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Luke and Mark back to an earlier stage and to show that Mark's Passion narrative was based upon Luke's special source or an earlier version of it.[1] But in the nature of the case such dependence would be more difficult to prove than even that of Mark upon Q.

Finally, was this a connected account or a group of fragments? That depends mainly on whether it was found in oral or in written form; for oral traditions will more naturally have circulated independently, written tradition in a single document. It is generally agreed, however, that Luke uses material from special sources in nearly all parts of the Passion narrative, from the Last Supper (cf. Lk $22^{15-17.\ 28-30.\ 31f.\ 35-38}$), through the trial (cf. Lk 23^{6-16}) and the Crucifixion (cf. Lk $23^{27-31.\ 39-43}$, etc.), to the Resurrection appearances (cf. Lk 24^{13-53} *passim*). Adding lesser touches which are more easily ascribed to tradition than to editorial creation, Luke's special materials would seem to have touched upon almost all parts of the Passion story. And since 1 Co 11^{23} 15^{3} suggest that the Passion narrative was probably the first part of the Gospel story to assume connected form, at least in the Gentile churches, it seems likely that a Greek evangelist, writing among Gentile Christians, would more readily have derived this information from a connected document than gathered it from scattered oral traditions.

[1] Goguel suggests (*Harvard Theol. Rev.*, xxvi. [1933] 28 f.), a somewhat similar theory of the Synoptic Apocalypse, that Luke used an *earlier* edition of Mark (cf. pp. 52–55); but the signs of sheer interpolation of Marcan verses are particularly strong in Lk 21.

A Philosopher looks at the Creeds.[1]

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My subject is the relation between two inquiries, on each of which separately the theological student has been much engaged. It requires no argument to show that the objects of philosophical reflection and the objects of religious faith have so much in common as to make it, if not impossible, at least extraordinary for minds concerned about either to remain aloof from the other. But it is possible, while attending to both, to pursue the threads altogether apart, or to think of them together in respect only of their termination, not of the course they run. My present purpose is to develop the idea of their respective procedures as compared with each other. What is the relation between those speculative exercises which we call philosophy and those convictions which are embodied in creeds?

In order to be clear, I am going to begin by defining my terms. The definitions I am going to give are not very good ones. Indeed, they are not so much definitions as descriptions; but if they serve as identifying labels, they will be adequate for my immediate purpose. By a philosopher I shall mean one who with an open mind, with no guide except his reason and with no material except experience, inquires freely into the ultimate character of the universe and of life. By a Creed, on the other hand, I shall mean any one of those historic formulæ which profess to explain life and the universe not through reasoning, but through a Divine revelation. No one, I suppose, will quarrel with the way I have described a philosopher. But there may be demur to my apparent suggestion that a Creed is not the product of reasoning. I think I can hear some disciple of Dean Inge retort with Inge's favourite quotation from Whichcote: 'Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational.' The Dean, however, as a good mystic, would be quick to point out that *rational* need not mean the outcome of reasoning. And when I speak of the Creeds, in contrast with philosophy, as involving this idea of *revelation*, it is enough for me to have on my side the chief inspirer of at least all the Creeds professed in the Reformed Churches. In the Letters of St. Paul I suppose no word is more common than the word 'reveal' or some synonym for it, and nothing can be clearer than that to which he opposes it. For St. Paul, at all events, what is essential in Creeds was no handiwork of a philosopher, nothing argued out by native ingenuity. Over and over again, in very varied language but always in the same sense, he declares it to have been not discovered but made known: a revelation from Him who at the first commanded light to shine out of darkness

[1] Address at the Annual Convocation of Pine Hill Divinity Hall, Halifax, N.S.

and did in these last days shine upon human hearts; the uncovering of a mystery which had been kept secret since the world began: what eye had never seen nor ear heard, but God had disclosed by His spirit.

Assuming this contrast to be clear, one hastens to add that a philosopher may hold a robust religious Creed, and that a saint may be tireless in philosophical speculation. History is strewn with examples. But then we remember that history is also strewn with examples of inconsistent thinking, even in strong thinkers, and perhaps this is one of them. It is at least plain that the two tendencies, devotion to a Creed on the one hand, and philosophic reflectiveness on the other, are very different tendencies. And there has often been a certain suspicion on both sides—I know not whether it has been stronger in the philosophical or in the theological camp—that a man must be either muddle-headed or of doubtful honesty if he professes to combine them. In this matter the hasty judgment of what is called 'common sense' has sometimes been reinforced by learned sanction. I need not remind divinity students of the theologians who have held the study of philosophy to be valuable not for the sake of exhibiting its achievements, but rather to expose its limitations. Nor need I remind students who have had a philosophical discipline of the note of irritation in their textbooks where it has to be pointed out that the free course of thought was confused or impeded by dogma.

Shall we say, then, about the relation between these two studies that it is simply one of mutual antagonism? Such a speaker as Earl Russell or Professor Westermarck, at the annual dinner of the Rationalist Press Association, will put this very definitely. The case is always declared to be obvious. Philosophy means an open mind, while a Creed demands a closed mind. A philosopher is always inquiring, by the light of reason, and is often forced to admit that his inquiries have failed. A theologian, on the other hand, in the high confidence which he calls 'faith,' is invariably successful, because—as he believes—the great secret has been confided to him from above, so that inquiries are superfluous if not impious. Can two ways of thinking more explicitly contradict each other? How can any man pursue them both? Can he, as Bernard Shaw says, go on indefinitely letting not the right lobe of the brain know what the left lobe doeth?

Those who feel sure of this utter antagonism will regard the study they favour as having one of its chief tasks in saving them from the perils of the other. This, I believe, we find fully exemplified. Next to overturning his countrymen's belief in the British social order, there is no project quite so dear to the heart of Earl Russell as to make his philosophy destructive of the Christian Creed. He pursues this with an almost evangelical zeal. Someone told him in his youth that it was the chief purpose of a philosopher to devise rational grounds for belief in God. I am almost driven by his writings of late to suppose that in his old age he has adopted the no less narrow view that a philosopher's main business is to destroy this belief. If you look at his latest book, entitled *The Scientific Outlook*, it will strike you—I think—as written in considerable alarm lest such men as Eddington and Jeans may surrender the fortress to the theological enemy. It is like a trumpet call, summoning back scientists to their impious allegiance. You will observe, too, about Russell, that the confidence he professes in the certainty of his conclusions has never been shaken even by his own frequent change of mind as to what the conclusions are. For my own part, again, I cannot but notice that the fierce reiteration is suggestive not so much of surer confidence as of uneasy misgiving. But the apostolic note is still there. As Voltaire said, *Ecrasez l'Infâme*. No quarter from philosophy to the theologians!

One can recall a like intolerance from the other side. I think I have known theologians who held it to be the main function of a Creed that it should stop people from dangerous inquiries. They delighted in that aphorism of Bacon which bids us attach weights rather than wings to the intellect; and if they did not use this aphorism exactly as Bacon intended it, they justified their free translation by its homiletic value. A Creed, they held, was to be learned in early youth that it might be a protection all one's life from what they called 'the insolence of reason.' I used to know a venerable divine whose opening prayer at the exercises of his theological college always included a petition that the students might be saved from philosophy; and though, after a distinct pause, he would add 'falsely so called,' I had a strong feeling that the pause was deliberate, and that the further words were mechanically repeated, in reluctant deference to the text of Scripture.

This notion of necessary antagonism is in the minds of more persons than care to acknowledge it. If a philosopher has any business in the world, it is—as Plato said—to draw forth the hidden implications of common opinion, and from time to time

he is helped to do this by the merciless candour of his friends. My memory here carries me back to a conversation I had with a very candid friend on the day after I had been appointed to my first university post. 'I observe in the newspapers,' he said, 'that you are going to lecture on moral philosophy. You will draw your material, necessarily, either from the Bible or from some other source. If you take it from any other source, you will be teaching error. If you take it from the Bible, you will be wasting your students' time, for they can read the Bible at home. Choose, then, which sort of scandal you will personally constitute.' This dilemma, posed with such caustic simplicity, has tormented many a mind far subtler than that of my friend. It was Renan's puzzle—how he should select from the Christian religion those parts which might be credible for a *philosophe*. And old Professor Ferrier, of the University of St. Andrews, with many divinity students before him in his lecture-room, used to say with great emphasis: 'Gentlemen, philosophy is a body of reasoned truth; but of the two requirements, it is more important that it should be reasoned than that it should be true.' Superficially, can there be any sharper contrast with faith than that?

But one does well in these matters to be suspicious of what is superficially clear—like those cases which are said to lie in a nutshell, or those interpretations which he who runs may read. In our mysterious universe what you can read while running at the same time is not likely to be important, and you cannot put much that is valuable—either of truth or of anything else—in a nutshell. No sooner have we finished expounding to ourselves the necessary antagonism of philosophy and Creeds than we recall, with a certain sense of shock, how for long centuries they were supposed to be essentially corroborative of each other.

At all events, if they are antagonistic, they have been to a remarkable degree mutually attractive. Their records are so intertwined, the genealogy of philosophical is so linked with that of theological concepts, that one cannot conceive how the history of either could now be written without constant reference to the other. You remember, perhaps, how the discovery that Creeds were a slow growth, parallel with the slow growth of philosophies, and indeed determined by the same kind of cause, impressed no less a philosopher than John Locke. He has told us how the same impulse which made him inquire into the origin of philosophic concepts, and incidentally gave us the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, set him to work upon the origin of theological formulæ, and incidentally yielded his *Letters on Toleration*. In each case it was a certain bewilderment at the product which sent him searching into the process. John Locke, distracted by the Creeds of his time, resolved to read the original records of the first days of Christianity for himself, and—search as he would—he could find no authority there for the requirement of these elaborate dogmas. So he decided that dogmas, like philosophies, must have developed relatively late. What would have amazed him still more would have been the discovery which is a commonplace of the historians in our time, that the development of Creeds was due primarily to the philosophers. Whatever view we take of those controversies which made the fourth century so notable, whether we think the Creeds were constructed to accommodate the Faith to philosophic demands or to protect the Faith against philosophic corruptions, it was clearly the impact of philosophy which gave birth to them.

If you look, too, at the centuries which followed, you will observe how they can be used to illustrate the view that philosophy is in its essence a corroboration of the Creeds, and that the Creeds but summarize philosophy. The significant term *ancilla theologiae*, however fiercely we may resent it now, reminds us of the long period during which it was the leaders of the Christian religion alone who in Europe put philosophic problems either to others or to themselves. It is, indeed, a far cry from the statement that in the Middle Ages theologians only were philosophers to the statement that intrinsically they should always be allies. But it is not fanciful, I think, to see in that long association proof at least of this—that the purpose for which the theologian seeks a Creed has something in common with the purpose for which a philosopher works out a system of thought. The more you search into the movement which culminated at Nicæa, the closer, I think, you will find this fundamental resemblance to be. In each case, the driving motive is the desire to reduce to order the data of experience, to find some world formula which will harmonize the facts of life. Where they differed was in that the Creed-makers of Nicæa possessed, or believed themselves to possess, a sweep of experience about which the philosopher as such knew nothing. And where their constructions clashed was just where under such circumstances one would expect them to clash.

It was not the difficulties so trite and familiar in our popular press that caused this trouble. What we now hear from a hundred voices about

the Creeds is that they are obscure and complicated, that they are variable and transient. Neither their obscurity nor their complexity is in itself any great objection to a philosopher: he too deals much in those qualities, and what would make him far more suspicious would be the perfectly clear or the perfectly simple. He knows, as Forsyth used to say, that the universe cannot be put into a formula which the undergraduate can easily remember. 'Can't you give me a succinct statement of your system?' said Victor Cousin to Hegel. 'M. Cousin,' replied Hegel, 'these matters do not lend themselves to a succinct statement, *surtout en français*.' Neither is the philosopher much disturbed to learn that the Creeds have been very different from race to race, or that branches of the one Church have fiercely denied each other's tenets and striven with apparent fruitlessness to adjust their conflict. He has seen this too in the philosophic schools, different aspects and sides of truth being emphasized with eager and even bitter exclusiveness. But whatever else he has inferred from such a conflict, there is one thing no real philosopher has ever inferred—that it proves philosophy itself to be vain. Least of all will such a man be alarmed at the spectacle of transience in a Creed. If there is anything that would completely undermine his confidence, it would be the spectacle of men trying to state the deepest convictions by which they lived, and managing to state these not only simply and clearly, but with no variety of individual or racial emphasis, and with a rigour which accumulating experience should be powerless to vary.

Professor D. G. Ritchie once said that of all the Creeds he thought the Athanasian most likely to be correct, because it made least compromise with popular demands. He was putting an important truth into a characteristic paradox. But from the philosopher's standpoint, what is most suggestive of all about the Creeds is not their changeableness. It is rather their tenacity. Think for a moment of the oldest among them which reached any elaborate or detailed statement. The Nicene Creed, says a piquant writer, is but the majority decision of a Committee which sat sixteen hundred years ago. What about the majority decisions of other committees of that date? How would they fare before the tribunal of modern thought? This one has strangely endured, so that even to-day no considerable branch of Christendom is ready to amend it, though it is strewn with implications which the progress of secular knowledge cannot countenance. What can that possibly mean but this—that the element which gives its value to the Nicene Creed is independent of the elements which vitiate it, and yet that although it is independent, the task of separating and restating it in isolation is too hard to face? Such is the extraordinary intellectual impasse which makes this Creed so fascinating to the philosophic historian.

To specify only a few points in some of the later Confessions which have had the work of Nicæa as their basis:

There has been no effective revision of the Creeds since the Copernican astronomy, since the rise of historical and literary criticism, since the growth of modern social science, since the discoveries of comparative religion, not to speak of the vast upheaval of Darwinism. It has been the office of philosophy, at every turn in this long course of intellectual achievement, to point out how much in the ancient formulæ is no longer defensible, how much must at least be re-interpreted in what Creeds and Confessions have said about the structure of the universe, about the inerrancy of Scripture, about the functions of the civil magistrate, about the origin of man, and about the personal perils of doctrinal error. But when this duty of criticism has been fulfilled, those Creeds still stand, and hardly anyone will undertake to draft them anew. Other formulæ of bygone centuries attract the activity of innumerable draftsmen. But even the more audacious of religious critics for some cause avoid the responsibility of reshaping. What is the instinctive inhibition that warns them off? It is a philosophic problem of fascinating interest.

I think the cause is this. The critic is far from confident that he could redraw those Creeds without spoiling in the revision the very active principle that has given them their value. He could draft a new philosophy; that is being done all the time. But this is another matter. Amid the resemblances between a Creed and a philosophy there is this crucial difference. They are alike in trying to explain experience, but the Creed-makers were right in thinking they had a whole continent of experience to explain which to philosophers, as such, was unknown. It was the specific experience of the Christian consciousness, the new force which had been at work steadily for three centuries in the life of mankind. From the philosophic point of view, this was no more than a new set of opinions and feelings, somehow developed by an Eastern cult, curious no doubt like its predecessors, and destined to as short a speculative career. For the Creed-makers at Nicæa it was no such thing; it was a disclosure, a Divine manifestation in the

fulness of time, and it would yet attest itself, by its world-transforming power, as having no real kinship with a philosophic guess. To stop this threatened confusion of things so different, to rescue what they called 'the Deposit of Faith' that no one might mistake it for yet another fancy of the schools, this was the purpose of Creed-making. Now, which view of the significance of Christianity in the world has the record of sixteen centuries confirmed? To put such a question is to answer it. It is likewise to answer the question why the making to-day of a new Creed is a venture which very few are bold enough to face.

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I said at the outset that philosopher and theologian have need to meet for discussion of their respective tasks. Not too often, lest each should compromise his independence, but also not too seldom, lest each should lose touch with a side of thought which he much requires to know. You will not misunderstand me if I add that they should meet with genuine, but not with excessive, mutual respect. The apostolic maxim that we should be able to admonish one another is a maxim to which, no doubt, some of us yield an all too facile obedience, but we can neglect it to our loss, and we have done this many a time in the relation of philosopher and theologian. History shows that they have been by turns afraid of each other, by turns forgetful that each has his own contribution to make, and will make it best if he is not too solicitous about the other's feelings.

Which of us, for example, would desire to restore the mediæval relation, the days of the *ancilla theologiæ*, when the philosophic teacher had to pause at every turn to take his theological bearings? When I think what philosophy suffered from that long servitude, and of the mark it so long carried even after it was set free, there comes back to my mind an old story from the *Dialogues* of Pope Gregory VII. It tells how Bishop Boniface, on one of his episcopal tours, had occasion to borrow a horse. They mounted him well, and his tour of visitation was completed; but, says the narrator, that horse was never quite the same afterwards; *post sessionem tanti pontificis*, after being sat upon by so great a pontiff. Something of the kind happened, I fear, to philosophy. It too was sat upon, not by one great pontiff, but by many, in the ages that are past. It too was commandeered by Princes of the Church in their ecclesiastical emergency, to endorse the Faith and confute the heretic. Sometimes indeed, like Balaam, the philosophic seer distributed blessings and curses in other than the appointed direction. But on the whole, century after century, he was all too complaisant; and the recovery of independence was slow. The very nomenclature of the philosophic schools, their very language, not only in stating a solution but even in propounding a problem, was long eloquent of the alien service to which they had been bound.

But if it was the mediæval fault for philosophy to be over-deferential to theologians, I think it is the fault of our age for theologians to be over-deferential to philosophy. These recoils commonly proceed too far, and the balance is now tipped unfairly in a new direction. I wish someone would write a book, long since overdue, which should supplement the familiar record of what theology owes to philosophical criticism by the no less valuable record of what philosophy owes to theological steadfastness. I have in mind three major issues: mechanism or vitalism, finite personality, objective moral obligation. It is well known that on all these the tide of philosophic doctrine has shifted again and again. Can anyone doubt that it was the obstinate resistance of the Christian consciousness, the whole spiritual climate produced by the working of the Christian principle in the world's thought, that compelled philosophic analysis to go back again and again upon its own apparent results, saving it from conclusions which were seen to be dialectically invalid only after they had been first proved destructive of the eternal values?

There is no need, at this time of day, to press the need for free philosophic inquiry. But there is need for the Church to reflect that once again speculative interest may be conciliated at too high a cost. Be not over-ready, says Karl Barth, to baptize into the Faith, all unshriven, the last daring hypothesis of science. As of old, the Deposit of Faith is to be kept. In religion as in art, it is the critic who must wait upon the artist, not the artist on the critic.