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example of Mr. Pierce Carey and the older example of Mr. Eustace Carey, Mr. Walker touches very lightly on the break with the Baptist Missionary Society, a controversy which lasted fifteen years and embittered Carey's later life. As these events happened over a hundred years ago there seems little purpose in glossing them over, especially as they illustrate, in a way that nothing else does, the Christian character and moral grandeur of the great pioneer.

The Epistle to the Ephesians is generally regarded as too theological to be easily made palatable to the modern mind. But this, it would appear, is a mistake. *A Philosophy from Prison*, by Professor F. R. Barry, D.S.O., M.A. (S.C.M.; 4s. net), is a study of that Epistle, and it is astonishingly modern. The method followed is to expound the sections of the Epistle and to bring out the connexion of thought, relating it to the social background of the Apostolic Age. Three main topics are handled, God in History, Christ the Meaning of History, and Self-expression and Social Life. The perplexity and sense of failure in the old Roman world, the breakdown of old moral standards, the war-weariness, are elements which bring the Apostolic Age into vital contact with the world of to-day, and the sufficiency of Paul's Gospel is impressively set forth.

A book on worship which deals not with its liturgical side but with the general principles underlying it and its place in our mental life has been published by the Student Christian Movement—*Worship: Its Necessity, Nature and Expression*, by the Rev. A. L. Lilley, M.A. (2s. net). There are four chapters. The first expounds the constant elements in man's nature which make him naturally a worshipper. The second (The Object of Worship) contends that though worship as an instinct has a natural priority to belief, yet its healthy development depends on a real desire to know its object as He is as fully as possible and in all His relations to created things. The third (The Essence of Worship) urges that the root meaning of worship is a full offering of self, and this combines its moral and its mystical elements in a discipline which is a service also. A final chapter on The Expression of Worship sums up an interesting discussion which if general in its nature is not without justification as an attempt to ground our instinctive and highest tendency in reason and fact.

Recent Thought on the Doctrine of God.

By Professor Clement C. J. Webb, M.A., LL.D., Oxford.

I recollect a wise teacher in my undergraduate days surprising us by saying of two philosophers, the criticisms by one of whom upon the other played a large part in our studies, that 'some day Mill and Green would be reckoned as belonging to the same school.' 'Of what school?' we asked. 'The school of the nineteenth century,' was the reply. It is indeed profoundly true that there is a family likeness in the intellectual positions characteristic of any one age. They may be diametrically opposed to one another, yet they share the same presuppositions; and there are ideas, familiar and congenial to another generation, which are equally repugnant to both the mutual antagonists of a particular epoch.

'He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.' The words suggest a conception of God which is unquestionably out of fashion in recent theology. They present Him, in the first place, as a Being whose existence may be doubtful, as might be that of the alleged founder of some historical institution, the supposed author of some epic poem, or the astronomical or biological process, conjectured in order to account for some observed phenomenon of the heavens or of organic life; and, in the second place, as 'the moral Governor of the universe,' dispensing rewards and punishments to His rational creatures according to their several deserts. In the eighteenth century, to every one,

whether believer in God or no, the name 'God' meant such a Being, such a 'moral Governor,' to Kant, the unsparing critic of the traditional 'proofs of God's existence,' no less than to Wolf, who formulated them anew, or to Paley, whose name became in this country so closely associated with the most popularly intelligible and widely impressive of them, the 'argument from design.' The atmosphere of contemporary theological discussion is very different from that which these men breathed. Our talk of 'religious experience,' of 'Divine immanence,' of mysticism, of an Absolute 'beyond good and bad,' of God as the unconscious projection by our imagination of our own nature as an object distinct from ourselves, would have sounded as strange to our forefathers as much of their talk has come to sound to us.

The springs of philosophy commonly have their source in the deposits of some religion, and the waters which flow thence long taste of the soil whence they took their origin. In the philosophy of modern Europe the ultimate principle in which it was sought to discover that unity which all philosophy divines to be present in the vast 'number of things,' whereof, as Stevenson's child's poem says, 'the world is so full'—this ultimate principle was at first called 'God' and envisaged more or less after the likeness of that 'God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth,' belief in whom was the first article of the Christian creed. It was only gradually realized that, on the one hand, the existence of God, the object of religious reverence and worship, could not be established by purely metaphysical considerations which took no account of specifically religious experience; and, on the other hand, that the ultimate principle of unity to which such considerations might point must not be endowed offhand with the attributes of the Biblical Deity. The beginning of this discovery is signalized by Kant's criticism of the 'proofs of the existence of God' on one side; and on the other by the contemporaneous change of attitude towards Spinoza, who, from being branded as a 'justly decried' atheist—the epithet is Locke's—came at the end of the eighteenth century to be hailed as a holy, God-intoxicated man by the prophets of the romantic movement.

The significance of Kant's criticism for the history of theology is that it leads to the abandonment of the attempt to justify belief in the God of religion by other than religious arguments. God is known as such—so it comes to be held—only in religious experience. The word 'God' has no meaning—or only a meaning quite remote from common usage—for those who lack this kind of experience. They may feel themselves compelled to postulate a First Cause, or an all-inclusive Reality, or an Absolute Unity implied in all relations between one thing and another, even in that between the mind which knows and the world which confronts it as the object of its knowledge. But to call this 'God' is either to invoke religious experience to interpret it, or else to summon up irrelevant associations from which the language of philosophy had better keep itself free. It is of course true that religious experience itself may be interpreted 'realistically' as apprehension of an independently existing object, but, though God in Himself be *more* than is revealed to His worshippers, yet He is primarily that which is known in religious experience. Since, in the first place, there is no possibility of verifying what is thus known by means of a *sensible* experience ('no man hath seen God at any time'); and, in the second place, religious experience is, at least in its intenser forms, an experience of such close union with its object that we can speak of God 'dwelling in us, and we in him,' the way is clearly open for a view which doubts or denies that in religious experience we are in fact cognizant of any being but our own.

Such a view has been put forward in many forms. These fall into two groups, according as those who maintain them consider that nothing can be regarded as genuinely *real*, the presence of which cannot be attested by sense-perception and investigated by the methods of the natural sciences; or, on the other hand, hold mind or spirit to be real in a fuller or deeper sense than any such object.

To both groups, however, religious experience, in respect of the actual form which it assumes, when it seems to be a relation of the worshipper to a being *other* (even if not, as Professor Otto would have us think, *wholly* other[1]) than himself, involves a large element of illusion. This type of view and its various possible developments can nowhere be so well studied as in Ludwig Feuerbach's *Wesen des Christenthums*, which George Eliot translated into English. Many more recent speculations, which

[1] I am not sure that the translator's 'wholly other' does not somewhat exaggerate Professor Otto's 'ganz anderes,' which might perhaps be better rendered 'quite other.'

find in religion an unconscious projection of our own wishes, emotions, and ideals in the form of an imaginary object, are anticipated in principle in this brilliant book; and it was by a wise choice that the late Baron von Hügel selected it for criticism in his remarkable examination of the kind of theory which it represents, published as *Religion and Illusion* among his 'Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion.'

What may be called the materialistic version of this type of view is represented by the French 'sociological' school, of which the late Emil Darkheim was the leader, and to which MM. Lévy-Bruhl, Hubert, and Mauss belong, whose work (down to 1915) the present writer has discussed, with reference to the bearing of their theories on the validity of religious experience, in a little book called *Group Theories of Religion and the Individual.* The psycho-analysts, while approaching the subject in quite a different way, generally share with these scholars their materialistic presuppositions. Hence, for them, to discover in the attitude of religious persons toward their God the presence of emotions which were originally directed toward a parent or toward the object of a sexual attraction is to interpret their religious experience as, in the last resort, a 'wish-fantasy,' by which it is unconsciously sought to appease cravings to which the circumstances of their lives deny their natural fulfilment. This is so even when the transference of the emotions in question to an imaginary object, in purely ideal relations wherewith may be found such satisfaction of those emotions as is possible, is regarded as conducive to mental health and therefore as desirable. Such a position, with especial reference to the worship of Jesus Christ, which the author is obviously in earnest in his desire to encourage, is adopted by President Stanley Hall in his noteworthy book called *Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology.*

Both the French sociologists and the psycho-analysts treat the mental life on a method which, consistently carried out, is quite as fatal to the validity of science (including their own sociology and psychology) as it is to the validity of religion; and are thereby in grave danger of cutting away the branch on which they sit; while their materialistic assumptions are exposed to all the objections which, it is well known to students of philosophy, beset every form of materialism. But there is, as I have already intimated, the possibility of a theory, differing from theirs in these respects while agreeing with them in making religion rather an unconscious projection by the imagination into the objective world of our own spiritual nature than, as it has seemed to the majority of religious persons, the revelation of Another than themselves with whom, through the activities of worship and prayer, they could establish what we may call a personal relationship.

On such a theory we become better acquainted with the true nature of ourselves and of the world we live in through religious experience than through our commerce by means of the senses with the material environment of our bodies. Reality is in its essence spiritual; this is the lesson which the doctrines of religion have to teach, and which, in coming to believe them, we begin to learn. But that it is a Spirit personally distinct from us is not the ultimate truth. Religious experience itself in its highest ranges, where it becomes what we call 'mystical,' feels after and even seems to apprehend a unity beyond any such distinction, in which (for example) what has been previously regarded as the outward history of a past manifestation—birth, life, death—of God in the flesh, is felt as continually taking place in the soul of the mystic himself. For in the end there is but one genuine Reality, an Eternal Life which the imagination first pictures to itself as an object of reverence and desire, but which in philosophy the mind comes to know as its own inalienable essence.

The line of thought just sketched is one which can trace its pedigree to Hegel, and has been recently illustrated (with variations) in this country by the work of two great thinkers whom we have lately lost, Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet. But, although to neither of these did there seem to be good grounds for supposing that there existed any self-conscious experience outside of such 'finite centres' as are human minds (and, within our knowledge, human minds alone), both used language which was not always easily to be reconciled with this judgment of theirs. Mr. Bosanquet, especially in his latest utterances, written with the Italian idealists, Croce and Gentile, in his eye, insisted much upon the importance of not identifying, as they seemed to do, the *human* spirit as such with the Absolute, the revelation whereof to poet and artist in Nature apart from man was by no means, he held, to be regarded, after the fashion suggested in Croce's theory of æsthetic, as a creation or self-expression of the human spirit, but rather as a source from

whence that spirit receives 'instruction and inspiration.' A more completely uncompromising immanentism, akin to what I take to be that of Gentile, has been within the last year ably set forth by an English teacher of philosophy in Mr. Collingwood's remarkable work *Speculum Mentis*. For Mr. Collingwood religion does not merely use metaphysical language, but *is* itself 'metaphorical assertion mistaking itself for literal assertion.' It is a characteristic suggestion of this writer that the seer of Patmos in passing from the great vision of the worship of heaven in Rev 4 to that of the New Jerusalem which has 'no temple therein' of Rev 21, is adumbrating the 'self-transcendence of religion' accomplished by Christianity, which is 'explicitly the one, true, and perfect religion,' but 'implicitly the death of religion,' 'the *via purgativa* of the religious mind,' which 'will become out of date for any given person or society' when—but only when—'in the mind of that person or society superstition has vanished for good and all.'

The object of this article is record rather than criticism. But it is permissible to wonder whether many of Mr. Collingwood's readers, while they will, if they be wise, feel gratitude to him for the rigorous examination to which he has subjected the traditional phraseology and familiar assumptions of popular religion, will not still be justified in declining to allow, as he would (it seems) have them allow, that all the essential values of religion are preserved in his philosophy. The crucial point at issue will, I think, turn out to be what is often called the problem of personality, that is, of the status of the individual mind within the spiritual whole apart from which, as we must unquestionably allow, it could not intelligibly claim to be *personal* at all. There are some considerable differences between Mr. Collingwood's philosophy of religion and the late Mr. Bosanquet's (as set forth, for instance, in his Gifford Lectures on *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*)[1]; and I have no desire to minimize the importance of these differences. But it seems to me that in both the significance of the personal relation of the soul to God in the religious life is underrated. Both Bosanquet and Mr. Collingwood would, of course, unlike the materialistic thinkers previously discussed, deny to the mutual intercourse of human persons in society a reality higher or more genuine than to the religious experience of worship of God and of life in Him. For Bosanquet the individuality of each one of us is in the end no more than a 'quasi-individual' (the Absolute alone is properly individual); and although, I think, Mr. Collingwood allows on the whole a higher rank to the self than Mr. Bosanquet, he would assign, if not to 'the literal God,' at any rate to the concept which the image of God metaphorically means, that is, to 'the philosopher's absolute,' a reality which, as it lives 'in its entirety, yet not indifferently,' in every individual, is the concrete whole, whereof every individual mind taken by itself is a partial, although unique and indispensable, expression.

Yet, after giving the fullest weight to this estimate by both the thinkers we are considering of the relative rank of social intercourse and of religious experience in the hierarchy of appearances, I find it impossible to persuade myself that it does not in fact, although not in intention, leave God less real than it leaves His worshipper. The finite self and God alike are in the view of Bosanquet (as also of Bradley, whom he regarded as his master in the philosophy of religion) 'appearances' of reality, not, as such, realities themselves; and God an appearance in which reality is more fully manifested than in the finite self. Yet the self is an appearance which we must accept as a primary feature of our experience, despite our inability (admitted in express terms by Bradley) to see why there should be such 'finite centres of experience' at all. God, on the other hand, is, so far as I can see, an appearance due to the fact that this inevitable recognition of the self as a 'finite centre of experience' compels us to distinguish from it and contrast with it, as a Being which, although the self's own existence depends thereon, and although therein the self 'lives and moves and has its being,' is yet *not* the self, that supreme Reality which in truth *is* the self, because it is all in all, but which, when once recognized as being so, *ipso facto* ceases to be what we call God, and becomes, in Mr. Collingwood's phrase, 'the philosopher's absolute.' And, similarly, in Mr. Collingwood's own view, God is, as we have seen, an 'image' by which we, in our imperfection, represent to ourselves that which the philosopher at his higher level (or rather philosophy, for the actual philosopher probably needs religion and its God for most of his time) conceives not as

[1] I may perhaps be permitted to refer to an article on 'Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of Religion' in the *Hibbert Journal*, October 1923.

God, but as 'the philosopher's absolute.' It is not because I am insensible to the almost overpowering attraction which such a position—call it monism, absolutism, immanentism, or what you will—has for the metaphysician that I confess to being held back from surrender to it by what appears to me to be necessary implications of religious—and not only of religious—experience.

Religious experience does indeed imply what it is the grand merit of this type of thought to insist upon, namely, that its object, God, must be not less than the ultimate Reality. Spinoza's words, *Quicquid est, in Deo est*, are the classical statement of a truth which is of vital importance to any theology claiming adequately to express that experience in a scientific form. I associated above the revolution which divides our theology from that of the eighteenth century with the work of Kant and the rediscovery of Spinoza. Kant's criticism of the traditional proofs emphasized the impossibility of proving God's existence apart from a specifically religious experience. The great Jewish philosopher stands for the conviction that only in a Being conceived as the all-embracing Reality (even though we may regard the categories under which he describes that all-embracing Reality as inadequate) can any one who has attained to that conception find his religious aspirations satisfied.

The obvious difficulty (abundantly illustrated by the history of religion) of reconciling this conviction with such an attribution of personality to God as will allow of prayer and worship being taken seriously, or with such an attribution to Him of moral goodness as will justify us in maintaining the attitude towards sin in ourselves or elsewhere which has characterized Jewish and Christian piety at their best, has led in recent times to the abandonment by certain theologians of the traditional ascription of infinity and omnipotence to God, and to the assertion that religion postulates as its object a Being not identical with, but included within, the Absolute of the philosophers; a Being from whose consciousness ours remains to the end as distinct as does one finite consciousness from another (although no doubt He knows our thoughts and intents in a measure vastly beyond that in which one finite person can know another's), and whose perfectly good will is disappointed of complete fulfilment by conditions over which it has no control. Of such a view the most prominent representative among recent British divines was the late Dr. Hastings Rashdall. Having discussed at some length his position, with others more or less akin to his, in the sixth lecture of my Gifford course on *God and Personality*, I will content myself here with a reassertion of my inability to consider that any doctrine which, in any interest, affirms God to be finite, or less than the Absolute Reality, is adequate to the demands of the religious consciousness, however attractive be the ease with which, by means of such a doctrine, some very grave difficulties in formulating our theology may be avoided.

Of these difficulties the most important and the one which, I think, weighed most with Dr. Rashdall, is that of attributing to an all-including Reality or Absolute the quality of moral goodness. The suspicion that a theology which identifies God with the Absolute must be in the long run prejudicial to morality might seem to be confirmed by the contention of some who, in championing such a theology, have insisted on the greater nearness of religion as compared with morality to the ultimate vision of truth, just because it does in some sense pass 'beyond good and bad,' on the one hand 'concluding all under sin,' on the other announcing the free forgiveness of sin, not as a debt of justice, but as an unmerited grace. This line of thought may be well illustrated from the early work of Professor A. E. Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct* (which must not be assumed to express the present views of its distinguished author). Attention may be called to the frequent appeal made in this book to the poet Blake, whose often profoundly suggestive, if no less often paradoxical, utterances on the nature of God and of religion have exercised an important influence upon much recent English thought on these subjects.[1] In his last completed book, *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, Mr. Bosanquet has powerfully contended that it belongs to the very essence of religion, by lifting the mind above the changes and chances of mortal life to a conscious participation in an eternally realized God, to transcend the 'moralism' of those who, believing in the ultimate reality of time and of progress in time, condemn themselves (to use a favourite phrase of Bradley's) to 'the doom of Tantalus,' and also expose their highest hopes to

[1] I have discussed some of these utterances, in reference to the doctrine of personality in God, in the fourth lecture of my Gifford course on *Divine Personality and Human Life*.

frustration by the operation of the laws of physical nature.

It is not, however, only those who are concerned to affirm the transcendence of morality by religion on the ground that morality has to do with time and religion with eternity, or of moral distinctions by God on the ground that all that is real must fall within His being, who find certain outstanding features of morality, as commonly conceived, unworthy of the Divine nature. This is also done by some who would have no hesitation in describing their notion of God as reached principally through the moral consciousness, but who regard the existing moral institutions of society, and especially its system of punishment, as a survival from an earlier stage of development, and hold that it is the function of religion to pass beyond the attitude which expresses itself in these to one which they believe to have been revealed to us in the teaching and example of Christ, so that the acceptance of Christ as the perfect revelation of the Divine character involves the depreciation of the attitude embodied in human law as less than Divine. I have especially in mind, as an example of this tendency, the contention of the late Miss Lily Dougall and the late Mr. Cyril Emmet—expressed in their joint work, *The Lord of Thought*, and in Miss Dougall's posthumous *God's Way with Man*—that we should cease to speak of the 'wrath of God' and should distinguish sharply natural consequences from divinely inflicted penalty. In the former of the two books to which I have just referred, Mr. Emmet attempted to show on critical grounds that what in the recorded teaching of Jesus might seem to be inconsistent with such views is probably not authentic. While it must be fully recognized that the conception, so prevalent in eighteenth-century theology, of the 'moral Governor of the universe' (the caricature of which as 'Urizen' in Blake's Prophetic Books is worthy of attentive study) is inadequate to the revelation of God in the New Testament as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ and as essentially love, it may notwithstanding be doubted whether the elimination of the 'wrath of God' from our thought of His nature will not be found to fail in meeting some of the profoundest demands of the religious spirit. It is impossible not to ask oneself whether the theology of the two lamented writers whom I have mentioned, as it reminds us of some of the attractive features of Marcionism, does not also share some of its defects as an account of the Christian God. In the statement that 'God is love,' it is no doubt the *predicate* which conveys the new information that is the theme of the New Testament; but the very significance of the New Testament revelation is lost if the *subject* be emptied of the meaning which is given to the word 'God' by that age-long experience, for which in our Bible the Old Testament stands in its contrast with the New—an experience of a Being mysterious and terrible, the Creator and severe Ruler of this enigmatic world in which our lot is cast. It is very instructive to note that, contemporaneously with such a movement of religious thought as is illustrated by the work of Miss Dougall and Mr. Emmet, so profound an impression should have been made on theological students in this country by Professor Rudolf Otto's *Das Heilige* (translated by Mr. J. Harvey as *The Idea of the Holy*), in which a quite opposite view of religion, as essentially concerned with a *mysterium tremendum*, is put forward (with what appears to the present writer to be an exaggerated emphasis) in direct contrast to all views which fail to distinguish the sphere of religion from that of reason and morality.

While welcoming Professor Otto's insistence upon the specific character of the religious consciousness, as primarily directed toward what he calls the *numinous*, and his recognition of the sense of the weird and uncanny as an undeveloped or degenerate form of the religious sentiment, and also his cordial acknowledgment that the highest form of religion is that which finds the *numinous* quality in what is rational and ethical, I venture to think that he errs by leaving at the end the rational and ethical elements in the highest religion merely juxtaposed, so to say, with the *numinous* or properly religious element, in which the object of the religious consciousness is 'wholly' or, at least, 'quite other' than the subject of it. For even if we take that poor relation of the religious sentiment, which we call the sense of the weird or the uncanny, it is never something merely 'quite other' than ourselves,—for example, a stone or other natural or artificial object, considered as that and nothing more,—that strikes us as uncanny, but something, such as a ghost, which *looks* like another person, but eludes our grasp or vanishes into thin air, or such as an animal or tree or piece of furniture, which *looks* 'quite other' than ourselves, yet seems to take knowledge of us or communicate with us as another

person like ourselves might do. And in the *numinous* object of the religious sentiment properly so called, I believe that we shall always find this union of remoteness or otherness with nearness and intimacy, neither factor being less essential to its religious character than the other; while in the highest religion there is made the discovery that only that is truly worshipful which most completely satisfies our aspirations after truth and goodness.

It would be a grave omission if we left our subject without any reference to the very original and striking speculation of Professor Alexander in his Gifford Lectures on *Space, Time, and Deity*.[1] What is most original in it is not, however, in the judgment of the present writer, its most valuable feature. The religious sentiment, according to Professor Alexander, is always directed towards a God who is not yet in being, but of whom the universe is as it were in travail, the present *nisus* towards whose birth it is that calls forth from our minds the peculiar response which we call worship or religious reverence. As soon as this mighty travail is over, what will be born of it will be no God, strictly so called, but gods or angels, finite beings higher than the highest now existing, who will then, so one gathers, yearn in their turn after some yet higher being which the fruitful womb of 'Space-Time' (Professor Alexander's abiding Absolute) will then conceive. But, if this view is, as we may be pardoned for thinking, too paradoxical to win acceptance, it is otherwise with much of Professor Alexander's theology, which is independent of this singular doctrine, and exhibits an intimate acquaintance with the facts of the religious life, such as is not always to be found in its philosophic interpreters.

Professor Alexander declines 'to explain the religious sentiment as a composite of various emotions not specifically religious, which we feel towards God. For this presumes that we can begin with a cognition of God, and that towards the object so presented we feel these emotions.' 'Even the idea that there is something mysterious which we fear or reverence is never in the first instance a piece of cognition; but is revealed to our wondering response, our uneasy astonishment and curiosity. It is the feeling or emotion which images the object, not the idea which induces the emotion. When we ask how we come by the cognition of God, we must answer that, as with love and hate and appetite and aversion, it is because the world itself provokes in us a specific response which makes us aware, no matter in how primitive a form, of God, and this specific reaction is what has been described above as a going out to something in the world with which we are in communion.' 'We are assured of other minds through the social emotion, and of deity through a different response, the religious emotion.' 'We are sure of one another's minds because we are social beings; but the social instinct is satisfied only by reciprocal actions on the par of others. There is no such reciprocal action from God. For though we speak, as we inevitably must, in human terms of God's response to us, there is no direct experience of that response except through our own feeling that devotion to God or worship carries with it its own satisfaction.' 'The assurance of the reality of God we cannot call surer than our assurance of each other's minds; both are equally sure; but it is simpler.' Though thus, in the spirit of modern theology, Professor Alexander definitely bases his affirmation of God on a specifically religious experience, he does not deny that 'even apart from religious emotion' in a world wherein levels of being, each higher than the last, have so far in the course of its history successively made their appearance, it is natural to divine a higher yet unrevealed (or indeed unborn); but 'without the practical revelation of God' in religious experience 'we could not discover' this world to be, in virtue of its *nisus* to Deity, 'worshipful.' We are thus 'assured of God's reality on the ground both of specific experience and speculative evidence, derived from experience itself. The belief reposes on this double basis; or at least when emotion assures us of God, we can look for speculative evidence of him in experience, and the direct experience and the speculative one support and supplement each other.'

It is interesting to note this recognition of a real though subordinate part which considerations that abstract from a specifically religious experience may play in the approach to God. In this connexion we may mention certain writers who, standing somewhat apart from the characteristic trend of recent thought on the subject, have made valuable contributions to the restatement of that 'argument from design' which to Kant, even in the midst of his drastic criticism of it, remained

[1] For a fuller statement of the appreciation which follows, see a review of this work, with special reference to its theology, in the *Church Quarterly Review*, January 1922.

ever 'the oldest, the clearest, and the most in conformity with the common reason of all the arguments for God's existence.' I have in mind Professor L. J. Henderson, who in his books, *The Order of Nature* and *The Fitness of the Environment*, contends that the 'fitness' of 'the actual distribution and conjunction of properties' in the physical constitution of the earth to render it the environment of life 'becomes intelligible only if you read it as a teleological pattern, as a preparation for life'; and Mr. C. J. Shebbeare, who in two works, *The Challenge of the Universe* and *The Design Argument Reconsidered* (the latter containing a debate on the subject with the well-known secularist Mr. Joseph McCabe), has argued that the real issue raised by the Argument from Design is whether there is any alternative to regarding as ultimately *accidental* much that we should find it very difficult so to regard except the conviction that the world is actually ordered on principles which are revealed to us through our moral and æsthetic intuitions, and whose origin cannot be satisfactorily explained by natural selection. The part of his argument relating to æsthetic principles is developed by Mr. Shebbeare with especial originality and force.

I have left myself no space for dealing with the extensive literature which testifies to the great interest in mysticism which is a notable characteristic of the present day. It stands, however, in intimate connexion with the stress laid by recent theology on religious experience and on Divine immanence. It is the more important to note that a writer of genius who in his *Mystical Element in Religion* has made a contribution of the first importance to the study of religious mysticism, the late Baron von Hügel, was an uncompromising opponent of all theories which emphasized Divine immanence to a point inconsistent with allowing that Divine transcendence the acknowledgment of which in his judgment—and he was no mere academic student of religious phenomena, but, as all who had the privilege of his friendship knew, a master of the spiritual life—was indispensable to a truly vital religion. He died before what he meant to be his principal work—on the Reality of God—was ready for publication. But there is good reason to hope that it will yet appear in a form tolerably complete; and its appearance will be awaited with impatience by all who know the greatness of the spirit whose main message to his generation it will contain.

Jesus Christ and the Four Penitents.

By J. Rendel Harris, Litt.D., LL.D., D.D., Birmingham.

This picture is a copy of a great work by Rubens, which hangs in a gallery at Düsseldorf. It may be taken, just as in the January number we took the Rembrandt in the Louvre of the Supper at Emmaus, to make gospel to the eye, or, as the philosophical people say, to employ art in the service of religion. The theme to be illustrated is Penitence, and the artist is to select a number of cases of notable repentance, in order that we may, from his treatment of the theme, obtain a clearer idea of the Love of God towards penitents which was in Christ Jesus our Lord. Four of these cases are delineated by the artist for our study and our edification.

We must, however, premise that, if the art-work is to be effective, it will be necessary for both artist and observer to have a correct idea of the place of Repentance in the scheme of Christian thought. We are not making a study of Natural Religion, for, as I pointed out recently, Natural Religion has no place in it for broken and contrite hearts; certainly, when Natural Religion gravitates into Pantheism, as it almost always does when left to itself, we shall find our canvas bare of figures. The two words Penitence and Pantheism are adjacent in the dictionary, but far removed in any other category of ideas. A Pantheistic artist will either say, 'Let us change the subject,' or else he will make his typical penitent say, without tears or sighs, but with an impertinence that tear or sigh would have excluded, 'Man's forgiveness give and take,' as Omar Khayyám does in his poem.

So we shall assume that all the figures presented in the guise of penitents will agree with one another in this: they will all come in at Repentance Gate, they will all go down Sorry Street, and get as