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fateful days in Jerusalem. But He refused. In the same Spirit He refused the relief on the Cross of a stupefying drug which was frequently procured for a crucified criminal by his friends. He forgot His pain, indeed, to comfort the dying thief who was crucified beside Him. These pictures of Jesus are typical. Like instances could be multiplied to show the untruth of the traditional representations of Jesus found in 'Christian art' and in conventional religious teaching.

Mr. TERHUNE takes as the climax of his own presentation the moment on the Cross when Jesus uttered the words, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' These words are commonly interpreted as a cry of dereliction, expressing the Saviour's dreadful sense of forsakenness. But to Mr. TERHUNE this is inconceivable. And it is also unnecessary. The words are the opening sentence of one of the Psalms, the twenty-second. The

Psalm was known by its first line, as 'Rock of Ages,' 'Nearer, my God, to Thee' are known to us. In this Psalm there are many phrases that could be read into His own experience, such as 'they pierced my hands and my feet.' And Jesus was repeating the Psalm to Himself as He hung on the Cross. Why? To comfort His friends who were there, says Mr. TERHUNE, by reminding them that all this had been foretold long ago. It was His supreme act of self-forgetfulness, the finest instance of His 'shining strength.' We may not be able to follow the author in this interpretation, and yet accept the fact that this cry was not one of desolation. For the twenty-second Psalm was really a song of trust in God, and Jesus may have been repeating it to Himself as a simple act of confidence in His Father. The words the onlookers caught were the opening words. But they may not have meant what traditional theology asserts they meant.

Brunner and the Moral Problems of our Time.

BY THE REVEREND SYDNEY CAVE, M.A., D.D., PRESIDENT OF CHESHUNT COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE title of this article may seem to some to savour of paradox. Brunner is a Barthian, and what have Barthians to say on the moral problems of our age? In his famous Commentary on Romans, Barth was as contemptuous of Christian Ethics as of Christian theology. Barth has long since recovered from what he later called 'the childish disease of being ashamed of theology,' but he still speaks as if we should jettison the whole development of theology from Schleiermacher through Ritschl, and in his Prolegomena to Theology (*Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes*) quotes with most approval the words of the Schoolmen of Protestant Orthodoxy, and that Orthodoxy was too concerned with correct belief to be much interested in moral problems.

Brunner writes without the violence of Barth, and is not, as Barth often is, the victim of a love for paradoxes. But his great book, *The Mediator (Der Mittler)*, described by Canon Mozley in the September issue of THE EXPOSITORY TIMES, poured

bitter scorn on modern attempts to describe the Jesus of history. All such attempts are variants of the one theme: that men do not believe in Christ. In spite of the concluding paragraphs in which he speaks of following Christ being the consequence of faith in Him, a casual reading of the book could easily lead to the view that Brunner, too, had little interest in modern perplexities of conduct. It has been from the attempts to understand the Jesus of history which he condemns that modern movements in Christianity to deal with social problems have often sprung.

The publication a few months ago of Brunner's book, *The Command and the Ordinances (Das Gebot und die Ordnungen)*, makes it impossible for any honest critic of the Barthian movement any longer to speak as if it had nothing to say on our modern problems. To the reviewer it seems one of the most suggestive and significant books on Christian Ethics he has read. Brunner writes with a knowledge of how many men have actually to

live which is lacking in many books on Christian Ethics written by men who are themselves protected from the cruel insecurity of modern industrialism. The book is a massive work of some seven hundred pages. Brunner describes it as an *Outline of Protestant Theological Ethic*. He tells us that as he read in its preparation other books on Christian Ethics, he found to his surprise that although there are many Protestant books on Ethics, none sprang from 'the centre of evangelical faith.' Many so-called Protestant Ethics are really Catholic in their teaching, for they are not based on the central Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. A truly Christian Ethic must not attempt to say what we ought to do. It should not make decisions, but should be preparatory to a decision. Otherwise it will be legalistic, and 'the chronic disease of legalism is the conflict of duties.' There is but one Christian command: the command to love. And what love in the Christian sense is we know, first through what God did in the Cross of Christ. 'Christian Ethics is the science of human activity as defined by the divine activity' in the Incarnation and the Cross of Christ. 'Love in the sense of the New Testament is not a possibility of man, but solely the possibility of God.' 'To be "in love" is not something man can be of himself; it is given to man through faith in God.' 'We are not—that is the meaning of the phrase, image of God—fixed stars; God alone shines in His own light; He alone has aseity. We are planets, which can only shine in borrowed light, in His light.'

Brunner passes from the discussion of the one command of love to consider the Creative Ordinances of God, which are the means chosen by the divine wisdom to bring men into those social relations in which alone human life can be lived. The first and most fundamental social relation is that of sex. Then follow the social relations connected with the provision of human needs and industry, and the social relations of race, State, and Church.

In his application of the law of love to the specific circumstances of these various social relations, Brunner writes with a sober sense that these relations have all been perverted by sin. 'We must not for a moment forget that we know the creation of God only as marred by sin and created men only as sinners.' It is only in the external activities of men that progress can be discerned and perfection is possible. 'When we look at the moral sphere, we have to say, there is no work which does not bear the finger-mark of sinful man.' There is progress in scientific technique

and research. 'A more or less continuous upward line can be traced from the rough stone hammer of palæolithic man to the electric dynamo.' But when we pass from life's circumference to its centre progress is more doubtful. 'Who in this age of motoring and of the world-war will dare affirm that human life is now more valued?' 'There is scarcely a good discovery which is not at once brought into the devil's use. Men are pressed nearer together, and the individual is more lonely. Christianity has spread itself over the world, but with this there is an atheism of the masses unknown in earlier times. And if we speak of the individual, who will assert that men are better than they used to be?' Brunner's words may sound to many too sombre. But at least his sober estimate of man saves him from the cruelty of an easy idealism, and he judges of modern problems as one who knows how hard life is for many.

It is impossible in one brief article to discuss the solutions which he suggests. As this book has only recently been published and is as yet but little known to English readers, it seems better to describe his treatment of moral problems without comment, whether of agreement or dissent, and as far as possible in his own words.

Marriage.—The crisis of marriage is a permanent phenomenon of history in that monogamy has always had to fight against other forms of sex-relationships, whether legal or illegal. And this is specially true of the history of Christianity owing to its strong demand for monogamy—a demand which has never been completely met. But, in the strict sense of the word, the crisis of marriage is a quite new phenomenon which in the last decades—we might even say, in the last decade—has caused the moral demand for monogamous marriage to be widely questioned both in theory and practice. The causes of this crisis are many: the destruction of the economic unity of the family, the housing-shortage of the great towns, the economic, social, legal, political, and spiritual emancipation of woman, the discovery of contraceptives, and, above all, those deep spiritual changes which have as their watchword the claim to 'the right of personality.' The crisis of marriage presents to-day the most serious and difficult problem of Christian ethics. And it is a problem which is too often dealt with in a merely conventional way. 'It is in its treatment of marriage that all Protestant ethics remains anabaptist or catholic; it is here that it turns the Sermon on the Mount into a "law."' But the problem cannot be solved by

an appeal to verses of Scripture. The seventh commandment requires to be founded in theology ; it is necessary to show the connexion of this commandment with the Biblical understanding of God and man.

The principle of monogamy cannot be assumed as self-evident. The subjective-idealist interpretation of its origin is inadequate. It is by no means obvious that a man can only love one woman at a time. If marriage be based on love, it is lost in advance. The lover cannot guarantee either the permanence or the soleness of his feeling of love, and marriage thus becomes only hypothetically possible. To base marriage on love is thus to build a house on sand. It is, indeed, this subjective idealism which more than anything else is the cause of the present crisis of marriage.

'Christian faith derives the validity of its demand for monogamy on the divine ordinance of creation.' 'Marriage is not a sacrament—and Protestant ethicists should cease at last to play with this conception of late Catholic ethics—but it is a *Sanctum*.' 'The sexual is not evil in itself; it is evil if separated from the personal bond of loyalty. It is the isolation of the sexual that is evil.' 'Marriage is the divinely created school of social relations, in which a man can learn that he can live not in isolation but in relation to another.'

What we recognize in the divine creative ordinance is the idea of marriage. 'This idea no more corresponds to its actuality than an actual man corresponds to the idea of man as God's image. As there are only sinful men, so there is only sinful marriage—marriage which is at the same time adultery.' That is a hard saying. It seems extravagant to say, as Brunner does, that 'the absolute law which Jesus taught about the sinful look makes each one of us an adulterer.'

The fact of universal sin most deeply modifies the moral problem of marriage. Protestant ethic must recognize this fact. Only as it does so will it free itself from the legalism of its Catholic heritage. The first modification of the moral problem of marriage by the recognition of the fact of sin lies in the added purpose of marriage as *remedium concupiscentiae*. Marriage is, as experience shows, the *Optimum* between complete asceticism and any other form of sexual relationship. The erotic-sexual impulse, in itself, like all that God created, pure and good, has through sin become a great peril for the life of the individual as of the community. What erotics regard as the fundamental fault of marriage—a certain tempering and

'domestication' of the wild erotic impulse—is one of the blessings of marriage.

A second modification, which the recognition of the fact of sin makes on the morality of marriage, is this: 'Since all are adulterers (*sic*), distinctions among men are only relative.' The man who has not committed adultery according to the civil law, cannot, on this account, boast that he has kept the seventh commandment. It is from this point of view that Brunner views the problems of divorce. Cases may arise when a man, in order to obey God's command, must act 'against the law,' the law expressed by the idea of marriage, which is God's creative ordinance. The recognition of the command of love—*i.e.* the recognition of grace—may in the concrete case within the sinful reality necessitate the breach of the generally formulated law of the creative ordinance of the idea of marriage. Brunner complains that even Protestants fail adequately to realize this. 'It is the curse of "Christian morality" that it always regards the most legal conception as the most "earnest."' 'Above all ordinances, even above the ordinances of creation, stands the will of God which here and now demands of me that I act to my neighbour with responsible love. But in a sinful complex world, no general law can lay down in advance what that action must be.'

Brunner proceeds to discuss the separate problems of marriage. Marriage cannot be founded on love. 'It originates in love, but it has its continuance in loyalty.' 'A marriage without love is a misfortune which requires for its endurance a moral energy and a heroic conception of life which for most men is beyond their powers.' "'Christian morality" for centuries, under the influence of false ideas of chastity, and of the ideal of virginity, has so persistently failed to recognize the importance of the natural ground-element of marriage and has so foolishly tabooed the emphasis on its importance as "unspirituality" . . . that the violent eruption of suppressed nature which we now experience, had to come.' 'A legalistic and falsely spiritual Puritanism and Pietism' departed from the realism of the Reformers, and the 'suppression from the side of the Christian society, due to this wrong development, of the elementary rights of human nature is the chief cause of the present chaos.'

'A marriage without love, and that means without sexual attraction, ought never to be made. If it is made, it carries in itself the seed of dissolution. The spirit, especially if it be created by faith, can carry on a conflict with nature, and perhaps against nature maintains the marriage. But even at the

best a high price has to be paid for the victory ; in many cases the price is too high. For the sake of love to the neighbour, the dissolution of such a marriage is the sole moral duty.'

Brunner's teaching here will offend some by its seeming laxity. But he vigorously protests that it is necessary to remember in view of the 'sexual-panic' of our time that full manhood is possible even if the sexual instinct be denied. 'That a man can only be a complete man in marriage or through sexual experience is an over-emphasis and false generalization which is contradicted a thousand times over by experience.' In view of the number of women who in these hard times are necessarily unmarried, it is absurd and cruel while maintaining the principle of monogamy, which excludes one-third of womanhood from motherhood, to assert that the woman belongs to the home and has motherhood for her vocation. Instead, the Church needs to give to women a large place in its life that they may find there a worthy substitute for the vocation of motherhood denied to so many of them to-day.

On the problem of children, Brunner writes: 'It belongs to marriage that it is fruitful, but that does not mean that it must be unlimitedly fruitful.' Birth-regulation is to-day an obvious duty of married couples. The word is new, but not the thing itself, and new, too, are certain methods of securing this. Asceticism in marriage is one way. Experience shows that it is a possible way, but it means 'a terrible, and for many a perilous, overruling of body and soul and contradicts the Bible word, What God hath joined, let no man put asunder.' Modern contraceptives are neither better nor worse than old methods, and among these old methods Brunner includes the recent Calendar of safe times issued by the Roman Church (in the *Encyclica casti connubii*). Brunner prefers not to use the American term 'birth-control,' but to use 'the beautiful German word found by a woman, *verantwortliche Mutterschaft*,' 'responsible motherhood.' The new discoveries have led to the avoidance of parenthood from motives of luxury and convenience. 'This is a very grave peril, but is it worse than the involuntary fruitfulness of the last century?'

The concluding paragraphs of this section deal with the bearing of industrialism on marriage. The necessity of women working in industry has led to the almost complete destruction of the common life of the home. Since many men are unable to maintain wife and children, marriage of the old kind is impossible for many. In consequence,

modern industrialism has led to 'free relationships.' Brunner, of course, condemns such irregular relations. It is better, instead, that such should marry, even although their marriage be at first deliberately childless. Such marriages are imperfect, and may yet provide the best conscientious solution of an individual life-problem. It has at the same time to be emphasized that the real cause many young people to-day shrink from marriage or from parenthood is their eagerness for pleasure and the excessive claims they make on life.

Brunner concludes his sober treatment of the problems of marriage with the warning that 'only in the deepest meaning of faith can the truth of marriage be again found. Only in the renewal of faith can the forces operate by which the crisis of marriage can be overcome. But that does not mean that Christian faith "solves" the problem of marriage. Even the marriage of the best Christians is not Paradise Regained. . . . A happy marriage has, indeed, its own special perils, the peril of false exclusiveness and self-satisfaction, the peril of the Pharisaic denial of solidarity with suffering, erring, and curse-bearing humanity.' 'In the ethic of marriage the last word must be, Live by the divine forgiveness.'

Of his discussion of other moral problems it is possible to speak more briefly, for Brunner's discussion is likely to cause in this country less offence and is less liable to be misunderstood.

Work and Civilization.—The problem of work falls within the sphere of theological ethics, in that work is an act of freedom. In relation to work also we stand under the command of God. Civilization and work, as the Reformers saw, are also a creative ordinance of God. The Bible teaches that work is meant to be service of the community. It is not what a man does, but why he does it, which determines the ethical quality of his work. Where work is prized in isolation, it becomes an idol. Where the meaning of work is no longer recognized, men lose the sense that they belong to God and become slaves of the world, and they lose also their sense of social obligation. Civilization is thus changed from a divine ordinance into a curse, and there arises the crisis of joy in work, and of unemployment. A man is a mere cog in a machine when he does not know what he does nor whom he serves, but knows only that through his work others are rich, while he is poor. In these circumstances, humanly speaking, it becomes impossible for him to recognize his vocation as God-given. Unemployment is the sign that a curse lies over modern

European industry. The cry of millions—Give us work—is something new in the history of the world. What an epigram on our civilization is the unemployment of a large part of the civilized world.

Industry.—Here, too, we can see a creative ordinance of God, but an ordinance broken by human sin. Work in industry is hallowed because and in so far as it is a sharing of the divine work of conservation of the race by provision for human needs. But industry, as we know it, bears always the curse of sin. Not only the individual's share in industry, but the industrial order as a whole into which we are born, has this characteristic. It is not possible for the individual sinlessly to take his part in industry. It is here that we have the clearest sign of the truth of the doctrine of hereditary sin, and of the falsehood of the individualism which asserts man's freedom. 'Actual industry is the field of the most brutal conflict of force, and it is no accident that Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest was thought out in the age and land of Manchester Capitalism.' Sombart's description of Capitalism as 'monstrous' is no exaggeration. 'Is it possible in an industrial organization which is anti-personal to develop the personal meaning of work? Can the proletarian or the capitalist understand what we theologians, who stand only on the circumference of this terrible, soulless world, say about calling, service, and the worth of work?' 'This capitalist system is unserviceable, worthless, irresponsible; more, it is irresponsibility become a system.'

'Yet we know that no system is simply fate. Even in this system the individual, to whom God has given faith and from whom He demands a life of faith and love, has opportunity within the meshes of a loveless system of showing love.' Men can, as capitalists, be in heart anti-capitalist and make some change, however little, in the system. Men can, as proletarians—if only by God's special grace—understand the meaning of the words calling, service, and love, and with these thoughts do their work in this cruel machinery of a Profit-system as service to the community. And, in spite of all, it is this industry which provides us all, good and bad, with food; through it God now maintains our life. Many aspects of the capitalist industrial order are for the immediate future simply our fate. We cannot if we would go back from the industrial order to simpler times. 'It would be not only quixotic to dream ourselves back into medievalism; it would be the greatest lovelessness.' The immense populations of the modern world can only be maintained through technical

mass-production and rationalized industry. Capitalism in its technical, industrial sense will remain the constant factor of every future industrial order, however it be called. 'The most "humane" system of industry is more cruel than an "inhuman" system if it does not provide men with their necessities.' Meanwhile, the Christian 'has to swim against the stream.'

Brunner ends this long section of his book with four theses on the duty of the Church in regard to industry:

(1) 'In regard to the need and sin of industry also, the Church has to proclaim the Gospel of the creation, reconciliation, and redemption of the world through God revealed in Christ. This Gospel, not any "social gospel," is the world's salvation in respect also of industry.'

(2) The Christian Church has as a society the duty of ministry. Social politics, though certainly the duty of Christians, is not the task of the Church.

(3) The Church has to expound the command of God, not only for the individual, but for the community. It is not its task to develop a programme or points in a programme, but to stir up a social conscience and the confidence that to faith nothing is impossible. It has to make strikingly clear the opposition between industry as it exists to-day and industry in the spirit of Jesus, and to do so without regard to the leaders of *Realpolitik* and without mixing itself in *Realpolitik*. In regard to industry, as we know it, the Church has to sound out clearly and fearlessly its call for repentance, and to show how the evil in industry comes from its Godlessness, and that only through obedience to God's will can there come any real improvement.

(4) The Church as the community of the faithful must show in the world the sign of another spirit and another life. The word of the Church will accomplish little unless in industrial matters also it shows a new life which will at once judge the world and free the world from its despair.

The State.—It is the will of the Creator that men should live, not in isolation but in a community. The State, as we know it, is an instrument of force and compulsion. In this sense it is not a creative ordinance, but an order defined by the fact of sin. 'Every state is an expression of human sin on a grand scale.' 'The State is the product of collective

sin.' Its 'fundamental characteristic is not right but might.' 'Every state maintains and aggrandizes itself by means which in themselves are morally impermissible.' And the ethical problem of the State is 'insoluble.'

On the problem of war, Brunner writes: 'War, that is, the constant readiness of the State to use all the means of force necessary for the objects of its policy, belongs to the essence of the State in so far as it has no better means of defending its right.' 'In principle, unconditioned pacificism is identical with anarchy, with Anabaptist Utopianism.' If we affirm the State as a necessity, we must affirm war as an eventual necessity. Yet in present circumstances, war is suicidal folly. 'The Christian must not live in the past.' In modern circumstances, 'what could be said with some justification in favour of war has lost to-day its validity.' 'War now is identical with the murder of peoples. War has outlived itself. It has become so colossal that it has now no intelligible function.' 'To found the necessity of war on historical thought is to overlook the fact that history has led us to a point in which all analogies from the past have lost their meaning.' 'War has reached a stage of development in which it has no longer any sort of ethical justification.'

'The Christian must take an active part in politics because he learns there, as nowhere else, that we are miserable sinners, who even with the best will cannot do what is truly good.' 'There is no possibility of there being a political programme or a political party, which as such is competent to

put the name "Christian" on its banner. Every form of politics and every political party stands under the judgment of Jesus Christ, and for each the Christian requires the special forgiveness of God. If this were generally recognized even among Christians, political strife would lose its most poisoned sting, and political possibilities would be released which, apart from this, are unthinkable.'

The section concludes with the reminder that 'the State is that divinely appointed ordinance which most clearly shows us that, as the New Testament teaches, we live in an evil world.' 'It is the *meditatio vitae futurae* which makes it possible for a Christian to do his hard duty in the world of politics without becoming hard, and which saves him at the same time from fleeing into refusal of responsibility through fear of having to be hard. It is from this hope that he wins his joy in service and his sobriety in service. And in these two words the whole political ethic of the Christian is included.'

It is obvious that in the limits of one article it has been impossible to do justice to Brunner's massive book. In his emphasis on human sin, Brunner ignores at times unduly the possibilities open to men through the divine grace. Sombre as is the book, it is full of suggestiveness, and is singularly free from the Pharisaic censoriousness and light-hearted idealism which often characterize Christian pronouncements on moral problems. This is a book which ought to be translated.

Literature.

PERSONAL IDEALISM.

IN *Christianity and Philosophy* (T. & T. Clark; 10s. 6d. net), Professor D. Miall Edwards, D.D., of the Memorial College, Brecon, Wales, offers us a useful and timely study. In his Gifford Lectures, Dr. Gore expressed the opinion that the present generation (unlike the generation of Augustine or Aquinas) will not enjoy the spectacle of a commonly recognized alliance between religion and philosophy. That opinion is tacitly endorsed in Dr. Streeter's recent Bampton Lectures. Nor would Dr. Edwards gainsay it. But he holds,

rightly, we think, that by the method which Dr. Pringle-Pattison employed of 'construction through criticism' it may be possible to discover the general outlines at least of a philosophy which will at once do justice to man's total experience of the world and serve as an intellectual framework for Christian convictions. Accordingly, in the face of rival philosophies, naturalistic and idealistic, he advances towards a theistic faith expressible in a form of 'personal idealism,' the key to the nature of reality being found in human personal experience, and reality being interpreted in terms of idea or spirit.