appeared. 'A man or woman is now ashamed of being frequently drunk in neighbourhoods where before the War such a thing would scarcely have been remarked.' The rather meagre details in the chapter on Religion, in which no mention is made of the work of the Salvation Army, suggest that Mr. Martin cannot have made a very intimate study of the work of the churches. 'Nothing is better known about the industrial classes than that they are inveterately addicted to gambling. . . . With most people here gambling is in the blood, for many it is our chief relaxation.'

Christological Notes.

By Principal Alfred E. Garvie, M.A., D.D., New College, London.

I. The Reformation made the doctrine of justification by faith the crucial article of a falling or a standing Church. It will be now generally agreed that this is too narrow a basis, and we must lay a broader foundation for the theology which our day needs. In my judgment it is *the person and the work of Christ*, not in distinction or separation from one another, but in their necessary mutual implication, for the work as the expression of the person derives its significance and value from the person. His whole historical reality must be taken into account as Revealer of God and Redeemer of men. The three offices which the Protestant dogmatics recognized—prophet, priest, and king—need to be brought into a unity, as Ritschl brought them, but with one modification. He regarded the kingship of Christ as the unifying conception, the prophetship as the manward and the priesthood as the Godward aspect of that kingship. Christ established the kingdom of God by bringing God to men in the revelation of God, and drawing men to God by the redemption He effected. Holding as I do that the most adequate conception of the kingdom of God is that of His *present saving sovereign activity*, and that the primary organ of that activity was and is Christ, His kingship is this sovereign saving activity of God in and through Him; for therein and thereby God reveals Himself and redeems man.

(1) It is evident that as the organ of this activity of God, Jesus must be in so immediate and intimate relation to God that what He does God does in and by Him—the person must be Divine as is the work. Whole-heartedly do I hold the Nicene faith that God—no other and no less—was in Christ 'for us men and our salvation,' although my mind does not allow me to bind my appreciation of His Divine Person and Work to the philosophical categories of the Œcumenical Creeds. With the passage of the years this conviction grows clearer and firmer. For me it would mean disaster to the Church were this Nicene faith to lose its authority over Christian thought; and, therefore, no duty seems more urgent than that a large measure of agreement should be reached in a modern Christology, which would state the abiding truth in the current modes of thought and speech of to-day. These notes are an attempt to remove misunderstandings, and to offer suggestions towards the fulfilment of that duty, and thus the presentation of that truth, so that it will again secure general acceptance.

(2) In this connexion there seem to be two dangers to be avoided—modernism and reaction—the Scylla and the Charybdis between which contemporary Christology should steer a steady and straight course. Modernism seems to me so to minimize the difference between God and man—using too glibly talk about the humanity of God and the divinity of man—that the distinctiveness of the person and the work of Christ is obscured, and He becomes only one instance of a general process. Or, on the contrary, when not tending towards pantheism, but inclining to deism, it so asserts the difference of God and man that Jesus is reduced to a wise and good man—the best of His race—who told men that God was Father, but did not as Son perfectly reflect that Fatherhood in His own relation to God. He is either Divine, as all men in some degree may be, or not Divine at all, since no man can be. In the reaction against modernism, of which in my judgment the Barthian school must be regarded as the most prominent and influential example, it is this difference of God from man—God the wholly Other—which is so emphasized, as to make it impossible to form a concrete conception of the historical personality of Jesus, as God under human conditions and limitations. There is an *Otherness* of God from man, so that it tends only to confusion to use of

God and man, terms obscuring the difference. But God is not altogether Other than man. There is a likeness of man to God, so that God can be the Father of all men, and each man may become a child of God. If we deny the difference of God and man, we deprive Christ of His unique significance and value; if we deny the affinity of God and man, an intelligible and credible conception of Him becomes impossible, and the mystery of His person becomes a monstrosity.

(3) The reason why the Creeds have not given us a satisfactory formulation of the truth about Christ is that they rest on a pre- and sub-Christian conception of God and man alike, exaggerating the difference and ignoring the affinity. The difference of the natures is so asserted, that the unity of the person remains a mere verbal abstraction. We must think of God as Jesus taught, as the seeking heavenly Father, and of man as He dealt with man, as the lost earthly child, if we are to understand in any measure how in the Son of Man it was God Himself who was seeking and saving the lost. He did not change the nature, character, or purpose of God as eternal holy love; but He did seek to change men's thoughts of God. Even in Christian theology that necessary change has not yet been completed, and an adequately Christian Christology is hindered because we have not yet an adequately Christian theology and anthropology. To give only one illustration in regard to the second, it is unhistorical dogmatism to talk about the fall of man, as if Gn 3 could still be treated as authentic history. The reality of sin—its universality, its persistence, its potency—need not be minimized, but the facts as to man's origin and development which modern knowledge yields us must have due weight given to them in our estimate of man as sinful and needing salvation. Sin has not so changed the nature of man as to make him less God's creation, and in promise and potency by the divine intention His child. What seems now to be needed is sobriety of temper, balance of judgment, and moderation of language in our doctrine of man.

(4) Because it is imperative that we should have Christ's conception of God and man, the fact of the Incarnation is so important for Christian thought. A man inspired to think and to speak of God as Father is an immeasurably less adequate and convincing revelation of God's Fatherhood than is an historical personality, who, under human conditions and limitations, knew Himself to be Son, as no man had ever known himself to be, and because of the certainty He had in Himself and His constant relation to God could and did with confidence declare God as Father to men. It is He who, through His Sonship, has mediated God's Fatherhood to men; He Himself had not, and needed not, any Mediator. There was an immediacy in His relation to God as there is not for any to whom He had mediated God's Fatherhood. To minimize or to deny His uniqueness—and this word I use with as absolute a meaning as I can put into it—is not to give greater assurance of the universal Fatherhood of God; it is in my judgment to lessen the certainty. God as man can bring the reality of God into the thought and life of man, as no words of man about God can. A theologian is depriving himself of the grounds of his confidence in the truth of God's Fatherhood, if he by denying that Christ is God as man challenges Christ's own certainty as Son of God; for it seems to me at least His consciousness as Son was not an inference He drew from God's universal Fatherhood: it was because He knew Himself as Son that He revealed God as Father.

(5) Without attempting to deal in any detail with what may be called the metaphysics of the Person of Christ, as I have done this elsewhere,[1] there is just one consideration, which my recent studies have suggested, which seems to me to deserve mention. The conception of evolution, as represented by Herbert Spencer, is now superseded; the current conception is represented by such phrases as *creative*, or *Emergent Evolution*. It is recognized that at each stage of evolution something new is created or emerges, inexplicable by, although dependent on, the old. The possibilities of Bergson's *élan vital*, to which he has given a theistic reference, do not exclude such a creative personality as Jesus Christ. The evolution of Alexander's creative principle of Space-Time is always towards an ideal deity which never becomes actual. Is it not at least credible, and not unintelligible, that at one point the ideal deity became actual? Lloyd Morgan, whose philosophy is theistic as a necessary complement to his naturalistic science, expressly admits that the ideal may have become actual, if the historical evidence can be held to prove the fact. It is my conviction that a Christology such as I have tried elsewhere to formulate is not a flagrant contradiction, but an appropriate completion of the realist-idealist philosophy to which some thinkers to-day are tending as a theistic interpretation of the current conception of *Emergent*

[1] I may refer the reader who has interest enough to desire to know my views more fully to my volume, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*.

Evolution. To avoid misunderstanding, let it be made clear that Christ does not merely emerge as a significant and valuable variation in evolution. Each emergent is created; not a personified process, but the personal God alone is the explanation of this final emergent: 'in the fulness of the time God sent his Son' (Gal 4^4).

II. As Christology is the interpretation of an historical personality, it cannot be only a speculation, based on conceptions of God and of man and of their mutual relation, but it must be consistent with the facts. There are some difficulties in the understanding of these facts, which may prove hindrances to the acceptance of a Christology. And in order to remove, or at least to attempt to remove these stumbling-blocks, I shall in the second part of this essay deal with some which I have encountered in recent reading.

(1) *The literary sources* must first claim attenion. (*a*) While it may be necessary to deal more critically with the Synoptic evidence than I did in my book, *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus*, I am sure that the general impression of the historical personality does not need any serious modification. The recent development of New Testament criticism—the *Formenlehre*—lends support to this conclusion. We are in the Gospels not dealing with individual opinions about the subject of the record, but with the witness of a community to what its corporate faith in Him had come to be. Post-Resurrection experience may have modified traditions of the earthly ministry; but the words and works of that ministry are not the total historical reality of Jesus Christ with which theology is concerned. The faith of the Church in Christ is also a fact about Christ to be taken into account. Where the thought is an advance beyond contemporary Judaism, is it not more probable that it is the Master's, greater as He was than any of His disciples? If there are Jewish elements not consistent with His distinctive teaching, may not the community (predominantly Jewish) rather than He who in other respects rose above His environment be responsible for them? If He was great enough to evoke a faith which, challenged by the fact of the Crucifixion, triumphed in the experience of the Resurrection, is a minimizing hypercriticism genuinely historical?

(*b*) As regards the Fourth Gospel, I must adhere to the position of my book, *The Beloved Disciple*, that the reminiscences blend with the reflections of an eye-witness in many passages, that there are editorial additions, metaphysical interpretation on the one hand, traditions of the Synoptic type on the other, but that it is possible to use the Fourth Gospel as a secondary literary source, not to add new features to the historical representation of the Synoptics, but to illustrate and confirm features less prominent in the Synoptics. If we reject the Fourth Gospel altogether as an historical source, we shall hesitate about accepting the confession of Mt $11^{25\text{-}27}$ (=Lk $10^{21.\ 22}$), as 'Johannine marble amid Synoptic bricks.' But if the picture in the Fourth Gospel of the Son as knowing, trusting, loving, and obeying the Father commends itself to us as historical, then this passage will be credible as an authentic tradition. I should not feel justified in basing on the Johannine evidence a Christology which was inconsistent with the Synoptic testimony, but the Johannine representation makes explicit what is implicit in the general impression given by the Synoptics. A discriminating criticism is necessary, and no man who cares for truth will twist the facts to make them fit with dogmas; but regard for truth does not compel us to assume that Jesus was an ordinary Jew, with no secret of His personality to be disclosed in His words and works.

(2) *The limitation of the knowledge* of Jesus is sometimes advanced as an argument against allowing to His teaching the authority which is usually assigned to it. (*a*) That in matters of ordinary knowledge—facts with which science or history is concerned—Jesus shared the limitations of His surroundings is not disputed by any one who does not allow dogmatism to override evidence. When He Himself confesses His ignorance of the hour of His coming in glory (Mk 13^{32}), we need not be surprised if He ascribed the Psalms to David and the Law to Moses, in accord with the current language of His own time, or if He with others referred certain forms of disease to Satanic agency. I do not find it necessary to assume that He was accommodating Himself in these matters to the ignorance of His hearers. The Incarnation would have been only a semblance, had He possessed omniscience.

(*b*) Our Christology need not encounter any difficulty here, unless when His limitation of knowledge is used as the ground for denying the infallibility of His moral and religious insight concerning goodness and God. Such an argument seems to me, however, to betray ignorance in him who advances it. Knowledge and insight are not indistinguishable and inseparable. A learned man may be a fool. A man of little knowledge may be wise in the things of God. Knowledge depends on capacity to acquire and remember facts. Insight depends on sensitiveness of conscience and spiritual

receptiveness. Saints and seers have not always been scholars.

(*c*) It is as regards His eschatological teaching that it is most difficult to apply this distinction, for that teaching borrows much from Jewish thought which is, if not inconsistent with, yet divergent from His distinctive revelation of the Father, and has been discredited by the course of history. But some considerations may be offered to relieve the doubt. As the literature of the New Testament generally shows, the primitive community was, we might almost say, obsessed by the Jewish apocalyptic thought. Here more probably than anywhere, the tradition of the teaching of Jesus became coloured by the beliefs of the community. In so far as Jesus used this Jewish eschatology, He was using it as did the prophets of old ; not with prosaic literalness, but with poetic freedom. How can the undetermined future be spoken of, unless imaginatively, in figures of speech? Even if He took any parts of it more literally than our historical knowledge allows us to do, that must be included in the ignorance which He Himself confessed regarding the future. It is only if the essential ideas of Apocalypse—God's activity in human history, His fulfilment of His purpose in the course of events, His judgment in and mercy towards men and nations, the coming of His kingdom in power and glory—are to be dismissed as false that Jesus' use of Apocalyptic for the practical ends of warning or encouragement can be regarded as evidence of the fallibility of His moral and religious judgment.

(3) That Jesus was in all points tempted as we are, yet without sin (He 4^{15}), is a truth firmly held by many whose Christology, if logically carried out, would make temptation impossible, because of the practical assurance that for this reason He is able to succour those who are tempted (2^{18}) and is compassionate towards them. With this lack of consistent thinking we need not now concern ourselves. The serious danger to Christology is the view that Jesus fell before temptation, and that had He not fallen, He would not, and could not, have been so gracious and pitiful to others.

(*a*) The assumption that temptation necessarily leads to sin strikes at the very roots of the moral consciousness. Sin would not be sin, were it inevitable. While there are temptations which are due to previous sinning, there are suggestions from without which have the character of temptation not in themselves, but because they offer the lower of two moral courses. The temptations of Jesus did not arise from any inward corruption but from His vocation, in which the alternative was presented of fulfilling the popular expectations or of doing the will of God itself, of escaping suffering or accepting sacrifice. As regards the second consideration, it may be said confidently that while there is a Pharisaic righteousness, there is also a saintly goodness: the first shows no pity, the second is full of grace. It is he who has carried the battle through to victory who can best succour the tempted, and show compassion to their weakness.

(*b*) It is to be regretted that theology has given such prominence to this negative phrase, *the sinlessness of Jesus*, instead of dwelling rather on the positive fact of His moral perfection, for, if we adequately appreciate the whole content of His personality, we shall hesitate in pronouncing our fallible judgment on any minor detail of His conduct, which we do not fully understand. The height of His ideal, as exemplified in His life as well as His teaching, of purity of heart, goodness in the motives and dispositions, as well as words and deeds, the depth of His humility in His dependence on, and submission to, the Father, the breadth of His compassion towards all men, the length of His constancy amid trial and suffering in His vocation make Him, to complete the spatial metaphor, an instance of four-square excellence. Compare Him with so great a Christian as Paul, how He excels in His appreciation of the beauty of Nature, His interest even in the beasts and birds around Him, His valuation of childhood and womanhood.

(4) What appears to me hypercriticism in face of such a character has discovered flaws in His attitude to the Gentiles, His denunciation of the Pharisees, His acquiescence in the moral order with its rewards and punishments, His recognition of the will of God in judgment as well as in mercy. (*a*) The case of the Syrophœnician woman is altogether inadequate counter-evidence to the universality of His grace, and His generous recognition of Gentile faith or Samaritan goodness. We do not know the whole story so as to justify a confident judgment. If we exercise an appreciative imagination, we can, reading between the lines, see in the words of Jesus an exposure of the Jewish prejudices of His disciples, who had probably remonstrated with Him for passing into a Gentile region, as in the parable of the Good Samaritan and in the commendation of the Samaritan leper He rebuked another prejudice. That the disciples should not seek earthly goods, nor limit their friendliness, as the Gentiles do (Mt 6^{32}, 5^{47}), is surely

a statement of fact and not a proof that He shared these prejudices.

(*b*) The disciples are required to excel the Pharisees (Mt 5^{20}) as well as the Gentiles. The Pharisees represented a perversion of religion and morals in their legalism, formalism, conceit, and censoriousness which was the antithesis of the filial piety towards God and fraternal practice towards men. Jesus taught that false principles and wrong practice were a hindrance to goodness and godliness. Their lovelessness to those who did not follow their ways, especially to the outcasts of Jewish society, was hateful to the compassionate heart of Jesus. His indignation seems to me no moral defect, but the inevitable reaction of the distinctive excellences of His character, of the distinctive deliverances of His conscience against what was most contrary. To be angry, if there be no personal resentment, is not sin ; it is the expression of a nature enthusiastic for virtue, passionate in loving. To think otherwise is in my judgment to show defective moral discernment.

(*c*) There is a moral order of the world, in which we may discern the reaction of God to goodness, and against evil. To describe the beneficent consequences of virtue or the injurious consequences of vice as natural only is to personify Nature, and to interpose that abstraction between God and man in His dealings with man. To take isolated sayings of Jesus about non-retaliation as exhaustively indicating human duty and divine purpose in regard to sin, as some pacifists do, is to ignore the teaching of the succession of prophets, and the witness of the course of history. Even to represent God's redemptive activity in Christ as God's sole method of government of mankind is a partial understanding. Those who refuse grace are under law ; those who reject mercy fall under judgment. That in calling men to receive the kingdom of God in repentance and faith Jesus warned of judgment and promised mercy shows no fall on His part below the Christian ideal. Jesus does speak of rewards and punishments ; He recognized reality, and based His appeal on such reality because those to whom He spoke needed such an appeal. But if we look beneath the figurative language, the blessings He offers are not such as the selfish or the worldly would appreciate and desire. I see a danger to an ethically sound and strong theology in the prevailing pacifism, which knows only the tenderness, and not the terror of the Lord, which would dismiss such a phrase as 'the wrath of the Lamb' as a superseded superstition. Redemption is, we may believe, God's final purpose, which, we may dare to hope, will be ultimately fulfilled ; but retribution—the reaction of His holy love against sin—has a place, even if it be subordinate, in God's dealings with men. To my conscience there is no offence in anything that Jesus taught about God's judgment, about the rewards of righteousness, or the penalties of sin. In His Cross He accepted, approved, and vindicated that moral order even in redeeming men.

(*d*) Those who reject the testimony of the Fourth Gospel cannot use the answer of Jesus to His mother at Cana (Jn 2^{4}) as evidence of defect, nor His committal of her to the beloved disciple as an unnatural severance of His filial relations (19^{26}). If we accept the words on both occasions as authentic, we must not judge them in isolation, but as parts of the larger whole of His renunciation of the family relations, whenever and wherever these in any way conflicted with the absolute claims of God. A mother's influence must not control the use of the powers God had entrusted to Him. In this universal relation to mankind as Saviour and Lord His filial relation must be suspended. Theology has sometimes given a representation of the sinlessness of Jesus, to which we may apply Tennyson's words : 'Faultily faultless, icily regular, splendidly null.' What is often ignored is His emotional intensity in His submission to God and service and sacrifice for man ; His rebuke, if such it was of His mother at Cana, or of Peter at Cæsarea Philippi (Mt 16^{23}), was not spoken in cold blood, but at white heat of feeling ; and we dare not judge whether the words should or should not have been spoken, unless we can feel as He did.

(*e*) That there is no evidence in the Gospels that Jesus ever showed penitence, confessed sin, or craved pardon is an indication of sinlessness from the beginning even in His inward life, which to me is absolutely convincing, and any minimizing of its significance leaves me unmoved. His attitude to sinners of compassion, succour, judgment, forgiveness is inexplicable to me, had He had any sense of sharing that sin Himself. How could such insensibility be combined with the holy love His character in other respects displays ? Over against this cumulative evidence, an obscure saying such as, 'Why callest thou me good ? none is good save one, even God' (Mk 10^{18}) cannot be understood as a confession of sin. May we not rather see in it a token of His humility towards God ? While He was still being tempted, and under trial, while His baptism of sacrifice was not yet accomplished,

nor His vocation fulfilled, He would not claim equality with the perfection of God.

(*f*) Even if I could not find an explanation in instances of word or deed which presented moral or religious difficulty, I should not dare to set my judgment as infallible over against His as fallible. There is enough positive evidence of unique supreme excellence to inspire an adoration for His personality, which justifies the conviction that if there appear what seem defects (I do not believe that there do), He must have been misunderstood or misreported. To sum up, the limitation of knowledge does not prejudice the infallibility of moral and religious judgment. The liability to temptation does not exclude the sinless perfection. There is neither word nor deed that compels us to lower the estimate of His person or work, which the faith of the Church throughout the centuries has enshrined—the faith which has proved that its hold is not on an illusion, but a reality, by its potency in saving and sanctifying men, and its promise of a humanity, redeemed from sin, and reconciled to God.

The Rationalization of Preaching.

By the Reverend J. S. MacArthur, B.D., St. Michael's College, Llandaff.

By the rationalization of preaching is meant, not the intensification of the appeal to reason in sermons, but the application to the ministry of the Word of methods analogous to those which in industry go by the name of rationalization. These methods in industry may be briefly summarized as specialization of work, centralization of control, and consequent elimination of redundant effort. Just at present there is a far from negligible body of opinion, represented by such men as Dr. C. E. Raven, which favours the view that the effectiveness of the ministry of the Word would be increased by following a similar plan. In this way not only would the standard of preaching be raised, but much activity would be liberated for the service of the Church in other directions.

As matters stand, vast numbers of clergy with no special homiletic gifts or qualifications have to preach, and preach frequently. The results of such preaching, it is urged, are not proportionate to the amount of labour expended on it, and the clergy who toil ineffectively at the production of less than second-rate sermons would fulfil their vocation better by devoting more care and time to pastoral work and to the spiritual direction of individual souls, work which in the end is more fruitful than even the best preaching. And the present age will not tolerate amateur preaching. Accustomed as it is to the workmanlike and finished products of rationalized industry, it demands a similar standard of technique in the pulpit. This demand is already to some extent being met by the wireless transmission of sermons and religious addresses, for which it is claimed that they attain so high a level as to make the average listener more than critical and less than receptive of what he hears when he goes to church. Hitherto the clergy, with the exception of such as are favourites of the microphone, have been disposed to turn a cold eye on broadcast preaching, regarding it as a rival to the regular ministry of the Word.

Would it not then be better to abandon the attitude of suspicion and frankly accept this new kind of preaching, this rationalized preaching, as a potent and valuable ally? The faithful would still assemble themselves together for worship, they would still receive the sacramental and pastoral ministrations of their clergy, but the sermon would proceed from a loud-speaker or even from a gramophone.

Along with this there might go a less drastic rationalization, effected by the selection of specially gifted and trained men who would constitute a preaching order in which their capabilities would find free scope, unhindered by the claims of pastoral or administrative work. Such a policy as this would not be conforming to the fashion of this world, but rather attempting to remove the reproach that the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light.

Yet plausible though the scheme sounds, it gives rise to serious doubts. In the first place, it is possible to question whether the rationalization of industry has been such a proved success as to commend analogous methods to the Church. There are two factors which impede the smooth working