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Ancient religion was always apt to be absorbed in cult and ceremonial, and much, too, of modern religion leans that way. But there is no evading the principle laid down here that no ritual can for a moment compare with a consecrated life; no sacrifice can please the Father's heart half so much as a child's brave loyalty in common things. We have taken the words 'Divine service,' and limited them wrongly to denote worship in church; and so the nearly incurable tendency to separate off the sacred and the secular still finds its way into common speech, and the gulf between the two is kept open. But all Christians are priests, and all

their lives should be service. There can be devotion in the lowliest duty, there can be prayer in business routine, there can be praise in drudgery, there can be consecration in everything. That, as the Apostle puts it, is the one kind of service which is *reasonable*. No other sort will bear being planned for, no other sort will bear being looked back upon. In His mercy God gave all He had, for Jesus Christ was His very heart. We must render back our all for very thankfulness, with the overflowing joy of those who have been put deeply in debt and are content to owe everything to God.¹

¹ H. R. Mackintosh, *The Highway of God*, I.

Recent Foreign Theology.

A Swedish Philosopher.

THE scholars and thinkers of the smaller nations who use their mother-tongue are at a distinct disadvantage, unless their writings are translated into what may be called one of the international languages. I had not even heard of this Swedish philosopher¹ until the editor of this volume sent me a copy of this German translation. The contents consist of lectures, delivered on the Claus-Petri Foundation at the University of Uppsala. The editor has prefixed an Introduction of forty pages, giving an account of the author and a sketch of his philosophy. Vitalis Norström was born in 1856, and died in 1916. From 1890 till his death he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Gothenburg.

His philosophical standpoint can be stated in the following propositions: (1) Philosophy should be regarded as epistemology, and not as ontology. (2) The start must be made from psychology, as containing the roots of all special sciences. (3) The activity or self-activity of thinking should be brought under the direction of the logical principle. (4) Logical necessity expresses not the *is* but the *should be*; and this formal normative science leads on to the real normative science, or ethics. (5) Moral obligation demands the wider content of society, law, and culture; and thus ethics leads on to history. But history may be regarded either

¹ Vitalis Norström, *Religion und Gedanke*, mit Einführung von Elof Akesson (Borelius, Lund; Kr. 12).

circularly (statically) or progressively (dynamically); the crucial point is whether the historical interpretation is *naturalistic* or *supernaturalistic*. A meta-historical standpoint must be attained, and that is attained only in the religious consciousness. The advance of philosophy is thus from psychology to logic, from logic to ethics, from ethics to history, and from history to religion (pp. xxxiv-xxxvi).

The Table of Contents indicates the progressive exposition of the volume. The first chapter discusses thought as the organizing principle of experience. The last sentence here may be quoted: 'We have accordingly fixed three different standpoints, which can be assumed towards scientific work. Of these the one *Empiricism* attaches itself one-sidedly to content and experience; the second *Formalism* one-sidedly to form and activity; while the third traces the form back to the subject as its source, sets the subject over against an object as the capacity over against a material, determines the capacity more closely as motive and power towards systematic unity, and derives the scientific transforming work from this motive and this power' (pp. 42-43).

The second chapter deals with the conception of Truth. The author starts from *truth for us*, not *truth in itself*, although the movement is from the one to the other as an ideal. Three types of science are recognized—natural science, mathematics and logic, and history. It is the author's conviction that 'the fundamental significance of truth belongs to the historical type' (p. 67).

Continuing the discussion in the third chapter, he compares truth as accurate description (realism), truth as coherence (formalism), and truth as value (pragmatism as opposed to intellectualism). 'The experience,' he says, 'which is the source of the knowledge of all that we can truly know of activity and purpose is present in the life of the will, and otherwise nowhere' (p. 90). These words, to which larger type is given, indicate the standpoint of the author, apprehending and thinking are activities, subordinate to willing as life.

Accordingly the fourth chapter, which was not included in the course of lectures, is a condemnation of *Intellectualism*, which it charges with two mortal sins. 'First that it inevitably leads to dogmatism, and then that it places itself as a hindrance in the way of our spiritual freedom' (p. 121). Regarding reality statically, it obstructs the dynamic of the will, and the progressiveness of truth for us.

Turning to a more constructive exposition, the author in chapter v. discusses the relation of *Form and Content*. Kant is blamed for a relapse to the dogmatism of the past, in referring the unifying principle of thought to reality itself, and not to our experience of it, and in not advancing from the theoretical thought to the volition, of which it is an aspect. Lecture vi. discusses the problem of mechanism and freedom from the author's distinctive standpoint, in which personality is the dominant conception, and in which will is the distinctive aspect of personality. He unequivocally asserts personal freedom. He regards the mechanical method as in its own sphere legitimate, but as necessarily pointing beyond itself. '*Natural necessity*,' he says, 'is a conception which has meaning and application only within a circle of facts closed by thought. . . . Nevertheless reality encloses what is *outside* as well as what is *inside*, and when thought, driven by a universal impulse, goes out and seeks reality itself, it steps over every barrier, which it has itself set. In this movement towards completeness and reality it then also lifts with the barriers the natural necessity' (p. 195). Chapter vii. seems to go over much the same ground, as it deals with natural science and psychology. The mathematical natural science is said to be confined to the quantitative, psychology is the science of the qualitative. Agreeing with Husserl as to the need of a science of the Qualitative, the author declines to distinguish phenomenology as a science different from psychology. He himself contrasts humanistic with natural science. 'Over against the explanation of man out of nature there stands the explanation of nature out of man' (p. 220).

He does not, however, rest in humanism, as for him faith completes knowledge, and 'no one reached faith by *willing*, only by *receiving*. Faith is never a work of our own inner activity by itself. It does not belong to what is done, but to what occurs' (p. 222). Chapter viii. accordingly passes from science to religion and philosophy. Science is a system of questions and answers; but it leaves some of its own questions unanswered; to answer them is the task of philosophy. 'From the logical criticism of the questions put there accordingly necessarily springs the epistemological, which takes up for treatment the universal problem of knowledge' (p. 232). The upper limit of inquiry confronts us with a reality that is more than knowledge, even will, feeling, life itself. 'The objective of this whole exposition,' he says, 'is to show religion as a last demand, which springs out of the striving for completeness of the scientific consciousness, and out of scientific self-reflection *in toto et tanto*, by means of successive logical mediation and without doing the least violence to the work and method of the sciences' (pp. 245-246).

The last three lectures deal with religion as the life of the soul, characterized by *peace* and inwardness, as universal community, and thus related to morality, and as eternal life, or redemption from finitude. While religion is a struggle for the culture of personality, yet it moves beyond its course and goal towards 'an existence (*Sein*) which is above all development, all history, and all obligation.' As I understand the writer, religion rises above a personal communion with the personal God to the supra-personal reality. But he stops just where it seems to me the crucial issue arises. 'Here at the close it would remain to elucidate the relation of the belief in eternity to the current belief in the hereafter, above all to the representation of God. That is not as yet relevant. Only so much in this last respect may be emphasised, that the idea of the Kingdom leads us a good deal deeper into religion than the idea of God. Both are genetically bound together, but the representations of God in and for themselves never lead beyond the standpoint of immanence to a decisive transcendence. That belongs alone to the belief in immortality, to the eternal Kingdom of personality' (p. 322).

I have read this volume with deep interest and high appreciation; but this conclusion disappoints me. While the popular religious conceptions of the personal God may not rise above immanence, may be too anthropomorphic, yet on the line of the development of thought in this volume that defect

could find its correction. While in relation to the world and man we may think of God as personal, as perfectly what man is imperfectly, we may supplement that conception by thinking of God as also supra-personal, not in contradiction to the personal, but as completing as well as including the personal. The merit of the volume is the evidence it offers of the onward march of human consciousness from natural to humanistic or cultural science, from knowledge to life, from life in man to life above and beyond. Justice is done to science in its own sphere; philosophy is vindicated as a necessary complement to science; and the inevitableness of religion as the highest and last issue of thought and life is fully recognized. Regarding

this volume, as many others, one does wish that philosophers would not be quite so much aloof from religious life generally, and would not take popular religious conceptions as final, but show a more intimate and appreciative knowledge of what theology, adequately equipped philosophically, can offer in correction of common religious thinking. While there is what seems unnecessary repetition, yet on the whole the argument advances consistently, and one can only wish that the writer had been spared to answer the ultimate questions which this course of lectures indicates, but does not deal with adequately. I can heartily commend this volume.

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Contributions and Comments.

The Question of the Unveiled Woman (1 Co. xi. 2-16).

FOR years I have read your splendid paper, both with pleasure and profit. I live in a Roman Catholic country where the Bible is read only in limited Evangelical circles, and there is no organ devoted to Bible study, such as appears in your columns.

This being the case, I hope I shall not be disappointed as I look to you to publish this letter in which I expose my serious doubts as to the traditional interpretation of 1 Co. xi. 2-16, *i.e.* the question of the unveiled woman.

After some study of the best commentators such as Godet, Plummer, etc., and a conscientious archæological research, to which I was led for reasons other than mere literary curiosity, I arrived at the conviction that a false concept, of ancient standing, is responsible for a certain confusion on the part of commentators. All whose works I have consulted interpret the thought of St. Paul as an *oriental* restriction obliging the Christian women of Corinth not to appear in public 'bare-faced.' (The adjective is Plummer's, *Intern. Crit. Comm., in loco.*)

This also is the thought of Ramsay in *The Cities of St. Paul*, dealing with the question of the 'authority' which the woman should have on her head.

But for this idea, of course, the famous interpretation of the unveiled woman's arousing the lust of the angels would never have arisen.

Herein is the error, as I see it. If we bring into the question the 'oriental' idea of *face veiled* or *unveiled*, not only is it impossible for us to understand the figures used by the Apostle, but we are inevitably led up against all the most positive data of history and archæology.

In the first place, let us observe that in all this passage we never find the word *face*; we find *head*, and that repeatedly. Furthermore, speaking of the head's being covered, Paul refers to the man as well as to the woman: this excludes the idea of veiling *the face*, because there never was a time, or a place, where it was the custom for men to go with their faces veiled.

Here we begin to catch up our thread.

In v. 16 Paul compares the abundant hair with a *peribolaion*. The Latin Vulgate uses *velamen*, and in Latin countries both Catholic and Protestant versions use *veil*: Sacy, Ostervald, Fillion, Goguel, Luzzi, Portuguese translations, etc. But let us notice that the Latin *velamen* does not necessarily imply the idea of our modern *veil*; even as the Greek *peribolaion*, it signifies rather a *mantilla*.

Honour, then, is due to the English translators, who did not use the term *veil* for *peribolaion*, in v. 16, but *covering*. Thus they take Paul from the ridiculous position in which he is placed by the