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are at once explained; they exist because ultimately both Q and M rest on Aramaic tradition, and, indeed, may have been Aramaic sources. In other words, the theories of Bussmann and Streeter are alternative explanations of the same literary phenomena.

The same conclusion is reached in another way. Bussmann claims that T and R differ in their attitude to the Kingdom of God, in their names for God, in designations for Jesus, in the prominence they give to His ethical teaching, and in other points. Without entering into the question whether he is right in important matters of detail, it is once more apparent that, on Streeter's hypothesis, similar phenomena would also be explained. If Matthew conflated Q and M, the special characteristics of M cannot fail to appear in the B Passages; and it is Streeter's belief that M had definite religious interests and a distinctive tone. 'Judaistic sayings,' he claims, 'only occur in contexts which on other grounds we should refer to M, or where there is evidence of conflation between Q and another source' (*The Four Gospels*, 256). Once again the two hypotheses cover the same facts.

But if this conclusion is just we must say more. Working in entire independence, the two investigators have presented theories which, for all their differences, are similar. It follows, therefore, that, if we have to choose between them, the one investigator has shaped stones which complete the building of the other.

To which hypothesis should preference be given? This is a question to which a much more careful consideration must be directed than can be attempted here. Preference should obviously be given to the simpler hypothesis, and, so far as I am able to judge, the simpler hypothesis is that of Streeter. Besides explaining the facts more simply than Bussmann's hypothesis, it has the further advantage that it is supported by what we can infer as to Matthew's literary methods as a conflator of sources. It has also the advantage that it gives recognition to the probable existence in primitive Christianity of parallel versions of the Sayings of Jesus.

Punishment in Ethics and Theology.

II.

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In the earlier part of this study I discussed the development of punishment from its primitive, almost purely external, form towards the stage at which it becomes inward rather than outward, and wins the response of an awakened conscience. We may now go on to consider more briefly the traditional distinction between the three aspects of punishment as deterrent, retributive, and reformatory. It will be readily agreed that the first stands on the lowest level as regards moral content. It represents an appeal to fear. It endeavours to protect the way of virtue by placing obvious pitfalls and penalties at every entrance into By-path Meadow. It is, indeed, easy to say needlessly disparaging things about the appeal to fear. If the fear concerned be that of losing the esteem of one's fellow-citizens, of bringing suffering on one's family, or of lessening one's own capacity for useful service, it may be far from ignoble. It is also an indispensable instrument in legislation and jurisprudence. Without some appeal to fear—though not necessarily in its grosser forms—public order could hardly be maintained. In a more personal sense, too, it may sometimes be well for us to realize sharply that some half-awakened tendency of our nature would place us 'outside the pale' if it were given free play.

Yet the deterrent use of punishment is a subordinate one, since it depends on repression rather than on the cultivation of an active love of what is good. Further, it may in extreme cases treat the object of punishment as a *corpus vile* to be sacrificed for the public warning, rather than as a moral being with the inalienable right at least to a chance of reformation. Like the 'punishments' inflicted by Nature, purely deterrent punishment never pauses to inquire under what provocation or temptation a crime has been committed: it is enough that a signal demonstration should be made of the consequence of a particular crime. Thus this utilitarian form of punishment may itself offend against

the deep-seated instinct of justice. To quote Solovyof: 'The penal law may, of course, intend to benefit the criminal himself, by deterring him, through fear of punishment, from committing the crime. But once the crime has been committed, this motive obviously disappears, and the criminal in being punished becomes solely a means of intimidating others, *i.e.* a means to an end external to him; and this is in direct contradiction to the unconditional law of morality.' [1]

But if we pass over from a purely deterrent view to one in which the retributive element finds a place, through the recognition that the wrong done cannot be undone and cannot be annulled without suffering, the conception of deterrence may have a real value. The wrong-doer, in accepting the pain or deprivation which have followed his act as its appropriate recompense, may not only be willing to endure the surgery of suffering for the sake of his own future life, but may be willing, nay, eager, that others should be warned by what has befallen himself and so should avoid his errors. In this case the objection that he is being used as means only to the good of others falls to the ground, for many a man has borne the burden of his own past for the sake of others even more than in any spirit of hope for himself.

It is, indeed, clear that deterrent punishment, whether mild or severe, fails of its effect unless the rough sense of justice which exists in any healthy society is enlisted in its support. As many recent examples show on both sides of the Atlantic, laws, however admirable, which run counter to this sense or go too far beyond it, cease to be obeyed. If the penalties are mild, they are accepted with a laugh or a shrug; if severe they provoke a strong reaction. Thus, if the element of retributive justice is treated as negligible or outworn, punishment fails to fulfil even its least exalted function, that of deterrence.

The relation between the *deterrent* and *retributive* views of punishment has been so clearly stated by Dr. Ewing in his recent book, *The Morality of Punishment*, that I cannot do better than quote his conclusion:

'The retributive theory insists that punishment ought to be for a past offence, utilitarianism that it ought to be for a future good, but may it not be for both? Perhaps it can only play the latter *rôle* effectively by first playing the former.' [2] Here we have a confirmation of the view to which more than one step of the argument has led—that the element of retribution cannot be extruded from the true idea of punishment. Punishment must be recognized as just, that is, as intelligently inflicted by some authority, human or divine, on a being responsible for his actions who has in some way been unfaithful to his calling and has failed to maintain right relations with his neighbour, with society as a whole, or with his God. Further, although there can be no exact or mathematical equivalence between wrong and penal suffering, for there is no 'yardstick' (in human hands at least) which can equate an act of will to a state of feeling, there must be some measure between the wrong act and the following pain if the latter is to be recognized as just. Thus the deterrent, and still more the reformatory, theory of punishment requires as a backbone and support the idea of retribution. As Dr. Ewing says further:

'There is another reason for regarding punishment as an end in itself in so far as it not only symbolises the condemnation of evil but is itself a thwarting, a defeat of the evil will and purpose. This explains very well why, quite apart from human agency, we should think a universe better in which happiness and unhappiness were distributed according to merit than one in which they were not, for we cannot separate the happiness of the bad from their triumph or the unhappiness of the good from their, at least partial, defeat. This principle, however, makes an end-in-itself not of the pain as such, but of that of which the pain is, at least usually, an inseparable concomitant, the defeat of evil.' [3]

That is to say, a thread of retribution is woven into the fabric of punishment in its whole length and breadth; for without retribution there can be no activity of conscience. Yet it is not the master element which determines the whole pattern. Nor is it that which lasts longest or, so to say, which wears best. Even in the form of vindication, to which the thought of retribution finally leads—the establishment of the outraged law as worthy of respect, as 'holy and righteous and good' [4]—it looks backward rather than forward. But the master-element in ethics must have a forward aspect—must in technical language be teleological. Just as, in true and wisely ordered punishment, the pain inflicted is less important than the social

[1] *The Justification of the Good*, 313; and on the whole subject see A. C. Ewing, *The Morality of Punishment*, ch. iii.

[2] *Op. cit.* 45.

[3] *Op. cit.* 108.

[4] Ro 7^{12} (R.V.). It would carry us too far to attempt to discuss punishment and theodicy, though it is a thought which comes both into the O.T. and N.T. (cf. Ps. 51^{4}, Ro $3^{4, 26}$).

disapproval which pain is meant to drive home to the conscience, so the end of punishment is the fashioning of a society where wrong has no place, and the refashioning of characters which for the time have come under the dominion of selfishness and evil. Thus the reformatory function of punishment is in the end the determining one, as it must be in any teleological system of ethics—in any system, whether specifically Christian or not, which measures all things by the part they play in building the City of God.

A group of questions here meets us regarding the limits of punishment. As regards human society, is capital punishment justified? If it be looked on as a matter of administrative convenience or economy—the 'ridding of society,' as we say, of some dangerous criminal, who cannot be allowed to remain at large and whose maintenance in prison for many years would involve heavy expense—then the answer is clear. A life ought not to be ended for these reasons alone. As regards the deterrent effect of capital punishment, it is, in part at least, for the experts to judge; but it would seem that they are by no means at one in its defence. Severely deterrent punishment has much less effect in preventing crimes of passion than those of premeditation; and in cases where the mental balance is seriously unhinged, the rule of preventive detention applied to others who show acute mental abnormality should surely be applied. On the specific ground of Christian Ethics the argument against capital punishment seems even clearer. Neither on the older nor on the newer view of the life after death can we assign to any human tribunal the right to say that a man's period of probation on earth must be cut short, and that there is no further hope of his reform. We know too little either of God's hidden working in this life or of such divine judgments as may lie beyond.

Yet in this dimly apprehended region questions inevitably suggest themselves as to the limits of punishment in the case of the unrepentant, and in that where punishment leads to penitence and reformation. When the effect of penal suffering is to harden a man, rousing him to a temper of revolt or deadening his moral sense, is it in accord with what we know of the divine character to think of the penalty as continued to all eternity? In most ages and branches of the Church the answer given would have been, Yes. The divisions of Dante's great poem mark a sharp distinction between the irremediable pain of those 'disdainful spirits' who have finally chosen evil as their good, and the intense but never purposeless suffering of those who ascend the Mount of Purification in the spirit of undying hope. But, if it be true that moral beings do ever set themselves in irreversible opposition to the will of God, there seems to be nothing either in ethical theory, or in the main truths regarding His nature which are made known in Scripture, which could compel us to believe in endless and ethically hopeless suffering. Moral law must, indeed, be vindicated; but it has been rightly said that its only full vindication is when it is perfectly observed. Short of this, punishment vindicates the law by bringing home to the wrong-doer and those associated with him the grievousness and disastrousness of what he has done, and by giving him an opportunity to turn and make a new beginning. If the first aim, which almost certainly involves acute pain, is accomplished, and the latter proves impossible of accomplishment, is there any purpose in further pain? May not evil finally burn up and annihilate the soul that is wholly given over to it? I have argued that a thread of retribution runs through all punishment: but if the hope of reform be withdrawn, must not the web finally fall into shreds and disappear?

If, on the other hand, repentance follows wrong-doing, and those transforming processes of regeneration begin which finally lead to a new and free life of the spirit, is there any need for further punishment? Is there any residuum of guilt which must be blotted out, any moral surd which must be resolved, in order that the claims of that law which is both moral and divine may be satisfied? This question, like the last, takes us very definitely into the sphere of theology; but before leaving the territory of ethical theory, I wish to quote the opinion of Dr. Ewing, which seems to me accurately to represent the truth on that plane, 'It is after all reformation and not retribution that destroys the moral evil in the character of the offender. . . . On the retributive view there would be something lost when a man is reformed by forgiveness instead of punishment, namely, ***the intrinsic value of the just suffering***. On our view it is a clear gain, for punishment is only intrinsically valuable in so far as it is the appropriate expression of disapproval, and if the man can be cured through forgiveness without punishment, the latter is not the appropriate expression, because it is not needed to bring home to him his wrong-doing.'[1]

But, if we are rightly to estimate how far the fact of forgiveness received annuls the penalties

[1] *Op. cit.* 22, 116 (Italics mine).

of wrong-doing, we must take account of factors which lie beyond the horizon of Plato and other great masters of moral philosophy. I remarked earlier that the *Gorgias* hardly deals with the question *how* the pain of punishment regenerates. We have, it is true, found certain indications of this. Such pain may open the eyes of the wrong-doer to the enormity of what he has done. It may cause a reaction in his heart and conscience, and so make him eager to escape from evil and live a new life. But does it give him new power? Is not the typical experience of the man thus awakened to the true nature of evil rather that of Paul—'What I hate, that I do. . . . For to will is present with me, but to do that which is good is not.'[1]

Clearly a new dynamic is needed; and the experience of forgiveness is the greatest of all sources of moral power. More than this, the effect of forgiveness depends on the character and personality of him who forgives, and on the degree in which the man who is forgiven realizes what it has cost to forgive. If the moral influence of punishment depends on the respect of the wrong-doer for those who dispense it, so, and much more, does the regenerative influence of forgiveness. It is of vital importance, *who* forgives. Nor, is 'respect,' the word just used, or even gratitude, an adequate description of the attitude of the man who receives pardon. There must be a double self-identification. First is that of him who forgives with the wrong-doer, since he must place himself alongside him, know something of his state of mind, and bear something—it may well be the greater part—of the consequences of his sin; and, following from this, there is the self-identification of the man forgiven with the higher life thus brought close to him. It needs no argument to show that the insight and content of Christian Ethics should here be especially clear and rich.

But, once more, what of the consequences? How widely does remission of these extend? It seems that the remission becomes more complete as we rise in the scale, already traced, of different types of punishment. On the purely natural level, there can be no remission. If the seeds of decay implanted in our physical and psychical nature by its very mortality have been fostered and strengthened by self-indulgence, the soil will always remain impoverished, and will prove more fertile in weeds than it would during a life of discipline and restraint. An instance of this was afforded by a man who, after a youth of folly, became a devoted and consistent Christian, and who not long before his death said to his minister, 'I've a saved soul in a ruined body.' As regards the social effects of sin, we cannot recall the waves, set up by some outbreak of selfishness, which pass in ever-widening circles away from our own control. At the best these abiding consequences of past error or neglect can but provide a summons to watchfulness and to the full use of the new power which comes into a changed life.

In the social sphere other possibilities open. It is true that the wrong-doer is often made to feel the disability and suspicion that persist even after a punishment has been endured or remitted. But this need not be so. If there be a widespread readiness to forgive, and to accept the man who has formerly done the injury as a 'brother beloved,' he may, like Onesimus, become in a new sense profitable to his comrades, and may show a considerateness, a loyalty, and a faithfulness in service which otherwise he might never have attained. And if this be at times true in ordinary human society, it should be constantly, and in a far deeper sense, true in the Church.

Finally, in the inward sphere, when punishment is accepted, and struggle against it has ceased—when, in Moberly's words, penalty has passed into penance—and the way is so paved for forgiveness, in what sense is remission possible? Here let me recur to a distinction which has been implicit in much that has gone before, that between the inward penalty in its hopeless and its hopeful forms. In the former we see 'the still further worsening of the moral self,' emphasized by the late Dr. D. M. Ross in his last book, where 'the sin gets built up into the very self' of the sinner.[2] There is the growing insensitiveness of the soul to good, which Plato describes as its 'incurable cancer,' and to which Dante gives a yet more tremendous expression in his *Inferno*. So long as this remains there can be no check upon the downward path. But over against it there is the case where the inward penalty accepted in the region where mere ethical analysis cannot penetrate, but where the creature meets the Creator, and the spirit who has failed and fallen meets Him who can raise to newness of life. Thereafter, certain of the sad results of failure continue, for they have travelled beyond the control of the will; and, as has been already suggested, they can but serve as a call to redoubled effort in the days that remain. But the inner flow of the life has been reversed. Its objective has been altered, and new and un-

[1] Ro $7^{15, 18}$ (R.V.).

[2] *The Cross of Christ*, 123–5.

dreamt-of powers have been granted for its pursuit. Since this is true, the consequences of past sin, painful though they may be, and a source of ever-new humility, are not in the strict sense penal suffering. If they were, then there were a flaw in the forgiveness through which the new life had its origin. On this point the testimony of Christian experience is surely beyond challenge.

As to the way in which this forgiveness has been won, our insight must remain limited. It is clear that the self-identification with the sinner of which we have already spoken was shown in its perfect form in Jesus Christ, and that it involved an unmeasured sharing of man's shame and suffering, without which the expression of perfect penitence, so memorably described in M'Leod Campbell's great book, could not have come about, nor the forces of regeneration have been released in the spirits of the repentant. It is clear also that these forces include the energy of a new God-given life, as well as the 'endeavour after new obedience' on the human side.

But it is perhaps less clear whether we should look for a further element, to which our fathers attached great importance. What of the idea of *guilt*? The traditional conception of a quantum of guilt, which must be expiated by a corresponding quantum of suffering, involves great difficulties both intellectual and moral. The *fact* of guilt, as personal responsibility for wrong personally done, cannot be evaded, but neither can guilt in this sense be transferred. It is here that the legal and substitutionary theory has gone astray and carried theology into a region where experience cannot follow. When a man has been enabled by the vicarious suffering of another to see sin, his own sin, as it really is—when by divine help he has abjured it, has found himself in a new relation to God and to his fellows, and has felt the inflow of a new life and power—guilt is, for him, no longer present. *How* it has been taken away, we cannot fully know. *How* the downward tendency of sin has been checked, and its consequences, cumulative and relentless, have been reversed, is the central mystery of the Cross. But it is surely well for us to emphasize those aspects of the Atonement which harmonize with what we know of punishment, penitence, and forgiveness—the measureless self-identification of the Loving with the unloving, the measureless bearing of those burdens which man has brought upon himself and which form the God-appointed penalty of his sin.

Recent Foreign Theology.

Varia.

It is only as we form a habit of perusing learned periodicals that we realize the actual means whereby scientific progress is being made. The edifice of scholarship is not built at a single effort; it is constructed stone by stone, even fragment by fragment, and it is only when a comprehensive work appears that we are fully aware of how much has been done. There is no such thing as finality in the task; the establishment of the facts itself is still far from complete, and the interpretation of them will probably vary in every generation. The slow but sure movement of Biblical studies is well represented by the *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*,[1] of which the second part of the fifty-second volume has now appeared. It contains a larger number of articles than usual, and, though they are naturally not long, they are as interesting and illuminating as ever. The Editor is to be congratulated on the very high level which his journal maintains. In the present number Begrich discusses the priestly 'Heilsorakel'—the Divine answer to a plea for salvation and deliverance. It will be remembered that it was Begrich who completed and edited the second part of Gunkel's great Introduction to the Psalter, and here he carries his master's methods a step farther. Pfeiffer, in an article which leaves room for more controversy than most, traces the effect of 'Wisdom' teaching (which he ascribes to Edom and Egypt) on later Jewish thought. Kuhl makes the interesting suggestion, based on Babylonian documents, that in Hos $2^{4ff.}$ it was not originally the husband who divorced the wife, but the wife who divorced the husband. Jeremias (Joachim) discusses the relation between the temple envisaged by Ezekiel and that erected by Zerubbabel, and concludes that the former served as the plan for the latter. Rudolph,

[1] Töpelmann, Giessen; pp. 81–160; Rm.4.