θεός in the sense of ἡ ὁ θεὸς 'Ιουδαίων μόνον ἐστὶν θεός;

—οὐχὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν;] forms a second independent question, whilst

the less authenticated *lectio recepta*, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἐθνῶν, forms only the second portion of the one question beginning with ἦ.

—ναὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν] God is the God of the Gentiles also, inasmuch as He is the Saviour also of the Gentiles. That He is the Creator, Lord, and Ruler of the Gentiles was acknowledged even by Jewish particularism. On the other hand, O. T. prophecy, in the Messianic prophecy of the calling of the Gentile world, bore witness also to the former truth, that God, as the Saviour of the Gentiles, is the God of the Gentiles.

Ver. 30. Paul argues *ex concessis*, namely, from the indubitable truth of the unity of God. If He is one, His fixed counsel respecting the human race must be one and the same. Were He merely the Saviour of one and not of the other, He Himself would not be one, but twofold in nature. ἐπεὶπερ] *quando scmel, quandoquidem, seeing that*, lays down a matter that is fixed, free from doubt. The less authenticated reading, received by Lachmann, εἴπερ, *siquidem, if at all events*, rests perhaps merely on a correction or change of the transcriber, ἐπεὶπερ being an ἄπαξ λεγόμενον in the N. T. Even εἴπερ of itself would give a good sense. For elsewhere also we find the rhetorical device employed of leaving in suspense one's own judgment on a matter as to which the final decision cannot be doubtful, a course by which the certainty of the position in question is only made the more emphatic, comp. 2 Thess. i. 6. Since, then, God is one, He manifests Himself as one towards Jews and Gentiles in justifying Jews, as He does Gentiles, through faith.

—ὃς δικαιώσει] not only in the general judgment; but the future denotes an act in constant course of occurrence, ver. 20, v. 19. What *always* holds good may be equally well represented as having taken place (perf.), as taking place (praes.), or as to take place (fut.).

—περιτομήν . . . ἀκροβυστίαν] *i.e. the Jews, the Gentiles*. So ἀκροβυστία, ii. 26; περιτομή, iv. 12.

—ἐκ πίστεως . . . διὰ τῆς πίστεως] The change of the preposition (ἐκ, *source*; διὰ, *means*) indicates no real difference of meaning, Gal. iii. 8; Eph. ii. 8. At most, it might be intimated that the distinction, if any at all, is merely verbal, not real, *i.e.* therefore in truth none at all. Thus in the change of prepositions would lie a certain Pauline subtlety. "Itaque," says Calvin, "subesse in verbis ironiam judico: acsi diceret, siquis vult habere differ-

entiam Gentilis a Judaeo, hanc habent, quod ille per fidem, hic vero ex fide justitiam consequitur." But probably the interchange occurs merely for rhetorical reasons. Moreover, the omission or insertion of the article (πίστεως, τῆς πίστεως) is immaterial, since in the self-defined idea πίστις, both may occur with equal propriety. But from the expression ἐκ πίστεως no *justificatio propter fidem* can be deduced. It indicates merely the rise or origin of justification from faith in general. The mode of origination may be variously conceived. But justification does not spring from faith in the sense of the latter being the *ground*, but only in this, that it is the *means* of justification. Hence, as matter of fact, ἐκ πίστεως = διὰ πίστεως, *per fidem*.

Ver. 31. Several modern expositors, following in the train of Origen, in harmony with whom Theodoret explains: ἄνωθεν γὰρ καὶ ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται τὰ περὶ τῆς πίστεως ἐθέσπισαν, find in this verse a resumption of the idea expressed in the words, ver. 21: δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, μαρτυρουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν. The law would then be confirmed by the doctrine of justification through faith alone, in so far as even in the Pentateuch, as the following chapter shows, Abraham is adduced as an example of justification through faith. But in this case we should expect in iv. 1 a γάρ instead of οὖν; for the bare assertion that the law agrees with the doctrine of faith could not directly form the basis of an inference (οὖν), but must first of all be itself established by evidence (γάρ). Moreover, the view referred to is not in perfect keeping with the context. The question, νόμον οὖν καταργοῦμεν διὰ τῆς πίστεως, manifestly looks back to ver. 28. The doctrine that man is justified through faith without works of the law, seemed to involve an utter abolition of the Nomos, and to give countenance to a pernicious antinomianism. To rebut this objection, it is not enough for the apostle to show that even the book of the law teaches justification by faith. From this the only inference would be, that the law decrees its own abolition. Thus the confirmation must be sought in something else. But it can neither be found in the fact that the law begets the knowledge of sin and so leads to Christ, nor in the fact that in Christ's sacrificial death the law obtained its due. For in this is still implied simply an abolition of the law, ver. 20; Gal. iii. 21-25; Eph. ii. 15; Col. ii. 14. Hence the meaning can only be: We establish the law, inasmuch as from faith the new obedience

proceeds, the love developes itself, which is the *πλήρωμα νόμου*, xiii. 10. The old establishment of the law, issuing from the Jews, was really a *καταργεῖν*, inasmuch as the law was still violated. On the other hand, the *καταργεῖν* of the *νόμος*, issuing from the doctrine of faith, is really an *ιστάναι*, inasmuch as the believer now fulfils the law by the Holy Spirit. "Faith fulfils all laws," says Luther's note on this verse; "works fulfil not a tittle of the law." Comp. viii. 4; Gal. v. 23. Certainly the law is abrogated only in the form of imperative demand and the curse annexed thereto (Eph. ii. 15; Gal. iii. 13), whilst in the case of the believer this is replaced by spontaneous obedience to the law, Rom. vi. 14-18. The present verse then contains merely a passing thought interposed by way of anticipation, an abrupt setting aside of a natural objection. Moreover, this way of speaking is quite in unison with the animation of the apostle's course of thought and style, comp. the subordinate argument in the opening of this chapter. Just as the brief proposition, *διὰ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας*, which concludes in ver. 20 the description of the sin of the Gentile and Jewish world, is more fully illustrated in vii. 7-25, so the present *νόμον ἰστώμεν*, which concludes the description just given of justification by faith, is treated at greater length in viii. 1-11. Here the apostle glances, so to speak, merely by anticipation, at the more complete argument which follows later on. The illustration of the idea suggested under every aspect would have interfered too much with the course of the main exposition at present in hand.

—*καταργοῦμεν*] *abolemus, we abolish*, ver. 3, iv. 14; Gal. iii. 17.

—*διὰ τῆς πίστεως*] namely, inasmuch as we teach that only through faith is justification attained. Comp. the reproach of abrogating the law brought against Paul on the part of the Jews, Acts xxi. 28.

—*ἰστώμεν*] *stabilimus, confirmamus, we establish, confirm*. As here *καταργεῖν* and *ιστάναι*, so in Heb. x. 9 *ἀναιρεῖν* and *ιστάναι* are contrasted. *ἰστώμεν* is not the conjunctive, but the indicative derived from *ιστάω*, instead of *ἵσταμεν* from *ἵστημι*, comp. Winer, p. 93. For the rest, the reading *ιστάνομεν*, received by Lachmann, is attested by preponderant evidence, although certainly the rhythm of the period is more in favour of the form *ιστώμεν* [Fritzsche, p. 210 in Wordsworth's Comm.]. See a declaration of the Lord corresponding to the affirmation of this verse, Matt. v. 17.

Though the Nomos in the present passage comes into consideration only with respect to its abiding moral substance, of this substance even the ceremonial law partook, in so far as under its material and perishing garb it embodied types of higher ethical conceptions.



## CHAPTER IV.

THEY are two closely interlinked propositions which the apostle has worked out in what precedes iii. 21 ff.,—first, that man is justified by grace alone through faith, not through works of the law; and next, which follows directly from the former one, that this justification is imparted not only to Jews, possessors of the law, but just as much to Gentiles. Both propositions are now corroborated by the example of Abraham,—the first by David's judgment also, —Abraham, the progenitor of the Jewish people, the father of the circumcision, who was for the Jews the name of highest authority, to whose sacred example they expressly appealed when they extolled the righteousness of works, and insisted on them as the sole means of justification. The fact of Abraham's example and David's testimony confirming the doctrine of justification by faith, proves that, as is said in iii. 21, it was witnessed beforehand by the law and the prophets.

Ver. 1. *Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν Ἀβραὰμ τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν εὐρηκέναι κατὰ σάρκα;*] The phrase *τί οὖν* or *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν*, common with our apostle elsewhere, must not lead us, with some expositors, to insert a note of interrogation after *οὖν* or *ἐροῦμεν* in this passage. Then the second question would run either: *ἐροῦμεν Ἀβρ. τ. πατ. ἡμ. εὐρ. κατὰ σάρκα*, or: *Ἀβρ. τ. πατ. ἡμ. εὐρ. κατὰ σάρκα*. But then, as object, we must supply to *εὐρηκέναι* either *δικαιοσύνην*, which is arbitrary, or an indefinite *τι*, which would only be possible upon the supposition that what Paul had said before suggests the notion that Abraham may have attained something *κατὰ σάρκα*. Thus the sentence: *τί οὖν . . . κατὰ σάρκα*, is to be taken as one question: "What, therefore, shall we say that Abraham our father has found according to the flesh?" *κατὰ σάρκα* is to be joined with *εὐρηκέναι*, not with *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν*. In the latter case Paul must have written: *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν εὐρηκέναι Ἀβραὰμ τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν κατὰ σάρκα*. This order of words is indeed recommended by numerous and weighty authorities, and Lachmann, who, moreover, reads

προπάτορα for πατέρα, has received it. Nevertheless, it looks far too like a designed transposition, especially as Origen and Chrysostom held to the former connection. But προπάτορα, uncommon in the N. T., in use only among the church Fathers to designate Abraham as the progenitor of the Israelites, is to be regarded as a gloss, intended to prevent πατέρα ἡμῶν here being taken in the spiritual sense, as in vv. 11, 12, 16, 17, 18. Moreover, the question: "What then shall we say that Abraham has found, our father after the flesh?" would give a wrong meaning. For the answer must still clearly be: "He has found nothing," which is without foundation. Certainly Abraham found something, and in truth much, namely, righteousness acceptable to God. Abraham found nothing merely by works of the law, or κατὰ σάρκα, which must therefore of necessity be joined with εὐρηκέναι. Since Paul by ὁ πατήρ ἡμῶν describes Abraham, not as father of all believers, but as progenitor of the Jews, he thereby indicates beforehand that in the subsequent reasoning he concerns himself with the Jews, who maintained that Abraham had been justified κατὰ σάρκα, ἐξ ἔργων. Κατὰ σάρκα seems then to be explained by ἐξ ἔργων, ver. 2. If the ἔργα are referred to the external, legal works which the unregenerate man performs in the strength of his natural free will, this legal righteousness would be designated here as originating from the old nature of man, the σάρξ, a δικαιοσύνη κατὰ σάρκα, σαρκική, in opposition to the spiritual righteousness of faith. As the apostle (Phil. iii. 4-6) comprehends under πεποιθήσεις ἐν σαρκί natural descent, circumcision, and works of the law, and as generally circumcision and works of the law from the Jewish standpoint are inseparably connected, in agreement with the interpretation suggested, κατὰ σάρκα should perhaps in the present passage also be referred to both, to circumcision and external works of the law. The only circumstance to throw doubt on this explanation is that Abraham had already in the obedience of faith complied with God's call, and already, as a believer, and one to whom righteousness was imputed not by works but by faith (comp. ver. 3), stood on the ground not of mere outward and legal works, but of works really good and acceptable to God. However, even believing David (comp. ver. 6) excludes his good works from justification. See my remarks on ver. 20. On this account the ἔργα of Abraham, which are not to be taken into account in the matter

of his justification, must embrace not only Abraham's works while still an unbeliever, but also his works when a believer. Chrysostom early confessed this when in his eighth homily on the Roman epistle he says: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔργα μὴ ἔχοντα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῆναι τινα, οὐδὲν ἁπείκός, τὸ δὲ κομῶντα ἐν κατορθώμασι μὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ πίστεως γενέσθαι δίκαιον, τοῦτο τὸ θαυμαστόν. Little, then, as the apostle assigns the good works of believers to the sphere of the σάρξ, since they are the fruits of the πνεῦμα, for Paul they fall into this category, directly that they are considered, as the Jews did with regard to the works of Abraham, in the light of righteousness availing before God. Everything wherewith man would magnify himself and assume airs, especially in God's sight, even though of itself a good gift of God, may be described as belonging to the sphere of the human, phenomenal, perishing. Comp. 1 Pet. i. 24. So also in Gal. iii. 3, Paul calls the desire for righteousness through faith alone a πνεύματι ἐνάρχεσθαι, the blending with this of good works a σαρκὶ ἐπιτελείσθαι, comp. also Gal. v. 4, 5; Col. ii. 18. The same view is expressed in the note of Flacius on this passage: "Vox secundum carnem hic significat ex operibus, non sine extremo contemptu Justitiae operum, sicut et Isaias inquit: Omnis caro foenum, et omnis justitia ejus sicut flos agri, et sicut etiam habetur, Philipp. iii. 4, et Gal. iii. 3, cum Spiritu coeperitis, nunc carne consummamini: causa locutionis est, quia caro, id est homo ipse in se habeat et praestet illam justitiam, non gratis ei a Deo imputetur, etiamsi eam praestet jam renatus, nam illa quoque opera vox haec complectitur." Calov, who agrees with this note of Flacius, in the end declares for a third interpretation, followed by a number of interpreters before and after him, according to which κατὰ σάρκα in this passage is to be referred to *circumcisio* as a *ceremonia in carne obsignata*. In modern days this explanation has been especially advocated by Mehring (comp. also Schott, p. 226), who says, p. 368: "If we join the words κατὰ σάρκα with εὐρηκέναι, they correspond to the subjoined ἐξ ἔργων, and include circumcision, which was expressly performed ἐν σαρκί. Nay, not without great probability they will denote not merely with *primary*, but, considering the words following immediately, with *exclusive* reference to circumcision as the chief representative of works (comp. Eccles. xlv. 20: καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ ἔστησε διαθήκην), all external things, to which

especially works belong." We are now disposed, although Meyer calls it "entirely opposed to the context," to give the preference to this interpretation, because it seems to us to be the one most directly suggested both by the expression and thing signified. Abraham, who is called the progenitor of the Jews, is as such withal the progenitor of the circumcised. The Jews regarded circumcision, not like the apostle as above all the seal of the covenant of grace, but exclusively as the seal of the covenant of law, as the sign of obligation to observe the law. It was to them the primary and fundamental work, including in itself all other works, as the cause includes the effect. Hence *κατὰ σάρκα*, ver. 1, is convertible with *ἐξ ἔργων*, ver. 2; and as surely as circumcision was a divinely ordained sign of the covenant, so surely might works be regarded as divinely produced works. The reference to circumcision is the more natural, as the Jews were directly described, iii. 30 (iii. 31 being, as we saw, a sentence only cursorily interposed), as the *περιτομή*, by which their specific distinction from the Gentiles as the *ἀκροβυστία* is emphasized. If the *περιτομή*, like the *ἀκροβυστία*, is justified only through *πίστις*, then is *περιτομή* itself not the means of justification. With this the question naturally connects itself, whether Abraham had not been justified through circumcision, therefore through works. Thus the special inquiry about the *ὠφέλεια τῆς περιτομῆς*, iii. 1, which was started in opposition to the assertion of its entire *ἀνωφέλεια* apparently maintained (ii. 25-29), and which still awaited its solution, is again taken up in the present chapter, and in the following ver. 11 receives an answer. Whether justification lies open to the Jew through circumcision or without circumcision, *i.e.* through works or without works, this is the question which is ever emerging again and again, and with which the apostolic exposition from ch. ii. to ch. iv. deals. But when Paul in this passage says, not *ἐκ περιτομῆς*, but *κατὰ σάρκα*, in this disparaging description of *περιτομή* lies wrapped up the answer to the question, namely, that in *this* way Abraham attained nothing. Comp. the expression *περιτομή ἐν σαρκὶ χειροποίητος*, Eph. ii. 11, and *εὐπροσωπεῖν, καυχᾶσθαι ἐν σαρκί* = *ἐν περιτομῇ*, Gal. vi. 12, 13. Just so even in Gal. iii. 3 *σαρκὶ ἐπιτελείσθε* may be said in severe irony of the circumcision in which the Galatians now sought their perfection, a course by which they simply made manifest their relapse into a carnal

mind, in contrast with their former spiritual disposition. With *εὐρίσκειν*, *ἔλθω*, to find, attain, gain, comp. Acts vii. 46.

Ver. 2 confirms the negation implied in the question of the previous verse. *εἰ γὰρ Ἀβραὰμ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη*] Paul says not *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, because the νόμος was not yet given to Abraham; but in substance the expression is the same. The Talmud even infers from Gen. xxvi. 5 that Abraham already observed the entire Mosaic law. *ἐδικαιώθη* is not directly and specially = was justified by God, but = was justified in general, was found just, leaving it undetermined by whom. Comp. iii. 4.

—*ἔχει καύχημα*] *habet gloriandi materiam*. He has reason to glory, namely, towards man, after human fashion.

—*ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*] *but not towards God*, who does not recognise merit. So the apostle says even of himself, he was *κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ ἄμεμπτος*, but calls this a *πεποίθησις ἐν σαρκί* that cannot justify him before God, Phil. iii. 4 ff. The interpretation now given of this verse is the only one at once natural and in keeping with the simple tenor of the words. That a general and indefinite reference is thereby assigned to *δικαιοῦσθαι* is a comparatively slight difficulty, as the word still retains its radical meaning. But all other modes of interpretation are decidedly forced and untenable. Some, altering the punctuation, have tried to explain the meaning in two ways. First: *ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. But this makeshift is to be rejected on this ground, that the formula of affirmation must have run, not *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, but *πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*, or rather *μὰ τὸν θεόν*, even *πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ* being a formula of oath, not of affirmation. Secondly: *εἰ γὰρ Ἀβραὰμ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη*; "For was Abraham justified by works?" Answer: "He may glory, but not before God." From this it follows that he was not justified through works. This explanation is ingenious enough, but artificial.<sup>1</sup> Against it the objection has justly been urged, that *εἰ* is not found in Paul in a direct question; that the question itself is irrelevant to what precedes; finally, that the sentiment of the answer in its unrestricted extent is inadmissible. In accordance with the connection of thought, the most passable sense would be given by the interpretation which regards *ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν θεόν* as the minor of a syllogism, of which the *conclusio* must be

<sup>1</sup> Meyer has now given this up, and follows the interpretation of the Greek exegetes.

supplied. "For if Abraham was justified by works, he has reason to boast, but he has no reason to boast before God; therefore he was not justified by works." But in this case Paul must clearly have written: ἔχει καύχημα πρὸς τὸν θεόν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔχει. Finally, Theodoret observes: ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων πλήρωσις αὐτοὺς στεφανοῖ τοὺς ἐργαζομένους, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φιλανθρωπίαν οὐ δείκνυσσι. So, too, the rest of the Greek exegetes, Chrysost., Occumen., Theophyl. If Abraham was justified through works, the meaning is, he cannot boast of this at least *with respect to God*, since in that case his justification is not *a divine benefit*, but *he himself* has earned it. But this was precisely what the Jews maintained. They therefore were not silenced by this. Hence their refutation must have been contained in the declaration of Scripture, ver. 3. But then this would have been introduced by ἀλλά, not by γάρ. Moreover, the apostle himself shares the opinion, that whoever is justified through perfect fulfilment of the law has reason to glory even *before God*. Comp. Mehring on the passage.

Ver. 3. That Abraham was not justified *before God* by the merit of works, is proved by the Scripture in which God Himself bears a different testimony about him, namely, that he won righteousness availing before God through faith, not through works. The Scripture passage quoted is taken from Gen. xv. 6. There Abraham receives the promise of a son and of a numerous posterity. Now, every divine promise is of necessity a pledge of an earthly gift and seal of heavenly grace. Faith in the former, therefore, always includes faith in the latter. The divine gift invariably bears the character of a sacramental ratification of divine covenant-grace and covenant-truth. Thus in Gen. xv. 1, in the words: "Fear not, Abraham, I am thy shield," the Lord first of all seeks to strengthen Abraham's confidence in this, His covenant-truth. But beyond this the earthly gift itself, made sure to Abraham, included in quite a peculiar way the promise of the highest heavenly gift. From his natural posterity was to go forth no other than the Seed of the Woman promised from the very beginning. Abraham's faith, then, in the promise of a posterity from which blessing was to diffuse itself over all nations, implied faith in the promise of the Messiah, the Seed of the Woman and Conqueror of the serpent, whose birth was linked to the seed of Abraham. Thus the higher divine word of promise

stood or fell with the lower. Clearly, then, the apostle in this passage brings into view the elements thus indicated of Abraham's faith. Not in so far as Abraham believed in the birth of Isaac and his natural posterity simply considered was he justified before God, but only in so far as this faith, looking both backward and forward, included in it reliance upon divine grace and upon the advent of the Messiah which was linked to Isaac's birth. This follows as matter of course from the nature of the Pauline doctrine of justification. If the object of Abraham's justifying faith had been, not God's grace in Christ, but only his future natural posterity, the analogy between Abraham's and a Christian's faith would simply have consisted in the subjective spiritual quality of trust. But had faith as a subjective quality of soul, as a spiritual excellence of disposition, as a virtue well-pleasing to God,—had this in Paul's view justified Abraham, the apostle would with his own hand have cut the very sinew of his doctrine of justification. For we have seen that, according to that doctrine, faith does not justify man before God on account of its subjective character, a view which must be described as a falling back to the legal standpoint, but that faith justifies man only on account of its object and import, which is no other than Christ, or God's forgiving grace in Christ. Even Abraham knew and in faith embraced the promise of this grace, and this faith was reckoned to him for righteousness.<sup>1</sup> That this is actually the apostle's meaning is

<sup>1</sup> I rejoice that now even Meyer adheres to this proposition, so boundless in its importance and pregnant in its issues, both as to the N. T. doctrine of justification and as to the notion of O. T. prophecy. He says: "Still less (in opposition to Neander and others) can the explanation of the subjective nature of faith in general, without the addition of its specific *object* (Christ), suffice for the conception of Abraham as the father of all believing in *Christ*; since in that case there would only have been present in him a preformation of faith as respects its psychological quality generally, and not also in respect of its *subject-matter*, which is nevertheless the specific and distinguishing point in the case of justifying faith.—We may add that our passage, since it expresses not a (mediate) *issuing* of righteousness from faith, but the *imputation* of the latter, serves as a proof of justification being an *actus forensis*: and what the Catholic expositors (including even Reithmayr and Maier) advance to the contrary is a pure subjective addition to the text." It is also far from sufficient when Tholuck, *Anl.* 5 (comp. Wieseler on *Gal.* iii. 6, p. 242 ff.), calls the parallel between Abraham's faith and the faith of Christians a *virtual* one, on the ground that the promise vouchsafed to Abraham was likewise a promise of *grace*. In the case of *justifying* faith, it is not a question of a promise of grace in general, but of the promise of grace in *Christ*. Tholuck no doubt calls the teaching of Lutheran theology, that even in the case of Abraham the Messiah promised to him is to be considered as the real object of faith, a *petitio principii*. But if it is admitted, which

proved by vv. 4, 5 beyond contradiction. It is said, ver. 3: Ἀβραὰμ ἐπίστευσε καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, and ver. 5: τῷ πιστεύοντι ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιούντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ λογίζεται ἡ πίστις εἰς δικαιοσύνην. Thus the πίστις of Abraham, which was accounted to him for righteousness, consisted in his believing in Him that justifies the ungodly, just as David's justifying faith, according to vv. 6-8, had no other meaning. That Abraham looked for the coming Messiah, the Messiah come expressly testified, John viii. 56. But if we always extract from the O. T. text merely the minimum that grammatical and logical interpretation, taken alone, can find in it, with no regard whatever to the whole strain of O. and N. T. Scripture, and to the teaching of the Lord and His apostles, the result is an exegesis in the highest degree barren for theology. We must grant, indeed, that in clearness, distinctness, and unbroken continuity, Abrahamic saving faith is not to be compared with the Christian, if only the essential identity of their substance be held fast. We have already indicated the connection of the Protevangelium with the promise of Isaac and with the universal blessing to spring from his seed, which justifies the apostle in his conception of Abraham's faith.<sup>1</sup> But then it follows from this that he has not arbitrarily enlarged the meaning of the Scripture testimony, to the effect that to Abraham his faith was counted as righteousness, in applying it to justification, while originally it merely expressed, like Ps. cvi. 31 (comp. Num.

even Tholuck does not deny, that for the apostle the justification of the Christian is an *actus forensis*, consisting in the imputation of the righteousness of Jesus Christ, then the *petitio principii* can only be discovered in the supposition that the apostle has drawn his parallel between Abraham's justifying faith and the Christian's justifying faith with due regard to *exactness*. But to question this argues no particular respect either for Pauline precision of thought or for the authority of the apostolic word of God. The great and holy Apostle Paul is at least no vacillating, misty divine of the modern mediation-theology. When Tholuck distinguishes in the Pauline doctrine of justification between the apostle's *conception* and the *truth embodied* in this conception, and discovers the latter in the notion that in the appropriation of Christ by faith lies in fact the principle of a perfect fulfilment of the law, that justification is an anticipatory declaration which judges of the germ by its subsequent complete development (comp. on ver. 5, p. 178 f.), it is easily explicable that he then also makes the apostle no longer so exact as to the object of Abraham's justifying faith. This may be more remarkable in Mehring, p. 385 f. Meanwhile, even he asserts that *per fidem* and *propter fidem* are not absolutely separable. In that case one should simply acknowledge in so many words that the Romish Church, in its theory of justification, in opposition to the Reformation, is fundamentally in the right.

<sup>1</sup> See more in detail in the *Excursus* to this chapter.



xxv. 12), the divine approbation of a particular act well-pleasing to God. In the case of Abraham it was his faith; in the case of Phinehas, spoken of Ps. cvi., his deed, that was reckoned as righteousness. The faith of Abraham, the father of the covenant and of faith, was specific faith in the covenant-promise. The deed of Phinehas was an extraordinary heroic achievement, which, on account of its apparent harshness, stood in need of special divine approval and of ratification in the shape of reward. Finally, Abraham's justification extended merely to his own person, while the reward of Phinehas extended "to all generations for evermore."

—ἐπίστευσε δὲ Ἀβραὰμ τῷ θεῷ] LXX.: καὶ ἐπίστευσεν Ἀβρὰμ τῷ θεῷ] Paul puts the main idea, on which the emphasis lies, first: ἐπίστευσεν, οὐκ ἔργα ἐποιήσατο, οὐκ εἰργάσατο. The particle δέ belongs merely to the citation, not to the connection of the Pauline argument. Moreover, instead of Ἀβράμ Paul employs the form of the name Ἀβραάμ, which appears first Gen. xvii. 5, and afterwards is exclusively used. He was to be introduced even here as the type and father of nations, of believers.

—καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην] literally after the LXX. The Hebrew text has the active יְהוָה חָשַׁב, where God is to be conceived as the subject. ἐλογίσθη, it was reckoned, namely, τὸ πιστεῦσαι, which is to be supplied from ἐπίστευσεν, Winer, p. 495. λογίζεσθαι in the present has sometimes (vv. 4, 5; contrary, ver. 6), in the aorist passive has always, the passive sense, because for the active sense the middle aorist form exists. In the Hebraistic mode of construction: λογίζεσθαι τινί τι εἰς τι (Ps. cvi. 31: חָשַׁב יְהוָה לְעַבְדּוֹ), εἰς denotes the result of the reckoning, ii. 26. As an evidence, not so much of the justifying power of faith as of the reward bestowed on true faith, the passage of Genesis cited by Paul is quoted in 1 Macc. ii. 52 more in the apocryphal Jewish than in the Pauline canonical sense.

Vv. 4, 5 lay down two general antithetical propositions respecting the ground of justification, from the application of which to the present case of Abraham the inference is that to him justification was vouchsafed without the meritorious mediation of works. Thus vv. 4, 5 contain an illustration of ver. 3. τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ] Luther strikingly: "but to him who is occupied with works." "Operantem vocat," says Calvin, "non quisquis bonis operibus addictus est, quod studium vigere debet in omnibus Dei filiis: sed qui suis meritis aliquid promeretur:

similiter non operantem, cui nihil debetur operum merito. Neque enim fideles vult esse ignavos: sed tantum mercenarios esse vetat, qui a Deo quicquam reposcant quasi jure debitum." *ὁ ἐργαζόμενος* has therefore the pregnant signification: *one active in works*, whose life-element is works, seeing that he performs them as a means to attain the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* and *σωτηρία*. The metabatic *δέ* serves merely to indicate the transition from one thing to another, or as a mere link of external connection.

—*ὁ μισθός*] The reward *due*, which presupposes, on the part of the receiver, merit in the proper sense of the word.

—*οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ χάριν ἀλλὰ κατὰ ὀφείλημα*] The emphasis lies not on *λογίζεται*, but on *κατὰ χάριν*, as the antithesis *κατὰ ὀφείλημα* indicates. The apostle does not wish from the expression *λογίζεσθαι* itself to prove that justification is by grace, which would be opposed to *idiom*. For *λογίζεσθαι* means: *to bring into account, to reckon*. Whether this is done by grace or according to merit each particular case shows, not the word simply. The proof of Abraham having been justified by grace is not that his faith was *reckoned* to him, but that his *faith* was reckoned. A work also may be reckoned, Ps. cvi. 31. Moreover, according to the former false conception, we should have most awkwardly before *κατὰ χάριν* to supply in thought a *τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν*, and, in addition, to suppose a *zeugma*, since after *ἀλλὰ* some such word as *δίδονται* must be extracted from *λογίζεται*. It has been justly observed, that if the apostle had given to *λογίζεται* the pregnant sense of reckoning by grace, he must have written: *οὐ λογίζεται δέ, ὅ ἐστι χάρις, ὁ μισθὸς τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ, κατὰ ὀφείλημα αὐτὸν λαμβάνοντι, λογίζεται δὲ τῷ μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ, πιστεύοντι δὲ ἐ. τ. δ. τ. ἀσεβῇ ἢ πίστις αὐ. εἰς δικ.* To one active in works, we must interpret, God accounts reward not by grace, but by debt. The *ἐργαζόμενοι*, supposing that they are *ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου* in the full sense of the word, have therefore, without doubt, a claim to reward proportionate to their merit. In reality, even to them God owes nothing, inasmuch as they have only done what they are bound to do, Luke xvii. 10. But of His goodness He has assumed this debt, bound Himself to them by the promise of reward, to the fulfilment of which they certainly have a just claim.

—*τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ*] Opposite of *τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ*, ver. 4. Not such an one is meant, therefore, as does no

good works at all, but one who does them not with a view to his justification.

—πιστεύοντι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἄσεβῃ] The ἄσεβης here is not Abraham in particular, who, according to the tradition derived from Josh. xxiv. 2, and found in Philo, Josephus, and Maimonides, before his calling is said to have been an idolater; for the proposition, as the parallelism of vv. 4, 5 shows, is to be taken as a general principle. δικαιοῦν τὸν ἄσεβῃ yields a stronger contrast than δικαιοῦν τὸν ἄδικον. All the more illustrious also is the energy of the faith which in reliance upon the divine χάρις believes in spite of ἄσεβεια. πιστεύειν ἐπὶ τινα, to believe in some one, ver. 24, Acts ix. 42, xi. 17, according to the Pauline conception of justifying faith, is not different from: "to put his trust in some one."

—λογίζεται ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην] The Latin church (Pelagius, Ambrosiaster, Vulgata) added to these words: *secundum propositum gratiae Dei* (i.e. κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς χάριτος τοῦ θεοῦ, after the analogy of 2 Tim. i. 9). The intention clearly was to make the antithesis more complete (τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ . . . λογίζεται . . . κατὰ ὀφείλημα, τῷ δὲ . . . πιστεύοντι . . . λογίζεται . . . κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς χάριτος τοῦ θεοῦ). But we do not need this addition, because for the apostle, as the connection shows, the imputation of *faith* as righteousness is of itself identical with the imputation of righteousness by *grace*. For him, faith is always in the act of justification the opposite of works and the correlative notion to grace (xi. 6). Hence with good reason the evangelical church has explained the expression: "faith is reckoned as righteousness," seeing that this is done by grace for the sake of Christ's righteousness, as equivalent to the proposition: "Christ's righteousness is reckoned to the believer as righteousness." "Et sane res eodem recidit, si orthodoxe explicetur," observes Calvin, "sive dicamus, *fidem imputari in justitiam, seu Christum fide apprehensum: quia fides nihil aliud est, quam apprehensio Christi et justitiae ejus; quid ergo diversi est, Christi apprehensionem nobis imputari, et Christum apprehensum imputari nobis?*" The application of the general principle of vv. 4, 5 to the case of Abraham follows naturally. If Abraham's faith *was* reckoned to him as righteousness (ver. 3), then was he one that dealt not in works, else he would have received the reward of righteousness as a debt due to him. But he was one that believed in Him

who justifies the ungodly, one therefore who was justified *χωρὶς ἔργων*.

Vv. 6-8. Confirmation of the contents of ver. 5 by the testimony of David. "Perapposite," says Bengel, "post Abrahamum introducitur David: quia uterque in Messiae progenitoribus promissionem suscepit et propagavit. Mosis nulla directa promissio data est de *Messia*; quia hic ei opponitur, neque ex Mosis stemmate prognatus est." By its very form (*καθάπερ*), the testimony and therefore also the example of David is alleged merely as a subordinate confirmation of the doctrine of justification which has been established by the case of Abraham. Still it contributes of itself a new, independent evidence of that doctrine. And, in fact, the appeal to David next to that to Abraham was peculiarly apposite, because Christ was and was called a Son of David, and to David, next to Abraham, the most definite promise of the Messiah had been given. Besides, Abraham lived before, but David after the giving of the law. *καθάπερ καί] sicuti etiam, even as also*, 2 Cor. i. 14; 1 Thess. iii. 6, 12, iv. 5; Heb. iv. 2, v. 4.

—*λέγει τὸν μακαρισμόν]* declares the felicitation, simply a more select phrase for *μακαρίζει*. *μακαρισμός* is not convertible with *μακαρία*. It means not: David declares the blessedness that a man possesses, etc., but: David expresses the felicitation of the man, etc., *i.e.* he pronounces the man blessed.

—*ὁ ὁ θεὸς λογίζεται δικαιοσύνην]* We must not, with the older Protestant exegetes, supply *Χριστοῦ*, by which course we should get the doctrine of the *justitia Christi imputata* in a directly scriptural expression. But the correctness of this Protestant doctrine follows by natural consequence from the Pauline order of thought. That God imputes or accounts to the believer a righteousness which of himself he possesses not, takes place, if at least God is not to be guilty of unrighteous or arbitrary conduct, precisely upon the ground of the existent righteousness of Christ, which as a substitutory righteousness, made ours by faith, is imputed to us. But the fact that in the present passage the *terminus technicus*, met with elsewhere, *δικαιοῦν* is interchanged with *λογίζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην*, furnishes a new proof that justification consists not in actually making man righteous, but in an *actus forensis* pronouncing him righteous.

—*χωρὶς ἔργων]* to be joined with *λογίζεται*. In the passage of the Psalms quoted (taken from Ps. xxxii. 1, 2, literally after the

LXX.) ἔργα are not positively excluded, but inasmuch as there justification is defined as consisting in forgiveness of sins, it is self-evident that in it works do not come into consideration; for forgiveness of sins forms the very opposite of merit of works. Further, the psalm does not speak expressly of justification; but inasmuch as μακαρία, like σωτηρία, only exists as the consequence of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, if the former must be placed in ἄφεσις τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, so also must the latter.

—ἐπεκαλύφθησαν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι] Heb. הִסְתַּרְתָּ יִסְדִּי (from הִסְתַּר). God so covers sin that it no more comes to light, *i.e.* He consigns it to oblivion, He pardons, remits it. Augustine on Ps. l. 1: "Si textit Deus peccata, noluit animadvertere, si noluit animadvertere, noluit punire."

—οὐ μὴ λογίσσεται] The intensive οὐ μὴ (of what will or should *nowise* take place) is construed in the N. T. only, and indeed most usually, with the conjunct. aorist, or with the indic. futur.; in the classics also with the conjunct. *praesentis*. The rule of Herrmann, that the conjunct. aorist stands in *re incerti temporis*, in the N. T. at least finds no support. The present passage might indeed be explained in harmony with it, but not *e.g.* 1 Thess. iv. 15. Comp. Winer, p. 634. This passage shows us that δικαιοῦν is synonymous with λογίζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην, μὴ λογίζεσθαι ἁμαρτίαν, ἀφιέναι τὰς ἀνομίας, ἐπεκαλύπτειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας, and that therefore the Protestant church has the full sanction of Scripture when it discriminates between justification and sanctification.

Although now (vv. 7, 8) David in general pronounced all blessed whose sins are forgiven, it might still be affirmed that this blessedness extended only to the περιτομή, to the Ἰουδαῖοι περίτμητοι, to whom David himself belonged. On this account the apostle (ver. 9) adds the question: Ὁ μακαρισμός . . . ἀκροβυστίαν; by which he passes over to the second point which he was desirous to attest by the example of Abraham, namely, that it confirms not only this truth that righteousness comes by faith, but also that it is vouchsafed equally to Gentiles with Jews.

Ver. 9. Ὁ μακαρισμός οὖν οὗτος, ἐπὶ τὴν περιτομήν;] Some would supply πίπτει. But *cadere in aliquem* is a Latinism unknown to Greek idiom. λέγεται, too, cannot well be supplied from ver. 6, comp. Heb. vii. 13. Paul asks not whether David

applies his felicitation only to the circumcision or also to the uncircumcision, but whether in and of itself it is to be applied only to one or also to the other? It is best, therefore, simply to supply *ἐστίν*. The *οὖν* draws an inference from the *μακαρισμός*, contained vv. 7, 8.

—*ἡ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκροβυστίαν*;] *or also*. The *καί* intimates that in what precedes *ἐπὶ τὴν περιτομήν* is said in *exclusive* reference to the Jews = *ἐπὶ τὴν περιτομήν μόνον*. Some codices even add this *μόνον*, manifestly supplied by themselves. *περιτομή, ἀκροβυστία*, *abst. pro concreto*, ii. 26, iii. 30.

—*λέγομεν γὰρ κτλ.*] The emphasis lies on *τῷ Ἀβραάμ*. "For we say that to *Abraham* his faith was accounted righteousness." As he was the first to receive circumcision, it may be asked whether he was justified before circumcision, or only as circumcised, and, further perhaps, even on account of circumcision. This question is answered in the following verse. If it were wished to lay the emphasis on *ἐλογίσθη*, we must assign to the word the pregnant sense, "to account by grace, without merit of works," a sense that it has not of itself, comp. on ver. 4. Better than this would be the emphasis on *ἡ πίστις*. If *faith* is imputed as righteousness, an imputation by *grace* finds place. The next question is, whether this takes place altogether independently of circumcision, or only on condition of circumcision pre-existent. The latter was the contention of the Pharisaic Jewish Christians (Acts xv.), and of the Galatian false teachers. From this followed the necessity of circumcision for the Gentiles, if they would partake in justifying grace and eternal blessedness. Nevertheless, it seems to us more simple and obvious to accentuate *τῷ Ἀβραάμ* than to give emphatic prominence to *ἡ πίστις*. The position of the words is not decisive against our view.

Ver. 10. *πῶς οὖν ἐλογίσθη*;] *sc. αὐτῷ*. *How, in what way?* not: *in what condition?* as if Paul had written *πῶς ἔχοντι* or *ποῶ ὄντι*. Rather is the question as yet indefinite, and is first defined more exactly by the subjoined *ἐν περιτομῇ ὄντι ἢ ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ*;

—*οὐκ ἐν περιτ. . . ἀκροβ.*] For Abraham's justification is treated of Gen. xv., but his circumcision for the first time Gen. xvii. The latter was only ordained by divine command several (at least fourteen) years after the former.

Ver. 11. Circumcision was not the means, but the consequence of justification, and the consequence, indeed, in the form of a confirming seal. By this representation the possible objection is implicitly guarded against, that according to Paul's view circumcision was altogether without use and meaning. καὶ σημεῖον ἔλαβε περιτομῆς] The genitive is *genit. appositionis*, therefore = καὶ σημεῖον ἔλαβεν ὃ ἐστὶ περιτομή, the sign consisting in circumcision, comp. Acts iv. 22: τὸ σημεῖον τοῦτο τῆς λύσεως; Jas. i. 12: ὁ στέφανος τῆς ζωῆς; Eph. vi. 17: ἡ μάχαιρα τοῦ πνεύματος. The reading περιτομήν, advocated by Bengel and Griesbach, is not sufficiently attested by manuscripts, and may most easily be explained by an error of the copyist through the adjacent accusatives (σημεῖον, σφραγίδα). Besides, Paul must have written καὶ σημεῖον ἔλαβε περιτομήν καὶ σφραγίδα, or καὶ ἔλαβε περιτομήν σημεῖον καὶ σφραγίδα. The arrangement of the words καὶ σημεῖον ἔλαβε περιτομῆς is only chosen for rhetorical effect, because it is more sonorous, solemn, and musical than either καὶ σημεῖον περιτομῆς ἔλαβε or καὶ ἔλαβε σημεῖον περιτομῆς. The expression σημεῖον alone is not identical with σημεῖον διαθήκης, חֶטֶן הַבְּרִית, Gen. xvii. 11, but signifies simply the sign that Abraham received in his person, by which he was distinguished from the uncircumcised. The religious significance of this sign is first given in the words subjoined.

—σφραγίδα] forms the apposition to σημεῖον περιτομῆς, *that it might be a seal, as a seal*,—a metaphorical expression for: *as a confirmation, a ratification, pledge*, comp. 1 Cor. ix. 2: ἡ γὰρ σφραγὶς τῆς ἐμῆς ἀποστολῆς ὑμεῖς ἐστε; 2 Tim. ii. 19; John vi. 27. The seal subjoined confirms and ratifies the contents of a document. Thus accordingly circumcision, ordained by God, was to Abraham, so to speak, a seal affixed to the declaration of righteousness vouchsafed to him on the part of God. In the Targum on Cant. iii. 8 the *seal* of circumcision is spoken of: הָיָה חֶטֶן חֲמִשָּׁה; as also in the formula of circumcision the words occurred: “Benedictus sit, qui sanctificavit dilectum ab utero, et *signum* (חֶטֶן) posuit in carne, et filios suos *sigillavit* (חֶטֶן) signo *fodderis sancti*.” The covenant which God made with Abraham, ch. xv. (see especially ver. 18), and which was therefore only renewed ch. xvii., was a covenant of grace and a promise on the part of God. In ch. xvii. 11 is circumcision first instituted as a *sign* of this covenant. As, then, God stood in covenant with Abraham

through a promise of grace, so Abraham stood in covenant with God through faith. The divine covenant-grace answers to the Abrahamic righteousness of faith. Justly, therefore, might the apostle describe circumcision, which, according to the O. T. text, was a covenant-sign, as withal a seal of the righteousness of faith.

—τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως] *the righteousness of faith*, the righteousness of which faith was the medium, which had its ground in faith.

—τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστίᾳ] *sc. σχεθείσης*. It seems natural to bind together δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως as one notion: *the righteousness-of-faith*, and then to refer τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστία to the complete notion: *the righteousness-of-faith which he had attained in uncircumcision*. But in the first place, for the sake of perspicuity, Paul must then have written: σφραγίδα τῆς ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνης τῆς κτλ. Again, the subjoined πιστευόντων δι' ἀκροβυστίας, ver. 11, τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστία πίστεως, ver. 12, shows that in the present verse the emphasis lies on τῆς πίστεως, not on τῆς δικαιοσύνης. Otherwise the apostle would have written, ver. 11: εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πατέρα πάντων τῶν πίστει δικαιοθέντων, not: πάντων τῶν πιστευόντων. Τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστία is therefore to be joined with τῆς πίστεως, not with τῆς δικαιοσύνης. “And he received the sign of circumcision as a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had in uncircumcision.” The apostle here takes circumcision simply as a seal of the covenant and of grace. Its other meaning, as a symbol of inward circumcision of heart (according to Philo, a σύμβολον τῆς τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκτομῆς), he does not here bring into view. But in point of fact, the sanctification of believers is itself a seal of their righteousness of faith already present. Without justification by faith there is no new life. The new life, therefore, bears witness to the presence of justification, to which, accordingly, it serves as a seal. Moreover, if circumcision is a σφραγίς of the δικαιοσύνης πίστεως, it is self-evident that since in the N. T., in baptism, a new σημεῖον σφραγιστικόν is instituted, circumcision is abolished, Col. ii. 11, 12. “Caeterum,” says Calvin, “quod in Abrahae persona circumcisio posterior iustitia fuit, non semper in sacramentis locum habet: sicut apparet in Isaac et posteris: sed Deus semel edere tale ab initio specimen voluit, ne quis externis rebus salutem affigeret,” as to which certainly the opposite, spiritualistic extreme must be just as decidedly rejected. This passage is of importance



in determining the notion of sacrament, inasmuch as according to it the sacramental sign stands out in antithesis, both to the *opus operatum* and the mere *nota professionis*, as a seal of the divine promise of grace which can only be embraced by faith. It is, in Augustine's phrase, *verbum visibile*, a visible pledge of grace.

—εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν κτλ.] by some expositors is taken ἐκβατικῶς = καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο πατήρ. But it is more forcible and more accordant with the biblical mode of conception to take it τελικῶς: that he might be, etc. Theodoret already well says: ὁ γὰρ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς προειδὼς ὡς θεὸς, ὡς ἓνα λαὸν ἐξ ἔθνων καὶ Ἰουδαίων ἀθροίσει, καὶ διὰ πίστεως αὐτοῖς τὴν σωτηρίαν παρέξει, ἐν τῷ πατριάρχῃ Ἀβραὰμ ἀμφότερα προδιέγραψε.

—πατέρα πάντων τῶν πίστ. δι' ἀκροβυστίας] It is, of course, the *spiritual* fatherhood of Abraham that is here alluded to. There exists a great family of believers, at the head of which stands Abraham, the *father* of faith. Abraham is founder and head of this family, and as such *father* of believers. Of the spiritual interpretation of Abraham's fatherhood the Lord had already set the example, John viii. 37, 39; comp. Matt. iii. 9; Luke iii. 8. As matter of fact, Abraham's righteousness of faith, present already before circumcision, and only confirmed and sealed by circumcision, was a strong testimony to the universality of divine grace, bound to no external conditions. The national limitation of God's kingdom, that came in later, bound to natural descent and an external *cultus*, was not, even during the time of its continuance, an absolute one, as is proved by the believing Gentiles who acknowledged the God of Israel, while prophecy expressly anticipated a time when all limits should be done away.

—δι' ἀκροβυστίας, *in, with uncircumcision*, ii. 27: διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς.

—εἰς τὸ λογισθῆναι κτλ.] illustrates parenthetically the preceding words: εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πατέρα κτλ. Abraham was to be father of all believers from among the Gentiles, *i.e.* to believers also from among the Gentiles was righteousness to be imputed.

—καὶ αὐτοῖς] as to Abraham himself. The καί, altogether in keeping with the strain of thought, which Lachmann on the evidence of some critical authorities erased, merely dropped out through a mistake of the eye of the copyist (occasioned by the *ναι* in the preceding λογισθῆναι).

—τὴν δικαιοσύνην] which was already spoken of, namely, the δικαιοσύνη πίστεως. Hence the article.

Ver. 12. Abraham is spiritual father, not only of believing Gentiles, but also of the Jews, provided that as his genuine children they resemble him not merely in circumcision, but also in faith. Already in the O. T. the distinction is drawn between the circumcised merely outwardly, in body, and the circumcised spiritually, in heart, Deut. x. 16, xxx. 6; Jer. iv. 4. καὶ πατέρα περιτομῆς] looks back to εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτόν, ver. 11: καὶ (εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτόν) πατέρα περιτομῆς. That the Jews may not understand this in a carnal sense, Paul at once adds, as a necessary qualification and illustrative definition: τοῖς οὐκ κτλ.

—ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσι κτλ.] *Dativ. commod.*: “to those who,” etc. We should have expected the apostle to continue in the genitive: καὶ πατέρα περιτομῆς τῶν οὐκ κτλ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν στοιχοῦντων κτλ., or rather: καὶ πατέρα περιτομῆς, τουτέστι (or λέγω δὲ) τῶν οὐκ κτλ. However, we also say: εἰμί τιμι πατήρ, comp. Rev. xxi. 7: καὶ ἔσομαι αὐτῷ θεός, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔσται μοι υἱός; Luke vii. 12: υἱὸς μονογενοῦς τῇ μητρὶ αὐτοῦ. The transition to the more pointed dative (“I am a father *to thee*,” more direct than “I am thy father”) cannot therefore be considered strange.

—τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον] like the unbelieving Jews, to whom Abraham was not father in the Pauline sense, *i.e.* not a spiritual father in faith. As to the phrase οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, see on ii. 8.

—ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν κτλ.] The expression is not to be illustrated by comparison with Gal. v. 25: πνεύματι στοιχεῖν, or Acts ix. 31: πορεύεσθαι τῷ φόβῳ τοῦ κυρίου, or Phil. iii. 16: τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν κανόνι, in which examples the dative is to be regarded as the dative of the *norm*, and the metaphor lies only in the word στοιχεῖν (to walk = to live), comp. Acts xxi. 24. Rather in the formula: τοῖς ἔχουσιν τινος στοιχεῖν or βαίνειν, the dative retains its original, local signification, and replies to the question: Where? “To walk in the footsteps of some one.” In this formula also not merely the word στοιχεῖν, but the whole phrase is metaphorical = “to imitate some one.” The phrase: “walk in the footsteps of the faith that Abraham had in uncircumcision,” instead of: “imitate the faith that Abraham had in uncircumcision,” is not without a touch of poetic grace. If, now, we look at the grammatical con-

struction of the sentence, it appears as if οἱ οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον must be different from οἱ στοιχοῦντες κτλ.; for were they the same, we should have expected, not τοῖς στοιχοῦσι, but στοιχοῦσι without the article : καὶ πατέρα περιτομῆς, τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ στοιχοῦσι τοῖς ἔχουσι τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστίᾳ πίστεως τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀβραάμ. On this account the Peshito, Vulgata, Theodoret early referred τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον, *sc.* οὔσι, to the Jews, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσι κτλ. to the Gentiles. "That he might be a father of the circumcised, not only of the circumcised (the Jews), but also of those who walk in the footsteps of the faith of uncircumcised Abraham." So, too, Luther. But, in the first place, it could not then have run : τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον, but must have run : οὐ τοῖς ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον, which some unimportant manuscripts even read, clearly as a correction merely. In the first case οὐκ would negative ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον εἶναι, in the second case πατέρα εἶναι. To suppose, with some expositors, that Paul has written τοῖς οὐκ for οὐ τοῖς, would be to suppose an inversion as unintelligible as it is unexampled in harshness. Further still, it is altogether inconceivable that Paul should have repeated once more the proposition already laid down ver. 11, that Paul is the father of believing Gentiles, and done this, moreover, in an unlikely form; for instead of ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσι τοῖς ἔχουσι κτλ., which could only serve to indicate the believing Jews, we should at least have expected : ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀκροβύστοις τοῖς στοιχοῦσι κτλ. On the other hand, the requirement which, in keeping with the tenor of thought, we naturally expected, that the Jews also, if they would be Abraham's children in truth, must possess faith, would have been left altogether unmentioned. Nothing, then, remains but to find in the words τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτ. μόν., ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσι κτλ., a description of the believing Jews. "That he might be a father of the circumcised, of those who are not *only* circumcised, but also follow the *faith* of uncircumcised Abraham." Thus only does ver. 12 completely correspond with ver. 11. Abraham, a father of believing *Gentiles*, ver. 11, and a father of believing *Jews*, ver. 12. It must accordingly be conceded that the article τοῖς before στοιχοῦσι is repeated in error, on which it has been rightly observed that Paul *carelessly* continues with ἀλλὰ καί, as if he had previously written οὐ μόνον τοῖς. We may here call to mind the canon which Calvin

enunciates on ii. 8 : "Ex aliis enim discenda est eloquentia : hic sub contemptibili verborum humilitate spiritualis sapientia quaerenda est." But it is to be borne in mind that negligences of expression occur perhaps in the most practised and correct writers. — But of set purpose the apostle says, not : "of those who follow Abraham's faith," but : "of those who follow Abraham's faith manifested in a state of *uncircumcision*," in order thus once again to strip the Jews of all pride in their circumcision.

The apostle, vv. 13–17, makes good the position that Abraham is father of all believers, not merely of the circumcised. The gist of the argument beginning with ver. 13 is found in the words of ver. 16 : *ὅς ἐστι πατὴρ πάντων ἡμῶν*. But the proof lies in the proposition that the promise of inheritance was given not through the medium of the law, but purely through the medium of the righteousness of faith. For were only those under the law, *i.e.* the circumcised, heirs of the promise, without doubt the Gentiles would be excluded, and Abraham would be father only of circumcised Jews, not also of believing Gentiles.

Ver. 13. *γάρ*] serves to make good the position that Abraham is father of believers, not merely of the circumcised.

—*διὰ νόμον*] not : *with* the law, *i.e.* while having the law, as in ii. 27, iv. 11. *διὰ νόμον* also is not of itself = *διὰ δικαιοσύνης νόμου*, or *δι' ἔργων νόμου*, but generally : *through the medium of the law, by means of the law*, for the law in no way co-operated as the medium of the promise, comp. *χωρὶς νόμου*, iii. 21. But doubtless the explanation of the word given by Grotius, *sub conditione observandi legem*, while of itself too narrow, may pass as a not inappropriate paraphrase of the *sense*. The *νόμος* appears here in correspondence with *περιτομή*, mentioned before, just in so far as from the legal standpoint circumcision was regarded as a sign of obligation to render a complete fulfilment of the law, Gal. v. 3. It is the more difficult to conceive such a condition of salvation imposed in circumcision in the case of *Abraham*, as the *Nomos* was not even as yet given to *him*, but was first given, according to Gal. iii. 17, *μετὰ ἔτη τετρακόσια καὶ τριάκοντα*, and, if the chronology be fixed more precisely, even later still.

—*ἡ ἐπαγγελία*] *sc. ἐγένετο*. With the word *ἐπαγγελία* the apostle always associates the notion of the spontaneous, unconditioned promise of grace. Comp. Gal. iii. 18 : *εἰ γὰρ ἐκ νόμου ἡ*

κληρονομία, οὐκέτι ἐξ ἐπαγγελίας· τῷ δὲ Ἀβραὰμ ἐξ ἐπαγγελίας κεχάρισται ὁ θεός.

—ἡ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ] *or* to his seed. In negative sentences the Greeks and Latins employ *ἡ* and *aut* where *καί* and *et* stand in affirmative sentences, comp. Matt. v. 17 with Rom. iii. 21. The σπέρμα are here manifestly believers, as the spiritual children of Abraham, ver. 16. In the O. T., to Abraham and his natural posterity was first of all promised the earthly possession, as an inheritance, of the land of Canaan. But in different ways the apostle arrives at the spiritual interpretation of this promise. In the first place, the history of Isaac's birth is for him, in accordance with the typical character of the entire O. T. history, an Allegorumenon, Rom. ix. 7-9; Gal. iv. 22-31. Isaac, the seed of Abraham, to whom the inheritance was made sure, was the son of promise, the son of the free woman. Ishmael, on the contrary, was the son of the bondmaid, born in the way of nature. The former prefigures the church of believers who are freed from the curse of the law, begotten spiritually through God's promise of grace. The latter prefigures the community of those that live after the flesh, that are busy in carnal works of the law, and are under legal bondage. Only the first are heirs of the spiritual Canaan, of ζῶν αἰώνιος, of δόξα ἐπουράνιος. In this conception he is justified by the fact, that through Abraham's seed all races of the earth were to be blessed. But according to the Prot-evangelium, as well as according to the entire tenor of O. T. prophecy, this seed was none other than Christ, the promised Seed of the woman, the true Israel (Isa. xlix. 3), He in whom the Israelitish nation reached its flower, its consummation, and the complement of its destiny. If Christ is the true Seed of Abraham, in whom every lower ἐπαγγελία, given to Israel κατὰ σάρκα, is elevated into a higher, heavenly promise, then are all believers who are in Christ, as such, both from among Jews and Gentiles, both in the period before and in that after Christ, Abraham's true seed and heirs with Christ of eternal life, Gal. iii. 16, 29; Rom. viii. 17. Finally, the apostle refers the promise given to Abraham, Gen. xii. 3, that in *him* all nations were to be blessed, to the blessing of righteousness and the gift of the Spirit promised to *believers*, Gal. iii. 6-9, 14. Being blessed through faith they are blessed in Abraham, *i.e.* like Abraham the father of faith, as whose spiritual children believers are regarded. Just as he as

natural father stands at the head of the natural Israel, so as spiritual father is he at the head of the spiritual Israel, who, so to speak, are born from his spirit of faith, because upon them the spirit of Abraham's faith rests, because they tread in the footsteps of his faith. By this last conception Paul in this passage also obtains the notion of the spiritual σπέρμα of Abraham, as vv. 11, 12, 16, 17, 18 show. But this coincides with the first conception, and with this derives its truth and validity from the mediatory interpretation. Because Christ is Abraham's σπέρμα, believers in Christ also are Abraham's σπέρμα, who, like Isaac, are born through promise, and walk in the footsteps of Abraham, their father in the faith.

—τὸ κληρονόμον αὐτὸν εἶναι [τοῦ] κόσμου] forms an epexegetis or a sort of apposition to ἡ ἐπαγγελία (Winer, p. 663), and is not in reality different from ὥστε εἶναι αὐτόν κτλ. The infin. praes. εἶναι does not stand for the infin. fut. ἔσεσθαι, for by the promise Abraham *is* already established in the inheritance of the world. By αὐτόν Abraham is made to stand alone as the chief subject. He appears as the representative of his σπέρμα, so that the promise given to him refers just as much to the σπέρμα. The article τοῦ is wanting before κόσμου in the best manuscript authorities, and must therefore be expunged. The reason of its absence may be, that the word κόσμος denotes an object the only one of its kind, and therefore is self-defined. It is always absent also in the phrases : ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κόσμου, and elsewhere frequently, v. 13 ; Gal. vi. 14 ; Winer, p. 147. By κόσμος, the object of the κληρονομία, if we decline to have recourse to arbitrary explanations, may simply be understood "all the world." But κόσμος is here the *glorified* world, the *new* heaven and *new* earth, 2 Pet. iii. 13, the κτίσις delivered from ματαιότης and φθορά, Rom. viii. 18 ff. To Abraham and his natural seed the earthly Canaan was promised (Gen. xii. 7, xiii. 14, 15, xv. 18, xvii. 8 ; comp. xxvi. 3 ; Ex. vi. 4). Just, then, as the apostle takes the natural seed merely as the type of the spiritual seed, the σπέρμα of which he speaks here being, as we have seen, Abraham's children in faith from among Gentiles and Jews, it follows that the earthly Canaan, the possession of Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα, may be regarded as the type of the heavenly Canaan which was to be the possession of Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ πνεῦμα, the church of believers. Just as in Christ

the natural Israel attained its flower and consummation, so also in this true Israel the earthly Canaan is elevated into the heavenly Canaan, *i.e.* the eternal happiness, whose possession Christ has procured. But this heavenly, invisible inheritance comes forth in visible manifestation, and reaches completeness in the new heaven and new earth for which we look in the *κόσμος καινός*. That *κόσμος* is not the world in its present earthly form, is proved also by Rom. viii. 17: *εἰ δὲ τέκνα καὶ κληρονόμοι, κληρονόμοι μὲν θεοῦ, συγκληρονόμοι δὲ Χριστοῦ*. Comp. Heb. xi. 8-16, from which we learn that the *σπέρμα* of Abraham, the community of believers, has still to look for a heavenly inheritance, *i.e.* the *κληρονομία Χριστοῦ*. As here the glorified world, so elsewhere the glorified earth is promised to believers as a future possession, comp. Matt. v. 5: *μακάριοι οἱ πράεῖς ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσι τὴν γῆν*, and again, Ps. xxxvii. 11: *יְיָ יִשְׁכֵּן בְּיָדֶיךָ יְיָ יִשְׁכֵּן בְּיָדֶיךָ*; ver. 29: *יְיָ יִשְׁכֵּן בְּיָדֶיךָ יְיָ יִשְׁכֵּן בְּיָדֶיךָ* (Matt. xix. 28; Luke xxii. 30); Rev. v. 10. Even in the O. T. the Messiah Himself is presented as the Ruler of the ends of the earth, Ps. ii. 8, lxxii. 8 ff. But in the present passage the comprehensive expression *κόσμος* is not to be confined merely to the *sphere of the earth* [Koppe, Köllner, Maier], still less are we to think of Messianic blessedness in general, present or even future [Wetstein, Flatt]. Nor, finally, can the apostle, in allusion to Gen. xii. 3, xviii. 18, xxii. 18, which passages already the old Greek expositors, Chrysost., Theodor., Theophyl., make the basis of their exposition, understand by *κληρονομία κόσμου* the reception of all nations into the theocracy [Beza, Estius], inasmuch as these very nations themselves are the *σπέρμα* to which this *κληρονομία* is promised. Comp. also Mechlita in *Jalkut Sim.* I. f. 69, 3: "hoc planum est, Abrahamum neque hunc mundum neque futurum haereditate consequi potuisse, nisi per fidem, qua credidit, q. d. Gen. xv. 6." *Tanchuma*, p. 165, 1: "Abrahamo patri meo Deus possidendum dedit *coelum et terram*." In the O. T. the land of Canaan is described as *κληρονομία*, *הֶעָרָה*, Deut. iv. 21; but in the N. T. the term is applied not to the earthly, but the heavenly Canaan only.

—*ἀλλὰ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πίστεως*] Certainly the promise was given to Abraham before the declaration of his righteousness through faith, Gen. xii., xiii. But he was already actually righteous through faith before the declaration recorded in xv. 6,

and the promise was also renewed to him after that declaration, xv. 18, xvii. 8.

Vv. 14, 15. The proof of this assertion, that to Abraham and his seed the promise of the inheritance was mediated through the righteousness of faith, not through the law, the apostle deduces from the impossibility of the opposite, which impossibility is grounded on the nature of the law, or rather on its relation to man's sinful nature. After this he reverts, ver. 16, to the assertion advanced ver. 13, and demonstrated vv. 14, 15. The nature of the proof, therefore, here is dogmatic, whereas in Gal. iii. 15-18 he pursues the historical mode of argument, showing that, since the law was first given 430 years after Abraham received the promise, the fulfilment of the promise cannot be dependent on fulfilment of the law. οἱ ἐκ νόμου] *sc.* ὄντες, ii. 8, iv. 12. These are not such as fulfil the law, οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου, ii. 13, nor such as are occupied with works of the law, place their trust in the law, οἱ ἐργαζόμενοι, iv. 4, but such as have, possess the law, belong to the law, ver. 16. But, of course, the κληρονομία is only denied to them in so far as they have only the νόμος, not πίστις as well; for ver. 16 intimates that even οἱ ἐκ νόμου, in so far as they are πιστεύοντες only, are partakers in the ἐπαγγελία. Therefore, in accordance with the sense, we might supply a μόνον not so well to κληρονόμοι as to οἱ ἐκ νόμου. Those meant are such as belong to the law simply. Those belonging to the law, as *such*, attain not the inheritance, ver. 16. The νόμος here is, of course, the Mosaic law; but the proposition holds good in a still higher degree of the moral law in general.

—κληρονόμοι] *sc.* εἰσί.

—κεκένωται ἡ πίστις] *Tertium enim non datur.* Either the νόμος or πίστις, *i.e.* the χάρις θεοῦ of which πίστις lays hold, is the medium of the κληρονομία. If, then, power to confer happiness resides in the law, faith has lost its power, Gal. iii. 21, 22. κεκένωται = *is made or become void, idle, useless, powerless* (not different from κενή ἐστίν as the result of κεκένωται); κενὸν καὶ ἀχρεῖον πρᾶγμα εὑρίσκεται, Theophyl., 1 Cor. i. 17, ix. 15; 2 Cor. ix. 3; Phil. ii. 7. We must not supply αὐτοῦ to πίστις, *i.e.* τοῦ Ἀβραάμ, for the proposition is general.

—καὶ κατήργηται ἡ ἐπαγγελία] and the promise *is abrogated, annulled*, iii. 3, 31, vi. 6, 1 Cor. xv. 26, *no longer finds place.* The reason of this assertion, consisting in the fact that it is the



distinctive property of the law to work ὀργή, the opposite of κληρονομία, is given in the subjoined ver. 15.

—ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὀργὴν κατεργάζεται] whereby, therefore, χάρις and the ἐπαγγελία are precluded. This exclusion of grace and the promise Luther has indicated by the *particula exclusiva* “only,” translating: “seeing that the law produces only wrath.” But ὀργή cannot be understood of man’s wrath against the divine judgment, as Melancthon explains: “Hos terrores conscientiae vocat iram, in quibus videlicet conscientia irascitur iudicio Dei, fugit et odit iudicium Dei.” Placed in contrast with objective χάρις and ἐπαγγελία, ὀργή also must denote something objective. Elsewhere, indeed, ἔχθρα is ascribed to guilty man in relation to God, viii. 7 (Eph. ii. 15), Jas. iv. 4, but never ὀργή. This is predicated only of God, i. 18, ii. 5, 8, iii. 5, v. 9, ix. 22; Eph. ii. 3, v. 6; 1 Thess. i. 10, ii. 16, v. 9, etc. But just as little can ὀργή denote man’s consciousness of the divine wrath (Müller, *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, vol. I. p. 105); for ὀργή is *wrath*, not: *consciousness of wrath*. Therefore ὀργή here is nothing but the ὀργὴ θεοῦ in its objective reality. The cause of the law working wrath, the degree, is stated in the next words.

—οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις] The law works wrath on this account, that its nature is so related to sinful human nature, that, wherever it appears, it necessarily leads to transgression. This proposition is put negatively by the apostle in the words: for where the law is not, there also is no transgression.<sup>1</sup> From this it does not seem *logically* to follow that where the law is transgression *always* is, but only that, as often as transgression is found, it is brought about by the law. But yet, *as matter of fact*, the former consequence follows of necessity. ἁμαρτία being already present in the nature of man, it follows that the νόμος *invariably* heightens it into παράβασις. To the apostle, παράβασις is always the transgression of a positive divine command, v. 14, 1 Tim. ii. 14, or of the positive law given by God through Moses, ii. 23; Gal. iii. 19; comp. Heb. ii. 2, ix. 15. The same is true of παραβύτης, ii. 25, 27; Gal. ii. 18; comp. Jas. ii. 9, 11; and of παραβαίνειν, Matt.

<sup>1</sup> “Paul, however, expresses himself *negatively*, because in his mind the negative thought that the fulfilment of the promise is not dependent on the law still preponderates; and he will not enter into closer analysis of the positive side of it—viz. that faith is the condition—until the sequel, ver. 16 ff.,” Meyer.

xv. 2, 3; 2 John 9. (In addition, only Acts i. 25 in an intransitive sense.) It follows directly from this that the absence of the article before νόμος does not justify us in extending the notion of this word to every legal norm in general. To the Gentiles, indeed, παραπτώματα are ascribed, Eph. i. 7, ii. 1, Col. ii. 13, but never παραβύσεις νόμου. How the law enhances ἁμαρτία into παράβασις, Rom. vii. 7-13 describes. Hence the νόμος is even called, 1 Cor. xv. 56, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας. According to Rom. v. 20, it intervened ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα. According to Gal. iii. 19, it was given τῶν παραβύσεων χάριν. Rightly Augustine: "Sine lege potest esse quis iniquus sed non pravaricator." The law then, working transgression, works also wrath and punishment. But thereby it is not affirmed that ὀργή falls *only* on the παράβασις νόμου. On the contrary, i. 18, Paul speaks expressly of an ἀποκάλυψις ὀργῆς that falls even on the *Gentiles*; and this justly, for even they have a knowledge of God and of the moral law, i. 21, 32, ii. 14, 15, against which they sin, so that their ἄγνοια, Acts xvii. 30, may always be regarded as nothing but a relative one. But yet, apart from this natural consciousness of religion and morality, the ὀργή θεοῦ rests upon the human race on account of the sinful principle innate within it, Eph. ii. 3, comp. Ps. li. 7, John iii. 6, on account of which, to all without exception, therefore inclusive of unconscious children, death is decreed, Rom. v. 12, 14. Hence ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου, ver. 13, is to be taken only relatively, in so far as by the νόμος the guilt of ἁμαρτία is aggravated. So already the scholion in *Matthæi*: ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέτρον ἐν κρίσει λογίζεται ἡ ἁμαρτία νόμου μὴ κειμένου ὡς νόμου κειμένου. The same holds good of the assertion: ὁ νόμος ὀργὴν κατεργάζεται. The law works wrath by enhancing it, since every enhancement is at the same time a new production of the object already in existence. Frequently in Scripture an absolute assertion, by the side of another assertion placed in opposition to it, is to be reduced to a relative degree. Comp. *e.g.* John ii. 11 with vii. 39. Compared with the wrath that falls on transgression of the law, the wrath that lies heavy on original sin is to be regarded as no wrath at all. Thus the divine ὀργή, and the κόλασις annexed thereto, has its differences of degree. It rests upon the unconscious sinfulness of Adamitic human nature. It is aggravated by

the fact of sin against the natural perception of God and law of conscience once aroused into activity, however variously disguised. It reaches its highest point when sin is developed as transgression of the law of God revealed from without, and at the same time revealed by the Spirit within in its purity and binding force. — Some good manuscripts and other authorities read οὐ δέ for οὐ γάρ. Lachmann has received the former reading. It seems that some copyists found it easier to understand the negative proposition as opposed to the former one than as a statement of the reason, and accordingly changed γάρ into δέ. But even if οὐ δέ were the original reading, δέ might have the power of the connective particle, and even thus the proposition serve as illustrative of the preceding. Comp. Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 845, and the example there quoted from Homer's *Iliad*, xiv. 416 :

τὸν δ' οὐπερ ἔχει θράσος, ὅς κεν ἴδῃται,

ἐγγὺς ἑὼν· χαλεπὸς δὲ Διὸς μεγάλῳ κεραυνός :

timet, qui prope videt fulmen immitti: grave autem Jovis fulmen est.

Ver. 16 draws an inference from vv. 14, 15. διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ πίστεως] Luther: "therefore righteousness must come from faith." But we should supply from the foregoing, not ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν, but either—inasmuch as the verse reverts to ver. 13, whose purport has been verified by vv. 14, 15—ἡ ἐπαγγελία ἐγένετο, or—which is more natural on account of the interpolatory ver. 14, and on account of the opposition between ἐκ πίστεως, ver. 16, and ἐκ νόμου, ver. 14—κληρονομία γίνεται, or still more precisely: οἱ κληρονόμοι εἰσίν. The order of thought of vv. 13–16 is therefore briefly the following: "The promise of inheritance comes not by the law, but by faith" (*Tertium enim non datur*), ver. 13; for the law works only wrath, and thus cannot be the medium of the inheritance; hence the inheritance comes through faith, ver. 16.

—ἵνα κατὰ χάριν] *sc. ᾗ* or ὧσιν, according as to the foregoing we supply κληρονομία γίνεται or κληρονόμοι εἰσίν. ἵνα indicates the divine purpose. κατὰ χάριν, *by virtue of grace, by way of favour* = δωρεάν, iii. 24, forms a contrast to κατὰ ὀφείλημα, as πίστις does to ἔργα νόμου. χάρις, ἐπαγγελία, πίστις are mutually related and hang together, as do ἔργα νόμου and ὀφείλημα. What is imparted to faith is imparted of grace, because faith has nothing in it of merit, but is simply the instrument apprehending grace,

which it in no way supplements or completes. The correspondence or identity of *ἐκ πίστεως* and *κατὰ χάριν* demonstrates the accuracy of the Protestant thesis: that we are justified *per fidem*, not *propter fidem*.

—*εἰς τὸ εἶναι βεβαίαν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν*] is not to be taken as a sentence expressive of consequence, but of purpose, therefore not: *so that*, etc., but: *in order that* the promise might hold good. The sentence supplies the antithesis of *κατήργηται ἡ ἐπαγγελία*, ver. 14. It was part of the divine intention to give certainty to the promise by making it depend entirely on grace. If fulfilment of the law is the condition of obtaining the inheritance, the promise of inheritance is uncertain, or rather falls to the ground, because the law only works wrath. But if the inheritance is the gift of free grace, the promise stands firm, just because it depends on no condition to be fulfilled on man's part. "Hinc etiam colligere promptum est," says Calvin, "gratiam non pro dono regenerationis, ut quidam imaginantur, sed pro gratuito favore sumi: quia ut regeneratio nunquam perfecta est, ad placandas animas nunquam sufficeret, nec per se ratam faceret promissionem." Withal, this passage furnishes a powerful argument in opposition to the scholastic doctrine of *conjectura moralis*. If the promise of inheritance by grace stands firm, then the certainty of the inheritance through faith must stand firm; whereas, in case the inheritance of salvation is made dependent at all on works, even though the works of the regenerate, through the imperfection of these works doubt must necessarily take the place of certainty, or, at most, only a conjectural, not an absolute certainty of salvation can be enjoyed.

—*παντὶ τῷ σπέρματι*] = *παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι*, comp. vv. 11, 12.

—*οὐ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου μόνον*] *sc. σπέρματι*. Therefore not = *not only to the circumcised Jews*, for these do not merely as such belong to the *σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ* in the Pauline sense of the word, but = *not only to the seed*, i.e. *to believers from among the circumcised Jews*. *οἱ ἐκ νόμου* are therefore here simply = *οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι*, elsewhere *οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς*. But since ver. 13, *νόμος* has taken the place of *περιτομή*.

—*ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἐκ πίστεως Ἀβραάμ*] *i.e.* also to believing Gentiles. *τὸ ἐκ νόμου σπέρμα* is also *ἐκ πίστεως Ἀβραάμ*. Wherefore from the contrast a *χωρὶς νόμου* or *μόνον* is spontaneously supplied, in accordance with the meaning, to *τῷ ἐκ*

πίστεως σπερματι. "Not only to the seed that possesses the law, but also to the seed that is of the faith of Abraham, *i.e.* without possessing the law, *i.e.* that is *only* of the faith of Abraham" —ὅς ἐστι πατὴρ πάντων ἡμῶν] *sc.* τῶν πιστευόντων, who is father of us all, *i.e.* of all believers, as well from among the Gentiles as the Jews. Thus the apostle herewith reverts to vv. 11, 12, and concludes the second part of his affirmation. The first consisted in the proposition: Abraham was justified through faith, not through works; the second in the proposition: Abraham is a father of *all* believers, just as much of those from among the Gentiles as of those from among the Jews. This latter proposition he has established in a twofold manner: (1) Abraham was righteous through faith before he received circumcision; therefore faith does it, not circumcision. (2) To Abraham salvation was promised, not on condition of fulfilling the law, but on account of his faith; therefore grace does it, not the law. But if neither circumcision nor the law does it, but only faith, Abraham is a father, not only of the Jews (his natural posterity; therefore also natural descent does it not), but a father of all believers, not less of those from among the Gentiles than of those from among the Jews.

Ver. 17. First of all, the universal spiritual fatherhood of Abraham is confirmed by a scriptural testimony, and then its guarantee and dignity are emphasized. καθὼς γέγραπται] Gen. xvii. 5.

—ὅτι πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθνῶν τέθεικά σε] literally after the LXX. In the original the ὅτι gives a reason for the change, immediately preceding, of the name Ἀβράμ (high father) into Ἀβραάμ (father of a multitude). In harmony with this, ὅτι in this passage serves to indicate the proof of ὅς ἐστι πατὴρ πάντων ἡμῶν. The apostle here also keeps to the spiritual meaning. Abraham is a father of many nations, *i.e.* of the great host of believers from among Jews and Gentiles. οὐ κατὰ φυσικὴν συγγένειαν, says Chrysostom, ἀλλὰ κατ' οἰκείωσιν πίστεως. . . . ὁ γὰρ τύπος τῆς ἐκείνου πίστεως πάντας ἡμᾶς νίους ποιεῖ τοῦ Ἀβραάμ. With τέθεικα σέ, *I have set thee*, *i.e.* *I have made thee*, appointed thee, comp. Heb. i. 2: ὃν ἔθηκε κληρονόμον πάντων.

—κατέναντι οὗ ἐπίστευσε θεοῦ] Several greatly interpolated codices, several versions and Fathers read ἐπίστευσας, which wrong

reading Luther follows, translating: "before God whom thou believedst." The correction ἐπίστευσας arose probably from the difficulty, little regarded by expositors, of connecting κατέναντι οὗ ἐπίστευσε θεοῦ with ὅς ἐστι πατήρ πάντων ἡμῶν; for, since Abraham is at present actually father of us all, he is this no longer merely, as during his life, κατέναντι θεοῦ. (Then it must have been said, Abraham is *realized at present*, as if he, just as in that sacred moment of history, were standing as father of us all before God's face. But manifestly Paul was not yet thinking of such realization when he wrote ὅς ἐστι πατήρ πάντων ἡμῶν, ver. 16. This could only have occurred as the sequel of the quotation, ver. 17.) Accordingly, κατέναντι οὗ . . . θεοῦ is not to be directly coupled with ὅς ἐστι πατήρ π. ἡμ., but with a phrase to be taken out of ὅτι πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθνῶν τέθεικά σε: "and as such he was appointed," or: "and thus he stood there as father of us all." But on this account καθὼς . . . σε ought not, as is commonly done, to be enclosed in brackets. Already has Bengel felt the necessity of the mode of connection given, when he says: *Constructio, τέθεικά σε, κατέναντι . . . θεοῦ, similis est illi: ἵνα εἰδῇτε, ἄρον*, Matt. ix. 6, conf. Rom. xv. 3; Acts i. 4.—κατέναντι οὗ ἐπίστευσε θεοῦ is usually resolved: κατέναντι τοῦ θεοῦ, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε. But elsewhere the attraction is only found in verbs that govern the accusative. It would thus be altogether regular if the phrase were: κατέναντι οὗ ἠγάπησε θεοῦ = κατέναντι τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃν ἠγάπησε. In verbs that govern the dative the attraction indeed is not unheard of in profane authors, but in the N. T. there is no unquestionable instance to confirm it, Winer, p. 204. Therefore a surer analysis is: κατέναντι θεοῦ, κατέναντι οὗ ἐπίστευσε, *coram Deo, coram quo credidit*, Winer, p. 206.<sup>1</sup> κατέναντι τοῦ θεοῦ = πρὶν ὕψι, *in Gou's presence*. κατέναντι is always in the N. T. = *coram, in conspectu, e regione, ex adverso, before, over against, in presence of*, Matt. xxi. 2 (xxvii. 24: ἀπέναντι); Mark xi. 2, xii. 41, xiii. 3; Luke xix. 30. In the present passage also the simplest course is to abide by this radical meaning, according to which Abraham is represented as believing and standing as πατήρ πάντων ἡμῶν in the presence of the God who appeared to him. No doubt with this the derivative meaning

<sup>1</sup> πρὶν ὃν κατεχρήσθη λόγων, Luke i. 4, cited by Tholuck, is no adequate parallel, as here the analysis is not πρὶν τῶν λόγων, πρὶν ὃν κατεχρήσθη, but simply τῶν λόγων, πρὶν ὃν κατεχρήσθη.

easily allies itself: *in the judgment* [Rückert, Köllner, Fritzsche, Maier, Umbreit], or: *according to the will* [Reiche, Krehl] *of God*, which latter sense would here be the more fitting, inasmuch as Abraham is *appointed* to be father of all. Still it is better to keep to the *radical meaning* of the word, a course, moreover, by which the language gains in realistic and vivid force. In ἐπίστευσε the πίστις of Abraham is again made prominent, in order to intimate afresh how this alone mediated the true spiritual and universal fatherhood of Abraham, and consequently is the sole and exclusive condition of genuine childhood to Abraham.

—τοῦ ζωοποιούντος . . . ὥς ὄντα] contains a description of the divine omnipotence. But the apostle says not simply τοῦ πάντα δυναμένου: Abraham was appointed father of all believers in the presence of the God whom he believed, who is almighty, *i.e.* because He is almighty; so that the remembrance of God's omnipotence would confirm to Abraham the promise that he should be a father of all believers, although as yet he discerned no sign of a realization which, according to sensible appearance, was impossible. But instead of the general τοῦ πάντα δυναμένου, Paul individualizes, and, in allusion to the actual circumstances of Abraham, says: τοῦ ζωοποιούντος . . . ὥς ὄντα.

—τοῦ ζωοποιούντος τοὺς νεκρούς] Deut. xxxii. 39; 1 Sam. ii. 6; Wisd. Sol. xvi. 13; Tob. xiii. 2; John v. 21; 2 Cor. i. 9; 1 Tim. vi. 13. The fact expressed is therefore to be taken as a standing characteristic of the divine omnipotence, and νεκροί is neither to be referred to the *spiritually* dead, nor yet to be identified with νεκρωμένοι, *decrepiti*, ver. 19, Heb. xi. 12, so that the sense would be: "who to the dead (*i.e.* the decrepid, physically infirm, as Abraham was) restores life (*i.e.* the power, therefore, to beget children)." Rather is ζωοποιεῖν τοὺς νεκρούς, as has been observed, a solemn formula for: *to bring to life the actually dead*. Therefore here the meaning can be nothing else. Doubtless there is to be conceded an *indirect* allusion to the infirm body of Abraham, which determined the apostle to the choice of this particular expression. As God brings back the dead to life, the more easily could He restore virile strength to Abraham, physically infirm through old age.

—καὶ καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὥς ὄντα] The following explanations of this difficult utterance must be at once dismissed:

(1) "He calls into existence that which is not, as He called that which is." This must have run: *καὶ καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καθὼς ἐκάλεσε τὰ ὄντα.* (2) "He calls those not yet born, as He calls those born, to eternal life" [Fritzsche, Mangold]. This sense has no relevance to the context, perspicuity would have required *καὶ εἰς τὴν ζωὴν αἰώνιον καλοῦντος*, comp. 1 Tim. vi. 12, and the *κλησίς* is addressed only in time to the actually living. It is merely *προορισμός, πρόγνωσις, ἐκλογή*, which takes place in the eternal counsel of God before the birth of the individual. (3) "Who adds those not yet living to the living," *viventibus adiungit*, so that *ὥς* would stand in the sense of *πρός, εἰς* [Luther, Wolf]. But, first, this interpretation is not a natural one; and secondly, in this case we should have looked for the article rather before *ὄντα* than before *μὴ ὄντα*. Moreover, in this sense *ὥς* stands only in reference to persons.<sup>1</sup> (4) Finally, it is grammatically impossible to take *ὥς ὄντα* for *εἰς ὄντα* = *εἰς τὸ εἶναι* [Reiche, Köllner, Tholuck, etc.], or for *ὥς ἐσόμενα* [de Wette], or to adduce by way of explanation the Heb. idiom *בְּיָמָיו* (בְּיָמָיו) *בְּיָמָיו*, "to make one thing of the same nature as another thing," for this would be *τιθέντος* or *ποιούντος*, not *καλοῦντος*. There remain, then, but two courses. (1) Either we may refer *καλεῖν* to the *creating* call of God,<sup>2</sup> and take *ὄντα* as the accusative of result,<sup>3</sup> so that *καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὥς ὄντα* = *καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτὰ ὥς ὄντα* = *καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὥστε εἶναι αὐτά*, "who calls those not yet living as living ones," i.e. that through His call they issue forth as living ones, as those who live. But then it is hard to see why Paul did not, as in the passage quoted from Philo, write more simply: *καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα καλοῦντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι*, or: *καὶ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων καλοῦντος τὰ ὄντα*. Besides, *ὥς* is never found elsewhere in this form of construction. Thus, at least, we should have expected: *καὶ καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὄντα*, as to which,

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Hermann, *ad Viger.* ed. tert. p. 853: "*ὥς* pro *εἰς* ab Atticis de re animata dici solere animadvertunt grammatici, rarissime autem de re inanimata, ut *ὥς Ἀβυδὸν.*"

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Isa. xxii. 12, xli. 4, xlviii. 13; 2 Kings viii. 1; Wisd. Sol. xi. 25; Philo, *de creat. princ.* p. 728: *τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλεσεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι.*

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Phil. iii. 21: *ὅς μετασχηματίζει τὸ σῶμα . . . σύμμορφον κτλ.* = *εἰς τὸ γίνεσθαι αὐτὸ σύμμορφον*, as some codd. even read as a gloss, 1 Thess. iii. 13: *εἰς τὸ σπηρίσαι ὑμῶν τὰς καρδίας ἀμίμπτους ἐν ἀγιωσύνῃ*; 1 Cor. i. 8; 2 Cor. iii. 6; 1 Thess. v. 23; Jude 24; Eccles. xlv. 6; see also, as to this proleptic use of *adjectiva effectus*, Winer, p. 779.



moreover, the use of the *participle* as *participium effectus* could scarcely be established. (2) For these reasons, the interpretation which seems to us most in conformity with the words as they stand simply is that which takes *καλεῖν*, like *κρῖν*, in the sense of “to call, to command” (comp. Ps. l. 1; Isa. xl. 26): “who calls the non-existent as existent, *i.e.* who issues commands concerning the non-existent as concerning the existent, who utters His ordaining command concerning that which is not as concerning that which is.” The description of almighty power, contained in these words, is used in the next place in allusion to the actual condition of Abraham, to whom, when he showed himself one *πιστεύσας κατέναντι θεοῦ*, Gen. xv. 6, God, pointing to the stars of heaven, said at once: *οὕτως ἔσται τὸ σπέρμα σου*. The non-existent then finds an application to the *σπέρμα*, concerning which God, defining its number, gave command, as concerning what exists. But if He gives command concerning the non-existent as concerning the existent, by this very act He attests His power to call that which is not into being. Less suitably, *καλεῖν* is taken in the sense of *appellare, to name* [Hofmann]. “He who calls by name that which is not as if it were.” In the first place, it must then rather have been written *καλεῖν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν αὐτῶν*. Again, the phrase “to call by name” would stand better as a designation of divine omniscience than of omnipotence; and lastly, the striking allusion to Gen. xv. 5 would fall to the ground. The present *καλοῦντος* distinguishes God’s act of command concerning the non-existent as an *abiding* characteristic of His omnipotence. *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* denotes relative negation, what exists not yet; *οὐκ ὄντα*, on the other hand, absolute negation. The description of divine omnipotence is universal. Hence it is not to be supposed that the neut. *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* stands for the masc. *τοὺς μὴ ὄντας*, comp. 1 Cor. i. 27, 28. *ὥς* is the comparative *as*. As a striking parallel, Philo, *de Jos.* i. 544, has been quoted, where it is said of the power of imagination that it pictures *τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὥς ὄντα*; and Artemidorus, p. 46, where it is said of the painter that he represents *τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὥς ὄντα*. But in the words *τοῦ ζωοποιούντος . . . ὥς ὄντα* divine omnipotence is described in the form of a climax, advancing from the dead to the non-existent. Because, then, God calls to life the dead, Abraham believed that He would also quicken his dead body; and because He gives command concerning that

which is not as concerning that which is, and therefore by His almighty power calls into being that which is not, Abraham believed in the promise of a numerous posterity. But we know already that, according to Paul's meaning, this σπέρμα is the community of believers. Abraham, then, believed in this his future σπέρμα, i.e. not so much in the Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα, in which, of course, he believed as well, as rather in the Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ πνεῦμα, the Ἰσραὴλ θεοῦ, comp. Gal. vi. 16. The object of Abraham's justifying faith has accordingly three elements. It consists in the ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν, vv. 3, 4; the spiritual σπέρμα, vv. 16, 17; and the κληρονομία, ver. 13. But the ground, the central point and the bond that gives unity to these elements, is Christ, without whom there is no pardoning grace which He alone merits on our behalf, no community of believers which He alone by His Spirit begets, no eternal life which He alone procured. If, then, in what follows, vv. 18–22, the justifying faith of Abraham is referred to the natural birth of Isaac, this is only done in so far as in the strength of faith with which Abraham embraced the promise of natural seed, he at the same time gave evidence of his unshaken believing expectation of the Messiah, whose birth was conditioned by Isaac's, as well as of the forgiveness of sins, the spiritual seed and heavenly inheritance, of all which Christ was to be the exclusive ground and Mediator.

Vv. 18 to 21 set in relief the strength of Abraham's faith. "Ostendit Paulus," says Bengel, "fidem non esse rem tenuem, cui justificationem adscribat, sed vim eximiam." This praise of Abraham's faith shows, at the same time, that justifying faith is no merely theoretical contemplation and perception, but a living trust, a confident reliance upon God's almighty grace. Εἶδες πῶς τίθησι καὶ τὰ κωλύματα καὶ τὴν ὑψηλὴν τοῦ δικαίου γνώμην πάντα ὑπερβαίνουσιν, Chrys.

Ver. 18. ὅς] runs parallel with ὅς ἐστι κτλ., ver. 16.

—παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι] a thoroughly Pauline oxymoron. παρ' ἐλπίδα τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ, explains Chrysostom; παρ' ἐλπίδα τὴν κατὰ φύσιν λέγει ἐπ' ἐλπίδι δὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ὑποσχέσεως, Schol. Matth.; "praeter spem rationis in spe promissionis credidit," Bengel. Were the meaning only this, that Abraham indulged hope subjectively where, in an objective point of view, there was nothing to hope for, his hope would be marked

as mere illusion. *παρ' ἐλπίδα*, *against hope*, Acts xviii. 13, where, according to appearance and the laws of nature, there was nothing to hope for. *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι*, *upon hope*, denotes the basis of the *ἐπίστευσε*. He believed, resting himself, so to speak, upon the ground of hope (in the divine promise). Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 10: *ὅτι ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ὀφείλει ὁ ἄροτριῶν ἀροτριᾶν*, also Tit. i. 2. "Una eademque res," observes Bengel, "et *fide* et *spe*, prehenditur: et fieri ut res, quae vere edicatur; *spe*, ut res laeta, quae certo *fide*, potest et fiet." The practical observation of Melancthon is also worthy of note: "Ita nos credamus, nobis ignosci, credamus nos exaudiri, etiamsi nihil nisi peccatum in nobis sentimus."

—*εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτὸν πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθνῶν*] cannot be taken as the object of *ἐπίστευσε*: *he believed that he would be*, etc., *he believed in his becoming father*. Apart from the consideration that then we should have expected *ἐαυτόν* instead of *αὐτόν*, the construction of *πιστεύειν εἰς* with a substantival infinitive (*πιστεύω εἰς τὸ εἶναι (γενέσθαι) μέ τι*), though logically possible, cannot be supported by examples [Winer, p. 413]; also, the energetic *παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ἐπίστ.* would be thereby weakened. Moreover, in what precedes, the object of Abraham's faith is never directly specified, and therefore is to be supplied here also from the context. Lastly, in that case Paul would probably have quoted a scriptural passage to evince the strength of Abraham's faith (of *παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ἐπίστ.*), not the great number of his posterity. Further, as concerns the consecutive sense, by which *εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτόν = καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο*, the objection has justly been made that it is opposed to the tenor of the passage; for vv. 19–21 are a *description of the faith itself*, so that the *result* of the faith (which is spoken of ver. 22) would be foreign to the subject. Accordingly, nothing but the telic sense is left, after which Luther rightly translates: "*in order that he might be a father of many Gentiles*." According to this, Abraham's faith is viewed, in harmony with *εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτόν κτλ.*, ver. 11, from the standpoint of the divine intention. In the divine counsel Abraham's faith was ordained for this end, to make him father of all believers (of many nations). Comp. Gal. iii. 8. There is an allusion to the divine oracle, ver. 17. To enclose in brackets the subjoined citation from Gen. xv. 5, which confirms *εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτόν πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθνῶν* with especial reference to *πολλῶν*, is

arbitrary, on account of the close connection in which it stands with what precedes.

—οὕτως ἔσται τὸ σπέρμα σου] namely, as the stars of heaven. The passage of the original, according to the rendering of the LXX., runs in full: ἐξήγαγε δὲ αὐτὸν ἔξω, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ· ἀνάβλεψον δὴ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, καὶ ἀρίθμησον τοὺς ἀστέρας, εἰ δυνήσῃ ἐξαριθμῆσαι αὐτούς· καὶ εἶπεν· οὕτως ἔσται τὸ σπέρμα σου (upon which in ver. 6 follows: καὶ ἐπίστευσεν Ἀβρὰμ τῷ θεῷ, καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην). In accordance with this—with the addition of Gen. xiii. 16, where it is said: καὶ ποιήσω τὸ σπέρμα σου ὡς τὴν ἄμμον τῆς γῆς—several codices and Fathers have thought that the present passage should be completed by appending to οὕτως ἔσται τὸ σπέρμα σου the gloss: ὡς αἱ (οἱ) ἀστέρες τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄμμον (ἡ ἄμμος) τῆς θαλάσσης. The Vulg. also reads, in several manuscr.: “sicut stellae coeli et arena maris.” On the other hand, the observation of Calvin is to be noted: “Consulto (Paulus) testimonium truncatum adduxit: quo nos acueret ad scripturae lectionem. Religiose enim id ubique in citanda scriptura curant apostoli, ut nos ad diligentiores ejus lectionem accendant.”

Ver. 19. καὶ μὴ ἀσθενήσας τῇ πίστει] and because he was not weak in faith. A litotes or meiosis. Μὴ ἀσθενήσας τῇ πίστει, ἀλλ' ἰσχυρὰν αὐτὴν ἔχων, Theophylact. “He was not weak” = “he was very strong.” For the doctrinal comprehension of these words, Calvin’s copious exposition is helpful: “Quod ait, non fuisse debilem fide, sic accipe: Non vacillasse, aut fluctuaturn esse, ut solemus in rebus ambiguis. Duplex enim est fidei debilitas: una, quae tentationibus adversis succumbendo excidere nos a Dei virtute facit: altera, quae ex imperfectione quidem nascitur, non tamen fidem ipsam exstinguit. Nam nec mens unquam sic illuminata est, quin maneant multae ignorantiae reliquiae: nunquam sic animus stabilitus, quin multum haereat dubitationis. Cum iis ergo carnis vitiis, ignorantia scilicet et dubitatione, assiduum est fidelibus certamen: in quo certamine fides eorum graviter concutitur saepe et laborat, verum superior tandem evadit: ut dici possint in ipsa infirmitate firmissimi.” τῇ πίστει, quod attinet ad fidem. It is the dative of reference, denoting the sphere to which a general predicate (here μὴ ἀσθενεῖν, as in ver. 20 ἐνδυναμοῦσθαι) is to be conceived as limited. Comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 20: μὴ παιδία γίνεσθε ταῖς φρεσίν (in understand-

ing); ἀλλ' τῇ κακίᾳ (in regard to wickedness) νηπιᾷζετε, Winer, p. 270. The reading of several codices, ἐν τῇ πίστει, is accordingly to be regarded as a gloss.

—οὐ κατενόησε] Several good authorities, also the Cod. Sinait., omit οὐ, which, accordingly, Griesbach deems suspicious, and Lachmann has expunged. But the negation cannot be dispensed with; for, as the subjoined δέ proves, Paul must then have written: κατενόησε μὲν κτλ. The οὐ was manifestly omitted from regard to Gen. xvii. 17. But apart from the consideration that Paul here, perhaps, refers only to Gen. xv. 5, 6, where Abraham's faith is forthwith decisively expressed, even the doubt of Abraham, related Gen. xvii., was but a transient one, which he at once in faith overcame. "Sed quoniam omissa consideratione," says Calvin, "totum suum sensum Domino resignavit: dicit apostolus, non considerasse. Et sane majoris fuit constantiae, ab ea re, quae se oculis ultro ingererat, cogitationem distrahere, quam si nihil tale in mentem ei venisset." To this add, that κατανοεῖν signifies not merely: "animum advertere ad, considerare," but: "oculos, mentemque in re defigere," to fix the attention on a thing, to view a thing closely, so to regard a thing as to decide by it, comp. Luke xii. 24, 27; Acts vii. 31, 32, xi. 6; Heb. iii. 1, x. 24. Accordingly, Paul would deny, not so much that Abraham in general directed his attention to the difficulty in the natural circumstances of the case, as only that this engrossed the whole of his thoughts. As of Abraham, Gen. xvii., so also of John the Baptist, Matt. xi., an instance of wavering faith is recorded.

—τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα ἤδη νεκρωμένον] ἤδη is absent in several manuscripts, versions, and Fathers; the Vulgate read it before ἑκατονταέτης. It appears therefore to be spurious. Lachmann has bracketed it. The expression gains in force and conciseness (τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα νεκρωμένον . . . τὴν νέκρωσιν τῆς μήτρας Σάρρας) without it. Perhaps it was inserted in allusion to the objection, that the power of generation in one a hundred years old was not unheard of in that age, against which Bengel's remark is to be observed: "Post Semum, nemo centum annorum generasse Gen. xi. legitur." Comp. also Calvin on the passage. But as concerns the power of generation mentioned still later in the marriage with Ketura, Gen. xxv. 1, 2, Bengel thus speaks: "Novus corporis vigor etiam mansit in matrimonio cum Ketura." νεκρωμένον = decrepid as regards power of generation, Heb. xi. 12.

—ἐκατονταέτης που ὑπάρχων] που, *fore, about*, for he was ninety-nine years old, comp. Gen. xvii. 1, 24 with ver. 17, xxi. 5.

—καὶ τὴν νέκρωσιν τῆς μήτρας Σάρρας] ἡ νέκρωσις, actively = *interfectio, killing*; passively, = (1) τὸ νεκροῦσθαι, *death*, (2) *state of death*. This may be taken, properly, of actual death,—so, perhaps, 2 Cor. iv. 10,—or, figuratively, of extreme torpor of the physical powers. According to Gen. xvii. 17, Sarah was ninety years old. The LXX. write Σάρρα, because the ρ in ἡρᾶ, *femina princeps, princess*, according to the etymology (from ἡρᾶ, to have dominion), should have the Dagesh.

Vv. 20, 21. εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐνεδυναμώθη τῇ πίστει] As the direct, positive antithesis of οὐ κατενόησε, ver. 19, we should have expected a simple εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐδυναμώθη τῇ πίστει. But this positive element acquires greater force when it is placed in contrast with the prefixed negative, οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ. εἰς, *quod attinet, with respect to, as regards. As concerns the promise, he doubted not in unbelief*. Comp. Acts xxv. 20: ἀπορούμενος δὲ ἐγὼ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτου ζήτησιν. But the εἰς may perhaps be referred to ἐπίστευσε first of all supposed, negatively paraphrased by οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ interposed, and positively expressed in ἐνεδυναμώθη τῇ πίστει. δέ is not = ἀλλά, but connective = “and indeed.” Moreover, we may also, with Meyer, suppose that “the negative proposition in ver. 19 is, in the first place, still more specially *elucidated*, likewise negatively, by εἰς . . . ἀπιστίᾳ (δέ, the expegetical *autem*), and then the *positive opposite* relation is subjoined to it by ἀλλ' ἐνεδυναμώθη κτλ. In the former negative illustrative clause, the chief element giving the information is εἰς τ. ἐπαγγ. τ. θεοῦ, which is therefore placed first with great emphasis: *but with regard to the promise of God, he wavered not incredulously, but waxed strong in faith*,” etc. τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ, *dat. instr. diffidentia adductus, through the unbelief*, which in this case he would have had. Hence the article. ἐνεδυναμώθη, Luther rightly: “*he became strong*.” ἐνδυναμοῦσθαι is not middle: “to make oneself strong, strengthen oneself,” but passive: “to be made strong = to wax strong, become strong,” Acts ix. 22; 2 Tim. ii. 1; Heb. xi. 34. Therefore = δυνατὸς τῇ πίστει ἐγένετο. Thus in διεκρίθη, according to N. T. usage, the passive stands instead of the middle form, whereas ἐνεδυναμώθη is the actual passive, Winer, p. 327. The dative τῇ πίστει, like the dative in μὴ

ἀσθενήσας τῇ πίστει, ver. 19, is the dative of reference or relation, *quod attinet ad fidem*. διακρίνειν, *to discriminate, distinguish, search into, decide*, Matt. xvi. 3; Acts xv. 9; 1 Cor. iv. 7, vi. 5, xi. 29, 31, xiv. 29. In the middle: *to separate oneself, to dispute*, Acts xi. 2; Jude 9; but mostly: *to dispute with oneself, to doubt*. So here and xiv. 23; comp. Matt. xxi. 21; Mark xi. 23; Acts x. 20, xi. 12; Jas. i. 6, ii. 4 (see Huther, *ibid.*). Elsewhere the word occurs in the N. T. only Jude 22, where, however, both reading and interpretation are doubtful.

—δοὺς δόξαν τῷ θεῷ] corresponding with the Heb. שׁוֹבֵר כְּבוֹד (יְהוָה) נִתְּנָה (in Rev. xix. 7 we read τὴν δόξαν, i.e. to give the glory due to God). διδόναι δόξαν τῷ θεῷ, *to give glory to God* = to think, say, or do what furthers God's glory. The connection in each case decides in what respect glory is given to God. It is given Him by the acknowledgment of His omnipotence, so here—by speaking the truth, which implies acknowledgment of God as the truthful One, who requires the truth to be spoken, so in John ix. 24—by thanksgiving for His goodness, so in Luke xvii. 18, and so on. In general, therefore, διδόναι δόξαν τῷ θεῷ is to acknowledge God for what He is, and to speak and act as His will directs. The hallowing of God's name means the same.

—καὶ πληροφορηθεῖς] The καὶ before πληροφορηθεῖς is wanting in several important Western manuscripts. But it only seems omitted because explicative; and if it is left out, πληροφορηθεῖς explains by direct addition in what the διδόναι δόξαν τῷ θεῷ consisted. "He gave God glory in being fully persuaded," etc. For the rest, the participial clause δοὺς δόξαν τ. θ. καὶ πληροφορ. κτλ. explains the mode in which the ἐνδυναμωθῆναι τῇ πίστει manifested itself. The *participia aor.*, annexed to the *verb. fin.* in the aor., denote here an action contemporaneous with the latter one; also, elsewhere, one preceding it. Comp. Delitzsch on *Heb.* ii. 10, vol. I. p. 118. πληροφορεῖν, *to fulfil*, 2 Tim. iv. 5; hence πληροφορηθεῖς, properly, *satisfied*, i.e. *fully convinced*, xiv. 5. οὐκ εἶπε πιστεύσας, ἀλλ' ἐμφατικώτερον, Oecum.

—ἐπηγγέλται] middle. *What He* (namely, ὁ θεός) *has promised*, Winer, p. 328. "Docet item," observes Melancthon on this verse, "*quod fides sit certitudo quaedam, non dubitatio. Ideo inquit: non dubitavit diffidentia, item: certus fuit. Has particulas meminisse debemus adversus impiam et perniciosam doc-*

trinam scholasticorum, quae jubet dubitare utrum habeamus Deum propitium."

Ver. 22 reverts to the principal thought, ver. 3 (comp. ver. 9). διὸ καί] *hinc nimirum, on which account also* (i. 24), namely, because Abraham believed so strongly, as has been just described, vv. 18-21. We are thus again reminded that in ver. 20 the ἐπαγγελία τοῦ θεοῦ (comp. δ ἐπιγγέλλεται, ver. 21) is specified as the object of Abraham's justifying faith. But we know already that not only the birth of Isaac, the numerous natural posterity, and the possession of the land of Canaan, were the substance of this ἐπαγγελία, but also the birth of the Messiah, and the forgiveness of sins linked thereto, the spiritual σπέρμα, as well as the heavenly inheritance, and that it was really the reference of the promise to the latter, not the former element, that gave to Abraham's faith its justifying power. Further, when justification is here ascribed to Abraham's faith on account of its strength, we must not from this deduce the proposition that only absolutely perfect faith justifies. In this case faith must have made righteous before God on account of its own perfection, and not, as it really does, on account of its objective import, the pardoning grace of God in Christ. Even Abraham's faith is not to be conceived as absolutely perfect (comp. Calvin's observation above on μὴ ἁσθενήσας τῇ πίστει, ver. 19). Rather was it a faith growing stronger through conflict with doubt (comp. ver. 20, ἐνεδυναμώθη τῇ πίστει, and Gen. xvii. 17). But, doubtless, in him faith conquered unbelief, so that he was not like a wave of the sea driven helplessly hither and thither by the wind of doubt (Jas. i. 6, 7), but God's strength was mighty in his weakness (2 Cor. xii. 9).

—ἐλογίσθη] *it was reckoned*, namely, the πιστεύειν just depicted, comp. ver. 3.

Vv. 23-25 contain the application of the scriptural testimony concerning Abraham's justification through faith to the justification of all believers in Christ through faith. ἐγράφη] *it was written*, namely, in Holy Scripture. The aorist is here chosen instead of the perfect, usual elsewhere (γέγραπται, *it is written*), because here there is not quoted a Scripture testimony in force at present, but reference is made to the historic fact of such a testimony being recorded then, in order to draw attention to the divine purpose linked with that historic fact.



—δι' αὐτὸν μόνον] *on his account only, i.e.* in order to make known the way and method in which Abraham was justified. Rightly Calvin: "Non propter ipsum duntaxat, acsi privilegium aliquod singulare foret, quod in exemplum trahere non conveniat." This is no history past and done with, but one continuously realized. Here *historia* is seen in the highest sense of the word as *vitae magistra*. Therefore δι' αὐτόν, *on his behalf*, is not to be interpreted: "that he might be honoured by posterity."

—ὅτι ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ] *that it was reckoned to him*, namely, τὸ πιστεύειν εἰς δικαιοσύνην. The addition εἰς δικαιοσύνην or ἡ πίστις (αὐτοῦ) εἰς δικαιοσύνην, supported by feeble authority, is a manifest gloss.

—δι' ἡμᾶς] *on our account, i.e.* to testify to us, that we may hence discern the only possible way and method of *our own* justification. Comp. xv. 4: ὅσα προεγράφη, εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν διδασκαλίαν προεγράφη; 1 Cor. ix. 10, x. 11; Gal. iii. 8; 2 Tim. iii. 16. "Quoniam probatio ab exemplo non semper firma est, ne id in quaestionem veniat, diserte asserit Paulus in Abrahae persona editum fuisse specimen communis justitiae, quae peraeque ad omnes spectat. Locus, quo admonemur de capiendo exemplorum fructu in Scripturis," Calvin. Comp. Beresch. R. xl. 8: "Quicquid scriptum est de Abrahamo, scriptum est de filiis ejus."

—οἷς μέλλει λογίζεσθαι] *to whom it is to be reckoned*, namely, τὸ πιστεύειν εἰς δικαιοσύνην. It is laid down that it will be imputed to them as often, that is, as the case occurs, that they believe. Justification is described as a divine act accomplished in time. μέλλει therefore refers neither to the future day of judgment, for justification is found already in the present aeon, not first of all on the threshold of the future aeon, the last day. Nor still less can μέλλει stand for ἔμελλε, *to whom it was to be reckoned*, in which case the apostle would place his point of view in the time of Abraham, or of the recording of the Scripture testimony concerning him.

—τοῖς πιστεύουσιν] *those who believe*, expresses the condition of imputation. "It shall be imputed to those who believe in Christ's resurrection, *i.e.* if we believe in Christ's resurrection."

—ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγείραντα Ἰησοῦν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν ἐκ νεκρῶν] The Christian's faith is here referred to God the Father, not to Christ, but to God in so far as He raised Christ from the dead. In both elements the analogy of the Christian's faith with that of Abraham

shows itself, for he also, according to ver. 17, believed *θεῶ τῷ ζωοποιούντι τοὺς νεκρούς*. "Fides Abrahami," says Bengel, "ferebatur in id, quod futurum esset et fieri posset: nostra in id, quod factum est, utraque in Vivificatorem." The faith of Abraham was faith in the God who, by the quickening of His decayed powers, gave assurance of the birth of the promised Seed of the woman which was linked to his natural posterity. The faith of the Christian is faith in the God who raised Christ from the dead, and thus accomplished the work of redemption. Thus for the Christian's faith, the object, which is the same in the faith of Abraham and the Christian, stands forth in its N. T. revelation in its historic clearness, limitation, and completion. But that the raising up of Christ is here adduced not merely as evidence of divine omnipotence in isolation from divine grace, but as evidence of this omnipotent *grace*, which is the sole object of the faith of *justification*, is shown by ver. 25, where Christ's resurrection is expressly described as the saving ground that conditions justification. In the phrases: *ἐγείρειν, ἐγείρεσθαι, ἀναστῆναι, ζῆν ἐκ νεκρῶν* in the N. T. *νεκρῶν* never has the article (only Eph. v. 14 forms an exception, and Col. ii. 12; in 1 Thess. i. 10 a *varia lectio* is found). On the other hand, it is said almost always *ἐγείρεσθαι, ἀναστῆναι ἀπὸ τῶν νεκρῶν*. Profane authors also regularly omit the article before this word, Winer, p. 153.

—*ὃς παρεδόθη*] namely, *εἰς θάνατον*, comp. Matt. x. 21, contains probably an allusion to Isa. liii. 12, LXX.: *καὶ διὰ τὰς ἀνομίας αὐτῶν παρεδόθη*, where also *εἰς θάνατον* is spontaneously supplied from the immediately preceding *ἀνθ' ᾧ παρεδόθη εἰς θάνατον κτλ.* The apostle says both *θεὸς παρέδωκε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ*, viii. 32, and *Χριστὸς παρέδωκεν ἑαυτόν*, Gal. ii. 20, Eph. v. 2, or even *ἔδωκεν ἑαυτόν*, 1 Tim. ii. 6; Tit. ii. 14. God, then, did not give Christ, the guiltless One, against His will for the guilty, but Christ of His own free will surrendered Himself to the pains of death. The redeeming counsel of the triune God is one and undivided. The love of the Son calls for His surrender not less than the love of the Father. The active and the passive elements in this surrender are indissolubly and inseparably one. If it is said, Acts iii. 13: *ὃν ὑμεῖς παρέδωκατε*, men can only be regarded as instruments of the divine counsel, Acts ii. 23, iv. 28; Gen. 1. 20. There is exhibited here the unity of the two historical factors, human freedom and divine ordination.

—*διὰ τὰ παράπτωματα ἡμῶν*] *on account of our sins, i.e. to expiate and atone for them, iii. 24, 25.*

—*διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν*] *on account of our justification, i.e. to effect it, to convey to us the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. δικαίωσις* (found, besides, only v. 18 as the opposite of *κατάκριμα*) is the act of God by which man is brought into the relation of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, of righteousness in relation to God. Elsewhere everywhere Scripture sets forth the *death* of Christ as the ground of our justification, iii. 24, 25, v. 9; 2 Cor. v. 21; Eph. i. 7; 1 John i. 7. In point of fact, the work of atonement and justification conditioned thereby, as the *τετέλεσται* of the Lord on the cross testifies, John xix. 30, is finished with the death of the Atoner. But the resurrection is the actual victory of the righteousness and life of the Prince of Life over the sin and death to which, not for His sake but for ours, He was given up. As such a victory the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead is withal His justification before men, *i.e.* the evidence that He died, not for His own sins, but as the eternal Son of God, as the holy and just One, *διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν*, i. 4; 1 Tim. iii. 16; John xvi. 10. Therefore, were He not demonstrated by the resurrection to be such a victor over sin and death, our faith were vain, as a faith in one who lies in the power of sin and death. Therefore, were not Christ our Atoner, there would be no justification for us, and we should be still in our sins, 1 Cor. xv. 17. But now in His resurrection our righteousness, which is in Him, and our life are secured and hidden. Along with Him, the Substitute, believing humanity has risen from sin and death, and, as righteous and endowed with eternal life, is seated on the throne of majesty. This security and hidden character it has, in so far as, exalted by His resurrection to the right hand of the Father, by His high-priestly intercession and prayer He renders effectual and perpetuates the merit of His sacrifice in the presence of God for His own, viii. 34; Heb. ix. 24; 1 John ii. 1; Rom. v. 10. For as His atonement avails not merely for the elect, so His resurrection also avails not merely for believers, although it does avail for these in a special manner, but for the whole Cosmos, that it may be led to faith in His atonement. Just as it is an actual victory, evidence, security, and defence, so is Christ's resurrection finally the condition of the *appropriation* of the salvation procured by Him, for God has exalted Him by

His right hand to be a Prince and Saviour, to give to Israel repentance and forgiveness of sins, Acts v. 31. Although, therefore, the death of Jesus alone has obtained righteousness and life for us in the way of *merit*, yet the apostles are right in making His resurrection everywhere the foundation of their preaching of the gospel. Only δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκ νεκρῶν is there given us an ἐλπίς ζωσα, 1 Pet. i. 3, seeing that, while atonement and the possibility of justification are mediated indeed through His death, the actual efficacy and reality of these depended on the resurrection. "Quamquam enim *præcessit meritum*, tamen ita ordinatum fuit ab initio, ut tunc singulis *applicaretur*, cum fide acciperent," Melancthon. Just as here the δικαίωσις, which the death of Christ effects, is referred, for the reasons given, to the resurrection, so in x. 10 is the σωτηρία, which is imparted to faith, annexed to confession. Finally, in opposition to modern interpretations, the remarks of Calov on this passage are still worthy of note: "Pervertunt autem sententiam Apostoli *Papistæ*, cum id eum hic velle contendunt, mortem Christi *exemplar fuisse mortis peccatorum*, resurrectionem autem *exemplar renovationis et regenerationis internæ*, per quam in novitate vitæ ambulamur, vid. Bellarm. l. II. de justifi. c. 6, quia hic non agitur vel de morte peccatorum, vel de renovatione et novitate vitæ, de quibus, cap. vi., demum agere incipit Apostolus, sed de non imputatione vel remissione peccatorum, et imputatione justitiæ vel justificatione." Comp. also Calvin on the passage; and as to subjective spiritual death and resurrection, vi. 4, 5, 8, 11.

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## EXCURSUS TO CHAPTER IV.

### THE PROTEVANGELIUM, OR THE SEED OF THE WOMAN AND OF ABRAHAM.

#### A STUDY IN BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.<sup>1</sup>

Whoever would take a comprehensive survey of the end and aim, the import and progressive development, of O. T. revelation, will arrive at no certain and satisfactory result as long as,

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from the *Kirchlichen Zeitschrift von Kliefoth und Mejer*, 1855, p. 519 ff.

beginning so to speak *ab ovo*, he follows the O. T. step by step, and endeavours to understand it simply from its own contents. It is only in the New that the O. T. has found its fulfilment, and only through the N. T. that the Old is unfolded in its real import and true significance. Here, in view of the two main constituents of divine revelation, if anywhere, holds good in its entire strain and compass the first principle to be observed in the interpretation of Holy Scripture from itself: "Scripture is the true interpreter of Scripture (*scriptura scripturam docet*)."<sup>1</sup> Even the advent and witness of the Lord Himself, like the teaching of the apostles, was in reality nothing else than a fulfilment and unveiling of O. T. revelation. In this sense Augustine justly said: "The N. T. is *enclosed* in the Old, the Old is *disclosed* in the New;"<sup>1</sup> and Luther compared the O. T. to the moon that borrows its light from the sun of the N. T. If, therefore, we would penetrate into the spirit and meaning of the O. T., we must above everything seek to discover the spirit and meaning in which it is understood and explained in the N. T. Not merely the N. T. doctrine of salvation in general, but also the N. T. view of the O. T. (both of which are inextricably bound up one with the other, nay, in a certain sense, fall one into the other), must govern and decide our view. But now, if, amid the rich variety of separate statements in the N. T. respecting the O. T., we desire a fixed point where we may obtain firmer foot-hold, and thence look about us, especially in the N. T., for a systematic treatment and exposition of the different stages in O. T. revelation and its relation to N. T. revelation, we are directed without doubt at once to the writings of the holy Apostle Paul. By birth, character, course of training, as well as by divine call, was Paul—the Pharisee, the zealot for the law, the persecutor of Christians, and then the Gentile apostle converted to the Lord, and by Him directly called to office and service—expressly destined and chosen *above* all the other apostles for this purpose—to discover to the church of Christ the real significance of the old covenant; to afford the deepest insight into the O. T.; both to perceive as clearly and describe as distinctly as possible the relation to each other of promise, law, and gospel; and in the most comprehensive fashion, to set forth those educative dealings of the Lord with Israel and with the Gentile world before and after Christ's advent

<sup>1</sup> *Novum Testamentum in Vetere latet, Vetus Testamentum in Novo patet.*

that were intended to prepare them for faith in Christ, and to lead them to faith in Christ. As long as Paul went upon the erroneous assumption as a Pharisee, that man, by fulfilling the law given of God through Moses, should and could attain perfect righteousness availing before God, and along with it life and salvation, the preaching of Christ crucified must have been scandal and foolishness to him. His standpoint at that time was simply the ordinary one of Jewish particularism. Only the people of Israel, descending in natural course from Abraham, distinguished by the covenant-sign of circumcision, had a right, by virtue of this descent and of their covenant-relation to God ratified by circumcision, on condition of fulfilling the law, to the future glory of the Messianic kingdom. For the Messiah Himself was to appear, not in a state of humiliation, but in a state of glory, in order to lead His elect people to the glory they deserved. But on the godless Gentile world He was to execute judgment, so far as in the case of separate individuals it was not incorporated into the O. T. theocracy by submission to circumcision and the law.

But when the apostle, by the light of the Holy Spirit, came clearly to perceive that perfect fulfilment of the law is impossible to sinful man, that therefore to attain righteousness and salvation on the ground of perfect fulfilment of the law is altogether out of the question, that, on the contrary, man can only thoroughly attain righteousness acceptable to God, and eternal life necessarily connected therewith, by means of faith in Christ, who took upon Him the guilt and penalty of our sin, and by His atoning death made satisfaction to the law and divine justice, then the position from which he regarded the subject must have been changed in every particular, nay, completely reversed. While *none* but the sinner who is justified by faith in Christ has righteousness and life, *every* sinner who is justified by faith in Christ has righteousness and life. Thus neither *Jew* nor *Greek* longer avails, but only *a new creature* through faith in Christ. Thus all depends not on descent from Abraham, but on faith. If the law cannot justify because man as a sinner is incapable of fulfilling it, it cannot have been given by God for the purpose of justifying the sinner. Not to lead to righteousness, but to expose sin, and to lead to the complete knowledge of sin as well as of the sentence of death on account of sin, by this knowledge to prepare and

dispose man to accept salvation in Christ through faith, and thus by effecting the knowledge of sin to become a schoolmaster unto Christ, remains the only conceivable end of the law. From this truth flowed for the apostle a stream of light over the entire O. T. covenant economy and its divinely-ordained course of development. There is but one way of justification in the old as in the new covenant—justification through faith. In this way even Abraham was led. He was justified through faith in the promise. But the promise is older than the law. Of all the principles of the apostle bearing on the economy of salvation, this is one of the most far-reaching. If righteousness and life were assured to Abraham and his race by God's free promise of grace, the meaning of the law that came in later cannot be, merely by way of supplement, to make the attainment of the inheritance, that was given freely, dependent on the impossible condition of fulfilling the law, which would be to render the promise nugatory. Abraham accordingly received circumcision not as a sign that he was bound to fulfil the law (for the law was not even given in his days), but as a seal of the righteousness he obtained through faith in the promise, through faith which he had even in his state of uncircumcision. Therefore natural descent from Abraham, circumcision, and fulfilment of the law will not, as the Jews and Paul the Pharisee fancied, lead to righteousness and life, for Abraham himself attained not thereto in this natural, carnal way. It is spiritual descent from Abraham, walking in the footsteps of his faith, of which as father of all believers he is an illustrious type, that leads to righteousness and to life. In the place of Israel after the flesh stands Israel after the spirit; in place of the natural seed stands the spiritual seed of Abraham as the real heir of the promises.

Let us here pause and look somewhat more closely at the passages of the Pauline epistles bearing on the point. We begin with Gal. iii. 15–18. Paul here says that even a human testament, when it has acquired legal force instead of being annulled or added to at pleasure, will be kept unchanged by all. How much more will this be the case with an ordinance of God! But God gave to Abraham and his seed the oft-repeated promise (hence the plural *the promises*, on account of the frequent repetition of one and the same promise). Therefore this legally valid ordinance or this covenant of God ratified previously, the law,

which was given 430 years later, cannot annul so as to make it void (430 years = the time of the sojourn of the children of Israel in Egypt, for the promise to Abraham was repeated to Isaac and Jacob. Therefore the giving of the law on Sinai fell 430 years after the time of promise had come to an end). The purport of the promise was the inheritance, with Paul always the inheritance of salvation, of eternal life. This inheritance God gave to Abraham freely by promise. Were, then, the inheritance by way of supplement made dependent on fulfilment of the law, it would necessarily become the fruit of work and merit, and the covenant-promise previously ratified by God be abolished and rendered void by God Himself. God forbid this to be said or thought!

But a special difficulty arises in this—in itself clear—exposition of the apostle in the 16th verse, the correct understanding of which, as we shall see, is of special importance for our purpose. The verse runs: "Now to Abraham and his seed were the promises made. He saith not, And to seeds, as of many; but as of one, And to thy seed, which is Christ." Thus the apostle says that the seed of Abraham to which, as to Abraham himself, the promise was given, is Christ; for that the *person* of Christ is here meant is shown by the closing words of the chapter, which glance back to this passage: "For ye are all one in Christ Jesus. And if ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." Thus the community of believers is called Abraham's seed, on this ground, that it stands in union with Christ, belongs to Christ. Therefore the real seed of Abraham is Christ (comp. also ver. 19). But then it seems hard to understand how the apostle can frame his argument as he does. He bases his course of reasoning on the use of the singular "seed" (τὸ σπέρμα). This denotes a single individual, since, if more were meant, it would have been said "seeds" (τὰ σπέρματα). Therefore it is not the numerous natural descendants of Abraham that are meant, but Christ—the one descendant, so called by way of eminence. This appears, indeed, as if it were a simple Rabbinical gloss (Midrasch), without any objective evidential force; for it is known well enough that *seed* (σπέρμα, זרע) is used in the singular collectively, and signifies *posterity*, whether this consist of many or one.<sup>1</sup> Even apart from the

<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the plural זרעים does not occur in the Hebrew in the sense of *soboles*, but only in that of *seed-grains*, 1 Sam. viii. 15.



inspiration of the apostle's language, it is evidently the more perverse to attribute to the apostle a mode of dogmatic proof based on grammatical ignorance of so crass a kind, as he himself often employs *seed* in the collective sense, as presently in this ch. v. 29: "Then *ye* are Abraham's *seed*," and elsewhere, as especially in Rom. iv., refers the promise given to Abraham's seed to Abraham's spiritual children, the body of believers. We are hence led, especially after this passage in the Roman epistle, in this 16th verse, in the words: "Now to Abraham and his seed were the promises made," to refer "and to his seed" as matter of course to Abraham's spiritual posterity, to which, according to Rom. iv., just as much as to Abraham himself, the inheritance was promised. From this we conclude, further, that the apostle's precise object is to prove that to this spiritual, not as the Jews and Galatian Judaizers supposed, to the natural posterity of Abraham, the promise is given. He proves it thus: Were the natural posterity meant, the plural would be used.<sup>1</sup> For Abraham, indeed, had more than one natural line of posterity, the one springing from Isaac, from Ishmael, from the children of Ketura, as well as the one springing from Esau. These natural lines of posterity, as natural, stand on exactly the same level. But the singular is used. Therefore one altogether unique posterity, distinguished from the many natural lines standing on the same level, is meant, *i.e.* therefore the spiritual posterity, the body of believers, as the seed of Abraham so called by way of eminence. But then to: "but as of one, and to thy seed," the apostle does not add as an explanatory apposition: "which is the church," or: "which is believers," but: "which is Christ." Not quite precisely do Augustine, *et al.*, explain this: "Christ and His church," Bengel, *et al.*: "the church alone," so that *Christ* would be put, as in 1 Cor. xii. 12, in a mystical sense for His body, the church of believers. On the contrary, we have already seen that *Christ* here (comp. also ver. 17, where, no doubt, the addition εἰς Χριστόν, unto Christ, is critically suspicious) must denote the personal Jesus Christ. It therefore seems more correct and exact to say that the apostle passes from the church to Christ, because both are so closely and inseparably connected as members

<sup>1</sup> To this it makes no difference that in the Hebrew זרעים cannot be proved to occur in the sense of posterities. A corresponding expression, like מַשְׁפָּחָה, might certainly have been used.

and head, that in one the other is always implied and involved. The church of believers as the body of Jesus Christ has its ground of permanence and unity in Christ its head. Therefore every promise made to the church is made to Christ, because it is only made to the church *in* Christ. Hence the apostle can say, the one seed of Abraham to which the promise is made is Christ, because the promise is made to Abraham's seed in Christ, because Abraham's seed attains to unity in Christ, really exists only in Him, in whom by faith it germinates and grows, and is elevated to true unity. In the same pregnant sense in ver. 28 he says: "for ye are all one in Christ." The apostle therefore says expressly that to Abraham the promise was given, that in Christ, on him, and on all who like him belong by faith to Christ, the inheritance of eternal life shall be bestowed, which promise could not be rendered doubtful or invalid by the law that entered afterwards.

But then the question is, whether the apostle's meaning is that Abraham himself understood Christ and the church of believers to be the crowning point of the promise vouchsafed to him, or whether he means that only in the N. T. is this knowledge found, the O. T. typical language and the O. T. typical history being only now explained by means of the mystical mode of interpretation, which deeper sense remained a mystery to Abraham himself. In favour of the latter supposition one might appeal to the fact that the apostle himself, Gal. iv. (comp. Rom. ix.), treats the history of Isaac and Ishmael as typical, and by an allegorical mode of interpretation regarded the former as a type of those born by promise, the church of believers, the latter as a type of those born after the flesh, natural Israel. Still, in the first place, the apostle may have meant to ascribe even to Abraham spiritual comprehension of the types referred to; and again, the genuine typology belonging to the economy of salvation, which he opposes to false Rabbinical typology, does not preclude the apostle from also finding the promise made to Abraham of Christ and the church of believers in the form of a direct prediction in the Old Testament. Now, that Paul ascribed even to Abraham conscious faith in Christ the personal Messiah, and in the believing church in union with Him, there can be no manner of doubt. According to its simple and natural signification, the Galatian passage already treated of allows no other sense. For the apostle says in

so many words that to Abraham the promise was given, whose very purport was Christ, and that by this promise the inheritance of eternal life was freely bestowed on him. How unnatural and artificial would be the notion, that for Abraham the direct purport of this promise was not Christ and the church of believers and the heavenly inheritance, but only Isaac and his natural posterity and the earthly inheritance! Besides, this latter view is expressly precluded by the exposition immediately preceding the passage. For the apostle there shows (Gal. iii. 6-14) that Abraham was justified not, as the Jews and Judaizers supposed, by works, but by faith. Therefore is he the father of all believers, and the promise that in him all Gentiles should be blessed is fulfilled in the Gentiles, like him, inheriting the blessing by faith. Now, was it meant that Abraham was justified by faith in the promised birth of Isaac, in the natural posterity and possession of the land of Canaan, and not by faith in Christ? By such a view the apostle would cut in two the very sinew of his entire doctrine of justification, and pluck it up by the roots. For, according to the apostle's doctrine, it is not subjective faith of itself that justifies man, no matter what the contents it includes or the object to which it is directed; but only faith in *Christ* is our righteousness availing before God, because Christ Himself, who bore and took away the curse of the law, procured this righteousness availing before God imputed to believers. In the same way (Gal. iii. 13, 14) Paul extends the blessing of Abraham in *Christ Jesus* to the Gentiles,—in Christ Jesus, who bore the curse of the law, and thus transformed the curse into blessing.

Now, that Abraham was justified, not by faith in the birth of Isaac, but by faith in the promised Messiah, is stated in the clearest way in Rom. iv. After the apostle has there quoted (ver. 3) Gen. xv. 6—a common proof—passage with him—“Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness,” he continues: “Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.” We therefore infer with the utmost stringency that to Abraham also faith was reckoned for righteousness, as to one that believed in God who justifies the ungodly. But God only justifies the ungodly through Christ. Abraham, therefore, was not justified by his faith in the birth of

Isaac, but by his faith in God, who justified him when ungodly through Christ. In the same way, continues the apostle by way of confirmation, David declares the blessedness of the man to whom God imputes righteousness without works, when he says: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." Paul next shows further, that to Abraham this blessedness and justification came when he was yet in an uncircumcised, not first in a circumcised state, so that he became father of all *believers*, as well of those belonging to the uncircumcision as of those belonging to the circumcision. To this church of believers, the true and genuine seed of Abraham, he says further, the promise of inheritance was given of free grace; it was not made to depend on the condition of fulfilling the law, by which the promise would be directly frustrated. That Abraham is father of all believers, he finds declared in the words of Gen. xvii. 5: "I have made thee a father of many nations," and says expressly that Abraham himself believed in the promise of this spiritual seed, and, indeed, so firmly and strongly, that on that account he regarded not his own and Sarah's dead body. We see here how the apostle couples the promise of Isaac and the natural posterity springing from him with the promise of Christ and the body of believers, the spiritual posterity of Abraham. For the church of believers was to spring from Christ, Christ from Israel, Israel from Isaac. Had not Abraham then believed in the birth of Isaac, he had not believed in the birth of Christ, the advent of Christ and of the church—the true and real seed of Abraham—being from this time bound to the birth of Isaac and his posterity, the people of Israel. And precisely because Abraham believed so strongly and firmly in the promise of the true spiritual seed, he also believed so firmly and strongly in the promise of the natural seed, as from this time one promise stood and fell with the other.

Now, in the same way in which the Apostle Paul was led was Luther led, and hence also called of God to disclose to God's church afresh the meaning of our apostle's writings. Upon the patriarchal age, the age of promise and faith, followed under Israel the age of law. But Israel knew not that the law is only a schoolmaster unto Christ, for the purpose of kindling to greater ardour desire for the fulfilment of the promise. They supposed

that the law was itself a means of justification. The time being fulfilled, God sent His Son, and at the same time His apostle, who, himself delivered by faith in the Son of God from the false righteousness of law and works, now imparted to God's church correct insight into the relation of promise and law, law and gospel. Thus the Gentile church, founded by the apostles, reproduced the history of the patriarchal church, in possessing again righteousness and life by faith in Him that had come and in the promise of future inheritance. Again, the church of believers having developed in the course of history under God's leading into a national church, it came, like the nation of Israel that grew out of the patriarchal family, under the dominion of law. Further, the Christian national church, living under law, instead of using the law as a schoolmaster unto Christ, supposed, like Israel, that it was a means of justification. Then God raised up Luther the monk, as once Paul the Pharisee, and leading him from monastic work-righteousness to justifying faith, chose him as an instrument to instruct the church of God anew in the distinction between promise, law, and gospel. And thus our church, in the point of biblical theology now in question, faithfully followed its great teacher, the Apostle Paul. With him, it attributed even to Abraham, the father of all believers, faith in the personal Messiah, and held him justified, like all believers of the old and new covenant, by *this* faith. It did not and could not subscribe to the modern subjective theory, according to which Abraham's justifying faith is said to be identical with the Christian's faith merely as regards its subjective character, while having an essentially different object; for by doing this it would in point of fact have contradicted the Apostle Paul to the teeth, utterly perverted the doctrine of justification taught in Scripture, and thrown to the winds the genuine evangelical analogy of faith.

The next question is, What authority the Apostle Paul has in the words of O. T. Scripture itself for his view of the promise made to Abraham? But before proceeding to answer this question, we call attention to the way in which the Lord is Himself in harmony with the apostle's view. Even John the Baptist had warned the Jews not to trust in their being Abraham's children, since from these stones God could raise up children to Abraham (Matt. iii. 9). Therefore not the natural, but spiritual descendants, the children of Abraham's faith, are his

genuine seed. In the same sense the Lord, in John, says to the Jews: "If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of Abraham. Ye would then not seek to kill me (but believe in me), that have told you the truth which I have heard of God," John viii. 39, 40. Especially pertinent here is the Lord's declaration, *ibid.* v. 56: "Abraham rejoiced that he was to see my day, and saw it, and was glad." The Jews had previously asked, ver. 53: "Art thou greater than our father Abraham?" In order to show that He is greater than Abraham, the Lord says that Abraham rejoiced to see His day, thereby himself acknowledging that Christ is greater than he. Abraham therefore brought himself into comparison with the person of Christ, and in spirit rejoiced that he should behold Christ's glorious day, which he actually beheld.<sup>1</sup>

We now return, having gained this basis of N. T. authority, to the O. T. itself. The Apostle Paul, in his conflict with the Judaizers, everywhere refers to Abraham, the founder of Israel's race and faith, and thus puts himself on equal ground with, and, as it were, in the very citadel of, his opponents, who also on their side appealed to Abraham the pattern of the righteous. If he succeeded in proving to them that Abraham was not justified by works, but by faith in the promise, their entire doctrine of works fell to pieces. But if we would learn from the O. T. itself the meaning of the passages in which the promises of a seed (עַלְמָא, σπέρμα), blessed and diffusing blessing, are given to Abraham, we must go still farther back to the point where mention is first made of such a seed in the O. T. This is done in the Protevangelium. The seed promised after the Fall is one and the same with the blessed seed promised to Abraham,

<sup>1</sup> How this took place, whether in Sheol, where the tidings of Christ's advent penetrated to Abraham, or, which we take for the right view, in a specially luminous apocalyptic vision, or otherwise, as regards our purpose may be left undecided. Enough that even the Lord testifies that Abraham during his lifetime waited to behold His day, thereby acknowledging the christological import of the promise made to him. Comp. also Meyer here. Even apart from the general tenor of the passage, the *day* of Christ in general, the *day* of the Lord, can only be understood, in consonance with universal biblical idiom, of the day of the Lord's personal advent. We refuse, therefore, to say with Hofmann (*Weissag. u. Erf.* II. 13) that Abraham witnessed the day of Christ, because he witnessed the day of the birth of Isaac, the son of the promise, Christ being set forth, *i.e.* typically, in the person of Isaac. At least this could only hold good for the present passage, if in the birth of Isaac even Abraham really acknowledged and beheld the pledge and anticipatory representation of the future personal Christ; but this Hofmann expressly denies.

whose advent was only subsequently linked on to Abraham and his race. We have then above all to enter upon a closer examination of the Protevangelium.

It is said, Gen. iii. 15 : "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed. He shall strike thy head, and thou shalt strike his heel." <sup>1</sup>

That the serpent, which with its seed is here placed over against the woman with her seed, was not the actual tempter, but only the organ of the tempter, Satan, both follows as matter of course, and is attested, as is well known, by the entire Satanology of Scripture as well as by particular declarations of the N. T., e.g. John viii. 44; Rom. xvi. 20; 1 John iii. 8; Rev. xii. 9, xx. 2. Thus, as the serpent stands behind Satan, so behind the penal sentence passed upon the serpent must be recognised the penal sentence passed upon Satan. Nay, as to the gist of the meaning, this sentence will the more relate to the real tempter, as he alone had really done what deserved punishment. The innocent animal, the serpent, might indeed, like the entire creation, be involved in man's *sufferings* on account of sin; but as it is incapable of moral action, and therefore of responsibility and guilt, no real *punishment* can fall on it. But at the very forefront of the penal decree it is said : "*Because thou hast done this.*" Moreover, if we refused to acknowledge this deeper underlying meaning, the mere literal interpretation would give rise to insuperable difficulties. Indeed, this interpretation cannot be strictly carried out. It is alleged that in the curse on the serpent its defeat in the struggle with man is expressed. But when

וְאִיבָה אֲשִׁית בֵּינְךָ וּבֵין הָאִשָּׁה וּבֵין זַרְעֶךָ וּבֵין זַרְעָהּ הוּא יִשְׁפֹּךְ רֹאשׁ וְאַתָּה תִּכָּרֵס עֲקֵב. The LXX. have : Καὶ ἔχθραν θήσω ἀνὰ μίσον σου καὶ ἀνὰ μίσον τῆς γυναικός, καὶ ἀνὰ μίσον τοῦ σπέρματος σου καὶ ἀνὰ μίσον τοῦ σπέρματος αὐτῆς. Αὐτός σου τηρήσει κερφάλην, καὶ σὺ τηρήσεις αὐτοῦ πτέρναν. Here all that can be called in question is the translation of נָשָׂא by τηρεῖν, to watch, aim at. However, whether instead of this we translate : to overtake, come up with, strike, or even : to crush, the sense remains substantially the same. Even in the first case, what is meant is a successful overtaking, one that misses not its aim, so that : striking the head is = crushing the head; and even in the latter case : to crush as to the heel is = to destroy as to the heel, to deal a deadly blow against the heel, to strike the heel successfully. The word only occurs further, Ps. cxxxix. 11, Job ix. 17, where the interpretation is likewise disputed. The translation advocated by Hengstenberg, *Christology*, I. p. 26, to crush, which is also attested by the Chaldee (comp. Delitzsch and Keil here), is certainly confirmed by συντρίψει, Rom. xvi. 20, supposing, as can scarcely be doubted, that this passage contains an allusion to the Protevangelium.

the serpent strikes man on the heel, the bite is so dangerous and deadly that the poison spreads thence through the whole body (Gen. xlix. 17). Therefore, all that would be really expressed would be a mutual destruction of the serpent race and human race. In any case, then, we must depart from the literal conception, and fix our attention simply upon the contrast of head and heel as the nobler and less noble parts. A wound to the first is, as a rule, incurable ; to the latter, curable. But even then the threat is by no means carried out completely, the victory of the human race over the serpent race, which, as ending with the overthrow of the serpent, is represented as total, in reality being never more than partial. Further, if here not merely a threat of punishment against the serpent, but also, which certainly cannot be doubted, a promise on behalf of man is meant to be expressed, we cannot of course find in this, taking the words in the bare literal sense, with Hofmann and others, simply the preservation of the life of the human race, despite the machinations of the serpent. The serpent is far from being the only animal hostile and deadly to man, and in any case can only be named as representing all beings and powers that aim at destroying human life. Thus we are compelled by the text itself, looked at on all sides, to go beyond the limits of the bare literal interpretation, which no doubt retains its lower aspect of truth, while receiving but a relative and partial fulfilment.

All depends, then, upon a clear and strict analysis of the text according to its higher reference. If the serpent is Satan, the seed of the serpent will be the children of Satan (the so-called τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου in the N. T., children of the devil). In allusion to the present passage, the Lord says in the parable, Matt. xiii. 38 : "The tares are the children of the wicked one" (where Bengel rightly observes: *mali, masculinum* ; Luther, wrongly, as neuter : "the children of wickedness"), and continues, ver. 39 : "The enemy that sowed them is the devil," manifestly a N. T. finger-post pointing the way to the deeper interpretation of the Protevangelium. The devil's seed here answers to the serpent's seed there (comp. Hengst. *Christol.* I. 26). In harmony with this, the Lord (Matt. xxiii. 33) calls the Pharisees serpents, broods of vipers (ὄφεις, γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν), xii. 34, iii. 7. (The serpent is an image of wickedness, of the wicked one, the devil.) If, then, in the Protevangelium enmity is put between the serpent's seed and woman's seed, and the serpent's seed are the children of



the devil, it follows that the woman's seed are the children of God (τέκνα, υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ). Thus in Matt. xiii. 38 the Lord opposes the children of the kingdom to the children of the evil one. We find, therefore, described in the present passage the enmity and conflict between the kingdom of darkness and the kingdom of light. But the contrast between the serpent's seed and woman's seed seems strange, for from the very time of the Fall all born of woman are the serpent's seed, children of the devil. They form by nature the world, the prince of which is the evil one (Job xiv. 4, xxv. 4 ; Ps. li. 7 ; John iii. 6). The contrast, therefore, to the serpent's seed in the spiritual sense is not the woman's seed, but God's seed, who are born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God, John i. 13 ; 1 John iii. 9 : " Every one that is born of God sinneth not, for His (*i.e.* God's) seed (σπέρμα αὐτοῦ) remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." More in conformity with the spiritual sense of our passage would have been : " and between thy (the serpent's) seed and my (God's) seed," than as the words run : " and thy (the woman's) seed." When Storr in his treatise, *de Proterangelio*, Opusc. II., remarks : " We readily see that even the posterity of the serpent is the posterity of the woman, but that it has been unworthy of the latter name since the time that it apostatized to the common enemy of its race" (comp. also Calvin, *Com. in Gen.*, here), and even Hengstenberg relies on this observation, this is no way sufficient to solve the difficulty meeting us here. As if already in the very Fall a *universal* apostasy of the human race to Satan's kingdom had not taken place ! And if we would restrict the designation " serpent's seed " specially to men who of set purpose persist and harden themselves in apostasy, so that on this account they no longer deserve the name of men, of seed of the woman, still, after taking away this seed of the serpent proper, the men left are nothing but the natural seed of the woman, not God's seed ; certainly not children of the devil in the strictest sense of the word,—children of men merely, yet not on this account children of God. The distinction, then, would be that of children of the devil and children of men, as in Gen. vi. 2, children of God and daughters of men = children of men. It would then be necessary to take another step still in the explanation, and say that as among the serpent's seed, to which all born of woman belong by nature, only they bear the

name pre-eminently who wilfully settle and harden themselves in their natural condition, and thus really become ever more and more like the devil, so as matter of course the seed of the woman opposed to them is also intended to stand in strict ethical contrast with them, and therefore presents itself before us as the woman's seed born of God. But this explanation, in truth, is so artificial and strained that we must still look for a more simple and natural solution of the hard knot, the problem in question here. We proceed, then, first of all, a step further in the analysis of the Protevangelium. It is said further: "He shall strike (or crush) thee on the head, and thou shalt strike him on the heel." Here, therefore, the woman's seed stands in contrast, not, as before, with the serpent's *seed*, but with the serpent itself. If, then, we were compelled previously, in the antithesis to the serpent's seed as a plurality, to regard the woman's seed collectively, we must here, in logical strictness, in antithesis to the serpent as an individual, regard the woman's seed as an individual. Over against the one serpent stands the woman's seed as a unity, an individual; over against the serpent's *seed* stands the woman's seed as a multitude.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thus the LXX. early reasoned. For it is noteworthy in the highest degree that although previously they translate: ἀνὰ μίσην τοῦ σπέρματος σου καὶ ἀνὰ μίσην τοῦ σπέρματος αὐτῆς, they forthwith proceed, not αὐτό, but (according to the unanimously attested reading) αὐτός (therefore not τὸ σπέρμα as a collective, but τὸ σπέρμα as an individual) σου τηρήσει κεφαλὴν. Joh. Gerhard, *Comm. super Genesin*. p. 107, seeks to deduce an argument for the position that the woman's seed in the Protevangelium is to be understood μονοπροσώπως καὶ ἰνικῶς, in individuo de solo Christo, ex oppositione, because in parte hujus raticinii posteriore semini mulieris non opponitur semen serpentis, sed ipse serpens in individuo. But the argument loses in conclusiveness, because Gerhard glides too easily over the opposition of the serpent's *seed* to the woman's seed in the first clause with the words: "In priori quidem membro semini mulieris opponitur semen serpentis, i.e. Diabolus cum omnibus asseclis, sed in hac oppositione non praeceise ad vocum significata, sed ad rem ipsam respiciendum. Unus Messias toti infernalium hostium catervae opponitur." When the Roman Vulgata, derived from later codices, reads: "Ipsa conteret caput tuum," a translation which has been combated by Luther in his *Comm. on Gen.*, and again with special thoroughness by Joh. Gerhard, *ibid.* (comp. also Calov, *Bibl. illustr.*, here), this reading has acquired special interest in modern days, because, as is well known, modern Jesuitism has based the *Scripture* proof of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, the serpent-conqueror, upon this reading exclusively. A striking evidence of what immeasurable *dogmatic* importance for Catholicism is the Vulgata in contrast with the original text, but at the same time a providential warning to Protestantism not to reply to the Catholic substitution in the Protevangelium of the Virgin Mary by a substitution of *humanity* in the place of Christ (comp. even Calvin, *Inst. lib. ii. c. 13, § 2*: "Non de uno duntaxat Christo illic sermo habetur, sed de toto genere humano").

Now, what kind of individual is he who shall trample on the serpent's head, *i.e.* triumph over Satan? He is a seed of the woman. Here we shall be still less justified than before in understanding by this a child of God in the sense of one born of woman, and spiritually born again of God, the woman's seed standing here in contrast not with the serpent's *seed*, *i.e.* those born spiritually of Satan, but with the serpent itself. There is therefore no allusion whatever to spiritual offspring. Thus he will be a seed of the woman in the proper sense of the word. But how can a sinful seed of woman overcome the serpent when from his very birth he himself is overcome by the serpent? He will be then no sinful, but a holy seed of woman, yet not, as we saw, one made holy by regeneration, but holy from his very birth; therefore a supernatural and miraculous, though true and actual seed of woman. Nay, we must go further, and conclude that, since Satan is the adversary who opposes God, and can only be overcome by the Lord God, who alone can abolish the sin and death that Satan brought into the world, and thereby strip Satan himself of his power and dominion, it follows that the Lord God Himself, as one born of woman, and on this very account a seed of woman,—holy, miraculous, supernatural,—will trample on the serpent's head. Moreover, man was already vanquished. Therefore, if a mere man were destined to achieve the victory, the promise on this side also had stood on doubtful ground. The enigma proposed before now resolves itself. The woman's seed, as an individual, stands in such close union with the woman's seed as a collective, that we may pass from the latter to the former as matter of course. "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed (collective); he (as an individual) shall bruise thy head." Now for the first time we perceive why the collective woman's seed denotes the church of God's children, namely, because, standing in union with this individual seed of woman, it has itself become a holy seed. It now bears the name and nature of that holy seed of woman, just as the church of Christ is itself called *Christ* (1 Cor. xii. 12). The individual seed of woman is God's Son, therefore is the collective seed that stands in union with Him, the church of God's children. In 1 John ii. 29 also a birth from Christ is spoken of, and in iii. 8-10 God's children born from Christ are opposed to the devil's children. Was not the Apostle Paul, then,

right in saying in the Galatian epistle : " He saith not : To thy seeds, as of many ; but as of one, And to thy seed, which is Christ " ? He says exactly the same of the church as the body that is said in the Protevangelium, passing over to Christ as the Head, and we see how He associated the seed promised to Abraham with the seed of the Protevangelium.<sup>1</sup>

We have been hitherto engaged merely with the second and third clauses of our text. But in the first clause it is said : " And I will put enmity between thee and the woman." The serpent is hostile to the woman, because the woman's seed will prove too strong for it. As the woman succumbed to the temptation of the serpent, so, too, from the woman victory over the serpent is to proceed. With the man the serpent had nothing to do directly, but only with the woman. Hence the woman only, not the man, is opposed to the serpent. The woman, without the man, brought ruin ; from the woman, without the man, comes salvation. The woman stood in Paradise face to face with the serpent as a chaste virgin, for only after the Fall is it said, Gen. iv. 1 : " And Adam knew his wife." And so also the woman, when placed by God in the Protevangelium face to face with the serpent as the channel of salvation, was still a chaste virgin. From a chaste virgin, therefore, without man, was the blessed seed, the serpent conqueror, to take his birth. This mystery Isaiah, by the Spirit, knew and indicated when he said, vii. 14, not as Luther renders, " Behold, *a* Virgin," but with the article : " Behold, *the* Virgin (הַעֲלָמָה) is with child, and shall bring forth a son, whom they shall call Immanuel ! "

<sup>1</sup> When Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, I. 576, dismisses the exposition of the Protevangelium, given above, with the words : " To pass by in entire silence the impossible notion that זְרַעָה was meant to be a collective, the church of believers, and on the other hand הוּא, relating thereto, an individual, namely Christ," this is merely a dismissal, not a reply. The *possibility* of our view lies precisely in the *uniqueness* of the relation that *this* individual bears to *this* collective, which may be described as a relation of identity. Delitzsch, *Comm. zu Genesis*, p. 182, pronounces judgment more cautiously. He says : " As the serpent's seed has its unity in Satan, it is to be presumed that the woman's seed, that overcomes the former, will have a person as a point of unity,—a presumption that, as we gladly concede to Philippi, was the more natural, as in this second clause הוּא has as its antithesis not the serpent's seed, but the serpent, and in the serpent Satan." No doubt this concession is partially withdrawn in what immediately follows, and the sharp distinction between collective and individual again disappears. Even in the reasoning of Keil here we desiderate point and definiteness.

We return, finally, to the third clause. We have, in the first instance, only taken into consideration its first half: "He shall strike or crush thy head." The second half runs: "And thou shalt strike his heel, or crush him on the heel." Thus the serpent-conqueror will not, without suffering, win the victory over the serpent. But we saw that on the one side the serpent's bite on the heel is deadly, and, on the other, that the contrast of heel and head, the heel only being struck, denotes the infliction of a curable wound. We have thus a death that is yet no death. And while the woman's seed tramples on the serpent's head, the serpent pierces him in the heel. Both meet together in the same moment of time, the death of the serpent abiding in death, and the death of the serpent-conqueror, which yet is no death. "The day that thou eatest thereof," the Lord had said, "thou shalt die the death." By means of its temptation, the serpent had brought death into the world. Therefore must death be carried into effect in the woman and all her race. Even the serpent-conqueror must succumb to death, but, in order to vanquish death, retaliating and inflicting it on the serpent. Therefore must Jesus in the serpent's form (the form of the guilty serpent's seed) hang on the cross in order to vanquish the serpent (John iii. 14). The claim of the devil, death, must be met. An actual death, which yet is no death, but a vanquishing of death, a rising from the dead! When, therefore, the holy One succumbs to the death due only to the sinner, and yet vanquishes death, He endures it in the sinner's stead, in his behalf to bring righteousness and life to light. If the devil is a liar from the beginning, then is his adversary the true Prophet. If the latter, for our sake, endures the serpent's sting, then is He our eternal High Priest. If He tramples on the serpent's head, then is He the heavenly King. Thus in the Protevangelium is Christ's three-fold office significantly intimated. "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His counsellor? or who will instruct Him? But we have the mind of Christ; and the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God."

We have considered the Protevangelium in the light of N. T. fulfilment, but we have inserted nothing not actually implied in the words. Directly after the fall of mankind, the Lord put forth

a holy enigma. The solution of the enigma is given only in Christ ; and now that the Lord has appeared, we are able to show how every other solution either explains away the enigma, *i.e.* with rationalistic shallowness empties the words of all mysterious meaning, or at most but approaches the solution, without perfectly satisfying the enigma. In God's wondrous wisdom, the enigma is so arranged that there is but one solution answering to the words perfectly and in every respect. It is here as with every ordinary enigma. One broods long on it, perhaps even approaches the meaning, but this and that word refuses to fall in with the solution, and the feeling remains of uncertainty whether the right one has been reached. But directly the right key is found it fits the lock exactly, and one says with joyous certainty : " Yes, here is the real solution ! " and is able to show how it suits the words of the enigma, however strictly taken. The Protevangelium is the bud, holding wrapped up in it the flower, Christ ; in Christ the flower has unfolded its perfect bloom and most glorious hues. When even Hengstenberg remarks, in reference to the interpretation of the majority of the ancient Christian, and especially Lutheran expositors, who by the seed of the woman expressly understood the Messiah, but certainly then exclusively, that by this explanation the gradual development of Messianic prediction so clearly evident in Genesis would be upset, that a gradual advance is just as obvious in the kingdom of grace as in the kingdom of nature, we may reply that the very characteristic of organic progress is this—that in every step of the development, the whole, with all its parts and members, is involved and present, and this ever grows as a whole and reaches forward towards completeness. The child does not so grow, that, while the trunk is present, the head is only added in later years. But whoever finds expressed, in the first instance, in the Protevangelium merely, the antithesis of God's church and Satan's church, and then supposes the announcement of the personal Christ to be introduced in later ages, really believes in a body to which the head is added later. Or would this be an organic development, if for two thousand years and more divine revelation foretold merely a general victory of the kingdom of light over the kingdom of darkness, and then suddenly, we may say like a pistol-shot, either in Jacob's blessing the Shiloh steps forth as the personal Messiah, or in Balaam's oracle Jacob's star, or in the prophecy of

Deuteronomy the prophet like unto Moses?<sup>1</sup> We fear that the concessions made here to a *spurious* historico-genetic development will at last leave the conceders exposed without defence to all the consequences of this principle. We, too, have a historico-genetic development, but we believe the true instead of the false form, in which, in the very germ and root, all is wrapped up which subsequently in plant and tree comes forth in complete manifestation. "My ways are not your ways," says the Lord; "but high as the heaven is above the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways." The Lord, in His dealings with mankind, proceeds by historical ways; but they are divine, not merely human ways, that He takes with them,—really ways at once divine and human, whose essence consists in this, that they are neither wholly divine nor wholly human. Thus in the Protevangelium He made the actual historical occasion, the relation of the woman to the serpent, His starting-point, and shaped the language of His verbal announcement in exact correspondence with these relations; but, notwithstanding, in this prediction He reached forward across untold generations, and in the protevangelical enigma sketched completely the entire kingdom of God, as regards its head and members, up to its triumphant historical conclusion. On this divine enigma the studies of countless generations have been fixed, and will only be completed in the new heaven and new earth, where Satan, the great dragon, the old serpent, shall be utterly overthrown, the serpent-victor complete His conquest, the church of God triumph with Him, and the serpent-seed be consigned to its final doom. Until then it does not yet appear what we shall be, because as yet He has not appeared whom we shall be like, the seed of the woman, of whom it is said that we are of His flesh and of His bones,—He the head, we the members of His body,—we the seed of the woman because He is *the* seed of the woman, children of God because He is *the* Son of God. Until then it is still true: "It is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church," Eph. v. 30-32. Until then, like the great fathers of our race, we still see through a glass in an enigma (δι' ἑσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι), 1 Cor. xiii. 12. Just as the whole of divine revelation

<sup>1</sup> We, of course, acknowledge in the fullest degree the striking exposition of the Shiloh-prediction in Hengstenberg's *Christology*, of the prediction of Balaam and of Deuteronomy in Kurtz' *History of the Old Covenant*.

is seminally involved and compendiously summed up in the Protevangelium, so from it has the whole of O. T. prophecy, of course under the continuous supernatural inspiration of God's revealing Spirit, been evolved, now this, now that aspect of prophecy being set in clearer relief. But to the original revelation no absolutely new elements have been added, just as invariably, in a really organic structure and course of development, nothing is evolved which is not to be found complete from the first in the germ.

What degree of clearness and definiteness subjective knowledge of O. T. revelation attained in believers of the old covenant, it may be hard to determine. In the case of individuals, there must have been far greater differences in degree on this point than among believers of the new covenant; and even in the same individual at different times, the light of knowledge must have shone with brighter or dimmer radiance. Less information is given in Scripture on the subject, because it has to do for the most part merely with describing the objective progress of revelation. But, on the whole, the stage of knowledge reached at any particular time must have corresponded to the receptiveness of the time. But with respect to whom should we assume a greater degree of receptiveness than in our first parents themselves,—the very ones who had fallen and been driven as exiles from Paradise to the curse-burdened earth, from life to death, from immediate converse with God to abandonment by God, from God's image and likeness to sin? How they must have longed and looked for some word of salvation and comfort from their God! After the Fall, indeed, the Lord only met them as a judge, and even the Protevangelium was merely woven into the word of judgment uttered over the serpent, and on this account appeared in the very form of a penal sentence upon the serpent. But even in the judgment on their enemy, tempter, and destroyer they found wrapped up the salvation which, as we have seen, was expressed with sufficient definiteness in the Protevangelium. This word of comfort they bore with them from Paradise into exile. The Lord had vouchsafed it to them as a stay and staff, as bread and water of life, that they might not perish by the way. This was for them the law of the Lord upon which they meditated day and night; and who will determine the limits within which they penetrated into the meaning, so rich in mystery, of this wondrous enigma? Should we not perhaps gain some light on this subject by rendering



with Luther, should it appear improbable to render—קָנִיתִי אִישׁ אֶת־יְהוָה: "I have the man, the Lord"?<sup>1</sup> That in the Protevangelium the man the Lord, the God-man, is *meant*, we have seen. To Eve it was said that *her* seed should trample on the serpent's head. Thus she was very likely to refer this to herself in a direct, not merely indirect sense. The birth of the first man must for her have been an overwhelming wonder. In her ecstasy of feeling she might easily overleap all bounds. She perhaps erred. Yet was her Magnificat a prophecy of that Magnificat of Mary which, unlike Eve's, was no illusion, but issued in a real fulfilment. Eve, indeed, had yet to learn that the serpent-conqueror would not be born of a sinful seed, that the natural seed of woman is merely a seed of the serpent. And this she was to find out in the most bitter and painful form; for Cain was the head and ringleader of the serpent's seed, was of the wicked one (1 John iii. 12), and as a fratricide imitated his father the devil, a murderer from the beginning. Thus must history and experience have led our first ancestors both negatively and positively to deeper and still deeper knowledge of the Protevangelium, for it began at once to be realized. In Cain and Abel the serpent's seed and woman's seed stood face to face as enemies. But the woman's seed was God's seed not by birth, but by faith in the future woman's seed, who would be God's seed by birth. And the woman's seed here did not vanquish the serpent's seed, but was vanquished and slain by it, so that longing and hope after the true woman's seed, the victorious hero and serpent-conqueror, must have been heightened and fostered all the more. Just as in the Protevangelium the woman's seed was only opposed to the serpent's seed collectively, but the victory over the serpent itself was promised only to the woman's seed as an individual, and therewith no doubt indirectly to the woman's seed collectively, and as the woman's seed collectively was made to precede the woman's seed as an individual,—so also was it to be in the historical development. Christ did not appear at the commence-

<sup>1</sup> Even Hofmann, *Weiss. u. Erf.* I. 77, allows that the rendering: "with the help of Jehovah," is exposed to grammatical difficulties, as אִישׁ never, like אֱלֹהִים, occurs in that meaning. He would translate: in presence of Jehovah, and explains, as it seems to us very artificially: "Eve looked upon the birth of her son as an event happening in presence of Jehovah, in reference to Him, and is right in this; it is a step in advance in her relation to Him." Further, it is self-evident that our exposition of the Protevangelium does not stand or fall with the rendering and view of Gen. iv. 1 referred to.

ment of human history to conquer Satan, but the individual seed of woman was preceded by the collective seed of woman. From the outset the human race parted into the race of Cainites and Sethites, who stood opposed as enemies, and certainly represented and prefigured typically in the form of an historical process the actual appearance, and consequent upon this the perfectly victorious final conflict, of Christ with Satan himself. Thus typical prediction from the first went hand in hand with direct. Neither was prediction merely typical, nor even did direct prediction merely spring from typical; but, on the contrary, the direct preceded the typical, and the typical rested on the direct. The Protevangelium is direct prediction, occasioned, not directly caused, by actual historical relations, and in form and contents corresponding to them. It began to be realized in a provisional and imperfect way in the opposition of Cainites and Sethites, and this initial and imperfect realization was again a pledge and typical prediction, in fact, of the perfect realization which the directly prophetic Protevangelium was finally to receive. O. T. revelation shows us not merely the reflected image of the sun in terrestrial water, but the very sun in heaven itself. The former is merely the effect of the latter, and where the latter is wanting, the former vanishes. But prophecy raises our eyes from earth to heaven, and points to the original image from which the earthly image springs. No doubt the sun in heaven and the sun in water appear illusively alike. But the confusion of one with the other rests on mere deception. The former is recognised by its difference from the latter in dazzling splendour and genial warmth. The sun of righteousness arose in the morn of human history, in the Protevangelium it shines full upon us, still later it threw forth an image of itself in the national history of Israel, and rose higher and higher in the horizon until in canonical prophecy it attained its meridian. Direct prophecy thus preceded typical, and again also doubtless followed it, expounding the type and referring it back to its original. It is the beginning and the end which enclose the middle, the word of testimony of Him who is Alpha and Omega, and who was before Abraham not merely from eternity with the Father, but also in the word of prophecy, in the Protevangelium, the promise of the woman's seed, the promise which later, as a promise of Abraham's seed, blessed and blessing, passed over to Abraham himself, and was linked to his race.

## CHAPTER V.

HAVING now proved that righteousness availing before God comes not by works of the law, Jews, like Gentiles, being under sin, and that the law therefore brings only knowledge of sin, or declares the whole world guilty,—having explained, further, how justification is mediated only through faith in Christ, who by His blood atoned for our guilt, and that therefore, for Jews as for Gentiles, there is but one path of justification, namely, solely and exclusively faith in Him who was crucified and rose again for us, apart from all reference to natural descent, circumcision, and law,—and, finally, having confirmed these propositions by the example of Abraham and the testimony of David,—the apostle next describes, first of all, in v. 1–11 the blissful results of justification, consisting in εἰρήνη πρὸς τὸν θεόν and in the unalterably certain ἐλπὶς τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ. In i. 17 he had summed up his theme in the prophet's words: ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. Having shown how δικαιοσύνη is only ἐκ πίστεως, he next makes clear how, by this δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως, ζωὴ is rendered sure.

Ver. 1. Δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως] *Having therefore been justified by faith, i.e. we who have believed in Jesus Christ, even as iv. 23–25 prescribed such faith to us as the condition of justification. The οὖν thus draws an inference from iii. 21–iv. 25 with special allusion to iv. 23–25. Following immediately on διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμ., iv. 25, δικαιωθέντες is placed at the head of the sentence with triumphant emphasis. As the apostle previously, while dealing with the world of Gentiles and Jews, kept himself in the background, so now he stands consciously within the circle of the Christian church. Hence, from this point forward, we and you.*

—εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεόν] *we have peace with respect to God, in relation to God. Luther: "we have peace with God." Εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ἄγειν, πρὸς (cum) denotes the relation of peace in which one party stands towards another, or each towards the other. Expositors quote, as parallel passages from*

profane authors, Herod. viii. 7, 8 : ἀντὶ πολέμου μὲν εἰρήνην ἔχοντες πρὸς θεούς ; Diod. Sic. xxi. 12 : Ἀγαθοκλῆς . . . πολλὸν χρόνον . . . εἰρηνεύων πρὸς Καρχηδονίους ; Plato, *de Rep.* v. 445 : εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄνδρες ἄξουσιν. Comp. also Acts ii. 47 : ἔχοντες χάριν πρὸς ὅλον τὸν λαόν ; xxiv. 16. By εἰρήνη then here, we are not to understand subjective peace of soul, *tranquillitas animi*, *pax conscientiae* ; for it were incongruous to associate the element of external relation with a mental state so purely internal as this. In the latter meaning we may rightly say εἰρήνην ἔχειν absolutely (ii. 10, viii. 6, xiv. 17, xv. 13) ; εἰρήνην ἔχειν ἀπὸ θεοῦ, i. 7 ; 1 Cor. i. 3, etc. ; ἡ εἰρήνη τοῦ θεοῦ (*genit. autor.*), Phil. iv. 7 ; τοῦ Χριστοῦ, Col. iii. 15 ; or ἐν Χριστῷ, John xvi. 33, but never εἰρ. ἔχ. πρὸς τὸν θεόν. The latter denotes not a *mental state*, but a *relation* of man to God. And, indeed, in this passage the relation consists not in the reciprocal removal of divine ὀργή and human ἔχθρα, but simply in the removal of the former. This is shown not only by the connection of thought in vv. 1–11,—which is not yet concerned with the sphere of the ἀγιασμός that is identical with the removal of the ἔχθρα, but with the sphere of ἰλασμός and δικαίωσις,—but also, and chiefly, by ver. 9, where δικαιωθέντες νῦν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ, σωθησόμεθα δι' αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς glances back illustratively to δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως, εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, ver. 1. In this objective sense of removal of the divine ὀργή, εἰρήνη stands also in Eph. ii. 14, 15 (comp. at least Harless, *ibid.*, and Col. i. 20). While, no doubt, the cancelling of the ὀργή θεοῦ really took place before through the *atonement*, and in the act of *justification* we actually received this deliverance from divine wrath, still withal it is a permanent *consequence* of justification, inasmuch as by justification we are brought into the state in which the ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ (ver. 5) rests continually upon us instead of the former ὀργή. The cancelling of ὀργή past is the pledge of escape from that to come. But then, of course, this εἰρήνη cannot but mirror itself in subjective εἰρήνη. Our peace with or before God, *i.e.* the peace that God has and holds with us, has necessarily inward peace of soul for its result. Here, therefore, it is not yet, as in viii. 2 ff., the removal of our ἔχθρα against God that is meant, but only the removal of the ἔχθρα (comp. on ver. 10), the ὀργή of God against us. Not the *sanctifying*, but the *saving* and *gladdening* results of justification are depicted vv. 1–11. In this entire chapter the

apostle does not as yet quit the subject of the objective aspect—so wondrous and rich in comfort—of the doctrine of atonement and justification, but first of all, by unfolding their blessed effects, leads us to a more profound insight into their nature. For this reason we must regard as out of place and untenable the reading—supported, certainly, by weighty though not preponderant evidence—which Lachmann has received in spite of its rejection by most expositors, and which arose, probably, from the ecclesiastical, hortatory *employment* of this passage, viz.: εἰρήνην ἔχωμεν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, *let us* (by abstaining from sin, or by a life well-pleasing to God, or by remaining truly devoted to Christ) *maintain peace with God*. If our peace with God consist in the removal of divine wrath, it is not *we* that can, but *God* that must maintain peace. Only the maintenance of *faith*, not of *peace*, belongs to man. Moreover, the apostle cannot exhort us to *maintain* peace with God, because he has not yet spoken at all of our *having* peace with God. What we are to *maintain* we must first *have*. And it is just this, that we *have* peace, which is expressed by the indicative ἔχωμεν. Comp. also with this passage Isa. xxxii. 17: שְׁלֹם הַצָּרָה הַצִּיָּה מַעֲשֵׂה הַיְּהוָה, *and the work of righteousness is peace*.

—διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] Jesus Christ, by His atoning death, mediated this peace with God, or rather He continually mediates it for us; for the love of God abiding upon the Beloved, Eph. i. 6, abides also continually upon us, the righteousness of the Beloved being ours through faith.

Ver. 2. δι' οὗ καὶ] *through whom also*. καὶ is not intensive, προσαγωγή εἰς τὴν χάριν being not something higher, but the *ground* of the εἰρήνη.

—τὴν προσαγωγὴν ἐσχίκαμεν τῇ πίστει εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην] The expression ἔχειν τὴν προσαγωγὴν occurs only again in Eph. ii. 18, iii. 12, both times in the intransitive sense *access* (not *introduction*). So, therefore, here. Vulg.: *accessum*.<sup>1</sup> In no passage are we to think of the usage in despotic courts of mediated access to the sovereign through the subordinate and often even infamous person of a προσαγωγεὺς, *sequester, admissionum magister, ad-*

<sup>1</sup> Meyer, indeed, has again defended *introduction* as the invariable meaning of the word; but he himself concedes, in Herod. ii. 58, *processions* as at least a *derived* meaning. It is there said: Πανηγύρις δι' ἧρα καὶ πομπὰς καὶ προσαγωγὰς πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων Αἰγύπτιοι εἰσι οἱ ποιούμενοι. The conjunction with πανηγύρις and πομπὰς favours the intransitive meaning. Comp. Schweigh. *ad loc.*; Hesychius, "προσαγωγή est προσέλισις, recte: accessio, nempe ad deorum aras, supplicatio," and Mehring, p. 464.

*missionalis*. The word itself does not suggest this; and the comparison, as taken from heathen antiquity, is far-fetched, and, moreover, ignoble. But access is mediated for us by the atoning passion of Christ, 1 Pet. iii. 18. In the other passages the *προσαγωγή* is *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, here *εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην*; for it is out of the question to make these last words depend on *τῇ πίστει*: *through faith in this grace*, for this reason, that while indeed it is said *πίστις εἰς τὸν κύριον, εἰς Χριστόν*, Acts xx. 21, xxiv. 24, the expression *εἰς τὴν χάριν* is without any N. T. analogy. *χάρις* here can only be the grace of justification, for no other *χάρις* was spoken of so far, iii. 24. The reference of *χάρις* to *εἰρήνη*, ver. 1, would give a meaningless tautology, or at least a flat, nugatory sense: "We have *εἰρήνη* through Christ, through whom also we have had access to *εἰρήνη*." Rather the sense is: "Justified through faith, we have *εἰρήνη* through Christ, through whom also we have had access to the grace of justification." *τῇ πίστει*, indeed, is wanting in good authorities, and is erased by Lachmann; but it was perhaps omitted originally for the purpose of ensuring the connection of *τὴν προσαγωγήν* with *εἰς τὴν χάριν*. The reading *ἐν τῇ πίστει* owes its origin simply to dittography (*ἐσχήκαμεν ἘΝ ἘΝ*). *πίστις* is here specified, as in Eph. iii. 12, as the condition of *προσαγωγή*, comp. Heb. xi. 6: *πιστεῦσαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸν προσερχόμενον τῷ θεῷ*. The unusual dative *τῇ πίστει*, *through faith*, comp. iii. 28, is chosen instead of *διὰ τῆς πίστεως*, in order to avoid the iteration of *διὰ*, which has just preceded. *ἐσχήκαμεν*, *we have had*, comp. 2 Cor. i. 9, ii. 12, vii. 5, in contrast with *ἔχομεν*, ver. 1. Therefore it is not = *habemus*, not = *nacti sumus et habemus*, but *habuimus*, i.e. *when we became believers*. For justification is complete directly we believe. We have had (*ἐσχήκαμεν*) access to the divine grace of which, as justified, we are partakers, and have (*ἔχομεν*) now peace with God. *ταύτην* implies a triumphant allusion to the glorious grace at present existing.

—*ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν*] *in which* (namely, grace) *we stand*, i.e. stand firm, abide continually, which we possess inalienably, John viii. 44; 1 Cor. xv. 1; 2 Cor. i. 24; Eph. vi. 13; 1 Pet. v. 12. "Postea subjicit continuo, ejusdem gratiae tenore fieri, ut firma stabilisque salus nobis maneat: quo significat, perseverantiam non in virtute industriave nostra, sed in Christo fundatam esse," Calvin.

—*καὶ καυχώμεθα κτλ.*] adds a new leading idea, on which

account the sentence is more aptly joined to εἰρήνην ἔχομεν κτλ., ver. 1, than to the subordinate sentence ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν. The consequence of justification is first present εἰρήνη; next, the hope of future δόξα. *καυχᾶσθαι* is not merely = *to rejoice*, but = *to glory*. But joyous glorying in a blessing that is the gift of grace is at the same time praise of this divine grace itself. Bengel observes, very acutely: “*καυχώμεθα, gloriamur, novo ac vero modo, conf. iii. 27,*” although the apostle has not positively indicated this antithesis.

—ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι] *propter specm.* ἐπί, with the dative in verbs of emotion, serves to specify the *reason*. So γελᾶν, μέγα φρονεῖν, μαίνεσθαι, ἀγανακτεῖν ἐπὶ τινι. As here, so also in LXX. Ps. xlix. 6, Wisd. xvii. 7, Eccus. xxx. 2, *καυχᾶσθαι ἐπὶ τινι* is used. Elsewhere in the N. T. is only found the construction *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν τινι*, ii. 17, 23, v. 3, 11, etc.; ὑπέρ τινος, 2 Cor. vii. 14, ix. 2, xii. 5; and περί τινος, 2 Cor. x. 8; also *καυχᾶσθαί τι*, 2 Cor. xi. 30. The *καύχημα τῆς ἐλπίδος* is spoken of also Heb. iii. 6.

—τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ] Luther: “the future glory which God is to give.” Then the expression would be parallel with μέλλουσα δόξα ἀποκαλυφθῆναι εἰς ἡμᾶς, viii. 18, and the genitive τοῦ θεοῦ, *genit. auctoris*. So John xii. 43: ἡγάπησαν γὰρ τὴν δόξαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον, ἢ περὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ. But in the latter passage, the honour which God gives stands in contrast with the honour which men give; whereas in this passage, that God confers δόξα would be a predicate of δόξα of little significance, because self-evident. For this reason it is preferable to interpret δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ of the *glory that God Himself has*, of the *glory of God* in which believers are one day to share, comp. John xvii. 22, 1 Thess. ii. 12, Rev. xxi. 11, where the seer beholds the holy city Jerusalem descending from heaven ἔχουσαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ. 2 Pet. i. 4 also affords illustration, where it is said that we are to be *θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως*; and 1 John iii. 2: οἶδαμεν δὲ, ὅτι ἐὰν φανερωθῇ, ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα. Melancthon: “quod Deus sit nos gloria sua aeterna ornaturus, i.e. vita aeterna et communicatione sui ipsius.” “Atqui hic evertuntur,” says Calvin, “pestilentissima duo sophistarum dogmata, alterum, quo jubent Christianos esse contentos conjectura morali in percipienda erga se Dei gratia, alterum, quo tradunt omnes esse incertos finalis perseverantiae. Atqui nisi certa in praesens intelligentia, et in futurum constans ac minime dubia sit persuasio: quis gloriari auderet?” But the

ground of our *καύχησις*, and of the *ἐλπίς τῆς δόξης*, lies in the *εἰρήνη πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, which we have as being justified.

Vv. 3, 4 carry to a climax the last thought of ver. 2. The *καύχησις* of Christians takes place not only on account of the *ἐλπίς* of future *δόξα*, but even on account of present sufferings, of course only in so far as the latter enhance the former *ἐλπίς*. οὐ μόνον δέ] We must not supply *τοῦτο* which the apostle would have added, but repeat from ver. 2 : *καυχώμεθα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ*. Comp. οὐ μόνον δέ, ver. 11, viii. 23, ix. 10 ; 2 Cor. viii. 19. *And not only do we boast of the hope of future glory,—ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσιν]* but we boast of tribulations also, which is saying far more, the unbeliever usually murmuring at these, and allowing himself to sink under them. Thus the antithesis *ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσιν* must be made dependent on *καυχώμεθα*: *gloriamur de calamitatibus*, not: *gloriamur in calamitatibus*, so that only the situation would be indicated in which the boasting occurs. That *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν τινι*, to boast on account of a thing, is in the N. T. the most common construction used with *καυχᾶσθαι*, see on ver. 2. Concerning such *καύχησις* of believers in tribulation, comp. Matt. v. 10, 12 ; Acts v. 41 ; 1 Pet. iv. 12, 13. Paul himself glories in his *ἀσθένειαι*, 2 Cor. xi. 30, xii. 9. But while such glorying excludes neither the painful sense of sufferings nor occasional despondency, both are overcome by the believing assurance of the salutary nature of sufferings. “Ubicumque enim profectus est salutis,” says Calvin, “illic non deest gloriandi materia.” Not sufferings simply are the object of glorying, but the fruit of sufferings, namely, the pledge they contain of the hope of glory.

—*εἰδότες]* knowing, being certain, states the reason of the glorying, 1 Cor. xv. 58 ; 2 Cor. i. 7, iv. 14 ; Eph. vi. 9. The following words : *ὅτι ἡ θλίψις . . . οὐ καταισχύνει*, form a climax, viii. 29 ff., x. 14 ff. ; 2 Pet. i. 5 ff. Believers glory in tribulations, not so much because they work *ὑπομονήν* and *δοκιμήν*, as because they work *ἐλπίδα*, *ἥτις οὐ καταισχύνει*, the last and highest issue of their influence.

—*ὅτι ἡ θλίψις ὑπομονήν κατεργάζεται]* This takes place, of course, only in the case of those justified by faith ; but in their case, as long as they are such, takes place without fail. *ὑπομονή* is not so much *patientia*, *patience*, i.e. quiet submission to evil (*ἀνέχεσθαι*), as rather *constantia*, *perseverantia*, *stabilis permansio*.



endurance, steadfastness (*μένειν*), comp. ii. 7; Matt. x. 22, xxiv. 13; 2 Tim. ii. 12; Heb. x. 36, and Luke xxii. 28: οἱ διαμεμενηκότες μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐν τοῖς πειρασμοῖς. This very *constantia* in suffering, which is a higher grace than *patientia*, works *δοκιμὴν*] i.e. *indolem spectatam, tried fidelity, approval*. Just so 2 Cor. ii. 9, ix. 13; Phil. ii. 22. Only through *ὑπομονή* does *δοκιμή* arise, for if *ὑπομονή* fail to hold out, the man becomes an *ἀδόκιμος*. Hence it is not correct to say that endurance merely makes known tested character, but does not produce it. Only out of perfected *ὑπομονή* springs *δοκιμή*, the latter thus being the result, not merely the manifestation of the former. The radical meaning of *δοκιμή* is *testing* (1 Cor. xi. 28; 2 Cor. viii. 2), then the word denotes the *testing borne* = *tried worth, approval*. This signification is required in the present passage by the connection, and cannot be rendered with Grotius: "exploratio sui ipsius," and still less with Luther: *experience*, probably as "experientia bonitatis Dei," as Calvin also explains. If it is said in Jas. i. 3: τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως κατεργάζεται ὑπομονήν, this does not contradict the present passage, for *δοκίμιον* is = *means of proof*, or = *δοκιμασία, proof*, whose effect is *δοκιμή* as *approval*. *δοκίμιον* therefore corresponds to *θλίψις* in this passage, which as the means of testing or test of *πίστις* here, as there, *ὑπομονήν κατεργάζεται*. But the state of approval, as observed, is nothing but the test borne. If, then, the proof is a proof of faith, the state of approval is nothing but the proof of faith borne, the final approval of faith, comp. 1 Pet. i. 7. In the present passage, also, *δοκιμή* is perhaps to be taken as *δοκιμή πίστεως*. Such final approval of faith Paul affirms of himself, 2 Tim. iv. 7: τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν καλὸν ἡγωνίσμαι, τὸν δρόμον τετέλεκα, τὴν πίστιν τετήρηκα. How *θλίψις* perfects *πίστις* is explained at length in Rom. viii. 35-39.

—ἡ δὲ *δοκιμή ἐλπίδα*] sc. *τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ*, ver. 2. Thus *ἐλπίς* returns in a circle upon itself. "In orbem redit oratio," Bengel. In the consciousness of the *ὀργὴ θεοῦ* removed, justifying faith produces *ἐλπίς τῆς δόξης*, and faith, approved by steadfast fidelity in tribulation, merges in a higher and enhanced measure of this *ἐλπίς*. Therefore faith tested and approved produces hope in enhancing and confirming it; for in the spiritual life every enhancement and confirmation is at the same time a fresh act of production. Comp. on iv. 15, and John ii. 11: ἐπίστευσαν εἰς αὐτὸν οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ, where the faith of the disciples,

already existing, is produced by the miracle of Jesus, in so far as by the miracle it is heightened and corroborated. We find a statement analogous to this passage in meaning, Jas. i. 12: *μακάριος ἄνθρωπος ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν ὅτι δόκιμος γενόμενος λήψεται τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς, ὃν ἐπηγγείλατο ὁ κύριος τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν.* Here, in like manner, *θλίψις* (*πειρασμός*) produces *ὑπομονή*, *ὑπομονή*—*δοκιμή* (*δόκιμος γενόμενος*), *δοκιμή*—*ἐλπίς* (*λήψεται στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς*). Also, while in the passage in James *ζωή* appears as the reward of *ἀγάπη*, not as the immediate possession of simple *πίστις*, or of *πίστις* approved by fidelity in tribulation, the expression *ἐπηγγείλατο* indicates that this reward is to be regarded merely as a reward of grace. And in point of fact, the inheritance that belongs to the children already by right of birth, is withal a superabundant reward of their obedience attested by love,—a reward of their obedience, in so far as by disobedience their birthright might have been forfeited,—a reward of *grace*, in so far as their obedience is full of defect and imperfection. Comp. on ii. 6.

Ver. 5. *ἡ δὲ ἐλπίς οὐ καταισχύνει*] *ἡ ἐλπίς* cannot be put for *αὕτη ἡ ἐλπίς* = “a hope attested by steadfastness under tribulation, therefore a hope established.” Rather *ἡ ἐλπίς* stands in exact parallelism with the preceding phrases, *ἡ θλίψις*, *ἡ ὑπομονή*, *ἡ δοκιμή*. In all these words the article points back to the same substantive standing before without article (iii. 30). Therefore *ἡ ἐλπίς*, in distinction from *ἐλπίς*, is simply = *spes, quam dixi*, the hope just mentioned,

—*οὐ καταισχύνει*] *makes not ashamed*, i.e. *deceives not* (צִיִּי, LXX. Ps. cxix. 116, and Eccus. ii. 10), comp. ix. 33, x. 11 (after LXX. Isa. xxviii. 16). For whoever is deceived in his hope blushes for shame. “Habet certissimum salutis exitum,” Calvin. “Nec fallat, spes erit res,” Bengel. The reason why the hope of future glory does not deceive the believer, does not suffer him to be put to shame, is stated in the words *ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη . . . ἡμῖν*.

—*ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ*] The genitive *τοῦ θεοῦ* is *genit. subject.*, not *genit. object.* Not: *the love that we have to God* (so wrongly Theodor., Pelag., August., Bernhard, Anselm, several Socinians and Catholics, the latter of *amor infusus*, also Umbreit here, and Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* 2 Aufl. I. 525), but: *the love that God has to us* (so Orig., Chrys., Ambros., Theophyl., Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, the older Protestant, and nearly all modern interpreters). The

latter signification is proved by the epexegetical 8th verse (*συνίστησι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγάπην εἰς ἡμᾶς ὁ θεός*). It is the ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, viii. 39, comp. 2 Cor. xiii. 14. Not our love to God, but God's love to us, is therefore alleged here as the basis of our hope.

—ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν] We are not to suppose an attraction out of ἐκκέχυται εἰς τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν, καὶ ἔστι (ἐνοικεῖ) ἐν αὐταῖς, Winer, p. 516. The Greeks, like the Latins, could think, for example, of wine as poured both into a glass and in a glass. So Suetonius says, *Galba*, c. 20: "amputatum caput in loco abjicere," which might also be expressed as *in locum*. So, as is well known, the Latins say simply: *ponere in loco*. Comp. LXX. Ps. xlv. 2: ἐξεχύθη χάρις ἐν χεῖλεσί σου. Love is poured out into the heart, i.e. it is shed abroad in the heart. In ἐκχέω, as in the Latin *effundere*, in the German *anschütten*, pour forth, lies the notion of abundance, fulness. Comp. Acts x. 45: ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔθνη ἡ δωρεὰ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐκκέχυται, Tit. iii. 6, where *πλουσίως* is expressly added. So, too, the Heb. תַּבַּח, Ezek. xvi. 36. Thus God's love has not merely dropped on us as dew, but like a stream has been poured into our hearts, it is shed abroad in our hearts, Isa. xlv. 3; Tob. iv. 17; Eccus. i. 9; Acts ii. 17, x. 45; John vii. 38, 39. But the love of God is poured into our hearts in so far as by faith we have an assured consciousness of this love, as we find ourselves in possession of it, 1 John iv. 9, 16. Strikingly Calov: "quae charitus effusa in nobis non qua *inhacionem subjectivam*, sed qua *manifestationem* et qua *effectum vel sensum* ejusdem in cordibus nostris effusum." The objection that, according to this view, the certainty of God's love is made interchangeable with God's love itself, is nothing to the point; for in the faith that grasps the love of God, not only the certainty, but also the actual possession of this love is involved.

—διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν] As the Holy Ghost is the cause, so also is He the fruit of faith—He is given to believers. "Datum praeterea hunc Spiritum dicit," remarks Calvin, "gratuita scilicet Dei bonitate erogatum, non autem redditum nostris meritis." But then the first effect of the Holy Spirit's working is, that the believer learns through Him the abounding love which God feels towards him in Christ Jesus. Accordingly, the πνεῦμα appears here, not as ἀρραβὼν, as in 2 Cor. v. 5, Eph. i. 14, but as *testis*, comp. viii. 15, 16: ἐλάβετε

πνεῦμα νίοθεσίας, ἐν ᾧ κράζομεν· Ἀββᾶ, ὁ πατήρ! Αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα συμμαρτυρεῖ τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἐσμὲν τέκνα θεοῦ; Gal. iv. 6. Thus we see that the apostle, although he contemplates the hope of eternal life as enhanced by steadfastness and fidelity in suffering, is so far from regarding this steadfastness and fidelity as an adequate ground of this hope, that, on the contrary, he puts forward as the sufficient and certain basis of our hope of future glory, not our love to God attested by fidelity, but God's love to us, resting on Christ's atoning death. The idea worked out in vv. 1-5 is therefore as follows: He that is justified by faith has nothing more to fear from God's wrath, this being cancelled through Jesus Christ. On the contrary, he enjoys the hope of future glory. Even tribulations cannot rob him of this hope, but only heighten and strengthen it; for by the Holy Spirit he is assured of the love of God towards him, so that even tribulations no longer appear to him a manifestation of divine wrath, and can no longer make his faith stagger. The God who from pure love to sinners sent His Son to make atonement, when they have become objects of grace and established in faith through tribulation, will the more assuredly bless them with eternal happiness.

Ver. 6. The love of God is *demonstrated* (γάρ) by the fact of Christ's atoning death for us when we were without God. *ἔτι γάρ Χριστὸς ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν*] Some expositors take *ἔτι γάρ* in the sense of *insuper, porro, moreover* (but this would be *ἔτι δέ*, Heb. xi. 36), or of *adeo enim, quin etiam, for even, nay even* (but this would be *καὶ γάρ* or *ἀλλὰ καί*). Rather ver. 8: *ἔτι ἁμαρτωλῶν ὄντων ἡμῶν*, shows that we must connect together *ἔτι ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν*. *For when we were still without strength*, Christ, etc. Such a hyperbaton is not by any means unknown, especially with *ἔτι*. Expositors quote Eurip. *Orest.* v. 416: *ἔκτον τόδ' ἡμαρ ἔτι πυρὰ θερμὴ τάφου*; Achill. *Tat.* v. 18: *ἐγὼ δὲ ἔτι σοι ταῦτα γράφω παρθένος*; comp. Winer, p. 692, and Luke xv. 20: *ἔτι δὲ αὐτοῦ μακρὰν ἀπέχοντος*. The needless difficulty caused by the order of the words provoked corrections. Hence some codices read *εἶγε γάρ*, others *εἰς τί γάρ*, instead of *ἔτι γάρ*, and place the *ἔτι* after *ἀσθενῶν*. The latter is even done by some manuscripts which retain *ἔτι γάρ* at the head of the sentence, either blending the true reading with a portion of the correction, or even borrowing the second *ἔτι* from the Lectionaries, which in like manner read *ἔτι* after *ἀσθενῶν*, because the old church-

lection began with *Χριστός*. Griesbach has therefore received this repetition of *ἔτι* wrongly; Lachmann, indeed, scarcely rightly. *ἀσθενής* never signifies anything but *imbecillis, infirmus, weak*, either *τῷ σώματι*, where it is used either of physical weakness or sickness, or *τῷ νόῳ* of mental weakness, *τοῖς χρήμασι* of poverty, *τῇ πίστει*, Rom. iv. 19, xiv. 1, and in many other relations. What the relation is, is indicated in each case by express addition or by the context. Here manifestly spiritual weakness, the weakness of sin, is spoken of. Comp. Isa. xxxiii. 24: "No inhabitant shall say, I am weak (sick, *חֵלֵף*), for the people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their sin;" liii. 4: *שׁוּבָה נָתַתִּי חֵלֵף*, LXX.: *τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν φέρει*; Matt. viii. 17: *τὰς ἀσθενείας ἡμῶν ἔλαβε*; Matt. xxvi. 41; Heb. iv. 15. Sin in this passage is represented as weakness, helplessness, in contrast with the strengthening love of God. But the expression *ἀσθενής* here may possibly be chosen in allusion to the contents of vv. 2, 3. The justified one has *καύχησιν* in the consciousness of God's love; the sinner has *ἀσθένειαν*, which calls for the strong help of love. The former has strong confidence in the *ἀγάπη* and *δόξα* *θεοῦ*; the latter, on the other hand, is weak and fearful from dread of the *ὀργή* *θεοῦ* and *κόλασις αἰώνιος*. Comp. 1 Cor. ii. 3: *ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρόμῳ*, and Heb. ii. 15. *ἀσθενής*, therefore, of itself is neither = *ἀσεβής*, which follows presently, nor = *ἁμαρτωλός*, ver. 8. Rather it denotes a condition of helplessness and spiritual dread as the consequence of *ἀσέβεια* and *ἁμαρτία*. Least of all do we need the correction *ἀθέων* for *ἀσθενῶν*.

—*κατὰ καιρὸν ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀπέθανε*] Some interpreters wish to join *κατὰ καιρὸν* with *ἔτι* = *ἔτι τέως, ἔτι τότε*, *adhuc eo tempore, adhuc tum, still at the time when we were weak*. But the separation in the order of the words tells against this, and also in that case *κατὰ καιρὸν* would be a useless addition. Others join it with *ἀσθενῶν*. So Luther: "*When in accordance with the period we were still weak.*" *κατὰ καιρὸν* would then be = *pro temporum ratione, secundum rationem temporis*, in so far as in the period before the advent of Christ we could not be otherwise than weak. But this would imply an inappropriate apology for the *ἀσθένεια*, diametrically opposed both to the spirit of the passage and the teaching of the apostle. *κατὰ καιρὸν* must accordingly be joined with *ἀπέθανε*. It may then be explained after Phavorinus: *κατὰ*

τὸν εὐκαιρον καὶ προσήκοντα καιρόν, *at the proper time, tempore opportuno*, the opposite of *παρὰ καιρόν, praeter opportunitatem, tempore alieno*, Heb. xi. 11. So *καιρόν μεταλαβών*, Acts xxiv. 25. In much the same sense also, *κατὰ καιρόν*, LXX. Num. xxiii. 23; Isa. lx. 22. In this case the death of Jesus would be conceived as taking place at the *right* instant of time for anticipating the imminent outburst of divine wrath, inasmuch as the *πάρεσις τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων*, iii. 25, had just come to an end, and God must then have vindicated His justice. Yet such a conception does not occur elsewhere in Paul, and would therefore scarcely have been expressed by the brief phrase *κατὰ καιρόν*. Still less *Pauline* appears the conception: "The death of Jesus took place at the *proper* point of time, namely, for the *ἡμεῖς*; as for these, it was not *παρὰ καιρόν*, but *seasonable*. Had Christ appeared and died *later*, they would have perished unredeemed in their sins, and would have had no part in His work of atonement." Moreover, this would equally hold good, if at all, of *every* generation in whose time Christ might appear, and at least of believers of the O. T. would *not* hold good, because as to these the saying: "*Mors Christi profuit, antequam fuit*," is true. It is therefore preferable to explain *κατὰ καιρόν*: *at the appointed time, tempore a Deo constituto*. In John v. 4, also, *κατὰ καιρόν* stands in the sense of *certo tempore*. In meaning, then, *κατὰ καιρόν* is identical with *ὅτε ἦλθε τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου*, Gal. iv. 4, comp. Eph. i. 10; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Tit. i. 3. Christ appeared as the Propitiator at the time determined beforehand in the divine counsel, announced beforehand by the prophets. The divine wisdom and love, which contain the reason of all divine determinations, without doubt ordained this precise point of time for the advent of Christ. So far, therefore, *κατὰ καιρόν* harmonizes well with the connection of thought in this passage. To the inquiry as to the real cause of this particular time being fixed, different answers may be given. Comp. J. G. Walchii, *Miscellanea sacra*, Meditatio xviii.: "*de tempore adventus Messiae idoneo*." The most fitting answer still seems to be the one at which some of the Fathers hinted, that the sinful disease of mankind must needs reach its full development before remedial means could be applied to purpose. So already Gregory of Nyssa says (in Walch, *ibid.*): "*Sic animorum aegrotantium medicus exspectavit, dum malitiae morbus, quo natura hominum victa laborabat, se totum*

aperiret, ne latens aliquid incuratum remaneret, si curaret id solum, quod cerneretur;" and Theophyl.: ὅτε πᾶν εἶδος κακίας διεξεληθούσα ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἐδεῖτο θεραπείας, ἐξαπέστειλε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ὁ θεός. Comp. also vv. 20, 21 of this chapter. — It is true that the preposition ὑπέρ in itself is not convertible with ἀντί, Winer, p. 479; Harless on Eph. v. 2; Meyer here. ἀντί is = *instead of, loco*; ὑπέρ (interchangeable with the synonymous περί) = *for, for the sake of, in commodum*. One may die ὑπέρ, and yet not ἀντί τινος, as the death that I submit to on another's behalf, to secure him some good or avert some evil, does not always assume that he must have died if I had not died. Still this will *usually* be the case, and with respect to Christ it *was* the case, His death being, as we know from other sources, a vicarious, sacrificial death, comp. on iii. 24. The phrase Χριστὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀπέθανε, παρέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν (Rom. viii. 32, xiv. 15; 1 Cor. i. 13; 2 Cor. v. 14; Eph. v. 2; 1 Thess. v. 9, 10; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Tit. ii. 14), therefore expresses the *compassionate love* of Christ's *vicarious, sacrificial death*, so that in ὑπέρ the ἀντί is assumed or rather included, comp. Steiger on 1 Pet. iii. 18. In the present case ὑπέρ implies the notion of *compassionate* substitution. That ὑπέρ sometimes of *necessity* involves the idea of ἀντί, is shown by passages like 2 Cor. v. 15, 20, 21; Gal. iii. 13; Philem. 13. Finally, the apostle in the present passage writes: ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν, not: ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, for the express purpose of setting forth withal the misery of sin (ἀσθένεια) in its penal, degraded, and guilty character, in which aspect alone the love providing the atonement is seen in its true antithesis, and receives its adequate illustration.

Ver. 7. What men are able to do and sacrifice being placed in contrast with the deed and loving sacrifice of Christ, the latter stands out in its absolute uniqueness. μὴ τις γὰρ ὑπὲρ δικαίου τις ἀποθανεῖται: ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τάχα τις καὶ πολὺ ἀποθανεῖν] The Peshito read ἀδίκων for δικαίου, which is clearly to be regarded as a mere correction, yielding, no doubt, an easy meaning, but at the same time a sentence somewhat flat and halting. "Christ died for the ungodly, ver. 6. Scarcely, that is, does one (*sc.* among men) die for an ungodly man; for on behalf of a good man one perhaps (that is, even among men) might venture to die, ver. 7. But God shows His love to us in that Christ died for us though ungodly, ver. 8." Some expositors, even while retaining the fully established *lectio recepta* δικαίου,

sought to obtain the meaning just given by altogether arbitrary means. *δίκαιος εἰμι*, with the following infinitive, is said to be = *dignus sum qui*. They accordingly supplied to *δικαίου*, from the following *ἀποθανεῖται*, an *ἀποθανεῖν*. "Scarcely will one die for one worthy of death." But then, manifestly, *ἀποθανεῖν* could not have been omitted; and it has been justly remarked that Paul must have written: *μόλις γὰρ εἴ τις δίκαιος ἐστὶν ἀποθανεῖν, ὑπὲρ τούτου τις ἀποθανεῖται*. Luther renders: "Now scarcely does one die for what is just; for what is good one might perhaps die." After the example of Jerome and Erasmus, he takes *δικαίου* and *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* as neuters.<sup>1</sup> But to take *δικαίου* as neuter is grammatically impossible, because in that case the article could not be absent. Justice is not *δίκαιον*, but *τὸ δίκαιον*, comp. Luke xii. 57: *τί δὲ καὶ ἀφ' ἐαυτῶν οὐ κρίνετε τὸ δίκαιον*; Col. iv. 1. And were *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* meant to be neuter, it must have stood, either in the sense of *τὸ συμφέρον*, *τὸ κέρδος*, which expression we should have expected, seeing that the ethical conception of *δικαίου* requires the *ethical* acceptance for *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* as well; or in the sense of *summum bonum*, *the highest good*. In the latter case the antithesis is lost altogether, since Christ also in dying *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν*, died *ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*. Accordingly both *δικαίου* and *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* must be taken as masculine, which is intrinsically probable, as the point in question in the death of Christ is a dying on behalf of *persons*. But in that case *δίκαιος* and *ὁ ἀγαθός* cannot be synonyms, serving alike to designate a good, righteous man. Thus Calvin: "Rarissimum sane inter homines exemplum exstat, ut pro justo quis mori sustineat: quamquam illud nonnunquam accidere possit." "For scarcely for a righteous man will any one die, but perhaps one may venture to die even for the righteous man; but Christ died for sinners." But Paul must then have written: *τολμᾷ δὲ (not γάρ) καὶ τάχα τις*, or: *τάχα δὲ καὶ τολμᾷ τις ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*. But with the present arrangement of the words the emphasis clearly lies on *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, which is therefore con-

<sup>1</sup> Melancthon's interpretation is the same: "Vix pro justo aliquis moritur i. e. inviti in causa justa mortem appetimus ubi mori debemus. Ut fur invitus moritur etiam si debet mortem legibus. Milites inviti mortem appetunt, etiamsi mori debent pro republica. Intelligatur igitur in verbis Pauli *pro justo* de re seu causa justa seu debito. Sic deinde, sed pro bono fortassis ausit aliquis mori, intelligatur etiam de re bona, jucunda et utili. Nam facilius suscipimus pericula incitati cupiditate aut opinione utilitatis, quam coacti debito. Sicut multi mortem appetunt ad retinendas res caras, ut conjuges aut gloriam," etc.



trasted with *δικαίου*, and cannot of course be identical with it. Add to this, that in *μόλις*, with the difficulty at the same time, the possibility is sufficiently intimated that some one might die for a just man, whereupon the second sentence becomes somewhat superfluous and tame. Accordingly *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* must stand to *δικαίου* in the relation of a different degree, as is indicated even by *τάχα*, perhaps, in relation to *μόλις*, scarcely. It is important in this case above all things to define the conception *ἀγαθός*. It is ordinarily taken in the sense of *benefactor*; so that *ὁ ἀγαθός* (with the article) is said to be = *the benefactor whom he has, his benefactor*. "Hardly does any one die on behalf of a righteous man (who stands to him in no nearer relation); for on behalf of his benefactor one perhaps takes it upon him (from gratitude) to die." For this signification there is quoted from the classics, Xenoph. *Cyrop.* iii. 3. § 4: *Κῦρον ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὐεργέτην, τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθόν*; *Hell.* vii. 3. § 12: *οἱ μέντοι πολῖται αὐτὸν, ὡς ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν κομισάμενοι, ἔθαψαν κτλ. Οὕτως οἱ πλείστοι ὀρίζονται τοὺς εὐεργέτας αὐτῶν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι*; *Charito Chacra et Callirhoe*, viii. 8: *ἐπευφήμησεν ὁ δῆμος· ἀγαθῷ ἀνδρὶ, πολυχάρμῳ, φίλῳ· πιστῷ ὁ δῆμος σοι χάριν ἐπίσταται τὴν πατρίδα εὐηργέτηκας*; *Lucian, Caucasus*, c. 18: *καίτοι θεοὺς γε ὄντας ἀγαθοὺς χρὴ εἶναι καὶ δωτῆρας ἐάων καὶ ἔξα φθόνου παντὸς ἐστάναι*; *Aelian, var. hist.* iii. 17: *Ταραντίνους ἐγένετο ἀγαθὸς Ἀρχύτας*. However, in all these and other passages *ἀγαθός* is perhaps = *noble, gracious*; but not exactly = *benefactor*, as the distinction from *εὐεργέτης* in the first passage clearly shows. The same holds good of *Matt.* xx. 15: *εἰ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου πονηρός ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀγαθός εἰμι*; *1 Pet.* ii. 18. Very striking is Cicero's illustration of the notion of the *ἀγαθός*, *de off.* iii. 15: "Si vir bonus is est, qui prodest quibus potest, nocet nemini, recte *justum* virum, *bonum* non facile reperiemus;" *de nat. deor.* ii. 25: "Jupiter optimus dictus est, id est beneficentissimus;" upon which, again, to illustrate the use of *δίκαιος*, Tholuck aptly quotes Xenoph. *Sympos.* c. 4, § 42, where the *δίκαιοι* are defined as those *οἱ ἥκιστα τῶν ἰλλοτρίων ὀρέγονται καὶ οἷς ἀρκεῖ τὰ παρόντα*; *Oecon.* c. 14, §§ 6-9, where the slaves who are not thievish are described as *δίκαιοι*; and *ibid.*, as likewise *Agcsilaus*, c. 11, § 8, where the *ἐλευθέριος* is placed over against the *δίκαιος*: *χρήμασί γε μὴν οὐ μόνον δικάως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἐχρήτο, τῷ μὲν δικάῳ ἀρκεῖν ἡγούμενος τὸ εἶναι τὰ ἀλλότρια, τῷ δὲ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ*

τῶν ἑαυτοῦ προσωφελητέον εἶναι. Accordingly δίκαιος is a just man who does no wrong; ἀγαθός, a noble, gracious man, a tender-hearted friend of human-kind, who does good to every one. Similarly, Bengel explains δίκαιος by *homo innoxius*; ὁ ἀγαθός by *omnibus pictatis numeris absolutus*, *eximius*, *lautus*, *regalis*, *beatus* v. gr. *pater patriae*; and observes: "articulus climaca efficit;" that is, the article with ἀγαθός intimates, perhaps, that this ἀγαθός is known and recognised as such in the family, the church, the city, the nation. As matter of fact, one will more readily venture to die for such an one than for a righteous man, who has indeed a just cause and suffers innocently, but still has not, like the kind, generous friend of humanity, drawn to himself the hearts of men. Thus, doubtless, ὁ ἀγαθός comes very near to the meaning of ὁ εὐεργέτης, yet without quite coinciding with it; ὁ εὐεργέτης, implying more another's relation to myself in respect of conduct; ὁ ἀγαθός, more a description of another's character in itself. Further, in ἁμαρτωλός, ver. 8, may be given the opposite of both expressions, not merely of δίκαιος, but also of ἀγαθός. Man scarcely dies for one that is just, at most for one that is good; but Christ died for us when we were still sinners, therefore neither just nor good. The first γάρ is explicative: *namely*; the second γάρ causal: *for*. "Scarcely, *that is*, will one die for a just man; *for* (to such a point perhaps a man attains) on behalf of a good man one perhaps ventures to die." ἀποθανεῖται is used not of ethical *possibility*, but the proper future,—of what *will* not easily *occur*, in fact, in the entire future, Winer, p. 349. καί belongs to *τολμᾶ*, not to ἀποθανεῖν, which, on account of the previous ἀποθανεῖται, carries no special emphasis. Besides, it must have read *τολμᾶ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν*, not *καὶ τολμᾶ ἀποθανεῖν*. καί = *also*, *even*; *τολμᾶ* = *sustinet*, *a se impetrat*, *prevails on oneself*, *undertakes*, comp. 1 Cor. vi. 1, 2; 2 Cor. x. 12.

Ver. 8. Contrast (δέ) between God's love and man's love, ver. 7. συνίστησι, *demonstrat*, *probat*, *proves*, as in iii. 5; not: *commendat*, as the Vulgate, or: *commend*s, as Luther translates. The present is selected, because the efficacy of Christ's atoning death continuing, the evidence of the divine love is conceived as continuing. συνίστησι is placed first, with an emphasis, in harmony with the strain of thought. What God *proves*, cannot be called in question by man. Wherefore, from the matter demonstrated, further inferences are confidently drawn

ver. 9. — ἔτι ἁμαρτωλῶν ὄντων ἡμῶν] Now are we no longer sinners; not as if we were never guilty of sin, but because our sin is no longer imputed to us,—because we are δικαιωθέντες ἐν τῷ αἵματι τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ver. 9. The ἔτι, glancing back at ἔτι, ver. 6, forms a contrast with νῦν, ver. 9; but ἁμαρτωλῶν answers to ἀσθενῶν and ἀσεβῶν, ver. 6, and is opposed to δίκαιος and ἀγαθός, ver. 7. Concerning the death of Christ as the highest demonstration of God's love, comp. John iii. 16; Rom. viii. 32; as an evidence of Christ's love towards us, Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 2, 25. When it is said, ver. 7: "Among men one scarcely dies on behalf of a just man," we should expect the contrast, ver. 8: "But God proves His love towards us by dying even for the unjust." Instead of this, it is said that "Christ died for the unjust." But the two are one, because Christ is God; and God, in surrendering Christ, the υἱὸς μονογενής, the ἡγαπημένος, Himself presented the sacrifice. Comp. 2 Cor. v. 19: θεὸς ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ. Hence also God here proves τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγάπην, His *own* love, by the fact that *Christ* died for us.

Vv. 9–11. That hope does not disappoint, Paul had inferred, ver. 5, from the consciousness of God's love dwelling in our hearts; and the real existence of this love he proved, vv. 6–8, from the atoning death of Christ. Instead now of simply turning back to his point of departure, ver. 5,—namely, to the proposition ἡ ἐλπὶς οὐ καταισχύνει,—and affirming that this has been proved correct, from vv. 6–8 he draws a further conclusion, namely, that if, when we were *sinners*, we were reconciled through Christ's death, still more, as *reconciled* and *justified*, we shall be preserved from God's wrath through Christ's *life*, and are able to glory in God, the giver of future glory. Thus, with vv. 9–11, although as to form advancing a step, really as to substance he turns back to his point of departure, ver. 5 (and, still further, to the fundamental thought of the whole exposition found in ver. 2), that the hope of the glory of God, of which we boast even in tribulation, makes not ashamed; which assurance of hope is now attested to us in a twofold way,—first by Christ's death for sinners, and then by Christ's life for the righteous.

Ver. 9. πολλῷ ὅν μᾶλλον] raises to a climax the assurance of the hope of glory. "Far less, therefore, for us who are justified, is our salvation a matter of doubt." The conclusion (ὅν) pro-

ceeds *a majori* (vv. 6-8) *ad minus* (ver. 9). It is a greater thing to be reconciled when sinners, than to be preserved from wrath when justified.

—δικαιωθέντες νῦν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ] comp. iii. 25. The sentence forms the antithesis of ἔτι ἁμαρτωλῶν ὄντων ἡμῶν, ver. 8. But the fact that justification is here represented as depending on the blood of atonement, without special mention of the mediating πίστις, proves, as previously observed, that in the act of justification faith is merely regarded as the organ laying hold of the all-perfect righteousness of Christ, not as completing or supplementing it,—not as a spiritual quality meritorious and commending to God on its own account. In the act of justification, πίστις has its sole merit through the αἷμα Χριστοῦ, which it receives, and through the χάρις θεοῦ, iii. 24, on which it relies. It is only the doctrine of justification of the Protestant Church which, from the elements that concur in δικαίωσις,—χάρις, αἷμα, πίστις,—is able to form a harmonic triad, while in every other combination they make hopeless discord.<sup>1</sup>

—σωθησόμεθα δι' αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς] i. 16, 18, ii. 8. "We shall be saved and rescued from wrath." A *constructio praeagnans*, comp. Winer, p. 775; Acts ii. 40. The same brachylogy is found in the reverse form, 2 Tim. iv. 18: σώσει εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν, *He will save me into His kingdom, i.e. He will save and place, etc.* The ὀργή is the wrath issuing forth on the future day of judgment. Theodor.: ἡ μέλλουσα κόλασις; comp. Matt. iii. 7: φεύγειν ἀπὸ τῆς μελλούσης ὀργῆς; 1 Thess. i. 10: ῥύεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης. But with future final wrath, of course all wrath that might fall on us in the present life is cancelled. If we are safe from ὀργή, then εἰρήνη πρὸς τὸν θεόν and ἐλπὶς τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ are confirmed to us and rendered inalienably sure. Upon the justified man there is no longer ὀργή, but only ἀγάπη

<sup>1</sup> Meyer remarks rightly: "Faith, as the *ληπτικόν* of justification, is understood as a matter of course (ver. 1), but is not mentioned here, because only what has been accomplished by God through Christ is taken into consideration." But when Tholuck remarks here: "The justification of the believer depends, in fact, upon the anticipation of his moral perfection, which living faith in grace in the end also brings to pass," this position of the modern mediation-theology rests on an absolute misconception of the scriptural, Pauline doctrine of justification. It stands, as even Mùhler has remarked with pleasure, in essential harmony with the Tridentine transformation of *justitia imputata* into *justitia infusa*. Comp. my observations on iv. 4.

τοῦ θεοῦ, so that even tribulations are for him no ἔνδειξις ὀργῆς, but an ἔνδειξις ἀγάπης, Heb. xii. 6 ; Rev. iii. 19.

Ver. 10. The purport of ver. 9 is further developed and vindicated. In this verse we have a double antithesis,—first of ἐχθροί and καταλλαγέντες, next of διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ and ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ. On the exposition, therefore, of this notion the understanding of the verse depends. ἐχθροί] *sc.* τοῦ θεοῦ, may have both an active and passive meaning, either = *hating God*, i.e. enemies of God, or = *hated by God*, i.e. exposed to His wrath. Just so the Latin *exosus* = *hating* and *hated*. The first meaning is found Rom. viii. 7 ; Col. i. 21 ; Jas. iv. 14 ; the second passive meaning, Rom. xi. 28 : κατὰ μὲν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἐχθροὶ δι' ὑμᾶς κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν ἀγαπητοὶ διὰ τοὺς πατέρας; comp. ix. 13. Which meaning is to be assigned in the present passage depends, as καταλλαγέντες forms the antithesis to ἐχθροί, on the decision as to the meaning of καταλλάττεσθαι. καταλλάττεσθαί τινι, again, may mean, as is acknowledged in our day, two things, both : *to be reconciled with some one*, in the sense of laying aside enmity, anger against him, so 1 Cor. vii. 11, and : *to be reconciled with some one*, in the sense of his laying aside enmity, anger against us, of our ceasing to be treated by him as enemies, comp. LXX. 1 Sam. xxix. 4 ; Matt. v. 24.<sup>1</sup> That the latter meaning is intended in the present passage follows not only from the correspondence of καταλλαγέντες with δικαιωθέντες, ver. 9, but also from the entire course of doctrinal development to the present point, according to which man's reconciliation with God consists simply in the removal of the divine wrath resting upon him, iii. 25. The removal of man's enmity against God is only the effect of the removal of divine wrath against men, the effect of ἰλασμός, καταλλαγή, δικαίωσις. Besides, Paul nowhere bases σωτηρία (comp. καταλλαγέντες σωθησόμεθα) upon our friendship with God, but only upon God's grace towards us. If, then, καταλλαγέντες are those with respect to whom God has laid aside His wrath, His enmity, the ἐχθροί are those who are burdened with His enmity, His wrath.

<sup>1</sup> The distinction formerly laid down by Tittmann, *de synonymis in Novo Testamento*, lib. i. p. 102 sqq., between διαλλάττειν ("efficere, ut quae fuit inimicitia mutua, ea esse desinat") and καταλλάττειν ("facere, ut alter inimicum animum deponat") is arbitrary, and may be regarded as abandoned, comp. Tholuck, *Sermon on the Mount*, on v. 24, and Fritzsche here.

As already remarked, it is no contradiction, that while God's *ἔχθρα* rested on mankind, His *ἀγάπη* instituted a scheme of reconciliation (comp. *κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ*, 2 Cor. v. 19); because the *ἔχθρα* falls only on *sin*, the *ἀγάπη*, on the other hand, regards *sinners*.<sup>1</sup> The first antithesis, then, is as follows: If we were reconciled to God, even when His wrath rested upon us, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved; for the actual removal of wrath is a pledge of permanent deliverance from wrath, of final salvation and blessedness, since even among men it is a harder task to become reconciled than with a reconciled heart to manifest goodwill. The second antithesis is given in *διὰ τοῦ θανάτου* and *ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ*. If the *death* of Christ, in which in humiliation and weakness He lay under God's wrath, appeased God's wrath, much more will the *life* of the Risen One, in which He now stands as our eternal and almighty Mediator and Intercessor before God's throne, keep far from us a return of wrath, viii. 34; Heb. vii. 25; 1 John ii. 1; also John xiv. 13, 14. But not merely Christ's high-priestly office, but also His kingly office forms such a safeguard for His own, since in virtue of that office He has power to bestow on them the benefits of His death, shield them from all hostile might, and carry to its end and final consummation the purpose of His atonement. *ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ* illustrates *δι' αὐτοῦ*, ver. 9. Concerning the instrumental *ἐν*, comp. Winer, p. 485.

Ver. 11. *οὐ μόνον δέ*] Some codices add *τοῦτο*, clearly originally but a gloss.

—*ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμενοι ἐν θεῷ*] If we wish to take the participle *καυχώμενοι* as such, it cannot stand in contrast with *καταλλαγέντες*, ver. 10: "Not merely *reconciled*, but also *boasting* in God shall we be saved," for *καταλλαγέντες* is not a more precise definition of *σωθησόμεθα*, but = *ἐπεὶ κατηλλάγημεν*. Rather in that case *καυχώμενοι* must be regarded as a definition, added later, of *σωθησόμεθα*: *οὐ μόνον δέ* (namely, *σωθησόμεθα*, ver. 10) *ἀλλὰ καὶ* (namely, *σωθησόμεθα*) *καυχώμενοι ἐν θεῷ*: "not only (shall we be saved), but also therewith glorying in

<sup>1</sup> I abide by the interpretation of the phrases *ἔχθροι* and *κατηλλάγημεν* given in the text, notwithstanding the polemic directed against it by Mehrling, p. 492 ff., a polemic which amounts to nothing less than a subjective transformation of Paul's objective doctrine of reconciliation. Comp. also against it my *Kirchl. Glaubensl.* IV. 2, p. 270 ff.

God." The apostle would then distinguish between *σώζεσθαι* (simply and actually) and *καυχώμενον ἐν θεῷ σώζεσθαι* (comp. Winer, p. 441), but the *καυχᾶσθαι* would be contemporaneous with the *σώζεσθαι*, i.e. both would take place in the future. But, apart from the awkward and tame form of expression which this gives, the *καυχᾶσθαι* hitherto (comp. vv. 2, 3) was always conceived as something present, not as something future, postponed to the day of judgment. So therefore here. The participle *καυχώμενοι* is used then, with *ἐσμέν* to be supplied, for the *verbum finitum*. The reading *καυχώμεθα* itself (or even *καυχῶμεν*, as some codices read in error) is not sufficiently authenticated, and must therefore be deemed a gloss which has crept into the text, or a designed correction. We have then the contrast and climax of the negative *σώζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς*, vv. 9, 10, and the positive *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν θεῷ*, ver. 11, which is grounded in the *ἐλπίς τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ*, ver. 2. Not merely shall we be finally delivered from wrath (*οὐ μόνον δέ, sc. σωθησόμεθα*), but we also boast in God (*ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμενοι*) as in one who will make us partners in His glory. Thus the reasoning turns back to its point of departure, and reaches a self-contained conclusion. *εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, ver. 1 = *σωθησόμεθα ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς*, vv. 9, 10; *καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ*, ver. 2 = *καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐν θεῷ*, ver. 11. Rejoicing and boasting in God as the author of all blessings is often mentioned in the O. T., Ps. xxxiv. 2, xliii. 4; Hab. iii. 18. Of the use of the participle (*καυχώμενοι*) instead of the *verbi finiti* (*καυχώμεθα*), examples may be quoted from the Greek poets (Sophocle., Oedip., Tyr. v. 157: *πρῶτά σε κεκλόμενος, sc. εἰμί = κέλομαι*) and the Byzantines (comp. Winer, p. 440, note; Kühner, *Ausfr. Gr. d. gr. Spr.* II. p. 379, § 680). Among the Hellenists this construction is further justified by Hebraistic usage (comp. the quotation from the LXX. in Rom. ix. 28, also 2 Cor. vii. 5, xi. 6).

—*δι' οὗ νῦν τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν*] The *καταλλαγή* is in possession, we receive it through faith, so that *καταλλαγὴν λαμβάνειν* = *δικαιοῦσθαι*, comp. 2 Cor. v. 21: *καταλλάγητε τῷ θεῷ*. The *νῦν* alludes to *νῦν*, ver. 9, and therefore stands in contrast with past, not future time.

The apostle has now delineated the universal sinfulness of man, as well as the reconciliation, justification, and bliss provided for

all in Christ. He had thus reached the end of one main section of his exposition, nay, had really developed the fundamental theme of his epistle as to its essential elements in every aspect. But before he proceeds to add to the foregoing a new course of reasoning altogether, he glances back once more at the general substance of his teaching hitherto, and, by way of conclusion, sums it up in the form of a parallel drawn between Adam and Christ—Adam the source of sin and death among mankind, Christ the source of righteousness and life. Thus the whole of humanity is seen summed up and represented in these its two federal heads, the first and the second Adam, comp. 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 45 ff. The religious historical development of humanity accordingly parts off into two great epochs—the period of the dominion of sin and death, and the period of the dominion of righteousness and life. At the head of one, as the principle determining its character and ruling its movements, stands Adam; at the head of the other, in like capacity, Christ. In the interval between these two chief epochs enters the intermediate economy of the law, bridging with its provisions the space from one to the other. This is the essential purport of vv. 12–21, in which are given the base-lines of a true and genuine philosophy of history. At the same time, the parallel here drawn includes an element of *doctrine* not hitherto mentioned, tracing back the sinfulness, so far merely described as existing among mankind, to its prime origin and source. Moreover, the substitutory satisfaction of Christ now stands forth with greater independence and emphasis, whereas previously it came into notice merely as the basis of justifying faith. Further, the *purpose* of the law is now intimated, ver. 20, whereas before only its *consequence* was described, iii. 20, iv. 15. Finally, in vv. 15–17, the superabounding *fulness* and transcendent *glory* of salvation in Christ are pictured in contrast with the ruin and misery of which Adam was the source. But the apostle did not make it his express object to introduce these new and weighty elements by way of adding a supplementary exposition. Rather the parallel, whose main points are found in vv. 12, 18, 19, is intended simply and directly as a comparative retrospect and summary conclusion.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Respicit totam tractationem superiorem," says Bengel, "ex qua hæc infert apostolus, non tam digressionem faciens, quam regressum, de peccato et de justitia." Then the fine remark: "Paulinæ methodi imitatione agendum primo est de peccato



Ver. 12. *Διὰ τοῦτο*] *therefore, accordingly, on this account*, joins on to the last words of the 11th verse in such a way as at the same time to refer back to the entire train of reasoning contained in i. 17—v. 11. In *δι' οὗ νῦν τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν* is involved the idea that we, *previously sinners*, have now (*νῦν*) through Christ received the reconciliation (*τὴν καταλλαγὴν*), *i.e.* are justified, *and therewith also become partakers of ζωὴ and σωτηρία*, as is explained in vv. 1–11. But therein is given an epitome of the entire purport of i. 17—v. 11.

—*ὥσπερ*] We have here an *ἀνανταπόδοτον*, as in Matt. xxv. 14; 1 Tim. i. 3. In exact correspondence with the protasis, as the whole of the succeeding exposition, especially vv. 18, 19, shows, the apodosis must have run: *οὕτω καὶ δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε καὶ διὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἡ ζωὴ καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡ ζωὴ διελεύσεται, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες δικαιωθήσονται*, or even the second half (*καὶ οὕτως . . . δικαιωθήσονται*) more briefly expressed: *ἵνα πάντες ἄνθρωποι δικαιωθέντες ζήσωσιν*. The protasis is too short to allow us to suppose that this apodosis escaped the memory of the apostle directly after ver. 12. Rather he was unable there to introduce the apodosis, as he wished first in vv. 13, 14 to verify the statements of ver. 12. Hence the place in which the apodosis dropped out is after the words *τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδὰμ*, ver. 14, where, after the long argument found in vv. 13, 14, it could only have been added in grammatical form and at due length with awkward effect. But then it is clearly indicated in the words of the 14th verse: *ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος*, which, however, neither amount to a *proper* apodosis as to form, nor yet comprise all the elements of a complete apodosis. They are therefore most aptly subjoined simply as a virtual and provisional substitute, but are not to be regarded as a grammatical apodosis. Among the many methods adopted to explain or supply the *ἀνανταπόδοτον*, this is decidedly the most simple and least artificial, and is followed, after the example of Calvin, by most modern expositors. For the refutation of other modes of construction, see Meyer here.

actuali, deinde retro de peccati ortu.—Et ex justificatione homo demum respiciens doctrinam capit de origine mali et reliqua." But Melancthon passes over to this section with the following words: "Absoluta est supra præcipua epistolæ hujus disputatio. Sicut autem dialectici docent *ἀνάλυσιν* facere, hoc est membra propositionum dissolvere et singula revocare ad methodum, ita hic fit *ἀνάλυσις*, membra propositionum, de quibus hactenus disputavit, methodice explicantur."

—δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου] namely, Adam, ver. 14 ; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 45, 47. "Cur nihil de muliere?" asks Bengel. (Comp. 1 Tim. ii. 14 ; 2 Cor. xi. 3 ; Eccus. xxv. 24.) Resp. 1, "Adamus mandatum acceperat ; 2, caput erat non solum generis sui, sed etiam Evæ ; 3, si Adamus non audisset vocem mulieris suæ, peccatum non venisset ad plures." It is especially on the third element in his answer that stress must be placed, for it did not concern the apostle so much to specify with historical exactness who was guilty of the first sin, as rather who, as the first sinner, became the representative and general head of a sinful human race.

—ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε] *sin entered into the world.* ἡ ἁμαρτία denotes (1) *sin as an act*, which signification is the *only* one belonging to ἁμαρτήμα, Mark iii. 28, iv. 12 ; Rom. iii. 25 ; 1 Cor. vi. 18. So Matt. xii. 31 ; Acts vii. 60 : κύριε, μὴ στήσης αὐτοῖς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ταύτην ; 2 Cor. xi. 7 ; Jas. i. 15, ii. 9 : εἰ δὲ προσωποληπτεῖτε, ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθε ; iv. 17 ; 1 Pet. ii. 22. Thus especially frequent in the plural, Eph. ii. 1 : νεκροὺς τοῖς παραπτώμασι καὶ ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ; Jas. v. 15 : κὰν ἁμαρτίας ᾗ πεποιηκώς ; Matt. iii. 6 : ἐξομολογούμενοι τὰς ἁμαρτίας ; ix. 3 : ἀφένται σοι αἱ ἁμαρτίαι σου ; Heb. ii. 17 : ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας. Whether here the ἁμαρτίαι, the sinful acts, are to be conceived as issuing from a single generative principle lying at their root, as conditioned by a sinful propensity, is not intimated in the expression as it stands, and therefore could only be discovered from the general strain of scriptural teaching. But without doubt ἡ ἁμαρτία signifies also (2) *sin as a propensity*, as an inner principle, as a power ruling in man, the parent of the whole brood of particular sinful desires and acts. So Rom. vii. 8 : ἡ ἁμαρτία . . . κατειργάσατο . . . πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν ; vii. 9 : ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀνέζησεν ; vii. 17 : ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία ; vii. 23 : τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου. Finally, ἡ ἁμαρτία denotes (3) *sin as the synthesis of the propensity and act*. So John i. 29 : ἴδε ὁ ἄμνος τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ αἶρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου ; Rom. iii. 20, iv. 8 ; 1 Cor. xv. 56 : τὸ δὲ κέντρον τοῦ θανάτου, ἡ ἁμαρτία. ἡ δὲ δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὁ νόμος ; 2 Cor. v. 21 ; 2 Thess. ii. 3 : ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἁμαρτίας ; Heb. iv. 15, ix. 26, x. 18 : προσφορά περὶ ἁμαρτίας ; 1 John i. 8, iii. 4, 5. This latter meaning should perhaps, in harmony with Scripture practice, which is not to view things according to their abstract

logical divisions, but to blend together in one graphic conception their inner essence and outward manifestation, be assigned to the word in every case, in which we are not compelled by the form of expression or connection of thought to fix our attention merely on one element of the subject, on sin as expression, manifestation, act, or on sin as propensity, principle, power bearing rule within. In the present passage, then, we are naturally led to include under ἡ ἁμαρτία everything which this expression can denote according to the teaching of Scripture and of the apostle. It is sin as the synthesis of the *habitus* and *actus*, but at the same time sin as a generic conception, *i.e.* not merely the individual sin of Adam, but the sin of mankind in general; for Paul says not that the sin of *one* man, but that *through* one man *sin* came into the world. Just as comprehensive, *e.g.*, is the idea of ἁμαρτία, also in John i. 29; 2 Cor. v. 21; Heb. x. 18. In this verse, therefore, under ἡ ἁμαρτία, the sinful condition of the world, with all sinful acts issuing therefrom, is contemplated as an abstract unity. It is the sin of the world taken as a totality both as to its principle and its manifestation. It is everything universally that can be called sin. This signification ἁμαρτία has throughout the present section, comp. vv. 13, 20, 21, where, moreover, ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θανατῷ is to be taken as defining the meaning of ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν κτλ., ver. 12. It is only the conception of ἁμαρτία thus defined that really involves the right connection with the import of i. 18—iii. 20, and sums up all that is there developed. Paul here traces back the world's sin there delineated to its original source, placing Adam, in whom the ἁμαρτία τοῦ κόσμου is wrapped up, in antithesis to Christ, through whom δικαιοσύνη, the ἰλασμός τοῦ κόσμου, is accomplished. The subsequent exposition of the present section will still further verify and corroborate this acceptance of ἁμαρτία in this passage, which is thoroughly confirmed by idiomatic usage,—nay, will evince it to be the only one possible. Besides, it is not essentially different from what is meant when ἁμαρτία is explained: *sin as a power*, as a *force* exercising its dominion, working and coming into manifestation in concrete sins, so that the sinful condition of the world is regarded merely as the effect of the ἁμαρτία that came in. For, of course, the actual sin of the world came into the world through Adam only potentially, but, without question, as a *real* power. Before Adam's act of sin there was

nothing in the world that could be called sin. With Adam's act of sin came into the world not merely something that could be called sin, but sin in general (not merely *ἁμαρτία*, but *ἡ ἁμαρτία*), in so far as in this act of sin the entire sin of the world lay wrapped up; for Adam's fall was the fall of the entire human race, as has been subsequently proved by the fact of his posterity being born sinners. — In the phrase *εἰσέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον* we must not refer *ὁ κόσμος* to the *universitas rerum* (to enter into the *universum* = *esse incipere*), but to this sublunary world, or the world of man, so that the expression denotes outward entrance into the human world, first occurrence among men. Comp. Wisd. ii. 24, xiv. 14; Heb. x. 5: *εἰσερχόμενος εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, of the entrance into the human world of the Messiah who, as the eternal Son of God, already existed in the *universitas rerum* (so, too, 1 Tim. i. 15: *ἔρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον*; and Gal. iii. 23: *ἔρχεσθαι* simply); 2 John 7: *πολλοὶ πλάνοι εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὸν κόσμον*. The first entrance of sin into the *universum* cannot be intended here, because according to universal Scripture teaching, and therefore according to the apostle's own view, sin already existed in the domain of evil spirits, and therefore in the *κόσμος* as the *rerum universitas*. "In mundum hunc," says Bengel, "qui dicitur genus humanum; esse coepit in mundo; nam antea non fuerat extra mundum."<sup>1</sup> But yet we must not think of sin's entrance into the human world as infecting with an inward taint individual men, of its entrance in the form of a principle ruling within and diffusing its influence, because *εἰσέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον* does not express this. Paul would then have written *εἰσέρχεσθαι εἰς τὴν καρδίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, or at least *εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*. Should it be objected to the meaning, "to enter into the human world = to appear among men," that this human world did not as yet exist when sin came into existence upon earth, it may be said that the apostle, directing his gaze backwards, beholds Adam's posterity already surrounding him as their federal head, if we do not prefer to understand *εἰσέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον* of entrance into this sublunary world in general, of appearance in this earthly world as a whole. In

<sup>1</sup> "Porro cur nihil de Satana," observes the same Bengel, "qui prima peccati causa est? Resp. 1, Satanas opponitur Deo; Adamus Christo; ad hic oeconomia gratiae describitur, potius, ut est Christi, quam ut Dei. Ideo Deus semel nominatur, ver. 15, Satanas nunquam. 2, Quid Satanac cum gratia Christi?"

this sense *κόσμος* stands, Matt. iv. 8 ; John xvi. 21 ; Rom. iv. 3 ; 1 Cor. vii. 31. "In hanc partem mundi, scil. terrenam, in qua homines habitant," Abelard. Through one man, therefore, according to the apostle's declaration, the sin of mankind came into existence in this earthly world.

—καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος] *sc. εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε*. It is important, first of all, to investigate the conception of *θάνατος*. *θάνατος* invariably signifies *death* as the antithesis and abolition of *ζωή*, *life*. As, then, life may be bodily, spiritual, or eternal life, so also *θάνατος* may be (1) *bodily death*. So John xi. 4 : ἡ ἀσθένεια οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς θάνατον ; xii. 33, xviii. 32 : ποίῳ θανάτῳ ἡμελλεν ἀποθνήσκειν ; Phil. i. 20 : μεγαλυνθήσεται Χριστὸς ἐν τῷ σώματί μου, εἴτε διὰ ζωῆς, εἴτε διὰ θανάτου κτλ. (2) *Spiritual death*. So 1 John iii. 14 : οἶδαμεν, ὅτι μεταβεβήκαμεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωὴν, ὅτι ἀγαπῶμεν τοὺς ἀδελφούς· ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφόν, μένει ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ. Comp. Matt. viii. 22 : ἄφες τοὺς νεκροὺς θάψαι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκρούς ; Eph. ii. 1 : καὶ ὑμᾶς ὄντας νεκροὺς τοῖς παραπτώμασι καὶ ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ; ver. 5 ; Col. ii. 13. This *θάνατος* forms the antithesis of the *ζωὴ τοῦ θεοῦ*, Eph. iv. 18, and consists in the privation of the holy and blessed existence of which the soul in fellowship with God is partaker, in which representation sometimes the loss of holiness, sometimes the loss of blessedness, is most prominent, according to the connection of thought. (3) *Eternal death* as the antithesis of future *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. So Rom. i. 32 ; 2 Cor. ii. 16, vii. 10 ; Jas. i. 15, v. 20 ; 1 John v. 16. This death (in Rev. ii. 11, xx. 6, 14, xxi. 8, called also ὁ θάνατος ὁ δεύτερος) is the ultimate outgrowth and completion of the spiritual death already actually present in the soul of the sinner.<sup>1</sup> But then it lies in the very nature of such biblical notions embracing a rich variety of elements, that often several, or even all of these elements, should appear in combination, the context of the passage deciding how many and which are to be conceived as blended in one. That by this means a difference of interpretation as to particulars can scarcely be avoided is easily conceivable, as the compass of the expression may be taken now more narrowly, now more

<sup>1</sup> In Scripture the metaphorical use of the phrases *θάνατος*, *νεκρός*, *ἀποθνήσκειν*, has the same latitude as that of the idea of *ζωή*. Thus we may speak of a death of the sinful life, of an inward, spiritual dying to sin, to the law, of dead faith, dead works, and so on. Comp. Rom. vii. 4, viii. 13 ; Col. iii. 5 ; Heb. vi. 1, ix. 14 ; Jas. ii. 17.

widely, while the text itself does not in every case give an absolutely certain deliverance. A combination of all three elements we think, *e.g.*, should be held, 2 Tim. i. 10, of the first and second, Matt. iv. 16, of the second and third, John v. 24, viii. 51. As relates, then, to the present passage, in the first place the element of bodily death should not be excluded from the idea of *θάνατος*; for not only is the allusion to Gen. ii. 17, iii. 3, 19 unmistakeable, but this meaning is assured to the word *θάνατος* by ver. 14, where the presence of sin before the law was to be demonstrated mainly from the presence of *bodily* death as that which alone had for every one the force of an undeniable, universally acknowledged fact. But then it is not to be imagined that here, where the apostle is describing the entire penal judgment which fell upon the whole of the world's sin, he should be satisfied with referring merely to the lower element, temporal death, without at the same time including the higher element, eternal death. That, on the contrary, the latter is done is proved by vv. 17, 18, 21, where *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* forms the antithesis of *θάνατος*. For there is no ground whatever for the assertion that in the idea of *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* the chief notion is that of bodily resurrection as the opposite of bodily death. Comp., on the contrary, 1 Cor. xv. 21, where *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν* forms the express opposite of death in the bodily sense. In any case, therefore, the first and third elements in our definition of the idea are demonstrably included in the word *θάνατος* in this passage. It might then be supposed that the apostle, having here selected physical death as the point of departure for his view, could not well include in the same thought spiritual death already present in the soul, since this is anterior to bodily death, but could only include future and eternal death, to which bodily death is the introduction and portal. But then without doubt, in an indirect way, present spiritual death would be involved, as a matter of course, in future eternal death, as in its crown and completion, just as in bodily death are involved all ills, diseases, and infirmities preceding and predisposing to it. In this case Paul in this passage would comprise in its crowning point everything which can be called bodily and spiritual death. However, it seems more appropriate and more in accordance with fact, from the first and directly to give the same breadth of meaning to the idea of *θάνατος* as to that of *ἁμαρτία*, so that as the latter denotes

everything which can be called sin, the former also embraces everything which can be meant by the simple term *death*. We have accordingly in the word *θάνατος* to recognise the union of the three elements laid down by us. It is death in the most comprehensive sense, *i.e.* bodily, spiritual, eternal death alike; for nothing but the entire domain of death can be regarded as an adequate punishment for the entire domain of sin enclosed by the *ἡμαρτία*, which came into the world through one man. It is no sufficient objection against such a combination of various elements of the notion that the same word cannot at the same time have a literal and tropical meaning, for the word *θάνατος*, taken even in the greatest range of its constituent elements, has still only one fixed sense—it is the negation, abolition, destruction of all that which is called life. Further, according to this passage, agreeably to the teaching of Scripture elsewhere, bodily death is not to be taken as an original principle of nature, but only as one that appeared among mankind subsequently in consequence of sin. Comp. Krabbe, *die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Tode*, pp. 194–198.

—καὶ οὕτως] *and in this way, and in consequence of this*, namely, because death came into the world as the consequence of sin, *i.e.* in consequence of the causal connection of sin and death.

—ὁ θάνατος] is critically suspicious, but in any case, even it is left out, is to be supplied as subject to *διήλθεν*. But omission mars the symmetry of the sentence, which is otherwise perfect, so that it is not easily conceivable that it was not originally written by Paul himself. Further, it is found in the oldest manuscripts, even in the Cod. Sinait.

—εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους διήλθεν] *penetrated, extended to all men, spread itself abroad to all men. διέρχεσθαι, to go through.* A place or country may either be crossed in *one* direction (Luke xvii. 11, xix. 1; John iv. 4), or one may pass through it in all directions (Acts viii. 4, ix. 32, x. 38). In the latter meaning here. Death planted its foot in the world (*εἰσῆλθεν*), and has now gone hither and thither in the world to all men (*διήλθεν*), has not remained with one only.

—ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον] *because all sinned.* The cause of the extension of death to all men without exception is the fact of all without exception having sinned. That ἐφ' ᾧ is to be taken in the sense of a conjunction scarcely needs now to be proved.

The reference of the relative  $\phi$  to  $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$   $\alpha\upsilon\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ , with the exception of some Catholic exegetes, is now rightly given up by all modern interpreters. Not only is such a reference shown to be arbitrary and inadmissible by the entire construction of the clause and the remoteness of  $\delta\iota'$   $\epsilon\nu\delta\omicron\varsigma$   $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\upsilon$ , but in addition all the meanings assigned on this supposition to  $\epsilon\phi'$   $\phi$  are beyond question untenable. For it means neither *in quo*, *in whom* (according to the famous saying of Augustine: "*in quo*, *sc.* Adamo, omnes peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus homo fuerunt;," so still Aberle),—this would rather be  $\epsilon\nu$   $\phi$ ,—nor yet *per quem* (*sc.* "omnes peccati poenam subiere," Grotius, or: "peccatores facti sunt," Melancthon; meanings, moreover, which do not at all belong to  $\eta\mu\alpha\rho\tau\omicron\nu$ ),—this would rather be  $\delta\iota'$   $\omicron\upsilon$ ,—nor yet *propter quem* or *cum quo*, which would be  $\delta\iota'$   $\omicron\nu$  or  $\sigma\upsilon\nu$   $\phi$ . More natural would be the reference, proposed by some, of the relative  $\phi$  to the subject  $\acute{o}$   $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$  directly preceding. But supposing us in this case to understand  $\epsilon\phi'$   $\phi$  of the *designed* result: "for which all sinned," there arises the impossible notion that some may sin for the purpose of being punished; and a passing ironical remark can the less be supposed, as the apostle is not engaged in controversy with definite opponents. If we take  $\epsilon\phi'$   $\phi$  of the *undesigned* result, in the first place this mode of employing  $\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}$  with the dative, especially in prose discourse, could not be proved; and in the next place, the idea that the death to which all are subject is the result of the fact that all sinned, would inappropriately stamp  $\epsilon\phi'$   $\phi$   $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$   $\eta\mu\alpha\rho\tau\omicron\nu$  with the character of a cursory observation, whereas the entire construction of the thoughts and sentence compels us to co-ordinate it in meaning with the remaining three clauses, and to find in it the statement of the reason why death came to all men without exception.  $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$  brought  $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ ,  $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$  came to all, *because* (thus must we, as matter of course, further conclude)  $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$  had come to all. ' $\epsilon\phi'$   $\phi$  is therefore without doubt to be taken as a conjunction. But this being so, it signifies, like  $\alpha\nu\theta'$   $\acute{\omega}\nu$  (comp. Luke xii. 3), either: *quare*, *wherefore*, so perhaps in Phil. iii. 12, or it stands in the sense  $\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}$   $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\omega$   $\omicron\tau\iota$  = *propter id quod*, *for that*, *because*, so in 2 Cor. v. 4, perhaps also in Phil. iii. 12. Thomas Magister and Phavorinus say expressly:  $\epsilon\phi'$   $\phi$   $\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\iota}$   $\tau\omicron\upsilon$   $\delta\acute{\iota}\omicron\tau\iota$ . Respecting  $\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}$  with the dative in the sense *on account of*, comp. Matt. xix. 9; Acts iii. 16; 2 Cor. xii. 21. In classical Greek,  $\epsilon\phi'$   $\omicron\iota\varsigma$ , the Latin *propter ea quod*, is more usual than  $\epsilon\phi'$   $\phi$ .



The meaning *for that*, or *because*, is also quite appropriate in the present passage, and on this account is received by modern interpreters almost without exception.<sup>1</sup>

"Ἡμαρτον cannot mean: *became sinful*, or: *were sinful*, for ἁμαρτάνειν is not = ἁμαρτωλὸν γίγνεσθαι or εἶναι. Still less does it mean: *bore the penalty of sin*. Rather ἥμαρτον is nothing but = *actually sinned*. If, now, by ἁμαρτία we understand only actual sins, in the sense that through Adam first of all committing sin, or through his act of sin, and in consequence of this, death came into the world, and that then death extended itself to all because all have actually sinned, we thus ascribe to our verse indeed a grammatically possible meaning, but at the same time leave altogether out of account not only the principle, *scriptura scripturam docet*, but also the entire tenor and strain of thought in the epistle itself. For not only in the preceding chapters by ἁμαρτία was intended the sinful principle already always dwelling in humanity, the sinful principle conditioning and causing the world's sinful state, but also in the entire subsequent exposition (comp. especially ver. 19) it is a real connection of the sin of humanity with Adam's sin which is spoken of. But above all, the very sinew of the Pauline parallel is severed, if we sweep away this connection between the actual sins of all and Adam's transgression, seeing that the apostle makes the *righteousness* of all absolutely conditioned by the righteousness of Christ. When it is objected to this that Adam is set over against Christ the author of life, not as the author of sin, but only as the author of death, it is evident at once how baseless and halting the comparison becomes, if to Christ, as the direct and sole source of righteousness and life, Adam is opposed merely in so far as he is the indirect source of death to his posterity, who, being independent of him as sinners, are condemned in the penalty of death, instead of in any other penalty, for no other reason than that this penalty by a positive, arbitrary

<sup>1</sup> To say nothing of the translation, altogether without support, *quamquam*, the acceptance which Rothe (*Neuer Versuch einer Auslegung der Paulinischen Stelle, Rom. v. 12-21*, pp. 17-33) has assigned to ἵφ' ᾧ has gained no special favour. He would resolve ἵφ' ᾧ, not into ἰπὶ ταύτῃ ὅτι, but into ἰπὶ ταύτῃ ὥστε, and ascribes to it the meaning which it has with the infinitive *praeterite* following: *on condition that, on the more definite condition that, ea conditione, ea ratione ut*. But, in the first place, this signification has never been confirmed by examples to the point; and further, as our subsequent exposition will show, the causal signification, commonly received and amply supported, is perfectly appropriate in the passage.

act of God's will was denounced against Adam's sin in the first place, and then in justice against the like sin in his posterity. Moreover, the Pelagian accommodation-theory, by which the connection between the sin of Adam and of mankind is placed merely in the spontaneous imitation of Adam's example, is arbitrary and inadequate, since not merely in this passage is there no mention of such imitation, but, as Calvin justly remarks: "quia hoc modo Christus exemplar tantum esset justitiæ, non causa."

If, then, ἁμαρτάνειν does not denote *to be or become sinful*, and yet the connection between the sin of mankind and Adam's transgression is to be preserved, nothing seems left but to ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον to supply in thought: *in consequence of Adam's sin*. "All have sinned in consequence of the taint derived from Adam's sin." But in this case, in the first place, one sees not why Paul did not write either: καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς πάντας διήλθεν, or: ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἐγένοντο. Again, ἡ ἁμαρτία would have to be referred to the sinful habit which entered as the dominating principle into the hearts of mankind. But we have seen that εἰσέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον has not this meaning. Finally, according to the view in question, in the second clause of this verse the unreserved universality of the dominion of sin and death would be especially emphasized and accentuated, seeing that the existence everywhere in the human world of ἁμαρτία and θάνατος was already affirmed in the first clause. Now, apart from the halting and disjointed character thus given to the language used, clearly vv. 13 and 14 must then be meant to prove ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, that *all* have sinned; which view, as the exposition of these verses will show, cannot be borne out.

For these reasons we are driven of necessity to accept the interpretation which, although abandoned by modern expositors (comp., nevertheless, Olshausen), and apparently remote, is yet the most obvious, simple, and natural;<sup>1</sup> namely, to ἥμαρτον to supply

<sup>1</sup> I rejoice that this dogmatic interpretation of the passage, in which, when I first revived it in all its stringency and point, a critic in Tholuck's *literarischen Anzeiger* prophesied that I should find no follower, has now found an earnest advocate in Meyer. Perhaps I may say that now, too, Thomasius will agree with, instead of opposing me and the rest who share my views, comp. *Christi Person und Werk*, I. p. 276. He decides for Hofmann's view of this passage (comp. *Schriftbeweis*, I. 477). But Meyer on the passage has already rightly observed that the reference of ἐφ' ᾧ as a simple relative to ὁ θάνατος = "they sinned under the dominion of death,"

in thought: ἐν Ἀδάμ, or still more precisely: "Adamo peccante." "Non agitur de peccato singulorum proprio," says Bengel. "Omnes peccarunt, Adamo peccante," or, as Koppe puts it, "ipso actu, quo peccavit Adamus." The momentary sense of the aorist ἡμαρτον tells also on the same side. Death penetrated to all, because all sinned when Adam sinned, because in Adam's sin their own sin was included. Thus as to substantial meaning, although by way of a different grammatical construction we should get back again to Augustine's "in quo omnes peccaverunt." We may aptly compare 2 Cor. v. 15: εἰ εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον, to which we find here the corresponding antithesis: εἰ εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἡμαρτεν, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἡμαρτον. Further, as here the ἀμαρτάνειν, so in 1 Cor. xv. 22 the ἀποθνήσκειν of all ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ is spoken of. The apostle therefore represents the sin of mankind as objectively wrapped up in Adam, precisely as he contemplates the righteousness of mankind as objectively wrapped up in Christ, and in this way alone the parallel attains its true precision and plastic intuitiveness. The doubt which may thereupon be raised against this interpretation, that the supplement ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ or τοῦ Ἀδάμ ἀμαρτάνοντος is not expressly added, is removed by the very interpretation we have given of the notion of ἀμαρτία in this passage. If ἡ ἀμαρτία denotes the collective sum of the sin of mankind, or even the sin of mankind as a real power, it is self-evident that the sin of all is comprised in it, and the supplement required appears necessary and natural. Through Adam the sin of mankind came to be manifested, and in consequence of it death; and thus death spread abroad to all, because in that very sin of mankind the sin of all was included.<sup>1</sup> "*Peccatum est prius morte: sed mortis universalitas prius innotescit quam universalitas*

cannot be justified grammatically. Thomasius himself interprets: ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον, "under which relation all have sinned, namely, under this relation, that in consequence of Adam's sin death ruled as an objective all-embracing power." This meaning of ἐφ' ᾧ also is not grammatically justifiable. Moreover, as a fact, would this interpretation follow more simply and naturally from the construction of the sentence than the one given?

<sup>1</sup> When Hofmann, with whom Tholuck agrees, objects to the supplying of *Adamo peccante*, that it is unjustifiable "at pleasure to supply in thought what nothing but one's own arbitrariness suggests to thought," the answer given in what is said above to this objection is sufficient for every one who will consider and weigh it. Meyer also justly replies: "The objection, that in this way the essential definition is arbitrarily supplied (Tholuck, Hofmann, Stölting, Dietzsch, and others), is incorrect; for what is maintained is simply that more precise definition of ἡμαρτον for which 'he

*peccati.* Hæc ratio *ordinis* incisorum quatuor in hoc versu," Bengel

Vv. 13, 14. As already remarked, according to the view of several, especially modern expositors, who differ from our interpretation of ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, ver. 12, these verses furnish a confirmation of these latter words. They are thus supposed to demonstrate the unlimited universality of sin in the world. Such proof might seem necessary to the apostle on account of the statement, iv. 15 : οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις. For it seemed as if the assertion of the universal presence of sin must be qualified by the principle, that before the advent of the law there was no transgression. In consequence of this, vv. 13, 14 would lay down that even before the law sin existed. Doubtless sin is not imputed where law is not; but yet from Adam to Moses death reigned, proving that even if παράβασις did not, ἁμαρτία did exist always in the world. Nevertheless, this acceptance presents manifold difficulties. In the first place, the apostle might regard the fact of all having sinned, iii. 23, as settled once for all, and even iv. 15 furnished no sufficient occasion for a fresh confirmation of this position. For there it was not denied that ἁμαρτία, but only that παράβασις existed before the law. Still, had Paul thought it necessary expressly to emphasize this distinction, it must at least have been done more clearly and definitely by some such words as : ἁμαρτία μὲν γὰρ ἄχρι νόμου ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ, παράβασις δὲ νόμου τότε οὐκ ἦν. But if we were willing to overlook the general incongruity between the form of expression and the meaning stated, still in the separate particulars the language must have been shaped quite differently. Instead of ἄχρι γὰρ

immediate connection has necessarily prepared the way." This holds good also against Mehring, who, p. 536, ventures to affirm : "if we would act with perfect honour, i.e. not foist our own thoughts into Scripture, we can only supply from what goes before. But in what goes before not in Ἀδὰμ, but only δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου has been spoken of, and hence we can only supply δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου, which, indeed, is understood as matter of course." But in what goes before not only was δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου spoken of, but also δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε, which words, rightly understood, already involve πάντες ἐν Ἀδὰμ ἥμαρτον. But in the further course of this chapter the apostle himself gives a commentary on his own meaning. Nothing but this incontestably clear meaning, not as Mehring supposes the Augustinian doctrine of imputation, which I should quite readily bring to the passage by way of supplement, led me to my interpretation, with which now, moreover, Besser and Ortliph agree. Comp., too, Delitzsch, *Bibl. Psychology*, p. 433.

νόμου, at least a *καὶ γὰρ ἄχρι νόμου* must have been used, and instead of *but* in *ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἔλλογεῖται*, a *certainly* or *of course*. But finally, according to the interpretation in question, one sees no reason at all why the apostle wrote: *καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ*, and not rather: *καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ παραβάντας τὸν νόμον*. There remains, then, only the second interpretation, according to which, in vv. 13, 14, the main thought of the 12th verse, namely, that through Adam sin and death came into the world, or that Adam's sin brought death to mankind; or, which amounts to the same, the interpretation, according to which *εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* in the sense accepted by us, is confirmed.<sup>1</sup> That this interpretation accords exactly with the meaning and connection of the words before us, and avoids the difficulties accompanying the other one, the exposition of the particulars will evince. *ἄχρι γὰρ νόμου*] Some expositors, following Orig., Chrys., Theodor., take *ἄχρι* in the sense of *donec*, *quamdū*, *during*, i.e. as long as the law lasted, during the law, till the end of the law, therefore from Moses to Christ. So *ἄχρι* stands, 2 Macc. xiv. 10: *ἄχρι γὰρ Ἰουδας περίεστιν ἀδύνατον εἰρήνης τυχεῖν τὰ πράγματα*, and Heb. iii. 13: *ἄχρις οὗ τὸ σήμερον καλεῖται*. But *ἄχρι νόμου* means here, in harmony with the usual sense of *ἄχρι*, *until the law*, till the time when the law was given, which would be from Adam to Moses. That this latter meaning is to be adopted is shown by the words: *ἀπὸ Ἀδάμ μέχρι Μωϋσέως*, ver. 14. "Par est ratio omnium ante Mosen et gentium deinceps, c. ii. 12," Bengel.

—*ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ*] *sin was in the world*. *ἁμαρτία* without the article does not differ from *ἡ ἁμαρτία*, ver. 12, comp. Winer, p. 148, and Gal. ii. 17; 1 Pet. iv. 1; Rom. iii. 9, vi. 14. The presence of sin before the law is proved by the testimony of Genesis. The apostle himself demonstrated this in his picture of the sins of the Gentile world. For, as observed, as the Gentiles had not the law of Moses, their sins stood on exactly the same footing as the sins of the whole of mankind before the law.

<sup>1</sup> According to the passage of Chrysostom quoted by Bengel, Paul teaches in this verse: *ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία τῆς τοῦ νόμου παραβάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἡ τῆς τοῦ Ἀδάμ παρακοῆς, αὐτὴ ἦν ἡ πάντα λυμαινομένη, καὶ τίς ἡ τούτου ἀποδιδυῖς; τὸ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νόμου πάντας ἀποκτείνουσιν*, "non id peccatum, quo lex violatur, sed illud, quo Adam inobediens fuit, omnem dedisse perniciem: nam etiam ante legem omnes esse mortuos."

Further, *ἁμαρτία* here is one and the same *ἁμαρτία* that is spoken of ver. 12. It is the one sin of mankind—there, objectively wrapped up in Adam; here, subjectively present in the world, and conceived as having its abode in it.

—*ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου*] Luther, after the example of Ambrose and August.: “but where no law is, one regards not sin.” So, too, Calvin, Beza, and several moderns. According to them, the imputing person is supposed to be man himself, and the sense, that where no law is, men do not impute sin to themselves, have no keenly impressed sense of their guilt and sin. But *ἐλλογεῖν*, *to take account, to reckon*, found again Philem. 18, alludes of itself rather to the relation between two parties, so that if a *self*-imputation were meant, this would have been expressly said. Next, the present proposition evidently corresponds with what is laid down iv. 15: *οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις*, comp. Acts xvii. 30, and therefore teaches that where law is absent an *objective* imputation is absent. Lastly, ver. 14: *μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβύσεως Ἀδάμ*, correspond to those who sinned: *μὴ ὄντος νόμου*, ver. 13; and as the former are plainly described as those who committed sins which God did not impute, in *ἐλλογεῖν* also God is to be conceived as the imputing person. That *νόμος* here means the Mosaic law, is evident as matter of course both from the allusion to the immediately preceding *ἄχρι νόμου*, and from the observations on ii. 12.

—*ἀλλ' ἐβασίλευσεν ὁ θάνατος ἀ. Ἀ. μ. Μ. καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας*] *ἀλλά* is not *atqui*, but *now*, used in the assumption or minor proposition; this would be *ἀλλὰ μὴν, καὶ μὴν*, or even *δέ*. But yet it is not exactly = *attamen, verumtamen, nihilo scius, but yet*; this would be *ἀλλ' ὅμως* or *ὅμως μέντοι*. Rather is it = *at, but, however*, in opposition to the preceding *οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται*. Comp. Meyer and de Wette on 1 Cor. iv. 15. Death appears here, so to speak, personified as a lord to whose sceptre men are subject, vi. 9, 12, 14, vii. 1. The Greeks say: *ἄρχειν, ἰνύσσειν, βασιλεύειν, ἡγεμονεύειν, κυριεύειν τινος*, or even *τινί*; the Hellenists: *βασιλεύειν ἐπὶ τινα* (LXX. 1 Sam. viii. 9, 11; Luke i. 33, xix. 14), in imitation of the Hebrew construction: “*בַּלְיָהּ* (Ps. xlvii. 8), “*בַּלְיָהּ* (Neh. v. 15), and “*בַּלְיָהּ* (Prov. xxviii. 15). In *καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας*, as is now universally acknowledged, the reading is to be regarded as adequately attested, the

evidence for the omission of *καί* being altogether insufficient; for the omission of *μή*, nowise sufficient. From Adam to Moses death reigned over those also who had not sinned.

—ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ] Chrysost. and Theophyl. join these words with ἐβασίλευσεν ὁ θάνατος. In the same way Bengel, who interprets: “Quod homines ante legem mortui sunt, id accidit eis *super similitudine transgressionis Adam*, i.e. quia illorum eadem atque Adami transgredientis ratio fuit: mortui sunt, propter alium reatum, non propter eum, quem ipsi per se contraxere, id est, propter reatum ab Adamo contractum.” In this case, in τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας would lie a peculiar Pauline keenness of distinction; namely, sinners before the law would be called μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντες, because they committed sins which were not *imputed*. Comp. 2 Cor. v. 21. This interpretation has much to attract, because according to it the thought which confirms ver. 12 is openly expressed, instead of being merely supplied by inference after Ἀδάμ. Also the ἀλλά, *but*, as well as the ἐπὶ before ὁμοιώματι, is thus capable of easier explanation. Only, then, one would have expected μὴ παραβάντας τὸν νόμον instead of μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντες, and instead of ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ the more direct ἐπὶ τῇ παραβάσει, or διὰ τὴν παράβασιν τοῦ Ἀδάμ. On this account it seems best to join ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμ. τῆς παρ. Ἀ. with μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας. Those, then, are described who did not, like Adam, transgress a positive divine command, but only committed sins not imputed by the law. Nevertheless, if over these death, the penalty of sin, reigned, this goes to prove that they are punished on account of Adam's παράβασις, or in so far as they sinned in Adam. ἁμαρτάνειν ἐπὶ τινι does not occur elsewhere, but it is not without analogy. We may either take ἐπὶ in the sense of rule, comp. Luke i. 59, 2 Cor. ix. 6, or interpret: *with, under* = the likeness existing, ὄντος ὁμοιώματος, Heb. ix. 17, x. 28. Therefore ἁμαρτ. ἐπὶ τ. ὁμ. τ. παρ. Ἀ. = to sin in such a way that one has or presents the likeness of Adam's transgression, i.e. as he transgresses a positive command. Since Origen, many interpreters have understood by μὴ ἁμαρτήσ. κτλ. young, irresponsible children. Clearly these are not to be excluded, but they are neither specially nor directly intended. But, without doubt, every interpretation of vv. 12–14 which views the *mors infantium* otherwise than as *stipendium peccati* must be rejected as a contradiction to the unlimited

generality with which the Pauline doctrine teaches that death is conditioned by sin. Most aptly now do the words come in—*ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος*]. Since after *Ἀδάμ* the thought naturally arises that all are subject to death on account of Adam's *παράβασις*, on this naturally follows the thought that Adam is therefore a type of Christ, inasmuch as just as Adam's sin brought death to all, so Christ's righteousness brought life to all. The words are to be understood thus: *ὅς* (*sc.* *Ἀδάμ*) *ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος*, *sc.* *Ἀδάμ*, *i.e.* *τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. In 1 Cor. xv. 45, also, Paul places in contrast *ὁ πρῶτος* (*ἄνθρωπος*) *Ἀδάμ* and *ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ*, as a Rabbinical saying runs: *הַיְהוָה הָיָה לְאָדָם הָאֲחֵרִית*, the last Adam (in contrast with the *הָאֲדָמָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה*) is the Messiah. As *αἰὼν μέλλον*, in contrast with *αἰὼν οὗτος*, denoted the Messianic period, so *Ἀδάμ ὁ μέλλον* or *ὁ ἔσχατος*, in contrast with *Ἀδάμ ὁ πρῶτος*, denoted the Messiah. The participle *ὁ μέλλον* is neither to be resolved by the imperfect: "which Adam is a type of him who *was* to come," nor yet is Christ Himself to be conceived as still to come, inasmuch as He is expected to return from heaven. Without doubt, in the phrase *ὁ μέλλον*, Paul employs a designation of the Messiah borrowed from the pre-Christian standpoint. Both on account of the familiarity of this conception of the Messiah as the *Ἀδάμ ὁ μέλλον*, and on account of the natural reference of *ὅς* to the immediately preceding *Ἀδάμ*, it must be described as improbable and artificial to take *τοῦ μέλλοντος* as neuter, and, referring *ὅς* to *τύπος*, to understand it as used by attraction for *ὃ* = which thing contains a figure of that which should one day take place, in which extension of death to all men on account of Adam's sin is contained a type of the future, or of a future thing, *i.e.* of the life procured for all by Christ's righteousness. *Τύπος* from *τύπτω*, the impression of one body on another produced by a blow or otherwise, *the impressed form, the impressed figure or type*, so John xx. 25: *τὸν τύπον τῶν ἡλῶν*; then generally, *the type, figure*, Acts vii. 43, and that conceived now as *the original type*, general form, pattern, norm, so Acts vii. 44, xxiii. 25, Rom. vi. 17, Heb. viii. 5; now as *fore-type*, either as a *moral*, so Phil. iii. 17, 1 Thess. i. 7, 2 Thess. iii. 9, 1 Tim. iv. 12, Tit. ii. 7, 1 Pet. v. 3, or *historical fore-type*, so 1 Cor. x. 6, 11, and so here. The *after-type, anti-type* (*ἀντίτυπος*, Heb. ix. 24; 1 Pet. iii. 21), here is Christ. *Πῶς τύπος*; asks Chrysostom. *ὅτι*, he answers, *ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τοῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ*,



καίτοιγε μὴ φαγοῦσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου, γέγονεν αἷτιος θανάτου τοῦ διὰ τὴν βρώσιν εἰσαχθέντος· οὕτω καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς τοῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καίτοιγε οὐ δικαιοπραγήσασι, γέγονε πρόξενος δικαιοσύνης (rather ζωῆς), ἣν διὰ τοῦ σταυροῦ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐχαρίσατο. Both, then, are representative heads of mankind—one the representative head of sin and death, the other of righteousness and life.

The exposition to follow of the remainder of the section will make manifest how only the interpretation we have accepted as the right one of vv. 12–14 renders possible an exposition of the rest of the section at once precise and in perfect harmony with the connection of the words. But we wish first of all to describe in its relations the apostle's general point of view in reference to the sin found among mankind, as far as we are able and authorized to do this by the principles already considered. Paul in the first place draws a distinction between *ἡ ἁμαρτία* and *ἡ παράβασις*. The latter is the single act of transgressing God's positive law, such as was done by Adam (ver. 14); the former, the sin of the world conceived as a unity, as this was wrapped up objectively in Adam's act (ver. 12), or subjectively dwells in the world (ver. 13). Only the *παράβασις* of Adam is to be regarded as sin that is imputed, punished with death; the *ἁμαρτία τοῦ κόσμου* is so only in so far as it was included in this *παράβασις*. Before the revelation of the Mosaic νόμος there was no sin imputed, punished with death, other than the *παράβασις* of Adam, including in itself the *ἁμαρτία τοῦ κόσμου*. Not the *ἁμαρτία τοῦ κόσμου*, but only the *παράβασις νόμου* stands in the same category with the *παράβασις Ἀδάμ*, and as such is in and of itself imputable and penal, just because it is not merely sin, but transgression of the law. But, on the other hand, the deputy of the νόμος, which, according to i. 19, 20, 32, ii. 14, 15, the Gentiles possess in their law of conscience, is sufficient to render them inexcusable; so that, in connection with those declarations, the absolute dictum: *ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου*, must be reduced to a relative import. That is, in comparison with the *παράβασις Ἀδάμ* and with the *παράβασις νόμου*, indeed the imputation, to which the *ἁμαρτία τοῦ κόσμου* is subject, cannot come at all into account, seeing that it finds its primary and essential imputation only in the *παράβασις* of Adam. Nevertheless this very *ἁμαρτία*, as a violation of the natural law of conscience, is imputable enough, i.e. is guilty and penal. "Sane unius lapsui," says

Bengel, "mors multorum assignatur immediate, ver. 15. Sic non negatur, cujusvis peccati stipendium esse mortem, sed ostenditur, primariam mortis causam esse peccatum primum. Hoc nos peremit: sicut latro post homicidium furatus punitur ob homicidium, nec tamen impune furatus est, furti poena in poenam homicidii confluente, sed ad homicidii poenam vix aestimata." If, now, we wish to formulate still further for our dogmatic consciousness the Pauline doctrines which are to be connected in the way indicated, we are, as matter of fact, naturally led to the old-fashioned method of distinguishing between, as also of associating, nature and person, genus and individual, or, more particularly, between the generic will and specific personal will, the latter of which is to be regarded merely as the individually-determined impression of the former, so that the latter is invariably involved and implied in the former. The universal generic will committed, in Adam, the personal, conscious act of transgression against God's positive law, and is accordingly subject to the penalty of death assigned to this imputable act of transgression. The particular individual, born afterwards, can of course have no recollection of this original act of transgression in which he was partaker, because on his part this act was the act, not of a conscious person, but merely of an unconscious genus. Nevertheless, that he did really and truly partake therein is proved by the fact that this act dwells in him from birth in the form of sinful propensity. For in this *habitus* is manifested nothing else than that aversion of human nature from God which took place in Adam. On this account there also dwells in the individual, along with the principle of sin, the principle of death as the wages of sin. When the individual advances into the arena of mature consciousness and independent will, he cannot, as matter of course, reverse the act of determination once done in Adam, but, in keeping with the primal sin committed once for all, goes on doing sin always. This doing of sin is *necessary*, because it is merely the consequence of the primal act; yet it is also *free*, because the generic act of determination done once for all time is a free act. When, therefore, the individual reproduces that generic sin in individual sinful acts, he does so freely, because in this he merely repeats the primal fact of apostasy, and continually determines himself personally in the same way in which he determined himself as a part of the genus. In proportion, then, as the individual detaches him-

self, so to speak, from the basis of nature, and by his own act makes the universal sin of nature his own, does he become personally responsible for it, although, in consequence of the darkness that has fallen upon moral and religious consciousness, this appropriation and responsibility appears merged in the original act and original guilt, and is only then fully complete, when, face to face with God's law anew revealed, it anew takes the form of a personal act of transgression.<sup>1</sup>

The apostle, having indicated rather than fully expanded the parallel between Adam and Christ, proceeds, vv. 15-17, first of all to specify the points of difference which are found along with the resemblance. Thus, before the parallel itself is drawn out in detail, a limitation in it is indicated. Bengel says well: "Adamus et Christus, secundum rationes contrarias, conveniunt, in positivo; differunt, in comparativo. Convenientiam Paulus primum, vv. 12-14, innuit, protasi expressa, apodosi tantisper ad subaudien-

<sup>1</sup> The Protestant Church had therefore adequate Scripture-ground, as well as sufficient dogmatic justification, for its doctrine of the *imputatio peccati Adamitici ad culpam et poenam*, and its consequence *peccatum originale* consisting in the *habitus peccandi* and the *reatus*, of which this is the ground. It is one merit of Julius Müller's treatise (*The Christian Doctrine of Sin*), that it has decisively demonstrated the untenableness of the modern mode of conception, according to which the natural sinful tendency or moral disorder caused by the fact of sin in Adam's posterity is regarded merely as innocent misfortune; so that in this matter all that is to be imputed to them is free consent (vol. II. p. 307). On the contrary, it is a fundamental element of Müller's doctrine,—as thoroughly in accord with Scripture and experience as it is far-reaching,—honourably distinguishing it from modern theories, that the sinfulness of the individual present from the very time of birth is subject to divine imputation, or constitutes a relation of guilt before the divine tribunal. Nevertheless even Müller holds fast to the rationalistic supposition of the absolute dependence of guilt upon *personal* self-decision. In order to get rid of the contradiction connected with this, he takes refuge in the speculative hypothesis of an extra-temporal state, and original fall of man as a personal being out of time (vol. II. p. 357). But this mode of solution only serves, in our opinion, to bring clearly out the necessity of giving up one or the other of the two contradictory premises; as well as, if the former is to be maintained, of seeking a further understanding of the *mystery* of original sin only in the way marked out by the church. As matter of fact, the speculative attempt at reconciliation in question does not, as its author supposes, merely begin *beyond* Scripture, but runs directly *in its face*, Scripture, as this passage of the Romans shows, clearly representing the human race, not only with respect to its physical and mental, but also with respect to its spiritual powers, as wrapped up in Adam, seeing that sin, not merely as a corruption of body and soul, but sin in general,—therefore, above all, as selfishness, as an apostasy of the spirit from God, and rebellion of the will against His command,—is expressly traced back to Adam's fall. Comp. the more thorough exposition of the doctrine of sin in my *Kirchlichen Glaubenslehre*, III. pp. 1-217.

dum relicta. Deinde differentiam multo magis directe et expresse describit."

Ver. 15. Ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ παράπτωμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ χάρισμα] τὸ παράπτωμα, from παραπίπτειν, *lapsus*, the offence. παράπτωμα is used of the *lapsus Adami* also Wisd. x. 1, as here. Παράπτωμα invariably denotes a definite sinful act, which, as in the case before us, may at the same time be παράβασις, comp. ver. 14, but not necessarily so; for the Gentiles have παραπτώματα, Eph. i. 7, ii. 1, but no παραβάσεις νόμου. Τὸ χάρισμα, the gracious gift of God, consisting in the imputation of the righteousness of Christ in justification, consequently = ἡ δωρεὰ in this verse; τὸ δώρημα, ver. 16; ἡ δωρεὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ver. 17. Therefore: *But not as the offence, so also the gift of grace.* In the predicate, ἐστίν, *is*, or ἔχει, *stands*, is to be supplied. We should now have expected the apostle, over against the παράπτωμα of Adam, to place the δικαίωμα of Christ, ver. 18, not the χάρισμα of God. But the form of expression is concise. On one side stands the παράπτωμα of Adam, the κατάκριμα of God upon mankind in consequence of this παράπτωμα, and θάνατος in consequence of the κατάκριμα. On the other side stands the δικαίωμα of Christ, the χάρισμα of God in consequence of this δικαίωμα, consisting in δικαίωσις, in the δωρεὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, and ζωὴ αἰώνιος in consequence of this χάρισμα. As the apostle then opposes χάρισμα to παράπτωμα, from the latter κατάκριμα θανάτου is, as matter of course, supplied to παράπτωμα, just as χάρισμα also points to ζωή, its consequence. The complete sentence would run: But it is not with the transgression of Adam, which had God's judicial wrath against mankind and death for its consequence, as with the gracious gift of justification, depending on Christ's righteousness, which has life for its consequence. But παράπτωμα and χάρισμα are emphasized and opposed merely in a preliminary way as the chief conceptions upon which the chief stress is laid in the exposition immediately following.

—Εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον] This passage confirms our interpretation of ver. 12; for the θάνατος of the many is described here as the direct consequence of the παράπτωμα of the one, precisely because in this παράπτωμα the ἁμαρτία of the many, of which death is the wages, is directly included. According to the other interpretation of ver. 12, the connection of the transgression of the one with the death of the

many must be conceived as brought about by the sinful acts or sinful tendencies of the many themselves, an idea of which there is not a trace in the words before us. εἰ, not = *quandoquidem*, *since*, but the conditional particle *si*, *if*, usual in the hypothetical syllogism. οἱ πολλοί, *the many*, as to extent not different from πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ver. 12. But the expression is selected in contrast to εἷς; for in the abstract all need not be many, ver. 19, xii. 5; 1 Cor. x. 17; also Matt. xx. 28, xxvi. 28, where likewise πάντες are described as πολλοί. "Possunt aliqua esse omnia, quae non sunt multa," observes Augustine.

—πολλῷ μᾶλλον] A *quantitative* plus of intensive demonstration of power can only occur here to a perplexed exegesis that is unable in any other way to conceive a real difference between the results issuing from Adam and from Christ, while the higher degree of *a priori* evidence belonging to one fact above another seems to constitute no real distinction between the two facts. But the structure of the sentence leads us, precisely as vv. 9, 10, 17, xi. 24, to think merely of the *logical* plus of certainty. For the conditional inference, that *if* (εἰ) the one is, *much more* (πολλῷ μᾶλλον) the other is, simply asserts that the existence of that other has a far higher degree of certainty and evidence than the existence of the one. πολλῷ μᾶλλον is therefore not = *in how much greater a degree*, but = *much more is it to be supposed, much less can it be doubted*. Rightly, Chrysostom: πολλῷ γὰρ τοῦτο εὐλογώτερον. For how should not the issues of a *divine* act working salvation be far more certain than the issues of a *human* act working ruin?

—ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεά] As previously χάρισμα, so here χάρις and δωρεά are opposed to παράπτωμα. In this way the χάρισμα, the *gift of grace*, is merely divided into its two constituents, *the grace* (ἡ χάρις) and the gift (ἡ δωρεά). Ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ denotes, then, *favor Dei*, God's gracious disposition towards men, from which, as from its fountain, flows ἡ δωρεά. But in this case the δωρεά itself, as is proved by the entirely parallel statement ver. 17 (οἱ τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης λαμβάνοντες), can only be the δωρεά τῆς δικαιοσύνης, the gift of justification, of which ζωὴ is only the result, not the δωρεά τῆς ζωῆς itself.

—ἐν χάριτι τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] As ἡ δωρεά = τὸ χάρισμα naturally requires the supplement ἐν χάριτι,

it is the most obvious course to connect these words, actually subjoined as they are, with ἡ δωρεά, not with ἐπερίσσευσε. The addition, naturally to be looked for, ἐν χάριτι is then to be regarded as an essentially constituent part of the substantive idea, and is therefore connected without the article (instead of ἡ ἐν χάριτι) with the preceding substantive, comp. Winer, p. 155, and Harless on Eph. i. 15. χάρις is then more precisely defined as the grace of Jesus Christ. Hence the subjoined article ἐν χάριτι τῇ κτλ., which unusual employment of the article (comp. also i. 18, ii. 14) cannot well be explained or supported if these words be connected with ἐπερίσσευσε. The apostle describing χάρις, which, according to what is said just before, we must have been disposed to regard as the χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ, as the χάρις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ cannot surprise us, as there is in truth but one grace of God, which is quite as much the grace of the Son as the grace of the Father. Concerning the χάρις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, comp. Acts xv. 11; 2 Cor. viii. 9; Gal. i. 6; Tit. iii. 7. But Paul says not simply ἡ χάρις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, but ἡ χάρις τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, in opposition to the παράπτωμα τοῦ ἐνός. Doubtless, as ἄνθρωπος Christ is the mediator, 1 Tim. ii. 5; but in so far as such He exercises χάρις, He is this only as the ἄνθρωπος, who is at the same time the υἱὸς θεοῦ, as θεάνθρωπος.<sup>1</sup> The apostle, as the beginning of this verse shows, would oppose χάρισμα to παράπτωμα. This he now does, but in such a way that in the words ἡ χάρις . . . Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ he resolves, paraphrases, and expands the notion of χάρισμα, and then, instead of opposing to τῷ τοῦ ἐνός παραπτώματι οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον a τῷ τοῦ ἐνός χαρίσματι οἱ πολλοὶ ζήσονται, speaks of the περισσεύειν of the χάρισμα. This also shows that the connection of ἐν χάριτι κτλ. with δωρεά is correct, whereas the connection with ἐπερίσσευσε

<sup>1</sup> "Libenter," says Bengel, "Jesum Paulus (prae ceteris apostolis, qui eum ante passionem viderunt) hominem appellat, in hoc negotio, 1 Cor. xv. 21; 1 Tim. ii. 5. Quis humanam Christi naturam excludat ab officio mediatorio? Paulus hoc versu, ubi nomen hominis Christo tribuit, Adamo non tribuit: et ver. 19, ubi Adamo tribuit, Christo non tribuit. Scilicet non eodem tempore humanitatem et Adamus sustinet et Christus: et aut Adam nomine hominis indignum se fecit; aut nomen hominis vix satis dignum est Christo. Porro denominari solet Christus ab humana natura, ubi agitur de hominibus ad Deum adducendis, Heb. ii. 6 sqq., a divina vero, ubi agitur de adventu Salvatoris ad nos, et de praesidio, quod ipse nobis praestat adversus hostes, Tit. ii. 13."

needlessly perplexes the order of thought, since τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι has then a double opposition, first, ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεά = τὸ χάρισμα, and next, ἐν χάριτι τῇ κτλ.

—εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσευσε] The πολλοί are πάντες δικαιωθησόμενοι, vv. 18, 19, who are described as many, in opposition to the εἰς ἄνθρωπος. The aorist ἐπερίσσευσε refers, not so much to the subjective and actual participation of the πολλοί in the χάρις and δωρεά, as to the objective and actual existence of this χάρις and δωρεά for the πολλοί. Περισσεύει τι εἰς τινα has not so much a comparative as a superlative import, iii. 7 = something comes to one most abundantly, something falls to one's lot beyond measure (περισσόν, abundanter, largissime, in most abundant degree). The difference, then, in the results of Adam's and Christ's life lies in the *superabundance* (the emphasis rests on ἐπερίσσευσε) of the results of the latter, and indeed this superabundance is set forth as an evident and natural fact (πολλῷ μᾶλλον). And this is the more evident as it is grounded in the grace of God and Christ, which, if manifested at all, can only be manifested superabundantly.

Ver. 16 introduces a further point of difference. As the one sin of Adam brings us condemnation, so through the righteousness of Christ, imparted to us in the way of gift, we are absolved not merely from the one sin of Adam, but also from the many sins which we ourselves have added. Καὶ οὐχ ὡς δι' ἐνὸς ἁμαρτήσαντος, τὸ δώρημα] Some modern expositors expunge the comma after ἁμαρτήσαντος, and make δώρημα the exclusive subject of the sentence, only supplying after it the copula ἐστίν = and not as through one who sinned is the free gift, i.e. it is not as if it were occasioned only through one sinner, rather is it bestowed on occasion of many trespasses. But the similarity with the beginning of the 15th verse suggests the necessity of a like construction here. The most simple mode of supplement would then be: καὶ οὐχ ὡς δι' ἐνὸς ἁμαρτήσαντος ἐγένετο, τὸ δώρημά ἐστι. The expression is, no doubt, very concise, but it is explained by the fact that above all special prominence was to be given to the εἰς ἁμαρτήσας, on whom in what follows everything turned, in opposition to the πολλοὶ ἁμαρτήσαντες, or rather to their πολλὰ παραπτώματα. On this account it is perhaps superfluous, in antithesis to τὸ δώρημα, to supply either, as is indicated by what follows, τὸ κατὰκριμα, or provisionally with

still less definiteness τὸ πάθημα, as the subject of the first clause = καὶ οὐχ ὡς δι' ἑνὸς ἀμαρτήσαντος τὸ κατάκριμα (τὸ πάθημα) ἐγένετο, τὸ δώρημά ἐστιν. Similarly Luther, who renders in paraphrastic form: "And the gift is not only concerning one sin (καὶ οὐ τὸ δώρημα ὑπὲρ ἑνὸς ἀμαρτήματος, namely, in order to obliterate only this one ἀμαρτήμα), as through the one sin of the one sinner all the ruin" (ὡς δι' ἑνὸς ἀμαρτήματος, since he read, on the critical authority of the Vulgate, πᾶν τὸ πάθημα or κατάκριμα). But the reading ἀμαρτήματος, not sufficiently authenticated, instead of ἀμαρτήσαντος, is plainly to be treated as a mere correction to remove a difficulty.

—τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίμα ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς κατάκριμα] *sc.* ἐγένετο. *For the judgment was from one unto condemnation.* τὸ κρίμα is of itself a neutral idea. The result of the κρίμα may as readily be acquittal as condemnation, accordingly as a righteous or unrighteous man is submitted to the divine judgment. Here, then, κρίμα becomes κατάκριμα, the judicial sentence becomes a sentence of condemnation, the judgment a penal judgment. This is the most simple and natural interpretation of κρίμα in the connection, and in relation to κατάκριμα. ἐξ ἑνὸς, *sc.* ἀμαρτήσαντος, or even ἀνθρώπου, vv, 12, 15, 17, 19. ἑνός cannot be neuter, because in what precedes we read ἀμαρτήσαντος, not ἀμαρτήματος; and the reference forward to παραπτώματων = ἐξ ἑνὸς παραπτώματος, instead of the reference backward to ἀμαρτήσαντος, is arbitrary. The sense remains substantially the same, whether I say the sentence of condemnation came through one sinner or through one sin; for even in the first case the one sin of the one sinner is meant. Here, as throughout this section, the gaze of the apostle is fixed on the εἰς, and when he speaks of his παράπτωμα he calls it παράπτωμα τοῦ ἑνός, not ἐν παραπτώμα. But even here the chief stress rests upon ἑνός, as in ἑνὸς ἀμαρτήσαντος; for in addition to this no emphasis is meant to be placed on κρίμα and χάρισμα, κατάκριμα and δικαίωμα, as points of difference. These indeed are real contrasts, and perhaps the intention is to intimate that it is not accidental that the free *grace*, from which issued the χάρισμα, has a *wider circle* of operation than the justice which passed the κρίμα. But it is perfectly self-evident, and therefore need not be instanced as a special point of difference, that if Adam and Christ are ever brought into



comparison, from the one issued κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα, from the other χάρισμα εἰς δικαίωμα. ἐξ, *from*, allied to, but not identical with διά, stands for the source or cause from which something proceeds, comp. Winer, p. 460. The κατάκριμα is completed in θάνατος, and extends εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς, as follows necessarily from the ideas developed in vv. 12–15.

—τὸ δὲ χάρισμα ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων εἰς δικαίωμα] *sc. ἐγένετο*. But the gift of grace was from many offences unto sentence of justification. ἐκ stands here also for the active occasion, inasmuch as the many sins are conceived as invoking the divine compassion to pass sentence of absolution, just as there the one sinner is conceived as invoking the divine justice to pass sentence of condemnation. πολλὰ παραπτώματα are the actual sins of individuals. Here, then, merely the εἰς ἁμαρτήσας, or the παράπτωμα of Adam, and the πολλὰ παραπτώματα are brought into contrast. The ἁμαρτία included in the παράπτωμα of Adam, and inherent in the individual as *habitus peccandi*, is not specially emphasized, though of course it is the principle and source of the particular παραπτώματα. Δικαίωμα is not to be identified with δικαίωμα in ver. 18, which latter as Christ's satisfaction of the law stands in contrast with the παράπτωμα of Adam. Here, on the other hand, δικαίωμα forms the opposite of κατάκριμα. One might even explain the form of the word merely from this opposition, so that δικαίωμα, the termination denoting product or state being chosen for the sake of resemblance to κατάκριμα, is equivalent to δικαίωσις. Still a difference of meaning may be supposed, which at the same time makes the substantive opposition still more precise. δικαίωμα signifies, i. 32, the ordinance; but here, derived from δικαιοῦν in the specific Pauline sense, the ordinance by which an unrighteous man is declared righteous. Thus δικαίωσις is the act of justification; δικαίωμα, on the other hand, the sentence of justification, the decretum absolutis, and in this way δικαίωμα, the sententia absolutoria, stands in appropriate contrast with κατάκριμα, the sententia damnatoria, not only as to form, but also as to meaning. Comp. Bar. ii. 17: δώσουσι δόξαν καὶ δικαίωμα τῷ κυρίῳ, also Eccles. xxxv. 16. Whereas, then, ver. 15 depicts the intensive, this verse depicts the extensive superabundance of grace, Christ having repaired not merely the loss inflicted by Adam, but also that which we added to it. "Gratia," observes Melancthon on this verse, "abolet multa

peccata, scilicet originale et actualia, radicem et fructus." So Augustine early: "quia non solum illud unum solvit, quod originaliter trahitur, sed etiam quae in unoquoque homine motu propriae voluntatis adduntur."

Ver. 17. On ver. 15 the thought naturally suggested itself that the future life of the many who receive the *περισσεία* of *χάρις* and of the *δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι*, is far more certain than the death of the many through the transgression of one. This thought now finds expression ver. 17, the verse thus containing indeed a supplement or inference, but in no sense a confirmation or exposition of ver. 15. The *γάρ* by which ver. 17 is introduced can accordingly only confirm the purport of ver. 16. Were it intended to confirm ver. 15, then ver. 16 must be regarded as a parenthesis, a view which seems altogether arbitrary. Ver. 16 affirms that the gift of grace makes reparation not merely for Adam's sin, but also for the many transgressions of his posterity. This is corroborated by the fact of the indisputable certainty that they who obtain the superabundant fulness of grace will one day reign in life. And, in fact, had Christ made satisfaction merely for the *παράπτωμα* of Adam, and not also for the many *παραπτώματα* of his posterity, neither would the grace bestowed on them have been called superabundant, nor could their reign in life have been regarded as assured, since that reign would have been still dependent on their own satisfaction for their *πολλὰ παραπτώματα*. The intensive abundance of grace, and the certainty of life springing therefrom (ver. 17), are thus without doubt the ground of the extensive all-sufficiency of this grace (ver. 16). *Εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματα ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσε διὰ τοῦ ἐνός*] answers to *εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον*, ver. 15. The reading is uncertain. Passing by Origen and an unimportant codex having *ἐν ἐνὸς παραπτώματι*, as well as the simple *τῷ παραπτώματι*, which is the reading of another unimportant codex, the reading *ἐν ἐνὶ παραπτώματι*, recommended by Griesbach, has considerable, the reading *ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ παραπτώματι* not inconsiderable attestation. But such attestation is not wanting to the *lectio recepta*. Both the variants worthy of notice, *ἐν ἐνὶ* and *ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ παραπτώματι*, are now, indeed, to be looked on as corrections; first, because they occur, for the most part, in the same codices which, reading in ver. 16 *ἀμαρτήματος* for *ἀμαρτήσαντος*, took *ἐνός* there as neuter, and must thus have been

disposed to substitute, ver. 17, ἐν παράπτωμα for παράπτωμα τοῦ ενός; secondly, because this disposition must have been strengthened by the apparently tautological repetition of διὰ τοῦ ενός. A positive evidence for the *recepta* is the correspondence with ver. 15, the reference to that verse in general in the present verse being unmistakeable. Instead of οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον, the apostle says here: ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσε, chiefly by this expression to prepare the way for the following ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύσουσι; for it behoves him here, in harmony with the strain of thought indicated, to make prominent that certainty of the abundance of life and reign in life which confirms the certainty of the atonement made for the πολλὰ παραπτώματα, ver. 16. For the same reason also in διὰ τοῦ ενός the εἰς is repeatedly and expressively emphasized, διὰ τοῦ ενός Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ being meant for this purpose to form a striking contrast, as the certainty of the reign in life depends on this very fact, that the εἰς who is its Mediator is *Jesus Christ*.<sup>1</sup> As τῷ τοῦ ενός παραπτώματι, in the beginning of this verse, runs parallel with τῷ τοῦ ενός παραπτώματι, ver. 15, so διὰ τοῦ ενός answers to δι' ενός ἁμαρτήσαντος and ἐξ ενός, ver. 16. But the repetition of οἱ πολλοί was of no moment here.

—πολλῷ μᾶλλον] as in ver. 15, not the quantitative plus, but the logical *much more* of inference to denote greater force of evidence.

—οἱ τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης λαμβάνοντες] The περισσεία, the abundance, the exuberant greatness, 2 Cor. viii. 2, resumes ἐπερίσσευσε, ver. 15, χάρις and δωρεά being distinguished from each other here as there; but δωρεά is expressly described with reference to δικαίωμα, ver. 16, as δωρεὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης (*genit. apposit.*). οἱ λαμβάνοντες might, as the *participium praesentis* with the article often is, be used substantively, so that, converted into a noun, it excludes all definition of time (= the recipients), comp. Winer, p. 444, and the examples there quoted. But it is best to preserve its participial and present force, the reception of grace, the objective existence of which was spoken of ver. 15, being thus described as continuing in time. "Accipere (λαμβάνειν)," says Bengel, "potest vel

<sup>1</sup> Similar emphatic repetitions are found also Matt. xxvi. 24: ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἰκεῖνος; 2 Cor. xii. 7: ἵνα μὴ ὑπεραίρωμαι; Eph. vi. 19, 20: ἰν παρρησίᾳ . . . ἵνα ἰν αὐτοῖς παρρησιάζωμαι.

tanquam neutro-passivum reddi *empfangen, erlangen, kriegen*, vel active *annehmen*. Illud potius. Relatio tamen ad *δωρεάν, donum*, cum actu *sumendi* melius convenit. In justificatione homo agit aliquid: sed non justificat actus sumendi, quatenus est actus; sed illud quod sumitur sive apprehenditur."

—*ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύσουσι*] Manifestly to be understood of future *ζωῇ αἰώνιος*, in which alone the *βασιλεύειν* takes place. Hence the future. But the apostle says not: *ἡ ζωὴ βασιλεύσει ἐπὶ τοῦς . . . λαμβάνοντας*, in correspondence with *ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσε*, but *οἱ . . . λαμβάνοντες ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύσουσι*, because the sinner is in subjection to death as to a foreign power lording it over him with despotic sway, whereas the justified man, as one delivered from the power of death, is himself raised to exercise dominion as a king in life. As to this *βασιλεύειν* of believers in eternal life, which is a *συγκληρονομεῖν*, a *συνδοξάζεσθαι*, and *συμβασιλεύειν σὺν τῷ Χριστῷ*, comp. viii. 17; 1 Cor. iv. 8, i. 2, 3; 2 Tim. ii. 12; Rev. xx. 4, xxii. 5.

—*διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*] "In uno hoc versu," observes Bengel on ver. 14, "ponitur nomen individui *Ἀδάμ*, in caeteris nomen appellativum, *homo*. Nomen autem *Jesu Christi*, Adami nomine oblivioni tradito, clare praedicatur," vv. 15, 17. If we briefly summarize the dogmatic elements in which the superabundance of the grace and gift of Christ is manifested, we shall put it thus: Adam possessed a finite righteousness and conditional promise of eternal life; Christ brought an infinite righteousness and the free gift of eternal life itself. Adam committed one sin, and in virtue of this incurred the penalty of death; Christ atoned for *many* sins, and not merely abolished death, but planted life in its stead.

The apostle had not yet explicitly drawn out the parallel between Adam and Christ, but now does it, vv. 18, 19. It was indeed, as to its essential substance, already contained in the protasis, ver. 12, taken along with *ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος*, ver. 14. Wherefore, even in the limitation of the parallel which the glory and exuberance of God's grace in Christ, filling his soul, compelled him to put first, in order clearly to set forth how much greater is the gain through Christ than the loss through Adam, —even in this Paul could take for granted the substance of the parallel itself, as in vv. 15–17 we have on one side the *παράπτωμα, κατάκριμα*, and *θάνατος*; on the other side, the *εἰς*

ἄνθρωπος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δικαίωσις, and ζωή. Still he must perforce draw out at length and set forth in due form the parallel itself on which, in the whole exposition before us, he laid emphatic stress. Hence after the incidental limitation he turns back to the beginning of his description, and now brings forward in their complete mutual relations all the ideal elements that come into view in the comparison between Adam and Christ.

Ver. 18. *Ἀρα οὖν*] *Accordingly then*. Paul places these particles of inference, in very frequent use with him, contrary to classical usage at the beginning of the sentence, vii. 3, 25, viii. 12, ix. 16, 18, xiv. 12, 19, etc. It serves often as here, *c.g.* vii. 25, to introduce a summary conclusion of the preceding exposition; for the substance of the summary recapitulation results as an inference from the contents of the detailed statement going before. Here, as remarked, the exposition, to which the resumptive inference refers, is partly introduced and indicated vv. 12–14, partly contained in the form of the presupposition vv. 15–17.

—*δι' ἐνὸς παραπτώματος*] That ἐνός, both here and in the following δι' ἐνὸς δικαϊώματος, is to be taken as masculine, not neuter, follows, apart from the contrast in which it stands with εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, from the fact that throughout the exposition, vv. 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, it is always used in the masculine. The apostle was under no necessity to write: διὰ τοῦ παραπτώματος τοῦ ἐνός. Rather here, where he begins the matter as it were afresh, the omission of the article is quite appropriate. So ver. 12 we read δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου, and then ver. 15 τοῦ ἐνός, because this εἷς was already named and familiar. Just so ver. 16, where again a new element is introduced, ἐνός, but ver. 17 τοῦ ἐνός. Just so here, ver. 18, ἐνός, and ver. 19, τοῦ ἐνός.

—*εἰς κατάκριμα*] *sc. θανάτου*, as after ver. 12 ff. is understood as matter of course. Comp. ζωῆς expressly added to the following δικαίωσιν. But the immediate connection in which, even as to outward phraseology, the παράπτωμα of Adam is placed with the κατάκριμα θανάτου of all men, intimates that this immediate connection obtains also as to actual fact, and that we have no authority to supplement or rather alter the apostle's meaning by any alien combination of thought. He says nothing but this, and this he does say expressly and exclusively, that through

Adam's transgression God's sentence of condemnation, which in death is carried into effect, came upon all men.

—οὕτω καὶ δι' ἑνὸς δικαίωματος] δικαίωμα here stands in opposition to παράπτωμα. It must therefore receive a sense in harmony with this contrast. Consequently it means neither, as in i. 32, ii. 26, *ordinance, statute*, nor yet, as in v. 16, *sentence of justification*; but, as in Bar. ii. 19, Rev. xix. 8, *fulfilment of right, righteous act*. The explanation quoted from Aristotle, *Ethic. Nicom.* v. 10: δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος, *reparation for an unjust act*, would indeed be strikingly appropriate in the connection, but it cannot be supported by biblical idiom. Aristotle probably does not mean reparation by means of a just action (*i.e.* by means of δικαιοπράγημα), but in keeping with the classical use of δικαιοῦν = *to punish, to chastise*, probably takes δικαίωμα in the sense of *punishment* as reparation for an unjust action. As Adam's παράπτωμα is a *transgression of law*, so Christ's δικαίωμα is a *fulfilment of right or of law*. As the one sufficed for the condemnation, so the other suffices for the justification, for the absolution of mankind. Christ's recte factum (δικαίωμα) is thus in very deed a *satisfactio*, and, in truth, as both the previous exposition and the present strain of thought evince, a *satisfactio vicaria*. But as Adam's παράπτωμα, so also Christ's δικαίωμα is to be taken as a particular definite action. The latter is the death of Christ, upon which the apostle has hitherto exclusively based our reconciliation and justification. Accordingly the death of Christ has a twofold relation. It is quite as much a fulfilment of law as a bearing of penalty,—the former principally as an *act* of spontaneous surrender, John x. 17, 18; the latter, as endurance of the curse of the law, Gal. iii. 13. The following verse shows that, as the result, the crowning point of His obedience, which was tested and proved through the whole of His life, is itself ὑπακοή. In this *obedience* Christ gave Himself up to the will of the Father, John iv. 34, etc., and so perfected the voluntary suffering of His death. Thus in the expressions δικαίωμα and ὑπακοή is, without doubt, given the groundwork for the dogma of *obedientia activa*, while the old dictum is justified: *actio ejus fuit passiva et passio fuit activa*. The death of Christ being not only κατάρα but also δικαίωμα, the δικαίωσις based upon it is not merely a negative removal of guilt, forgiveness of sins, but also a positive declaring *just*, since the justified are not merely

regarded as if they had done no sin, but as if they had fulfilled the law.<sup>1</sup>

—*εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους*] in parallel opposition to the preceding *εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους*. Still there follows here as matter of course the qualification, that by *πάντες ἄνθρωποι* are only meant all that believe. The doctrine of universal restoration contradicts not merely the doctrine of Scripture elsewhere, but also other explicit statements of the apostle himself, Phil. iii. 19; 2 Thess. i. 9. Paul here has in view on one side the race of those lost in Adam, on the other side the race of those saved in Christ. There are *πάντες ἄνθρωποι κατακεκριμένοι*, here *πάντες ἄνθρωποι δικαιοθυσόμενοι*. Both are *οἱ πολλοί*, in opposition to the *εἰς*. Those who remain in the Adamitic state of ruin he does not take into account. Before his spiritual vision there rises only the antithesis of Adamitic and Christian humanity. See an exactly similar limited use of *πάντες*, 1 Cor. xv. 22; comp. also Rom. xi. 32; 2 Cor. v. 15, as well as the explicitly stated limitation, Gal. iii. 22; 2 Thess. iii. 2. The remark of Thomas Aquinas is so far right: “*quamvis possit dici, quod justificatio Christi (= τὸ ἐνὸς δικαίωμα) transit in justificationem (= εἰς δικαίωσιν) omnium hominum, quantum ad sufficientiam, licet quantum ad efficientiam procedit in solos fideles.*” Still what is meant here is not merely the possibility or offer, but the real experience of justification.

—*εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς*] unto justification of life = justification unto life, *i.e.* which carries life with it, makes partaker of life (namely, of *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*). *ζωῆς* may be taken as *genitivus effectus* or *qualitatis*. Winer, p. 235, classes it with genitives of “inner reference of a remoter kind.” “*δικαίωσις ζωῆς*,” remarks Bengel, “*est declaratio divina illa, qua peccator, mortis reus, vitae adjudicatur, idque jure.*” To the first clause an *ἀπέβη*, *res cessit, abiit in*, is to be supplied; to the second, as ver. 19 indicates, an *ἀποβαίνει*, or rather *ἀποβήσεται*. So, rightly, Winer, p. 734. If the second time we supply an *ἀπέβη* or *ἐγένετο*, the apostle would contemplate the act still continuing in time as already completed.

<sup>1</sup> Upon the history of the development of the dogma of Christ's active obedience in the Lutheran Church, comp. *de obedientia Christi activa historiam et progressionem inde a confessione Augustana ad formulam usque concordiae enarravit*, Thomasius, Erlangae 1846. On the dogma itself, comp. my *Thätigen Gehorsam Christi* and my *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, IV. 2.

Ver. 19 contains the confirmation (γάρ) of ver. 18. ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν] The radical meaning of καθιστάναι is *sistere, constitucere, to set down, constitute*, Acts vii. 10, 27, etc. (From the meaning, *to set down*, bring down, comes the meaning, *to conduct*, Acts xvii. 15.) In the passive: *constitui, to be put down, set down, constituted*, Heb. v. 1, viii. 3, Jas. iii. 6, iv. 4, 2 Pet. i. 8 form no exceptions to this. At least in N. T. idiom the meaning of καθίστημι never passes into that of *reddere, facere*; passive, *reddi, fieri*. Accordingly in this passage we can do nothing but abide by the only radical meaning of any authority, and ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν is = *were set down as sinners, were put into the category of sinners*.

—δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται] = *shall be set down as righteous, shall be put into the category of righteous*. If, then, the latter takes place, as the whole tenor of the Pauline doctrine of justification has shown us, through imputation of the righteousness of Christ, the former must be conceived as having taken place, if the parallelism of thought is to be preserved, as also in harmony with the interpretation of ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, ver. 12, accepted by us as correct, through imputation of the sin of Adam. "Habemus ergo hic," says Calov, "*justitiam et obedientiam Christi, quae imputatur nobis in justificatione nostra, in judicio divino per fidem, vel cum fide apprehenditur, quemadmodum inobedientia Adami imputata est posteris ejus. Ut enim hi peccatores constituti sunt imputatione inobedientiae Adami, sic justi nos constituimur imputatione obedientiae vel justitiae Christi.*"<sup>1</sup> The future (κατασταθήσονται) is used, as in iii. 20, because justification is to be conceived as an act not yet come to an end, but continuing in the future. It does not refer, then, to the future revelation of glory after the resurrection. Not then for the first time *shall* they be put into the category of the righteous.

—οἱ πολλοί] in compass = πάντες, is placed in both clauses

<sup>1</sup> The passage quoted by Bengel from Thom. Gataker. *Diss. de novi instr. stylo*, c. 8, is worthy of note: "Aliud est *justum constitui*, etiam ubi de imputatione sermo habetur, aliud *justificari*: cum illud justificationis fundus et fundamentum existat, et justificationem veram, cui substernitur, necessario praecedat, justus enim quis existat, prius necesse est, quam possit vere justificari. Utrumque autem a Christo habemus: nam et satisfactionis Christi meritum homini ex se injusto imputatum, justum eundem jam constituit, quum justitiam ei conciliet, qua justus sit; et justitiae hujus virtute, quae merito illo comparatur, justificatur necessario, ubi id opus fuerit: h. e. jure merito absolvitur, qui hac ratione justus exstat."



at the end with emphasis. Thus: "through the transgression of one it has come upon all men unto condemnation (ver. 18), because through the disobedience of the one they have all been put into the category of sinners (ver. 19), and through the fulfilment of right of one it shall come upon all men unto justification leading to life (ver. 18), because through the obedience of the one they shall all be put into the category of righteous (ver. 19)." Moreover, from the entire strain of Pauline teaching, such as we have hitherto listened to, the distinction follows that the sin of mankind, wrapped up objectively in Adam, at the same time inheres subjectively in mankind, whereas the righteousness of the justified through faith remains objectively wrapped up in Christ. (Comp. Calvin's remark on ver. 17 of this chapter.) But this distinction, though not denied (comp. vv. 13, 14, 20, 21, where the *παράπτωμα* of Adam is expressly conceived as inhering in mankind in the form of *ἀμαρτία*), is not expressly noted in the parallel itself, because in it only the point in common is placed in contrast, namely, the *objective inclusion* in Adam of sin bringing death, and in Christ of righteousness bringing life. Moreover, the limitation of the parallel does not specially bring out this difference, because *its* only purpose is to set in clear relief the exuberant abundance of grace in relation to the greatness of sin and ruin.

The apostle knows then, as we have seen, but one economy of sin and death, and one economy of righteousness and life. The head and mediator of one is Adam, the head and mediator of the other Christ. The question is now asked, Wherefore served the economy of law that intervened as a form of divine revelation between the period of sin and that of grace? This question, in conclusion, is answered, Not at all to bring righteousness and life, and so take the place of Christ, but to aggravate sin and death, and so complete the work of Adam, was the law given, ver. 20. By this means grace found occasion to manifest itself in superabundant fulness, ver. 20, so that the divine purpose to make grace reign unto life, where before sin reigned in death, was still accomplished, ver. 21. Without doubt, this supplementary remark concerning the purpose of the law was necessary to the completeness of the argument, especially in an epistle the ever-recurring refrain of which may be described as this: the *law* is nowise the mediator of grace, of righteousness, and life.

Ver. 20. Νόμος δὲ παρεισῆλθεν] The following explanations of παρεισῆλθεν we must reject as idiomatically indefensible:— (1) *It came in between* (Adam and Christ). (2) *πρὸς καιρὸν, obiter, ad tempus intravit.* (3) *Intravit, adesse coepit = εἰσῆλθεν*, in which case the preposition παρά is left altogether out of sight. Demonstrable (Gal. ii. 4; 2 Pet. ii. 1; also 2 Macc. viii. 1: παρεισπορευόμενοι λεληθότως), although not tenable in the present passage, is the rendering of the Vulgate: *subintravit = clam irrepisit*; for the notion of the law stealthily creeping in is opposed to the solemnity and publicity of its promulgation (Ex. xix. 16 ff.; Gal. iii. 19), to the esteem and reverence that Paul manifests for it (Rom. vii. 12 ff.), as well as to its wise divine purpose as stated in this passage. The meaning *practerea intravit, insuper introiit, or ingressa est lex, it came in or into the world besides* (i.e. beside ἁμαρτία, which, according to ver. 12, had already entered), yields a parallelism between the νόμος and ἁμαρτία not altogether pertinent. In this case, too, one would rather have expected πρὸς (comp. προσετέθη, Gal. iii. 19, according to the *lect. recept.*) or ἐπὶ as a designation of what is added to something already existing, instead of παρά. There remains, accordingly, nothing but the rendering: *to come in by the side of, by the way*, by which the law is described as a subordinate, accessory institution.<sup>1</sup> Alongside the chief economy of sin (εἰσῆλθεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ver. 12) ran the secondary economy of law (παρεισῆλθεν ὁ νόμος), modifying it, not in a specific, but only in a gradual way, since it did not, like Christ, abolish, but only, while preserving its essential character, enhance it. Rightly therefore Luther: *but the law came in by the way*.

—ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα] *that the offence might be increased or swell beyond measure.* The conjunction ἵνα is to be taken τελικῶς (see on iii. 19), not ἐκβατικῶς. The increase of the παράπτωμα as the result of the law must have been expressed by the words: νόμου δὲ παρεισελθόντος ἐπλεόνασε τὸ παράπτωμα. But if ἵνα be taken as a particle of *purpose*, it is arbitrary to supply to ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα: "in the eyes, in the conscious-

<sup>1</sup> Least of all may we render, with Mehring: "The law entered in opposition thereto, or appeared in opposition thereto." Apart from the doubt raised as to idiom, ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα forbids this. The apostle would scarcely have expressed a psychologically true proposition in the form of a logical contradiction ("the law appeared in opposition to sin for the purpose of enhancing it").

ness of men ;” for Paul did not write : ἵνα πλεονάσῃ ἡ ἐπίγνωσις τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Then, too, in what follows, the ὑπερπερισσεύειν of χάρις must likewise be conceived as taking place in the acknowledgment of men, clearly in opposition to the apostle’s meaning (comp. also vi. 1). According to Paul’s teaching, therefore, it was really the design of the law to multiply sin, just as it is said, Gal. iii. 19, that the law was given τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν, i.e. *ut transgressioness fierent*, and, 1 Cor. xv. 56, the law is called ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας. On the very ground that it leads to παράβασις it works ὀργήν (Rom. iv. 15). But, of course, the increase of sin by the law is only to be regarded as a *mediate purpose* of God, for the *final purpose* is, by increasing to force sin from within outwards, and leave it without concealment, and so work the *knowledge* of sin. διὰ γὰρ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας, Rom. iii. 20. How the enhancement of sin brings about the knowledge of sin, Rom. vii. 7 ff. describes. Here, then, the subject is not the final purpose in view, but only the mediate purpose, because the chief point was to insist that the law was nowise a medium of righteousness, but only a means of enhancing unrighteousness. Accordingly the emphasis lies on πλεονάσῃ. Comp. Augustine, *Enarratio in Ps. cii. c. 15* : “Hoc est in lege magnum mysterium, ideo eam datam, ut crescente peccato, humiliarentur superbi, humiliati confiterentur, confessi sanarentur.—Non crudeliter hoc fecit Deus, sed consilio medicinae. Aliquando enim videtur sibi homo sanus et aegrotat: et in eo quod aegrotat et non sentit, medicum non quaerit: augetur morbus, crescit molestia, quaeritur medicus, et totum sanatur.” τὸ παράπτωμα is never the *sinful habit, the power of the sinful principle*, but always the *sinful deed*. Moreover, it never, like ἡ ἁμαρτία, stands abstractly or collectively, just as little as the synonymous ἁμαρτήμα, but always refers to the concrete case only, to the definite particular sin of an individual. So therefore here. τὸ παράπτωμα is the trespass of Adam,—a meaning which, even if another were idiomatically possible, must still be maintained, because in this entire section (vv. 15, 17, 18) παράπτωμα invariably has this definite reference. Until the νόμος there was only Adam’s παράπτωμα; the law was given to multiply this παράπτωμα. But the παράπτωμα of Adam can only be multiplied by the law in so far as in the form of ἁμαρτία it inheres subjectively in mankind, on which account directly afterwards ἡ ἁμαρτία is used in the place of τὸ

**παράπτωμα.** Our verse then supplies a new proof of the correctness of our view of the exposition contained in vv. 12–19. **πλεονάζειν** = **πλέον γίγνεσθαι** or **εἶναι**, to become or be more, *augeri, multiplicari, abundare*, used of *extensive* or *intensive* abundance (2 Cor. iv. 15, viii. 15; Phil. iv. 17; 1 Thess. iii. 12; 2 Thess. i. 3; 2 Pet. i. 8). Here in the latter meaning, as the contrast of **ὑπερπερισσεύειν**, ver. 20, **πλεονάζειν**, vi. 1, indicates. The **παράπτωμα** or the **ἁμαρτία** implied in it was intensively aggravated by the law, inasmuch as from simple **ἁμαρτία** it became **παράβασις νόμου**. Luther: “in order that sin might become more abundant.”

—**οὗ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ὑπερπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις**] The apostle does not begin this sentence with **ἵνα**. We have therefore no reason to suppose that he regards the superabounding of grace as the *final purpose* of the enhancement of sin by the law. Rather one took place merely on *occasion* of the other. The aorist (**ὑπερπερίσσευσεν**) might be taken, as serving often in Greek to denote a general result of experience, in the sense of *what is usual*. Comp. Kühner, *Ausf. Gr. d. Gr. Spr.* II. p. 76. We should then have a general proposition, from which, in order to restore the thread of thought, we must still deduce the particular historical concrete case (where sin has abounded, there grace is wont to abound still more exceedingly, as took place in this case, etc.). Otherwise the following **ἵνα** would be left without adequate point of connection; for to regard the general proposition as a parenthesis, and make the second statement of purpose: **ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐβασίλευσεν κτλ.**, depend on the first: **ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα**, will not do, because the purpose, that as sin reigned in death, grace should reign unto life, was not accomplished only by the increase of sin through the law, as of course this purpose might be accomplished without this, ver. 17, and in the sphere of the Gentile world, which had not the law, must have been so accomplished. It appears preferable, then,—no certain instance of this use of the aorist, moreover, being forthcoming elsewhere in the N. T., comp. Winer, p. 346,—to refer **οὗ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν . . . ἡ χάρις** in this passage at once and directly to the particular historical concrete case, or to take it as a pure historical allusion. Then we might regard **οὗ** as an adverb of time = **ὅτε, ἐπειδή, when**, answering to the Latin *ubi*, as this temporal sense actually occurs in the combination **ἀφ' οὗ, ἐξ οὗ**: “but when sin increased, grace waxed exceedingly abundant.” Nevertheless this use of **οὗ** must

be regarded, especially in Greek prose, as nowise established, and in the N. T. unknown. We are accordingly compelled to abide by the local meaning, the only one established (iv. 15; 2 Cor. iii. 17: οὗ . . . ἐκεῖ, etc.) = *where*, i.e. in the *region* where, in the *sphere* in which. In the same sphere in which sin increased, grace abounded beyond measure. But then this sphere is no other than the nation of Israel placed under the law; so that Abelard's view of the οὗ may stand as a correct paraphrase of the *sense*: "in eodem populo, quo." But, no doubt, what has been done *once* on the part of God may be expanded—as repeating itself amid like circumstances in like manner—into the idea of a general law of divine action. ὑπερπερισσεύειν has not the comparative (Luther: "there grace became *far more abundant*"), but, like other compounds with ὑπέρ, the superlative meaning: *supra modum, valde redundare, to abound exceedingly*, Mark vii. 37, 2 Cor. vii. 4; comp. ὑπερλίαν, 2 Cor. xi. 5; ὑπερπλεονάζω, 1 Tim. i. 14; ὑπεραυξάνω, 2 Thess. i. 3; ὑπερνικῶ, Rom. viii. 37; ὑπερυψώω, Phil. ii. 9. The apostle's holy fervour loves expressions that transcend common limits. Moreover, he chooses ὑπερπερισσεύειν instead of ὑπερπλεονάζειν, because περισσεύειν is stronger than πλεονάζειν,—περισσόν denoting abundance absolutely; πλεόν, merely more than what is necessary. At the same time, ὑπερπερισσεύειν is perhaps used in allusion to περισσεύειν and περισσεία, vv. 15, 17. They who died τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι have received τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος; but in respect to those in whom the παράπτωμα, inhering in them in the form of ἁμαρτία, was increased through the νόμος, a ὑπερπερισσεύειν of grace found place. Finally, in relation to the preceding πλεονάζειν, the ὑπερπερισσεύειν still retains a comparative meaning. If, where sin rose high, grace rose to a still higher point, it is self-evident that the grace was greater than the sin.

Ver. 21 concludes the entire train of reasoning, carried on from ver. 12, bringing forward once again the main thought lying at its foundation. Even the economy of the law must subserve God's final purpose of making grace reign as previously sin had reigned. The law had indeed enhanced sin; but over against the increase of sin a superabundant fulness of grace had been given, in order that still the final purpose of God might be accomplished. In this verse, then, neither τοῦ ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία nor τοῦ ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ have we to supply the addition: "in

abundant measure." The apostle says not that sin and grace have been enhanced that not merely sin and grace, but *abundance* of sin and *abundance* of grace might stand in mutual contrast, but that abundance of grace has been set over against the enhancement of sin, in order that the universal, original purpose of God—through grace to abolish sin, through Christ to make up what had been lost through Adam—might not fall to the ground. This verse answers completely, although with a different turn of phraseology, to the meaning of ver. 17. Thus it contains no new thought, but merely the fundamental thought previously expressed by way of conclusion, to indicate that everything, even the legal economy, has tended to subserve the end stated.—*ἡ ἁμαρτία*] *sin*, which, in consequence of the *παράπτωμα* inhered in mankind, and in the case of those who were subject to the *νόμος*, had been enhanced into *παράβασις*.

—*ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*] *in death*; not as Luther translates: *unto death*, which would be *εἰς τὸν θάνατον*. Sin reigned *ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*, grace *εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*; for the sphere of death, in which sin exercised its sway, was one already existing; whereas *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, comp. ver. 17, is conceived as future. The antithesis of *θάνατος* and *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, vv. 17, 19, pervading this section, clearly appears also here, on which account it is inadmissible to translate *ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*, *through death*, as if in contrast with *διὰ δικαιοσύνης*. Instead of *οὕτω καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη βασιλεύσῃ*, Paul says, in allusion to *χάρις*, mentioned just before,

—*οὕτω καὶ ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ διὰ δικαιοσύνης*] Grace reigns unto eternal life as its final goal, to which it leads, since it is grace alone that works and bestows eternal life. But *δικαιοσύνη* is the *δικαιοσύνη πίστεως*, the righteousness of faith, which grace imparts; not righteousness of life, which the apostle only begins to describe in the sixth chapter.

—*διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*] Righteousness is the medium, Christ the Mediator. Hence the repeated *διὰ*. "Jam ne memoratur quidem Adamus," says Bengel, "soli Christi mentio viget."

## CHAPTER VI.

THE theme of the apostle, announced i. 17, that in the gospel the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* is revealed as coming *ἐκ πίστεως*, had now been discussed under all aspects. But the peculiar nature of the evangelical doctrine of justification left open the possibility of a suspicious misinterpretation. Thus from the declaration just made, v. 20 : *οὐ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ὑπερεπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις*, ignorant or malicious conclusions might be drawn. That this was actually done has been already intimated in the words, iii. 8 : *καθὼς βλασφημούμεθα καὶ καθὼς φασί τινες ἡμᾶς λέγειν, ὅτι ποιήσωμεν τὰ κακὰ, ἵνα ἔλθῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ*. And, indeed, even in apostolic days the doctrine of grace was perverted by some to the practical service of sin (Gal. v. 13 ; 1 Pet. ii. 16 ; Jude 4 ; also Jas. ii. 14 ff.),—a circumstance which might give a semblance of accuracy and truth to the objection that this is the inevitable consequence and fault of the doctrine itself. For this reason the apostle in the present chapter anticipates this perversion and misinterpretation, himself raising the question : *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν ; ἐπιμενοῦμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ ;* which he repels with a *μὴ γένοιτο*, and then shows how justifying faith, by its very nature, is the death of the old and the rising of a new man, on which account whoever is renewed by justification must of necessity be the servant of righteousness, not of sin, whose power and dominion over him is broken. But the doctrine of justification forms the all-determining and central thought of the epistle to such a degree that even the doctrine of renewal and justification, in itself so important, is introduced and discussed merely in the form of a defence against a false inference from the doctrine of justification. Moreover, the first introductory question of the chapter furnishes a new proof that, according to the apostle's teaching, the sinner's justification consists purely in the grace of forgiveness, not withal in the grace, without doubt directly implied in it and most intimately associated with it, of sanctification and renewal. If sanctification and renewal form a con-

stituent element and integral factor in the notion of justification, the question : ἐπιμενοῦμεν τῇ ἁμαρτία, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ ; has neither reason nor meaning.

Ver. 1. Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν ;] iii. 5. *What, then, shall we say ?* i.e. what shall we infer from what was just said ? v. 20. The apostle himself introduces the possible false inference. He does not represent it as made by an opponent—a Jew or Jewish Christian. In this case he would not have said : τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν, but : ἐρεῖς οὖν μοι, ix. 19.

—ἐπιμενοῦμεν τῇ ἁμαρτία] The best codices give ἐπιμένωμεν,<sup>1</sup> which reading, rightly approved by all modern expositors, Griesbach in his smaller edition, Lachmann, and Tischendorf have received into the text. The copyists wrote ἐπιμενοῦμεν, after the pattern of ἐροῦμεν. The conjunctive is deliberative : Are we to continue ? Comp. Mark xii. 14 : ἔξεστι κῆνσον Καίσαρι δοῦναι ἢ οὐ ; δῶμεν, ἢ μὴ δῶμεν ; Comp. Winer, p. 356. ἐπιμένειν τινί, to continue in something, comp. xi. 22 ; Col. i. 23.

—ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ ;] glances back at v. 20.

Ver. 2. μὴ γένοιτο] comp. on iii. 4.

—οὔτινες] causal, *quippe qui, we being such as*, see on i. 25, 32. The fact of our having died to sin is the reason why we shall no longer live in sin. But the relative sentence is placed first with emphasis, in order to bring out with greater force the impossibility of the ζῆν ἐν ἁμαρτία. The apostle argues from the τεθνηκέναι τῇ ἁμαρτία as an acknowledged fact against the absurd inference of the first verse, without entering more deeply into a logical analysis of the false conclusion, whose possibility was fitly repelled by μὴ γένοιτο.

—ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτία] comp. Gal. ii. 19 : νόμῳ ἀποθνήσκειν ; Col. ii. 20 : ἀποθνήσκειν ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων τοῦ κόσμου ; 1 Pet. ii. 24 : ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογίγνεσθαι ; Rom. vii. 4 : θανατοῦσθαι τῷ νόμῳ ; Gal. vi. 14 : σταυροῦσθαι τῷ κόσμῳ. Thus ἀποθνήσκειν τῇ ἁμαρτία = *to die to sin*, or *as regards sin*, not : *to die by sin*, and not : *to die on account of sin* (with Clirist). Comp. Theodoret : ἡρνήθης, φησὶ, τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ νεκρὸς αὐτῇ γέγονας. To die to sin means to break off living connection with it, to have no further relation to it, no further communion with it. The

<sup>1</sup> "So Cod. A B C D E F G, Min. Cod. Sinait. read ἐπιμένωμεν, but perhaps only as an error in copying. For the indic. pres. would involve the supposition, not occurring here, of an actual desire to continue in sin," Winer, p. 354.



norist denotes an occurrence that happened *once*. According to the previous exposition, this can only be the moment and act of justification itself, which by the following verse is represented as annexed to the reception of the sacrament of baptism. Thus forgiveness is at the same time the death of sin. Forgiven sin only is hated, that unforgiven is loved. By means of justifying faith the life of sin receives, as matter of course, its death-blow. This does not first take place through a second isolated act following upon faith.

—*πῶς*] expresses the impossibility of the thing. Whoever in the past died to sin, can and will no longer live in sin.

—*ἐτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ*] ver. 11 ; Col. ii. 20. To live in sin = to maintain living fellowship, relation, connection with it. Similarly *περιπατεῖν ἐν τινι*, 2 Cor. iv. 2 ; Eph. iv. 17. Still *περιπατεῖν* is the external manifestation of the *ζῆν* that denotes internal spiritual fellowship, Col. iii. 7 ; Gal. v. 25. Calov's remark is worthy of note : " Pontificii hinc extorquere volunt dogma suum de omnimoda peccati sublatione et extirpatione ; sed non urgenda est *metaphorica* locutio, neque extendenda ultra mentem Spiritus Sancti contra analogiam fidei. Nam Apostolus de dominio peccati loquitur, quod justificatis peccatum non dominetur, quodque non serviant illi peccato, non vero eosdem sine peccato et peccati sensu esse docet."

Ver. 3. The impossibility of the Christian living in sin, the apostle deduces from the significance and effect of the sacrament of baptism. He refers to the baptismal act, because by it the Christian has been taken into communion with Christ. From its import, therefore, the nature of the Christian's position must needs be clearly apparent. If, according to Paul's mode of view, baptism were merely a symbolical attestation to the fact of regeneration which has previously taken place, and not rather, as is expressly stated Tit. iii. 5, comp. Eph. v. 26, the effectual medium by which *παλιγγενεσία* is accomplished, the apostle would more aptly have reminded the church of the moment of their believing than of the moment of their baptism. For faith also is a faith in Christ's *death*. It may not be said that the reference to the baptismal act is only chosen because by *κατάδυσις* and *ἀνάδυσις* the submergence of the old and the emergence of the new man is shadowed forth ; for in that case Paul would have named these symbolical acts and indicated them more

definitely, whereas it must remain doubtful whether in this passage he even so much as glanced at them, although doubtless, comp. especially ver. 4, this is probable. Elsewhere also Paul reminds the churches of baptism as the sacrament of their initiation into communion with Christ, comp. Gal. iii. 27, Eph. iv. 5, and the passage analogous to the present one, Col. ii. 11, 12. While, then, in the preceding verse he only said in general terms that they actually died to sin, in this verse he intimates that this took place in baptism, because what took place in them as Christians must certainly make itself known as having taken place in baptism, the sacrament of their incorporation into Christ. This holds true especially of infant baptism preceding the ministry of the Word. But even the Word that precedes the baptism of adults is merely preparatory to baptism as the real crowning act, just as the Word following baptism simply points back to baptism by way of continuous exposition and application. The Word that goes before offers to all collectively the gracious gift which baptism conveys to the particular definite individual. Faith *before* baptism accepts *for itself also* the gift promised in the Word to *all*; faith *in* and *after* baptism accepts the blessing given *by God Himself to it specially*. In the former case takes place a subjective and human (though one willed and brought about by God), in the latter an objective and divine individual application of the blessing of salvation. Wherefore, as in baptism the general act of salvation has been accomplished in me directly by God, my faith as to its assurance of salvation rests upon my baptism, in which, as in a focus, the Word going before or following is gathered up, and sheds upon me its illuminating rays. ἡ ἀγνοεῖτε, ὅτι] vii. 1 = ἡ οὐκ οἶδατε, ὅτι, xi. 2; 1 Cor. vi. 2, etc. Or (if what is asserted ver. 2 should still appear doubtful, if you are unwilling to concede it), *know you not?* (which not to know as something universally known would be a reproach to you.) “Doctrina de baptismo fuit omnibus cognita,” remarks Bengel; and: “*Ignorantia* multum officit: *scientia* non sufficit.”

—ὅσοι] *quotquot, as many as, all we who.*

—ἐβαπτίσθημεν] passive. Paul here speaks, not of what Christians *did*, but of what *was done* in them in baptism. Just so in the main in the next verses up to ver. 11. No doubt he already touches beforehand on the subjective design (ἵνα . . . καὶ

ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν, ver. 4; τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ver. 6) which they, in consequence of that objective fact, have to realize. But it is not till ver. 12 that he expressly summons them to the actual fulfilment of that duty.

—εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν] *unto Christ Jesus*, in relation to Him. But the relation, as the exposition itself proves, is one of most intimate union, dependence, and fellowship.

—εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν] *were baptized unto His death*. “Qui baptizatur,” says Bengel, “induit Christum Adamum secundum; in Christum, inquam, totum, adeoque etiam in mortem ejus baptizatur: et perinde est, ac si eo momento Christus pro tali homine, et talis homo cum Christo pateretur, moreretur, sepeliretur.” Comp. 2 Cor. v. 15. The apostle describes a psychological event, mysterious indeed, but real and certain, although conceivable only by *experience* of the new birth effected through justification. As the death of Christ is the crown and chief element in His redemptive work, baptism above all introduces into union with the *death* of Christ. Hitherto the fellowship with Christ’s death, in which baptism places us objectively and faith subjectively, was only considered in so far as it justifies, now it is considered as it sanctifies. But it does the one through the other. The incorporation of man into Christ’s death through justifying faith is at the same time his sanctification. For the sin of his, which he beholds by faith lying upon Christ his substitute, and in Him crucified, is no longer present in him; it is crucified, *i.e.* forgiven, and at the same time blotted out. The act by which he subjectively transfers his own sins to Christ, who objectively bore them, as one and the same act both justifies and sanctifies. Although, therefore, the apostle here treats of sanctifying incorporation into Christ’s death, he does not thereby exclude justifying incorporation into the same death. Nor does he even regard the former as subsequent to the latter in time. Rather for him fellowship with Christ’s death, mediating the forgiveness of sins, is *eo ipso* the act of sin’s obliteration, or the death itself of the old man. Only in this way can we explain the sudden transition from the delineation of believing fellowship with Christ’s death as one that justifies to the description of identity with Christ’s death as one that sanctifies, and the phraseology answering to this in the

exposition now following. But hence results the inference that justification is regarded, not as the temporal, but as the causal antecedent of sanctification, and, although not separable, to be distinguished from it. "Utriusque finis causa in mortem Christi baptizamur, ut et liberemur morte Christi a peccati reatu et Spiritus S. effundatur in nos, cujus virtute liberi reddamur a dominio peccati, ut peccato mortui amplius non vivamus eidem, sed Domino nostro, ejusque sanctissimis vestigiis insistamus. *Fines hi subordinati sunt*; nam liberationem a reatu peccati vel justificationem consequitur liberatio a dominio peccati, ut justificati non vivant peccato, sed peccato mortui Domino, qui eos a peccati reatu et maledictione liberavit, vivant atque serviant," Calov. Luther's small Catechism distinguishes the gift or benefit of baptism, consisting in the forgiveness of sins and eternal blessedness, from the significance of baptism, which consists in this: "that the old Adam in us, with every sin and evil lust, is to be drowned, and to die through daily sorrow and penitence, and a new man, living unto God in righteousness and purity for ever, daily to come forth and rise up." But what is to be actually done by us daily was done in us originally in the very act of baptism; as also the gift and the significance of baptism, although standing to each other in the relation of cause and effect, are yet combined in one and the same moment of baptism.

Ver. 4. If by baptism we are brought into fellowship with Christ's death, it follows that we are also buried with Him, inasmuch as burial is the attestation of the truth and reality of death. "Sepultura mortem ratam facit," Bengel. *συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ*] The *συν* in *συνετάφημεν* does not merely express a comparison = ὥσπερ αὐτός, as if Christ's physical burial were to be taken as a type of our spiritual burial. Rather it denotes a real fellowship, seeing that in the dead body of Christ our substitute, in virtue of our spiritual incorporation in Him, our sinful body is conceived as buried at the same time. Comp. Col. ii. 12: *συνταφέντες αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βαπτίσματι*. On the figure, Chrysostom remarks on John iii.: *ἡμῶν καθάπερ ἐν τινι τάφῳ τῷ ὕδατι καταδύνοντων τὰς κεφαλὰς ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος θάπτεται, καὶ καταδύς κάτω κρύπτεται ὅλως καὶ καθάπαξ*.

—*διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον*] corresponds to *εἰς*

τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν, ver. 3, for which reason εἰς τὸν θάνατον is to be joined with διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, not with συνετάφημεν, the expression "buried unto death," moreover, containing an incongruous figure. The repetition of the article before εἰς τὸν θάνατον is needless, because τὸ βάπτισμα εἰς τὸν θάνατον = τὸ εἰς τὸν θάνατον βαπτίζεσθαι, forms *one* notion.

—ἵνα κτλ.] *in order that*, etc. ἵνα is to be taken τελικῶς, not ἐκβατικῶς. We are dead and buried with Christ, not that we may continue dead, but that we may rise again as Christ rose again, or rise again in and with Him. But the apostle forthwith describes the ultimate purpose of sanctification, which is not only an ἀποθνήσκειν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ and a συνεγείρεσθαι τῷ Χριστῷ, but also an ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατεῖν, in contrast with the former περιπατεῖν ἐν ἁμαρτίᾳ. As incorporation into Christ's death is the death of the old man, so is incorporation into Christ's resurrection the resurrection of the new one. In truth, this death and this rising again are *one* indivisible act, for no neutral condition of the human spirit is conceivable even for a moment. But the two are rightly separated in idea as the negative and positive sides of one and the same process. Besides, there is no doubt implied in the forgiveness of sins, mediated by faith in Christ's death, along with the destruction of the old life at the same time, and, indeed, as matter of course, the creation of the new one. Nevertheless, this last element is not arbitrarily referred to Christ's *resurrection*, because the *death* of Christ is only the principle of the new life in so far as it is the death of the Prince of *life*, in so far as in it that holy and eternal life was laid down which by the *resurrection* manifested and asserted itself in its truth, and reality, and triumphant immortality. But, in like manner, as incorporation into Christ's death obliterates sin by *cancelling guilt*, does incorporation into Christ's resurrection regenerate by positively *justifying*, Eph. ii. 5, 6; Col. ii. 12, 13, iii. 1.

—διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς] *Through the glory of the Father*. The glory of God comprises the manifested plenitude of His attributes; but among them, in a particular case, *one* may be especially illustrious. So here the omnipotence, the δύναμις, to which elsewhere the raising of Christ is uniformly ascribed, 1 Cor. vi. 14; 2 Cor. xiii. 4; Eph. i. 20, comp. with Col. i. 11, where we read τὸ κράτος τῆς δόξης.

—ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς] not absolutely identical with ἐν ζωῇ καινῇ, but stronger, inasmuch as the idea of *newness* is put forward as an independent idea, and thus special attention is directed to it, vii. 6; 1 Tim. vi. 17; Winer, p. 296.

Ver. 5 contains the confirmation (γάρ) of the last thought, ver. 4: ἵνα ὥσπερ κτλ. We are able to walk in a new life, because, if we are dead with Christ, we shall also be partakers in His resurrection. Of our *resurrection* to the new life the apostle had not directly spoken in the last verse, but simply of its consequence—our *walk* in the new life. But this walk is conditioned by, and possible through nothing but the resurrection. εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ] Luther: “but as with Him we are planted in a like death.” Calvin: “nam si insititii facti sumus similitudini mortis ejus,” with the remark: “Ergo ut surculus communem habet vitae et mortis conditionem cum arbore in quam insertus est: ita vitae Christi non minus, quam et mortis participes nos esse consentaneum est.” But σύμφυτος is not to be derived from φυτεύω = ἐμφύτευτος,<sup>1</sup> *engrafted*, set, implanted, but, like συμφυής, from φύω, as the *Etym. Mag.* rightly remarks: ξύμφυτος, ὁ συγγενής, ἀπὸ τοῦ ξὺν καὶ φύω. The meaning of σύμφυτος, as has been shown by modern expositors (comp., beside Lösner, *obss. sacr.* p. 253, Reiche and Fritzsche here), is very diversified:—(1) Derived from φύομαι, in the sense of *to become, to become by birth*, it means *connate, innatus*. LXX. Zech. xi. 2: ὅτι κατεσπάσθη ὁ δρυμὸς ὁ σύμφυτος, i.e. the primeval oak-forest, coeval with the place. Hence (a) *existing from birth, innate, innatus*. So Joseph. *Antt. J.* vi. 3. 3: ἡ σύμφυτος δικαιοσύνη; 3 Macc. iii. 22: ἡ σύμφυτος κακοήθεια. In the same sense stands ἔμφυτος, Wisd. xii. 10: πονηρὰ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν καὶ ἔμφυτος ἡ κακία αὐτῶν. The opposite of this σύμφυτον, *innate, natural*, is given in ἐπίκτητον, ἐπακτόν, ἐπίθετον, *adventitium, adscititium*, what is gained in addition, what is added, strange, counterfeit, artificial. (b) *Of like species, race, descent, birth, nature, cognatus, cognate*; metaphorically = *similis, similar*. (c) *Arising simultaneously, growing simultaneously*, Luke viii. 7: συμφυεῖσαι αἱ ἄκανθαι, *spinæ simul exortæ*. This leads us to the second class of meanings of σύμφυτος:—(2) From φύομαι, in the meaning *to grow*, it signifies (a) *grown together, concretus, connaturatus*; metaphorically: *closely united*.

<sup>1</sup> As may easily be suggested by the analogy of *φυσιογόνος* actually occurring.

Hence of places, (*b*) *overgrown, consitus*. Α τόπος σύμφυτος, accordingly, is a place, as it were, grown together, densely covered with trees, *i.e.* overgrown with trees. LXX. Amos ix. 13 : καὶ πάντες οἱ βουνοὶ σύμφυτοι ἔσονται. But in the present passage, manifestly only the meaning (1 *b*) or (2 *a*) can find place. It is most appropriate to take the latter, as by it both the choice of the expression σύμφυτος is better explained, and the intimate fellowship of believers with Christ is more definitely set forth. Besides, the phrase “cognate or similar to the likeness of death” is tautological, or rather illogical. We might indeed connect σύμφυτοι with τῷ Χριστῷ, to be supplied, and take τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ as the *dativus instrumenti*: “for we are become cognate (similar) to Christ through the likeness of His death (*i.e.* through our dying spiritually as Christ died bodily, vv. 2–4).” But in this case Paul would probably have written : εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν αὐτῷ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου. As the words now run, we are naturally led to the simple and most obvious connection of σύμφυτοι with τῷ ὁμοιώματι, a connection which is to be retained as long as it yields an appropriate sense. But such a sense demonstrably exists. “For if we grew together, *i.e.* became closely united with the likeness of His death.” The ὁμοίωμα (analogue) of His death is the spiritual dying with which, in baptism, vv. 3, 4, we grew together, *i.e.* became closely united. But to be closely united, or, as it were, covered with the likeness of Christ’s death, means nothing else than (in virtue of His death) “to be dead spiritually as He was bodily,” or “to be such as that it belongs inseparably to their nature to set forth in themselves likeness to His death (in a moral relation, ver. 3 f.)”

—ἀλλὰ καὶ] *verum etiam, but also*. The antithesis to which ἀλλὰ refers is found, as here, so also occasionally in classical Greek, in a hypothetical protasis. Homer, *Il.* viii. 153 : εἴπερ γάρ σ’ Ἔκτωρ γε κακὸν καὶ ἀνάγκιδα φήσει, ἀλλ’ οὐ πείσονται Τρῶες.

—τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα] We might perhaps attempt here to apply the construction εἶναί τινος = to belong to some one. So τῆς ἀναστάσεως εἶναι, to belong to the resurrection = to stand in fellowship, to be closely united with the resurrection. But elsewhere εἶναί τινος refers only to relation to a *person*, and denotes dependence, subjection, not mere fellowship. Besides, in this way the parallelism of expression in the protasis and apodosis

would be lost. *σύμφυτος*, then, being construed as well with the genitive as the dative, several expositors have made *τῆς ἀναστάσεως* depend on *σύμφυτοι*, which is to be repeated in thought. Nevertheless, as the expression *τῇ ἀναστάσει* lay at hand for this purpose, the abrupt change of construction must appear the more strange. Accordingly nothing is left (in accordance with the familiar form of *comparatio compendiaria*, comp. Matt. v. 20, etc.) but to supply *σύμφυτοι τῷ ὁμοιώματι*, in which, especially as the emphasis lies on *τοῦ θανάτου* and *τῆς ἀναστάσεως*, there is no difficulty. "We are closely united, as with the likeness of His death, so also with the likeness of His resurrection." The *ἀνάστασις* is the *ἀνάστασις αὐτοῦ*, the resurrection of Christ, and the *ὁμοίωμα* of the same is our spiritual resurrection. We are not then to think of the bodily resurrection of believers, a notion altogether foreign to the connection. The future *ἐσόμεθα* expresses neither a *should* nor a *would*, but denotes that which is the consequence, in the nature of things, of another thing presupposed or preceding. If we are dead with Christ, it follows that we shall rise with Him, because otherwise our fellowship with Him were imperfect and defective. Incorporation into His death is not conceivable without incorporation into His resurrection.

Ver. 6. The apostle had spoken hitherto of an incorporation into Christ's death, of a being covered with the likeness of His death. The representation was thus pre-eminently objective, inasmuch as the man was pictured as transplanted out of himself into Christ's death, or into the likeness of His death and resurrection, *i.e.* into the new spiritual man projected, so to speak, out of the subject. It is now declared, more precisely, what consequences this objective event has in the nature of the subject himself. It is, as to its nature, a destruction of the sinful principle in us, an annihilation of corrupt desire and inclination. The *βαπτισθῆναι εἰς τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, the *συνταφῆναι αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον*, the *σύμφυτον γενεῖναι τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ*, subjectively regarded, is nothing else than a *συσταυρωθῆναι* of the *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος*, a *καταργηθῆναι* of the *σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. Accordingly *τοῦτο γινώσκοντες*] is neither to be taken as confirmatory nor causal; but the participle, as often (ii. 4), simply continues the construction = *καὶ τοῦτο γινώσκουμεν*.

—ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος] comp. Harless on Eph. iv. 22,



and Bucer's comment on that passage: "(deponere) veterem hominem h. e. naturam nostram quanta est, quae erroneis concupiscentiis perpetuo fertur." The παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, *the old man*, is the sinful *ego*, the ἐγὼ σαρκικός, Rom. vii. 14; ἐγὼ ἡ σάρξ, *ibid.* ver. 18. It is παλαιός, viewed from the standpoint of ἀναγέννησις, παλιγγενεσία (John iii. 3; Tit. iii. 5), *the former, previous man*, to whom the ἄνθρωπος νέος, καινός, created by the new birth, or the καινὴ κτίσις, is opposed, Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 9, 10; 2 Cor. v. 17. The phrase παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος is therefore a personification, not of the former *mōde of conduct* (Col. iii. 9, πράξεις αὐτοῦ are distinguished from the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος himself), but of the previous (sinful) *character* or ruling tendency of the whole life.

—συνεσταυρώθῃ] *sc.* τῷ Χριστῷ. Elsewhere an ἀποθέσθαι, ἀπεκδύσασθαι of the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος is spoken of; here, a σταυροῦσθαι, in allusion to the crucifixion of Christ, with which we enter into fellowship, and so experience the crucifixion of our old man. "Hunc veterem hominem dicit esse affixum cruci Christi, quia ejus virtute conficitur. Ac nominatim allusit ad crucem, quo expressius indicaret non aliunde nos mortificari, quam ex ejus mortis participatione," Calvin. "σύν non similitudinem notat, verum simultatem, ut ita dicam, et communionem," Calvin.

—ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας] *that the body of sin might be destroyed*, specifies the purpose of ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθῃ. But as the καταργεῖσθαι of the σῶμα appears here as the end and aim of the σταυροῦσθαι, it can only be understood of an actual annihilation, not of a mere cessation of activity, a reduction to inactivity. The σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας cannot then denote the physical, material body, in so far as it is the seat or organ of sin; for this is only destroyed by natural death, comp. 1 Cor. vi. 13: καταργεῖν τὴν κοιλίαν. Nor can the incidental meaning of the subsequent σῶμα θνητόν, ver. 12, be decisive as to the sense of the preceding σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας appearing in another connection. Accordingly in this latter phrase we can only, with many older and some modern expositors (comp. especially, Julius Müller, *Christ. Doct. of Sin*, I. 330), recognise a continuation of the figure. ἁμαρτία is conceived as a σῶμα, and in the crucifixion of the old man, not the actual body, but this σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας is destroyed. In

this case it is most natural not to suppose a mere periphrasis (so Theodoret: *περιφραστικῶς αὐτὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία*), but to explain the choice of the figurative expression by supposing that the apostle considers the mass of sin as an articulated organism, as *σῶμα*, whose members are particular sinful lusts. So Pelagius: "Quia unum vitium membrum peccati, omnia corpus totum." Quite analogous, then, is the phrase, Col. ii. 11: *ἐν τῇ ἀπεκδύσει τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκός* (comp. Julius Müller, *ibid.*, Bähr, and Steiger on the passage). In that place is meant the totality of the *σάρξ*, the *natura corrupta*, the *ἀπέκδυσις* of which is represented, as in the present passage, as accomplished in our joint-burial in baptism. Were *σῶμα* here man's natural body, the *ἀπέκδυσις τοῦ σώματος* in this passage must have been understood, analogously to *ἀπεκδύσασθαι*, 2 Cor. v. 4, of bodily death. But this *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός* has its *μέλη*. These are *τὰ μέλη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, Col. iii. 5, consisting in particular lusts, *πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία*, etc., whose *νεκροῦσθαι*, analogous to *σταυροῦσθαι, καταργεῖσθαι, ἀπεκδύεσθαι*, is enjoined. Already Chrysost. interprets *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας* here by *τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν διαφόρων μερῶν πονηρίας συγκεκλιμένην κακίαν*. "Ideo autem cum Christo crucifixus est homo vetus," remarks Calov, "ut aboleatur non hoc vel illud tantum peccatum, sed totum peccati corpus cum omnibus membris suis, ut posthac non serviamus ulli peccato, nam ita aboletur peccatum, quantum ad dominium, quando non servitur eidem."

—*τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*] "finem abolitionis notat," Calvin. As in ver. 4 our walk in a new life is described as the end of our spiritual resurrection, so here it is described as the end of our spiritual death with Christ, that we should no longer render obedience to sin. We are to do what God did in us. Because sin's dominion over us is abolished, we are no longer to serve it. If we commit sin, we serve it according to John viii. 34, it is our *βασιλεὺς* or *κύριος*; we, its *δούλοι* or *ὑπηήκοι*, vv. 12, 14.

Ver. 7 confirms *τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ* by the proposition: *ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*] *for he that is dead is absolved from sin*. Several, especially modern, interpreters refer *ἀποθνήσκειν* to *physical* death. In that case a threefold interpretation is possible. (1) He that is dead is freed from sin, because by death he is freed from the body, the seat of sin. This view rests upon an anthropology quite as unbiblical as

it is un-Pauline, comp. Julius Müller, I. 315.<sup>1</sup> (2) "*Usus est sententia civili de operibus,*" says Melancthon. "*Mortua natura non est efficax.*" The dead one sins no more against the statutes of the civil law. *Τίς γὰρ ἐθεάσατο πώποτε*, comments Theodoret, *νεκρὸν ἢ γάμον ἀλλότριον διορύττοντα . . . ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀτόπων διαπραττόμενον*; But against this view it has been remarked, in the first place, that Paul would have simply expressed this meaning in the words: *ὁ γὰρ νεκρὸς οὐκέτι ἁμαρτάνει*, and then he would probably have added the more exact definition: *against the civil law*, as without doubt he believed in an *ἁμαρτάνειν* against the divine law in the life hereafter in the case of the *ἀπίστοις*, just as much as in the case of the *διάβολος*. For if *ἁμαρτία* ceased, *θάνατος* would be abolished. (3) Others explain the proposition of death by *execution*, by which sin is atoned for. In this case with *δεδικαίωται* is compared the juristic expression of ancient German criminal law, according to which it was said of the executed: *he is justified*. But here clearly the apostle speaks not only of freedom from subjection to punishment, but also of freedom from sin itself. In the latter lies the motive for *μηκέτι δουλεύειν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*. Moreover, we have no authority for referring *ὁ ἀποθανών* specially to death by *execution*. Accordingly *ἀποθνήσκειν* must be referred to the *ethical* death spoken of in the preceding vv. 5, 6, and in what directly follows (ver. 8: *εἰ δὲ ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν Χριστῷ*, which stands in relation to *ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανών*, ver. 7). In this case it is not necessary to supply *τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ* to *ἀποθανών*, although even then the sentence would not be directly tautological. Just as we say: he that lives to sin is the slave of sin, may we say: he that is dead to sin is freed from the slavery of sin. Notwithstanding, *ὁ ἀποθανών* is to be simply interpreted: *he that is dead*, whereupon it follows naturally from what precedes that here is meant the inner, spiritual death carried into effect in believing fellowship with Christ's death, by which, as by death in general, all former relations and connections are dissolved, and therefore the connection with sin, which thus loses its old authority and power over man. But if man is absolved from sin, he ought not again to hold converse with it. *δεδικαίωμέθα ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ἵνα μηκέτι δουλεύωμεν αὐτῇ*. *δεδικαίωται* Chrysost. explains by *ἀπὴλλακται*; Theophl., Oecum., Schol. Matth. by *ἡλευθέρωται*. "*Nil jam in eum juris est peccato,*"

<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless this is still repeated by Meyer.

explains Bengel, "ut non jam sit *debitor*, c. viii. 12. Justus est, ratione praeteriti a reatu; ratione futuri, a dominio, ver. 14." *δικαιοῦν* retains, then, here the meaning *absolvere*, to *acquit*, which the added definition ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας enlarges to the notion of *liberare*, to *set free*. Comp. Eccus. xxvi. 29; Acts xiii. 39. Man being set free from sin, it has lost its power over him, its power to accuse and to *govern* him. Comp. also with the statement of this verse the analogous utterance, 1 Pet. iv. 1: ὅτι ὁ παθὼν ἐν σαρκί, πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας, and Steiger, *ibid*.

Ver. 8 continues the thought expressed in vv. 6, 7. The emphasis falls on ἀπεθάνομεν and συζήσομεν. If we *died* with Christ, we believe that we shall also *live* with Him, for only thus does our fellowship with Him become complete. The sentence corresponds with the one contained in ver. 5. Still there is no tautology, but a systematic carrying forward of the exposition. The process of sanctification is treated first of all as to its objective, vv. 3, 4, next as to its objective and subjective, ver. 5, and finally as to its purely subjective aspect, vv. 6–8. If by faith we stand in fellowship with Christ's death and resurrection, we are thereby incorporated with the spiritual death and spiritual resurrection (σύμφυτοι κτλ.) that manifest their subjective existence in us as the death of the old man and as a new life (συζήσομεν). πιστεύομεν] This confidence is based on the assurance that God will not leave His work of grace unfinished in us, which would be the case if He made us partakers merely of the death of Christ and not also of His life, 1 Thess. v. 24; 2 Thess. iii. 3; 2 Tim. ii. 11.

—συζήσομεν] refers not to the future ζῶν αἰώνιος, neither exclusively nor partially, in so far as this may be regarded as the continuation of the present ζῶν ἐν Χριστῷ. Neither πιστεύομεν (see *ante*) nor the future (which is to be explained as in the similar case, ver. 5) commits us to this opinion, which is also alien to the strain of thought (comp. the summary conclusion, ver. 11). Rather συζήσομεν refers exclusively to the new life of believers in this world, which no doubt, according to John iv. 14, is in itself the water that springs up to eternal life.

Ver. 9 introduces the new thought that this ζῶν ἐν Χριστῷ is a continuous one, never again to be interrupted, since Christ, raised from the dead, dies no more. εἰδότες] = καὶ οἶδαμεν, comp. γινώσκοντες, ver. 6.

—ὅτι Χριστὸς, ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν, οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει] from which it directly follows that our life, being conformed to His, is an enduring, unending one; for in Christ's life lies the power and the promise of the unbroken continuance of our life. But this does not preclude the possibility of our again losing this life, supposing us to fall away.

—θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει] *death is no longer* (as formerly) *lord over Him*. An emphatic repetition of οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει, strengthened by the form of asyndeton. As the sinless Son of God, Christ was lord of death; but as our substitute, made sin for us (2 Cor. v. 21), He made Himself its servant.

Ver. 10. Confirmation of οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει, ver. 9. The death which Christ died He died to sin ἐφάπαξ, therefore He will not die a second time; but the life which He lives He lives τῷ θεῷ, in which lies the guarantee for the imperishableness of His present life. ὁ γὰρ ἀπέθανε] comp. Gal. ii. 20: ὁ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, Winer, p. 209. ὁ is paraphrased by several expositors: *quod attinet ad id, quod, as concerns this, that*; but by others is more correctly taken as the case of object. ἀποθνήσκειν τι, ζῆν τι = *aliquam mortem mori, aliquam vitam vivere*. So therefore ὁ ἀπέθανε, *what He died* = the death that He died, He died, etc.

—τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανε] (*this*) *He died to sin, i.e. died in relation to sin*. The phrase is chosen in allusion to ver. 2: οἵτινες ἀπεθάνομεν, and ver. 11: νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ. But the parallel is merely a formal one, Christ having died to sin in a different manner from us; He, as the previous exposition and the teaching of Scripture elsewhere show, to atone for and efface it; we, to get rid of fellowship with it. But of course our ἀποθνήσκειν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ is only a consequence, and takes place only in virtue of the ἀποθνήσκειν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ on the part of Christ.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Meyer, following Hofmann, explains: "*He is dead to sin* (dative of reference), i.e. His dying *concerned* sin; and, indeed, so that the latter (namely, the sin of the world, conceived as power) has now, after He has suffered death on account of it, become without influence upon Him, and has no more power over Him; He submitted Himself to its power in His death, but through that death *He has died to its power*." If this exposition is not to detract from the biblical doctrine of atonement, which at least in Meyer is not the case, it would *in point of fact* be equivalent to our view; for in no other way had sin power over Christ than that in His death He bore the penalty of sin as a substitute. Moreover, the exposition: "*to die in reference to sin = to die to the power of sin*," seems to me artificial. Neither ver. 2 nor ver. 11 furnishes a parallel instance.

Bengel calls the dative τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ a *dativus detrimenti*. Although as to grammar more correctly described as dative of *relation*, as matter of fact Christ no doubt died, not in *commodum*, but in *detrimentum peccati*.

—ἐφάπαξ] used emphatically, *once*, i.e. once for all, not to be repeated, Heb. vii. 27, ix. 12, x. 10; 1 Pet. iii. 18; Heb. ix. 26, 28.

—ζῇ τῷ θεῷ] *He lives to God*. His life belongs no longer to the death-causing power of sin, but to the eternal, immortal God alone, with whose glory it is penetrated, clothed with whose omnipotence He Himself now reigns as king for ever. “Vivit Deo, vitam ex Deo gloriosam, divini vigoris plenam, in perpetuum. Nam Deus est Deus viventium,” Bengel.

Ver. 11. Application of ver. 10 to believers in the form of a recurrence to ver. 2, and conclusion in the same form of the previous course of reasoning. οὕτω] *in like manner*, namely, as Christ *once* died to sin and lives to God, ver. 10. Griesbach and others needlessly place a colon after ὑμεῖς. It is true it was said of Christ that He died to sin, not that He reckoned, etc. But even with this new punctuation the same difference remains, for λογίξεσθε κτλ. still contains the exposition of οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς. At most, Griesbach's reading renders the language more emphatic. As an example of the usual mode of connection, comp. Luke xvii. 10.

—λογίξεσθε ἑαυτοὺς] *Imperative*, not *indicative*, in which case we should have expected οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς λογιζόμεθα, comp. ver. 8. λογίξεσθε, not *colligite*, *conclude*, but *existimate*, *reputate*, *censere*, *consider*, *judge*, *be assured*, iii. 28; 1 Cor. iv. 1. Believers are to *acknowledge* themselves for what they are; and with this is connected the summons, ver. 12, to *represent* it also in their life. But what they are they became through baptism unto Christ's death.

—νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ] The *lect. recept.* εἶναι after νεκροὺς μὲν is rightly removed from the text by Griesbach, Knapp, and Lachmann on preponderant authority. It is also said λογίξεσθαι τινά τι, “to take one for something,” Wisd. v. 4, xv. 15.

—ζώντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ] to His will and service, given up to Him as His property (xiv. 8; 2 Cor. v. 15; Gal. ii. 19). Besides, the parallelism of thought with ver. 10 proves as matter of course that the spiritual death is to be viewed as having taken place once for all, the spiritual life as of unbroken continuance. “Ut

Christus excitatus est ad incorruptibilem vitam, ita vos Dei gratia renatos esse, ut totam vitam in sanctitate et justitia traducatis: quando aeterna est semperque vigeat haec, qua renovati estis, Spiritus sancti virtus," Calvin.

—ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ] not *per Christum Jesum*, but *in Christo Jesu, in fellowship with Christ*. ἐν denotes, as often, the element in which the Christian's spiritual life is lived (1 Thess. ii. 14). The words may be joined with νεκροὺς μὲν . . . τῷ θεῷ in common, or simply with ζῶντας τῷ θεῷ. The former seems preferable, because νεκροὺς . . . ζῶντας, in strict parallelism with ver. 10, is connected in thought, and in conclusion receives in common ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ as an accessory definition.

—τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν] according to decisive critical testimony, is to be deemed spurious, and is therefore rightly expunged from the text by Griesbach and Lachmann. It is to be regarded as an ascetic or liturgical addition, or inserted by copyists in the text without special design, in reminiscence of v. 21, vi. 23; 1 Cor. xv. 31; Phil. iii. 8, etc.

The apostle having shown what Christians have become in virtue of fellowship with Christ mediated by baptism, and what they are to deem themselves, exhorts them now, vv. 12, 13, actually to be what they have become, by their own act to ratify God's act in them, or to realize subjectively the spirit of their objective regeneration. They are accordingly to exhibit themselves in life as νεκροὺς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ver. 12, up to ἁμαρτία, and as ζῶντας τῷ θεῷ, ver. 13, from ἀλλὰ παραστήσατε onward. Thus the import of vv. 12, 13 corresponds with that of ver. 11.

Ver. 12. Μὴ οὖν βασιλεύτω ἡ ἁμαρτία] *Wherefore let not sin reign*. An inference (οὖν) from the foregoing. Because you have to regard yourselves as νεκροὺς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ver. 11, it follows that sin ought not to reign, for one would contradict the other. The antithesis of βασιλεύειν is not the existence of sin in general, as if the latter were supposed and permitted, and only its sway precluded and forbidden.<sup>1</sup> The thing is correct in itself, but is not here expressly mooted. Rather the apostle pays no regard to

<sup>1</sup> So Augustine in Calov: "Non ait non sit, sed non regnet. Quamdiu enim vivis, peccatum necesse est esse in membris tuis, saltem illi auferatur, ne fiat, quod jubet." Certainly *in itself* this is fully as true as Luther's gloss: "Mark, the saints have still evil lusts in the flesh, which they follow not." Comp. also Calov's observation against the Pontificii on ver. 2 of this chapter.

this aspect of the relation, but depicts the Christian position according to its idea, in conformity with which sin, being buried by baptism unto Christ's death, is never again to wield power and influence in man. *μὴ βασιλευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία* answers to τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ver. 6 ; comp. ὑπακούειν in this verse, and κυριεύειν, ver. 14.

—ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι] to be joined with *βασιλευέτω*, so that it describes the sphere of activity of *ἁμαρτία* ; not with *ἁμαρτία*, in which case the article (ἡ ἁμαρτ. ἡ ἐν τῷ θν. ὑμ. σ.) must have been repeated. *σῶμα* cannot here denote exclusively the physical, material body. As such it must have been conceived either as the source, or the seat, or the organ of sin. The sensuous theory, according to which the body is set forth as the *source* of sin, contradicts just as decisively the biblical as the Pauline mode of conception (comp. Jul. Müller, I. 295). On the other hand, the body is doubtless the *seat* of sin, but neither its exclusive nor original seat. By this mode of view the apostle would leave unnoticed the chief sphere of sin's activity, and by dwelling exclusively on the bodily sphere, fall back upon the notion that the body, as the exclusive seat, is also at the same time the primary source of sin. But if, finally, we view the body as the *organ* of sin, sin manifests its dominion in man *through* the organ of the body, but does not reign *in* the organ. Paul would then have written : ἐν ὑμῖν διὰ τοῦ θνητοῦ σώματος, but not : ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι. Besides, the notion of the organ of the reign, when the point in question is merely the reign, is out of place. But, on the other side, *σῶμα* cannot be simply identified with *σάρξ* or *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος* as a designation of the corrupt *tendency* of human nature. This conception can be proved neither idiomatically nor by usage. For the understanding of the peculiar modification intended by Pauline idiom in the word *σῶμα*,—for it is certain that sacred philology ought as little to be restrained within the narrow limits of classical usage as biblical conceptions are exhausted by pagan forms of ideas, just as words like *ἁμαρτία*, *δικαιοσύνη*, *σάρξ*, *θάνατος*, *ζωή*, etc., appear in Holy Scripture with a perfectly distinct modification of meaning,—we must take into consideration passages like Rom. viii. 10, 13. In the latter passage, *θανατοῦν τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος* forms the antithesis of *κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν*. As little, then, as the latter should be referred merely to the activity of the lower impulses of sense,



can the former concern the mortifying of *these* impulses. We may not say with Müller, I. 328, that the *σάρξ* is related to the *πράξεις τοῦ σώματος* as the genus to the species. Why should the apostle mention merely one, and that a subordinate species of the *σάρξ*, just there where the chief point was to require the *θανατοῦν* of the entire *σάρξ*? But a positive guide for the elucidation of the word *σῶμα* is supplied in ver. 10 by the contrast in which *σῶμα* and *πνεῦμα* are there placed. *πνεῦμα* there is the spirit of man in so far as it is pervaded and governed by God's Spirit; *σῶμα*, that which is left of the entire man after the subtraction of the spiritual element, therefore as much the soul as the material body, in so far as it is not the abode of God's Spirit. The designations are selected in accordance with the natural, anthropological division of man into *πνεῦμα* and *σῶμα*. Here, as there, *πνεῦμα* denotes the higher, inner ruling; *σῶμα*, the lower, visible, and concealing, earthly, servile principle. *σῶμα*, then, in both the passages cited, is that portion of man which is conceived as not yet illuminated by the *πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, the source and seat of sinful inclination, as well spiritual as sensuous, without yet, like *σάρξ*, denoting inclination itself. This *σῶμα* is a *σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου*, vii. 24; *νεκρόν*, viii. 10; *θνητόν*, viii. 11; for precisely as the seat of *ἁμαρτία* is it subject to *θάνατος*, the wages of sin, vi. 23. Thus the phrase *θνητόν σῶμα* in the present passage is explained. The *σῶμα* is man as to body and soul, in so far as he is not yet permeated by the *πνεῦμα*. As such it is *θνητόν*, *mortal*, and herewith are we admonished not to suffer it to live in sin, or to surrender it to the dominion of that which alone brought death upon it. In the fatal effects of sin lies a reason for shunning it. The penalty of death passed on the *σῶμα* on account of sin at the same time strips it of all rights; for, as tried and under sentence, it is without rights. Therefore has it no right to suffer sin to reign in it, or, which is the same, by permitting sin itself to reign over the *πνεῦμα*. The *σῶμα* of the Christian, then, is dead, not that it may remain in death, but that it may be raised from death to life, comp. viii. 11: *ζωοποιήσῃ καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν*. In the soul this takes place through the continuous process of regeneration and sanctification; in the body, through the resurrection.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> If we would still refer *σῶμα* exclusively to the material body, we must in that case say that the apostle, speaking *ideally*, looks upon regeneration, according to

—εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ] This reading, the one most strongly attested, received by Knapp, Lachmann, and Tischendorf, approved by several modern expositors, is, as can scarcely be doubted, the original one. From this, as a gloss, arose the reading : εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν αὐτῇ, the ἐπιθυμίαι τοῦ σώματος being identified with ἁμαρτία, as to meaning, rightly. The combination of both readings, along with the insertion of ἐν which became necessary, resulted in the *lectio recepta* : εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν αὐτῇ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ, which accordingly cannot well be accepted as the original from which the two others sprang by partition, because it is the least attested. The same holds good of the opposite, *i.e.* shortest reading : εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν, received by Griesbach, from which, then, the others must have arisen by means of explanatory supplements.

Ver. 13. μηδὲ παριστάνετε] *nor yet present.* παριστάνειν, the N. T. form for παριστάναι = *to yield up, present, place at the disposal, place at the service, give up to something*, vv. 16, 19, xii. 1 ; Matt. xxvi. 53 ; Acts xxiii. 24 ; 2 Tim. ii. 15.

—τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν] The μέλη are the different parts of which the σῶμα consists. Hence here not merely the members of the body, hand, foot, etc., but also those of the soul, heart, will, understanding, vii. 5, 23.

—ὅπλα ἀδικίας] *as weapons of unrighteousness.* Several expositors take ὅπλα in the sense, certainly in itself well-grounded, of *instruments*. But everywhere else in the N. T. the word has the meaning *weapons*, and, indeed, in the literal sense, John xviii. 3 ; elsewhere only tropically, Rom. xiii. 12 : ὅπλα τοῦ φωτός ; 2 Cor. vi. 7 : ὅπλα τῆς δικαιοσύνης ; x. 4 : τὰ ὅπλα τῆς στρατείας ἡμῶν. This analogy of the Pauline idiom may be

rv. 2-11, as already *entirely* completed in the *spirit*. Then we only need note the observation of Calov : “ Quod autem corporis et membrorum mentionem facit, non eo accipiendum, ac si in corpore tantum dominetur, anima vero a pravis desideriis immunis sit, nec peccati dominio subjeci possit, sed quod in corpore et membris corporeis apertius sese exserat peccatum, quodque non permissio dominio peccati in corpore ac membris corporeis, nec in nervum ita erumpere peccatum aut vim suam plene exerere aut vires etiam eas acquirere possit, quo nos captivet et in miseram servitutem redigat, et ex adverso imminuatur ita ac frangatur vis concupiscentiae et desideriorum, dum non permittitur tale dominium : ubi tamen intermittenda etiam non est veteris hominis et pravae concupiscentiae interioris mortificatio ac desideriorum inde prorumpentium subactio, cohibitio et repressio,” etc. But the exposition of the idea of σῶμα given in the text still seems to us to deserve the preference in this passage.

accepted as decisive with respect to the present passage. Add to this that the apostle elsewhere shows a fondness for military images, vii. 23, 1 Cor. ix. 26, Eph. vi. 11 ff., 1 Thess. v. 8, and that in the present passage the explanation in question is supported both by the βασιλεύειν of ἁμαρτία, ver. 12, and by the expression τὰ ὀψώνια, ver. 23, likewise borrowed from military service. ἁμαρτία is pictured as a βασιλεύς, who uses the members of man as weapons by which to win and establish a kingdom of unrighteousness, and then to reward his soldiers with death as their wages (τὰ ὀψώνια). But ἀδικία is *unrighteousness*, not as a special vice, but, as often, *unrighteousness* in the sense of immorality generally.

—ἀλλὰ παραστήσατε] The imperative aorist (in distinction from the imperative present παριστάνετε just used) denotes here not so much an action passing rapidly, or one which should take place at once, Winer, p. 393, but marks an action which took place *but once*, as once for all.

—ἐαυτούς] *yourselves*, your entire personality, the entire man. "Primo consideratur persona Christiani, deinde actiones et munera. Homo in peccato mortuus non commode diceretur *sistere* SEIPSUM peccato: sed vivens potest se *sistere* Deo," Bengel.

—ὡς ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῶντας] *as those who were dead and now live*, who from being dead have become alive. ὡς denotes the character, and the mode corresponding to this, in which they are to regard themselves. The phrase glances back to ver. 11; but the νεκροί are not νεκροὶ τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ in the sense of ver. 11, but in the sense of Eph. ii. 1, 5, Rev. iii. 1, *i.e.* not those who died in baptism *to* sin, but those who are dead *in* sin.

—καί] *sc.* παριστάνετε, which is to be taken from παραστήσατε, in contrast with the former παριστάνετε. The entire *ego* is surrendered once for all to God, but its separate members in a gradual process.

—τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν] figure here as members of the entire *ego* (comp. the preceding ἐαυτούς), which confirms our view of σῶμα and μέλη. "Membra quoque nostra illius arbitrio destinata sint ac consecrata: ut nihil, quam ejus gloriam spirent omnes animae ac corporis nostri facultates," Calvin.

—ὄπλα δικαιοσύνης] *as weapons of righteousness*. δικαιοσύνη here is a notion quite as general as ἀδικία its opposite.

—τῷ θεῷ] Contrast with τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ.

Ver. 14. The assurance uttered in this verse contains the reason (γάρ) justifying the apostle in addressing to his readers the exhortation given in vv. 12, 13. ἁμαρτία γὰρ ὑμῶν οὐ κυριεύσει] *for sin shall not reign over you.* The sentence cannot be taken imperatively, this meaning applying to the second but not to the third person future. Moreover, it is not an expression of confidence in the Romans, for in this case Paul would have said: You will not let sin reign over you. It expresses, then, the certainty of a fact, or, as this is to be conceived as future, a promise, fitted to give the readers comfort and consolation in reference to the exhortation just addressed to them. "Consolatio et promissio," Melancthon.

—οὐ γάρ ἐστε ὑπὸ νόμον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ χάριν] The reign of law is in keeping with the condition of man's bondage to sin, iii. 20, iv. 15, v. 20; but with the reign of pardoning, justifying grace, the freedom of man from sin's bondage, vi. 2-11. Conscience fettered and terrified by the law hates the judge; conscience set free through grace loves the reconciler. But hate binds fast to sin, whereas love releases from it. "Gratia non solum peccata diluit (*i.e.* dimittit), sed ut non peccemus facit," Augustine. Of the relation of the law to sin, the apostle has only spoken hitherto in brief sentences by way of intimation. It is not till the seventh chapter that he treats of it in the shape of more detailed exposition. εἶναι ὑπό τι, to be under something, to be under its dominion, iii. 9; Gal. iv. 21, v. 18.

As from the doctrine of grace abounding through sin abounding, v. 20, the inference might be drawn that it is good to continue in sin that grace may be multiplied, vi. 1, so the statement: οὐ γάρ ἐστε ὑπὸ νόμον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ χάριν, might awaken the idea that with freedom from the law licence is given to sin. This idea the apostle repels with the utmost energy. But yet he does not here so much develope the inner psychological impossibility of the legal state fostering and furthering righteousness, and of the state of grace fostering and furthering sin, as rather again remind of a matter-of-fact relation into which his readers, through faith in the gospel, have entered. As baptism into Christ's death mediates the death of the old and the rising of the new man, ver. 3 *fi.*, so is freedom from the law, in point of fact, a bondage to righteousness, the dominion of grace a freedom

from sin, so that once a δουλεία ἁμαρτίας εἰς θάνατον, but now a δουλεία θεοῦ καὶ δικαιοσύνης εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, takes place. In the contrasted outcome and end, on one side θάνατος, on the other ζωή, lies withal a motive for renouncing sin and serving righteousness. This is the purport of vv. 15-23.

Ver. 15. *Τί οὖν ;*] comp. on iii. 9.

—*ἁμαρτήσομεν*] *shall we sin?* is to be taken as a pure future = shall sin find place in us? Here also, as in ver. 1, the apostle himself draws the inference, in order thereby to anticipate another's possible, and, indeed, often already urged objection. Good codices have *ἁμαρτήσωμεν ; are we to sin?* a reading recommended by Griesbach, received by Lachmann and Tischendorf. It seems, like *ἐπιμένωμεν*, ver. 1, to be genuine, although, especially as it is not countenanced by quite as many authorities, it may have been conformed to ver. 1. *ἁμαρτήσαι*, comp. v. 14, 16, stands in later Greek for *ἁμαρτεῖν*, Winer, p. 99.

—*ὅτι οὐκ ἐσμέν ὑπὸ νόμον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ χάριτι*] an emphatic repetition.

Ver. 16. The *μὴ γένοιτο* is established by an appeal to a truth admitted unconditionally by the readers themselves, for *οὐκ οἴδατε*] introduces an uncontradicted proposition, for which the experience, the consciousness of the readers may be appealed to. *Κnow you not, to whom you yield yourselves unto obedience, his slaves (actually)<sup>1</sup> you are, whom you obey?* The sentence is a general one, hence

—*παριστάνετε*] present absolute, to denote what always stands good. The bond of slavery, once contracted, binds firmly.

—*εἰς ὑπακοήν*] *unto obedience, i.e. to obey it henceforth.*

—*δοῦλοί ἐστε*] *sc. τούτου or ἐκείνου.*

—*ὧς ὑπακούετε*] *whom you obey*, not: *whom you obeyed*, emphasizes the notion of ὑπακοή still more strongly. Slaves to him whom you obey = slaves rendering service by obedience. In *ἥτοι . . . δικαιοσύνην* is given to the general sentence its special reference.

—*ἥτοι ἁμαρτίας*] *sc. δοῦλοι.* The *τοί* added to *ἥ*, which in classical Greek is usually strengthened by *γε*, “expresses an ex-

<sup>1</sup> I incline now to agree with Meyer, that here not *ιστί*, but, as the order of words and the correlation with *παριστάνει* *ἑαυτούς* require, *δοῦλοι* has the emphasis. “Whoever places himself at the disposal of another for obedience as a slave, is no longer free and independent, but is simply the slave of him whom he obeys.”

clusive force with respect to external objects, the given case being severed from all other otherwise conceivable possibilities," so that ἡτοι = ἡ = either this *only* or that, *tertium non datur*. Herod. i. 11: νῦν τοι δυοῖν ὁδοῖν παρουνσέων, Γύγη, δίδωμι αἵρεσιν, ὁκοτέρην βούλει τράπεσθαι, etc., ἀλλ' ἡτοι κείνόν γε τὸν ταῦτα βουλευσάντα δεῖ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἢ σέ, τὸν ἐμέ γυμνήν θηησάμενον. Hartung, *Lehre von den Partikeln der Gr. Spr.* II. 356 f.; Kühner, *Ausf. Gram. der Gr. Spr.* II. 444.

—εἰς θάνατον] *unto death*. Clearly θάνατος here, as in vv. 21, 23, is in contrast with ζωὴ αἰώνιος. It cannot then be taken as the opposite of εἰς δικαιοσύνην, which only comes afterwards, and exercises no retrospective force, *i.e.* of the cessation of *moral* action in life. The idea may be taken quite as comprehensively as in v. 12, although in that case the element of spiritual, and especially eternal, death predominates. If it is supposed that because *bodily* death falls still upon the δοῦλος ὑπακοῆς, and on account of the contrast of θάνατος and ζωὴ αἰώνιος, vv. 21, 22, by θάνατος *eternal* death exclusively *must* be understood, it may be replied that by means of *actual* sins death in the utmost compass of the idea, therefore also *bodily* death, as it rests already on man on account of the corruption of original sin, is also personally appropriated and deserved through his own act. But for the δοῦλος ὑπακοῆς even *bodily* death is abolished, partly already in the shape of *penalty*, partly hereafter by the resurrection. Especially on account of ver. 23 we wish here to abide by the *general* notion of θάνατος, for τὰ γὰρ ὀφώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας θάνατος seems to us to point back expressly to v. 12. The *same* death that falls on man on account of *original* sin, v. 12, falls on him also on account of *actual* sin.

—ἡ ὑπακοῆς] namely, to God, opposite of ἁμαρτίας, which as to its essence is παρακοή, v. 19. The church doctrine of *nova obedientia* finds here even as to expression its point of connection. It follows also from the entire tenor of the previous as of the subsequent exposition, that it is in harmony with the apostle's meaning to teach that the abolition of the law for believers consists only in deliverance from the curse and constraint, not from the obedience of the law. This obedience as to its nature is a free one, but from freedom we cannot be made free. The use of the word ὑπακοῆς, employed here in a different relation, is in the Pauline style occasioned by the preceding εἰς ὑπακοήν.

—εἰς δικαιοσύνην] *unto righteousness*, as matter of course not to be understood of the righteousness of faith, but of righteousness of life, as in vv. 13, 18 ff. *δικαιοσύνη*, *moral righteousness* as a *condition*, is the result of the continuous act of ὑπακοή. As the exactly corresponding opposite of ἦτοι ἀμαρτίας εἰς θάνατον, we should have expected ἡ δικαιοσύνης εἰς ζωὴν instead of ἡ ὑπακοῆς εἰς δικαιοσύνην. But it was of prime importance for the apostle here to lay stress on the ethical elements of ὑπακοή and δικαιοσύνη. The motive of terror and attraction, lying in θάνατος and in ζωή, is only brought forward expressly and independently from ver. 21 onward, to which εἰς θάνατον here merely forms a prelude. Nevertheless, perhaps along with δικαιοσ., its consequence, ζωὴ αἰώνιος, is to be supplied in thought out of the antithesis θάνατος. δικαιοσύνη here denotes, then, neither “righteousness subjectively realized, even as this is the object of ultimate ἐλπίς,” nor yet “the righteousness awarded to believers in the judgment on account of Christ’s death.” Against both, the conception of δικαιοσύνη, ver. 18, is decisive. To ὑπακοή εἰς δικαιοσύνην is analogous δικαιοσύνη εἰς ἀγιασμόν, ver. 19. With the doctrine of this verse, comp. Matt. vi. 24.

Ver. 17 contains the application or minor proposition of ver. 16. χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ] *sc. εἴη*. “Adjungit gratiarum actionem; primum quo doceat, non esse id proprii meriti, sed singularis Dei misericordiae: simul ut ab ipsa gratiarum actione discant, quantum sit Dei beneficium, coque magis ad peccati detestationem animentur,” Calvin. The χάρις θεοῦ challenges the χάρις ἀνθρώπων.

—ὅτι ἦτε δούλοι τῆς ἀμαρτίας] The thanksgiving of the apostle cannot of course refer to their having been the slaves of sin, but only to the following ὑπηκούσατε κτλ. According to this view, ὅτι ἦτε δούλοι τῆς ἀμ. ὑπηκούσατε δὲ κτλ. stands for ὅτι ὄντες ποτὲ δούλοι τ. ἀμ. ὑπηκ. ἐκ καρδίας, comp. Winer, p. 785. But this construction excites some suspicion, and still more the absence of the preparatory μέν after ἦτε, scarcely to be dispensed with in this case, an absence of which no quite corresponding instance can be adduced. As the sentence gives here a wrong sense, if it is not understood in close relation to the subsequent contrast, the particle indicating this relation was here altogether indispensable. It is preferable, therefore, with several modern expositors, to place the emphasis upon ἦτε, a view which is favoured by the precedence given to ἦτε. “But thanks be to

God, that ye *were* slaves of sin (that this is past and gone)." Comp. 1 Cor. vi. 11 : καὶ ταῦτά τινες ἦτε; Eph. v. 8 : ἦτε γὰρ ποτε σκότος, and Harless there. The attraction following can only be resolved, as is acknowledged by all modern interpreters, by ὑπηκούσατε δὲ ἐκ καρδίας (τῷ) τύπῳ διδαχῆς εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε, Winer, p. 205.

—ὑπηκούσατε] corresponds to ὑπακοή, ver. 16, save that the former more general ὑπακοή here appears more definitely as ὑπακοή τοῦ εὐαγγελίου.

—ἐκ καρδίας] comp. Matt. xviii. 35, and ἐκ ψυχῆς, Eph. vi. 6; Col. iii. 22. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἠναγκάσθητε, οὐδὲ ἐβιάσθητε, ἀλλ' ἔκοντες μετὰ προθυμίας ἀπέστητε, Chrys. "Veritas et efficacia religionis Christianae," remarks Bengel. "Mali non possunt plane ex animo esse mali, quin eos semper vel inscios poeniteat sui et servitutis suae: sed boni ex animo boni sunt et libere."

—εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε] namely, by God through the Spirit of God at work in the gospel, for which χάρις is due to God. τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ βοήθειαν αἰνίττεται, Chrys. The passive (παρεδόθητε) emphasizes the passive relation of man in regeneration, his activity (ὑπηκούσατε) being only the result of this relation, according to the well-known axiom: "Ita a Spiritu Dei agimur ut ipsi quoque agamus." Wherefore the

—τύπος διδαχῆς] cannot be understood in the subjective sense of "*the form of doctrine, imprinted in the heart,*" as this is rather imparted to or impressed on him. Luther and others: "*the pattern of the doctrine, exemplar, ideal* which the doctrine sets up, sentiendi agendique norma ac regula." But we cannot well say, *to obey* a pattern. In any case, the meaning is simpler and more in keeping: *form, definite type of doctrine.* Expositors quote from Jamblichus, *vit. Pyth.* c. 23, the perfectly analogous τύπος διδασκαλίας = τρόπος διδασκαλίας. Comp. ii. 20: μόρφωσις τῆς γνώσεως; 2 Tim. i. 13: ἱποτύπωσις ὑγιαίνοντων λόγων; Acts xxiii. 25. But by τύπος διδαχῆς, in agreement with the connection, is meant the gospel in the *stricter*, not in the *brouder* sense, the doctrine of the righteousness which is in Christ, a righteousness of faith closely connected and inseparably interwoven with righteousness of *life*, which includes and produces righteousness of life as certainly as the germ the fruit.

Ver. 18. Several interpreters find in this verse the logical conclusion, regarding, and indeed justly, ver. 16 as the major,



and ver. 17 as the minor proposition. But, in the first place, the particle *δέ* raises a doubt, for we should have expected *οὖν* instead, even if we take it as *δὲ μεταβατικόν*. Again, even in *ὑπηρεύετε . . . διδαχῆς* as to substance is contained *ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ*, which is therefore more naturally taken as a more precise explanation than as a final inference. Wherefore ver. 18 is perhaps to be directly and strictly linked to ver. 17, and separated from it only by a comma, not by a period or note of exclamation, so that *ἦτε δοῦλοι τῆς ἀμαρτίας* corresponds with *ἦτοι ἀμαρτίας εἰς θάνατον*, ver. 16, *ὑπηρεύετε . . . διδαχῆς* with its more precise explanation, contained in the 18th verse: *ἐλευθερωθέντες . . . ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ* with *ἡ ὑπακοῆς εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. But we may, nevertheless, with Lachmann and Meyer, set a colon before *ἐλευθ.*, when the sentence is no longer dependent on *ὅτι*, but stands out independently, and so more emphatically. The conclusion then follows of itself: "Thus the question raised, ver. 15, is to be answered in the negative, and duly repelled by a *μὴ γένοιτο*. Therefore must you obey, not sin, but righteousness."

—*ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ*] *you were enslaved to righteousness*. The expression is no doubt paradoxical, but very significant, sharply emphasizing the subjection, the fruit of grace, of the justified man to the law of righteousness. *Πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ . . . οὐ δύναται ἀμαρτάνειν*, 1 John iii. 9. He is one *freed* from sin and a *slave* of righteousness. Comp. the analogous paradox, 1 Cor. vii. 22. Elsewhere *δουλεῖν*, *δουλοῦν* expresses for the most part the ethical servitude, the slavery to sin and the law, which is freedom from righteousness, Gal. iv. 3; Tit. ii. 3; 2 Pet. ii. 19. But comp. also vii. 25, xiv. 18; Col. iii. 24; 1 Thess. i. 9.

Ver. 19. *ἀνθρώπινον λέγω*] in a similar way to *κατ' ἀνθρώπου λέγω*, iii. 5, apologizes for the expression *ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ*, which is somewhat gross and accommodated to dull powers of apprehension. "Humanitas se loqui dicit non quoad substantiam, sed quoad formam," Calvin.

—*διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν*] Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 22. The *σάρξ* is the *natura mere humana*, in contrast with the divine *πνεῦμα*, Matt. xxvi. 41. From this weakness of the flesh, found still in every believer in a higher or lower degree, flows slowness of comprehension in spiritual things. Only a nature

wholly spiritual is able to understand and appreciate purely spiritual truth in a purely spiritual form. Until then it stands in need of conceptions and expressions put in a figurative, strongly sensuous way. "Humanus sermo frequens et quodammodo perpetuus, quo scriptura se ad nos demittit. Sermo apertior non semper aptior ad rem ipsam," Bengel. Paul had used the expression: "you were *enslaved* to righteousness," lest they should fall into the carnal mistake of supposing that freedom from the law is freedom *from* righteousness; as, on the contrary, it is freedom *to* righteousness, or, more strongly put, bondage to righteousness. Moreover, the marks of parenthesis must be erased; for the following ὥσπερ γάρ κτλ., while it elucidates ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, does so likewise ἀνθρωπίνως with reference to the ἀσθένεια of the σάρξ, seeing that here also the δουλεία τῆς δικαιοσύνης is placed in parallelism with the δουλεία τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

—ὥσπερ . . . οὕτω] Comparison between the former and present condition.

—γάρ] namely. The explanation is given in the form of exhortation. The apostle exhorts the church, in harmony with the nature of the sanctifying process, to become that which it already is.

—τῇ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἀνομίᾳ] Instead of the one τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ver. 13, two sinful principles are specified; but these merely characterize the idea of ἁμαρτία under its two aspects, subjective and objective; or regard sin with respect to its inner essence, as which it is ἀκαθαρσία; and with respect to its relation to the divine law, as which it is ἀνομία. Comp. 1 Thess. iv. 7: οὐ γὰρ ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἁγιασμῷ, and 1 John iii. 4: πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία. As ἀκαθαρσία, sin is defilement of body and spirit; as ἀνομία, it is guilt.

εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν] = ὥστε ποιεῖν τὴν ἀνομίαν. ἀνομία, the first time, denotes opposition to law as a principle; the second time, opposition to law in its manifestation—the unlawful deed. "Just as you yielded up your members slaves to impurity and to lawlessness, for the practice of lawlessness or for doing what is unlawful," so now yield up (οὕτω νῦν παραστήσατε, where, without doubt, the aorist, as the νῦν added intimates, denotes what is to be carried out at once; see on ver. 13) your members slaves—

—τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ εἰς ἁγιασμόν] *to righteousness unto holiness of walk.* δικαιοσύνη, again, denotes the principle; ἁγιασμός, the manifestation, the practical matter of fact.

In conclusion, the apostle urges, vv. 20–23, to a ready compliance with the exhortation last given, by reference to the unhappy effects of the former bondage to sin, and the happy effects of the present bondage to righteousness and God, of which the former should deter them from sin, the latter encourage to holiness.

Ver. 20. “Comply with the exhortation just given, ver. 19, *for*,” etc. The particle γάρ introduces a motive, which is not itself given till ver. 21 ff. In the present verse the way is prepared for it. The apostle, therefore, without any essential alteration in meaning, might have written: τίνα γὰρ καρπὸν εἶχετε τότε, ὅτε δούλοι ἦτε τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ἐλεύθεροι δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ. But he begins, first of all, by reminding them of their former state, adducing, not without a touch of irony, its advantage (ἐλεύθερον εἶναι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ), in order, over against the imaginary advantage, to make the real disadvantage and injury stand out in more striking colours. ἐλεύθεροι ἦτε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ] *i.e. de facto*, not *de jure*. Engaged in the service of the opposite sovereign, sin, as no one can serve two masters, you were in fact free from the other sovereign, righteousness. Even then you had freedom; but of what sort, and linked with what issues! That delicious freedom from restraint brought at length the bitterness of death. ἐλεύθεροι ἦτε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ = οὐκ ἦτε δούλοι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, *free from righteousness, i.e. free with respect to righteousness, in relation to righteousness.* It stands in antithesis to δουλοῦσθαι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, δούλοι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, vv. 18, 19; Winer, p. 263.

Ver. 21. Several interpreters connect together τίνα . . . ἐπαισχύνεσθε; as *one* question. “What fruit had you then (of the things) of which you are now ashamed?” The answer to be then supplied is: none, or pernicious fruit. But the supplying of ἐκείνων or ἐξ ἐκείνων before ἐφ’ οἷς, which then becomes necessary, is difficult, and not fully borne out by vii. 6. Moreover, the parallelism of thought requires those sins and shameful deeds (ἐκεῖνα ἐφ’ οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε) to be just as much regarded as the καρπός of their former condition, whose τέλος is θάνατος, as in ver. 22 good works are represented as the καρπός of their present state, whose τέλος is ζωὴ αἰώνιος. But if we

would interpret: "What fruit now had you then of things, of which you are now ashamed? *i.e.* you had then no fruit, no *moral* gain of, etc.; for what leads at last to death could bring you no moral gain," it is quite self-evident that things of which one is ashamed, *i.e.* sins and shameful deeds, bring no *moral* gain. It is therefore best, with Luther and most modern interpreters, to place the note of interrogation after τότε, so that ἐφ' οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε forms the answer. "What fruit had you then? Things of which (ἐφ' οἷς = τοιαῦτα ἐφ' οἷς) you are now ashamed." Comp. in Gal. v. 19-22 the antithesis of ἔργα τῆς σαρκός and καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος. The things of which they are ashamed now that they are converted, are sinful deeds as the fruit of their bondage to sin; ἀνομία, ver. 19, as the effect of the δουλεία τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας καὶ τῆς ἀνομίας. Elsewhere, indeed, the apostle speaks only of the καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος, τοῦ φωτός, τῆς δικαιοσύνης. But here a sort of ironical oxymoron is found. They had a καρπὸν ἄκαρπον, comp. Eph. v. 11. τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἐκείνων, θάνατος] Reason of the shame. You are now ashamed of these acts; for how shameful must the act be whose end is death! The hurtfulness of sin sets in relief its shamefulness, the destruction that it brings, as a divine punishment, embodying a judgment upon its worth. τέλος, *end, issue, final result*, 2 Cor. xi. 15, Phil. iii. 19, 1 Pet. i. 9, not absolutely identical with ὀψώνια, *wages*, ver. 23. Rather ver. 23 expressly shows that τέλος, which may be quite as well χάρισμα as ὀψώνιον, is in itself neither of them. Respecting θάνατος, see on ver. 16. If the reading received by Lachmann, τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέλος κτλ., is genuine, the μὲν does not correspond to the following δέ, but is to be rendered: *for the end indeed*, etc. Comp. Hartung, *Lehre von den Part. d. Gr. Spr.* II. 414.

Ver. 22. Antithesis to vv. 20, 21. They were ἐλεύθεροι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, but are ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας] for their freedom in reference to the law was their natural condition, preceded by no other *from* which they had been set free; whereas they were *set free from* sin by regeneration.

—δουλωθέντες δὲ τῷ θεῷ] To serve righteousness is to serve God, vv. 18, 19, for only the righteous is God's servant, Isa. liii. 11. Augustine says, strikingly: "Deo servire vera libertas est." Comp. also 1 Pet. ii. 16.

—ἔχετε τὸν καρπὸν ὑμῶν εἰς ἁγιασμόν] Breviloquence for ὁ

καρπὸς ὃν ἔχετε ἐστὶν (ἄγει) εἰς ἁγιασμόν, "the fruit that you now have leads unto holiness." The καρπὸς is the ἔργα τοῦ πνεύματος of believers, which are a fruit that they enjoy, which, apart from all reward, are on their own account to them a delightful fruit of grace. The end and aim of grace, certainly only to be attained in this life in unceasing approximation, is ἁγιασμός, holiness. There is here clearly a glancing back to the conclusion of ver. 19, to δουλεία τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἰς ἁγιασμόν.

—τὸ δὲ τέλος ζωῆν αἰώνιον] still dependent on ἔχετε. ζωὴ αἰώνιος is here conceived as future. Comp. on i. 16.

Ver. 23 ratifies what is said, vv. 21, 22, of the final result of the bondage to sin and to God. τὰ ὀφώνια] = ἡ ἀντιμισθία. Ὀφώνιον κυρίως λέγεται τὸ τοῖς στρατιώταις παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως δεδομένον σιτηρέσιον, Theophylact. The expression is used in allusion to ver. 13. The collective plural, to indicate the very various elements in kind or coin used in payment, is more usual than the singular. Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 7.

—τὸ δὲ χάρισμα τοῦ θεοῦ] Death is the well-earned and merited wages that sin gives, but eternal life is and remains the unmerited gracious gift of God. We have it

—ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ] in believing fellowship with Him who is at once righteousness and eternal life, 1 John v. 20. Thus the inseparable connection of justification and sanctification, which forms the basis and fundamental view of this chapter, reappears at its end. He that is justified by faith in Christ has eternal life as God's gracious gift; and inasmuch as sanctification is simply the subjective development of the objective gift of justification, ζωὴ αἰώνιος remains, even for the sanctified, what it was at first, namely, χάρισμα θεοῦ, whose possession he does not first earn by means of ἁγιασμός, but only awaits, and, when he has attained the end of sanctification, actually receives. *Bona opera*, according to St. Bernard's well-known saying, are merely the *via regni*, not the *causa regnandi*.

## CHAPTER VII.

THE law is lord over man as long as he lives. Only death can dissolve his relation to the law, just as the wife can only come into the power of another husband when her husband is dead. In the same way, then, the church is dead to the law; and, this first marriage-bond being dissolved, has become the possession of Christ, her second husband. The purpose of this new union is to bring forth fruit to God; for the law did nothing but stir up sinful desire, and only through freedom from the law has service in the new spiritual nature been made possible and real. This is the purport of vv. 1-6. If, then, we ask, to what point in the foregoing exposition this teaching links on, the statement, ver. 14, at once occurs to us: *ἀμαρτία γὰρ ὑμῶν οὐ κυριεύσει· οὐ γὰρ ἐστε ὑπὸ νόμον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ χάριν*; for vv. 1-4 of this chapter manifestly correspond to *οὐ γὰρ ἐστε ὑπὸ νόμον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ χάριν* = *οὐ γὰρ ἐστε νόμον, ἀλλὰ Χριστοῦ*, and vv. 5, 6 to the inference to be drawn from this: *ἀμαρτία ὑμῶν οὐ κυριεύσει*. The decisive statement of vi. 14 might easily cause offence, especially in the Jewish-Christian portion of the church, as it was always difficult for Jewish Christians to look upon the dominion of the law as entirely abolished by Christ. Hence the apostle in the present section proves at still greater length that this is the actual state of things, that the notion of a union between the law and Christ, and of the first being retained alongside the latter, is altogether without warrant, and that only by the passing away of the dominion of the law is the dominion of sin broken and the dominion of righteousness established. Every other mode of connection with what precedes, although in appearance more probable, is to be regarded as really more improbable and artificial.

Ver. 1. *\*Ἡ ἀγνοεῖτε*] vi. 3; 1 Cor. vi. 16. In the nature of things, *ἡ* usually relates to the subject immediately preceding; but there is no logical necessity for this. The point of connection may also lie farther back, provided that there is sufficient reason for this, and that it is obvious to the reader. But here this is

actually the case. The proposition vi. 14 might, as vi. 15 shows, lie open to a dangerous misconstruction. This must first of all be repelled. After this is done in vi. 16–23, the apostle returns, according to intention, to vi. 14, in order to expand the sentiment of that verse more fully, and defend it against the doubts that might arise. Still, if it is desired *formally* to connect the deferred exposition of vi. 14, contained in vv. 1–6 of this chapter, with what immediately precedes, we may say that the position that the Christian, set free from the service of sin and become the servant of God, has his fruit unto holiness and eternal life as the final result, vi. 22, 23, could not be *truth*, if the Christian were not free *from the law*, and did not belong to the risen Christ instead, etc., vii. 1–6.

—ἀδελφοί] As Paul is about to examine a doubt usually raised only by Jewish Christians, we cannot wonder at his here addressing himself specially to them with the title ἀδελφοί. In iv. 1, also, his question is specially directed to Jewish Christians, and on this account calls Abraham *our* (i.e. natural) father. In a quite similar way, xi. 25 (comp. ὑμεῖς, vv. 28, 30), as likewise follows from the context, only Gentile Christians are addressed by ἀδελφοί. The purport of this passage clearly stands in positive and direct relation to the Jewish Christians, and can only bear a secondary and subordinate application to the Gentile Christians. But it is obvious that this gives no ground for the assertion that the Roman church consisted in overwhelming proportion of Jewish Christians (against this, see Introduction), and that therefore the entire church is described *a parte potiori*; for, as observed, even a part of the church may be exclusively addressed without noticing the other.

—γινώσκουσιν γὰρ νόμον λαλῶ] not: “for I speak to those among you that know the law,” i.e. to the Jewish Christians, which would be τοῖς γινώσκ. κτλ., but: “for I speak to you as to those that know the law; I speak to those acquainted with the law.” γὰρ then belongs, not to ἀδελφοί, but to ἡ ἀγνοεῖτε, and confirms, not the reference of the address to the Jewish Christians, but the assumption of knowledge in those addressed. But certainly the pregnant and specific description γινώσκοντες νόμον applies only to Jewish Christians, ii. 17–20, and could not as matter of necessity leave the readers in doubt as to who were addressed in ἀδελφοί.

—ὁ νόμος] here also *the Mosaic law*, as is proved by the allusion to vi. 14, *γινώσκουσι νόμον* in the present verse, and the application ver. 4 of the present chapter. Therefore neither the *moral law* in general, nor yet merely a part of the Mosaic law, namely, the *marriage-law*.

—κυριεύει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου] comp. vi. 14: ἁμαρτία οὐ κυριεύσει. The *κυριεύειν* of sin holds good as long as the *κυριεύειν* of the *Nomos* holds good; but the *κυριεύειν* of the *Nomos* holds good—

—ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ζῇ] *sc. ὁ ἄνθρωπος, for as long time as he lives.* Most expositors take the sentence ὁ νόμος . . . ζῇ as a general proposition. "The law wields its power over man for the whole period of his life." But apart from the triviality of such a proposition, it was already of itself sufficiently obvious, so that, in fact, no appeal was necessary on its account to the *γνώσις νόμου* of the readers. Add to this, that in reality it is false and in any case anti-Pauline. Paul might, indeed, say that the law is given to man for the whole period of his life, but not that it *rules* over him during the whole period of his life (*κυριεύει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*). For the believer, as is here to be expressly proved, the dominion of the *Nomos* has ceased. He is no longer ὑπὸ νόμον, and the νόμος is no longer his κύριος. Accordingly ζῇ here is to be understood, not of physical, but spiritual life, and we have a statement analogous to the words: ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, vi. 7. As long as man lives, *i.e.* his old, natural life continues, he is a servant of the law; only when he is spiritually dead is he free from the power of the law, ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου. To this, then, ἐθανάτωθητε τῷ νόμῳ, ver. 4, and κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ἀποθανόντες, ver. 6, correspond, the apostle by the latter more precisely defining the summons to spiritual death stated generally in this verse as a summons to die *to the law*. Thus only does the appeal to the knowledge of the law on the part of his Jewish-Christian readers acquire its profounder meaning. It is such a knowledge as they could not but have derived from the experience of their former condition of subjection to the law in contrast with their present condition of freedom in Christ. Several expositors as subject to ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ζῇ supply, not ὁ ἄνθρωπος, but ὁ νόμος. This certainly has the advantage that the simile, νῦν. 2, 3, is made to correspond still more closely. But the apostle, as ver. 4 shows, intends to speak here, not of the death of the law, but of the



death of man in relation to the law; and, as he puts this topic in the very front, our view of *ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ζῇ* (among the advocates of which Umbreit and Besser are now to be numbered) is perfectly agreeable to the context.<sup>1</sup>

Vv. 2, 3. Most modern expositors find in these verses an example in support of the general proposition, ver. 1. So Estius early: "Quod dixit, exemplo declarat legis conjugalis, a qua *deinde* (namely in ver. 4) *comparationem sumit.*" But, first of all, this proposition, as already remarked, was sufficiently evident of itself without illustrative example. Again, those expositors themselves must acknowledge that the example is inapposite, nay, halting. If it were meant to correspond to ver. 1, it must inversely have been said: *ἡ γὰρ ὑπανδρος γυνή, ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ζῇ, τῷ ἀνδρὶ δέδεται νόμῳ· ἐὰν δὲ ἀποθάνῃ (sc. ἡ γυνή), κατήργηται ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ἀνδρός.* Finally, in that case ver. 3 is a casual and needless expansion of the example, although in the application, ver. 4, the chief stress is placed on this expansion, and the chief reference made to it. It is best, then, to take vv. 2, 3, not as an example demonstrating by a concrete case in needless and clumsy fashion the proposition: that death dissolves the relation to the law, but—according to the view once universally received, in modern days held only by Reiche, Klee, Olshausen, Tholuck (although in the fifth edition with trembling hand), and Besser—as a simile or allegory. Several interpreters then, in the train of Augustine, understand by the *γυνή* the human soul; by the one *ἀνὴρ* sinful lust, the *παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν* spoken of ver. 5, the *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος*; by the *νόμος τοῦ ἀνδρός*, the law, which constitutes the union of the soul with sin; lastly, by the other *ἀνὴρ*, Christ. But, first of all, it is somewhat far-fetched and forced to place the *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος* over against the *ἐγώ* as the *ἀνὴρ* in relation to the *γυνή*; and again, according to this view, Paul must have written in ver. 4: *καὶ ὑμεῖς θανατωθέντες (sc. τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ) διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χρ. ἠλευθερώθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου*, whereas he is now clearly treating of death in relation to the law, not of death in relation to sin. He wishes to prove, not that by being freed from the law we are dead to sin, but rather the reverse (vv. 5, 6), that by being dead to the law we are freed from sin. It is therefore best, with the majority of interpreters, who follow the allegorical explanation of

<sup>1</sup> The objections raised by Meyer and Tholuck we look upon as not conclusive.

the verse, in the train of Origen and Chrysostom, to understand by the *ἐκκλησία* the church, by the one *ἀνὴρ* the law, by the other Christ. It is common with the apostle to set forth the relation of the church to Christ under the image of marriage, 2 Cor. xi. 2; Eph. v. 32; and Hengstenberg, *Comm. on Psalms*, II. p. 120. We have here a striking and beautiful expansion of the image, the marriage-covenant serving to set forth the relation of the covenant of law to the covenant of grace. The partial inversion of the comparison that appears in the exposition, ver. 4, presents no difficulty, because in reality the death of the law is identical with the death of the individual in reference to the law.

—*γάρ*] either confirmatory: *for*, for thus is it prefigured in the law, or explanatory: *nempe, namely*, because the allegorical instance borrowed from the marriage-law illustrates the relation in question of man to the law, Jas. ii. 2.

—*ὑπανδρός*] *marito subjecta, i.e.* married. The expression occurs also in classical Greek, and is used by the LXX. for the Hebrew *אִשָּׁה נִשְׁתָּה*, Num. v. 29, etc.

—*τῷ ζώντι ἀνδρὶ δέδεται*] *is bound to her living husband*, is bound to be his only. Comp. *δέδεσαι γυναικί*, 1 Cor. vii. 27, and *ἐκκλησία δέδεται ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ζῇ ὁ ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς*, ver. 39.

—*νόμῳ*] *by the law*, namely, the Mosaic. He appeals to the law in the presence of those who *γινώσκουσι νόμον*. The law, indeed, contains no express command of the sort, but only an indirect precept; for as only the husband could dismiss the wife by bill of divorce, Deut. xxiv. 1, it followed that the wife on her part was bound to the husband during her life. That the wife also by the bill of divorce was released from obligation to the husband (Kidduschin, f. ii. 1: “mulier possidet se ipsam *per libellum repudii* et *per mortem mariti*, Deut. xxiv. 2 f.”), Paul leaves out of sight, not so much because he only takes into account the rule, not the exception, as rather because it only concerned him here to lay stress on this,—that the wife on her part has no power, while her husband lives, to separate and release herself from him, in which relation no change is made by the power of the husband on his part to free himself from his wife.

—*κατήργηται ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ἀνδρός*] the phrase *καταργεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τίνος*, not used in classical Greek, is found again in ver. 6 and Gal. v. 4. In meaning it corresponds with *ἐλευθέρα*

ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ver. 3 (comp. ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπὸ, vi. 18, 22), although it is stronger and best compared with φθείρεσθαι ἀπὸ, 2 Cor. xi. 3. We should have expected κατήργηται ὁ νόμος τοῦ ἀνδρός (iii. 31) καὶ αὕτη ἐλευθέρα ἐστίν. But in energetic phraseology the notion of abrogation is transferred to the person, and by a *constructio praeagnans* καταργεῖσθαι ἀπὸ is put for καταργεῖσθαι καὶ χωρίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, *to be annulled and released from the law, i.e. to be entirely set free from the law and released from it in every respect.* ὁ νόμος τοῦ ἀνδρός, *lex ad maritum pertinens, de eo lata*, the law referring to the husband, made in reference to him. Comp. LXX. Lev. vii. 1: οὗτος ὁ νόμος τοῦ κριοῦ κτλ., οὗτος ὁ νόμος θυσίας σωτηρίου; xiv. 2: τοῦ λεπροῦ; xv. 3: τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας, etc. Thus it is not really different from ὁ νόμος περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, LXX. Lev. xi. 46: οὗτος ὁ νόμος περὶ τῶν κτηνῶν καὶ τῶν πετεινῶν κτλ., and the genitive expresses, according to Winer, p. 235, inner reference of a remoter kind. *Law of the husband, i.e. the law fixing the relation to the husband, i.e. as results here from the context, in such a form that it binds to him.* Bengel remarks on τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ἀνδρός, “non incommode statuas appositionem: *a lege, viro.*” Although this grammatical construction is untenable, it may be said that Paul has not without purpose chosen the phrase ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ἀνδρός (ver. 3, ἐλευθέρα ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου) instead of the simple ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρός, in order to intimate that the freedom of the wife from the husband in the spiritual sphere, prefigured by this relation, is freedom from the law.

—ἄρα οὖν] see on v. 18.

—χρηματίζει] The verb χρηματίζω, derived from χρῆμα, originally = to transact business, then: to manage state affairs, especially to hold councils, to give answers and decisions upon questions, to consult, ordain, decide. Hence in the N. T. of divine answers and decisions, χρηματίζειν = *oracula edere, divinitus admonere, edocere*, Heb. xii. 25; the passive χρηματίζεσθαι, *oraculo moneri, oraculum accipere, divinitus admoneri*, Matt. ii. 12, 22; Luke ii. 26; Acts x. 22; Heb. viii. 5, xi. 7 (hence Chrys.: χρηματισμός προφητεία ἐστίν; Rom. xi. 4: χρηματισμός = *oraculum*). From the meaning: to conduct state affairs, to hold a public office, has arisen in later profane writers, Polybius and Diodorus (χρηματίζει βασιλεύς, he assumes the title of king, has himself called king), Plutarch (νέα Ἴσις ἐχρημάτισε, she had herself called a new

Isis), Strabo (ἐχρημάτισε Καρχηδόνιος), and others, the meaning χρηματίζω, I take, assume a title of office, character, name; then simply: *I am called*. So here, μοιχαλὶς χρηματίσει, *she shall be called an adulteress*. Comp. Acts xi. 26: ἐγένετο . . . χρηματίσαι πρῶτον ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ τοὺς μαθητὰς Χριστιανούς. The future χρηματίσει is used, because what always holds good may be conceived as holding good also in the future.

—ἐὰν γένηται ἀνδρὶ ἑτέρῳ] *if she shall become another man's* (as wife). Comp. the וְאִשָּׁתִּי אֲנִי, Ruth i. 12; Judg. xiv. 20; Ezek. xvi. 8, xxiii. 4. ἕτερος is here well chosen, because it concerns not merely another husband of two, but also one of another kind, belonging to another class or category. So Christ, in relation to the law, is not merely ἄλλος, but ἕτερος ἀνὴρ, Gal. i. 6.

—τοῦ μὴ] = ὥστε μὴ, of result, not of purpose, comp. Acts iii. 12, vii. 19; Winer, p. 408.

Ver. 4. ὥστε] Particle of inference, *quare, itaque, accordingly, therefore*. On the following indicative, comp. Winer, p. 377. It follows that they also are dead to the law through the body of Christ, because through the body of Christ the law is slain, and therefore they, like the wife through the husband's death, are free from the dominion of the law. The apostle, glancing back to ver. 1, says: ὑμεῖς ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ, instead of, as vv. 2 and 3 would have led us to expect, ὁ νόμος ἐθανατώθη, κατηργήθη, not so much to avoid giving offence to the weak Jewish Christians by the former harsher expression (for in x. 4 he says: τέλος νόμου Χριστός; Eph. ii. 15: τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασι, καταργήσας; Col. ii. 14), as rather because, in keeping with vi. 14, he would deal, not with the abolition of the law, but with the release of believers from the law. Both are no doubt inseparably interwoven, nay, identical, and therefore the transition could be made from one conception to the other without difficulty. But had he (vv. 2, 3) chosen the purely objective representation, it might then have seemed as if the abolition of the law left the Christian, like the wife in the preceding comparison, in his natural state, without the inner subjective change substituting for the yoke of the law the lordship of Christ. Moreover, since the σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ is to be conceived as θανατωθέν, and in this very σῶμα θανατωθέν the law is at the same time slain (comp. the passages of the Ephesian and Colossian epistles just cited), we can scarcely speak of an inversion of the simile, the proposition: you are put

to death to the law through the body of Christ, being in reality identical with the proposition: since through the body of Christ the law is put to death, you are set free from it. There is accordingly found here not so much an inversion as a contraction of thought and expression.

—καὶ ὑμεῖς] *you also*, namely, ὥσπερ ἡ γυνή, vv. 2, 3.

—ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ] not ἀπεθάνετε τῷ νόμῳ, because only the σῶμα θανατωθέν τοῦ Χριστοῦ and your incorporation by God's gracious act into this σῶμα θανατωθέν are the ground of your deliverance from the law. On the dative τῷ νόμῳ, put to death, dead to the law, as to the law, opposite of γίγνεσθαι (ζῆν) ἐτέρῳ, comp. Winer, p. 263.

—διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ] *sc.* θανατωθέντος, which is supplied naturally from ἐθανατώθητε, or even because ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ may be regarded as a contraction of ἐλευθερώθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου διὰ τοῦ σώματος θανατωθέντος τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Through the fact that the body of Christ was slain, through the slaying of Christ's body you are put to death to the law, in so far precisely as through the slaying of Christ's body the law is slain. Therefore the death of Christ even here comes into view as a vicarious sacrificial death. With σώματος, comp. Eph. ii. 15: ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ; and ii. 16: ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι. The expression σώματος is used instead of θανάτου with plastic insight. Christ's obedient *self*-surrender to death is not to be conceived as excluded, Heb. x. 10. Had we, moreover, in ver. 1 only a general proposition, and in ver. 2 f. the example illustrating it, ver. 4 would contain, not an inference, but an application. But it would then be introduced by οὕτως, not by ὥστε. At least if we interpret (comp. de Wette, *Römerbr.* 4 Aufl. p. 91): "*Therefore you also are put to death to the law*" (so that it no longer reigns over you as dead), we must say that it does not at all *follow* that they also are dead, because only death releases from the law, vv. 2, 3, but that the law no longer reigns over them only follows on the supposition, or because it is actually the case, that they also are dead. Therefore either: οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀπεθάνετε τῷ νόμῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὁ νόμος κυριεύει ὑμῶν, or ὥστε ὁ νόμος οὐκέτι κυριεύει οὐδὲ ὑμῶν, διότι καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀπεθάνετε.

—εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς τῷ ἐτέρῳ] *in order to your becoming another's*. Explication of γενομένην ἀνδρὶ ἐτέρῳ, ver. 3, εἰς τό,

tolic, not consecutive ; for the end of the law being abolished is that they should belong to Christ.

—τῷ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐγερθέντι] apposition to ἐτέρῳ, used in allusion and contrast to σῶμα θανατωθέν. They belong not to the dead, but to the risen Christ. Through the slain Christ they are dead to the law. The other husband, to whom they now belong, is therefore not the slain, but the risen, the living Christ, vi. 5. There may also be supposed a reference to the active power of the Risen One who remains not in death, a reference preparatory to ἵνα καρποφορ. τ. θεῷ, v. 10, vi. 9.<sup>1</sup>

—ἵνα καρποφορήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ] specifies the purpose of γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἐτέρῳ, and the final purpose of ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ. The change of person is found in other places also, viii. 15 ; Gal. iii. 14. The transition to the common mode of speech in the first person plural expresses the generality of the demand, promise, etc., and thus adds force. On καρποφορήσωμεν, Bengel remarks : “ *Fructus respondet proli : nam similitudo est a matrimonio.*” So, too, the majority of ancient and modern interpreters, who understand καρπός of the *fruit of marriage*, good works. Theodoret early remarks : καὶ ἐπειδὴ συνάφειαν καὶ γάμον τὴν εἰς τὸν κύριον προσηγόρευσε πίστιν, εἰκότως δείκνυσι καὶ τὸν τοῦ γάμου καρπόν. But as this metaphor, occurring so often elsewhere in Scripture, of καρπὸν ποιεῖν, Matt. iii. 8, 10 ; καρπὸν δίδοναι, Mark iv. 7 ; καρπὸν φέρειν, John xii. 24, xv. 2 ; καρπὸν ἔχειν, Rom. i. 13 ; καρποφορεῖν, Matt. xiii. 23, Mark iv. 20, 28, Luke viii. 15, Col. i. 6, 10,—is always taken from the soil, trees, grain, vine, and as even in this epistle καρπὸν ἔχειν, vi. 22, just before, and καρποφορεῖν τῷ θανάτῳ, vii. 5, just after, refer to fruit of the soil (comp., besides, Gal. v. 22 ; Eph. v. 9 ; Phil. i. 11), there is no adequate ground for supposing a deviation here from this use of the word, which is invariable in the N. T. The metaphor of καρποφορεῖν, so familiar, needed in fact no special occasion to suggest its employment. It must therefore remain exceedingly doubtful whether, while retaining the trope from the soil, merely an *allusion* to the καρπὸς κοιλίας (Luke i. 42) should

<sup>1</sup> “ For if Christ became *through His bodily death* our deliverer from the law, we cannot now belong to Him otherwise than as the *Risen One* for a new and indissoluble union. The importance of this addition, in its bearing on the matter in hand, lies in the *καινότης ζωῆς* (vi. 3, 11, 13, 22), which, on the very ground of the ethical communion with the Risen One, issues from the new relation,” Meyer.

also be supposed. But against the notion that the *καρπὸς κοιλίας* is here directly meant, beside what has been already quoted, tells the somewhat indelicate coarseness of the figure, which, moreover, would stand out in strong contrast with the bare intimation of the marriage-relation lying in the phrase: *εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἐτέρῳ. καρποφορεῖν τινι*, to bear fruit for one, *i.e.* to bear fruit that one may enjoy, that is agreeable to him. Since the end of our union with Christ consists in our being bound to bear fruit to God, it follows that through Christ the law is only abolished relatively. "Ac tenendum quidem est," says Calvin, "Paulum eam duntaxat partem, quae propria est Mosis ministerio, hic attingere. Nam quatenus decem praeceptis tradidit Deus, quid rectum sit, vitamque nostram instituit, nulla nobis somnianda est Legis abrogatio: qui vigere perpetuo debet Dei voluntas. Itaque diligenter meminerimus, non esse hanc a justitia, quae in Lege docetur, solutionem: sed a rigida exactione et ea, quae inde sequitur, maledictione. Non ergo bene vivendi regula, quam Lex praescribit, abrogata est: sed qualitas illa, quae libertati per Christum partae opponitur, nempe dum summam perfectionem requirit, et quia non praestamus, constringit nos sub aeternae mortis reatu."

Vv. 5, 6. Confirmation of ἵνα καρποφορήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ. This *καρποφορεῖν τῷ θεῷ* is now to take place, for (γάρ) under the law only a *καρποφορεῖν τῷ θανάτῳ* took place, ver. 5; but now, when we are delivered from the law, a *δουλεύειν ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος*, ver. 6, which by its very nature is a *καρποφορεῖν τῷ θεῷ*. Thus is justified our initial assertion, that as vv. 1-4 of this chapter are the development of the second half of vi. 14, οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ νόμον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ χάριν, so vv. 5, 6 are a more precise presentation of the first half, ἁμαρτία ὑμῶν οὐ κυριεύσει, or, if one chooses, of the entire sentence, ἁμαρτία ὑμ. οὐ κυρ., ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑ. νόμ., ἀλλ' ὑ. χάριν. Instead of ὅτε γὰρ ἦμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκί] according to the connection of thought, we should rather have expected ὅτε γὰρ ἦμεν ὑπὸ τὸν νόμον, to which, then, νυνὶ δὲ κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ver. 6, stands in opposition. On this ground Theodoret early explained ἐν τῇ σαρκί by ἐν τῇ κατὰ νόμον πολιτείᾳ, and supported the explanation by the words · σάρκα γὰρ τὰς τῇ σαρκὶ δεδομένας νομοθεσίας ὠνόμασε. Certainly εἶναι ἐν τῇ σαρκί cannot be identified offhand with εἶναι ὑπὸ τὸν νόμον. But the reference of the expression to the essence of the

law is imperatively demanded by the connection, unless the structure of the language is to be described as altogether out of harmony and irrelevant. *σάρξ*, then, is the old essence of human nature in opposition to the new essence of the *πνεῦμα*. But this manifests itself not merely in the dominion of sinful lusts and propensities, but quite as much in reliance upon descent, circumcision, external prerogatives, and works of law. Comp. on *κατὰ σάρκα*, iv. 1. The Jewish Christians, therefore, were *ἐν τῇ σαρκί*, just as they relied upon those carnal things; and *εἶναι ἐν τῇ σαρκί* accordingly means not to be under the law, but to be in a legal position, of a legal nature.

—*τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*] *the passions of sins, i.e. the passions leading to sins, that have sins for their result.* Comp. on *εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς*, v. 18. *τὰ παθήματα*, elsewhere in a physical sense *sufferings*—only again, Gal. v. 24, in an ethical sense—occurring also in profane authors, *passions*, in the latter passage co-ordinated with *ἐπιθυμίας*. But *παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν* cannot be inverted “passions brought about by sins,” because while *ἡ ἁμαρτία* indeed does, *αἱ ἁμαρτίαι* does not denote the sinful principle active in the heart. Parallel is Jas. i. 15: *ἡ ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν*.

—*τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου*] either directly a more exact definition of *τὰ παθήματα*, as perhaps 1 Thess. i. 8: *ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, or *ὄντα* (not merely *φαινόμενα* or *γνωριζόμενα*, as, besides being ungrammatical, Chrysostom wishes) is to be understood. For the law not merely works *ἐπιγνώσιν ἁμαρτίας*, but is also *δύναμις ἁμαρτίας*, 1 Cor. xv. 56. “*Hoc est legis opus*,” says Calvin, “*corda nostra magis accendere, ut in tales cupiditates ebulliant.*” *How* this is done is explained at length, ver. 7 ff. The *παθήματα* brought about through the law (*διὰ*) are those excited and set in motion through the law. “*Lex enim*,” Calvin strikingly remarks, “*ob peccatum accusans et damnans, nos ad iram fremitumque contra se et Deum excitat, et interna malitia sentiens legem urgentem et damnantem, tanquam ignis in calce viva perfusus aqua, tanto magis exaestuat, quum virtutem obsequendi haud videat.*”

—*ἐνηργεῖτο*] *were active*, middle, not passive, which occurs nowhere in the N. T. Of persons Paul invariably uses the active *ἐνεργεῖν*, 1 Cor. xii. 6; Gal. ii. 8, iii. 5; Eph. i. 11, 20, ii. 2; Phil. ii. 13; of things, the middle *ἐνεργεῖσθαι*, 2 Cor. i. 6, iv. 12;



Gal. v. 6 ; Eph. iii. 20 ; Col. i. 29 ; 1 Thess. ii. 13 ; 2 Thess. ii. 7, comp. Jas. v. 16 ; on the other hand, Matt. xiv. 2 ; Mark vi. 14. In profane authors the middle does not occur. From 1 Cor. xii. 11, therefore, according to this invariable Pauline idiom, an argument may be deduced for the personality of the Holy Spirit.

—ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν] The μέλη as parts of the σῶμα (comp. on vi. 12) are here mentioned in the same sense as in vi. 13, 19. Hence Melancthon justly observes: “ Quod autem dicit affectus peccatorum per legem excitatos, efficaces fuisse in membris nostris intelligit de dubitatione, indignatione adversus Deum, desperatione,” save that *sensual* lusts are just as little to be excluded.

—εἰς τὸ καρποφορῆσαι τῷ θανάτῳ] The fruits are no other than the sinful deeds that bring death, vi. 21, 23, and Jas. i. 15 : ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα ἀποκύει θάνατον. εἰς τό, in keeping with ὥστε, ver. 6, is to be taken ἐκβατικῶς, not τελικῶς. Respecting θάνατος, comp. on vi. 16, 21, 23. Again, what is here said in particular of Jewish Christians may also be applied, although only in a subordinate and analogous manner, to Gentile Christians, and, moreover, to all Gentile Christians, not simply to those among them who formerly belonged to the *proselytis portae*. Even the law of conscience possessed, according to ii. 14, by the Gentiles, as the deputy of the Mosaic Nomos, stirred up the lusts of the flesh. It was, so to speak, an emanation of the divine, revealed law, by means of which that law exerted its influence even over the natural life of man. Hence the law of conscience may be here viewed as included under the Nomos, and condensed in it as in its culminating point. Besides, what is said in this section could only bear application to the Gentile Christians, in so far as, had they not become Christ's, they must have come under the Nomos, since no third form of revelation exists or can exist. But by the ancients (comp. Calov here) this verse is rightly understood to intimate that *believers*, even in the time of the old covenant, were justified and regenerated simply through *faith* in the promise, and were thus delivered from the law which excites fleshly lusts.

—νυνί] used as *adverbium temporis* in contrast to ὅτε, ver. 5. Just so νυνί, vi. 22, in opposition to ὅτε, ver. 20.

—κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου] Theophylact: ἀπελύθημεν,

ἡλευθερώθημεν. Comp. κατήργηται ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ver. 2.

—ἀποθανόντες] This reading, the best attested by manuscripts, is the one approved by all modern editors and interpreters. The *lectio recepta* ἀποθανόντος is really a mere conjecture, that has crept into the text through a misunderstanding on the part of Beza of Chrysostom's interpretation, comp. Reiche, *Com. Crit.* I. p. 50 ff. The connection of κατειχόμεθα is no doubt thereby made easy, but the representation of the νόμος as ἀποθανών would be inconsistent with the idea of ver. 4. The reading τοῦ θανάτου, occidental only, is likewise to be regarded as a correction to remove difficulties. The νόμος was described as νόμος τοῦ θανάτου in allusion to ver. 5, where θάνατος was mentioned as its consequence, because ἀποθανόντες was understood, not of spiritual death in relation to the law, but wrongly of death brought about by the law. νυνὶ κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀποθανόντες, so that ἀποθανόντες gives the mode of κατηργήθημεν, is in meaning identical with ὑμεῖς ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ, ver. 4, on which account the connection of ἐν ᾧ with τοῦ νόμου appears easier than that with an ἐκείνῳ or τούτῳ (neut.) to be understood after ἀποθανόντες, Winer, p. 198, note. With ἀποθανόντες, comp. Gal. ii. 19 : ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον ; Col. ii. 20 : εἰ ἀπεθάνετε σὺν Χριστῷ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων τοῦ κόσμου.

—κατειχόμεθα] as a captive in prison, Gal. iii. 23 : ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρουρούμεθα συγκεκλεισμένοι, iv. 3, also Rom. xi. 32.

—ὥστε] so that, consequence of release from the law.

—δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς] as is self-evident τῷ θεῷ, vi. 22. Just as self-evident is it that the δουλεύειν ἐν παλαιότητι γράμματος is a δουλεύειν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ (vi. 17, 20), for which reason neither τῷ θεῷ nor τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ need be expressly added.

—ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος καὶ οὐ παλαιότητι γράμματος] comp. ii. 29 ; 2 Cor. iii. 6. From the last passage it follows that πνεῦμα here is the πνεῦμα θεοῦ Himself, not merely the human spirit renewed by God's Spirit, which πνεῦμα may perhaps mean elsewhere. γράμμα is the law, in so far and as long as it is not written by God's Spirit on man's heart, as it presents itself to him merely as an external, dead, and fatal letter. καινότης might, then, be referred to πνεῦμα, so that καινότης πνεύματος would be a more energetic expression for καινὸν πνεῦμα, vi. 4 : καινότης ζωῆς. But the πνεῦμα can only be called καινόν, in so

far as it attests a new condition of life; and elsewhere only *ἄνθρωπος* or *κτίσις*, not *πνεῦμα*, is accompanied by this predicate. Hence it is preferable to understand *καινότης* of this new condition of man which the *πνεῦμα* conditions and effects; and in the same way *παλαιότης* is to be understood of the former condition of life moulded under the influence of the *γράμμα*, of the inward and outward constitution of the *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος*. Luther therefore rightly: "thus that we may serve in the new nature of the spirit, and not in the old nature of the letter." That this old nature is sinful and the new nature holy, results naturally as well from the character of the principle which is its source, as from the entire tenor of the exposition. *ἐν* denotes the sphere, the element in which the *δουλεύειν* takes place, and is of course to be referred to *παλαιότητι*.

In the exposition of the doctrine of God's justifying and sanctifying grace in Christ, which has engaged the apostle up to this point, he had continually made reference, although mostly but in brief sentences, to the Mosaic Nomos, and repeatedly asserts its inability to confer righteousness, holiness, and life. Nay, on the contrary, he describes the law as a principle that mediates sin, divine wrath, and death. His doctrine of grace stood in complete contrast with the doctrine of law. Thus we read, iii. 20, that the *νόμος* justifies not, because it brings *ἐπίγνωσιν ἁμαρτίας*; that, accordingly, righteousness availing before God is revealed *χωρὶς νόμου*, ver. 21; just so, iv. 15, that the *νόμος* works wrath, because it has *παράβασιν* for its consequence; v. 20, that it is given to aggravate the *παράπτωμα*; vi. 14, that with its dominion, the dominion of sin is broken. With a similar apparently disparaging remark concerning the law he had concluded the section, just expounded, of this seventh chapter. What the apostle said there, vv. 5, 6, leads him to the subjoined apology for the law, now indeed become necessary, in which he vindicates the Nomos from the guilt of its evil consequences, and charges them absolutely to the account of the sinfulness of human nature. This is the drift of the exposition that now follows, vv. 7-25. The apostle uses the first person, and therefore utters his own experience. Still, at the same time (the rhetorical *σχῆμα* may be called *κοινωνίς*, *κοινοποιία*, *ιδιώσις*, or *μετασχηματισμός*), the universal experience of mankind is delineated. If merely his individual spiritual states were meant to be described, without our being justified in

giving them a universal reference, such a description would be deprived of all evidential force, since it must then remain utterly uncertain whether the law invariably produced such effects as he had once and by the way experienced. But, on the other hand, that Paul here, *excluding* his own experience, pictures only the general experience of mankind, or that of the Jewish people under the law, is, to pass by all other inconveniences, out of the question, because the apostle, as his life, his writings, and the case itself testify, had actually gone through the conditions here delineated, and pictures them with such a vivid touch as nothing but remembrance of past or consciousness of present occurrences can impart.<sup>1</sup> “Imprimis in rebus spiritualibus,” says Melancthon, “prodest Sanctorum experientiam nosse, ut ex eorum exemplis agnoscamus vim verbi et opera Dei.” “Se ergo in exemplum sistere voluit apostolus,” observes Calvin, “partim *ἐνεργείας* ergo, siquidem illustrior fiat exemplis oratio, partim *πιθανολογίας* gratia. Nihil enim loqui se ostendit, nisi quod sensu atque experientia suapte compertum habeat. Tunc enim utilissime docetur, cum in se quisque descendens doctrinae vivum experimentum ex se ipso capere potest.” Rightly, Theodor. Mopsu. on ver. 8: τὸ ἐν ἔμοι ὅτε λέγει, τὸ κοινὸν λέγει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, and Theophyl. on ver. 9: ἐν τῷ οἰκέῳ δὲ προσώπῳ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν λέγει. But if we ask, of what period in his life the apostle treats in this section, it is unquestionable and really conceded by all expositors that vv. 7–13 can only refer to the legal condition of the unregenerate. We consider then, first, the content of these verses, and defer till afterwards the consideration of the question, what stage of the inner life is described in vv. 14–25.

Ver. 7. *Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν* ;] comp. iii. 5, vi. 1, also iv. 1.

—ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτία ;] *Is the law sin?* Most interpreters suppose a *metonymia effectus pro causa* = *is the law the cause of sin?* comparing it with Gal. ii. 17: ἁμαρτίας διάκονος, and appealing to Mic. i. 5: כִּי־פָשַׁע יַעֲקֹב הָלְאָה שְׁמֵרֹן. “Who is the

<sup>1</sup> To the view of Grotius (“Apostolus autem hic sub prima persona describit Hebraeum genus quale fuit ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ primum ante legem, deinde post legem”), which Calov calls a “glossa Pelagiana, Sociniana et Arminiana,” in modern days only, Reiche (who even finds, ver. 15 ff., in the double ἐγώ “the empirical, sinful Jew, as he appears in experience and history, and as such does evil, distinguished from the ideal Jew free from sin, as he might and should have been, who as such disapproves that evil”) and Fritzsche have adhered. See its thorough refutation in Tholuck, *Com.*, 1842, p. 349 ff.

author of Jacob's transgression? Is it not Samaria?" But, apart from the consideration that there the expression is poetical, and that in this sense we should at least in the present passage have expected *ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτία μοι γίνεται*; Paul also could not offhand and in every respect deny that the law is the cause of sin, seeing that, according to his own representation, although not its efficient, it is yet its proximate cause. On this account several modern interpreters, following Tittmann, *de syn. in N. T.* lib. I. p. 46 (*manifestum est, in verbis: ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτία; ἁμαρτίαν non esse incitamentum ad peccatum, sed quod per se pravam et vitiosum est*), have rightly taken *ἁμαρτία* in the sense of *ἁμαρτώλος, κακός* (*abstr. pro concr.*). Is the law sin? *i.e.* something whose nature is in itself sinful, immoral? The supposition is natural, that, from the homogeneity of cause and effect, what occasions sin is itself sinful. The abstract *ἁμαρτία* is chosen, then, instead of *ἁμαρτώλος* (2 Cor. v. 21, also 1 John iv. 10) on account of the subjoined *ἁμαρτίαν*. The contrast, ver. 20, *ὁ νόμος ἅγιος = οὐχ ἁμαρτώλος*, also favours this interpretation. But, of course, it only seems possible to suppose that the law itself is sin in so far as it could be held answerable for the sin that it occasions, when of set purpose and malice aforethought it brings to ruin man in himself without sin; for the supposition that the law is sin, on the ground of its commanding wrong instead of right, or rewarding instead of punishing sin, would be too diametrically opposed to the universally admitted idea of law. Hence Calvin's intermediate view: "*Quum autem rogat, an peccatum sit: intelligit, an peccatum sic generet, ut illi imputari ejus culpa debeat*," and Bengel's: "*num lex est peccatum sive causa peccati peccaminosa*," may perhaps be nearest the truth. The law would be itself sin if it were the direct cause of sin. This dangerous misunderstanding the apostle now rebuts, as usual, by a

—*μὴ γένοιτο*] comp. on iii. 4.

—*ἀλλά*] not = *but indeed*, but = *imo, on the contrary*, or = *but*.

It introduces the opposite of what was denied in *μὴ γένοιτο*. That which is designed to lay bare and make known sin cannot itself be the malicious and guilty cause of sin. *ἁμαρτία μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, φησὶ, γνωριστικὸς δὲ ἁμαρτίας*, Theophyl.

—*τὴν ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔγνω*] *I knew not sin*. *ἁμαρτία* here is, of course, as the subjoined explanatory *τὴν τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐκ*

ἦδειν proves (vv. 8, 9, 11, 13, 14), sin as an inward principle, not sin as an act, for the sinful act was known indeed before the law. But "I knew not sin" is not to be directly explained: I knew not that sin is sin; for the apostle says not οὐκ ἦδειν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι ἁμαρτίαν, but man knows not sin at all, just because he knows not that sin is sin, *i.e.*, before the revelation through the law, the character and essence of sin is unknown to him, because he takes the sinful propensity, dwelling in him, for a lawful, divinely-implanted inclination. In the apodosis, as often (John viii. 39, ix. 33, xix. 11; Acts xxvi. 32), the ἄν (οὐκ ἔγνω instead of οὐκ ἂν ἔγνω) is omitted for emphasis. I knew not sin = certainly I should not have become acquainted with it, answering to the Latin *cognoram*. Comp. Kühner, *Ausf. Gram. Th.* II. p. 556. But the emphasis implied in this form of expression is not always regarded in later Greek, in which the omission of ἄν becomes increasingly frequent, Winer, p. 382.

—εἰ μὴ διὰ νόμου] *sc.* ἔγνω ἀυτὴν. The Nomos is here the Mosaic law, as is proved, if further proof were needed, by the express citation from the decalogue. The purpose of this entire section is, no doubt, to vindicate the Mosaic law, but therewith, of course, the law of conscience is vindicated in all its analogous effects.

—τὴν τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐκ ἦδειν] *for I should have known nothing of lust.* τε γάρ, *for indeed*, is stronger than the simple γάρ. Hermann remarks on a similar τε γάρ in Sophocles, *Trachin.* v. 1015: "τε illud non copulat, sed lenius affirmat quam τοί, unde natum est, ut Germanice per *ja* vel *wohl* exprimi possit." ἐπιθυμία here, of course, denotes not the divinely-implanted, natural instinct, the rational ὁρεξις in itself, but its perversion in God-opposing, evil desire. Of the existence of the latter, man knows nothing until the precept of the law, forbidding it, is brought home to him in its inward personal obligation. Until then he knows, indeed, that lust exists in him, but not that this lust is sinful. Certainly here also the apostle does not directly say: οὐκ ἦδειν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι κακὴν, but simply: τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν οὐκ ἦδειν; but, supposing by the expression ἐπιθυμία nothing but ἐπιθυμία κακὴ to be meant, the sense amounts to the same. Just because man, until the appearance of the prohibitory precept, knows not that the lust existing in him is evil, he knows not the specific character and

real nature of *ἐπιθυμία* at all, he knows nothing of evil desire. "Consuetudo loquendi obtinuit," says Augustine, *de civ. Dei*, l. xiv. c. 7, "ut, si cupiditas vel concupiscentia dicatur nec addatur, cujus rei sit, non nisi in malo possit intelligi." The apostolic position is corroborated by experience. Civil law judges but the act, the moral law of philosophers the consent of the will. Only the revealed Nomos, just because it is *πνευματικός*, ver. 14, judges even the evil desire and inclination itself. But the present Pauline teaching condemns just as much the Catholic doctrine that the evil desire of the regenerate is not in itself sin, as the certainly equally warranted rationalistic opinion that the evil desire of the unregenerate is not in itself sin. If evil desire is forbidden, it is sin; and if it is sin in the unregenerate, even though he knows it, it is so much the more sin in the regenerate, because he knows it. The subject here is not the so-called *concupiscentia formata* or *voluntaria*, i.e. *concupiscentia* in union with *consensus*, as Catholicism, Socinianism, and Arminianism with arbitrary shallowness maintained. Rather the apostle describes *ἐπιθυμία* simply and absolutely, therefore even *concupiscentia involuntaria* or *informis*, as *ἀμαρτία*. *ἐπιθυμία* may then be identified with the preceding *ἀμαρτία*; but it is perhaps more precisely (ver. 8: *ἡ ἀμαρτία . . . κατεργάσατο . . . ἐπιθυμίαν*) viewed as the most immediate effect and primary manifestation of *ἀμαρτία*, which is conceived simply as the radical, underlying principle. "*Ἀμαρτία*, peccatum," says Bengel, "est quasi materia peccans, ex qua *omnis* morbus et paroxysmus *concupiscentiae*." And: "Penitior et reconditior est *ἡ ἀμαρτία*, peccatum: *ἡ ἐπιθυμία*, *concupiscentia*, magis in sensum incurrit, eademque peccatum prodit, ut fumus ignem."<sup>1</sup> In the existence of *ἐπιθυμία* I learn the existence of *ἀμαρτία*; wherefore I knew not sin, for I knew not *concupiscentiae*, without the law. But the *γνώσις ἀμαρτίας*, here spoken of, is not absolutely identical with *ἐπίγνωσις ἀμαρτίας*, iii. 20. It is rather simply the first step towards the latter. For the full knowledge of sin it does not suffice to know that lust is evil, but we must also apprehend that it is not to be overcome by natural, human strength. This latter knowledge, ver. 13, is the final result of an inward process, joining on to the former knowledge, as is described in vv. 8–12.

—*εἰ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἔλεγεν*] namely, in Ex. xx. 17.

<sup>1</sup> Inversely, Jas. i. 15 takes *ἀμαρτία* as the sinful act, whose cause is *ἐπιθυμία*.

—οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις] The future, chosen in conformity with the O. T. legal idiom, views the command as already obeyed in the future, and is therefore more commanding in tone than the imperative, Wirer, p. 396. Paul does not here adduce the objects of lust, specially mentioned in the striking passage in Exodus, because his point was desire in general, evil lust universally. Indeed, the meaning of that special indication was not to represent desire after objects not specially mentioned as lawful. But we see how the apostle regards οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις as the innermost kernel and centre of the entire law, just as the Lord does the positive ἀγαπήσεις corresponding to it, Matt. xxii. 37, comp. Rom. xiii. 10. And, in reality, the act only takes place through the good or evil desire after the really good or evil act. But under ἐπιθυμία here is included, not merely *sensual* desire, but quite as much, nay, pre-eminently, ἔχθρα εἰς θεόν and φιλαυτία.

Ver. 8. But the propensity to sin is so little suppressed by the prohibition of lust, that, on the contrary, defiant and invincible by the law, it takes occasion from this very law for the first time to break forth into evil desire and lust of every kind—an unanswerably certain, psychological fact, which man can more easily reason and argue against than get rid of. ἀφορμὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς] Elsewhere it is only said: ἀφορμὴν λαμβάνειν ἐκ, παρά, ἀπό, not: διὰ τινός. On this account several modern expositors suppose ἀφ. δὲ λαβ. ἡ ἀμ. to be used absolutely, and join διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς with the following κατειργάσατο. But then the more suitable order would have been: κατειργάσατο ἐν ἐμοὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς; whereas, upon διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς placed *first*, an unwarranted emphasis would be placed. The same relation obtains in ver. 11; whereas διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ver. 13, placed first, really has a special accent. On this account the connection of διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς with ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα, more probable even according to the previous context, seems to deserve the preference, if it can only be justified grammatically. The choice of the preposition διὰ may possibly be explained thus: that in this way reproach was meant to be still farther removed from the law and thrown upon sin. The Nomos did not so much give occasion to sin, as sin took occasion by means of its appearance, on the ground of its innocent intervention (διὰ), to express itself, to manifest its own nature. Hence we prefer to interpret ἀφορμὴν λαμβάνειν by: *to take occasion*, not by: *to receive, obtain*



*occasion.* Obtaining occasion would allude more directly to the *giving* of occasion on the part of the Nomos. Vulg., Erasim. translate: "*accepta occasione*;" more correctly Beza: "*sumta occasione*," adding the remark: "*occasionem autem cupiditates in nobis excitandi non praebet lex, sed eam arripit cupiditas nostra, legis interdicto irritata.*" The ἐντολή, *the command*, or rather, here, *the prohibition* (namely, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις), is related to the νόμος, as *pars* to *totum*; comp. Eph. ii. 15: ὁ νόμος τῶν ἐντολῶν. "*Præceptum*," remarks Bengel, "*pars est legis, addita expressiore connotatione virtutis coactivae, quae coercet, injungit, urget, prohibet, minatur.*"

—κατεργάσατο ἐν ἐμοὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν] *brought about in me all manner of desire.* κατεργάζεσθαι, *to work powerfully*, stronger than ἐργάζεσθαι, as in iv. 15, v. 3; comp. on ii. 9. But the bringing about of desire consists in the enhancement of desire already existing and at work through the Nomos. πᾶσα ἐπιθυμία, *all manner of desire*, desire of every sort, i. 18, 29; Eph. iv. 31. The general οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις touches each separate concrete ἐπιθυμία, and incites it to burst forth in greater strength. ὅταν τινὸς ἐπιθυμῶμεν, εἴτα κωλυόμεθα, αὔρεται μᾶλλον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ φλόξ, Chrysostom. With the sentiment of this verse comp. Prov. ix. 17, xx. 17, as well as the Ovidian: "*Nitimur in vetitum semper, cupinusque negata*;" and the Horatian: "*Audax omnia perpeti Gens humana ruit in vetitum nefas.*" The heathen world knew well that prohibition fans desire into passionate eagerness for the unlawful act, and that the accomplishment of this act is punishable; but Scripture describes even this kindling of desire itself as sinful. "*Desperati morbi remediis exasperantur. Sic legi membrorum eo ipso dulcia fiunt pleraque, quia lege Dei sunt prohibita. Tanta enim est naturae nostrae depravatio, ut quo exquisitius in lege prohibetur peccatum, eo magis in contrarium nitatur. Tendit enim ad libertatem suam, quae vinculo legis quasi adstricta videtur, adeoque illud vinculum rumpere nititur,*" Calov.

—χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία νεκρά] *sc. ἐστίν*, not ἦν, which the apostle must have expressly added. The proposition is general. As long as the law, with its prohibition of concupiscence, does not come within man's consciousness, sin is dead, *i.e.* it slumbers, so to speak; not raging with desire, as when it is stirred up by the law. It flows along smoothly till it is met by an impeding

barrier, over which it leaps with tumultuous violence; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 56: ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ νόμος. Here, too, νόμος denotes, not the moral law in general, but the Mosaic Nomos, for no other contains the prohibition of ἐπιθυμία pure and simple. The explanation of this verse by the *knowledge* of sin (*"Detexit in me omnem concupiscentiam: quae dum lateret, quodammodo nulla esse videbatur,"* Calvin) is manifestly forced and untenable.

Vv. 9, 10. ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτέ] The question is, what period in his life the apostle characterizes in these words. Melancthon here distinguishes a threefold status of man: the status *securitatis*, the status *sub lege*, and the status *regenerationis*. In the words: χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία νεκρά. Ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτέ, Paul describes the first, thence to ver. 13 the second, from ver. 14 onward the third stage of the inner life. In the state of security man lives a life of unrestrained lust without regard to the divine law, or fancies himself, with a hypocritical show of righteousness, to be righteous before God by outward works of the law. In this latter condition Paul found himself during his Pharisaic period. He then lived without law, because the law did not yet alarm him, did not accuse him. "Lex enim tunc vere lex est, cum iudicat et terret, non cum est in parietibus scripta. Ita Paulus hic dicit, se sine lege vixisse, hoc est: se fuisse securum, cum arbitraretur, se legi satisfacere, quia habebat hypocrisin externorum operum." So most of the old Lutheran and Reformed interpreters, Calov, Carpzov, Bengel, Calvin, etc. In that case, the condition described in the words ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς, etc., must begin with the moment when the Lord appeared to the apostle, and, by revealing the true nature of the law, effected in him, although not as yet the new birth, the repentance that precedes it, as *e.g.* Luther says in his first disputation against the Antinomians, *Thes.* 34: "Paul is first of all smitten to the earth by the law, when he hears the voice that said to him, 'Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?' Then he was made alive by the gospel, when the Lord said to him, 'Rise,' etc., Acts ix." But we believe that this view, at least with regard to its sharp, unrestricted definition of Paul's Pharisaic life as a lawless *status securitatis*, is involved in no insignificant difficulties, both exegetical and psychological. In the first place, it is not probable that Paul would have described his life in Pharisaism, without qualification, as a ζῆν χωρὶς νόμου, seeing

that he characterizes precisely the same condition as a διώκειν νόμον δικαιοσύνης, Rom. ix. 31; as an εἶναι ὑπὸ νόμον, 1 Cor. ix. 20, Gal. iv. 5, 21; as an ὑπὸ νόμον φρουροῦσθαι συγκεκλεισμένους, Gal. iii. 23; comp. also Phil. iii. 6. Again, vv. 7–13 of this chapter plainly contain a more minute development of ver. 5, in which latter passage certainly the subject is not merely the legal condition *after*, but *before* the appearance and revelation of Christ. As concerns, further, the course of Paul's religious development, he assuredly did not belong to that class of the Pharisees who, without having received any impression of the inward holy and inviolable nature of the divine law in the soul, sought to make a show before God and man with a superficial appearance of righteousness. On the contrary, we are obliged to suppose that, even before his turning to the Lord, he acknowledged the unconditional obligation of the command requiring pure love to God, and of the command forbidding evil desire, and strove most earnestly to obey them. But he went upon the mistaken belief that he was able in his own strength to fulfil God's law, to extirpate and overcome forbidden inclination, and by perfect obedience secure for himself God's approval. Therefore he must learn by experience how desire is only stimulated and inflamed by prohibition; and thus, instead of approbation, wrath, instead of life, death fell to his lot. The outward history of his nation was again reflected in his inner life. Israel, placed under the law, by its continuous rebellion against the law became a nation of transgressors, which in consequence experienced the continuous judgments of the Lord. But such experiences did not make the Pharisee Paul waver in his belief. Encouraged by what he believed he had already attained by his moral strivings, he still hoped at last to accomplish his end—to satisfy and get the better of the divine judgment, and reach perfection of life. When the law of God encounters man's unregenerate nature, it no doubt exerts on him its *imperative* and *terrifying* influence, makes him a παραβάτης νόμου, proves to him the δύναμις ἁμαρτίας, and brings to him ὀργήν, κατάραν, and θάνατον; but yet it is unable to humble his pride, disabuse him of the notion that at last he will hold the field as victor, and conduct him to the true and full ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας. This *humbling* influence the law only then exercises when the Spirit of God within makes clear to man the relation of the carnal

character of his nature to the spiritual essence of the Nomos, imparts to him along with the knowledge of the guilt of the evil lust and inclination dwelling in him an insight into its unconquerable nature, and thus gives him the contrite spirit and broken heart in which desire towards sin dies, instead of reviving. Only then does he learn to renounce confidence in fulfilment of the law as an illusive means of justification before God, and to acknowledge Christ as the end of the law and its condemnation. Thus has the νόμος become to him a παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν, and he himself begins to lay hold upon grace, instead of, as before, persecuting it. Thus we have no doubt, with Melancthon, to distinguish a threefold status in the life of Paul, a *status securitatis*, *legalis*, and *regenerationis*, only that we place his Pharisaic period, not in the first, but in the second status. ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτέ falls therefore before this Pharisaic period, or even if partially within this, still only up to the moment when the depth of the law's demand unfolded itself in his soul by perception of the obligation of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, and he now saw that the law requires not only outward act, but inward inclination. That the apostle also, even when a persecutor of the church of Christ, still felt the sting of the law's condemnation in his heart, which he endeavoured by legal strivings, all the more earnest, to blunt, appears to be intimated in the Lord's word: σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λακτιζειν, Acts xxvi. 14. In ζῆν χωρὶς νόμου, therefore, the subject is not merely the first stage of childhood, or so-called childlike innocence, although this is not to be conceived as specially rejected.<sup>1</sup> The phrases: ἁμαρτία νεκρά· ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων . . . ἢ ἁμαρτία ἀνέζησεν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον, plainly form designed antitheses. It is natural, therefore, to give to ἔζων a pregnant signification. "Nam mors peccati," says Calvin, "vita est hominis: rursum vita peccati mors hominis." ἔζων would then = ζῶην εἶχον, but may not on this account, with Augustine, be imme-

<sup>1</sup> Although we still believe ourselves compelled to abide firmly by the exposition given above, yet agreement with the view of the older teachers of our church now seems to us to allow that Paul's *status legalis* during his Pharisaic stage was still to be called *relatively* a *status securitatis*. For, in spite of the perpetual condemnation and terror of the divine law, he perpetually lulled himself in security, since he supposed himself able to prevail over this condemnation by performing works well-pleasing to God, and thus sought and found in his works an apparent life that stifled and hindered the full and abiding experience of his spiritual death. Only when the Lord, appearing to him, completely subdued him and smote him with three days' blind-

diately interpreted by *vivere mihi videbar*, although doubtless that *life*, comparatively undisturbed, unruffled by experience of the law's curse, was in itself merely an apparent life, not the true *ζωή*. That the assertion of Möris: *ἔξην, ἀττικῶς ἔζων, ἑλληνικῶς*, is unfounded, *ἔζων* being the better form, as is proved by the consonous form *ἔζων* used invariably in the 3d plur., see Buttmann, *Ausf. Gr. Spr.* II. § 114, p. 144, under *ζάω*. On the contrary, the compound sound *η*, prevailing in contraction, in accordance with which the 2d and 3d sing. *ἔξης, ἔξη* were formed, early led usage astray into the formation in *μι*, so that it was also said *ἔξην*, and in the imper. *ζῆθι*.

—*ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς*] "Data Israelitis lege," interprets Grotius, referring the preceding *ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτέ* to the life of the Israelites in Egypt. But if this view were at all allowable, Paul must at least have written *ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ νόμου*. The *ἐντολή* is the prohibition *οὐκ ἐπιθυμῆσεις*, and its coming is to be referred to its entry into man's consciousness.

—*ἡ ἀμαρτία ἀνέζησεν*] "*revixit*," remarks Bengel, "*sicut vixerat cum per Adamum intrasset in mundum*." Demonstrably *ἀναζῆν* signifies everywhere *reviviscere, to come to life again* (Luke xv. 24, 32; Rom. xiv. 9; Rev. xx. 5, the last two passages according to the *lect. recep.*). For the meaning *vivere incipere, to come to life*, no example has been adduced. The appeal to the meaning etymologically possible (*ἀνά, again*, like *ἀναπηδάω, ἀνάλλομαι, ἀναβοάω*) avails nothing against invariable usage. Even the analogy of *ἀναβλέπω*, John ix. 11 (comp. Lücke here), is illusory. First of all, *ἀναβλέπειν* actually has both significations, both *to look up* (Matt. xiv. 19; Mark vii. 34; Luke xix. 5) and to see *again*, to recover his sight (Acts ix. 12, 17, 18). Again, the latter signification is found *whenever* the blind seeing is spoken of, even in John ix. 11, 15, 18. For although there the blind man is expressly described as *born blind*, ver. 1, still

ness, did he become so perfectly conscious of the law's sentence of death which could awaken but could not remedy evil lust, that he was no longer inclined to seek life in himself, but in Him that died and rose again for him. Strikingly Besser: "Accordingly we shall say that 'being alive without law, the commandment coming, and sin living again,' extends through the whole period that Paul was in the flesh, ver. 5; but that 'dying' through the law, although it announced itself long before, again and again, only came to completion in the three days of his physical blindness, when he felt the law most deeply as he never did before, and 'in the hot-bath of conscience' beheld its real purity."

seeing is considered as man's normal condition, which is restored to him although he had lost it from birth. But *ἀναζῆν*, in the sense *reviviscere*, agrees perfectly, not only with the only certified idiomatic usage, but also with the dogmatic teaching of the apostle. Paul then views (which harmonizes very well with his exposition given v. 12 ff., and with his entire conception elsewhere of the relation of the world's sin to Adam's sin and to the law, and furnishes a new evidence of our view of his doctrine of sin) one and the same sin as *ζῶσα*, in so far as it is *παράβασις νόμου*, but otherwise as *νεκρά*. It was alive in Adam's disobedience, is dead in mankind living without law, and comes to life again in renewed transgressions of the law. We have no need, therefore, of the conjecture of Hemsterhuis, in itself ingenious, *ἀνέξεσεν*, *offerbuit*, which besides is precluded by manuscript authority and by the antithetical phraseology (*νεκρά*, *ἔζων*, *ἀνέζησεν*, *ἀπέθανον*). The Attic dialect usually forms the aorist and perfect of *ζῆν* from the form *βίωω*, Buttmann, p. 90 and p. 144.

—*ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον*] forms the antithesis as regards form to *ἀνέζησεν*, as regards substance to *ἔζων*. *ἀπέθανον* = *I fell victim* to death. As to the notion of *θάνατος*, comp. on vi. 16. As original sin and actual sin work death, so does transgression of the law, meriting it in an enhanced degree. Here also the element of spiritual and eternal misery predominates.

—*καὶ εὐρέθη μοι*] *and it was found, proved to me*, Winer, p. 770. *οὐκ εἶπε γέγονε θάνατος, οὐδὲ ἔτεκε θάνατον, ἀλλ' εὐρέθη, τὸ καὶνὸν καὶ παράδοξον τῆς ἀτοπίας οὕτως ἐρμηνεύων, καὶ τὸ πᾶν εἰς τῶν ἐκείνων (men) περιτρέπων κεφαλὴν*, Chrys.

—*ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ εἰς ζωὴν*] *the command that was to serve unto life*, namely, according to divine intention. The law as to its nature shows us the way in which we may attain salvation (Lev. xviii. 5; Deut. v. 33; Luke x. 28; Rom. x. 5; Gal. iii. 12). Its proving to us, notwithstanding, the means of ruin and death lies not in its nature, but in ours, and is therefore not its fault, but ours. Thus a medicine, curative by nature, aggravates instead of removing an incurable disease.

—*αὕτη εἰς θάνατον*] *sc. οὖσα*, 1 Pet. i. 7. The question is, whether *αὕτη* or *αὗτη* is to be read. In the abstract both *αὐτός* and *οὗτος*, and even *ἐκεῖνος*, serve for the purpose of resumption and emphasis, Winer, p. 199. Here *αὕτη* seems preferable on account of the parallel *τοῦτο*, vv. 15, 16, 19, 20. This resump-

tion of ἡ ἐντολή ἡ εἰς ζωὴν immediately preceding has a tragic emphasis.

Ver. 11. The reason of the ἐντολή working θάνατος instead of ζωή lies, not in the ἐντολή itself, but in ἁμαρτία, which is therefore put emphatically at the head. The sense of this verse is illustrated by ver. 8. Sin took occasion by the commandment (ἡ γὰρ ἁμαρτία ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς) and deceived me (ἐξηπάτησέ με), making the very command that was given for the purpose of extinguishing my lusts an occasion for exciting in me every kind of lust. The deceitfulness of sin, therefore, consists here not so much in its presenting as a good the object of lust, that, as soon as it is attained, proves an evil, as in this, that it turned the law, in which I ought to have found a guide to righteousness, in my case into a means of furthering unrighteousness. Rightly has it been remarked, that in the conduct of ἁμαρτία, such as is described in this verse, there is probably an allusion from the nature of the case to the serpent in Paradise. Comp. even with the *form* of sentence in Gen. iii. 13, LXX.: ὁ ὄφεις ἡπάτησέ με, and 2 Cor. xi. 3. Calvin arbitrarily remarks: "Merito dicit Paulus: Ubi peccatum a lege detegitur, nos a vita abduci. Ergo verbum ἐξαπατᾶν non de re ipsa, sed de notitia exponi debet: quia scilicet ex lege palam fit, quantum a recto cursu discesserimus." Similarly Flacius, who in his *Clavis* renders ἐξηπάτησέ με, *deceptum me declaravit*, against which Calov here justly remarks: "de ipsa deceptione agitur." It is still the struggle of the more earnest Pharisaism that is here described, in which with all outward righteousness of law and works (comp. Phil. iii. 6: κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ γεγόμενος ἄμεμπτος) the commandment yet excites inward lust and menaces death to the transgressor. But as long as man in this condition regards evil desire as only an incidental emotion of the heart, which by energetic effort he can eradicate, and fancies that by pangs of repentance or acts of righteousness he can overcome the wrath of God, which manifests itself in the sense of unhappiness that attends evil desire, he is still at a great distance from that spiritual knowledge of the law, from that ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας the production of which is the final aim of the νόμος. Only when this aim is accomplished does he recognise evil desire, not merely as an incidental product of his free will, but as an inevitable expression of his sin-enslaved condition, and along with this the impossibility

of satisfying the divine justice by *ἔργα νόμου*. This latter knowledge was communicated to the apostle only on the appearance of the Lord. The Pharisaism of Paul thus always involved this self-contradiction, that whilst the *νόμος* wrought in him *ἐπιθυμία* and *θάνατος*, he nevertheless always hoped by its means to attain *δικαιοσύνη* and *ζωή*. Even during the three days of his physical blindness after the Lord's appearance this struggle still continued. Nay, it only then reached its highest point, when Paul perceived clearly and felt deeply in all its greatness, weight, and irresistible force the fatal sentence with which sinful desire, aggravated by the spiritual law, menaced him. But at this point the aim and end of the struggle is accomplished. Now, at length, he desisted from the attempt by the performance of works of law to overcome the wrath of God, fully and frankly acknowledged himself exposed to that wrath in confessing his hopeless bondage to sin, fled for refuge to the pardoning grace of the Lord who appeared to him, and by this faith was buried with Him in death to sin, and rose with Him to a new life of righteousness. *ἐξαπατᾶν* stronger than *ἀπατᾶν*, comp. *ἐκπεπλήρωκε*, Acts xiii. 32. *ἀπέκτεινεν*] *procured me death*, answers to *ἀπέθανον*, ver. 10.

Ver. 12. *ὥστε*] *Consequently, therefore*, deduces the result of the exposition vv. 7–11. The apostle would prove that the ruinous effects described ver. 5, are the fault, not of the law, but of sin. This purpose he has now accomplished, and accordingly puts into words the result arrived at. The *νόμος* is not *ἀμαρτία*, but *ἅγιος*.

—*ὁ μὲν νόμος*] The particle *μὲν* leads us to expect an antithesis introduced by *δέ*, such as *ἡ δὲ ἀμαρτία* or *ἀμαρτωλός*. This antithesis is omitted, because the apostle's animation of spirit leads him first to anticipate an objection (*τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν κτλ.*), the answer to which, ver. 13, substantially contains the missing antithesis, Winer, p. 720.

—*καὶ ἡ ἐντολή*] namely, *οὐκ ἐπιθυμίσεις*. Whereas the *νόμος* had received only *one* commendatory predicate, the *ἐντολή* receives three, because by it *ἀμαρτία* had taken occasion to break out into all *ἐπιθυμία*.

—*ἀγία καὶ δικαία καὶ ἀγαθή*] Theodoret interprets: *ἀγίαν προσηγόρευσε, ὡς τὸ δέον διδάξασαν δικαίαν δὲ, ὡς ὁρθῶς τοῖς παραβάταις τὴν ψῆφον ἐξενεγκοῦσαν ἀγαθὴν δὲ, ὡς ζωὴν τοῖς φυλάττουσιν εὐτρεπίζουσιν*. Similarly, although defining the notion of *ἅγιον* and *δίκαιον* more correctly, Calov: "*Sancta*



dicitur lex ratione *causae efficientis et materialis*: quia a Deo sanctissimo est, et circa objecta praecepta sancta occupatur: *justa* est *formaliter*, quia justitiae divinae ἀπεικόνισμα, nostrae regula est; *bona* est ratione *finis*: quia bona temporalia et aeterna promittit. Si *sancta et justa*, non ergo *deceptionis* causa: si *bona*, non ergo *causa mortis et condemnationis*." Thus ἀγαθός would be, not: morally good, but: useful, beneficial, comp. the synonymous καλὸς ὁ νόμος, 1 Tim. i. 8. But the parallelism with ἅγιος καὶ δίκαιος, with καλός, ver. 16, as well as ver. 13, favours the former signification. For τὸ ἀγαθόν, ver. 13, clearly represents the common, essential root-idea of the three predicates, ἅγιος, δίκαιος, ἀγαθός, and sin appears far more sinful as a perversion and abuse of the morally good than as a perversion and abuse of the merely useful. The better interpretation, therefore, is: ἅγιος, *holy*, as revealing the holy nature and will of God; δίκαιος, *just*, just in character, such as it should be, *i.e.* answering to the idea of righteousness and laying down its rule; ἀγαθός, *good*, excellent, faultless.

Ver. 13. The apostle himself raises the objection, which might be deduced from his last words: τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν ἐμοὶ γέγονε θάνατος;] "Has, then, that which is good become death to me?" *i.e.*, "Has, then, that which is good procured me death?" In ver. 7 the question was raised: ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτία; here it is asked: ὁ νόμος θάνατος; Both are repelled in the same manner, the fault being charged, not on the νόμος, but on ἁμαρτία. The most weighty MS. authorities, also Cod. Sinait., read ἐγένετο, which, received by Lachmann, may be genuine. It answers to ἀπέθανον, ver. 10; ἀπέκτεινεν, ver. 11. By it is explained without difficulty the rise of the *lect. recept.* γέγονε, as also, the difference of reading having once appeared, the omission of the verb altogether in some codices. θάνατος, *death* = cause of death, comp. on ver. 7.

—μὴ γένοιτο] It is said, indeed, ver. 10: εὐρέθη μοι ἡ ἐντολὴ . . . εἰς θάνατον. But the really effective cause of this was nothing but ἁμαρτία, not the nature of the ἐντολή itself.

—ἀλλὰ ἡ ἁμαρτία] = *sc.* ἐμοὶ γέγονε θάνατος. The law is merely the occasion, sin the real cause of death. The construction: ἀλλὰ ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοι κατεργαζομένη (ἦν) θάνατον, ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία, which even Luther in his translation follows, apart from the self-made difficulty of the participial construction (κατεργαζομένη instead of κατειργάζεται), is also of itself less simple and natural.

—*ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία*] Some expositors take *ἁμαρτία* as subject, and join *κατεργαζομένη* with *φανῇ*. “That it might appear that sin wrought me death by means of what is good.” But *ἁμαρτία* would then have the article. *ἁμαρτία*, therefore, is predicate: “that it might appear sin.” The subject referred to here is, first of all, the appearance, the actual manifestation of sin’s character, as also the parallel sentence *ἵνα γένηται κτλ.* shows. This bursting forth of sin without doubt was involved in the divine purpose, comp. *ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα*, v. 20. But the final purpose of this objective manifestation of sin is its subjective acknowledgment, its manifestation in the consciousness of man. By the very fact of its proving the *δύναμις ἁμαρτίας* does the *νόμος* lead to the *ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας*.

—*διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοι κατεργαζομένη θάνατον*] Causal sentence: “Since it wrought me death by means of what is good.” Sin stands forth as sin, as a rebel against God and His law, precisely by this, that it abuses God’s good and blessed law to evil ends.

—*ἵνα γένηται καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτωλὸς ἢ ἁμαρτία διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς*] Climactic parallel sentence. The first *ἵνα* is resumed in order to put still more definitely the sentence introduced by it, iii. 26; 2 Cor. ix. 3, xii. 20; Gal. iii. 14, iv. 5; Eph. vi. 19, 20. “That sin might be sinful beyond measure by the commandment.” In *γένηται* as in *φανῇ* the objective and subjective (*might be and might appear*, iii. 4), the real and the ideal elements are to be considered as combined, and, indeed, the latter as the result of the former. As sin became *παράβασις νόμου*, it became *καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτωλός*, i.e. stood forth in its most intimate essence as sin, and was at the same time known as such. Thereby is completed the process, preparatory to redemption, of which the *Nomos* is the means; for with the *ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας* now attained is necessarily associated the longing for redemption, and thus the *νόμος* has become a *παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν*. With *καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν*, comp. 1 Cor. xii. 31; 2 Cor. i. 8, iv. 17; Gal. i. 13. *διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς*, *by means of the command*, which it so shamefully abused, stands emphatically at the end of the whole exposition.

Before proceeding to the exposition of the following verses 14–25, it behoves us, in the first place, to understand in general what condition the apostle describes in these verses, whether that of the regenerate or unregenerate. On the *history* of the inter-

pretation, comp. especially Tholuck in his *Commentar*, 1856, p. 335 ff. On the whole, it may be said that the pietistic and rationalistic exegesis refers the passage to the *status irregenitorum*; on the other hand, the Augustinian and Reformation exposition understands it of the *status regenitorum*. At the first glance, no doubt, the former view alone seems to be the one exclusively warranted. It is said to be dishonouring to the power of the Spirit of regeneration, and to give dangerous encouragement to carnal security, to maintain that the regenerate man has nothing but a powerless will to what is good, which is overmastered and taken captive by the opposite doing of what is evil; so that the entire gain of regeneration would be reduced merely to an impotent longing, after which, as before, the doing of what is opposed to law would maintain its ground. Nay, this is contradicted both by what the apostle affirms of the regenerate, ch. viii. and elsewhere (ch. vi.), as well as by the account of his own life and his own consciousness, Phil. iv. 13. Hence it is not to be wondered at that the reference of this passage to the legal struggle of the unregenerate has come in modern days to enjoy an acceptance almost without exception; comp., however, Delitzsch, *die biblisch-prophetische Theologie*, p. 260 f., Anm.; Harless, *Christian Ethics*, § 26a, § 27b; Besser, *Bibelstunden*, VII. 1, p. 483 ff.; Luthardt, *die Lehre von freiem Willen*, p. 404 f.; in reality, also, Umbreit in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, p. 633 ff., and *Römerbr.* p. 74 ff.<sup>1</sup> It

<sup>1</sup> Even Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, Th. I. p. 230 ff., according to the whole drift of his exposition, is to be reckoned in the above class (comp. especially p. 232 f.), although his exposition seems to me to be at variance with itself. He refers at the same time to my interpretation of the passage and to Hofmann's *Schriftbeweis*, I. p. 460 ff. But in Hofmann I find the reference of this passage to the unregenerate only skilfully covered; and if Thomasius, 2 Aufl. p. 276, Anm., does not comprehend how I can describe his exposition as at variance with itself when he agrees both with me and Hofmann, it seems to me that he has not rightly understood Hofmann's real meaning. Hofmann says (*Schriftb.* I. p. 469): "Before the thankful response (ver. 25) to his anxious question (ver. 24), Paul has set forth the state of contradiction in which he finds himself, when he considers himself in the abstract, apart from what he is in Christ, seeing that as ego, as the inner man, he is subject to the law of God, but as regards his nature, as the outer man, to the law of sin." And: "Therewith it is also certain that from ver. 14 Paul says everything of his present experience, but only as he describes himself, when delighting in the law of God, entirely with regard to his own moral relation to God, apart from the moral capacity accruing to him from community of life with Christ." Therefore, even apart from what he is in Christ, considered in the abstract (i.e. therefore considering the condition of the regenerate after abstracting the effects of the Spirit of regeneration), the apostle as ego, as the inner man, is subject to the law of God, i.e.

is therefore essential above everything to enter upon a closer examination of this mode of conception, as well as of the different modifications it has actually assumed or possibly may assume.

In the first place, when it is supposed that delight in God's law may be ascribed to the unregenerate, it does not seem easy to see with what justice it can then be said that this delight is never answered by corresponding, but always by contrary conduct. This may be the case in particular moments, when the powerful excitement of sensuous impulse overmasters the rational will. It may even be found as a permanent condition in feeble or

*συνῆδισθαι, δουλεῖν τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἕσω ἄνθρωπον*, belongs to the natural, unregenerate personality in itself. Meyer also, ii. 4, has understood Hofmann exactly as I have done, while he commends him for rightly returning to the pre-Augustinian interpretation. Moreover, this professed picture of his present condition on the apostle's part, *abstracting* what he is in Christ, seems to us to be nothing but an empty abstraction. If I am in Christ, and depict what I am out of Christ, I depict *in concreto* not what I actually *am*, but only what I *once was* out of Christ. Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, indeed, calls this "a sophism" (p. 455); but even Schott, *Römerbr.* p. 276, agrees with my judgment, and calls the abstraction on which Hofmann's view rests *a casus non dabilis*. Comp. my *Kirchl. Glaubensl.* III. p. 227 ff., and the confirmatory observation of Meyer here. Delitzsch (p. 453, note) now, indeed, recalls his opinion expressed in the *Bibl. proph. Theol.*, that in vii. 14 ff. of this epistle the regenerate man, as such, is the speaker, and adheres unreservedly to the view of Hofmann. He calls the *συνῆδισθαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ* an effect of God's law, not of the Spirit of regeneration,—of God's law which the man learned to like, because it won his love (p. 453). He even describes this effect of the law as an effect of grace, when he says, p. 447: "The apostle does not mean (by the *ἕσω ἄνθρωπος*) a higher and better self left to man after the Fall, but the self effected by grace (!), namely, the paedagogy of the law in the order of salvation, or, as may be said, the one set free (!) by grace." Expressed dogmatically-historically, this is a retrogression from the Augustinian to the semi-Pelagian mode of view. For what, then, remains for the spirit of regeneration to do, except to *support* the higher self, set free by the law, in its effectual carrying out of its will against the recalcitrant *σάρξ*? Moreover, this is not Pauline. For in the present chapter the apostle expressly teaches, not a release of the higher self, but only a release and aggravation of evil desire, of *ἐπιθυμία*, by the law, and a death-bringing operation of the *Nomos*. Finally, it agrees not with the evangelical *ordo salutis*, which only knows of love to the law as an effect of the gospel bringing forgiveness, not as an effect of the law bringing a curse. Even in the 2d edition of the *Schriftbeweis*, Hofmann remains faithful to his view. But he calls it (I. p. 556) an unjustifiable wrong on my part to hint suspicion that he only skilfully concealed his real meaning, namely, the reference of vii. 14-24, to the unregenerate. But the question is simply this, whether *βίβω ἀγαθόν* and *σύμφημι, συνῶμαι, δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ* is an effect of the Spirit of regeneration, which Hofmann expressly denies. That it is found, according to Hofmann, in the regenerate is nothing to the point, for according to him it is to be found in the regenerate not *in so far as*, but in so far as he is *not* regenerate. In that case, it must also be found even in the unregenerate, and the struggle depicted in vii. 14-24 is in itself the struggle of the unregenerate ego, which runs through the life of the regenerate as well.

passionate characters. But there are also men of strong will, heroes of self-denial, calm and temperate characters, who prove by their conduct that they are able to fashion their life by the law of reason, and to keep sensuous desire in unbroken subjection to the moral will. Even heathendom has real wonders of asceticism to show. If in such ascetics, or generally in the so-called *καλοῖς καγαθοῖς*, the *viris bonis*, there is but the *θέλειν* of good, the *πράσσειν* follows inevitably. But just here the second difficulty occurs to us. Could the apostle ascribe to man's natural will the *μισεῖν* of evil, the *συνήδεσθαι* and *δουλεύειν τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ*, and, indeed, a consent to that *Nomos* which he has expressly described as spiritual? Could he conceive the *ἐγώ* of man, the innermost centre of his personality, as at one with the law of God? How does this agree with his descriptions, and those of Scripture elsewhere, of the deep corruption of the human heart? If he has only just said that the law works *πάσαν ἐπιθυμίαν*, according to the view in question, he might much rather have spoken of *ἐπιθυμία* of good than of evil. If (viii. 7) he characterizes the *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός* as an *ἔχθρα εἰς θεόν*, and yet in the dominion of this carnal mind a hatred against evil finds place, its inmost principle is rather to be described as love than enmity to God. If (Phil. ii. 13) he ascribes not only the *ἐνεργεῖν*, but also the *θέλειν* of good to the power of God's grace, and yet this willing of good forms the very substance of man's moral condition as it is by nature, it is to be regarded simply as a gift of nature springing from God's creative power, not as a gift of grace springing from redemption. Accordingly, to the unregenerate man who strives to obey the law, there can as little be ascribed merely a *ποιεῖν* of evil as a *θέλειν* of good. If the inmost ego of man, the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*, the *νοῦς*, was directed only to good even before regeneration, so that only the *σάρξ* prevented him from exhibiting it in outward act, we should then certainly be driven to foist on the apostle the anthropology of rationalism, according to which man's will, good in itself, is only fettered by the power of the sensuous nature, and in the performance of the sinful act is overborne; whereas it is acknowledged, without doubt, and that by the foremost modern inquirers, that the ethical conception of the *σάρξ* is one far deeper and more comprehensive than that of the sensuous nature. It embraces the entire sphere of the corruption of human nature, its alienation from God and selfishness, not less

than its mere sensuous desire, on which account the apostle enumerates (Gal. v. 19) among the *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός*, not only *πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, ὑσέλγεια, μέθαι*, and *κῶμοι*, but also *εἰδωλολατρεία, φαρμακεία, ἔχθραι, ἔρεις, ζῆλοι, θυμοί, ἐριθείαι, διχοστασίαι, αἰρέσεις, φθόνοι, φόνοι*, describes (Rom. iv. 1, Phil. iii. 4) confidence in works as a carnal sentiment, and (Col. ii. 18) even calls a theosophic asceticism an *εἰκὴ φυσιοῦμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ νοός τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*.

The notion of the *σάρξ* just indicated might no doubt be retained in the present passage, and nevertheless this might be taken as characterizing the condition of the unregenerate. The *σάρξ* would then be not merely irregular, sensuous impulse, but the old man as to his *selfish*, sensuous tendency, in whom only the spirit and will would have to be considered as at natural variance with each other, so that the excessive power of the lower ego would be confronted by the impotent longing of the higher ego. Again, the first difficulty raised against the former view might be supposed to be obviated by the statement that even where the outward act corresponds to the law, in the life of the natural man *prava concupiscentia* reigns; the merely legal act is not therefore to be described as really good, and the performing of evil spoken of here by the apostle consists not merely in outward law-opposing action, but quite as much in the profoundly inward act of evil inclination triumphantly overpowering and bringing into bondage the better self. The only question is, in what this higher, better self consists? It could clearly only be found in the action of conscience ineradicably implanted in man. But apart from the consideration that conscience appears more as an inevitable power, standing face to face with the real act of will in man, than as a mental function, the product of the free ego-life, and therefore asserting itself far more in the form of a *law* of conscience than in the form of an *impulse* of conscience (as *e.g.* Bleek describes the *νόμος τοῦ νοός* in the carnal man, comp. the *Birth of the Christian Life*, p. 13, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, p. 42), still the content of the natural law of conscience is nowise identical with that of the *νόμος πνευματικός*, ver. 14; of the *νόμος θεοῦ*, ver. 22, to which the longing, the joy, and the service of the higher ego here described is said to be directed. For the law of conscience contains essentially nothing but the acknowledgment of the authoritative sanction of the universal in opposi-

tion to unlimited individual inclination ; but it knows nothing of the real principle and quintessence of the divine Nomos, namely, of the requirement of love to God—the very primal, personal love—and of love to God's divinely established and divinely hallowed image represented in the person of a neighbour. To question this is to question the natural development of man's ethical conception, such as is presented to us in heathenism, and only in heathenism untouched by the influences of revealed truth. If the psychical, fleshly man possessed a remnant of *this* knowledge and *this* love for the spiritual law, then he would have within him by nature alongside the fleshly a spiritual principle as well. Scripture could not with such sharp severance everywhere contemplate and describe everything spiritual in him as a supernatural, gracious effect of the *πνεῦμα θεοῦ* ; it would be false that what is born of the *σάρξ* only is *σάρξ*, John iii. 6 ; that the psychical man understands nothing of spiritual things, 1 Cor. ii. 14 ; that he is one *πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχων*, Jude 19. And this difficulty, again, is not absolutely removed if we make, as Augustine in the first period of his dogmatic development, Bengel, Olshausen, Tholuck, the so-called *gratia praeveniens* a co-operating factor in the condition of the unregenerate here described. At least such is the conclusion if this takes place in the synergistic sense, according to which the divine Pneuma is conceived as awakening, exciting, strengthening, and supporting the natural pneumatic germ of spirit which hitherto lay slumbering under a fleshly husk.

If the objection is to be thoroughly cleared away, and the view in question placed in perfect harmony both with the unsophisticated anthropology of Scripture, which nowhere contains a trace of the notion that in the fleshly man as such there still lies concealed a remnant of spiritual life, and with far-reaching and complete views as to the nature of human sin and its relation to renewing grace, we must take the *θέλειν, συνήδεσθαι*, and *δουλεύειν* of the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* in reference to the spiritual law of God as the pure and exclusive product of the *creative* divine Pneuma Himself, who, in the stage of development of the inner life here described, merely began His activity, and had not as yet carried it on to the point of real regeneration, who merely planted the germ of the new nature, but had not yet ripened it to the perfect flower. Only thus could the reference of this passage to

the unregenerate be called dogmatically and psychologically unobjectionable from the standpoint of the general biblical and specific Pauline form of doctrine. We should no doubt find ourselves verging towards the opposite interpretation, yet without overstepping the boundaries and entering its proper domain. It is a point in favour of the application of the passage to the *status irregenitorum*, modified in this way, that we thus obtain an easy connection with what immediately precedes. For if with ver. 13 we had reached the point where the Nomos, unfolded by the Pneuma, awakened the knowledge of sin and the felt need of redemption, in vv. 14, 15 the very nature of the spiritual condition which has thus arisen is further developed; and to this links on just as easily and naturally the still further advance contained in the account, ch. viii., of the state of regeneration. Hence also Augustine, even in his later period, retracting his former view of this passage, only says: "Longe enim postea etiam spiritalis hominis (et hoc *probabilius*) esse *posse* illa verba cognovi," comp. *Retractt.* l. i. c. 23, l. ii. c. 1. From this it would follow that even at the end of his life, though he deemed the reference of the passage to the "homo sub lege positus, nondum sub gratia" improbable, he did not deem it impossible. Now, though we on our part regard this application, taking it in the way more exactly defined by us last, as not contradicting the analogy of faith, and therefore dogmatically free from objection, there are still weighty exegetical difficulties that seem even then to confront us.

First of all, in vv. 17-20, the real ego of man is presented before us as on the one hand entirely separate from sin and opposed to it, and on the other harmoniously united and bound up with the spiritual law of God. But manifestly only the ruling, not the inferior part of man's nature, can be described as the real ego. If sin rules, the *ἐγώ*, the primary and active will of man, is itself *σαρκικόν*; if the Spirit and grace rule, it is *πνευματικόν*. Only in the personality truly made free by Christ can the real ego, the higher and ruling will, amid the duplicity of the ego continually found, be considered as released from sin. If, on the other hand, all that is still found in man is a spark of longing, awakened by the Pneuma, for such a will, a spark so overlaid by the ashes of selfishness and evil desire that consent to sin, the act and dominion of sin, remains the permanent condition,



the real ego yet stands on the side of ἐνοικοῦσα ἁμαρτία, not of the divine νόμος; it is the ally, not the foe of sin. Comp. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, l. i. c. 22, and c. 18: "Nam si concupiscit et consentit et agit, quomodo non ipse illud operatur, etiamsi se operari doleat, et vinci graviter ingemiscat?" Add to this that the apostle depicts the spiritual state of development here set forth not as past, but, as the present tense beginning with ver. 14 proves, as present. Now, in order to account for this striking phenomenon, which certainly cannot be supposed to have arisen merely from the vivid realization of the past, it has been alleged that the condition of the unregenerate here described occurs still in the life of the regenerate merely as an abnormal, not as a normal condition, and therefore was known even to the apostle, not simply from memory, but withal from still continuing experience. But, in the first place, such conditions of absolute spiritual impotence will not harmonize in the least with the spiritual fulness and vigour of the apostolic life such as lies here without a break before our view. But if they occurred, certainly it would be but very occasionally; and the animation, graphic clearness, and impressiveness of the picture of his present *ταλαιπωρία* remains as striking and inexplicable as ever. Still further, it is not at all an occasional, but a perpetual and prevailing condition, and, indeed, one described by the present tense as now existing, that is in question. Moreover, we confess it appears doubtful to us whether the description "abnormal condition of the regenerate," if subjected to strict analysis, yields any tenable meaning at all. The normal condition will be that in which evil desire and inclination, while not indeed utterly extirpated but continually alluring and tempting man, is yet overpowered by sanctified inclination, so that it fails to gain the consent of the spiritualized will, and to be expressed in act. Or, where the carnal principle breaks out in word and act, and comes to open manifestation, these will only be moments of unwisdom, feebleness, and rashness, to which the innermost will of man refuses its assent, with which he stands in no alliance, and to which he does not yield a painless and unresisted dominion. The factors, invariably forming the life of the regenerate man, are thus without doubt πνεῦμα and σὰρξ, the one ruling, the other serving, although tempting, and alluring, and impeding him as he follows the path that is good and well-

pleasing to God, and opposing, and often, indeed, as it were behind his back and against his real wish, overpowering his sanctified will in its attempts to carry out its purpose. Within the limits of this permanent condition there are, doubtless, degrees and fluctuations, a more or less powerful sway of the Pneuma, a stronger or feebler opposition of the *σάρξ*, a more or less frequent surprise by *peccatis ignorantiae, infirmitatis, and praecipitantiae*; yet, withal, the Pneuma never ceases to be the permanently ruling principle. On this account these various fluctuations, degrees, and inconsistencies of themselves furnish no clear and definite principle of division, and do not justify us in speaking of normal and abnormal conditions of the regenerate. If, on the other hand, the Pneuma loses the ruling power, and falls back into a state of servitude, such as according to the view in question must be depicted in this passage, then a retrograde movement takes place, which, unless it is again reversed, leads at last back to the original state of spiritual death; and this status can no longer be called an abnormal condition of the regenerate, because in the case of the backslider regeneration in the proper and strict sense of the word no longer exists at all.

We are therefore involuntarily carried a step farther, and adopt the view which must be described as the opposite of the one hitherto dealt with. But it is clear from the previous discussion in what *sense*, with Augustine in his later period, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Beza, the chief representatives of this view, we apply the present passage to the condition of the regenerate man. It must first of all be laid down that this condition is seen exhaustively set forth only in the combined teaching of ch. vii. 14-25 and ch. viii. 1-11. For in these two passages, one immediately following the other, are pictured the two aspects, ever appearing in mutual connection, of one and the same spiritual status; so that the regenerate man, according as his glance is directed to the one or the other aspect of his nature, is able every moment to affirm both of himself, as well what is said vii. 23 as what is said viii. 2. Hence also ever rises from his heart with equal truth the twofold cry, as well *ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος* as *εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ*. But certainly the combination of elements so opposite is only conceivable if, as observed, in the life of the regenerate sin is considered, not as

ruling the consent of the will and the conduct, but only as the stimulus of evil desire dwelling constantly in the heart, ever impeding and defiling the new, holy inclination, and therefore ever felt more and more as a yoke of bondage. But clearly the apostle has here chiefly in view a profoundly inward doing, as, indeed, already everything from ver. 7 on was referred simply to *ἐπιθυμία*, not to the outward act merely. Even when the life of the regenerate man is holy and governed by the Spirit, the uninterrupted, persistent sinful emotions of the heart may very well be described as a doing of evil that is not desired. To this is to be added that these very emotions never remain absolutely within; but, even apart from the manifold sins of ignorance, weakness, and unwatchfulness in which they manifest themselves, leave their hindering or polluting influence on the best acts of the regenerated one, and thus envelope even his brightest experiences as it were with a veil of earthliness. Comp. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelag.* l. i. c. 18, where he observes on ver. 16 of this passage: "Facere ergo se dixit et operari, non affectu consentiendi et implendi, sed ipso motu concupiscendi;" and *ibid.* c. 19 on ver. 18: "Hoc est enim perficere bonum, ut nec concupiscat homo. Imperfectum est autem bonum, quando concupiscit, etiam si concupiscentiae non consentit ad malum;" and on the same verse, *Contra Julianum Pelagianum*, l. iii. c. 62: "Facere bonum, est post concupiscentias non ire: perficere (*κατεργάζεσθαι*) autem bonum, est non concupiscere." Comp. *Retract.* l. i. c. 23: "Propter hanc itaque concupiscentiam motusque ipsos, quibus ita resistitur, ut tamen sint in nobis, potest quisque sanctus jam sub gratia positus dicere ista omnia."

Now it would be unjustifiable to suppose that, according to our interpretation, there is too sudden and abrupt a leap from the description of one condition to that of the other. For with ver. 13 the apostle had already reached the limits of the legal condition, seeing that, where the law has worked *ἐπίγνωσιν ἁμαρτίας*, the conscious need of redemption is awakened which finds its satisfaction in the justification and new birth that follow, so that the transition to the latter stage seems prepared for and altogether natural. Moreover, it is to be borne in mind that the bond of connection for the representation of the two diverse conditions is found in the purpose announced in vv. 7, 13, to

avert blame from the law and fasten it on sin. But this purpose was most surely effected by setting forth the life of the regenerate, because in it, as ver. 16 declares, it is precisely the higher will of man, brought into unison with the law, that is best entitled to head the vindication of the law. Add to this that even the condition depicted in vv. 7-13, as vv. 14, 15 expressly show, still enters into and runs through the life of the regenerate man, although now certainly no longer as an exclusive, but merely as a partial and secondary element in it. For as far as he is still *σάρξ*, he still experiences continually that *ἐπιθυμία* is stirred up by the *νόμος*, and to him *ἁμαρτία* becomes *καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτωλός* through the *ἐντολή*. And if we look at this point narrowly, we may even say that in what follows in vv. 7-25 the apostle explains the condition characterized in vv. 5, 8 of this chapter, and in viii. 1-11 that characterized in ver. 6 of this chapter, showing more at length how the *Nomos*, encountering the *σάρξ* of man, excites always only *τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*, without on that account being liable to any just accusation.

But while glancing, by this reference, at the carnal element still always present in the life of the regenerate, he at the same time brings up for discussion a point hitherto kept in the background, but essential to the complete development of the doctrine of regeneration and sanctification,—one which could not be omitted in a complete representation, and which accordingly furnishes a new evidence of the correctness of our view. If we take into account only the delineation ch. vi., ch. vii. 1-7, and ch. viii. 1-11, we may easily gain the impression that the regenerate man has become all *πνεῦμα*, and the *σάρξ* has been utterly extinguished in him; so that we are no longer able to perceive why the summons to mortify the *σάρξ*, beginning viii. 12, is necessary. It was thus every way essential expressly to characterize the carnal element still constantly adhering to the spiritual life.<sup>1</sup> A very striking parallel with the present passage *in nuce* is supplied, as

<sup>1</sup> "Postquam *legem divinam vindicavit*, vel *pravæ concupiscentiæ omnem culpam transcribendam docuit*, ejus vim sese etiamnum experiri, ingemiscit apostolus, etiamsi *renatus* jam sit, et *justificatus*; idque ideo, quia *nondum ex asse spiritualis*, sed *ex parte adhuc carnalis*, quum *Spiritus* quidem *primitias* acceperit, sed *carnis* adhuc *reliquiæ* superent, a quibus mirentur quantum fatigetur. Id quod operose exequitur, ad confundendam et contundendam perfectionem *propriæ justitiæ*, quam venditabant *Pharisæi*, ut unice laus maneat *gratiæ Dei*, et *redem-*

is well known, by Gal. v. 17, where, certainly and beyond question, the subject is the *status regeneritorum*; and we believe the same view must be held in regard to the Lord's declaration, Matt. xxvi. 41.

Lastly, as concerns the practical significance of the different interpretations of this passage now passed in review, it may be said that the application to the state of regeneration in the way we have defined must be called not the laxer, so much as the stricter one. The former would be the case if the meaning were, that the regenerate man has nothing but an impotent and fruitless will to what is good, along with a constant performing of what is evil. But since, according to the other mode of interpretation, the condition of the unregenerate man here professedly described must enter, although abnormally, into the life of the regenerate, it must be said, on the contrary, that by this view dangerous encouragement is directly given to carnal security, as the regenerate man may then always comfort himself with the thought that he is there and then in such a condition, which nevertheless leaves him *in statu regeneritorum*. But, on the other side, the view combated by us may certainly lead as far astray in the direction of pietistic self-complaining, if, that is, it is supposed that, in the regenerate man, the root of sin must be so destroyed that he has no need continually to join in the cry, ver. 24. Thus the rock of wantonness threatens on one side, of despair on the other, like a Scylla and Charybdis.

Ver. 14 confirms (γάρ) the inevitable necessity of the experience hitherto narrated, and introduces the highest and best vindication of the law by means of the experience of the regenerate. It could not but be that ἡ ἁμαρτία, ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς, κατειργάσατο πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θάνατον, for ὁ νόμος πνευματικός, ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός. The apostle depicts here the character of human nature in the abstract in its relation to the divine law. His declaration thus holds good of the σάρξ universally, whether it be that of the unregenerate or regenerate. The sole point of

*noni Christi, solisque fidei adseratur justificatio. Ideo tum de concupiscentia in renatis proliza lamentatio, ad vers. 24 inclus. tum pro liberatione a Christo facta nervosa gratiarum actio hic habetur v. 25," Calov. He also calls vv. 1-6 of the seventh chapter, Pars I.: "ἀλληγορικοῦ . . . διδακτικὴ ἐκ τοῦ ματρίμονιαι τοῦ status non renatorum et renatorum differentiam illustrans;" vv. 7-13, Pars II.: "ἀπολογητικὴ τοῦ legis sanctitatem vindicans;" vv. 14, 15, Pars III.: "σχιτιστικὴ, querelam apostoli de vi pravae concupiscentiae exhibens."*

difference is, that of the former nothing *else* holds good; of the latter, what is here said holds good only *in so far* as he is still *σάρξ*.<sup>1</sup> As far as he is no longer such, what is said viii. 9 also holds good of him: *ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλ' ἐν πνεύματι*. In like manner he can just as well say of himself: *ἐγὼ πεπραμένος εἰμι ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, as, according to vi. 18: *ἐγὼ δὲ ἐλευθερωθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ἐδουλώθην τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ*. The deliverance accomplished once for all is withal, as a self-developing principle, a progressive redemption from bondage not yet absolutely abolished. The expressions, chosen by the apostle here and subsequently, are really not stronger than the quite similar tones to be found so commonly in the prayers and hymns of the Christian church in all ages. It would in fact be, not an evidence of special progress, but a sign of defective self-knowledge, were a believer, upon appeal to his regeneration, to refuse to apply to himself, and to describe as appropriate to his condition, in any moment whatever of his life, the sentiments expressed in these prayers and hymns. Besides, it is to be well observed that the apostle here begins with *οἶδαμεν γάρ*, such knowledge belonging to believers only. It is doubtless true that of itself it holds good, even for the unregenerate man, that the law is spiritual, while he is carnal, sold under sin; but that it is so to him he knows not, nay, denies. This knowledge only the regenerate one possesses, for it is itself the result of enlightening grace. Very justly Delitzsch observes, *bibl. proph. Theol. ibid.*: "Directly the spiritually-minded man, confronted with God's spiritual law, feels most acutely and profoundly that he has still of himself a carnal nature, and cannot ransom himself entirely from the power of sin, by the very fact of his accusing himself in daily repentance as *σαρκικός*, it is apparent that, as to the fundamental tendency of his personality, he is *πνευματικός*." — *οἶδαμεν γάρ] ὠμολογημένον τοῦτο καὶ δῆλον ἐστίν, ὅτι πνευματικός ἐστι*, interprets Chrysostom. Comp. ii. 2, iii. 19, viii. 28. But it is only for the Christian consciousness that this is an *ὠμολογημένον καὶ δῆλον*. The otherwise pretty equally attested reading *οἶδαμεν δέ* appears to have come into the

<sup>1</sup> At the same time I have no wish to deny, as Meyer in his former editions misunderstood me to deny, that the *subject* in vv. 14–25 is the same as in vv. 7–13. Thereby different *states* of the same subject are described; and ver. 14, in passing from one state to the other, for the first time characterizes the *natural* character of the subject such as he is in the abstract and never absolutely ceases to be. So also Melancthon: "*Primum autem narrat Paulus qualis sit natura carnalis secundum sese.*"

text from the parallel passages just quoted. δέ would have to be taken as δέ μεταβατικόν, comp. on iv. 15. Semler's conjecture, οἶδα μὲν γάρ, is needless, because ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός εἰμι does not depend on οἶδαμεν ὅτι, but forms an independent sentence; and untenable, because Paul would then have written ὁ μὲν νόμος, not οἶδα μὲν.

—ὅτι ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστίν] The conception of πνευματικός defines itself from the antithesis σαρκικός. But here plainly it is not the physical antithesis of σὰρξ and πνεῦμα, as in Col. ii. 5, but the ethical antithesis so frequently occurring in Paul, Gal. iii. 3, v. 16 ff., vi. 8. ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστίν cannot then mean: the law refers to the πνεῦμα of man. i.e. it requires not merely the outward work, but also the right disposition ("mentem et interiorem hominem respicit," Beza). Rather, here, the reference to the θεῖον πνεῦμα is to be decidedly held; but not on this account to be interpreted, with Theodoret: θείῳ γάρ, φησίν, ἐγράφη πνεύματι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς χάριτος ὁ μακάριος Μωσῆς τὸν νόμον συνέγραψεν; for here it was important to describe, not so much the *origin* as the *character* of the Nomos in contrast with the character of man. As the latter is σαρκικός, so the former is πνευματικός, i.e. carries in it the nature of the πνεῦμα. This is really the invariable signification of πνευματικόν, only that the reference to origin is sometimes, as in i. 11, glanced at as well. Moreover, in this passage both elements might be united. The Nomos has its origin from the πνεῦμα, and therefore has the nature of the πνεῦμα. Still, by this antithesis of σαρκικός no direct allusion at least is made to the former element. But then the Nomos is spiritual in nature and essence, in so far as it sets up the ideal of a spiritual man, and by such an one only is fulfilled, because he, as Calvin says: "coelestem quandam et angelicam justitiam requirit, in qua naevus nullus appareat, ad cujus munditiam nihil desideretur;" or because he, as Bengel interprets: "requirit, ut sensus omnis humanus respondeat sensui Dei: Deus autem est Spiritus."

—ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός εἰμι] Griesbach, Scholz, and Lachmann, after the best manuscripts (so also Cod. Sinait.\*) and several Fathers, have received the reading σάρκινος (in the same way 1 Cor. iii. 1; Heb. vii. 16), which is approved by the majority of modern interpreters. Decision is difficult; for whereas external authorities are conclusive for σάρκινος, internal reasons favour σαρκικός.

The former signifies merely *of flesh* or *fleshy* (as *adjectiva proparoxytona* in *ινος* denote almost invariably the material, e.g. ξύλινος *of wood*, πήλινος *of clay*, ἀκάνθινος, βύσσινος, κρίθινος, γήινος, etc., comp. Buttmann, *Ausf. Gr. Spr.* II. p. 340; Winer, p. 122; Fritzsche, *ad Marcum*, p. 797 sq.; and in *Comm. on Römerbr.* here), the latter is *carnal*. That Paul observes this distinction is proved by 2 Cor. iii. 3, where the perfectly idiomatic antithesis of ἐν πλαξὶ λιθίναις and ἐν πλαξὶ καρδίας σαρκίναίς is found, whereas σαρκικός is used everywhere else where the antithesis πνευματικός is expressed or understood (Rom. xv. 27; 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4, ix. 11; 2 Cor. i. 12, x. 4). It is therefore hard to suppose that in some passages Paul deviated from this fixed distinction. Nevertheless, were σάρκινος in this passage to be considered genuine, we must either say that popular language confounded the forms, and used σάρκινος in the sense of σαρκικός, especially as *all* adjectives in *ινος* do not denote material (comp. ἀνθρώπινος, Winer, p. 123, note; Tholuck here), or, which is especially favoured by πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, that σάρκινος, placed in antithesis to πνευματικός, is stronger than σαρκικός. I am of flesh = I am made of flesh as of a material, i.e. simply and purely flesh, comp. John iii. 6: τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκός, σὰρξ ἐστὶ. But from this it can neither be inferred that sin consists in sensuousness, for the fleshly material denotes even here the entire corruption of nature,<sup>1</sup> nor yet that sin is the substance of human nature, for a rhetorical expression is not to be construed with logical stringency. Comp. *Formul. Concord. Sol. Decl.* i. 51, upon Luther's expression: "peccatum et peccare esse corrupti hominis naturam." In 1 Cor. iii. 1, Paul at least calls the regenerate who are not yet strong in faith νηπίους ἐν Χριστῷ, σαρκικούς. But every Christian, when he looks at the sin still remaining in his flesh, appears to himself such a νήπιος, and therefore a σαρκικός.

—πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν] Illustrative supplement to σαρκικός or σάρκινος εἰμι. Sin is represented as a lord, man as a slave who must do what the lord commands. "Coactionem semper excipio," remarks Luther, "sponte enim peccamus, quia

<sup>1</sup> Even Meyer understands by the σὰρξ the *material psychical* nature of man that consists the divine πνεῦμα. I do not understand how an expositor who finds in the apostle's writings the doctrine of the *imputatio peccati Adamitici*, of the *satisfactio vicaria*, and *justitia imputata Christi*, can everywhere attribute to him the anthropology of rationalism.



peccatum non esset, nisi voluntarium. Sed addicti sumus ita peccato, ut nihil sponte possimus nisi peccare: quia malitia, quae in nobis dominatur, huc nos rapit. Quare haec similitudo non coactam (ut loquuntur) astrictionem sonat, sed voluntarium obsequium, cui nos ingenita servitus addicit." Comp. herewith the statement of Augustine, *de grat. et lib. arbitr.* c. 15: "Semper est autem in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper est bona." *πιπράσκεισθαι ὑπό τι*, like *δουλοῦσθαι ὑπό τι*, Gal. iv. 3. Elsewhere it is said *πιπράσκεισθαί τινι*, *לְרַבִּי*, Lev. xxv. 39; *לְרַבִּיהֶן*, Deut. xxviii. 68, and Bar. iv. 6: *ἐπράθητε τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*. With the sentiment of the expression *πιπράσκεισθαι ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, comp. also especially the phrase *וְהָרִיעַ לְרַבִּיהֶן*, 1 Kings xxi. 20, 25; 2 Kings xvii. 17; *πιπράσκεισθαι τοῦ ποιῆσαι τὸ πονηρόν*, 1 Macc. i. 15.

Ver. 15. Confirmatory elucidation of the preceding *ἐγὼ πεπραμένος εἰμι ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*. The bondage of sin shows itself precisely in carrying out sin's commands in involuntary blind obedience, without consciousness and inquiry; for such is the relation of a slave to his lord. *ὁ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι, οὐ γινώσκω*] In the wake of Augustine several expositors have interpreted *οὐ γινώσκω*, *non approbo, I approve not*. Bengel: "non agnosco ut bonum." But neither the Heb. *וְיָ* nor *γινώσκειν* has this meaning. Even in the passages quoted for it, Ps. i. 6 (comp. Hengstenberg here), Hos. viii. 4, Amos iii. 2, Eccus. xviii. 28, Matt. vii. 23, John x. 14, Rom. x. 19, 1 Cor. viii. 3, Gal. iv. 9, 2 Tim. ii. 29, *וְיָ, γινώσκειν*, means properly nothing but: *cognosco, novi, I know, discern, perceive, not: agnosco, I acknowledge, I approve*. Rightly Chrysostom early interpreted: *σκοποῦμαι, φησί, συναρπάζομαι, ἐπήρειαν ὑπομένω, οὐκ οἶδα πῶς ὑποσκέλιζομαι*. Vulg.: "quod enim operor, non intelligo." Luther: "for I know not what I do." Comp. Luke xxiii. 34: *οὐ γὰρ οἶδαςί τί ποιοῦσι*. The regenerate man sins not consciously and willingly. It is the blind natural impulse of evil desire and inclination not yet entirely eradicated that carries him away. His better ego knows nothing of this act of his sinful nature. But from this it certainly *follows*, of course, that this higher self does not acknowledge and approve such an act.

—*οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω, τοῦτο πράσσω ἀλλ' ὁ μισῶ, τοῦτο ποιῶ*] The fact of the regenerate man as such wishing and loving only the good that is well-pleasing to God, just proves (*γάρ*) that the evil he performs is not done of conscious (*οὐ γινώσκω*) purpose.

$\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$  cannot here denote the so-called *velleitas*, the weak, powerless will of the schoolmen. To energetic dislike ( $\mu\iota\sigma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ ) only energetic wishing can correspond.  $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$  has not this diluted meaning in the passages quoted for it, 1 Cor. vii. 7, 32, xiv. 5, 2 Cor. xii. 20; for even there  $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$  expresses thorough determination of purpose, which is only opposed by outward hindrances, not by any paralysing indecision. Here, accordingly, must be meant the *regnitus*, whose new higher ego alone can be the subject of such a  $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$  and  $\mu\iota\sigma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ . The will spoken of by the apostle is nothing but the will of the new man. Even the old man has his will; but Paul calls that which in the regenerate one is the deepest wish and innermost longing of his heart, his will  $\kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{\epsilon}\xi\omicron\chi\acute{\eta}\nu$ . On the contrary, that which wars with this he calls what is opposed to his will. The parallel passages quoted from the classics, among which the best known are *Epictet. Enchirid.* l. ii. c. 26:  $\acute{o} \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\nu \dots \acute{o} \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota, \omicron\upsilon \pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}, \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota} \acute{o} \mu\grave{\eta} \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota, \pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ , and Ovid, *Metam.* vii. 19: "Aliudque cupido, mens aliud suadet, video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor," supply an analogy to the apostle's statement, belonging merely to the sphere of natural morals, not to the Christian sphere. There, the question is only of contradiction between reason and sensuousness; here, between  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  and  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\varsigma$ . Well Calov: "Nihil huc Medea facit, aut quicquid hic geminum *e gentilibus* collegit." Grotius: "non enim de *appetitus sensitivi adversus intellectualem pugna*, vel de *rationis et voluntatis contentione*, quam non renati experiuntur, cum ea, quae non probant mente, eligunt tamen et sequuntur voluntatis affectibus abrepti: sed (de) *pugna spiritus et carnis*, quae non locum habet, nisi in renatis, hic disseritur: quod *exemplo Apostoli* satis constat, siquidem de semetipso loquatur." The apostle is speaking of sin which constantly besets and surprises the believer, not exactly in outward word and deed, but above all in thought and inclination. When he says: I do not what I wish, but what I hate that I do, this does not mean that the believer never does anything good, but that with the good he does sin is ever mixed, disturbing, biuding, causing him to fall, or at least to waver. He never does what he wishes, because he never performs a perfectly pure act in perfectly holy love. When he glances from the height of spiritual freedom, to which grace has raised him, down into the deep abyss of nature's sin, which is always alluring and enticing, often even causing him to tremble, and leading him to

the brink of ruin, there attends him continually, along with the consciousness of inward strength and freedom, the sense of an alien power and bondage. And it is just this aspect of his experience and feeling that the apostle pictures in this section. "Negat se facere, quod lex exigit, quia non facit omnibus numeris, sed quodammodo fatiscit in suo conatu," Calvin. The *τοῦτο* before *πράσσω* is to be accounted suspicious on critical grounds.

Ver. 16 by the metabatic *δέ* draws from what precedes an inference by which the thought from which the entire discussion sprang—the innocence and excellence of the law, ver. 14 (comp. vv. 12, 7)—is corroborated. This thought is here expressly stated for the last time, the delineation of the condition of man under the law, vv. 7–13, and under grace (the latter, as regards its two aspects of subjection still remaining, vv. 14–25, and of freedom already existing, viii. 1–11, which delineation serves as a basis for the vindication of the law) being carried on from this point without further express reference to this apologetic purpose. But the reasoning of the apostle is fully demonstrated. The will of man, condemning its own unlawful acts, thereby takes its stand as an advocate for the law. The phraseology is determined by the preceding *ὁ μισῶ* (= *ὁ οὐ θέλω*), *τοῦτο ποιῶ*. Otherwise the reverse form: *εἰ δὲ οὐ θέλω τοῦτο, ὁ ποιῶ*, would have been more suitable. *σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ, ὅτι καλός*] *I agree with the law that it is good, i.e. I confirm the assertion which the law makes respecting its own character, Deut. iv. 8; Ps. xix. 8–11.* Thus *σύμφημι* with the dative retains its original signification: I say with, agree with, *consentio*, and has not, with *σύν* merely intensifying, the signification: I assent, I grant, *confiteor*. The law is good, because it commands the good that I myself wish, forbids the evil that I myself wish not.

Ver. 17. If I consent to the law that it is good because my inmost heart's desire, my real will, is in unison with the law, it is no longer I that do the evil, but sin that dwells in me. It is thus a power alien to my real man that still holds me prisoner, and verifies *ἐγὼ σαρκικός εἰμι, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, ver. 14. The fact that the apostle here sets his real ego in opposition to sin, shows, considering the matter from the standpoint of biblical and Pauline hamartology, the impossibility of interpreting the present passage otherwise than of the regenerate. Yet, certain as it is that he is depicting the sinfulness that clings

to the believer, he can, it must be remembered, on the other hand, pay no higher tribute to the dignity of the Christian's position than when he says: It is not *I* that sin. Thus οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτό is in a certain sense a correction or qualifying exposition of ἐγὼ σαρκικός εἰμι. Both, without doubt, hold good of the ego of the man, but the former more than the latter, inasmuch as the innermost and most real will of the regenerate is seen in the fulfilment of the divine law. In the redeemed man sin has withdrawn from the centre of personality to the circumference of elementary nature. νυνὶ δέ] not a temporal particle = "nunc post legem datam" (Grotius), or = "ex quo Christianus factus sum" (Koppe), but: *but now*, if it is so, or: *but thus*, since this is the case, namely, since I agree with the law that it is good. Just so—

—οὐκέτι] is to be taken logically, not temporally, of that which cannot be conceived after what has been said. But it is true no longer, can no longer be supposed that *I* commit evil. Comp. ver. 20, xi. 6; Gal. iii. 18.

—ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἀμαρτία] As of sin, so of the Spirit of God it is said: ὅτι οἰκεῖ ἐν ἡμῖν, viii. 9; 1 Cor. iii. 16, comp. vi. 19. The regenerate man is not only a lodging-place of sin, but also a temple of the Holy Spirit. The purport of the 17th verse, as is shown by the 20th verse, which repeats it almost verbatim, is elucidated and confirmed by the consciousness that springs from Christian experience (οἶδα γάρ).

Ver. 18. The qualification, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, added to ἐν ἐμοί, is another proof that Paul can only be speaking of the regenerate. In me, *i.e.* in my flesh, dwells no good thing (= nothing good, Luther), is the same as saying that in my real ἐγὼ something good dwells. And, indeed, this good, so called in the highest sense and corresponding to the pneumatic Nomos, can itself be only of a pneumatic nature, so that by the real ego, to which the ἐγὼ σαρκικός is opposed, only the ἐγὼ πνευματικός, the καινός, πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος can be meant. As everywhere where it appears in a moral sense, so here σὰρξ stands for σαρκικός, *i.e.* παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, and postulates as its constant antithesis νέος ἄνθρωπος. — τὸ γὰρ θέλει παράκειται μοι] Bengel remarks on θέλει: "Accusativus, *bonum*, non additur: et hujus orationis tenuitas tenuitatem τοῦ velle exprimit." But with as much justice it might be maintained, in the opposite sense, that Paul's here always using θέλει, without express mention of the object, only

of wishing what is good, shows that he is treating of the man renewed by the Spirit, in whom, since he is considered *a parte potiori*, no real willing of what is evil any longer exists. *παράκειται*, *a latere jacet*, lies beside me = *πάρεστι*, *est in promptu*, *mihi adest*, is present in me. Comp. the analogous *πρόκειται*, 2 Cor. viii. 12, *in conspectu jacet*, and Hom. *Odyss.* xxii. 65 : *νῦν ὑμῖν παράκειται ἐναντίον ἢ μάχεσθαι ἢ φεύγειν*. The apostle looks round, so to speak, in the space of his inner ego, and finds lying right before him the *θέλειν* of what is good; but of the *κατεργάζεσθαι* (comp. on ii. 9) *τὸ καλόν*, on the contrary, of which he looks round in search, he is compelled to say—

—*οὐχ εὕρισκω*] *I find it not*, *i.e.* I know not where it is, it is not there. *οὐχ εὕρισκω* is thus = *οὐ παράκειται*, not = *I cannot attain it*. Still the meaning is not, that the believer's only characteristic is an wholly ineffectual state of desire (comp. against this, Phil. ii. 13), but that even in his best act, since sin is ever mixed with it, he does not perform the act that corresponds to his will sanctified by the Spirit of God. He would love God, and finds in himself the love of sin; so that, looking upon this power of sin still lingering in him, he ventures at the very best to affirm of himself a *willing*, not a *performing* of what is good. Well worthy of note here is Luther's marginal gloss: "To do, means not to perform the work, but to feel lusts stirring themselves. But to perform is to live without lust, quite purely, which does not happen in this life." Instead of *οὐχ εὕρισκω*, attested by the occidental codices, the Alexandrian (also Cod. Sinait.) read merely *οὐ* (namely, *παράκειται*), which reading has been approved by Griesbach and accepted by Lachmann. But, to say nothing of the difficulty created by the double *οὐ* at the end of this verse, and directly again at the beginning of the next verse, this mode of expression seems altogether too abrupt, harsh, and frigid. Were it original, the glossarists would scarcely have supplied a term so very appropriate as *εὕρισκω*, but would far more probably have repeated *παράκειται*. Thus an *ἀβλεψία* of the copyists seems to have occurred, their eye wandering from *οὐχ*, ver. 18, to *οὐ*, ver. 19, when *οὐχ εὕρισκω* dropped out, and the manifest hiatus was then supplied by a simple *οὐ*, or as one codex reads, by *οὐ γινώσκω*, after ver. 15, or, as the Aeth. has, by *οὐκ ἔχω*.

Ver. 19 proves *τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλόν, οὐχ εὕρισκω*,

ver. 18, by repeating the statement found already, ver. 15. Only that in this verse ἀγαθόν is expressly added in apposition to ὁ θέλω, and κακόν to ὁ οὐ θέλω. The parallelism of ver. 19 and ver. 15 tells in favour of omitting τοῦτο before πράσσω.

Ver. 15 : οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω, πράσσω· ἀλλ' ὁ μισῶ, τοῦτο ποιῶ.

Ver. 19 : οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω, ποιῶ (ἀγαθόν)· ἀλλ' ὁ οὐ θέλω (κακόν), τοῦτο πράσσω.

Ver. 20 deduces from ver. 19 the proposition announced ver. 17, that had to be proved. The ἐγὼ after θέλω, on the authority of numerous and important manuscripts, Fathers, and versions, in which it is altogether wanting, or placed after τοῦτο or before οὐ, is to be accounted suspicious in the highest degree, and has indeed been rightly omitted by Lachmann and Tischendorf. The analogy of vv. 15, 16, 19 also is against the use of this pronoun, as well as the absence of the antithesis which, by its emphatic meaning, it imperatively requires. It thus seems to have been awkwardly supplied by copyists from the next clause of the verse (οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζ.), in order to intimate that the real ego not only does not perform, but does not wish what is evil. But the Pauline antithesis is not at all : It is not *I* that wish what is evil, *I* do it nevertheless, thus *I* do it not ; but : *I wish* not what is evil, *I* do it nevertheless, thus *I* do it not.

Ver. 21. So far, two points were established ; first, that the law is good, ver. 16 ; and next, that it is not *I*, but sin dwelling in me, that does the evil ; i.e., that sin, as involuntary, is a power alien to me, reducing me to bondage against my will, ver. 20. But these were just the two elements contained in ver. 14, and now sufficiently expounded. Both elements were established by the experimental proposition that *I* indeed desire the good but perform the evil, that *I* do what *I* desire not, vv. 15, 19. This latter proposition, since both the propositions contained in ver. 14 depend upon it and are to be traced back to it, may accordingly be regarded as the final outcome of the entire previous discussion, vv. 14-20. In the present verse, therefore, it is advanced as such, and in its turn is established, vv. 22, 23. Difficulties arise in the construction of the words. Interpreters are divided into two classes. The one refer τὸν νόμον to the Mosaic law. Among the different explanations given by them, the one advocated especially by Knapp, *Scripta varii argumenta*, ed. sec. tom.

II. pp. 383-393, Fritzsche, and Tholuck here alone deserves notice: "I find, then, that while I wish to practise the law, the good, evil is present with me."<sup>1</sup> τὸν νόμον is thus dependent on ποιεῖν, and τὸ καλόν in apposition to τὸν νόμον. We have no wish to press strongly against this construction, which is no doubt grammatically possible, the objection often raised of intolerable harshness, because it might be replied that this depends simply upon exegetical feeling, which is always but an uncertain and changeable rule of judgment, and because the same objection might be retorted by the advocates of the view in question upon its opponents in reference to their own interpretation. But other difficulties seem to us to stand in the way. If it is certain that Paul deduces the import of this verse, not only as to meaning but as to form, from the preceding, it must first of all appear strange for him here to speak abruptly of a θέλειν, ποιεῖν τὸν νόμον, whereas so far he has spoken only of a θέλειν, ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, ver. 18; τὸ ἀγαθόν, ver. 19. When, moreover, in the very next clause we find the antithesis, so common before, of ποιεῖν, πράσσειν, κατεργάζεσθαι, or even παράκεισθαι of κακόν, we are at once led naturally to connect together also in this verse τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν. Add to this, that if the apostle had even adopted the altered mode of expression, τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν, there was yet no reason for the epexegetical supplement, τὸν καλόν. To guard against the notion of the νόμος being a κακόν (comp. ver. 16) were here altogether irrelevant, and for the mere purpose of paving the way for the following contrast of τὸ κακὸν παράκειται the supplement τὸ καλόν was the more needless, as, if the previous phraseology were once abandoned, it would have been far more simple and to

<sup>1</sup> Tortuously, and opposed to the context, Meyer (in former editions), after the lead of the Greek exegetes: "I find, then, the law for me, so far as I am disposed to do the good, *because* evil lies before me; i.e., I find that the law (namely, the Mosaic), so far as I have the will to do what is good, is *designed for my advantage*, because to me (to my personality in itself, apart from this moral will) evil is present. The latter circumstance makes the former relation evident; for if evil lies before my person in itself, as regards that better will the law can only be designed for my good to serve as a rule to this moral will, in opposition to this impulse." Even the exposition given by Meyer in recent editions is very forced: "I find, then, in me, whilst my will is directed to the law to do what is good, that evil lies before me." Against this comp. Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 445, note. Not less forced Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 463: "Its ever lying near me to do evil causes me to see that the law to me who wish to do it is good." Against this comp. Meyer, II. 24.

the purpose to write: εὐρίσκω ἄρα, τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν, ὅτε ἐμοὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία παράκειται. But if it were simply intended to intimate that what is now called θέλειν, ποιεῖν τὸν νόμον is the same that was previously called θέλειν, ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, this would be a remark just as little to the point as a mere play of words. Inversely, the apostle might have said with more reason: εὐρίσκω ἄρα, τὸ καλόν τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν, τὸν νόμον, in order to intimate that the καλόν which he had spoken of wishing to do is no other than the νόμος θεοῦ, not a rule chosen at will by man, but one fixed by God, by which simply and solely perfection of conduct can be estimated. Thus, not that the Nomos is the καλόν before named, but perhaps that the καλόν before named is the Nomos, might have been remarked in an appropriate and significant sense. Therefore, since the text is to be regarded as completely authenticated, and the conjectures attempted can only be described as arbitrary, we are compelled to adhere to the second class of expositors, which is also the most numerous. They agree in interpreting ὁ νόμος in this passage not of the Mosaic law, but in the sense of *norma*, *regula*, *præscriptum*, i.e. law in general, rule, natural necessity, analogously to the use of νόμος, ver. 23, where Bengel renders: *dictamen*. The construction, then, may be in one of two ways,—either the dative τῷ θέλοντι is dependent directly on εὐρίσκω: “I find, then, for me that wish to do what is good, the law that evil is near me;” or, supposing an easy transposition of ὅτι (Winer, p. 697), it is to be explained: “I find, then, the law, that to me that wish to do what is good, evil is near.” Decision is not easy, but we incline to the second view, because by it the proposition: “I wish to do good, but evil is beside me,” which was plainly intended to be expressly brought forward as the result of what precedes, stands forth more prominently. The objections urged equally against the two latter views appear not difficult to remove. They consist principally in two points. First, that in this case τοῦτον τὸν νόμον must have been said instead of τὸν νόμον. But, first, the necessity for this is not apparent, as the demonstrative meaning is not imperatively called for; and again, even the article, as has been observed, may be used demonstratively in the same manner as in Acts xi. 16: τοῦ ῥήματος τοῦ κυρίου, ὡς ἔλεγεν; xx. 35: τῶν λόγων τοῦ κυρ. Ἰησ., ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶπε. But, further, νόμος, where it has the



wider signification, is said to be used only in contrast with νόμος in the proper sense, iii. 27, vii. 23, viii. 2, ix. 31. But even this contrast is not to be excluded, since it is introduced now preparatory to the further exposition, ver. 23. The very consideration hitherto of the relation in which the regenerate man stands to the law suggests to the apostle the law, that to him that wishes to do good evil is present. But this experience is very significantly called a law, just because it expresses no accidental and transient, but an inevitable and abiding phenomenon.

Vv. 22, 23 elucidate the result stated in ver. 21, that to me that wish to do good, ver. 22, evil is present, ver. 23. *συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ*] for *I take delight in the law of God.* *συνήδομαί τινι* may mean: (1) to rejoice together with some one over a thing. But the interpretation: "I rejoice with another in God's law, I share the joyous delight that is taken in the divine law," is irrelevant, because the idea of another is here altogether out of the question. Exceedingly forced and far-fetched is the makeshift: "I rejoice *with the law of God*, so that *its* joy (the law personified) is also *mine*, namely, concerning the moral good desired by the law and by me." (2) *Intus, apud animum meum lactar*, to rejoice in something inwardly, in his soul. So here. Analogous is the meaning of σύν in σύννοδά μοι and in συλλυπούμενος, Mark iii. 5. One cannot then say offhand either that σύν is pleonastic, or that it adds strength. And yet both might be maintained under cover of the signification just given, by supposing either that "to rejoice with oneself" was reduced in the course of usage to a simple "to rejoice," or that, which of itself is more natural, *apud animum lactari* is meant to describe depth and inwardness of delight, *i.e.* strong delight. The latter meaning is also to be preferred on account of the following κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, which accentuates this element still more distinctly. But *συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ* is distinguished from σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ, ver. 16, the latter denoting the consent of the intellect, the former, appropriation by the heart and will. The νόμος is defined as νόμος θεοῦ (*genit. auctor.*) in contrast with ἕτερος νόμος immediately following. The delight in God's law here described is treated of Ps. i. 2, xix. 8-12, xl. 9 (comp. Hengst. here), cxii. 1, cxix. 14, 16, 47, 70, 77, 92, 143, 174. Even in these passages, so important for the exposition of the present one, delight in God's law is the delight of the *righteous*, the regenerate,

and even there with delight is blended lamentation over sin still remaining in the flesh.<sup>1</sup>

—κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον] “Interior homo,” says Melancthon, “significat hominem, quatenus renovatus est Spiritu Sancto.” Just so Calvin: “Interior homo non anima simpliciter dicitur, sed spiritualis ejus pars, quae a Deo regenerata est.” Comp. Luther’s marginal note: “The inward man means here the spirit born of grace, which in the saints contends against the outward man, *i.e.* reason, mind, and everything that is natural in man.” But ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is not in the abstract and directly identical with ὁ καινός, πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος. Rather ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος (which expression is needlessly derived from the phraseology of the Platonic school, comp. Harless on *Eph.* iii. 16, p. 314 f.) denotes in the first place merely the νοῦς, vv. 23, 25, the πνεῦμα ἀνθρώπου in contrast with the ἔξω ἄνθρωπος, the σῶμα, or the σάρξ, *i.e.* man, in so far as he is not outward and visible to others, *i.e.* body, but as he is inward and hidden, *i.e.* spirit. So 2 Cor. iv. 16; *Eph.* iii. 16. But without doubt, as these very passages show, it is the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, to whom the πνεῦμα θεοῦ is given to work in him the new birth and renewal. Accordingly, by the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος even the καινός ἄνθρωπος may be denoted, on the supposition that the former is to be conceived in a definite order of thought as necessarily ἀνακεκαينωμένος. Quite analogous to this is the employment of ψυχή, 1 Pet. ii. 11 (comp. Steiger here): ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν σαρκικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, αἵτινες στρατεύονται κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. The reference here cannot be to the soul in its natural character, for, as such, it is itself a ψυχὴ σαρκική, but to the soul as it had been renewed in the believing readers of the epistle, in whom it was pervaded by the Holy Spirit, so that Calvin rightly interprets: “ipsa animae regenitae natura, quae spiritualis est. Totus homo interior, qui per Sp. S. renovatus est, intelligitur.” On the other hand, in 1 Pet. iii. 4 it is certainly doubtful whether the description ὁ κρυπτός τῆς καρδίας ἄνθρωπος,

<sup>1</sup> Tholuck, p. 341, directly quotes these passages from the Psalms as an evidence against our reference of συνήδισθαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ to the regenerate. Nay, he even appeals to the prayer in *Oed. Tyr.* v. 845. Thus he places the believing Israelite on a par with the devout heathen, and identifies the natural law of conscience with the spiritual, revealed law of God, whose fundamental requirement is love to God, of which the heathen knew nothing. In fact, only on such grounds is it possible to refer this passage to the conflict in the unregenerate. But this alone is enough to condemn the reference for all deep, truly spiritual understanding of the Scriptures.

corresponding with ἕσω ἄνθρωπος, signifies simply every inward ego, even of the natural man in contrast with the body,—so Steiger, in which case we must interpret: “Outward adornment, that of the body, becomes not Christian women (ὧν ἔστω, οὐχ ὁ ἕξωθεν κόσμος), but the inner man in the imperishable ornament of a meek and quiet spirit (ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ τοῦ πραέος καὶ ἡσυχίου πνεύματος),” so that the imperishableness of a meek and quiet spirit is conceived as the principle pervading and sanctifying the κρυπτὸς τῆς καρδίας ἄνθρωπος,—or whether ὁ κρ. τῆς κ. ἄνθρ. of itself is to be conceived as pervaded by the πνεῦμα θεοῦ, comp. Wiesinger here, in which case (which we hold to be the right view) we must interpret: “the inward (= spiritual) man, consisting in the imperishableness of a meek and quiet spirit” (“in pectore latitans homo, qui perpetuitate mansuetae et tranquillae mentis cernatur,” Fritzsche, *Comm. in ep. ad Rom.* tom. II. p. 64), so that τὸ ἀφθαρτον τοῦ κρ. κ. ἡσ. πνεύμ. more precisely explains the character of this inner man (comp. Rom. ii. 29: ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος, καὶ περιτομή καρδίας, ἐν πνεύματι). Now, in the present passage, ὁ ἕσω ἄνθρωπος is in point of fact the inner man, not simply in so far as he *may* and should be pervaded by the Spirit of God, but in so far as he *actually is* pervaded by the Spirit of God, for only as such has he delight in God’s law.<sup>1</sup> The apostle’s use

<sup>1</sup> Meyer asserts that “it is quite arbitrarily denied by me that to the *unregenerate* man belongs, as respects his moral ‘I,’ the συνῆδμαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ (comp. ii. 15), and it must belong to him, since the sinful nature has its seat and home in the σάρξ, vv. 18, 25, as the *antithesis* of the νοῦς. This does not, indeed, consist with the assumption that it is precisely the *higher* powers of the natural man that by nature are at diametrical variance with God and His law (*Form. Conc.* p. 640 f.), but it nevertheless rests on an exegetic basis.” We ask, on the other hand, whether Meyer really supposes that his carnal Hamartology consists better with the Augustan Formula of 1530, to which, in the preface to his 2d edition, he so strongly adheres, in distinction from the Concord Formula? But, as concerns his assertion that his anthropological positions are exegetically established, we hold precisely that they are *not* exegetically established. Whoever is acquainted with the position of investigation respecting the biblical notion of the σάρξ, will be compelled to declare both assertions *at least* equally warranted. Harless *e.g.* says, *Christian Ethics*, § 26a: “It is confessed that the biblical notion of σάρξ has *nothing further* in common with the Gentile and modern notion of sensuousness than that it includes under it the so-called sensuous desires” (comp. § 10). Comp. also Harless, *Comment. zum Ephes. Br.* p. 162; Wieseler on Gal. v. 13; Tholuck, “Erneuerte Untersuchung über σάρξ als Quello der Sünde,” *Stud. u. Krit.* 1855, III. 1, u. *Com. zu Röm.* 5 Ausg., the exposition of vi. 6; Delitzsch, *Bibl. Psych.* p. 439; Luthardt, *die Lehre vom freien Willen*, p. 394 ff. All these inquirers, as well as Jul. Müller, Ernesti, Thomasius, etc., in spite of many variations in particulars, decidedly agree in opposing Meyer’s narrow view of the biblical conception of the σάρξ.

here of *this* expression, not of *καινός, πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος*, is explained by the tenor of the previous exposition. He wishes just to show that sin is a power foreign to the believer, bringing him into bondage against his will. This he does by showing how his real ego, the innermost ground and core of his desire and being, is free from sin. Thus there was here no occasion whatever for describing this innermost ground and core as expressly spiritual. Rather, on the contrary, since in the apostle's teaching it is self-evident (and in harmony with the entire doctrinal exposition given so far by the Roman epistle of sin and grace, flesh and spirit, bondage of the law and freedom of the gospel cannot be conceived otherwise) that only that which is created in man through the Pneuma can be (ver. 22) in sympathy with the pneumatic law (ver. 14), the only thing of importance was, to describe this desire of the Pneuma in man as his real ego (ver. 17), his real inward man (ver. 22). The *μέλη* (ver. 23), then, are not the sinful corruption of human nature in the abstract, just as little as the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* or the *νοῦς* (ver. 23) is the new character of sanctified human nature in the abstract; but the former is here described as *μέλη* (*σῶμα*, ver. 24; *σάρξ*, vv. 18, 25), the latter as *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* (*ἐγώ, νοῦς*), by a mode of expression borrowed from and corresponding to natural, *i.e.* morally indifferent anthropology. The higher, inner, hidden part (the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, νοῦς*, the *ἐγώ* proper) of man simply is a rational, in the regenerate man a spiritual essence. What remains in the former, after taking away the *πνεῦμα ἀνθρώπου*, is called *σῶμα, σάρξ, μέλη*; and just so, therefore, is all that called which remains in the latter, after taking away the *πνεῦμα θεῖον*, which is conceived as having become the principle subjectively active in man. "Interior igitur homo," remarks Calvin, "non anima simpliciter dicitur, sed spiritualis ejus pars, quae a Deo regenerata est: membrorum vocabulum residuam alteram partem significat. Nam ut anima est pars excellentior hominis, corpus inferior: ita spiritus superior est carne. Hac ergo ratione, quia spiritus locum animae tenet in homine, caro autem, id est corrupta et vitiosa anima, corporis, ille interioris hominis, haec membrorum nomen obtinet." Comp. the remarks on *σῶμα*, vi. 12. Thus *σάρξ, σῶμα, μέλη*, vv. 18, 23, 24, 25, in this section really hold a middle place between the purely physical and purely ethical meaning, and in a certain sense form the point of transition from the former

to the latter; as respects the form of the conception leaning to the one side, as respects the substance to the other. "*Nec membra tantum intelliguntur externa,*" observes Calov, "*sed interiores quoque facultates, quae veluti membra sunt, quod per easdem operetur homo vetus, et in iisdem consistat.*"

—βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου] may be construed in two ways. We may either make the partic. ἀντιστρατευόμενον governed by βλέπω (after the manner of *verba videndi* joined with the participle, Acts viii. 23 ; 1 Cor. viii. 10 ; Heb. x. 25 ; Mark v. 31 ; Luke xxiv. 12 ; John v. 19), so that ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου very closely coheres with ἀντιστρατευόμενον: "But I see that another law wars in my members against the law of my spirit," or we may join ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου with ἕτερον νόμον, and resolve the *participium* by the *pronomén relatiuim*. So Luther: "But I see another law in my members that wars against the law in my soul," and most expositors. This latter mode of construction seems to deserve the preference on account of the sharp antithesis it gives between ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου and ἔσω ἄνθρωπος. βλέπω, like εὐρίσκω, ver. 18, denotes perception after inward survey. ἕτερον νόμον, a law of another kind, ver. 4, not merely ἄλλον νόμον. Comp. Tittmann, *de Synon. in N. T.* p. 155 sq.: "ἄλλος ἕτερος. Illud denotat aliū, nulla diversitatis, nisi numeri, ratione. ἕτερος, non tantum aliū sed etiam diversum indicat. ἄλλος Ἰησοῦς . . . ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, 2 Cor. xi. 4 sq." A law of another kind, namely, than the law of God, in which I take pleasure after the inward man. ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου, vi. 13, vii. 5 ; Jas. iv. 1. ἀντιστρατευόμενον, comp. the remark on ὅπλα ἀδικίας, vi. 13, and Jas. iv. 1 ; 1 Pet. ii. 11 ; also ἀντίκειται, Gal. v. 17. The νόμος τοῦ νοός is not identical with the νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ, but is the law issuing from and immanent in the human spirit that has become spiritual, the law demanding and consisting in συνήδεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ. νοός is the spirit, not merely as to its theoretical, but also as to its practical aspect, *mind*, i. 28, xii. 2 ; 1 Cor. i. 10, ii. 16 ; Eph. iv. 17, 23 (Harless) ; Luther here: "*Gemüth*, soul." (Meyer: "practical reason;" Beck, *ibid.* *Psych.* p. 42: "the soul's spiritual sense.") The mind and soul of the Christian are directed to what is spiritual, to the νόμος θεοῦ. On the form νοός in later Greek (after the third declension), instead of νοῦ, and νοῖ instead of νόφ, see Winer, p. 72.

—καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου] The figure implied in ἀντιστρατευόμενον, taken from military service, is continued in αἰχμαλωτίζοντα. The contending foe takes prisoner his opponent, and thus gains the victory. The prisoner of the law of sin as such does what sin, his master, commands. Only this takes place, as already remarked, not in such a sense as if nothing but sin were present in the regenerate, but in such a sense that the law of the spirit does not thoroughly permeate his will, inasmuch as sin still mingles with the will, constantly hindering and disturbing its operations. This impossibility of ever attaining perfect holiness, this continuous encompassing by εὐπερίστατος ἁμαρτία, Heb. xii. 1, this perpetual cloud on the spiritual life from the encumbering body of evil desire and inclination, is just that which is felt by the believer as an ever-continuing bondage of sin, existing side by side with the freedom that he has in Christ. αἰχμαλωτίζω (Luke xxi. 24; 2 Cor. x. 5; 2 Tim. iii. 6) from αἶχμη ἁλίσκομαι, “to make prisoner of war;” τῷ νομῷ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, comp. πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, ver. 14. The slave may be either a prisoner of war or a bought slave. But with equal pertinence man might be described as a slave born in the house of sin (γεννα). The ancient Attic writers say αἰχμάλωτον ποιεῖν. Still later than αἰχμαλωτίζειν is the form αἰχμαλωτεύειν, Eph. iv. 8, also 2 Tim. iii. 6, according to the less attested *lect. recepta*. Now, Eph. iv. 8 being taken from LXX. Ps. lx. 18, αἰχμαλωτίζω may be described as the sole form occurring in the N. T. με is not the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, the νοῦς, the real ἐγώ, ver. 17, for neither is it emphatic, nor does the νοῦς cease to be subject to the νόμος θεοῦ, comp. ver. 25, but it is the entire ego in the abstract, considered as morally indifferent, which as subject to the law of God is νοῦς, ἔσω ἄνθρωπος; the real ego, as subject to the law of sin, is σάρξ, σῶμα, comp. ver. 25: αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῦ . . . τῇ δὲ σαρκί. The dative τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας is *dativ. commod.*, not *instrum.*: “and takes me captive for the law of sin,” i.e. under the power of sin. By νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας the ἕτερος νόμος is more exactly defined as to its character. This ἕτερος νόμος is simply, which before was not expressly said, a νόμος ἁμαρτίας. Hence also it is not said merely αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με ἑαυτῷ, i.e. the ἕτερος νόμος makes me its prisoner. Further, the supplement τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου

expressly identifies the one νόμος with the other, and obviates the supposition that the νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας is a νόμος different from the ἕτερος νόμος. "The law of sin that, *as was said*, is in my members." Hereby, too, the connection of ἕτερος νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου is again corroborated. The distinction that some have attempted to discover between ἕτερος νόμος and νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας must be regarded as more or less untenable. If it is wished to distinguish a fourfold instead of a threefold νόμος, with logical strictness the νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ, the law proceeding from God, could only be opposed to the νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας, the law proceeding from sin. With the first, the νόμος τοῦ νοός, delight in good, would then harmonize; with the latter, the ἕτερος νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, inclination to evil. But the νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας itself, just as much as the ἕτερος νόμος, being found ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, this distinction between an objective and subjective law of sin falls to the ground, and there remains only a threefold νόμος, a νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ, a νόμος τοῦ νοός μου, and an ἕτερος νόμος, or a νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου. "But he calls both the spirit and the flesh," says Luther in his preface to *St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, "a law, because, as is the manner of the divine law, it impels and demands: therefore also the flesh impels, and demands, and rages against the spirit, and would have its desire. This conflict lasts in us as long as we live, in one more, in another less, according as the spirit or the flesh is stronger. And yet the whole man himself is both these, spirit and flesh, which contends with him until he becomes all spiritual."

Ver. 24. The fact of the still-continuing captivity of sin, realized in *experience*, impels the apostle to the lament and cry for help of this verse. Even the redeemed Christian, and he expressly, in view of his *carnal* nature, is seen still ever lamenting and seeking redemption. ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος] Cry of distress. *Unhappy man that I am!* Wrongly Bengel: "me miserum, qui homo sim! The nominative is the nominative of exclamation, Winer, p. 227. ταλαίπωρος, Rev. iii. 17, joined with ἐλεεινός, according to the usual derivation from τλῆναι τὸν πῶρον, *i.e.* τὸ πένθος, according to Passow *s.v.*, perhaps a poetical variation of ταλαπεῖριος, a strong expression to denote misery, comp. iii. 16: σύντριμμα καὶ ταλαιπωρία (LXX. for רָצָה); Jas. v. 1: κλαύσατε ὁλολύζοντες ἐπὶ ταῖς ταλαιπωρίαις,

iv. 9: *ταλαιπωρήσατε καὶ πενθήσατε καὶ κλαύσατε*. On the cry of distress follows the call for help in the form of an inquiring survey.

—*τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*;] The redeemed man is ever, as it were, crying afresh for a new Redeemer from the power of sin still remaining in him. “Non quaerit autem, a quo sit liberandus, quasi dubitans ut increduli, qui non tenent unicum esse liberatorem: sed vox est anhelantis et prope fatiscantis, quia non satis praesentem opem videat,” Calvin. Several interpreters refer this cry for help to the Christian longing for death, which with redemption from the body brings redemption from the evil of sin. But *σῶμα* here, as observed, denotes the material body neither exclusively nor abstractly, but body and soul, in so far as they are not yet pervaded by the *πνεῦμα*. Moreover, the longing expressed here, as ver. 25: *εὐχαριστῶ . . . ἡμῶν*, in connection with viii. 1 f. shows, finds its satisfaction in the present life. Thus the point treated of is not the wish for deliverance from the *σῶμα* in itself, but from the *σῶμα* in so far as it is subject to sin and death, *i.e.* for the deliverance of the body from sin and death, comp. ver. 23. But, no doubt, inasmuch as this wish can only receive its final and complete fulfilment in the future life and in the glorification of the body, this element may be conceived as echoing, so to speak, breaking forth involuntarily from the background of natural feeling. The genitive *τοῦ θανάτου* may be taken as simply *genit. possess.*: “the body belonging to death,” *τὸ χειρωθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου*, or also according to Winer, p. 235, as genitive of reference: “the body leading to death.” Respecting *θάνατος*, comp. on v. 12, vi. 16, vii. 10. The question is, whether *τούτου* should be joined with *θανάτου* or with *σώματος*. It is supposed that in the latter case the apostle for the sake of clearness must have written *ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου*. But this judgment, in our opinion, rests on a very precarious canon. A writer often intends a particular definite collocation of words, without reflecting that for the reader it may be ambiguous. The placing of *τούτου* after *σώματος*, moreover, was required by the emphasis aimed at, and there remained then nothing but the order *ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*, which in addition is relieved of difficulty by the consideration that *σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου* may be joined together as a *single* conception, “body-of-death.”



The only point in question, then, is to decide with which of the two *substantiva* (σώματος or θανάτου) the *pronomén démonstrativum* is joined with greater relevance to the connection of *thought*. As to this we certainly believe with σώματος, for θάνατος was not the subject, vv. 14–24 (we must, then, with Luther in his original note interpret: “He calls the misery and sorrow of the conflict with sin death”), and the allusion to ver. 10 ff. appears too remote. The emphatic indication, contained in τούτου placed last, can thus only refer to the σῶμα, hitherto spoken of as the seat of ἁμαρτία.

Ver. 25. Thanks for redemption found in Christ, and recapitulation of what was last explained. εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν] This *lectio recepta* has no adequate confirmation from manuscripts. For εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ are found the variations χάρις τῷ θεῷ, χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ, ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ, ἡ χάρις κυρίου. The two last readings are plainly alterations made to obtain a direct answer, ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ or κυρίου (*sc. ῥύσεταιί με*), to the foregoing question, ver. 24: τίς με ῥύσεται; Thus the only choice seems to lie between χάρις τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τ. κυρ. ἡμ., which Mill and Griesbach approve, and Lachmann has received, and χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ κτλ., as Fritzsche reads. We give the latter reading the preference, on the ground that the omission of δέ is more easily explained than its insertion. The supposition that this reading was taken from vi. 17 has no probability in its favour.<sup>1</sup> It might just as well be said that εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ is borrowed from i. 8, where, in addition, διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is likewise found. After the wail and cry for help, ver. 24, the apostle’s language becomes calm and measured; whereas, if χάρις τῷ θεῷ is read without δέ, it acquires an abrupt and unconnected character: “Wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from this body of death?”

χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τ. κυρ. ἡμ.] “But thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord.” There is thus no ground for misgiving. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 57: τῷ δὲ θεῷ χάρις, τῷ δίδόντι ἡμῖν τὸ νίκος διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. With this, also, the subjoined calm, recapitulatory exposition links on more simply and readily. χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ, comp. 2 Cor.

<sup>1</sup> Yet this is maintained even by Meyer. In this case, with him, we should have to retain the *recepta* εὐχαριστῶ κτλ. This is no doubt confirmed also by the Cod. Sinait., which only reads χάρις δέ by a second hand.

viii. 16 ; ix. 15, διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, comp. i. 8. Thanksgiving is presented to God *through* Jesus Christ, because He is the cause of our having reason to present thanksgiving to God. αἰτίου ὄντος τῆς εὐχαριστίας, explains Theophylact, αὐτὸς γὰρ, φησὶ, κατώρθωσεν ἃ ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἠδυνήθη· αὐτὸς με ἐρρύσατο ἐκ τῆς ἀσθενείας τοῦ σώματος, ἐνδυναμώνσας αὐτὸ, ὥστε μηκέτι τυραννεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας. The apostle having, on the one hand, in view of the sin still remaining in the flesh, broken out into the wail and cry for help which dwell perpetually in the Christian soul ; and, on the other, mindful of the redemption found in Christ,—enjoyed already in experience by himself, and anew and more and more deeply to be appropriated in ever-advancing progress,—having presented his thanksgiving to God, he now recapitulates, in the form of an inference, the essential purport of what has been explained from ver. 14 onward, especially from ver. 21 to κυρίου ἡμῶν, ver. 25. Two positions are advanced : first, that the regenerate man with the spirit serves the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin ; and secondly, that, nevertheless, having reason for praise on account of the redemption of which Christ is the mediator, in spite of the twofold nature of His *ego* already mentioned, no condemnation falls on those who are in Christ, because in them the sin remaining in the flesh no longer comes into account, but only the new nature of the spirit. The first inference is drawn by ἄρα οὖν in this verse, the second by ἄρα νῦν in viii. 1 f. Thus the division of the chapters here interrupts the strict connection of thought, and may therefore be described as little to the purpose. A beginning might perhaps be made of a new paragraph, since certainly the description of a new aspect in the condition of the regenerate opens, but not suitably of a new chapter. The seventh chapter would thus conclude better with viii. 11.

—ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῦ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ· τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας] Comp. the striking practical explanation of these words by Haldane in his *Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans*, as well as the profound and rich comments of Besser on this entire section, vv. 14–25. (Only, we find the twofold sense, which the latter would assign to the expression νόμος ἁμαρτίας, “the law that has sin for its subject,” and “the law that judges sin,” incapable of being sustained *exegetically*.) The fact that the apostle, after the thanksgiving for deliverance accomplished,

repeats this proposition, shows that it contains a description of the state of the regenerate man. Otherwise we should have expected to see it prefixed to the thanksgiving. And after the utterance of the thanksgiving, if the description of a new and opposite state of life were meant to be forthwith introduced, there was no reason whatever for a passage recapitulating and repeating the description of the former state of life. Besides, in that case *χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ κτλ.* would acquire the character of a parenthetical interpolation, with which only viii. 1 links on, *ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ κτλ.* referring back to ver. 24—manifestly an unnatural and violent mode of connection. On this account even Olshausen refers the words *ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ κτλ.* to the new birth now introduced; which then, certainly, since they clearly contain the substance of vv. 14–24 *in nuce*, should by reflex influence have changed completely his view of the entire section. *ἄρα οὖν*, comp. on v. 18. *αὐτὸς ἐγὼ*, comp. Fritzsche and Tholuck here. *αὐτὸς ἐγὼ* has either an *adversative* or *declarative* signification. The first occurs Luke xxiv. 39 : *ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ εἰμι*, *that it is I myself* (not a spectre that has mimicked my form). Comp. Rom. xv. 14. In that case, the contrast in this passage would be contained in *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. *I myself*, i.e. *I alone, apart from Christ's interposition*. On this view, indeed, *χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ κτλ.* need no longer be regarded as a parenthetical interruption. But it must be described as far-fetched, because the thought with which : “*I myself* with the spirit serve the law of God” is supposed to stand in contrast, namely : “*Jesus Christ* is my deliverer from this body of death,” can only be indirectly taken from the thanksgiving expressed before. The second signification of *αὐτὸς* answers to our German *eben, even, just, very*, and denotes the very one spoken of just before, or just now, or about to be spoken of. It is found ix. 3 : *ἡγχομένη γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου*. “*Even I*, who have just made known the sorrow of my heart;” although in this passage the first meaning also might be found : “*I myself*,” in contrast with his brethren. 2 Cor. x. 1 : *αὐτὸς ἐγὼ Παῦλος . . . ὃς κατὰ πρόσωπον μὲν ταπεινὸς ἐν ὑμῖν κτλ.* “*Even I*, Paul, who,” etc. xii. 13 : *τί γάρ ἐστιν ὃ ἡττήθητε ὑπὲρ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐκκλησίας, εἰ μὴ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οὐ κατενάρκησα ὑμῶν*; “*Even I*, who by many signs proved myself an apostle of Christ,” comp. ver. 12. So especially often in the phrase *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, Rom. ix. 17, xiii. 6; 2 Cor. ii. 3,

v. 5, vii. 11 ; Gal. ii. 10 ; Eph. vi. 18, 22 ; Phil. i. 6 ; Col. iv. 8 ; 2 Pet. i. 5. So also in the present passage : *Even I who was just now spoken of*, i.e. who just now bewailed to God my sin and misery, and presented my thanks for deliverance. Some expositors interpret *αὐτός ἐγώ* here by *idem ego*. "I, one and the same man, do a twofold act, with my spirit," etc. But *αὐτός* is never in the N. T. = *ὁ αὐτός*, Winer, p. 139 ; and the other attempts made to extract this sense are to be regarded as artificial and without sufficient evidence. *δουλεύω*. If it is maintained that in the regenerate no *δουλεύειν νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας* takes place, we must reply that this takes place not absolutely, but only *τῇ σαρκί* ; whereas, on the contrary, it must be maintained that in the unregenerate no *δουλεύειν νόμῳ θεοῦ*, even *τῷ νοῦ* takes place. On the sin still remaining in the flesh, even in the *reginitus*, comp. Eph. iv. 22 ; Col. iii. 5. "Brevis epilogus," observes Calvin, "quo docet, nunquam ad justitiæ metam pertingere fideles, quamdiu in carne sua habitant : sed in cursu esse, donec corpore exuantur.—Fatetur, se ita esse Deo addictum, ut reptans in terra multis sordibus inquinetur. Notabilis locus ad convincendum illud perniciosissimum Catharorum dogma, quod hodie suscitare rursus conantur tumultuosi quidam spiritus." The strong expression *δουλεύειν* (vi. 18) shows that even in the *θέλειν ποιεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν* and the *συνήδεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ* no mere *voluntas*, no mere impotent and fugitive acquiescence, is to be supposed.

## CHAPTER VIII.

THE apostle now presents to us the life of the regenerate man under its other aspect. He had described fully the circumstances out of which the sin perpetually cleaving to him necessarily arose. He describes now the might and glory of the new life-principle, of the grace and Spirit that believers receive in Christ Jesus. Thus ch. vii. 14-25, viii. 1-11 do not picture different and successive conditions in a Christian's life, but, taken together, furnish an exhaustive description of one and the same condition with respect to the two elements of which it is invariably composed. As already intimated in the remarks introductory to vii. 14-25, the believer, glancing at the *ἁμαρτία ἐν σαρκί*, has reason every moment to cry : *Ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος ! τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου ;* but being ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, and in Him delivered from *κατάκριμα*, he is withal able to say : *ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἡλευθέρωσε με ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.* By this view we do not call in question the fact that the one or the other element is uppermost in consciousness, according as he finds himself more vehemently assaulted by sin, or governed and influenced by the spirit of freedom and life. Luther's words, in his preface to the Roman epistle, may stand as a general introduction to the eighth chapter : " In the eighth chapter he gives such combatants the comforting assurance that the flesh does not condemn them, and intimates, further, the nature of flesh and spirit, and how the Spirit comes from Christ, who has given us His Holy Spirit to make us spiritual and quench the flesh, and assure us that we are God's children, and how fiercely sin rages in us as long as we follow the Spirit and strive to mortify sin. But as the flesh is kept under by nothing so effectually as the cross and suffering, he comforts us in suffering by assuring us of the sympathy of the loving Spirit and all creatures, seeing that the Spirit groans in us and the creature longs with us that we may be delivered from the flesh and sin. We thus see that these three chapters relate to the one work of

faith, which is there called mortifying the old Adam and doing violence to the flesh." As introductory to the section, vv. 1-11, which has first of all to be interpreted, Calvin's words are worthy of note: "Ubi certamen subiecit, quod habent pii cum carne sua perpetuum, redit ad consolationem illis valde necessariam, cujus antea meminerat: quod tametsi a peccato adhuc teneantur obsessi, mortis tamen potestati jam exempti sint et omni maledictioni, modo non in carne vivant, sed in spiritu. Tria enim simul conjungit, imperfectionem, qua semper laborant fideles, Dei indulgentiam in ea condonanda et ignoscenda, regenerationem spiritus: atque hoc quidem postremum, ne quis vana opinione se lactet, acsi liberatus esset a maledictione, carni suae interim secure indulgens. Ut ergo frustra sibi blandiatur homo carnalis, si de emendanda vita nihil sollicitus hujus gratiae praetextu impunitatem sibi promittat: ita habent trepidae piorum conscientiae invictum propugnaculum, quod, dum in Christo manent, sciunt, se esse extra omne damnationis periculum."

Ver. 1. Inference (*ἄρα*) from what precedes. The question is, from which words the inference is deduced. To connect it with ch. iii. or iv., or v. 12 ff., or vii. 6, is too remote, and therefore arbitrary. On the contrary, we must certainly find a point of connection with the context immediately preceding. Now, they who see the condition of the unregenerate described there seek a link of connection in part in the last words of vii. 25 (*ἄρα οὖν . . . ἁμαρτίας*). The train of thought would then be as follows: "When I was yet under the power of sin, on account of sin I was doomed to death. *Now*, then, when we are in *Christ Jesus* we are saved from condemnation, *for* in Christ Jesus is freedom from the law of sin and death." According to this view, the emphasis lies on *νῦν*. But in this case the more apt and natural arrangement would clearly have been: *νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲν κατάκριμα τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, or even *οὐδὲν ἄρα κατάκριμα τοῖς νῦν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. Moreover, this thought would have been far more suitably expressed in an antithetical than in a consecutive form: *νῦν δὲ οὐδὲν κατάκρ. κτλ.*: "Formerly I was a slave of sin and death. But now," etc., comp. *νυνὶ δέ*, iii. 21. Therefore the connection must be made with the *first* part of vii. 25 (*εὐχαριστῶ . . . ἡμῶν*), whose contents, no doubt, point back to ch. iii. ff. But if, accepting this mode of connection, *ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ . . . ἁμαρτίας* is meant to refer to the *status irre-*

*genitorum*, then εὐχαριστῶ . . . ἡμῶν could only be viewed as a subordinate parenthetical sentence, despatched, as it were, in an instant, or, at all events, after these words a pause (comp. de Wette here) must be supposed. In both cases the mode of connection proposed would acquire a strange and forced appearance which does not belong to it on our view. According to our view, the idea embodied in the context, vii. 24, 25, is as follows: "The believer, with the soul serving the law of God, with the flesh the law of sin, while he has reason to mourn, has also reason for thanksgiving to God." Now, from this it follows that on those who are in Christ Jesus no condemnation falls, for in Him they have freedom from sin and death. Thus the sin and death still present in them are not only constantly swallowed up in the righteousness and life to be found in Christ, but also, in the case of those who are in Christ Jesus, are no longer even brought before God in judgment. οὐδὲν ἄρα νῦν κατάκριμα] *sc.* ἐστίν. ἄρα νῦν = *on this account now, on this account then*, like ἄρα οὖν, v. 18, vii. 3, 25, viii. 12, etc. Respecting νῦν as a logical particle of transition, see on iii. 21; and besides the passages there cited, comp. especially Heb. xi. 16; Jas. iv. 13, v. 1; 1 John ii. 28. ἄρα οὖν Paul always places at the *head* of the sentence; but after ἄρα οὖν, vii. 25, this would have been very awkward here. *κατάκριμα*, as in v. 16, 18, = *sentences of condemnation*, carried into effect in the very act of death in the entire compass of the notion, the element of spiritual and eternal misery predominating. For them no more is there sentence of condemnation = it falls on them, etc. The interpretation: "nullae poenae, nihil damnatione dignum"—Luther, "nothing worthy of condemnation"—cannot be accepted, at least as a precise interpretation of the *word*. With the sentiment, comp. *κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος*, Gal. v. 23.

—τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ] *sc.* οὖσιν. After the whole exposition contained in ch. iii.—vi. there needs nothing else to disprove the arbitrary and superficial explanation that puts οἱ ἐν Χριστῷ on a parallel with the designations οἱ τοῦ Ζήνωνος, οἱ ἀμφὶ Πλάτωνα, οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου (we never do say οἱ ἐν Ζήνωνι, Πλάτωνι, Πυθαγόρῃ, of a scholar's relation to his teacher), or to prove that the phrase εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ in the apostle's lips can only denote a real, spiritual, and no doubt mystical community of life on the part of the believer with Christ. Comp. John xv. 3 ff.; Acts xvii. 28; Rom. xvi. 11; 1 Cor. i. 30;

2 Cor. v. 17 ; Gal. iii. 27, 28 ; Winer, p. 484, note. In 1 John ii. 5, *τηρεῖν τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ* is expressly described as a *characteristic* of *ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι*. The two, therefore, cannot be identical. From *εἶναι ἐν κυρίῳ* follows *εὐρίσκεσθαι*, Phil. iii. 9 ; *στήκειν*, iv. 1, 1 Thess. iii. 8 ; *περιπατεῖν ἐν κυρίῳ*, Col. ii. 6. By faith we are incorporated with Christ, the Atoner and Redeemer. By *εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, therefore, we have, under their subjective aspects, *δικαίωσις* and *ἁγιασμός* in inseparable connection (1 Cor. i. 30), and therewith the abrogation of every *κατάκριμα*. The following supplement—

—*μη̄ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα*] is wanting in the most important codices, versions, and Fathers either entirely or as to its latter half (*ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα*). It has therefore been justly described by most editors and interpreters as a spurious gloss from ver. 4. Moreover, such a condition (and conditionally it must be translated in the absence of the article *τοῖς*) yields an irrelevant sense here, where there is no occasion to specify the condition on which *κατάκριμα* is abolished, but, above all, to *establish* the fact of the abrogation itself, ver. 2. The express treatment of this *condition* as such really begins only with ver. 12 f.

Ver. 2 states the reason (*γάρ*) why for believers there is no *κατάκριμα*. The *νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς* forms an antithesis with *νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου*. On the latter phrase, Chrysostom early remarked: *Οὐ τὸν Μωσέως νόμον λέγει ἐνταῦθα· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ αὐτὸν νόμον ἁμαρτίας καλεῖ. Πῶς γὰρ ὃν δίκαιον καὶ ἅγιον πολλάκις ὠνόμασε καὶ ἁμαρτίας ἀναιρετικόν ; ἀλλ' ἐκείνον ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός*. Indeed, it is obvious that here in the *νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας* we must hold fast by the reference to the *νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου*, vii. 23, 25. Just as there the subject spoken of is captivity (*αἰχμαλωτί-ξιν*) to this law, so here the subject is deliverance (*ἐλευθεροῦν*) from it. The Mosaic law can be so much the less intended, as Paul would scarcely have called it a *νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου* in this connection. For although (vii. 5) he speaks of the *παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου*, describes the *νόμος*, 1 Cor. xv. 56, as a *δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, and ascribes to it, 2 Cor. iii. 6 (comp. ver. 7), *ἀποκτείνειν*, yet in the exposition immediately preceding the present passage, as it were correcting these expressions and reducing them to their due measure, he expressly



observed that the νόμος is not ἁμαρτία, and not the cause of θάνατος. On the contrary, it is ἅγιος, δίκαιος, ἀγαθός, and καλός; and ἐπιθυμία is not brought about by the ἐντολή, but only upon occasion of the ἐντολή by ἁμαρτία, which is likewise the cause of θάνατος, vii. 7, 8, 12, 13, 16. It is therefore impossible that directly afterwards he should describe the same νόμος as a νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, as a cause of sin and death. The subject spoken of here, then, is that mighty principle of sin in our members which wields the power of a law, so that Chrysostom and Theodoret not inaptly interpret this νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας by δυναστεία τῆς ἁμαρτίας. But inasmuch as our σῶμα with its μέλη is subject not merely to ἁμαρτία, but also, precisely through ἁμαρτία, to θάνατος, vii. 24 (comp. v. 12), the power dwelling in our members and making us its slaves is a νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, a power issuing from sin and death (*genit. auctor.*). Upon this view, the meaning of νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς now explains itself. By this, in like manner, must be understood a principle dwelling within man. By νόμος, therefore, cannot be meant the gospel, the new covenant, the Christian scheme of salvation (somewhat after the analogy of νόμος πίστεως, iii. 27), in contrast with the O. T. Nomos. But the νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος is not, therefore, identical with the νόμος τοῦ νοός μου, vii. 23, not even if the latter be conceived as νοὺς πνευματικός. For the νόμος of the νοὺς πνευματικός does not make man free from the νόμος of ἁμαρτία and θάνατος, but only when the πνεῦμα θεοῦ sets him free from the latter does the νόμος of the νοὺς πνευματικός come into existence in him. Comp. ver. 10 in relation to ver. 11. The πνεῦμα here, then, must be the πνεῦμα θεῖον, ἅγιον himself. In so far as He works eternal life, ζωή (comp. 2 Cor. iii. 6 : τὸ πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ), He is a πνεῦμα τῆς ζωῆς; and in so far as this Spirit leading to life (comp. as to this *genitivus effectus*, John vi. 35 : ὁ ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς; Rom. v. 18 : δικαίωσις ζωῆς) is a principle dwelling and ruling in man's heart, does a νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς find place, a sovereign power proceeding from the Spirit who is the means of life, that breaks and masters the power of sin and death. But the πνεῦμα leads to ζωή, the opposite of θάνατος, in abolishing ἁμαρτία, the cause of θάνατος. This antithesis, complete at every point, of νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς and νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου at once suggests that ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ] is to

be connected neither with τῆς ζωῆς, which would give one item too many in the first member of the antithesis, nor with τοῦ πνεύματος, nor with ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς (which, in spite of the article being absent, is no doubt possible, Winer, p. 171, although here, certainly, on account of the possible ambiguity, the explanatory ὁ, τοῦ, or τῆς before ἐν Χρ. Ἰησ. was to be looked for), but with the following ἡλευθέρωσε. This mode of connection corresponds perfectly with the contents of the preceding and following verses. The object is to prove that for those who are ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ there is κατάκριμα no longer, ver. 1. This is the case precisely, because ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ freedom is given from the law of sin and death through the Spirit of life, ver. 2. And to prove this position again, it is shown that ἁμαρτία is condemned, not by the νόμος, but ἐν Χριστῷ. Thus ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ coming first in this verse is explained, not only by the fact that the words immediately following ἡλευθέρωσε με ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου κτλ. would not bear interruption, but also by the emphasis lying on ἐν Χρ. Ἰ. in this verse both in allusion to ἐν Χρ. Ἰ., ver. 1, and in opposition to νόμος, ver. 3. At the same time, by this mode of connection subjective redemption is traced back to its objective ground. The Spirit of life has made us free from the law of sin and death in *Christ Jesus*, so that we partake in this freedom only as we are in Him. Thus subjective renewal depends upon the objective atonement and justification of which we are partakers through our being in Christ by means of faith. Respecting ἐλευθερία ἐν Χριστῷ, comp. the Lord's saying, John viii. 36.

—ἡλευθέρωσε με] The aorist denotes the single act of deliverance by incorporation into Christ through faith, comp. οἱ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὴν σάρκα ἐσταύρωσαν, Gal. v. 24. This freedom, ideally complete, is in reality to be conceived as a principle in course of development. The reading ἡλευθέρωσε σε instead of με has clearly arisen merely from repeating by mistake the last syllable of ἡλευθέρωσε. Here Paul speaks of himself for the last time as representing all believers. Already previously, ver. 1, οἱ ἐν Χριστῷ were mentioned in general. Then appears ἡμεῖς, ver. 4, and ὑμεῖς, ver. 9. The wail over the power of sin still continuing he takes specially on himself. In picturing the glory of redemption, his language becomes inclusive and general.

Ver. 3 confirms ἐν Χρ. Ἰ. ἡλευθέρωσε με κτλ., ver. 2. τὸ γὰρ

ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου] ἀδύνατον may either be taken in the active sense = ἡ ἀδυναμία, the impotence; or it has a passive signification = what cannot be carried out, the impossible. But the latter would be τὸ ἀδύνατον τῷ νόμῳ. The νόμος is here, of course, the νόμος Μωϋσέως, the νόμος θεοῦ. The question is, how the sentence before us is to be construed. It is altogether arbitrary to suppose an accusat. absolut., or to supply the preposition κατὰ or διὰ = “as respects the inability of the law,” or “on account of the inability of the law.” Better than this would be the supposition of an anacoluthon, τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου . . . ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν πέμψας . . . κατέκρινε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν for τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου . . . ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, πέμψας . . . καὶ κατακρίνων κτλ. “What was impossible to the law . . . God, sending His Son, condemned sin in the flesh,” instead of “this God did, and condemned,” etc. So Winer, pp. 290 and 718.<sup>1</sup> But there is no need, as is acknowledged in these days by the most profound interpreters, to suppose an anacoluthon. On the contrary, the construction may be regarded as according to rule. τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου is to be taken as nominative, and in apposition to the subjoined principal sentence: ὁ θεός . . . ἐν τῇ σαρκί, and to be resolved relatively: ὃ ἦν τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου (Vulg.: “quod erat impossibile legi”), thus: ὁ θεός κατέκρινε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, ὃ (sc. τὸ κατακρίνειν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν) ἦν τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου. “For the impotence of the law—God condemned sin in the flesh,” i.e., “God condemned sin in the flesh, which was the impotence of the law (i.e. that which the law was not competent for).” Quite analogous is the construction, Heb. viii. 1: κεφάλαιον οὖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις, τοιοῦτον ἔχομεν ἀρχιερέα. In exactly the same way, even in classical Greek, stand the phrases: τὸ μέγιστον, *id quod maximum est*, τὸ δεινότατον, τὸ ἔσχατον, τὸ κεφάλαιον, τὸ τελευταῖον, as appositional adjuncts before the principal sentence. Comp. Kühner, *Ausf. Gram. d. gr. Spr.* Th. II. p. 146, § 500, 1, Ann. 2. The prefixing of ἀδύνατον τοῦ is here specially warranted by the contrast in which it stands with ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ver. 2, and the emphasis thus gained.

—ἐν ᾧ ἡσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός] ἐν ᾧ here is plainly to be taken

<sup>1</sup> So too Luther: “This God did and sent His Son, and condemned sin in the flesh through sin,” where *πρὶ ἁμαρτίας* is translated *through sin*. We might indeed resolve or paraphrase *κατέκρινε* by *ἐποίησε κατακρίνων*, but not, as Luther seems, though not necessarily, to have construed *πέμψας* by *ἐποίησε πέμψας*.

not as a relative *in which*, as in ii. 1, but as a conjunction. As such it may mean: (1) *quo tempore*, so Mark ii. 19, Luke v. 34, John v. 7, comp. ἐν παντὶ χρόνῳ, ἐν ᾧ, Acts i. 21, and ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ, Acts vii. 20; (2) as an attraction for ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι, either *in eo quod*, *quatenus*, *as far as*, or *propter hoc quid*, *propterea quod*, *quoniam*, *because*, Heb. וְשֵׁנָּה, comp. ἐν τούτῳ πιστεύομεν, *propter hoc*, *on this account* we believe, John xvi. 30, and οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ δεδικαίωμαι, *per hoc*, *by this* am I not justified, Winer, p. 484, Heb. vi. 17. The temporal meaning cannot be accepted here, because the law was not merely powerless to abolish sin at a particular time when it was weak through the flesh, but was powerless at any time to do that which was the peculiar office of Christ. There remains then nothing but the meaning "as far as," or "because," and indeed the latter is preferable, because what is here affirmed of the law's weakness bears no limitation. It is powerless to abolish sin, not merely in so far as it is weak through the flesh, but by its very nature, just because wherever sin is confronted with sin its weakness is apparent. It is ἀσθενής and ἀνωφελές, Heb. vii. 18; οὐ δύναται ζωοποιῆσαι, Gal. iii. 21. The imperfect (ἡσθένει) serves to indicate what continued to be true up to the time of Christ's advent; comp. the exactly similar imperfect, vii. 5, 6. In truth, this ἀδυναμία of the νόμος continues even in the case of the redeemed Christian, so far as he is still σάρξ, comp. vii. 14–25. On the other hand, with respect to the most essential aspect of his ego he has become πνεῦμα, and as such is competent to the πλήρωσις νόμον, as is explained at length, viii. 1 ff. The weakness of the law was brought about διὰ τῆς σαρκός. The σάρξ was the mediating cause. In conflict with the Nomos it showed itself the stronger.

—ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν πέμψας ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας] By putting τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν first, marked emphasis is laid on God's act of love. Just as by ἑαυτοῦ (comp. ἴδιος υἱός, viii. 32) the filial relation of Christ is described as a metaphysical one (comp. on i. 3), so by πέμπειν κτλ. Christ's personality is described as a pre-existent one, comp. Gal. iv. 4; John x. 36, xvii. 3, etc.: ἀποστέλλειν εἰς τὸν κόσμον. But Christ appeared not ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας, which is the Ebionite conception, nor ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκός, which is the Doketic,<sup>1</sup> but ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας,

<sup>1</sup> Against this Doketic view Tertullian observes, *contra Marcionem*, l. v. c. 14: "Similitudo ad titulum peccati pertinebit, non ad substantiae mendacium."

which is the Biblico-Pauline. *σάρξ* here is manifestly the entire nature of man, as in John i. 14, Rom. i. 3, ix. 5, 1 John iv. 2, as regards body and soul. But this *σάρξ*, as we know from vii. 14, 18, 25, is a *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*. Christ could appear indeed *ἐν σαρκί*, but not *ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας*, for He must of necessity be *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*, Heb. iv. 15 (comp. John viii. 46, xiv. 30; 2 Cor. v. 21; Heb. vii. 26; 1 Pet. ii. 22, iii. 18), for the very end that He may be able *κατακρίνειν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί*. Thus He appeared *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, comp. Phil. ii. 7: *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος*. Theodoret early remarked: *οὐκ εἶπεν ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς, ἀλλ' ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας. φύσιν μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρωπείαν ἔλαβεν, ἁμαρτίαν δὲ ἀνθρωπείαν οὐκ ἔλαβε· τούτου δὴ χάριν τὸ ληφθὲν οὐχ ὁμοίωμα σαρκὸς, ἀλλ' ὁμοίωμα σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας ἐκάλεσε· τὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν ἔχων φύσιν ἡμῖν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔσχεν ἡμῖν γνώμην*, and Oecumenius: *τὸ ἐν ὁμοιώματι οὐ πρὸς τὸ σαρκὸς ὄρεῖ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*. In the same way Theophylact: *σάρκα ἔχοντα ὁμοίαν μὲν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τῇ ἁμαρτωλῷ, ἀναμάρτητον δὲ διότι γὰρ ἐμνήσθη ἁμαρτίας, διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὁμοίωμα προσέθηκεν*. Wherein this resemblance in Christ to human nature as a *sinful* nature consisted, we shall see later on. The fact that *σάρξ* here denotes not merely the physical aspect, but the entire nature of man, and indeed as such is called a *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*, corroborates our view of the notion of *σάρξ* in the seventh chapter.

—*καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας*] to be joined with *πέμφας*, whose purpose it specifies, not with *κατέκρινε*. Taken alone, *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* might no doubt intimate the relation between the mission of Christ and sin merely in general; but as it is a formula current elsewhere to denote the purpose of *expiating* sin (LXX. Num. viii. 8, Heb. ix. 26; Ps. xl. 7, Heb. ix. 26; Lev. vi. 25, 30; Heb. x. 6, 8, 18; 1 Pet. iii. 18), and, moreover, as the relation of Christ to sin has been expressly described in this epistle (iii. 24, 25, v. 11, 18) as that of a *propitiator*, this element, spontaneously suggesting itself, cannot by any means be excluded. On the other hand, the connection of thought, both with ver. 2 and with ver. 4, requires us to regard Christ as standing to sin not merely in the relation of its atoner, but of its obliterator. It would therefore be a one-sided course, supplying *θυσίαν* after the manner of the LXX., to take *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* here directly and exclusively in the meaning: "expiatory sacrifice." On the contrary, we must leave to this

phrase its broader reference, and interpret: "respecting sin, on account of sin;" but in the thoroughly definite acceptance: "to obliterate by expiating sin."

—κατέκρινε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί] The expression κατέκρινε is manifestly used in allusion to κατάκριμα, ver. 1. Because in Christ Jesus the κατάκριμα is carried into effect on sin, it no longer exists for those who are in Christ Jesus. ἐν τῇ σαρκί is to be joined with κατέκρινε, not with τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. Not only would the article be called for in the latter case (τὴν ἐν τῇ σαρκί),—the same reason not existing for its omission as in analogous instances, Winer, p. 147,—but the keenly contrasted order of thought also suggests the first method of connection. Sin had its home ἐν σαρκί, and as such could not be judged by the νόμος. Wherefore the Son of God appeared ἐν σαρκί, and by Him the judgment on sin was carried out ἐν σαρκί. The question is, in what way the κατάκριμα of sin was carried out. We might think of a sanctification of human nature by the sinless life of the Redeemer, a sanctification itself involving a condemnation, *i.e.* a victorious extirpation of sin in and out of human nature. But in this case the phrase κατακρίνειν is most strangely chosen. By that phrase we are driven involuntarily to think of a definite moment in Christ's life, when an actual κατάκριμα in the proper sense of the word took place. This is the moment of death, the κατάκριμα being always executed in θάνατος, v. 16, 18. Elsewhere, too, Scripture ever ascribes the oblitative condemnation of sin to Christ's death; and the doctrine of redemption taught in the Roman epistle is wholly rooted in the idea that the κατάκριμα of ἁμαρτία is supplied in the θάνατος, the αἷμα Χριστοῦ. The foregoing περὶ ἁμαρτίας also, as observed, points to the same conclusion. But just as little can the apostle's doctrine of atonement, known to us from ch. iii.—v., leave us in any doubt as to the way in which the κατάκριμα ἁμαρτίας is to be conceived as carried out in the θάνατος Χριστοῦ. The sin of mankind lay upon Him, their surety and representative (ὕπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν, 2 Cor. v. 21), and in Him was condemned. And this condemnation was really carried out in the penalty of death. But then the sin condemned, *i.e.* expiated in the death of Christ, is *eo ipso* taken away and blotted out, to which the resurrection of Christ bears witness. Therefore they who are in Christ Jesus, with the remission at the same time enjoy the extirpation of sin,

both blessings subsisting in Christ in inseparable unity. The latter element had been already dwelt on in ch. vi. and vii. 1-6. But in the present passage it was necessary to put this expressly forward as the final aim of the atonement, the connection of thought with vv. 2, 4, where a real deliverance from sin is treated of, requiring it. *κατακρίνειν* therefore here, as regards meaning, is not = *to overcome* or *destroy* simply, which is countenanced neither by the notion of the word nor analogous example, but = "to destroy or overcome by judgment, to take away by condemning, to obliterate by atoning." So already Irenaeus: "condemnavit peccatum, et jam quasi condemnatum ejecit extra carnem." Comp. John xii. 31 with xvi. 11; and as to the analogous amplification of the notion *δικαιοῦν*, on vi. 7. The antithesis to *ἀδύνατον τοῦ νομοῦ*, thus resulting, is as follows: "The law was able indeed to condemn sin, but not so to condemn as by the condemnation to remove or erase it. But God by the death of His Son so condemned sin as by this very (expiatory) condemnation to destroy it." The powerlessness of the law was the work of the *σάρξ*, because sin in human nature, condemned by the law, is not blotted out but only inflamed to so much the greater intensity. On the other hand, laid on the holy humanity of Christ, sin was blotted out and reduced to nought. But this leads us back to the expression *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*. The truth intended to be conveyed here cannot be the christological one, that the Son of God appeared not *ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας*, but, because sinless, merely *ἐν ὁμοιώματι* of such *σάρξ*, for there was no occasion here for pressing the sinlessness of Jesus in opposition to any alleged sinfulness. Rather the expression is of a soteriological nature, and is meant to show how Christ was able to destroy *ἁμαρτία ἐν τῇ σαρκί*, because He Himself appeared *ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας*. But this description it was needful to guard against possible misunderstanding, by appending the more precise definition *ἐν ὁμοιώματι*. Christ appeared *ἐν ὁμοι. σαρ. ἁμ.* means, therefore, nothing but this: that He appeared in the likeness of sinful humanity, in so far as He took upon Him our sin, and, *as it were* (*ἐν ὁμοιώματι*), Himself became a sinner (Isa. liii. 12; John i. 29; 2 Cor. v. 21), in so far as in His malefactor-death, although holy in Himself, He appeared in the form of a sinner. But this malefactor-death was merely the crown and culmination of the course of sufferings, full of shame and ignominy, in which He appeared *ἐν ὁμοιώματι*

σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας, a course stretching through His whole life from the cradle to the grave. "Eum vero in similitudine carnis peccati venisse dicit: quia tametsi nullis maculis inquinata fuit Christi caro, peccatrix tamen in speciem visa est, quatenus debitam sceleribus nostris poenam sustinuit," Calvin. If it is supposed that a mere assumption of another's sin involves no similarity of nature, we must observe that it is not even said that Christ appeared in a *nature* like man's sinful nature, but merely in a *form* like it. Every one condemned innocently appears ἐν ὁμοιώματι of a criminal, without being himself a criminal. If, on the other hand, we seek the ὁμοίωμα in the *liability to temptation* of the σάρξ of Christ, this belongs to the very idea of human nature, and while it involves the possibility of sin, does not involve likeness to it. Even of the first Adam, on the ground of liability to temptation, it could not be said that he was created ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας. Least of all can the phrase before us, with Menken and Irving, be perverted to support the unscriptural doctrine of a sinful tendency dwelling in Christ Himself, and only overcome by non-acquiescence on His part. On this view, ὁμοίωμα is meant to denote, not similarity, but identity. In this case the qualification ἐν ὁμοιώματι were altogether superfluous, and the apostle would simply have written ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας. Nay, the κατακρίνειν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί would have been carried into effect, not by God at all, but by Christ by His non-acquiescence in the tendency to sin. If we join ἐν τῇ σαρκί with κατέκρινε, this is not indeed to be referred directly to the σάρξ of Christ, where then αὐτοῦ (Eph. ii. 15) would have been added. The subject is the general condemnation of sin in the very human nature in which it has its seat. But this human nature in which sin was condemned is of course none else than the human nature of Christ. In the interpretation of this verse, expositors for the most part divide into two classes: one referring the words περὶ ἁμαρτίας and κατέκρινε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί exclusively to the *expiation* of sin by the death of Christ; the other, exclusively to the *blotting out* of sin by Christ's holy life. But the truth, as we have confessed, lies in the truth that combines both. The precise point treated of is the blotting out of sin by means of expiation.

Ver. 4 states the design (ἵνα) with which God κατέκρινε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί. But of course this design is to be con-



sidered as actually accomplished, so that, instead of the particle of design *ἵνα*, the particle of result *ὥστε* might have been used. *ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν*] We have already passed in review the various senses in which *δικαίωμα* occurs in the N. T. in general,—(1) *Judicial ordinance* in general, legal award, i. 32; Rev. xv. 4; LXX. Num. xxxi. 21; 1 Sam. xxx. 25. Closely allied to this, (2) *legal demand*, statute, ordinance, moral precept, ii. 26; Luke i. 6; Heb. ix. 1, 10. (3) *Fulfilment of right or law*, right conduct, v. 18; Rev. xix. 8; Bar. ii. 19. (4) *Justifying sentence*, *sententia absolutoria*, in opposition to *κατάκριμα*, *sententia damnatoria*, v. 16. Here the only choice lies between the second and fourth meaning. If we decide for the meaning *legal demand*, we must understand the statement in question either, with most modern expositors, of sanctification, or, with most of the older Protestant exegetes (in harmony with their exclusive reference of ver. 3 to the *satisfactio vicaria*), of justification. With respect to the first view, the demand of the law is fulfilled in us by the very act of our walking not after the flesh, but after the spirit. But, first of all, in this case *δικαίωμα* must needs be taken in a collective sense, whereas in a collective sense it is found elsewhere only in the plural. And further, on this view it presents no contrast with *κατάκριμα*, ver. 1; *κατέκρινε*, ver. 3. Besides, *πληρωθῇ* would more suitably have come first than *δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*. Referred to *justification*, the demand of the law would be fulfilled by *justitia imputata*. But if by *τοῖς μὴ κτλ.* the ground or condition of justification were meant to be indicated, the Pauline doctrine of justification would be entirely altered. Or if by these words the consequence of justification is meant to be indicated, we must (with Luther) interpret: in us who *now* (i.e. having been justified) walk no longer after the flesh, but after the spirit. But we have no warrant for interpolating a *νῦν*. There is left then nothing but the interpretation *δικαίωμα* = *sententia absolutoria*, justifying sentence. This meaning agrees well with the strain of thought, and yields a striking contrast to *κατάκριμα*, ver. 1, and to *κατέκρινε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, ver. 3. For those who are in Christ Jesus there is no *κατάκριμα*, but a *δικαίωμα νόμου*, because in Christ Jesus *ἁμαρτία*, which calls aloud for *κατάκριμα*, is itself smitten with *κατάκριμα*. In perfect analogy with this, it is said in reference to the specially mentioned *καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος*, Gal. v. 23: *κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων*

οὐκ ἔστι νόμος = κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν ἐστι κατάκριμα νόμου = ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπληρώθη τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου. Thus νόμον ἱστῶμεν, Rom. iii. 21, has now verified itself; for through the fulfilment of the law by believers the law has gained its due, so that over them the law can now pronounce its sentence of acquittal. "Τὸ δικαίωμα," remarks Bengel, "antitheton, *condemnatio*, ver. 1. Peccatum est condemnatum: qui fuerat peccator, nunc recte agit, et lex eum non persequitur." Comp. Rom. xiii. 8; 1 John iii. 9. Whilst by this mode of representation the apostle guards the doctrine of justification from being mistaken for a mere magical charm that covers without at the same time extinguishing sin; on the other hand, in consonance with the entire course of the apostolic exposition, it is ever to be borne in mind that only on the basis of the perfect righteousness of faith can there be any question of real righteousness of life. Only because we are justified in Christ does the sin perpetually cleaving to us (vii. 14-25, viii. 8) no longer come into account. Only thus can the holy acts which are the fruit of God's Spirit in those who are righteous in Christ be called a fulfilling of the law. Comp. our exposition of ii. 6. πληροῦσθαι, *ratum fieri*, to be carried out, Luke iv. 21; LXX. 1 Kings ii. 27; 2 Chron. xxxvi. 21. ἐν ἡμῖν, *on us*, 1 Cor. iv. 6, so that the δικαίωμα νόμου is carried out, and becomes visible on us, *i.e.* by means of our spiritual walk. ἐν ἡμῖν here, then, is not: *in us*, nor yet: *by us*, which would be ἐφ' ἡμῶν.

—τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα] describes the character of those on whom the justifying sentence of the law is carried out. But this character at the same time is the ground of the act. Primarily τὸ πνεῦμα is the objectively real Holy Spirit, the self-subsistent divine Spirit. On the other hand, πνεῦμα without the article is the Spirit as a principle dwelling and active within man, a subjective possession. Comp. Harless on Eph. ii. 22. As, however, πνεῦμα ἅγιον is already to be regarded almost as *nomen proprium*, even where the objectively self-subsistent divine Spirit is meant the article may be left out. Comp. Fritzsche here, and Winer, p. 151. On the other hand, one can see no reason why, in certain connections, even to πνεῦμα in the subjective sense the definite article should not be added. Thus whether, in particular cases, the objective or subjective meaning obtains, cannot be decided with certainty by the insertion or omission of the article. As to the present passage, Bengel's

remark is worthy of note: "Spiritus denotat vel Spiritum Dei, vel spiritum fidelium, ver. 16. Hic est vis nova ab Illo producta in nobis et sustentata: et de hoc sermo est, ubicunque caro stat in opposito." Here, then, without doubt the subjective meaning is to be preferred; and πνεῦμα, in opposition to the σάρξ, is the pneumatic essence of man as the product of the ἅγιον πνεῦμα, the self-subsistent Spirit who is active in man. Comp. John iii. 6: τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος, πνεῦμά ἐστιν, i.e. the spiritual nature and essence, in opposition to the σάρξ, the corrupt, carnal human nature, is the product of the self-subsistent, personal Spirit of God. In this passage, then, we must interpret: "To walk by the rule of corrupt, carnal human nature," and "by the rule of renewed, spiritual human nature." But Theophyl. rightly observes: κατὰ σάρκα ζῇ ὁ ποιῶν σάρκα κυρίαν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ δέσποιναν τῆς ψυχῆς. The substance of vv. 1-4, Luther indicates rightly in the marginal note: "Although sin still rages in the flesh, it condemns not, because the Spirit is righteous, and strives against it. Where He is not, the law is so weakened and overpowered by the flesh that it is impossible for the law to help man, save to sin and death. Wherefore God sent His Son, and laid on Him our sin, and thus helped us by His Spirit to fulfil the law." "Caeterum aliud est servire carne legi peccati, cum legi Dei mente servitur, quod de renatis, quia non prorsus spirituales sunt, affirmatur cap. vii. v. ult. aliud ambulare non secundum spiritum, sed secundum carnem, quod in renatis locum non habet, nec cum gratia Dei aut fide justificante consistere potest. Quia ibi invita servitus est, hic voluntaria in iis, quae caro dictitat, exequendis occupatio: nam τὸ ambulare studium et frequentationem peccati voluntariam et malitiosam infert, Ps. i. 1. Ibi caro luctatur quidem adversus spiritum, non autem ei praedominatur, hic vero praedominatur caro. Renati ergo etsi imbecillitates carnis adhuc sentiant, non tamen secundum carnem ambulant, aut carnalibus desideriis iudulgent," Calov.

Ver. 5 confirms (γάρ) ἡμῖν, τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα. For those who are in Christ Jesus there is no κατάκριμα, but δικαίωμα νόμου, because they are no longer, as once, κατὰ σάρκα, but κατὰ πνεῦμα. But instead of εἶναι Paul had just written: περιπατεῖν κατὰ σάρκα, κατὰ πνεῦμα. He therefore explains in this verse how the latter results necessarily from the former. From κατὰ σάρκα εἶναι follows τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς

φρονεῖν; on the other hand, from κατὰ πνεῦμα εἶναι follows τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος φρονεῖν. But from τὰ τῆς σαρκός, τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος φρονεῖν, results again, of necessity, κατὰ σάρκα, κατὰ πνεῦμα περιπατεῖν. Thus τὰ τῆς σαρκός, τοῦ πνεύματος φρονεῖν, forms the intermediate notion between κατὰ σάρκα, κατὰ πνεῦμα εἶναι, and κατὰ σάρκα, κατὰ πνεῦμα περιπατεῖν. We walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. For only they who are after the flesh are fleshly-minded, and therefore walk after the flesh; but they who are after the Spirit are spiritually-minded, and therefore walk after the Spirit. But we are not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. (Comp. ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σαρκί, ἀλλ' ἐν πνεύματι, ver. 9.) Therefore we walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. οἱ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ὄντες] *qui carnis indolem referunt*, synonymous with ἐν σαρκί, σαρκικὸν εἶναι. "They who are after the flesh, *i.e.* they who carry in them the nature of the flesh, are fleshly." To this corresponds the opposed οἱ δὲ κατὰ πνεῦμα, *sc.* ὄντες.

—τὰ τῆς σαρκός φρονοῦσιν] Comp. Matt. xvi. 23 : οὐ φρονεῖς τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων; Phil. iii. 19 : οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονοῦντες; Col. iii. 2 : τὰ ἄνω φρονεῖν. φρονεῖν τι signifies to direct thought and endeavour to something, to brood upon, strive after something. τὰ τῆς σαρκός = what is of the flesh, what belongs to the flesh, the interests, aims, and possessions of the σάρξ. The antithesis of this is τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, *sc.* φρονοῦσιν. From this φρονεῖν τὰ τῆς σαρκός, τοῦ πνεύματος, follows next of necessity and naturally περιπατεῖν κατὰ σάρκα, κατὰ πνεῦμα. Endeavour corresponds to being; action, to endeavour.

Ver. 6 states the reason why they who are κατὰ πνεῦμα, τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος φρονοῦσιν. They do it because the φρόνημα of the σάρξ is θάνατος, but the φρόνημα of the πνεῦμα, ζωή. — τὸ γὰρ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός θάνατος] *for the striving of the flesh is death*. This is not to be resolved and paraphrased directly by the proposition : "for the striving of the flesh has death for its result." Rather is θάνατος (in which notion here again the element of spiritual misery especially predominates, as the contrasted εἰρήνη shows) conceived as already realized (comp. ζῶσα τέθηκε, 1 Tim. v. 6, and Eph. ii. 1, 5), as not merely a result, but characteristic note, immanent property of a carnal disposition. In favour of this tells not merely the expression itself taken in its simplest sense, but also the comparison of τὸ πνεῦμα ζωή in

contrast with τὸ σῶμα νεκρὸν, ver. 10. Further, we must not interpret: "for the striving of the flesh is directed to death," i.e. the object of carnal effort is death, for the simple reason that every one, even the carnally-minded, seeks after life, not death.

—τὸ δὲ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος, ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη] *but the striving of the Spirit is life and peace.* ζωὴ is put first as the direct antithesis of θάνατος. εἰρήνη, peace, as a subjective spiritual quality, comp. ii. 10, sets in relief that element in the more comprehensive notion of ζωὴ which here comes chiefly under consideration. "Addito verbo, *pacis*," says Bengel, "præparat sibi transitionem ad v. sq., ubi describitur *inimicitia*." But this ζωὴ and εἰρήνη, in which the φρόνημα of the πνεῦμα consists, is nothing else than that which is already directly associated with δικαίωσις. δικαίωσις ἐκ πίστεως is ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη, i. 17, v. 1; but justification being naturally and inseparably bound up with man's renewal to a pneumatic essence, κατὰ πνεῦμα or ἐν πνεύματι εἶναι likewise is ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη. The same is true also of the φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος, the immediate and necessary consequence of εἶναι ἐν πνεύματι. Just as the πνεῦμα itself, ver. 2, is ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη, so also is the φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος. Rightly remarks Bengel: "θάνατος . . . ζωὴ, in hac jam vita cum continuatione in altera."

Ver. 7 states the reason (διότι, *propterea quod, because, for*, see on i. 19) why the striving of the flesh is death, for it is ἔχθρα εἰς θεόν] *enmity against God*, the sole source of life. As here the carnal disposition, so in Jas. iv. 4 the love of the world is called ἔχθρα τοῦ θεοῦ. But the φρόνημα of the flesh is enmity against God—

—τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται] *for it is not subject to the law of God.* The rebel against the law of a ruler is an adversary (ἔχθρὸς) to the sovereign who gives the law. But it is not subject to the law of God—

—οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται] *for neither can it be.* It cannot be, because it is against its nature, the nature of the carnal disposition being simply rebellion against God and His law. Just as in presence of the σάρξ an ἀδυναμία of the νόμος holds good, ver. 3, so, on the other hand, in presence of the νόμος an ἀδυναμία of the σάρξ holds good. The νόμος is unable to master the σάρξ, because by it the latter is only the more provoked and inflamed, and the σάρξ is unable to submit to

the νόμος, nay, necessarily revolts against it, just because the νόμος is pneumatic in essence, the opposite of the carnal nature, vii. 14. The present verse contains a strong argument against the doctrine of the so-called *liberum arbitrium* of the natural man. This carnal disposition, which cannot submit to God's law, is neither the product of man's spontaneous determination, nor can it be got rid of by spontaneous determination. On the contrary, according to the apostle's teaching, it constitutes his actual original nature. How far this is the case vii. 14-25 shows, where it has been described to us how this σάρξ, still remaining even in the regenerate man, despite the fact that his ἐγώ, his νοῦς, has become pneumatic, is by an inner necessity dominated by the principle of rebellion against God's law. Notwithstanding, the regenerate man is no longer κατὰ σάρκα, and has no φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός, because the σάρξ has been reduced to the position of a subordinate element in his nature, always deplored and always resisted, his real ego, the ruling principle of his personality, being the pneuma.

Ver. 8. οἱ δὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες, θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται] *but they that are in the flesh cannot please God.* This proposition, introduced by the metabatic δέ, couples on directly to the first proposition in ver. 7, διότι . . . εἰς θεόν, τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ . . . δύναται being simply interpolated to confirm the latter proposition. "The striving of the flesh is enmity against God; but they that are in the flesh cannot please God." Thus is made good the proposition of ver. 6: "the striving of the flesh is death." For enmity against God that has God's displeasure as its result, cannot be conceived without death as its result, nay, is itself death simply and absolutely. Upon ἔχθρα εἰς θεόν follows invariably the ὁργὴ θεοῦ, which is here expressed by θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται. ἐν σαρκὶ εἶναι (comp. vii. 5), to be in the flesh, to live and move in it, differs from κατὰ σάρκα, viii. 5, σαρκικὸν εἶναι, vii. 14, merely as to the form, not as to the substance of the conception. ἐν indicates the element or sphere, κατὰ the rule or course. The distinction made (2 Cor. x. 3) between ἐν σαρκὶ περιπατεῖν and κατὰ σάρκα στρατεύεσθαι lies not in the formula in itself, but in the fact that there σάρξ is used the first time in a physical, the second time in an ethical sense. Just as the phrase ἔχθρα εἰς θεόν, ver. 7, forbids our taking φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός as mere sensuous feebleness instead of malignant opposition of

the will to God, so *θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται* in this verse forbids our thinking of the *ἀδυναμία* of the *σάρξ*, ver. 7, as a merely innocent instead of a guilty incapacity. "To be carnally-minded," says Luther in the marginal gloss, "is when one seeks not after God, or cares not for Him, and knows nothing of Him."

Ver. 9. The apostle here omits the proof of the second half of ver. 6, namely, that the *φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος* is *ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη*, because it is *φιλία θεοῦ* and is in the possession of strength for the *πλήρωσις νόμου*, and therefore has the *εὐδοκία θεοῦ* as its result,—a proof that is in fact implied as an antithesis in vv. 7, 8, and formally drawn out would have rendered the exposition flat and prolix,—and instead of this proceeds at once to apply ver. 8 antithetically to the Roman church. The truth expounded vv. 1–8, in general terms, that they who are in Christ Jesus are no longer in the flesh and death, but in the spirit and life, is here expressly and specially applied to the readers, and this in such a form as at the same time to challenge them to prove whether or not this glorious assumption is founded in fact. *ἐν πνεύματι*] Opposite of *ἐν σαρκί*, in the element of the spiritual nature, synonymous with *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, ver. 5, = *πνευματικοί*.

—*εἴπερ πνεῦμα θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν*] *εἴπερ* Chrysostom was the first to interpret by *ἐπείπερ*, *quandoquidem*, appealing to 2 Thess. i. 6. This may be the meaning of *εἴγε* indeed, but not of *εἴπερ*. Comp. Hermann, *ad Viger*. § 310, p. 834: "*εἴπερ*, quod nos *wenn anders* (if at all events) dicimus, ita ab *εἴγε*, quod nos dicimus *wenn denn* (if then) differt, quod *εἴπερ* usurpatur de re, quae esse sumitur, sed in incerto relinquitur, utrum jure an injuria sumatur (see confirmatory instances in Hartung, *Lehre von den Partikeln der gr. Spr.* Th. I. p. 343); *εἴγε* autem de re, quae jure sumta creditur. *Εἴπερ δοκεῖ σοι*, *wenn es anders dir so gefällt* (if at all events it seem good to thee) dicimus ei, de quo non certo scimus, quid ei placeat, aut de quo id nescire simulamus. *Εἴγε δοκεῖ σοι*, *wenn es denn dir so gefällt* (if, indeed, it seem good to thee), dicimus ei, de quo scimus, quid ei placeat." This meaning *εἴπερ* has also in all other passages of the N. T., ver. 17, 1 Cor. viii. 5, xv. 15, 2 Cor. v. 3, where likewise *εἴπερ*, not *εἴγε*, should be read, 2 Thess. i. 6; see on Rom. iii. 30; 1 Pet. ii. 30.<sup>1</sup> Here

<sup>1</sup> According to Tholuck also, *Beiträge zur neuest. Sprachcharacteristik*, p. 146; and on this passage the distinction can be verified universally both in classical and

this meaning must be the more firmly held (*ἀμφιβολίας ἐστίν*, remarks Theodoret on *εἴπερ*), as the subjoined *εἰ δέ τις πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ οὐκ ἔχει* shows that the apostle would here urge the church to examine whether their Christian profession were not a mere show without their really possessing the Spirit of Christ. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the glorious testimony that he bore to their faith, i. 8, *εἴπερ*, "if at all events, if as I may presume," involving no *positive* doubt. With *οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν*, comp. 1 Cor. iii. 16, also vi. 19; 2 Tim. i. 14. *οἰκεῖν* doubtless implies the notion of a permanent abiding, without the element of permanence being meant to be specially emphasized in *distinction* from a mere momentary, fleeting phenomenon. But *εἶναι ἐν πνεύματι*, being in a spiritual nature, is the consequence of the *ἐνοίκησις τοῦ πνεύματος*, of the indwelling of the Spirit of God.

—*εἰ δέ τις πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ οὐκ ἔχει*] The *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* (Phil. i. 19; 1 Pet. i. 11), as the interchange of *πνεῦμα θεοῦ* and *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* shows, is not different from the former. This identity follows also from viii. 14 f., comp. with Gal. iv. 6. Both denote here the self-subsistent divine Spirit, which *πνεῦμα* with the addition *ἅγιον, θεοῦ, Χριστοῦ*, invariably signifies. Therefore *πνεῦμα θεοῦ, πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, is the Spirit that is the common possession of God and Christ, not the Spirit sent by God and Christ to men, proceeding from both in time. This is proved by Gal. iv. 6: *ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν*. If God sends the Spirit of His Son, He cannot be called the Spirit of the Son because the Son sends Him into the heart. But if He is called the Spirit of the Son because He is the possession of the Son, so much the more must He be called the Spirit of God because He is God's possession, for this reason, that the Son possesses only what the Father does. Were He merely called God's Spirit because God sends Him, it would be said indeed *ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ*, but not *τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*. There is no inconsistency here with 1 Cor. ii. 12, vi. 19, for it is self-evident that the Spirit who is God's proceeds also *ἐκ θεοῦ* or *ἀπὸ θεοῦ*. Only because God and Christ possess Him can they impart Him to men, or, in dogmatic

N. T. usage, and only disappears in degenerate Greek, that *εἴπερ* = "if at all events," expresses slight doubt, *εἴγε* = "if then," an admitted assumption. Meyer, indeed, now disputes Hermann's canon, but allows that the meaning assigned by the latter exclusively to *εἴπερ* suits the connection in the present passage admirably.



terminology, the temporal sending of the Spirit into believers' hearts by the Father and the Son is based upon His eternal procession from both. Thus the present passage contains, without doubt, a *dictum probans* for the occidental doctrine of the *processio Spiritus S. a patre filioque*. Certainly that the *πνεῦμα θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ* is to be conceived as a self-subsistent, personal principle, not as a mere impersonal divine power, both *immanente* and *transcunte*, does not follow directly from the present passage alone, but is made good in other ways from N. T. teaching. Further, if the Pneuma is equally the eternal possession of God and Christ, if *πνεῦμα θεοῦ* = *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, then is *Χριστός* also Himself = *θεός*. "*Spiritus Dei, spiritum Christi. Testimonium illustre de S. Trinitate*," remarks Bengel. But Paul in this passage uses the expression *πνεῦμα θεοῦ* interchangeably with *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, just because the truth of *οὐκ εἶναι Χριστοῦ*, where God's Spirit is wanting, is thus the more clearly apparent.

—*οὗτος οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ*] With *εἶναι τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, comp. 1 Cor. iii. 23, 2 Cor. x. 7, and *οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, 1 Cor. xv. 23, Gal. v. 24. "To be Christ's" = to be Christ's property, to belong to Him. This denotes a relation of possession by another not of a mere outward, but of an inner nature, so that in substance it really coincides with *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ εἶναι*, comp. Gal. iii. 28, 29: *πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἰς ἓστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ*. But whoever has not the Spirit of Christ belongs not to Christ, because Christ imparts His Spirit to all that belong to Him. Thus the possession of the Spirit of Christ is the characteristic note of those belonging to Him. Comp. 1 John iv. 13: *Ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ μένομεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος αὐτοῦ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν*. As to *εἰ οὐ* instead of *εἰ μή*, comp. Winer, p. 599. The *οὐ* here belongs to the verb, not to the conditional particle. *οὐκ ἔχειν* = to be without, destitute of.

Ver. 10. Result of belonging to Christ. *εἰ δὲ Χριστός ἐν ὑμῖν*] After ver. 9 we should have expected *εἰ δὲ πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἔχετε*, or *εἰ δὲ πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν*. But here, as in *αὐτοῦ εἶναι*, ver. 9, the necessary consequence is at once stated, for in His Spirit Christ Himself dwells in us. By faith we are *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, ver. 1, comp. 1 Cor. i. 30; 2 Cor. v. 17, xiii. 4; John vi. 56. From this it follows that we are partakers of the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, vv. 2, 9. But, in His *πνεῦμα*, *Χριστός* Himself

is ἐν ἡμῖν, ver. 10, 2 Cor. xiii. 5, Gal. ii. 20, iv. 19, Eph. iii. 17, Col. i. 27, John vi. 56, xv. 4, and with Christ the Father also comes to make His abode with us, John xiv. 23. Thus the *unio mystica* is carried into effect under its objective aspect in the real indwelling in believers of the triune God, the Father and the Son making their abode in believers' hearts in the Spirit. "Qui Spiritum habet, Christum habet: qui Christum habet, Deum habet," Bengel.

—τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν δι' ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην] The principal element, the result of Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, lies in the second proposition, τὸ πνεῦμα . . . δικαιοσύνην. The preceding qualification, τὸ σῶμα . . . ἁμαρτίαν, ratifies our view of vii. 14–25, showing that even in the regenerate the σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου, vii. 24, is present. What the apostle has said of the regenerate man so far in ch. viii. might make it seem as if he were all πνεῦμα and ζωή, which would be inconsistent with the exposition found in vii. 14–25. He therefore takes the description, hitherto treated ideally, and reduces it to its real dimensions. Thus what is said in vv. 7, 8 takes place partially even in believers, whilst no doubt the opposite, to be taken from those verses (τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος ζωὴ φιλία γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑποτάσσεται = τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην), is the ruling principle in their nature. Thus, while the second half of ver. 6 (τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη) is not, indeed, supplementarily demonstrated in the present verse, in conjunction with its demonstration implied as a *tacit* contrast in vv. 7, 8, it is applied directly to the readers of the epistle. The interpretation of the separate expressions in this verse differs very widely, according to the different views taken of this and the preceding chapters (comp. the account of the divergent explanations in Meyer, Fritzsche, and de Wette). In the first place, as concerns the expression τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωή, it clearly points back to τὸ δὲ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος ζωή, ver. 6. The πνεῦμα here, then, is not the divine Spirit simply, for He would least of all by the apostle be called ζωή. Rather is πνεῦμα the human spirit penetrated and sanctified by the divine Spirit, the pneumatic essence of the regenerate, itself, like the φρόνημα issuing from it, peaceful, blessed life (ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη, ver. 6). Πνεῦμα δὲ ἐνταῦθα τὴν ψυχὴν προσηγόρευσεν (ὁ Παῦλος), ὡς πνευματικὴν ἤδη γεγενημένην, observes Theodoret.

The *ζωή*, then, is to be viewed not merely as future, but as actually present. On this view, it seems most obvious to refer the *δικαιοσύνη* to inherent righteousness of life, vi. 18. But against this tells *διὰ* with the accusative = "on account of," for righteousness of life is not the ground of life. Moreover, taking into account the reference to the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* in the present context, *ἀγιοσύνη* would have been spoken of rather than *δικαιοσύνη*. The *δικαιοσύνη*, then, is the righteousness imputed to faith. With *τὸ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην*, comp. *ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*, i. 17. Thus the majority of the older, and several modern expositors. In exact analogy with the contrast contained in the present verse, in vi. 23 *θάνατος* as the *ὀψώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας* was opposed to *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* as the *χάρισμα ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. Indeed, in ver. 6 the *φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος* was itself called *ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη*. But it was not said that the spiritual disposition is the *ground* of life. On the contrary, the *ground* of life is, and remains alone, the righteousness imputed to faith, from which issues the righteousness of life, or spiritual disposition by which faith is attested and maintained. Thus even this righteousness of life is partaker in the life that is the fruit of the righteousness of faith, and in so far also *τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος* is *ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη*. Comp. Jas. i. 25: *ὁ παρακύψας εἰς τὸν νόμον τέλειον τῆς ἐλευθερίας, καὶ παραμείνας, . . . οὗτος μακάριος ἐν τῇ ποιήσει* (not *διὰ τὴν ποίησιν*) *αὐτοῦ ἔσται*. Further, to refer *δικαιοσύνη* in this verse to the righteousness of faith, is not inconsistent with referring *πνεῦμα* to the human spirit become *pneumatic*. For the first thing the human spirit does when renewed by the Spirit of God is by faith to lay hold on the righteousness of Jesus Christ, and the eternal life which that righteousness secures. In this sense the older Lutheran dogmatics placed *regeneratio* as the *collatio virium spiritualium ad credendum* before *justificatio*. On this interpretation the meaning of the first clause now explains itself. To *πνεῦμα* is opposed *σῶμα*; to *ζωή*, *νεκρόν*; to *διὰ δικαιοσύνην*, *δι' ἁμαρτίαν*. The *σῶμα*, then (comp. on vi. 12, vii. 23), opposed to *πνεῦμα*, is all that remains of the believer's individuality after the *πνεῦμα* is abstracted. It is soul and body, in so far as these are not permeated by the *πνεῦμα*, and are therefore the seat of sin still remaining. This *σῶμα*, on the very ground of sin still present, is a *σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου*, vii. 24; *i.e.*

it is just as much *θυητόν*, vi. 12, viii. 11, as *νεκρόν*. It is *θυητόν*, in so far as death, which like the *σῶμα* itself is to be conceived as both spiritual and corporeal, is only completed hereafter. It is *νεκρόν*, in so far as this death even at present dwells in body and soul as the dominating principle. Comp. 2 Cor. i. 10, iv. 11 ff.; Eph. ii. 1, 5; Rev. iii. 1.

Ver. 11. According to ver. 10, *θάνατος* is still found in the Christian by the side of *ζωή*, because *ἀμαρτία* is still present by the side of *πνεῦμα*. According to the present verse, *θάνατος* is to be vanquished by a gradual process, and finally to be entirely swallowed up in *ζωή*. — *εἰ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγείραντος Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν*] The *πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, ver. 9, in whom Christ Himself dwells in us, ver. 10 (so that, inversely, this *πνεῦμα* also dwells in those in whom Christ is, ver. 11), is here called the Spirit of Him that raised Jesus from the dead, our *ζωή* being included in Christ's resurrection, vi. 4, 5; Eph. ii. 5; Col. ii. 13; 2 Tim. i. 10. Therefore, if the Spirit of Him that raised up Christ dwell in us, in this Spirit is given to us the pledge (2 Cor. v. 5) that we are partakers in Christ's resurrection and its blessed fruits. If, then, God that raised Christ from the dead, and thus brought life and immortality to light, has given us His Spirit, in whom is involved the pledge of our fellowship with the Risen One and of our participation in the power of His resurrection, it follows, of course, that He who raised Christ from the dead will complete His work in us, and swallow up the death present in us in life, or that He will quicken the *νεκρὸν σῶμα*, ver. 10.

— *ὁ ἐγείρας τὸν Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν*] On the preceding *Ἰησοῦν* Bengel remarks: "Mox, in apodosi, *Christum*. Appellatio *Jesu* spectat ad ipsum; *Christi*, refertur ad nos. Illa appellatio, tanquam nominis proprii, pertinet ad personam; haec, tanquam appellativi, ad officium."

— *ζωοποιήσει καὶ τὰ θυητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν*] "*Mortalia corpora vocat quicquid adhuc restat in nobis morti obnoxium: ut mos illi usitatus est, crassiorem nostri partem hoc nomine appellare. Unde colligimus, non de ultima resurrectione, quae momento fiat, haberi sermonem, sed de continua Spiritus operatione, quae reliquias carnis paulatim mortificans, coelestem vitam in nobis instaurat,*" Calvin. Still the bodily resurrection, as the final goal of this life-giving process, is not excluded, but included with

the other, for the very reason that the *σῶμα* on which the *ζωοποιήσις* is carried out is to be considered as partaking of the nature of both soul and *body*; in Tholuck's phrase, "the process of the body's glorification as the outcome of the process of redemption." Respecting this twofold aspect of the *ζωοποιήσις*, comp. John v. 21 ff., also iv. 14, vi. 58. But, on the other hand, were *σῶμα* merely the material body, and therefore *only* the bodily resurrection here meant, one would have expected, in the inverse order to the present, *θνητόν*, ver. 10, and *νεκρά*, ver. 11. But, of course, the gradual absorption of *θάνατος* into *ζωή* can only take place through the gradual absorption of *ἀμαρτία* into *δικαιοσύνη*, conceived as righteousness of life, or of the *σῶμα* into the *πνεῦμα*, by which soul and body are hallowed and glorified.

—*διὰ τὸ ἐνοικούν αὐτοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν*] This reading is received by Erasmus, Stephanus, Mill, Bengel, Matthäi, Griesbach, Knapp, Scholz, Hahn, and approved by nearly all modern expositors. The Elzevir edition, on the contrary, read: *διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικούντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ὑμῖν*; and Lachmann and Tischendorf have restored the *recepta*, which de Wette also thinks the original reading. The critical authorities are pretty evenly balanced. Comp. Reiche, *Com. crit.* I. p. 54 ff. The codices A B C, Cod. Sinait., indeed expressly have the genitive; on the contrary, D E F G J; and from *Maximi monachi Dial. iii. de s. Trinit. in Athanas. Opp.* ii. pp. 228, 234, it appears that the orthodox defended this reading in their dispute with the Macedonians, in order to prove by it: *ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ φύσεως τὸ πνεῦμα πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ*, because it follows from this reading: *ὅτι ὥσπερ ὁ πατὴρ ἐγείρει τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ ζωοποιεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ υἱός, οὕτως καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ*. They also asserted that the genitive is found *ἐν ὅλοις τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ἀντιγράφοις*, and that the Pneumatomachoi had falsified the text in the interest of dogma. But, on the other hand, the accusative is found in the most ancient Fathers and translations, Iren., Orig., Tert., Peshito, Ital., therefore before the outbreak of the controversies referred to; and on this account the Macedonians, not unjustly, question the assertion of the orthodox in *Maximus*, that the genitive is found in all ancient manuscripts. But, inversely, it is just as little to be supposed that the orthodox on their part had falsified the reading, since, apart from the fact that this cannot be shown to have been the practice of the church, they were able to deduce the deity of the Spirit from so

many other passages in the N. T., and even for the *ζωοποιεῖν* proceeding from Him could appeal to John vi. 63; 2 Cor. iii. 6. Furthermore, before the outbreak of the controversies mentioned, the genitive occurs once in Clemens Alex. and in Methodius, although the latter, another time, has the accusative. Even in still later Fathers—Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine—sometimes the genitive is found, sometimes the accusative. Thus a decision can only be arrived at upon internal grounds. These certainly seem to us to favour the accusative, *διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα ἐν ὑμῖν*, on account of His Spirit dwelling in you, i.e. because His Spirit dwells in you (Luther: on this account, that His Spirit dwells in you); for if we suppose this supplement absent altogether, we shall still be compelled to supply it in thought. "But if the Spirit of Him that raised Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised Christ from the dead will also quicken your mortal bodies (just because His Spirit, the pledge of your fellowship with the Risen One, dwells in you, and God who gave you this pledge will not deceive you, cannot deny Himself)." It cannot be said that this supplement is useless, merely repeating what is contained already in the protasis. For, first of all, such a repetition would have special emphasis; and, again, the idea contained in the protasis is not so much repeated as simply expressly drawn out, since in the protasis it was not directly expressed, but only capable of being educed from it by inference. But the genitive, *διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ὑμῖν*, would add a new idea, and would therefore be linked on by a *καὶ τοῦτο*, and this, xiii. 11; 1 Cor. vi. 6; Eph. ii. 8; Phil. i. 28; 3 John 5, Lachmann. Further, the transition of the accusative into the genitive seems more easily explicable than the converse change. In order to substitute the accusative for the genitive, there must have been a more exact analysis of the connection of thought, whereas the genitive suggested itself naturally, since it was customary to think of the Spirit as the *mediator* of the divine acts of creation and redemption; and in this very place, without doubt, He is the principle effecting the *ζωοποίησις* of the *θνητὸν σῶμα* (ver. 2).

The apostle has now delineated the spiritual state of the regenerate in all its features; the power of the still remaining *σάρξ*, which brings forth *θάνατος*, vii. 14–25; the glory of the *πνεῦμα*, which is *ζωή*, viii. 1–9; and the operation, ever pro-

gressing and advancing to its final goal, of this latter principle in those who are not yet entirely *πνεῦμα*, but still at the same time *σῶμα*, vv. 10, 11. Now follows the admonition to walk also after the Spirit, so as from the Spirit to reap life; and not after the flesh, so as not to fall a prey to death, vv. 12–17. If the analogous admonition, vi. 12 ff., has as its postulate the description of the spiritual state of the regenerate man in its idea and completeness, the paraenesis now following relates to his state in its concrete reality, in which it is seen to be a state of progress, in the form of a contrast of mutually hostile powers. And thus, from the consideration of this state results the summons to subjugate the evil principle still existing, and energetically maintain and prosecute the good.

Ver. 12. "*Αρα οὖν*]" draws an inference from vv. 1–11. Because, then, *πνεῦμα* brings us *ζωή*, we are bound to live not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. "Habet autem haec conclusio vim exhortationis: quemadmodum semper a doctrina exhortationeum solet deducere: sic alibi, Eph. iv. 30, monet, ne contristemus Spiritum Dei, quo obsignati sumus in diem resurrectionis. Item Gal. v. 25: Si Spiritu vivimus, et Spiritu ambulemus," Calvin. The loving address—

—*ἀδελφοί*]" is meant to open and win the readers' hearts to the admonition. It answers to *ἀδελφοί μου*, which we last read vii. 4. What they became by divine act (*θανατωθέντες*), vii. 4, this they are now to become by their own act (comp. *θανατοῦτε*, viii. 13), to affirm spontaneously the purpose (*εἰς τὸ . . . ἵνα*, vii. 4) of the divine act upon them.

—*ὀφείλεται ἐσμέν οὐ τῇ σαρκὶ τοῦ κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν*]" The antithesis *ἀλλὰ τῷ πνεύματι, τοῦ κατὰ πνεῦμα ζῆν*, which is indicated by the position of *οὐ* (not: *οὐκ ὀφείλεται ἐσμέν τῇ σαρκί*, but: *ὀφείλεται ἐσμέν . . . οὐ τῇ σαρκί*), is readily understood of itself. According to Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 844, in *cp. ad Rom.* II. p. 131, and Winer, p. 410, the infinitive *τοῦ κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν* is to be considered as dependent on *ὀφείλεται*, after the model of the formula, *ὀφειλέτης εἰμι τινί τινας*. But the expression: "We owe to the flesh the living after the flesh," appears to us harsh and strained; and we think it in any case more natural here to take the genitive of the infinitive, substantivised by the article, as is done so frequently, especially in Paul and Luke (Winer, p. 408), as the genitive of design or result,

comp. on i. 24. "We are are debtors, not to the flesh, in order that we may live after the flesh;" *i.e.*, if we stood in a debtor's relation to the flesh, the design of this relation would be to incite us to live after the flesh. Or: "We are debtors, not to the flesh, so that we live after the flesh;" *i.e.*, if we stood in a debtor's relation to the flesh, the effect of this would be that we should live after the flesh. For that this genitive may also be a genitive of *effect* (Winer, p. 410), may be inferred, among others, from the formula previously cited: *ὀφειλέτης εἰμὶ τινί τινος*. So: "I am thy debtor in a great sum" = "I am thy debtor, so that I have to pay thee a great sum."

Ver. 13. There is no motive for living a life after the flesh, for (γάρ) to live after the flesh brings death. *εἰ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ζήτε, μέλλετε ἀποθνήσκειν*] We live after the flesh, when we give way to the inclination of the old man without restraint. *μέλλετε ἀποθνήσκειν*, *mors vobis proposita est*, *death is appointed you*, *lies before you*, *you must die*, comp. iv. 24; 1 Thess. iii. 4; Jas. ii. 12. That *ἀποθνήσκειν* here cannot be understood exclusively of bodily death, one might suppose, would be self-evident, for this comes even to the regenerate man who lives after the will of the Spirit. Nevertheless, some modern expositors, prejudiced by a real idiosyncrasy against the spiritual, or combined spiritual and physical conception of the notions *θάνατος*, *νεκρός*, *θνητός*, *θνησκεῖν*, *ἀποθνησκεῖν*, would even here hold to the purely physical meaning. They have therefore been compelled to resort to more or less arbitrary or artificial supplements of thought, either: "you shall so die, that for you there is no *ἀνάστασις*," contrary to express Scripture teaching, John v. 28, 29; Acts xxiv. 15; or: "you shall so die, that for you *ζωή* no longer remains, that you shall live a *vita non vitalis* in Hades." But what, then, can we make of such passages as John vi. 49, 50, xi. 25, 26; 1 Tim. v. 6; Rev. iii. 2? How the above-mentioned explanation always has some expedient ready in such and many like cases, one may see among others from Käuffer, *de Biblica ζωῆς αἰωνίου Notione*, Dresden 1838, pp. 100, 114. We are further told here, p. 96, that even in Eph. ii. 1, 5, Col. ii. 13, *νεκρός* is used *sensu proprio* and *per πρόληψιν* for *obnoxius vel adjudicatus morti*. The unprejudiced expositor has no choice but to confess that in the present passage *ἀποθνήσκειν*, in contrast with *ζῆν*, embraces as wide a sphere as the latter, and that both terms, in manifest allusion to



vv. 2, 6, 10, 11, denote the broadest conception of death and life. Here, above all, is meant spiritual and present, yet withal bodily and spiritual death. Just as Christianity acknowledges a transcendent and at the same time immanent God, so, too, it acknowledges a present and at the same time future ζωή. The same holds good of θάνατος. The oft-repeated objection, that the same word cannot at the same time have a natural and tropical meaning, has the less foundation, as θάνατος, wherever it appears as the consequence of ἁμαρτία, denotes the *undivided* idea of divine penal judgment, consisting in every kind of physical and spiritual misery. For those, therefore, who are ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ even *bodily death* remains no longer as a penal judgment, which alone makes it really θάνατος, but merely as the completion of ἀπολύτρωσις, as a transition to ζωὴ αἰώνιος. Besides, whatever we are wont and able to include in thought under the word "death," this certainly the Apostle Paul was able to include under it. Comp. our exposition of the notion θάνατος on v. 12. The declaration before us supplies a *dictum probans* for the possibility of apostasy, the so-called *amissibilitas gratiae*.

—εἰ δὲ πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦτε, ζήσεσθε] ζῆν after the σάρξ has θάνατος as its result, θανατοῦν of the σάρξ, ζωή. We may here refer πνεύματι to the objective Spirit of God, and take it instrumentally. *By means of* this Spirit of God dwelling in him, ver. 11, by whom he is led, ver. 11, the believer mortifies the flesh. Still the practice of Scripture is to make the Spirit use man as the instrument or organ of His activity, but not man the Spirit. We therefore think it best to refer πνεῦμα here, in harmony with the meaning settled by us in vv. 4, 5, 6, 10, to the subjective, pneumatic character of the regenerate spirit, and to interpret not so much "*by* the Spirit" as "*in* the Spirit," in analogy with πνεύματι περιπατεῖν, στοιχεῖν, Gal. v. 16, 25. The following πνεῦμα θεοῦ, ver. 14, referring to πνεῦμα in this verse, does not preclude this view, for even man himself is πνεῦμα or ἐν πνεύματι, in so far as he is the abode or under the influence of the πνεῦμα θεοῦ. Further, in ver. 13 πνεῦμα only is spoken of in contrast with σῶμα; on the other hand, in ver. 14 the πνεῦμα θεοῦ is expressly mentioned, vv. 9, 11. The πράξεις are not identical with ἔργα, acts, deeds, but πρᾶξις is either "behaviour, bearing," Matt. xvi. 27; or "business, occupation," Rom. xii. 4; or *sensu malo*, an *improbum facinus*, a *machinatio*,

Luke xxiii. 51. In the latter meaning, the plural is specially in use, Acts xix. 18. So here and in the parallel passage, Col. iii. 9 : ἀπεκδυσάμενοι τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτοῦ. They are the *prava facinora*, the *machinationes*, the *molimina*, the sinful tendencies of the σὰρξ, of the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος. Rightly, therefore, Theodoret: τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος, τουτέστι τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός, τὰ τῶν παθημάτων σκιρτήματα. Moreover, it is only these that can be mortified (*i.e.* the σὰρξ σὺν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, Gal. v. 24), not ἔργα, for *facta infecta fieri nequeunt*. This also confirms our view of the word σῶμα in the present passage (comp. on vi. 12, vii. 23, 24, viii. 10, 11); for to the material body as such no πράξεις can be ascribed, but to body and soul, in so far as these stand in opposition to πνεῦμα. Exclusively sensual tendencies cannot be meant here in consistency with the general κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν. If it is alleged that the σῶμα, in itself indifferent, only comes into account here as the executive organ of sin, still the *tendencies* of sin do not spring from the body. The reading τῆς σαρκός, not adequately attested, instead of τοῦ σώματος, is to be regarded either as a correct gloss or a correction, which arose from a wrong understanding of the word σῶμα in this passage, but from a right perception of the idea required here. θανατοῦν = καταργεῖν, comp. vii. 4. Melancthon's comment on this verse is noteworthy: "Si secundum carnem vixeritis, moriemini. Est autem secundum carnem vivere obsequi cupiditatibus carnalibus. Id vocant peccare mortaliter. Si spiritu actiones carnis mortificabitis, vivetis. Hic fatetur Paulus in sanctis esse actiones carnis et malos motus, sed tamen sanctos non obsequi illis motibus. Atqui hinc sumi potest quae peccata venialia, quae mortalia dicuntur."

Ver. 14 confirms the promise of ζωή, given in ζήσεσθε, ver. 13. Ver. 14 begins the confirmation, which is only concluded in ver. 17. Being under the influence of God's Spirit is an evidence of divine sonship, ver. 14; for when the Spirit is received, He makes Himself known as a Spirit, not of bondage, but of divine sonship, vv. 15, 16. But sonship is inseparably bound up with inheritance (namely, the inheritance of ζωή), ver. 17. ὅσοι γὰρ πνεύματι θεοῦ ἄγονται] *for as many as are moved by the Spirit of God*; but, according to ver. 9, these are all who really belong to Christ. ἄγεσθαι πνεύματι θεοῦ is the ground; πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦν, the result. Where the latter is

found, the former must be present. Hence one expression takes the place of the other without difficulty, because one is derived by necessity from the other. *πνεύματι ἄγεσθαι* is also found in Gal. v. 18. *ἄγεσθαι* is used of an abiding influence, in opposition to a transient impulse, to *φέρεισθαι*, 2 Pet. i. 21 ; comp. *οἰκεῖν*, ver. 9. Man's passive relation to the operation of the Holy Spirit is the primary and anterior ; man's active operation, the secondary and subsequent element. Without *ἄγεσθαι πνεύματι θεοῦ* there is no *πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦν*. "Ita a Spiritu sancto agimur, ut ipsi quoque agamus."

—*οὗτοι*] *these*, and no others. Comp. Gal. iii. 7 : *γινώσκετε ἄρα, ὅτι οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, οὗτοί εἰσιν υἱοὶ Ἀβραάμ*. Would you then really be and remain God's favoured children, and thus heirs of life, which without doubt is your wish, prove and attest your divine sonship by yielding to the influence of the Spirit prompting to mortification of the flesh.

—*υἱοὶ θεοῦ*] *υἱὸς θεοῦ* as a designation of the believer is used by Paul in opposition to *δούλος*, comp. in ver. 15 the antithesis of *πνεῦμα δουλείας* and *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας*, Gal. iii. 23–26, iv. 1–8. As long as man lives under the law he is *δούλος*, as such seeks by works to earn for himself reward, though reaping only wrath and curse, and stands before God his Lord and Judge with fear and trembling. As a slave he has no part in the inheritance. Not life, but death awaits him. But by justifying faith man passes from a state of slavery to a state of sonship. Instead of the Judge's wrath and curse, the Father's love now rests upon him. Instead of the fear of a slave, he has now the trust and confidence of a child, and free access to the Father's heart. But as a child he has a legal title to the inheritance. The *υἱός* is *κληρονόμος*. All this is secured for him by the Son of God, on whom the Father's love rests by nature, Eph. i. 6, who redeemed him from the curse of the law, being made a curse in his stead, Gal. iii. 13, and having now become His brother, John xx. 17 ; Rom. viii. 29. Thus by faith he is invested with the rights of Him who is the Son by nature, whereas he himself is a child, not by nature, but by adoption. He is not *φύσει*, but *θέσει υἱός*, he has obtained the *υἰοθεσία* ; for *φύσει* he is a *τέκνον ὀργῆς*, Eph. ii. 3, not a *τέκνον θεοῦ*. Comp. also Rom. ix. 26 ; 2 Cor. vi. 18 ; Eph. i. 5. Just, then, as in Paul, in harmony with the central thought of his teaching, the *υἰοθεσία* is viewed in opposition to *δουλεία*, and the

several elements of this idea coincide with the characteristic marks of this relation ; so, on the other hand, John on his part employs the phrase *τέκνον θεοῦ* in a meaning likewise in harmony with his mystical vein of contemplation. This mode of view occupies itself not with the contrast of law and gospel, justification by works and justification by faith, bondage under the curse of the law and freedom under grace. On the contrary, its central point of observation is the new spiritual birth from God, imparted to us through faith in Christ in contrast with natural, carnal generation. For it, the *τέκνον θεοῦ* is identical with *γεγεννημένος ἐκ θεοῦ*, John i. 12 ; 1 John iii. 9, 10, v. 1, 2. This divine generation obliterates sin, the product of Satanic generation. The *τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ* form for it the antithesis to the *τέκνοις τοῦ διαβόλου*. Finally, in the Synoptics, likewise in conformity with their line of conception and representation, which, falling before Pentecost, falls also before the period in which the Spirit was to keep before Him the wondrous facts of atonement, justification, and regeneration as the central object of His contemplation, around which all His thoughts revolve, the natural, purely human side in the notion of sonship is more the ruling element. It is the idea of the child's likeness in disposition to the father that is here specially brought forward, Matt. v. 9, 16, 45, 48 ; Luke vi. 35. Still there are not wanting points of accord with the Pauline idea of *υἰοθεσία* (especially in Luke, comp. xv. 18, 19, 21, xx. 36, but also in Matthew, comp. xvii. 25, 26), as conversely in Paul the element predominating in the Synoptics is found, Phil. ii. 15. *τέκνον, υἱὸς θεοῦ* denotes, then, in Paul the position and privilege, in John the origin and natural likeness, in the Synoptics the identity in disposition of the child with the father. Only by combining these elements is the N. T. notion of a child of God exhaustively presented. One element follows naturally from another ; from justification, the new birth, from this the child-like mind answering to the mind of the Father in heaven. But in John is found only the expression *τέκνον*, in the Synoptics only *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, in Paul both meanings. The former expression may have been selected by John in allusion to the etymology apparent on its very face (*τέκνον* from *τίκτω*, one begotten, born, a derivation more familiar to the popular consciousness than that of the word *υἱός* from *ὕω* with the digamma = *φύω*), to which, as we have seen, he holds fast in his idea of *τέκνον*. Moreover,

with him the word has a certain touch of tenderness, 1 John iii. 1, just as in the N. T. generally in affectionate addresses τέκνον or τεκνίον is very frequently used, υἱέ never. (Heb. xii. 5 forms merely an apparent exception, because there it is a quotation, and the child is viewed as under age. On the other hand, it is said, Acts xiii. 10 : υἱέ διαβόλου, not τέκνον διαβόλου.) In Paul, υἱός and τέκνον θεοῦ are interchanged in such a way that there seems to be no difference whatever in meaning, Rom. viii. 14, 16, 17, 19, 21; Gal. iv. 7. Still, although both words alike indicate an inner relation of love on the Father's part, a relation of confidence and right of heirship on the child's part, in υἱός withal the notion of maturity in distinction from immaturity under the law, which is not included in υἱός, may perhaps be specially emphasized, Gal. iii. 24-26, iv. 1-7. Hence, too, Christ as Son of God is ever called υἱός, never τέκνον θεοῦ. (The phrase παῖς θεοῦ, applied to Israel, David, Jesus, Matt. xii. 18, Luke i. 54, 69, Acts iii. 13, 26, iv. 25, 27, 30, corresponds with the O. T. הָיָה עֶבֶד.) Therefore the Synoptics use only υἱός θεοῦ, because only the full-grown child can be called upon to imitate the father's spirit. Finally, if the arrangement υἱοί εἰσιν θεοῦ, received by Lachmann and Tischendorf in this passage, which is countenanced by the uncials, Cod. Sinait., and several Fathers, is genuine, υἱοί, in contrast with δοῦλοι, ver. 15, would have the emphasis next to οὔτοι.

Ver. 15. For the truth of the assertion advanced ver. 14, the apostle appeals to the Christian experience of his readers. "They that are moved by the Spirit are God's children, for you received not the spirit of bondage, but the spirit of sonship." οὐ γὰρ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας πάλιν εἰς φόβον, ἀλλ' ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας] The antithesis of πνεῦμα δουλείας and πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας requires that both the genitival relation and the notion of πνεῦμα in both expressions be taken in a corresponding sense. πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας, then, cannot be "the Spirit that works sonship, or places in a filial relation to God," for the impartation of the Spirit is an effect of adoption, Gal. iv. 5, 6, not the reverse. It must therefore be interpreted, either: "the spirit that proceeds from sonship," or: "the spirit that peculiarly pertains to sonship, the spirit of sonship, *spiritus, qualis adoptatorum est*;" Luther: "a child-like spirit." The latter meaning most aptly falls in with the interpretation of πνεῦμα δουλείας, "the spirit that is the

characteristic of slavery, *spiritus, qualis est servorum* ;” Luther: “a slavish spirit.” The question then is, what πνεῦμα is meant, whether the πνεῦμα θεοῦ or a πνεῦμα ἀνθρώπινον, the objective divine Spirit Himself, or a subjective, human, although spiritual affection? For the first view, neither the connection nor yet Gal. iv. 6 is conclusive alone. For there the subject is not the πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας, but the πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, and the πνεῦμα might very well be conceived as the operation of this divine πνεῦμα in man. But in the nature of the case, the transition is easy from the πνεῦμα θεοῦ to His operation, the πνεῦμα as the pneumatic essence in man. Thus the connection with ver. 14, where the πνεῦμα θεοῦ is mentioned, to which certainly the πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας in this verse corresponds, cannot be a hindrance to our interpreting the latter of the child-like spirit in man, which, as the operation of the divine Spirit, of necessity points back to His presence. But we hold, further, that this view is actually required by the antithesis with πνεῦμα δουλείας. For the Spirit of God cannot be called a πνεῦμα δουλείας, since He neither works bondage nor proceeds from it, or is a characteristic sign of it, being given only to children and the free, not to slaves. It is indeed said that πνεῦμα δουλείας does not denote the spirit that men actually had under the law, but merely denotes negatively what the spirit that Christians had received is not. Thus: “the spirit that you received is not a spirit of bondage, but a spirit of sonship;” i.e., slaves possess not this Spirit of God, but only the children of God. πάλιν is said to belong, as the order of words shows, not to ἐλάβετε, but to εἰς φόβον = εἰς τὸ πάλιν φοβεῖσθαι, such, namely, as was the case under the law working wrath. But neither this negative conception of οὐ γὰρ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας, nor yet this connection, right in itself, of πάλιν, seems to us to remove the difficulty referred to. For the spirit of bondage may still be merely the spirit of fear; and when it is said: “the spirit that you received is not a spirit of bondage that you should again fear,” or, “so that you will again fear,” it is understood, of course, “as took place when you possessed the spirit of bondage, i.e. the spirit of fear,” and the words understood: “as took place under the law working wrath,” are merely an attempt to conceal the identity of these two supplementary phrases under a variety of expression. The πνεῦμα δουλείας must then always be so under-

stood that it may be conceived as an actual possession of man, therefore not as *Spiritus Dei*, but as *spiritus servilis hominum*. The latter, indeed, is not so much received as simply possessed. Wherefore we must interpret: "you received not a servile spirit that you should again fear, as when you possessed this servile spirit, but you received a child-like spirit." Thus de Wette rightly interprets πνεῦμα δουλείας, υἰοθεσίας, a spiritual affection, such as one has in slavery, such as one has in sonship, and remarks that ἐλάβετε = ἔδωκεν ὑμῖν ὁ θεός, indicates the objective source of this spiritual affection. Comp. Rom. xi. 8: ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμα κατανύξεως; 2 Tim. i. 7: οὐ γὰρ ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμα δειλίας, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀγάπης καὶ σωφρονισμοῦ; 2 Cor. iv. 13. ἔχοντες δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως; Gal. vi. 1: καταρτίζετε τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν πνεύματι πραότητος; Eph. i. 17: ὁ θεὸς . . . δῶκεν ὑμῖν πνεῦμα σοφίας. The δουλεία and the φόβος were certainly the effect of the revealed νόμος; but it is not to be inferred from this that the Roman Church consisted mainly of Jewish Christians, or that the apostle is here addressing merely the Jewish Christian portion of the church. For the operation of the natural law of conscience, which, according to ii. 14, 15, the Gentiles possessed, is analogous; and that Paul regards heathenism also as a state of bondage, is shown by Gal. iv. 8, 9. On υἰοθεσίας Grotius observes: "Non satis habuit dicere Spiritum libertatis, sed dixit adoptionis. Nam qui adoptantur, si servi sint, et liberi ex servis fiunt et filii. Filii lege facti θετοί dicuntur in jure Graeco. Verbum est υἰοθετεῖν, unde υἰοθεσία, quod et arrogationem et adoptionem specialiter Romanis dictam comprehendit. Poterat et ab ipsa naturali generatione similitudinem sumere apostolus, sed ut ab adoptione sumeretur, hinc loco convenientius fuit, quia simul meminit status prioris, quasi servilis." But then, as adoption effects a complete transference to the relation and rights of a child by birth, the spirit of adoption as to its nature and results is not different from the spirit of sonship. The repetition of ἐλάβετε (it is written once in 1 Cor. ii. 12) occurs for the sake of emphasis, comp. Heb. xii. 18, 22; Eph. ii. 17, 19 (where Lachmann reads καὶ εἰρήνην and ἀλλ' ἐστέ).

—ἐν ᾧ κρᾶζομεν] not: at whose instance, or: through whom, but: in whom we cry. κρᾶζειν, Gal. iv. 6, here not, as usual elsewhere, of a bare outcry, but of a distinct call, as a token of joyous confidence, in contrast with trembling despondency in

prayer. "*Clamor*," says Bengel, "sermo vehemens, cum desiderio, fiducia, jure, constantia."

—'Αββᾶ, ὁ πατήρ] In the Palestinian provincial dialect, the Aramaic ܐܒܬܐ was employed instead of the Hebrew אב. The formula ἁββᾶ, ὁ πατήρ, is found again in Mark xiv. 36; Gal. iv. 6. ὁ πατήρ cannot be regarded as a translation appended by the evangelist or apostle; for in that case the usual interpretation formula: ὃ ἐστὶ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, ὃ ἐστὶ μεθερμηνεύμενον, never wanting, especially in Mark (iii. 17, vii. 11, 34, v. 41, xv. 22, 34, also Matt. i. 23, xxvii. 46, John i. 39, 42, Acts i. 19, iv. 36, xiii. 8, Heb. vii. 2), would be added. Paul's practice, on the other hand, is so little to interpret Hebrew phrases, that in 1 Cor. xvi. 22 he has even left the very unintelligible μαρὰν ἀθά without explanation. ὁ πατήρ, then, is a component part of the prayer itself. The observation of Grotius is untenable: "Imitatur puerorum patribus blandientium voces. Mos est blandientium repetere voces easdem" (similarly before him Chrysost. and Theodor.), as in this case ἁββᾶ, ἁββᾶ, or ὁ πατήρ, ὁ πατήρ (Matt. vii. 22, xxvii. 46), must have been said. Still less to the point is Calvin's observation: "Significat Paulus, ita nunc per totum mundum publicatam esse Dei misericordiam, ut promiscue linguis omnibus invocetur: quemadmodum Augustinus observat. Ergo inter omnes gentes consensum exprimere voluit. Unde sequitur, nihil jam differre Graecum a Judaeo, quum inter se coaluerint." Not only is there nothing to suggest such a subordinate reflection, but, in addition, neither the connection nor the emphasis of the expression permits it. The more likely account is, that ἁββᾶ, in use among the Palestinian Jews, passed over to the Hellenists, and from them to the Christians, just as phrases like Abba, Jehovah, Immanuel, etc., have passed over into our hymnology. But it was quite natural that in prayer, the language of the heart in confidential intercourse with God, the same address should be repeated in the mother-tongue of the worshipper. Thus we should not readily say in prayer "Jehovah," without adding "Lord." The opinion that ἁββᾶ is used on account of the child-like sound may be combined with ours, as it may indicate the reason for the Jewish form of address, ἁββᾶ, being originally retained. Still it is a question whether the opinion does not depend too much on a transfer of *modern* experience and practice in the use of the word Abba. Comp. also Meyer here. ὁ πατήρ, the nominative with the



article for the vocative, comp. Mark v. 8, 41, ix. 25, xv. 34; Luke xviii. 11, 13; Winer, p. 227. The apostle in the present verse contrasts the effect of the O. T. revelation of law with the effect of the N. T. revelation of grace. The one is the *πνεῦμα δουλείας*, the other the *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας*. "Neque tamen inde colligas," says Calvin, "vel Spiritu adoptionis neminem ante Christi adventum fuisse praeditum: vel quicumque Legem acceperint, servos fuisse, non filios. Ministerium enim Legis cum Evangelii dispensatione potius confert quam personas cum personis. Fateor quidem hic moneri fideles, quanto cum ipsis liberalius nunc egerit Deus, quam olim cum Patribus sub Veteri testamento: externam tamen dispensationem respicit, cujus tantum ratione praecellimus: quia ut praestantior fuerit Abrahae, Mosis et Davidis fides quam nostra, quatenus tamen in speciem sub paedagogia eos Deus continuit, nondum ad libertatem, quae nobis patefacta est, progressi erant." With this should be specially compared Gal. iii. 23-26 and iv. 1-6. How much more must the *πνεῦμα δουλείας* have held sway over those who were not delivered from it, at least comparatively, by *πίστις* in the *ἐπαγγελία*, but remained as captives fast bound in the legal point of view! On the change of person, *ἐλάβετε, κρίζομεν*, Calvin remarks: "Personam ideo mutavit, ut sortem omnium sanctorum communem exprimeret, acsi dixisset: Spiritum accepistis, per quem vos, ut nos reliqui omnes fideles, clamatis."

Ver. 16. *αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα*] means not: *idem spiritus*; Luther: *the same spirit*, for this would be *τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα*; but: *ipse Spiritus, the Spirit Himself*, namely, the Spirit of God, in whom and through whom we have the *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας*, ver. 15.

—*συμμαρτυρεῖ τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν*] 1 John v. 6-11. Vulg.: "testimonium reddit spiritui nostro." Luther: "bears witness to our spirit." So, too, several modern expositors. This sense would only be tenable upon *our* interpretation of ver. 15; for if *πνεῦμα* is there taken in the sense of *πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, in the present verse we get merely a tautological and next to meaningless emphasis. If the children of God raise the Abba-cry in the Spirit of God, it is self-evident that it is the Spirit of God Himself who bears testimony to their sonship. But it might very well be expressly stated, that in the child-like spirit in which the Abba-cry is uttered the Spirit of God Himself bears testimony to our spirit as to our filial position. However, there is no

example to prove that the compound *συμμαρτυρεῖν* can be taken as identical with the simple *μαρτυρεῖν*. Accordingly, *συμμαρτυρεῖν* here, as in ii. 15, ix. 1, is to be taken in the sense of *unco testari*, to bear witness along with. Our spirit witnesses our *νιοθεσία*, in the character of a child-like spirit, by its Abba-cry, ver. 15. But it does not witness this alone, but with it the Spirit of God does the same. But the latter witnesses this not by an immediate assurance, but by means of the general word of promise which He applies to the particular individual in whom He dwells. For whereas Scripture calls all who believe in Christ children of God, the Spirit testifies to the individual believer Thou art God's child! This testimony of the Spirit is the first testimony, and withal the cause of the Abba-cry, which is the second. Against the *Pontificii certitudinem gratiae infallibilem impugnantes*, Calov remarks: "Quod nostro spiritui testificatur et confirmat Spiritus S. de eo nos indubitato certi sumus; quia testimonium Spiritus Sancti certissimum est et prorsus indubitatum, cui qui non credit, Deum mendacem facit, 1 John v. 10." The asyndeton (instead of *αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα* we should have expected an *οὐ μόνον δὲ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα*) seems most easily vindicated, if, laying a sharper accent on *αὐτό* and *συμ*—, at the end of the verse we supply the thought: "And thus for our sonship all simply requisite evidence is at hand." Finally, the teaching of the 16th verse forms an antithesis with the Deistic quite as complete as with the Pantheistic view of the relation of God to the world in general and to the human spirit in particular. It shows that Christianity is the *fellowship* of God the Spirit with man, in abiding *distinction* from the human spirit.

Ver. 17. *εἰ δὲ τέκνα, καὶ κληρονόμοι*] From our sonship follows necessarily, by the analogy of human law, our heirship, Gal. iv. 7. But this heirship, as an heirship of God and co-heirship with Christ, consists in *δόξα* or *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* (comp. the *συνδοξασθῶμεν* of our verse, and *μέλλουσα δόξα*, ver. 18). Thus the truth of *ζήσεσθε*, ver. 13, is established. The proposition *εἰ δὲ τέκνα (ἔσμέν), καὶ κληρονόμοι ἔσμέν*, in the first instance, merely announces a truth universally valid, which is but more precisely defined by the subjoined *κληρονόμοι μὲν θεοῦ κτλ.* Thus to *τέκνα* and *κληρονόμοι α θεοῦ* is not to be supplied.

—*κληρονόμοι μὲν θεοῦ*] In ordinary human relations, the inheritance is only entered upon after the testator's death, Heb.

ix. 16, 17. In applying the comparison, this point is not to be regarded. The *tertium comparationis* is merely the patrimonial estate, which by right of sonship belongs to the son, and in the sphere of earthly relations is described as inherited estate. Comp. also Luke xv. 12. At most, the notion of death intervening before entry upon the inheritance might be retained in general terms,—there the father's death, here the child's death, which is the moment of transition to eternal life, or to the possession of the heavenly inheritance.

—συγκληρονόμοι δὲ Χριστοῦ] The inheritance of God, imparted to the children of God, is really the inheritance of Christ, to participation in which they are summoned by adoption. He is the κληρονόμος κατ' ἐξοχήν, Gal. iii. 16–18, Heb. i. 2; and incorporated in Him by faith, they, too, come to participate in what He possesses,—they, too, become κληρονόμοι, Gal. iii. 28, 29, comp. Rom. iv. 13. As in the old covenant to Israel and Jacob typically, so to Christ all rights of the first-born and heir are transferred. He is the πρωτότοκος ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, ver. 29, and shares His patrimonial inheritance with His brethren, which, as a spiritual inheritance, by its very nature devolves to every one whole and entire. The *untheocratic* reference of this passage to the *Roman* law of inheritance is as foreign as it is inappropriate. There an equal share in the inheritance belonged to all children by birth; so that in the application of this, the gracious act and interposition of Christ, the first-born and only real heir would be thrown quite into the shade. Preferable to this would be Wieseler's opinion on Gal. iv. 7, that Paul has in view no *particular* law of inheritance at all. Still we believe, for the reasons indicated, that we must abide by the reference to the *Jewish* law of inheritance.

—εἴπερ συμπάσχομεν] *if at all events we suffer with*, appends the indispensable condition on which alone every Christian may hope to attain to participation in the δόξα of Christ. Comp. Matt. xx. 22 f.; Col. i. 24, iii. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 11 f.; 1 Pet. iv. 13, v. 1. No doubt the death of Christ procured for God's believing children the title to future glory; but they can only preserve this title, and enter upon possession of the glory itself, by being conformed to His sufferings and death.<sup>1</sup> These sufferings are

<sup>1</sup> Calvin rightly observes, that here, not the *causa*, but the *ordo adipiscendae salutis* is indicated. Melauchthon says that συμπάσχειν is required, not as *meritum*

no doubt really martyr-sufferings, such, especially, as the first Christians endured in a marked degree. But the idea may be generalized and applied to suffering in conflict with sin, to the *θανατοῦν τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος*. All suffering on the part of the Christian is at root one and the same. It is renunciation of the world in its various forms. But the *πάσχειν* must be thought of as *willing* suffering; for only this makes the Christian, even the non-Christian being unable to avoid *involuntary* suffering. But if suffering is the inevitable condition of glorification, in this very fact comfort is necessarily implied; inasmuch as in that case, so far is it from casting a shadow on the hope of glorification, that it includes a new pledge of that blessing, v. 3 ff.

—*ἵνα καὶ συνδοξασθῶμεν*] in order to be also glorified with Christ; in essential meaning the same as, though stronger than, *οὕτω γὰρ καὶ συνδοξασθησόμεθα* (as is self-evident *σὺν τῷ Χριστῷ*, John xvii. 22; Rev. iii. 21). *ὁ γὰρ τοῖς οὐδὲν κατωρθώκοι τοσαῦτα δωρησάμενος ἀγαθά, ὅταν ἴδῃ καὶ πονήσαντας καὶ τοσαῦτα παθόντας, πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἀμείψεται*, Chrysostom. The regular and necessary consequence of a thing is often, in energetic phraseology, viewed as intended by the thing itself. So here the glory that follows as a necessary consequence of suffering is pictured as the aim of the suffering itself, *ἵνα* depending on *συμπάσχομεν*, not on *συγκληρονόμοι*.

or *pretium vitae aeternae*, but merely as *obedientia propter ordinem a Deo sancitum*. Just so Calov: "*Passiones non conditio sunt meritoria, sed ordo, quem Deus in hominibus ad aeternam haereditatem admittendis constituit et observat. Causa enim unica constituta erat *visiois* vel *adoptio*."* But previously, upon κληρ. β. συγγληρ. χρ., he had remarked: "*Quum autem hic vita aeterna haereditas dicatur, manifestum est excludi operum merita, quae Papistae asserunt.*"

END OF VOL. I.