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THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

CHURCH union has been much before the public mind in recent years, and doubtless it will continue to be so in the years to come. But there is one aspect of it more comprehensive than any that is generally entertained by friendly Churches for one another. It is that aspect of it emphasized in the Epistle to the Ephesians, where the writer prays that his readers 'may be strong to apprehend *with all the saints* what is the breadth, and length, and height, and depth; and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge.' That is his ambition for his converts; the goal is that they 'may be filled unto all the fulness of God'; but the achievement of that ambition demands nothing less than all the spiritual force available. It can be accomplished, but only 'with *all* the saints.' Comprehensive beyond the dream of all but the most daring Churchmen would be a Church which included all the saints.

Most of us are not quite at our ease when we meet the word 'saints.' We feel that that high title is not for us, and we modestly prefer to associate it with the great figures of the Church who have exhibited the Christian virtues and graces and pieties in pre-eminent degree—St. John, St. Paul, St. Augustine, and many another whose light has burned and shone in the dark places of history. But in the New Testament the word simply designates the ordinary, inconspicuous members of Christ's Church, set apart and consecrated to the holy life involved in their relation to Christ; and the fundamental Church union, without which the larger unions will be robbed of more than half their vitality, is the brotherly union of the members of a local congregation with one another in their endeavour to apprehend the love of Christ and to cherish the things that are lovely and of good report.

These, however, are but a fraction of a mighty multitude which no man can number. We speak of the Holy Catholic Church. But of the Churches which call themselves Catholic, what can compare in catholicity with that which includes *all* the saints, and which places at the disposal of every tempted and struggling soul, for her guidance and inspiration, all the wise thoughts with which they have ever been visited, all the heroic endurance, even unto death, with which they have sealed their testimony, all their love, hope, faith, joy, triumph, all their vision of eternal things unseen?

All that glorious heritage is ours, and yet how little we know of it, how little we have entered into it, how little we have tried or even desired to enter into it! It is ours, and yet it is not ours, for most of us make little or no effort to appropriate it. Few of us know as much as we might of the saints whose heroic and brilliant story fills the pages of the history of our own Church, and we know still less of the saints of other Churches and other communions. But the true Christian fellowship knows no denominational distinctions; it

includes all who aspire 'to apprehend the breadth, and length, and height, and depth.'

No Church has a monopoly of piety or wisdom. Each has something to learn from every other. In ecclesiastical, as in other spheres, God fulfils Himself in many ways, and He has something to say to us through the saints and the methods of every communion. The European Churches in the meantime have much to teach the Asiatic Churches, but the time is perhaps not far distant when they will have something to learn from them. We are debtors unto all the saints—to those with whom we agree, and also to those from whom we differ. The more we know of the fellowship of the saints, the richer and the fuller will our own life be.

It becomes us then to enter speedily into communion with those about whose saintship there can be no dispute. And surely in this regard must come first of all the saints who wrote the Bible and who poured into it their experience of the love and the leading of God. But how often do we suffer our stifled souls to be revived in the ampler air of the Evangelists? Yet the Gospels and even the Epistles are far better known than the prophets. To many Christian people, are not Amos and Hosea little more than names? The Bible is crowded with the lives and the words of the saints, in whose fellowship, if we but cared to cultivate it daily, our lives might be clothed with undreamt-of nobility and power.

But all through the Church's history, from the first century to the twentieth, she has never been without her saintly witnesses; and our life will be the richer when we know the story of their struggles. Our fortitude will be encouraged by the sight of their fidelity, our wisdom will be matured by the study of their meditations. We should therefore be at more pains to acquaint ourselves with the biography of Christ's mighty men—Savonarola, Luther, Knox, Bunyan, the Wesleys, Newman, and many a score of others. 'Have ye not read?' said Jesus. Reading is one way of increasing our spiritual stature. Especially perhaps the reading of biography—'have ye not read *what David did*?' It might even be plausibly urged that the reading of biography is a Christian duty; it is at any rate an incomparable privilege—a means of grace and growth.

Every hymn-book is a testimony to our indebtedness to the saints. There we meet sweet singers of every communion. We sing 'Lead, kindly light, amid the encircling gloom,' 'My God, how wonderful Thou art!' 'Hark! the herald angels sing,' 'O Love Divine, how sweet Thou art!'—we sing these and a hundred other great hymns of the Church without asking or caring whether they came from monk or bishop or minister. In their harmonious songs of praise all petty discords die. As we sing those hymns we step into that shining fellowship from which no power can excommunicate us but our own little-mindedness and sin.

In a paper on the philosophical approach to religion, given at the recent Cambridge Congregational Conference, Professor Sorley said, 'Mathematics and mathematical physics again occupy the centre of the stage, as they did in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and their equations can be understood only by the highly trained mathematician. It would have been a good thing for the philosophers of the present day if they had been compelled to pass a qualifying examination in the higher mathematics before completing their professional curriculum. As it is, the non-mathematical philosopher has to accept many results which he understands only imperfectly and many reasonings which he does not understand at all. He has to move warily, but he is helped by the philosophers who have come from the ranks of the mathematicians themselves; and they have brought into prominence certain results of the new science which are conspicuously significant for philosophy.'

Realizing, as we have all begun to do, the profound bearing that the new physics is likely to have upon philosophy and theology, we welcome every competent attempt to elucidate its meaning

and help us to assign to it its due place in the realm of thought. In the current number of *The Hibbert Journal* there is an acute criticism of the New Realism as expounded by Professor ALEXANDER in his book on 'Space, Time, and Deity.' Professor ALEXANDER'S name for the New Realism is 'Empirical Metaphysics.' He limits experience to sense-experience, and therefore starts from the assumption that the physical world is 'the Universe.' Experience somehow guarantees its own reality independently of mind, which itself is only a bit of sense-experience. 'The effect of the empirical method in metaphysics is severely and persistently to treat finite minds as one among the many forms of finite existence having no privilege among them except such as it derives from its greater perfection of development.' In these words Professor ALEXANDER emphatically rules out 'mind as an entity superior both to things and to passing states.' It is not the object of sense-experience, therefore it does not exist.

What, then, is the ultimate reality? It is Space-Time. 'Space-Time is the stuff of which matter and all things are specifications.' Here we may ask, 'If sense-experience is the guarantee of reality, what experience have we of Space-Time?' We have experience of space as emptiness, and of time as duration, but of Space-Time as an indissoluble and all-embracing whole, of Space-Time as the one stuff of which all things are made, we have no experience whatever. Professor ALEXANDER, in endeavouring to elucidate the matter, describes Space-Time variously as 'the primary reality,' 'the bare elements of the world,' 'the totality of all substances.' Thus, as the critic in *The Hibbert Journal* justly remarks, 'Space-Time is on the one hand the universe in its lowest expression and on the other hand the universe in its totality. It is Alpha from one point of view, and Alpha and Omega from another.' But this confusion of thought was perhaps inevitable. For if the universe in its lowest expression is self-existent and intrinsically real, and if there is no gradation in reality, then, however much the universe may gain in complexity, it will never really rise above the level of its own lowest expression. It was Space-Time in the beginning of things, and it will be no more than Space-Time at the end.

The next question to be faced is, 'How does the primary reality Space-Time succeed in differentiating itself?' Here Professor ALEXANDER is driven back on metaphors which he uses somewhat vaguely and with little regard to their original meaning. Space-Time is the *matrix* out of which all things come, or the *stuff* from which all things are made. Taking the metaphor of a matrix or womb we may ask, 'How did the empty womb of Space-Time become full of possible existents, and how came they to be fertilized and born?' Taking the metaphor of stuff or raw material we may ask, 'By what power is the raw material worked up, and how can it be at once the endless variety of finished articles and yet remain the primary stuff?'

The term used to cover the process—a term which appears to be gaining a wide popularity—is 'emergence.' Matter is, at some unknown point and in some unknown way, an 'emergent' from Space-Time. Life is similarly an 'emergent' from matter, and mind an 'emergent' from life. There is here a succession of unexplained and unintelligible jumps, from Space-Time to matter, from matter to life, from life to mind. Take the first jump. The bodies of the physical world are not pieces of Space-Time, but pieces of something very different, namely, matter or mass. The space occupied by a body is no criterion of its mass. In other words, there is no fundamental connexion between the space occupied even by an atom and its massiveness, so that there is no transition from the mere conception of space to that of matter and its exchanges of energy. The transitions from matter to life and from life to mind are equally abrupt and unintelligible. As Professor Haldane has remarked in criticism of this theory of emergent evolution, 'It seems to me that Alexander produces the real world very much as a conjurer produces rabbits out of a hat. The rabbits are real enough, and not shams; but in reality they were there from the beginning. Newtonian matter was there from the beginning if it is there now. Life was also there from the beginning if it is

there now. Equally without beginning are the interest and values of conscious behaviour.' In other words, the ultimate source of all things must transcend the highest height to which the evolution has risen ; it must have contained from the first all that has ever emerged.

The weakness of the New Realism, as expounded by Professor ALEXANDER, is its depreciation of Mind. It seeks reality at the lower end of the scale rather than the upper. This amounts to a subversion of the due order of things and encourages a tendency to express the higher in terms of the lower. 'As we follow the world in its ascent from the first beginnings of things to the present stage of its development, we shall find that there is a constant tendency for each stage in turn to drag the stage next above it down to its own level, and to sink to the level of the stage next below it.' From this depreciation of mind there are, of course, eminent physicists who vigorously dissent. Eddington, for example, says, 'I know that I think with a certainty which I cannot attribute to any of my physical knowledge of the world.' And again, 'Mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience, and all else is remote inference.' Along this road he and others find the most direct avenue of approach to the ultimate reality. 'Order,' says Professor Sorley, 'is the result of intelligence on the human level ; and the greater order on the cosmic scale reveals an intelligence adequate to it. That, or else what we call chance. And the newer knowledge has so increased the complexity of the elements brought into order that the probabilities against the production of the world by a fortuitous concourse of atoms have been enormously increased. Three centuries ago Francis Bacon used the memorable words, "I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind." I do not know what reasons there are (if any) which could induce a reasonable man to believe the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, but I am convinced, in spite of the disagreement of many philosophers of the day, that there is, if possible, even more reason now than there was three hundred years ago to reject the view that "this universal frame is without a mind."'

'The Heathen Heart,' by the Rev. Campbell MOODY, D.D., attracted considerable attention when it was published some years ago. Dr. MOODY has followed that book (and others) by *The Purpose of Jesus in the First Three Gospels*, which contains the Bruce Lectures for 1929 (Allen & Unwin ; 5s. net). It shows the independence and clear vision which we have been led to expect from this writer. It raises big questions, indeed the biggest question of all, and seeks to bring us back to realities that in recent times have been largely evaded.

Dr. MOODY is dissatisfied with the way in which the gospel facts have been handled by writers on the New Testament in our time. The things that stare us in the face in the Gospels have been whittled down or ignored until Jesus has become a figure of no special significance. The whole trend of recent criticism has been to represent Jesus as a religious leader with a great message, not about Himself but about God. His purpose was to reveal God as Father, and there His significance ends. Dr. MOODY denies this. It was not the purpose even of His public preaching. It was still less the purpose of His individual dealing.

One of the outstanding facts of the gospel narrative is the urgency of Christ's claims for Himself. Is it possible to account for this 'awful urgency' if His complete gospel was summed up in the 'Prodigal Son'? Is it possible to account for this urgency, or to justify it, if His chief or perhaps His sole aim was to make known the love of the Father? Prophets and psalmists had revealed God's love to men. To receive their revelation it was quite needless to own any allegiance to them. Jesus as the Revealer of the Father is, indeed, an enticing picture, and it is true as far as it goes. But, taken alone, it does not present the Jesus of the Gospels. For, in the Gospels, His chief purpose is to draw men to Himself as the sole means of entrance to God's Kingdom, the sole means of approach to God.

And He implies, in one or two of His utterances, that He cannot, or will not, make a *real* revelation of the Father except to those who have joined themselves to Him.

This may be regarded as the central theme of the book. And Dr. MOODY proceeds, in a remarkable chapter on 'The Word of the Cross,' to carry it to the centre. The purpose of Jesus was to present Himself as a *Saviour*. The treatment of the death of Jesus is the best and most moving part of the book. It may be described as a vindication of the orthodox belief about the Cross. Dr. MOODY puts aside, with a few incisive but adequate words, some current interpretations. The death of Jesus, for example, was not merely the inevitable conclusion of His life. Again, Jesus did not go up to Jerusalem to offer Himself as Messiah, hoping that the people would receive Him.

Nor did Jesus go to meet death with the idea of moving the hearts of men by His sufferings. He does not speak, as we so often do, of winning men by love. As a matter of fact, what Jesus in the Gospels most insists upon is that His suffering is a necessity. Suffering and death are a cup handed to Him, a baptism awaiting Him. We are at once struck with the overwhelming importance of this event in His own mind. It is something to which He looked forward with mingled dread and expectancy. Was it from His study of Isaiah that our Lord learned a doctrine repugnant to the common understanding, the necessity of dying in order to reign? Is it not much more likely that the terrible truth, so unwelcome to flesh and blood, was directly revealed by the Father, and then confirmed by a study of Scripture? In any case, the disclosure appears to have come to Him at a very early date. The Temptation that followed the Baptism is much more comprehensible if we suppose that already a path of suffering lay before the eye of Jesus.

If Jesus regarded Himself as the Servant we need not discuss the authenticity of such words as 'The Son of man came to give his life a ransom in the place of many.' How could He keep from saying this? He must have thought it a hundred times. What it means, at the very least, is that Christ's death takes the place of the death of many; and the natural interpretation is that the death of an innocent One exempts the guilty. Why do so many theologians and interpreters admit this grudgingly, or deny it altogether? Surely it was Christ's meaning. Better to be frank, and admit Him wrong, than subtle, and explain Him away. Dr. MOODY points out that the truth of the 'ransom' saying is confirmed by the saying at the Lord's Supper, 'this is my blood of the covenant.' It was a covenant between God and man in the blood of Jesus.

Then follows what is the most interesting passage in the exposition, a justification of traditional beliefs about the death of Christ, particularly two: that which regards Jesus as a Substitute for the sinner, and that which lays emphasis on the justice of God. Dr. MOODY contends that biological and social science, as well as philosophy, has shattered the old assurance that each individual stands alone. They have made the old idea of substitution intellectually credible. He then proceeds boldly to vindicate the idea on moral grounds. Mentioning actual instances in which men have taken the place of others, he says that they arouse in us nothing but admiration and reverence. And if it be said that one may not be *punished* in another's stead, he demurs, and quotes in support Dr. Dods's question, 'In what intelligible sense can sins be borne but by bearing their punishment?'

The final stage of this absorbing discussion is a vindication of the conception of God as Judge. The God who is presented to us in much Christian thinking to-day is not a real Being, Dr. MOODY contends. The God who is love and only love, has a nature more limited than ours. When we are at our best, injustice and cruelty fill us with anger, and this anger is not a form of love! Just as little is the wrath of God to be belittled or apologized for. Indeed, the God who is imagined in much of our modern literature is not the God of either Old or New Testament; and just as little is He the God of reason, or of experience. If we exclude judg-

ment and wrath from the nature of God, we do not bring Him near. We put Him far away. He is no more the Living God. Dr. Moody brings all this to a pointed conclusion when he says that, though mystery may remain in the death of Christ, yet the mystery is abated if we recognize that by His own will, and by the Father's appointment, the innocent did, in some sense, take the place of the guilty. May God forbid that for us Jesus should cease to be a Saviour!

The Language of the Pentateuch in its Relation to Egyptian.

By Professor John E. McFadyen, D.D., Glasgow.

Professor A. S. Yahuda has just published an elaborate volume of 320 large and beautifully printed pages, bearing the title *Die Sprache des Pentateuch in ihren Beziehungen zum Aegyptischen* (Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, W.10; Mk.22). Only an accomplished Egyptologist could do justice to this impressive book; but even Old Testament scholars who are not Egyptologists will recognize it at once as a contribution of first-rate importance to Old Testament science. As this volume is to be followed by another which will deal with the portions of the Pentateuch not here discussed, any criticism of the argument which it introduces must be premature and incomplete; but the trend of the conclusion is already quite visible. Briefly it is this, that the Pentateuch originated about the time of the Exodus and before the conquest of Canaan. Hebrew, it is argued, was developed from a primitive Canaanite dialect, under the influence of Egyptian, into the literary language which we find in the Pentateuch: so pervasive is its Egyptian colouring, alike in language and style, that it could only have originated in an Egyptian environment. Thus the argument of the book, as its title suggests, is mainly, though not exclusively, linguistic. There are words and turns of expression, it is contended, which occur in no other Semitic language, but are to be found in the Pentateuch and in Egyptian; and similarly, words which within the Bible appear only in the Pentateuch, but also in Egyptian. Of course Egyptian words in the Pentateuch, like אָחוּ, *reeds* (Gn $41^{2.\ 18}$), have long been recognized as such, but Dr. Yahuda believes that other words, which have passed for Semitic, are really Egyptian: *e.g.* חַרְטֻמִּים, *magicians*, which the *Oxford Lexicon* connects with חֶרֶט, 'stylus,' is explained as derived from the Egyptian *ḥrj* and *ḏm* and meaning 'those who are over the books,' *i.e.* 'learned in the (magical) writings.' So תּוֹעֵבָה, *abomination*, for which the *Oxford Lexicon* assumes a root תעב, is held to be connected with the Egyptian *w'b* (יעב), 'pure, holy,' and it should in strictness be referred in Hebrew dictionaries to יעב. (The transformation of the meaning would be explained by the simple fact that what was holy to the Egyptians would be an abomination to the Hebrews.) Similarly בֵּן, *post, place* (*office*) (Gn 40^{13} 41^{13}), is believed to have nothing to do with the Hebrew בּוֹן, but comes from the Egyptian *gnw*, 'a stand.' Again שֶׁבֶר, *corn, grain*, which looks so genuinely Hebrew, is the Eg. *šbw*, 'food'; and the puzzling חֲמֻשִׁים (*Oxf. Lex.* 'in battle array,' Ex 13^{18}, Jos 1^{14} 4^{12}, Jg 7^{11}) is connected with the Egyptian *ḫmś* ('lance, harpoon') and explained to mean 'armed with lances.' It is certainly not without significance that no less than four Egyptian words appear in a single verse (Ex 2^{3})—תֵּבָה (ark), גֹּמֶא (rushes), סוּף (reeds), and יְאֹר (river).

The first and shorter section of the book deals with the Joseph and Exodus narratives, which reflect most distinctly the Egyptian environment, and exhibit most clearly a linguistic relation with Egyptian. The second and in some ways the more important and interesting section deals with the Genesis stories in 1–11, in which the Babylonian element has long been recognized, and with the patriarchal stories. The first section offers a detailed examination of certain words and phrases which can only be explained, or at least can best be explained, on the basis of Egyptian analogies. Here are some illustrations. The difficult עַל־פִּיךָ יִשַּׁק (Gn 41^{40}: according to thy word 'shall they be