
A table of contents for the *London Quarterly Review* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_london-quarterly-and-holborn-review_01.php

THE

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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ART. I.—1. *The Institutes of Law: a Treatise of the Principles of Jurisprudence as Determined by Nature.* By JAMES LORIMER, Professor of Public Law, and of the Law of Nature and Nations, Edinburgh University. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1872.

2. *A Systematic View of the Science of Jurisprudence.* By SHELDON AMOS, M.A., Professor of Jurisprudence, University College, London, &c. London: Longmans and Co. 1872.

3. *Elements of Law, Considered with Reference to Principles of General Jurisprudence.* By WILLIAM MARKBY, M.A., Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1871.

4. *Reasons for the Study of Jurisprudence as a Science.* By JAMES LORIMER, Professor, &c. Edinburgh. 1868.

5. *Elements of Jurisprudence.* By C. J. FOSTER, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Jurisprudence, University College, London. London. 1853.

6. *Considerations on Law.* 1871.

THE Science of Jurisprudence may be said to be in an interesting if not a satisfactory condition among us at the present time. It is notorious that its study as a science was formerly almost wholly neglected in England. This has frequently been admitted and deplored by distinguished English writers, and the fact has often been brought against us as a reproach by foreign jurists. "For several generations," says Professor Lorimer, "we have abandoned all promising

attempts at the cultivation of the philosophy of law." "In England," declares Mr. Best, a learned and able legal writer, "the neglect of the study of jurisprudence is notorious, and, indeed, is gloried in. That law as a science either has no existence, or, if it has, is wholly beneath the notice of the (*soi-disant*) practical man, and should be relegated to the region of dreamers and visionaries, has long been the favourite axiom of the legal profession in this country."* Another eminent legal authority, Dr. Herbert Broom, doubts whether it can be said that jurisprudence is regarded as a science in England. And the French jurist, Lerminier, is represented as saying, "As regards the science of law, properly so called, England sleeps on for ever." It is, however, gratifying to believe that these remarks are no longer true in all their force, but that a notable change is rapidly taking place in English thought on this subject. Indeed, many years ago, indications of such a change were not wanting, and, within a comparatively short period, the altered condition of juridical science in this country has become very decided.

While we were "sleeping on" during the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early portion of the present, scientific jurisprudence was cultivated in several Continental countries, and especially in Germany, with laudable diligence and eminent success. Despite our isolation in pursuits of this nature, the speculations of Continental jurists began, some forty years ago, to make themselves felt here; and, among the first to make us acquainted with the results of their labours, must be ranked the late Mr. John Austin, whose *Province of Jurisprudence Determined* appeared in 1832. The doctrines unfolded in this very able work were largely the product of two agencies,—the speculations of Bentham, and, more particularly, the researches of the German historical school, which had been established by the labours of Hugo and Savigny. Every competent judge will admit that Austin's writings have exercised a marked influence on English juridical inquiries during the last forty years. They have contributed directly to awaken in England an interest in the science of jurisprudence, and have thus materially helped to bring about the revolution in English thought to which we are referring. That more scientific views respecting its nature are now gaining ground

* *On the Study of Jurisprudence.* By W. M. Best, M.A., barrister, &c. "Social Science Transactions." 1862.

in this country, is evident from a variety of circumstances. 1. It is seen in the way in which jurisprudence is now usually explained or described by writers of ability. It is admitted by such men that a science of law exists, and that law deserves to be studied in a scientific way. 2. The revived and earnest study of Roman law in recent years is another evidence of the new spirit in which jurisprudence is cultivated. 3. The increased attention given to the study of law in several of our universities, in the Inns of Court, and in some colleges, is a clear proof of a greater interest in the pursuit of law as a science. 4. The zealous efforts put forth of late by influential men in the profession in favour of improved legal education, show the existence among that body of a conviction that jurisprudence should be more systematically cultivated. 5. The active measures taken in our time to promote law reform, both as regards its substance and its form, all proceed on the assumption that law may be advantageously treated as a science. 6. Lastly, nothing more conclusively proves that a change has come over our mode of looking at jurisprudence than the character of the literature on the subject. Formerly, we had properly no literature on the scientific principles of jurisprudence; but within the last few years many works of power on the subject have appeared in our language.

If the progress already made is not all that could be desired, it is still full of promise. The educated mind of England is awakening to the necessity of pursuing juridical inquiries in a scientific spirit; and, if nothing very great has yet been achieved, it is satisfactory to know that the question is engaging the best attention of men of learning and ability. What has been attempted can only be regarded as the beginning, but we venture to think it is a beginning that may be taken as an assurance that, from this time forward, England will not again "sleep" in reference to the scientific cultivation of jurisprudence. We must, however, be willing to benefit by the labours of foreign jurists. Judge Story observed, respecting America,—"There is no country on earth which has more to gain than ours by the thorough study of foreign jurisprudence." May we not, with equal propriety, say there is no country on earth that has more need of a thorough mastery of the science of law than England, and none that would gain more from the practical application of such knowledge to the improvement of its laws? Then the subject is every way worthy the attention of our countrymen.

It is a noble study. "The science of law," says Warnkœnig, "is at the same time one of the most useful and the most noble departments of knowledge that can engage the human mind." Without any disposition to magnify its importance, or overrate its utility, we think we may safely affirm that the progress of the jurisprudence of every people is closely connected with the progress of their civilisation. There cannot be a greater mistake than to suppose that the cultivation of this science is a matter which only concerns lawyers. It immediately affects every class of the community. It ought to interest every intelligent citizen, because the laws of a State directly bear upon the well-being and prosperity, the liberty and security, of every member of the community. As the laws of a nation determine the legal rights and duties of a citizen, it must be obvious they, in this way, constantly impede or expedite his daily conduct in the ordinary affairs of life, and they consequently hinder or facilitate every effort for the social improvement of the community at large. It would certainly be idle to seek to establish this proposition by lengthy argumentation. All thinking persons must know that the laws of a nation determine the civil relations that exist among its constituents; and, as such, they are, or should be, the embodiment of that people's notions of what is just and right in these relationships.

Now, if all are directly affected by laws, and, consequently, concerned that these should be wise and just, all should be equally interested in the means for attaining this end, in the processes which are needful to secure wise and just laws, and in the investigation of those principles on which the wisdom and justice of laws depend. If this reasoning be sound, it follows that the public have an abiding interest in the systematic cultivation of jurisprudence, or in the elucidation of those scientific principles which ought to determine the character of all law. Further, if the public are so immediately interested in the character of the laws under which they live, it must concern every intelligent citizen to obtain clear views as to the nature of this science. It should, then, we hold, be generally known what jurisprudence is:—what is meant by the term; what is the subject-matter of the science, and what is its object. And, these inquiries being dealt with, further questions will present themselves, such as,—what are the ultimate principles or grounds of the science? on what primordial facts does it rest? If, as Dr. Whewell says, facts and ideas are both essential to the formation of scientific truth, we are concerned to know what are the facts, and what

the ideas requisite for the building up of the science of law. Or, again, if, as Professor Ferrier holds, philosophic truth consists of two elements, the necessary or universal, and the particular or contingent, we ought to be able to say what are the universal and what the particular elements in the truths of jurisprudence. If we look into the history of this branch of knowledge, and try to ascertain how these questions have been dealt with by its greatest cultivators, we shall find that different answers have been given to the queries just propounded. An examination of what has been advanced will lead us to see that the different modes of treating these points have given rise to different theories as to the nature and foundation of law, and thus to the different schools or sects of jurisprudence. We shall, in this way, be brought to the grounds of divergence, and to a knowledge of the foundation on which different philosophers rest their doctrines:—in other words, to a knowledge of the distinctive principles of the different classes of thinkers.

Before proceeding to answer the question, What is jurisprudence? it will materially help us to a mastery of the subject if we inquire to what generic sphere of thought or field of knowledge jurisprudence belongs. Is it a physical science? Does it belong to intellectual philosophy or psychology? Is it a branch of economical, theological, or ethical speculation? Happily, on this point, the history of jurisprudence presents little difference of opinion. With a few exceptions, it has been held, in all ages, that jurisprudence is a branch of ethical science. It is generally admitted that its inquiries properly belong to morals in the largest sense of that term. In our own country there would seem to be one class of thinkers that dissent from this doctrine, and it may be important to note what great thinkers have said upon it. We affirm that jurisprudence belongs to ethics, because law has to deal with the relations that exist between men in society, and with conduct springing out of such relations; with human actions, their origin, qualities, and effects, and with their rightness or wrongness; with actions as just or unjust, as honest or fraudulent; with motives and intentions, as these are embodied in acts; with offences, injuries, wrongs, crimes, and punishments. Can it be needful to show that all questions raised on these matters are necessarily ethical in their nature? In dealing with problems about any of these, we must inevitably appeal for their settlement to man's moral nature, to the primary instincts or sentiments of his moral being, or, in other words,

to his moral consciousness. All the fundamental conceptions connected with law are essentially moral notions, and the philosophy of law must ultimately run up into ethical inquiry. It is not said that the science of jurisprudence and the science of ethics are identical: nothing of the kind. There is a clear distinction between them. But it is affirmed that jurisprudence is a branch or part of ethical science.

The whole history of speculation about law confirms this view. Both in ancient and modern times, many distinguished philosophers have confounded jurisprudence and ethics, or have failed to draw any distinction between them. It is well known that Plato treated politics, law, and morals, as one subject. In Aristotle's writings we find faint indications of a distinction, while in those of Cicero there is a clearer perception of the difference. The distinction is sometimes either directly asserted or implied in the Roman classical jurists, but it is also frequently lost sight of in their discussions. In his able book on the science of law, Mr. Reddie contends that "a great deal of confusion, of vagueness and obscurity of thought and expression, have arisen among jurists from not distinguishing, at the outset, ethics or morals from compulsory human law, and from confounding both under one general and common appellation."* Mr. Reddie illustrates the importance of his remark by referring to instances of this confusion in the speculations of Grotius, Puffendorf, Leibnitz, Wolf, Burlamaqui, and others. The ablest modern philosophers, while they insist on a marked distinction between the province of jurisprudence and that of ethics, maintain that the two sciences are closely connected, and especially that jurisprudence forms a branch of the wider field covered by the moral sciences. It is important to see what has been said on this point, because, in our day, we have writers, on one hand, who attempt to separate law from ethics, and, on the other hand, we have philosophers who entirely confound them. We say that while law is distinct from ethics, it should ground itself in morals. Kant expresses this thought in various ways in his *Metaphysical Elements of Jurisprudence*. Ethics, he says, take cognisance of internal states of mind and regulate internal acts, while law only takes cognisance of the outward act; but then "all law whatever rests on the consciousness of obligation under the moral law itself." (P. 180.) Sir James Mackintosh

* *Inquiries, Elementary and Historical, in the Science of Law.* By John Reddie, Advocate. P. 33.

observes:—"Ethics relate to those virtuous dispositions of the mind from which right conduct flows: jurisprudence relates to those outward acts of the man which are directly injurious to his fellow-men. Jurisprudence is confined to the virtue of justice; ethics extend to all moral qualities."* Mr. Reddie examines this point at some length in the third chapter of his work, and reaches conclusions almost identical with those of Mackintosh:—"Law is merely a branch of ethics, and deals only with the virtue of justice; but this ultimate moral principle of justice is the foundation of positive law and judicial coercion."† Dr. C. J. Foster declares that "We cannot erect jurisprudence into a science, unless moral philosophy afford us some certain foundation on which to rest it;" and again he sets forth the relation of the two sciences thus:—"Now the duty which morals and jurisprudence respectively have to discharge, I take to be simply this,—to furnish a rule of action, voluntary in the one case, and compulsory in the other, which so commends itself to the mind of the person subject to it, as to assure the assent of his consciousness."‡ Mr. J. G. Phillimore says,—"The centres of law and morality are the same, but the circumference of the latter includes the former."§ In his treatise on jurisprudence, Mr. C. S. M. Phillipps explains the matter in a manner very similar to that of Mackintosh, Reddie, and Foster. Having defined jurisprudence and morality, he observes,—"It is manifest from these definitions that the science of morality comprises that of jurisprudence."‖ In the second volume of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's *Theory of Practice*, there is a section on "The Relation of Ethics and Law," in which this point is admirably elucidated. The views propounded by Mr. Hodgson are substantially the same as those of the writers just quoted. "The domain of law is more restricted than that of ethics; law deals with overt acts; ethics with both inward feelings and overt acts; every political law has the moral law for its basis." In his *Studies on Roman Law*, Lord Mackenzie says,—"The province of morals is evidently much wider than that of jurisprudence, which treats only of those duties which can be enforced by external law."¶ In explaining the relation of jurisprudence to ethics, Professor Amos seems to hold the same general doctrine, though it is less distinctly expressed. In the chapter in Professor Lorimer's *Institutes*,—"Of the Relation

* *Memoirs*, Vol. II. p. 367. † P. 60. ‡ *Elements*, pp. 5, 32.
§ Inaugural Lecture on Jurisprudence, delivered in the Hall of the Middle Temple, Hilary Term, 1851. ‖ P. 5. ¶ P. 55.

between Jurisprudence and Ethics," the author states and illustrates views slightly different from those enunciated above. He concludes,—"The relation in which jurisprudence stands to ethics is thus a subordinate one, the relation of species to genus." Even Mr. Austin regards ethics and law as closely related; indeed, as "inseparably connected parts of a vast organic whole;" but he does not explain the precise nature of this connection. It must be stated that Fichte does not base law on ethical principles.* By a very abstract process of metaphysical reasoning, Fichte deduced our conception of law from a ground which, though independent of ethics, is perfectly consistent with moral principles. We thus see that jurisprudence is regarded by its ablest cultivators as a branch of moral science, and that law, in its ultimate grounds, rests upon morals. Hence we conclude that all the vital questions raised in jurisprudence must be reasoned and finally settled on moral grounds. It is assumed, therefore, in these inquiries, that the very conception of law, as applied to determine the relationships of men in society, is a moral conception, and may be analysed into simpler moral notions.

Jurisprudence, we have seen, is a science, and it is regarded as forming one branch of moral science. But what is jurisprudence? What is the meaning of the term? Professor Amos favours us with a criticism on "the extremely loose way in which the term jurisprudence is commonly employed;" and well he may remark on this point. For everyone at all conversant with legal literature will know that the word jurisprudence is employed by writers in this department of inquiry in different senses. Nothing can be more puzzling to the student of law, when he first enters upon these pursuits, than the various ways in which the term is applied. Professor Amos observes:—

"The term 'jurisprudence,' in the present state of English scientific terminology, suggests, even to the professional lawyer, ideas possessing every degree of laxity and indeterminateness. To some the term 'jurisprudence' conveys no more precise meaning than what may be described as 'everything that has to do with the law of a nation, or (perhaps) any other, if there be any other, kind of law.' To others, the term means the 'philosophy of positive law;' an expression consecrated indeed by Mr. Austin, but which throws the inquirer back on the true import of the term 'philosophy,' and so into one of the most intricate and hopeless questions of nomenclature that has ever divided the world of thinkers into an indefinite number of mutually repulsive atoms. To others, again, the term 'jurisprudence' means nothing

* *Science of Rights*, Book I. Sect. iv.

more than the process of comparing at leisure the positive law of different countries, without having any distinct purpose in instituting the comparison. Or, again, the term seems to be almost synonymous with 'legislation,' and to mean the process of discovering the best laws to make, and also the best way of publishing them in formal language so as to secure them most effectually against all chances of erroneous interpretation. Lastly, the term 'jurisprudence' means, for many serious minds, the intellectual process of ascertaining the place that the phenomenon of law holds in the constitution of human society and in the development of the human race."—(Pp. 507, 508.)

This is by no means a complete enumeration of the senses in which the word has been employed. It is remarkable that Professor Amos should have omitted to notice the sense in which jurisprudence has been employed more extensively than any other,—that of denoting inquiries into what we know of natural law, or of law, as such, and as based on moral principles. In exhibiting the relation of jurisprudence to ethics, some indications have been furnished of the general notions expressed by the word, but let us now inquire, more particularly, how the term has been applied by jurists and philosophers. The term comes to us from Roman law. In the Latin language, *jurisprudentia*, as its etymological formation shows, simply means "knowledge of law." The Romans, however, evidently meant by it the science of law, or law in its source and principles. The most authoritative explanation of its meaning is that which is given in the remarkable passage which opens the *Institutes* of Justinian:—"*Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, justi atque injusti scientia*," which is thus rendered by Mr. Sandars and other translators:—"Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and human; the science of the just and the unjust." It should be remembered that this is not the language of Tribonian, the compiler of the *Institutes*, but of Ulpian, one of the most eminent of the classical jurists. To us the meaning of the writer seems simple and clear; Ulpian asserts, and he designed to assert, that "*jurisprudentia*" is concerned with inquiries about justice—about abstract justice as the foundation of law, or about what is just *in* law. We know that certain English disciples of the analytico-historical school demur to this interpretation, and, indeed, ridicule the passage; but is not this the plain, natural signification of the language? Mr. Sandars' comment on this section of the *Institutes* is very good. He says: "*Jurisprudentia* is the knowledge of what is *jus*, and *jus*, according to the theory of the law of nature, laid down what was com-

manded by right reason, this right reason being common to nature, or, as the Romans more often said, to the gods and to man."* Mr. Cumin's comment is equally just:—"Law is the science of the just and the unjust; the body of rules which enables a man in everything, whether human or divine, to distinguish the lawful from the unlawful."† We think, however, that the comment of the French jurist, Ortolan, brings out the meaning of the Roman jurist in the most complete and satisfactory manner. He insists that it is the business of jurisprudence to determine what is just and what is unjust in the broadest application of these terms; and his remark, distinguishing the precise force of the two words *notitia*, simple knowledge, and *scientia*, science, strikingly illustrates the importance of taking Justinian's last sentence in its widest application.‡ It would be easy to show that this conception of the nature and object of jurisprudence subsisted through the Middle Ages, reappearing in Europe on the revival of learning, and the renewed cultivation of jurisprudence by Grotius and other great jurists. It is unnecessary, however, to quote authorities to this effect. Coming to modern writers, Kant says: "By the science of law is meant the systematic knowledge of the principles of the law of nature (from which positive law takes its rise), which is for ever the same, and carries its sure and unerring obligation over all nations and throughout all nations."§ "Jurisprudence, properly so called, is the science of the relations which exist between men as united in society," according to Warnkœnig. Mackintosh declares: "The first principles of jurisprudence are the simple maxims of reason, of which the observance is immediately discovered by experience to be essential to the security of man's rights, and which pervade the laws of all countries."‖ In his *Deontology*, Bentham observes: "Jurisprudence is the science by which law is

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* *Institutes of Justinian*, p. 78. † *Manual of Civil Law*, p. 31.

‡ La définition donnée ici de la jurisprudence, et qui appartient à l'ère philosophique des jurisconsultes romains, paraît au premier coup d'œil assez ambitieuse: *divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia*, la connaissance des choses divines et humaines! mais il faut ne point séparer cette première partie de la seconde, *justi atque injusti scientia*, et traduire ainsi: la jurisprudence est la connaissance des choses divines et humaines pour savoir y déterminer le juste et l'injuste. En effet, les objets auxquels s'applique la jurisprudence sont les choses divines et humaines; le but pour lequel elle s'y applique est, y déterminer le juste et l'injuste. Il faut donc commencer par connaître ces choses. Cette explication paraîtra encore plus exacte si l'on pèse bien la valeur de ces mots *notitia*, simple connaissance, et *scientia*, science.—*Explication Historique des Institutes de l'Empereur Justinien*, Tome I. p. 136.

§ *Metaphysics of Ethics*, p. 177. ‖ *Works*, p. 180.

applied to the production of felicity."* His disciple, Mr. James Mill, says: "The object and end of the science, which is distinguished by the name of jurisprudence, is the protection of rights;"† and by rights, Mr. Mill means legal rights, or rights created by law. Dr. Foster remarks that "a perfect system of jurisprudence is one which provides adequately for the protection of all the rights of nature;" and again, "the subject-matter of jurisprudence is natural law, or that course of human conduct which is morally enforcible by public authority."‡ Mr. W. M. Best thus explains the subject:—"By general or natural jurisprudence, I mean those principles of law which are established *jure naturali*, and exist everywhere, unless so far as they are modified by municipal law, or custom, to meet the exigence of place or circumstance. These principles are learned by the attentive study of human nature, of the rules of morality and general policy, of history and the laws of different countries."§ After quoting Ulpian's definition, Lord Mackenzie says that, "according to modern notions, jurisprudence is the science of positive law—that is, law established in an independent political community by the authority of its supreme government." This is substantially Mr. Austin's definition. In numerous passages of his work, he tells us that "the science of jurisprudence, or simply jurisprudence, is concerned with positive laws, or with laws strictly so called, as considered without regard to their goodness or badness."‖ This definition may be taken as that of Mr. Austin's followers; of Mr. Poste, when he says, "Jurisprudence treats exclusively of positive law," and of Mr. Markby in his *Elements of Law*. The views of the German jurists, Hugo, Thibaut, and Savigny, do not essentially differ from those of Austin and his followers. Of a different school is Mr. Phillipps, who uses jurisprudence to signify "the science which teaches us to analyse and classify the rules of justice;" and he adds that, in so defining it, "I mean distinctly to exclude the idea that jurisprudence teaches us, or can possibly teach us, what the rules of justice are. Justice itself is an instinct and not a science."¶ The design of Professor Lorimer's *Institutes* is to show that the principles of jurisprudence are based on natural law; still, he formally states that "the ultimate object of jurisprudence is the attainment of human perfection," but "the proximate

* Vol. I. p. 28.

† "Treatise on Jurisprudence," in the Supplement to *Encyclopædia Britannica*, p. 143. ‡ *Elements*, pp. 111, 138. § Pp. 97, 98. ‖ Pp. 177, 178.

¶ *Jurisprudence*, pp. 1, 2.

object of jurisprudence, the object which it seeks as a separate science, is liberty."* Professor Amos informs us that he has taken "almost an excessive amount of care to fix with precision the true import of the phrase, 'Science of Jurisprudence.'" His formal definition is repeated several times in his work, and runs thus:—

"The science of jurisprudence deals with the facts brought to light through the operation upon the fact of law (considered as such, and neither as good nor bad) of all other facts whatsoever, including among these other facts the facts resulting in the creation, and expressing the historical and logical vicissitudes of law itself."—(P. 18.)

This is certainly not a very simple or clear definition. Is law itself—either positive or natural law—the subject-matter of the science, or only "the facts resulting in its creation," whatever these may be?

On these explanations and definitions we must offer a few remarks. 1. The explanations here given of jurisprudence render it obvious that eminent writers on the subject have used the term in somewhat different senses. 2. It will be seen that some of these writers speak of the subject-matter of the science, as Kant, Foster, Phillipps, Mackintosh, Best, and Austin, although they do not agree as to what that subject-matter is; while others appear to aim at a description of the object, or end, of the science, which they variously represent as "felicity," "liberty," "the protection of rights," &c. 3. Some of these definitions are certainly vague and comprehensive enough, and seem to attribute to jurisprudence a wide and indeterminate field of inquiry. For it may be said that almost every science is designed to be "applied to the production of felicity." This end is surely not peculiar to jurisprudence. Again, many other branches of knowledge also aim to secure "liberty." The attainment of these objects is not the exclusive business of jurisprudence, and hence these definitions tell us nothing respecting the special nature of this science. Then, there are vast numbers of "facts brought to light through the operation upon the fact of law of all other facts whatsoever" that are dealt with by other sciences, and that form the appropriate phenomena of other departments of thought. Professor Amos' definition does not say what the appropriate or special facts of the science are. Should not the definition of a science either mention the peculiar facts with which it deals, or specify the peculiar way in which it deals with them? The explanation

* P. 279.

of Professor Amos does neither. The Professor expressly calls his account a "definition." What would he consider the genus, and what the differentia, in this definition? 4. These explanations are so variously worded that, at first sight, many of them might seem to have no relation to a common subject. On comparing them it will, however, be found that a real affinity exists among a considerable number. For instance, when Ulpian speaks of the "science of the just and the unjust," Phillipps of "analysing and classifying the rules of justice," Kant of the "knowledge of the principles of the law of nature," Best of "the principles of law which are established *jure naturali*," Mackintosh of "the maxims of reason," Foster of "natural law, and the protection of the rights of nature," and Lorimer of "natural law," a little reflection will suffice to show that these writers all mean the same thing, or nearly so. Again, the explanation of Austin and those of his way of thinking are substantially the same. There is, then, more substantial agreement among these definitions than might be suspected on a first perusal. 5. Indeed, we submit that, so far as their import is clear and definite, these definitions may all be arranged in two classes:—those that make jurisprudence deal with the foundation or the universal element in law, or base it on natural justice; and those that say its only business is to deal with the classification and features of the positive, existing laws in a community, without considering their character as good or bad, or without taking account of the moral principles on which law rests. 6. To the first class belong Ulpian, Kant, Mackintosh, Foster, Best, Phillipps, Lorimer, and a host of English jurists of the past and present time: and to the second class belong Bentham, Austin, with their disciples, and their great English leader, Hobbes. The second class say that jurisprudence is simply concerned with law as it *is*, and not as it *ought* to be. This view is reiterated in every form of language by Mr. Austin in his great work, and it is expressly endorsed by Mr. Markby,* and by another able follower, Mr. Poste.† It is scarcely necessary to say that the first class of writers teach a wholly different doctrine respecting the nature and objects of jurisprudence.

Jurisprudence is a science. It is a part of ethical science, or it is a science founded on moral principles. It is explained as a science which furnishes an exposition of the nature of law—of natural law as well as of positive law. The next

* *Elements*, pp. 5, 6. † *Elements of Gaius*, pp. 2, 3.

step in our inquiry, then, is this—*What is law?* what is its essential nature, its foundation, and ultimate principles? Whence does law derive its authority, sanction, or binding force? To these questions different answers have been given by eminent thinkers, and it is in the modes of dealing with these problems, and in the answers given, that we find those theories which have originated the different schools of jurisprudence. Here it may be asked, first, are these proper questions to raise, or is this a consideration necessary to the establishment of the science? and, secondly, by what principles can they be elucidated and decided? Now, if jurisprudence be a science, it should investigate the principles on which it rests: it should ascend to the beginnings, and deduce from these that body of truth which constitutes the science. Is not science systematic truth? In becoming systematic, every inquiry necessarily runs up into philosophy, and cannot establish itself as a science without this. As Ferrier observes, philosophy is reasoned truth,—reasoned out from the very beginnings, and through its combination of the universal and particular elements which constitute it. Now, is there anything universal or permanent in our conception of law? If so, must there not be what Whewell would denominate the fundamental ideas of the science,—those operations of reason which colligate and interpret the particular elements or facts that are exhibited in the laws of any community? In reference to the second question, it has been already shown that problems raised about the origin and nature of law must be settled by the appeal of reason to ethical facts and principles. Further, here, as Cousin shows it is in philosophy, we are not at liberty to entertain such questions or not at our pleasure: we are bound to deal with them. They inevitably present themselves in human consciousness, and demand solution. We are thus landed in theoretical morals, and we feel the propriety of Dr. Foster's remark that "we cannot erect jurisprudence into a science, unless moral philosophy affords some certain foundation upon which to rest it." Let us, then, turn to moral philosophy for this foundation.*

Ever since the dawn of speculation on ethical subjects in Greece, in the time of Socrates, moral philosophy has been dealing with these questions, and it is in following the stream

* It is all important now, when jurisprudence is cultivated as a science, that we should clearly ascertain on what it rests. Professor Foster has well said:—"Now that law is at length assuming among us the rank of a science, the principles upon which it is to be founded ought to be well settled."

of thought in the history of these efforts that we shall best understand the origin of our modern schools of jurisprudence. In reference to the nature and foundation of law, two leading theories have existed from the time of Socrates. The main problem in this discussion may be thus stated:—Is there such a thing as natural justice, or natural law, which underlies positive law, or which constitutes its foundation or its permanent element? or, is positive law to be accounted right and just simply in virtue of its enactment by the sovereign power in a State? In other words—Do right and wrong in law arise from the nature of things, or are they created by human institution? This is the question which has divided philosophers from Socrates to Austin and Mill. One class of thinkers maintains that law is, or ought to be, founded on reason, in the nature of things, on natural justice, and that our conception of law is of something real and absolute; the other class contends that the mere command, or the appointment of a law by human authority, constitutes it just; that this appointment is the source and measure of its character; and that there is nothing absolute in our conception of law. The advocates of the latter doctrine hold that, in seeking to determine the character of law, we should not go beyond its institution; we should take no cognisance of moral principles or natural law on which it rests. Pushed to its legitimate conclusion, this theory means that might is right. It was on this ground that Hobbes said, "No law can be unjust." It cannot be unjust, because the theory admits of no test of its character, and no appeal from the power that appointed the law. Intimately connected with these doctrines are the theories propounded by philosophers on the foundation of morals; and here again we find two principal lines of thought—the intuitional or subjective theory, and the utilitarian or objective theory. As a rule, the subjective, or intuitional, or idealistic view of morals, is connected with the doctrine of natural justice and natural law; and the utilitarian or objective theory of morals, with a denial of the existence of natural law and natural justice, and the assertion that the character of law depends entirely on human institution.

Moral philosophy arose with Socrates. While it would be foreign to our object to enter into any details of his moral system, it is directly pertinent to our inquiry to note that Socrates held the doctrine of a natural or Divine law, which is the true source of obligation in every sphere of human action. With Socrates right or justice was not a matter of convention; on the contrary, he taught that there was a

natural justice upon which positive law should be based. This statement is authorised by many passages in the *Dialogues* of Plato, that are allowed to represent the views of his master; but it is, perhaps, most distinctly laid down in the beautiful discussion which he held with the Sophist Hippias, on what Xenophon styles "Justice," or, as Professor Blackie phrases the title, "On the foundation of Natural Right and Positive Law," as reported by Xenophon. As is usual in the Socratic Dialogues, the discussion begins with banter; but the disputants are soon brought to the real subject by the remark of Hippias, that "we are talking of justice and the rule of right," and by his announcing that he had something new to say on the subject. Socrates is eager to get the secret from him, but he will not, he says, advance anything until Socrates has explained *his* views on the subject of right. Socrates then says, "*Right is conformity to the laws.*" At this Hippias expresses surprise, and inquires what laws are meant. The Dialogue proceeds thus:—

"Tell me, O Hippias, did you ever hear of what we might call *unwritten laws*?—Yes; those laws, I presume you mean, which are the same in all countries.—Can we say, then, do you imagine, that men made such laws? How could that be? Men could neither come together for such a purpose, nor, if they did, could they ever agree.—Who, then, do you think, laid down these laws?—In my opinion, the gods; for amongst all men the universal instinct is to acknowledge the gods."

After considering some illustrations of natural or divine law, such as reverence to parents, gratitude, &c., the discussion ends thus:—

"Now, by Jove, said Hippias, I must confess that I do here see plain traces of a divine law; for that laws should bring along with them their own penalties when broken is a most rare device, to which no mere human legislator has ever yet been able to attain.—Well, then, Hippias, do you think that the Gods, when they make laws, make them in accordance with right, or with what is contrary to right? Not with what is contrary, assuredly; for if laws are to be made in accordance with absolute right, the gods are the only powers that can make them perfectly. And so, Hippias, to finish our long discourse, we conclude that *with the Gods law and right are identical.*"*

This discourse of Socrates with Hippias supplies indirect evidence, that among the contemporaries of the speakers there were philosophers who maintained the opposite doc-

* *Professor Blackie's Four Phases of Morals*, pp. 113—120.

trine that the character of law was derived from mere convention, or human institution.

In the *Dialogues* of Plato this question of moral distinctions and the foundation of law is several times raised, and it is clear from these passages that there then existed a class of thinkers who regarded positive law as just, simply in virtue of its appointment, as Hobbes did. The doctrine is repeatedly criticised and confuted by Plato in his writings. It has been commonly said that the Sophists urged this doctrine, and maintained that might makes right, and that there is nothing intrinsically just in law; but Mr. Grote demurs to this statement about the Sophists. Now, it matters nothing to our purpose whether the thinkers alluded to by Plato are called Sophists, Rhetors, or Philosophers; the fact is undeniable that we meet in the writings of Plato with characters who propound such principles. We may just mention a few well-known passages. In the *Gorgias* (85, 86, 95), the reasoning of Polus and Callicles proceeds on the ground that there is no such thing as natural justice, and Plato makes Socrates confute these arguments. In the *Theætetus* (75) Protagoras and others are represented as maintaining that things are not just and unjust, holy and unholy, by nature, but by institution, and as each city enacts for itself by its own laws; and, consequently, that what we term just and unjust have not by nature any essence of their own. In the *Protagoras* (52, 53, 54), the same or nearly the same doctrine is discussed and refuted. And, finally, in the *Laws* * there is a remarkable passage, which is thus rendered by Professor Jowett:—

"They would say that the gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but only by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature, and another thing by law; and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by laws have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made."†

It is surely unnecessary that we should attempt to prove

* Book X. c. 4.

† *Jowett's Translation of Plato*, Vol. IV. pp. 399, 400. The original runs thus:—Θεούς, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ. οὐ φύσει ἀλλά τισι νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅταν ἕκαστοι ξυνθῶνται συνομολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα· τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα, ἃ δ' ἂν μεταθῶνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνομένα τεχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀλλ' οὐδή τινι φύσει.

that the idealistic Plato opposed this sensational origin of our notion of justice and right. It has been well said: "The scope of Plato's philosophy was essentially ethical. His object was to set ethics upon a transcendental basis. He wished to connect a scheme of morality which, he thought, ought to prevail between man and man, with the divine personality." * It is well known that Mr. Grote gives another interpretation of Plato's reasoning on this subject; but, valuable as we deem his book on Plato, we think he is sadly in error on this point, and would refer the reader to Professor Maguire's *Essays*, mentioned in the note, for a fuller exposition and a juster estimate of Plato's ethical speculations.

The mind of Aristotle was widely different from that of Plato. It was less poetical and speculative, more analytical and practical. His great book on morals, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is one of the most practical works we have on moral philosophy. Still, on the points under consideration, Aristotle's views do not differ from those of Socrates and Plato. Every reader of the fifth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "On Justice," will know how clearly he points out the distinction between "natural justice" and "legal justice"—that is, the justice of human law. Then, in his *Rhetoric* (Book I. chap. xiii.), he expressly declares: "There are two kinds of law, that which is proper to each community, and that which is common to all. For there is, as all men perceive, more or less clearly, a natural justice and injustice, which all men in common recognise, even if they have no society or compact with each other." † He then quotes those beautiful lines from Sophocles, where Antigone admits she has acted contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to the law of nature. Now, if nothing else existed in Greek literature on this point, this declaration of Antigone would suffice to show the deep and widespread conviction in the

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* *Essay on the Platonic Idea*, by Professor Maguire, p. 111. In this work, and particularly in another by the same author, *Essays on the Platonic Ethics*, the reader will find capital elucidations of the chief points in Plato's moral doctrines, with some admirable strictures on Mr. Grote's misrepresentations of Plato's views. Grote's views are expressed in several parts of his book on Plato; but they are most fully brought out in his comment on the *Gorgias* in the second volume.

† For a full discussion of several points connected with Aristotle's ethics, and indeed with Greek ethics generally, the reader is referred to the essays and dissertation contained in Sir Alexander Grant's edition of *The Ethics of Aristotle*. Professor Blackie's Lecture on Aristotle, in his interesting volume entitled, *Four Phases of Morals*, abounds in suggestive views on Aristotle's moral system.

Greek mind of the difference between natural and instituted law. She says:—

> "No ordinance of man shall override
> The settled laws of nature and of God;
> Not written, these, in pages of a book,
> Nor were they framed to-day nor yesterday;
> We know not whence they are; but this we know,
> That they from all eternity have been,
> And shall to all eternity endure."*

Similar views to those of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, on natural justice and the foundations of law, were held by many of the Greek philosophers that came after their time. By others, as by the Epicureans and Cynics, as well as by the Sophists and sceptical sects, the opposite doctrine was taught. In one form or another these philosophers held expediency, or the utilitarian theory, as the criterion of action. According to Aristippus, "No action was in itself good or bad, but only by convention." There is one sect whose teaching on this subject deserves special notice, on account of the marked influence which their doctrine has exerted on the development of Roman law, and, through Roman law, on modern thought; we refer to the Stoics. This sect insisted, more strenuously than any other, on the existence of a natural, or, as they called it, a divine law, to whose requirements all human action ought to be conformed. The fundamental principle of their ethical system was: "Follow nature;" "live conformably to right reason;" "live according to nature;" meaning by these obedience to natural law. The Stoics did not, like the Epicureans, look to the objective world or convention for the foundation of morality, but to reason—to man's moral nature. Mr. Lewes thus briefly states the ethical doctrine of the Stoics:—

> "Their ethics are easily to be deduced from their theology. If reason is the great creative law, to live conformably with reason must be the practical moral law. If the universe be subject to a general law, every part of that universe must also be duly subordinate to it. The consequence is clear: there is but one formula for morals, and that is, live harmoniously with nature."†

Schwegler explains the point in almost similar terms. Now, the Stoical system of ethics was very widely accepted in the declining years of Greece; but its importance in our inquiry

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* Thompson's *Sales Attici*, 65.
† *Biog. History of Phil.: The Stoics.*

arises from its spread among the Romans, and from the part it played in unfolding and shaping Roman law. The influence of Stoicism in this direction has frequently been noticed. Mackintosh refers to it in an eloquent passage of his Dissertation, and Mr. Lewes says, "Zeno was in spirit a Roman, and his philosophy anticipated Roman life." But Mr. Lecky has shown, more fully and distinctly than any previous writer, how Stoical ethics moulded Roman law.* We shall find that it was from Greek philosophy, and especially from Stoical ethics, that those views of natural law were derived which expanded and perfected Roman law through the Prætorian Edicts and the labours of the *Jurisconsults*.

The Romans were emphatically a practical people. They were men of deeds rather than of imaginings—of action rather than of speculation. Their literature contains little that is original in poetry or philosophy. After the conquest of Greece by the Romans, philosophy was introduced into the imperial city by Greek emigrants. The systems that found most favour among them were the Epicurean and the Stoic. To the speculations of Plato, or even to those of Aristotle, they never gave much attention. Still, in the closing years of the Republican period, the systems of Zeno and Epicurus were much studied by the educated classes in Rome; and, if Rome does not furnish us with an original moral philosophy, she gives us her wonderful legal system, which exhibits a singular application of Greek moral philosophy. The perfection to which Roman law ultimately attained has invested the whole course of its history with peculiar interest, and this has led some modern jurists to attach great value even to the study of its earlier forms. It appears to us to be a notable error on the part of the leading spirits of the historical school to consider the early forms of Roman law so precious. In his work on *Ancient Law*, Sir H. S. Maine says:—"If by any means we can determine the early forms of jural conceptions, they will be invaluable to us. These rudimentary ideas are to the jurist what the primary crusts of the earth are to the geologist. They contain potentially all the forms in which law has subsequently exhibited itself" (p. 3). Savigny speaks in somewhat similar terms in his early work, *The Vocation of the Age for Jurisprudence*. We cannot but think that these great men much overrate the value of these early forms of law. The earliest laws of every community spring from their customs, which are mostly engendered by the

* *History of European Morals*, Vol. I. chap. ii.

peculiar circumstances in which the people have been placed. These early laws are generally harsh and barbarous. It is readily admitted that the laws of such communities may be exceedingly useful in historical research; but we cannot regard them as "invaluable" to the modern jurist, who is seeking to build up the science of jurisprudence. It seems to us absurd to say, "they contain, potentially, all the forms in which law has subsequently exhibited itself." Like the laws of every other rude tribe, the laws of the early Romans abound in harsh, cruel, and unjust provisions. Our knowledge of early Roman law is very scanty; but, if we may judge of its character by the information gathered and presented by such writers as Niebuhr, Ihne, Mommsen, Ortolan, and Clark,* we must think these laws would be of small value to the modern scientific jurist in the construction of this science. After the first laws came the Twelve Tables, which were, to a great extent, an embodiment of the old laws and customs, with certain additions and improvements brought from Greece. As Gibbon remarks, the Romans regarded this code with a "blind and partial reverence," and they obstinately adhered to its laws when their condition had quite outgrown the absurd and harsh provisions of this early code. What is the history of Roman law for six centuries after the establishment of the Twelve Tables, but a record of efforts to get rid of, to ameliorate, or supersede, the barbarism of their earlier laws and code? Professor Maine's own book furnishes abundant evidence that such was the principal object of all efforts for the amendment of Roman law. And how was the great change effected? Chiefly through the agency of what Maine calls "fictions:" natural justice, natural law, and equity.

In no writings do we find the doctrine that positive law should be based on justice or natural law more explicitly set forth, or more strenuously insisted upon, than in those of Cicero. In several of his works, in his *Republic*, in his *Laws*, in his *Offices*, as well as in some of his *Orations* and other pieces, the great Roman author propounds this view, and urges it with much eloquence and force. It would be impossible, and it is unnecessary, to quote these well-known pas-

* *Early Roman Law. The Regal Period.* By E. C. Clark, M.A. Macmillan and Co., 1872. Mr. Clark's book is very valuable, as well for its accurate learning, as for the fair spirit in which it deals with the various intricate points connected with this inquiry. Among the histories of Roman law, Ortolan's *Histoire de la Législation Romaine* will be found worthy of special attention. Mr. Cumin's useful *Manual of Civil Law* contains a translation of and commentary on the Fragments of the Twelve Tables.

sages. It must suffice to take a few scattered sentences from the *Laws*, and one passage from the *Republic*. In the *Laws* we have the following :—

"Man is born for justice, and law and equity have not been established by opinion, but by nature. . . . For to those to whom nature has given reason she has also given right reason, and therefore also law, which is nothing else than right reason, enjoining what is good, and forbidding what is evil; and if nature has given us law, she hath also given us right. . . . It is therefore an absurd extravagance in some philosophers to assert, that all things are necessarily just which are established by the civil laws and the institutions of nations. Are then the laws of tyrants just, simply because they are laws? . . . There is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. . . . But to think that these differences exist only in opinion and not in nature is the part of an idiot." *

In the third book of the *Republic*, chap. xxii., occurs the following splendid passage on the nature of law :—

"True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one thing to day, and another to morrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must for ever reign eternal and imperishable." †

There is abundant evidence that these views as to the founding of positive law on natural law, or natural justice, extensively prevailed among the public men and educated

* Yonge's *Translation of the Laws*. Bohn's *Classical Library*. Pp. 411, 413, 416.

† Yonge's *Translation of the Republic*. Bohn's *Classical Library*. P. 360. It will be known to the reader of Burke's works that they contain two or three passages on this topic that may be said to be equal in eloquence and force to this language of the great Roman orator. One splendid passage occurs in his denunciation of arbitrary power in his speech on Hastings' trial. In his *Tracts on Popery Laws*, Burke says :—"It would be hard to point out any error more truly subversive of all order and beauty, of all the peace and happiness of human society, than the position that any body of men have a right to make what laws they please; or that laws can derive any authority from their institution merely, and independently of the quality of the subject-matter. . . . All human laws are, properly speaking, only declaratory; they may alter the mode and application, but have no power over the substance of original justice."—*Burke's Works*, Vol. VI. pp. 16, 17.

classes at Rome, from the time of Cicero; and it is worthy of note that, although there were among the Romans disciples of Epicurus, we have no exposition or defence of his ethical principles from any distinguished writer. It is admitted that most of the *Jurisconsults* belonged to the Stoical sect.* Then these doctrines about natural law were not discussed at Rome simply as matters of speculation, but were practically worked into the legal system by the jurists, and especially by the Prætors and other magistrates. Through their edicts the Prætors and the Ædiles had a great power in interpreting, modifying, and enlarging the civil law. These magistrates were virtually legislators, and by their edicts they could apply to cases as they arose the principles of natural law, and thus they virtually created the best part of the Roman law, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which "decisions" and "cases" form law with us. In his Introduction to *Justinian's Institutes*, Mr. Sandars observes:—

"By far the most important addition to the system of Roman law which the jurists introduced from Greek philosophy, was the conception of the *lex naturæ*. We learn from the writings of Cicero whence this conception came, and what was understood by it. It came from the Stoics, and especially from Chrysippus. . . . But man has reason, and, as reason cannot be twofold, the *ratio* of the universe must be the same as the *ratio* of man, and the *lex naturæ* will be the law by which the actions of man are to be guided, as well as the law directing the universe. Virtue, or moral excellence, may be described as living either in accordance with reason, or with the law of the universe. These notions worked themselves into the Roman law. The Jurists did not draw any sharp line between law and morality. As the *lex naturæ* was a *lex*, it must have a place in the law of Rome. The Prætor considered himself bound to arrange his decisions so that no strong moral claims should be disregarded. He had to give effect to the *lex naturæ*, not only because it was morally right to do so, but also because the *lex naturæ* was *lex*. When a rigid adherence to the doctrines of the *jus civile* threatened to do a moral wrong, and produce a result that was not equitable, there the *lex naturæ* was supposed to operate, and the Prætor, in accordance with its dictates, provided a remedy by means of the pliant forms of the Prætorian Actions." †

What say the great Roman jurists as to the foundation of law? With the exception of the *Elements of Gaius*—and they are imperfect—we only possess fragments of the writings of these men, and these mostly in the shape of extracts that are

* Dunlop's *History of Roman Literature*, Vol. II. p. 300.

† *The Institutes of Justinian*, with English Introduction, Translation, &c., by Thomas Collett Sandars, M.A., pp. 13, 14.

incorporated in the Compilations of Justinian. Three works—*The Code*, *The Digest* or *Pandects*, and *The Institutes*—were "made up" under Justinian's authority. Each of these is properly a digest; that is, a distribution under separate heads of a body of laws previously not so distributed, but such laws retaining traces of independent origin, and, in fact, expressed in the language of the original documents: a Code is the expression of the substance of previous laws, as a logical, homogeneous, and organic whole.* The so-called *Code* of Justinian is properly a digest of the Constitutions, or of Roman statutory law; and the *Pandects* are a digest of the Roman common law. The *Pandects* are, therefore, principally taken from the writings of jurists. We have seen that Ulpian speaks of the just and the unjust as the foundation of law. From the opening sentences of the *Institutes* we take the following:—

"Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi;" that is—Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render everyone his own. "Juris præcepta sunt hæc; honeste vivere, alterum non lædere, suum cuique tribuere;" that is—The maxims of law are these: to live honestly, to hurt no one, to give everyone his due. "Jus naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit; nam jus istud non humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalium quæ in cœlo, quæ in terra, quæ in mari nascuntur;" that is—The law of nature is that law which nature teaches to all animals. For this law does not belong exclusively to the human race, but belongs to all animals, whether of the earth, the air, or the water. "Jus autem civile vel gentium ita dividitur. Omnes populi qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum jure utuntur; nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit, id ipsius civitatis proprium est, vocaturque jus civile, quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis. Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peræque custoditur, vocaturque jus gentium, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur;" that is—"Civil law is thus distinguished from the law of nations. Every community governed by laws and customs uses partly its own law, partly laws common to all mankind. The law which a people makes for its own government belongs exclusively to that state, and is called the civil law as being the law of the particular state. But the law, which natural reason appoints for all mankind obtains equally among all nations, and is called the law of nations, because all nations make use of it.†

The first section of the *Elements of Gaius*, omitting the original, is thus rendered by Mr. Poste:—

* We are using these terms as they have been defined by Mr. Holland in his valuable *Essays on the Form of Law*, pp. 14–18.

† *Institutes of Justinian*, by Sandars, pp. 77, 78, 79, 80.

"The laws of every people governed by statutes and customs are partly peculiar to itself, partly common to all mankind. The rules enacted by a given state for its own members are peculiar to itself, and are called civil law; the rules prescribed by natural reason are observed by all nations alike, and are called Gentile law."*

In these extracts we have three kinds of law mentioned:—1. *Jus civile*, the civil law, or old Roman law; 2. *Jus gentium*, or the law common to other states; 3. *Jus naturale*, natural law. There is a little confusion in the application of the latter two terms, as the second and third kinds of law appear to be confounded with each other, or both terms are sometimes used for the same thing. As Mr. Sandars remarks, "by *lex naturæ* the jurists meant to express right reason inherent in nature and man;" and they "contrasted it with the *jus civile* and the *jus gentium*." We think it doubtful whether it was always designed to be contrasted with the *jus gentium*. For he observes, "when the jurists came to examine different systems of law, they found much in each that was common to all; this common part they term the *jus gentium*." It appears to us clear that they frequently called this common part *jus naturale*. They regarded the law which is common to all systems as the expression of right reason, and hence, with propriety, called it *jus naturale*. We therefore conclude that by *jus gentium* the Roman jurists often meant *jus naturale*—natural law, the expression of right reason.†

Now the jurists who form the modern historical school—Savigny, Austin, Maine, and others—deny the existence of this natural law: they hate the very expression, and treat the whole thing with the utmost scorn. The interpretation they give of the language now quoted from the Roman jurists is more ingenious than satisfactory. They contend that by natural law the Romans simply meant *jus gentium*, or that they used the terms as equivalents; and that *jus gentium* was merely the law that the Romans adopted from other states—the parts of Roman law which they borrowed, and which they incorporated into their own; and thus, on this theory, natural law was, with the Roman jurists, nothing but positive law! On this we observe:—1. This explanation coolly sets aside, in favour of a theory, the plain, simple language

* *Elements of Roman Law, by Gaius: with Translation and Commentary*. Edward Poste, M.A., p. 10.

† So successfully had the Roman jurists sought to embody the dictates of right reason in their law, that Dr. Tellkampf, Professor of Political Science in Breslau, remarks:—"The Roman law acquired the title of 'Written Reason.'" —*Essays on Law Reform*, &c. 1859. P. 11.

of a series of the most acute legal writers the world has ever known; or, it virtually asserts that the Roman jurists did not know what they were writing about. It is certainly very modest of Mr. Poste to tell us that the language of these jurists about natural law is "inappropriate and misleading!"* and of his master, Mr. Austin, to say that "the notion is a conceit!" 2. It is not a fact that the Roman jurists apply the expression "natural law" as the equivalent of *jus gentium*, when this expression simply means (if it ever does) the positive law of the State. 3. Besides sometimes seeming to speak of natural law in this sense, they employ it most frequently to express the rules of right reason, as Cicero did. This is clear from the sentences quoted above; and many passages to this effect are quoted by Phillimore in his *Private Law among the Romans* (pp. 39, 40).† 4. But if we accept, hypothetically, the explanation offered by the historical school, it only deals with a small portion of the facts, or of the texts. It does not touch the other expressions employed by the Roman jurists as equivalents of natural law, as "justice," "the just and the unjust," "equity," "rules prescribed by right reason," "precepts of the law," &c. 5. Their interpretation of natural law ignores the history of the doctrine on the subject. It is admitted on all sides that both the phrase and the doctrine came from Greek philosophy. How was it used by the Greek philosophers? Let the reader turn back to the extract given from Aristotle, and he will see at once. By natural law the Greeks meant the elements common to the law of all states, and they regarded it so, because all men have a sense of natural justice. Now, the Romans got the expression and the doctrine from the Greeks, and they evidently understood it as the Greeks had taught it. We submit, this view of the matter will harmonise all the expressions used by the Roman jurists, by Ulpian, Gaius and others, and will afford a simple elucidation of all the facts.

Roman law has been a vital power in the history of European civilisation since the time of Justinian. The labours of such men as Gibbon, Spence, Hugo, and Savigny have made it clear that Roman law exerted a considerable influence upon

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* *Comment on Gaius*, p. 12.

† These passages are drawn from the writings of various jurists that are quoted in the *Pandects*, and they are peculiarly interesting as showing how great moral principles were worked into the law by the Roman jurists. This point is still more fully illustrated in another work by Mr. Phillimore—*Principles and Maxims of Jurisprudence*, 1856. See also Ortolan's masterly exposition of Roman law, in his *Généralisation du Droit Romain*, in Vol. I. of the *Explication Historique des Instituts de Justinien*.".

the institutions of the Gothic tribes that founded the European states. As the various Western states were consolidated, portions of this law were, in different degrees, incorporated in their systems of law. With the revival of learning and intellectual activity, the Roman law was again zealously cultivated in most European kingdoms, and in all the earliest modern works on jurisprudence we find its principles and the principles of Christianity respecting natural justice and the foundation of law.* Among the earlier writers who accepted this doctrine, we may mention Melanchthon, Saurez, Gentilis, Bodinus, Sir Thomas More, Cujacius, and Donellius. Coming down to a later period, Leibnitz "viewed the law of nature as the source of all human legislation." His disciple, Wolf, took the same line of thought. The two eminent Prussian jurists, Baron Coceii and his son, "hold all human law to be founded in the law of nature." Lord Bacon declared that "our law is grounded upon the law of nature." The same general doctrine was explained and defended by Hooker, Cudworth, Cumberland, Rutherforth, and most of the other English philosophers who wrote during the seventeenth and the earlier portion of the last century.

While such has been the doctrine held by the great bulk of modern jurists, the opposite view, that there is no such thing as natural law or natural justice, and that law derives its character solely from human institution, has been maintained by a few men of eminent ability. Among these, Hobbes, Spinosa, Haller, and Thomasius are most prominent. These great thinkers have been followed by many other writers of less note; but it is unnecessary to attempt to enumerate them. The doctrines of Hobbes on the nature and foundation of law are unfolded in several of his works, as *De Cive*, *De Corpore Politico*, and most fully and systematically in *Leviathan*.

From the course which speculation took in the early and middle portions of last century, there arose a more independent and critical spirit of investigation, and this was carried into two separate fields of inquiry—philosophy and history. The working of this bolder spirit, in both these lines of thought, has done much to determine the progress and character of modern jurisprudence. In England the profound speculations of Berkeley and Hume led to some controversy, and

* Mr. Reddie remarks:—"From the earliest period in modern times, since the revival of learning, it appears to have been the practice of jurists to trace the origin and foundation of all human or positive law to what has been called *jus naturæ*."—*Science of Law*, p. 29.

resulted in the Scotch philosophy of common sense, which did exceedingly little for the science of law. In Germany the new movement was more fruitful; it gave a fresh direction to the tendency originated by Leibnitz and Wolf, and really created the philosophy of Kant, from which have flowed the numerous systems of philosophy that have since sprung up in that country. Among the Germans, speculative philosophy has been much more closely connected with jurisprudence than among any other people. The philosophy, or rather, perhaps, we should say, the philosophies thus produced, have operated both directly and indirectly on the science of law: directly, for not only Kant, but Fichte and Hegel, as well as several of their disciples, have written important books on jurisprudence; and indirectly, through the fact that most of the jurists and professors of law in Germany have been disciples of one or other of these philosophers, and thus philosophy has largely moulded their speculations on jural subjects. The new movement in historical inquiry arose out of several circumstances: a more accurate philology, a profounder philosophy, and a more scientific method of inquiry, all contributed to bring about the improvement. It first manifested itself in efforts at the general history of humanity and the philosophy of history. In France this spirit was fostered by the writings of Bossuet and Montesquieu; in Germany by those of Herder and Lessing; in Italy by those of Vico; and in England by such works as Ferguson's *History of Civil Society* and the writings of Professor John Millar. These historical investigations tended directly to elucidate jural phenomena, and to their investigation after a more scientific method. It thus appears that both the philosophical and the historical movements met on the field of jurisprudence. The impulse thus given to the study of law led, in Germany, to the diligent and successful cultivation of the science during the closing part of the last century, and these labours have been continued to the present time. The results of this activity have been manifested in various ways; in the development of new doctrines, in a learned literature on jurisprudence, in arduous efforts for the improvement of law through codification, and by the able discussion of questions connected with the fundamental principles of the science. As might naturally be expected, jurists and philosophers have differed in these questions. German writers usually enumerate four schools of jurisprudence:—1. The Practical; 2. The Philosophical; 3. The Historical; and 4. The Judicial; and of one or two of these they make subdivisions. It

appears to us that these different methods of explaining juridical principles may be brought under two general heads or sects—the Philosophical School and the Historical School. It may, however, be satisfactory to give some account of these different schools according to the German method.

The Practical School.—The jurists and philosophers that go under this title appear to accept the fundamental principles advanced by Leibnitz and Wolf, and some have laboured zealously to embody their doctrines in law. They looked rather to courts, to decisions, and to the opinions of jurists and casuists for the embodiment of their principles, than to written law, unless they might be able to obtain a code that should be based on these principles. They advocated a departure from the letter of existing written law to meet the peculiar circumstances of cases as they arose, and they attached great importance to the fact that general principles should be adapted to the actual facts and conditions of a people. The principles of justice or of natural law they would have reasoned out and applied, on strictly logical principles, to the requirements of the case; and, like Wolf, in their methods of reasoning, they leaned to mathematical forms. This school is sometimes spoken of as consisting of two sections. Both sections agreed in this, that judges should go beyond the word of positive law for principles to aid and guide their decisions; but one party held that judges should base their decisions on natural law, as such, and the other that they should rely rather on the authority of great jurists, casuists, or courts, as the acknowledged interpreters of the law of nature. Both sections admitted that positive law should be based on natural law, and that philosophical principles should be employed in unfolding and applying natural law. Strictly speaking, we might say such jurists belong to the next, the Philosophical School, if their fundamental principles were to be allowed to decide their place. The only reason, so far as we can judge, why they are called "Practical" is, that they sought to adapt law to the actual circumstances of the citizens, and because the *Code Frederic* was chiefly framed by some eminent men belonging to this party—particularly Nettelbladt and Daries. That this school recognised natural law as the foundation of positive law is clearly seen in the language which sets forth the design of their great practical work, the *Prussian Code*, which was to promulgate a "droit général du pays, qui comprenne toutes les loix de la société civile: de faire précéder à chaque matière les principes généraux; d'en déduire les conséquences qui en découlent nécessairement; et de former ainsi

un système universel qui puisse être appliqué à tous les états qui prennent la raison pour règle et pour fondement de leur loix."

The Philosophical School.—Kant's critical spirit put new life into philosophy towards the close of the last century, and this, combined with the bold speculative activity engendered by the French Revolution, created the Philosophical School of jurisprudence. At that period the conviction seized the minds of many ardent men that a system of law could be framed on philosophical principles that would almost be perfect, and that would be adapted to all nations. There was something grand in this idea; but it was soon found that it could not be realised in practice. The theory looked too exclusively at the subjective element in law, at human nature and the conception of justice in the abstract; and it ignored the objective element, and the facts brought out in experience and history. Of course, the adherents of this school sought to base positive law on natural law, on natural justice, equity, the dictates of reason, or the inalienable rights of man. The error of this party was that they attempted to deduce a system of positive law exclusively from abstract principles of this kind. Perhaps it may be said, the more idealistic spirits of the party carried this disposition further than the sober-minded adherents approved. To the Philosophical School belonged many able and distinguished men, jurists, philosophers, and professors. Among these may be mentioned Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Gans, Thibaut; and if the general theory of the school cannot be accepted as a whole, it is readily admitted that, through their writings, many men belonging to this party have rendered invaluable services to the science of jurisprudence. Many of its adherents have been strenuous advocates of codification, and they supported the adoption of the *Code Napoléon*, or a similar code for Germany.

The Historical School.—In its fundamental principles and method, this school may be said to be directly opposed to the last-mentioned. It does not attempt to found positive law on natural law, or natural justice, or on any subjective basis, but on objective facts and experience; it does not seek to test the character of positive law by any subjective standard, or abstract principle, but it accepts what *is*, or has been, because it exists, and regards its existence as its justification. It looks backward rather than forward. Perhaps it will be most satisfactory to take an explanation of its doctrines from a German writer, who remarks:—

"The peculiar characteristic of the Historical School is, that they regard no legal principles as capable of universal and unconditional application. They view law as a mere result of the accidental relations of a people, and as changing with them. According to the principles of this school, everything may be right, even slavery and many other things, which the Philosophical School declares to be a violation of the universal rights of man, and absolutely wrong. The Historical School allows a very narrow sphere to that legislation in which law is based on the will of the lawgiver, and a very large one, on the contrary, to customary law, which commences and perpetuates itself by popular usage and the decision of courts. Its ideal is the Roman law. It rejects all reasons deduced from a supposed nature of things or from philosophical opinions of right, and derives existing law, not from the decisions of courts and colleges, in which it perceives many glaring errors, but from ancient laws and law-books. It regards as truly right, not what modern times have recognised and followed as right, but what they would have esteemed right if they had properly understood the ancient sources, and therefore considers that all improvement must be the result of a thorough examination of history."

According to this sect of jurists, the law of any people at any particular period has grown out of the previous state of that people: it should be so, and law cannot and ought not to be tested by any notions about justice, equity, and right. It terms these things "conceits," or "fictions." In Germany, Hugo and Savigny have done most to establish this school, through their very able and learned works. It is said that Savigny modified some of his views in the latter part of his life, or rather, perhaps, that his doctrine had been misunderstood by those who judged from his earlier work, *On the Vocation of the Age for Jurisprudence*. In support of this statement, Mr. Guthrie prints Savigny's preface to his last great work, which he believes was designed to remove misapprehension; and Mr. Phillimore assures us that Savigny has "renounced the errors of his earlier work," and has "borrowed largely from the principles of his antagonists," the Philosophical School. He certainly ceased to be so strongly opposed to codification, but we confess we see little change of fundamental principles in the preface to his *System of Modern Roman Law*.*

The Legistic or Strictly Judicial School.—This might, perhaps, be termed the Eclectic School. Those who belong to it were dissatisfied with the theory of each of the preceding sects as a theory, and contended that the principles of any

* This preface is prefixed to Mr. Guthrie's translation of Savigny's *Treatise on the Conflict of Laws*. Edinburgh: Clark. 1869.

one, if exclusively accepted, were inadequate as a guide in building up the science of law. They therefore turned their attention to the study of positive law in a broad practical spirit, and with a strong leaning to the practice of interpreting existing laws literally until they were amended by legislation.

Through these sects much ability and learning were brought to the cultivation of jurisprudence in Germany. Controversies arose respecting the fundamental principles of the science and the methods by which it might be built up,—chiefly between the philosophical and the historical schools. These discussions led to a thorough examination of the foundations of law. Phillimore justly observes,—"The collision between these two great schools has struck out flashes of light which have illuminated the most abstruse and distant portions of the subject. As usual, neither side has mastered the whole truth." It must be added, that in the writings of many German jurists of recent years, a disposition has been manifested to combine the methods of the two sects,—to unite philosophical deduction with historical research. This seems to us the only correct method of inquiry; it is the true inductive method, because it applies ideas to the interpretation of facts.

The intellectual activity thus directed to jurisprudence in Germany has materially affected the progress of the science, and the results have influenced its cultivation in other countries, in France, in Italy, in England, and America. Both the philosophical and historical schools have had distinguished disciples in France, and several able scientific works have appeared on the subject in that country; but the respect in which the *Code Napoléon* is held there, has, in some degree, prevented that free development of jurisprudence which would otherwise probably have taken place. Still the works of the great German masters have been translated into French.

As law was formerly studied in England, little opportunity was afforded for the action of the German movement on the jurisprudence of this country. It is well known that in reference to law pursuits, England, until very recently, was almost wholly unaffected by the studies of the Continent. As already observed, some forty years ago, the late Mr. Austin made his countrymen acquainted with the character of German speculation, and particularly with the spirit and scope of the Historical School. From the appearance of his work in 1832, and more especially during the last twenty-five

years, England has shown considerable interest in the cultivation of jurisprudence as a science. In consequence of our isolation on such questions, and through the peculiar, the practical, and craftlike way in which these subjects were formerly studied in England, we were almost entirely beyond the reach of the scientific jurisprudence of the Continent. Hence, we have benefited less by the efforts of German jurists than any other State in Western Europe. The publication of Mr. Austin's treatise makes an era in the history of English jural thought. He founded what has generally been called the English historical school, but which, we think, may, with more propriety, be styled the historico-analytical school. His school may be so called, because his principles and method differ materially from the purely historical school of Germany. This difference may be chiefly traced to the labours of Bentham. In all Austin's writings we see the analytical spirit and the utilitarianism of Bentham. The system of jurisprudence unfolded in the works of Austin is not, then, identical with that of the purely historical school. Every reader of Austin will know that the utilitarian theory of morals underlies all his reasonings. It forms the groundwork of his doctrines and conclusions; and, in fact, his lectures contain one of the most elaborate and lucid expositions of utilitarianism that is to be found in the language,—not even excepting that by Mr. Mill. Mr. Austin himself said that "a fitter name for those jurists of the historical school would be the *inductive* or *utilitarian* school."* These jurists certainly base their science on utilitarian ethics, but, assuredly, they have no better claim to the title "inductive" than others. In strict propriety, the disciples of Austin have less claim to this title, because, in seeking a foundation for jurisprudence, they exclude from the field of their observation the facts revealed by consciousness respecting man's conceptions of justice, right, obligation, duty, &c. Undeniably, Mr. Austin's works and teachings have exercised a powerful influence on the thinking of many able men among us, and have thus done much to shape the course of recent speculations on jurisprudence in England. By some, Mr. Austin seems to be regarded as the creator of the science in this country. Even Dr. Foster says,—"I differ *toto cœlo* from the principles which the signal perfections of Mr. Austin's treatise have established as the foundation of *the English school of jurisprudence.*" Now we must think it

* *Jurisprudence*, p. 702.

unwarranted to speak of this system as if it were the only form of scientific law cultivated in this country, or, as if it constituted *the* English school of jurisprudence. Such a view seems to overlook the history and formation of English law, and to ignore the principles that have all along determined its character,—all the great principles of justice and morals that have aided its development in our courts of Common Law and Equity. Jurisprudence may not have been studied after a scientific fashion among us; still, says Foster, "no one acquainted with our law but will assert for it a highly scientific character." The same remark is made by Mr. Phillipps in his *Treatise on Jurisprudence.*

Englishmen have been proud, and justly so, of their Common Law. While there is much in the Common Law that is sound and admirable, all will admit that, through a neglect to apply scientific principles to its arrangement, and to its modes of procedure, our system has become the most absurd in the civilised world. Much has, certainly, been done of late to reform this. It is well known that with us law has been long cultivated in a practical way,—as a craft rather than as a science. Practical details were mastered, but all general principles of theory were slighted. The effect of this mode of studying law has been that speculation and original thinking on the subject have rather been repressed than fostered. Our practice has admitted little opportunity for the scientific thinker to propound systems deduced from philosophical principles. Labours of this kind have found no encouragement in the profession. Hence, until very recently, controversies respecting the foundation and nature of law did not much trouble or interest English lawyers. From the time of Hobbes, such questions had occasionally engaged the attention of philosophic writers, but they had not been so much discussed by jurists as to give rise to different theories and different schools. As Mr. Justice Story has observed,—

> "The course of the Common Law naturally leads those who are engaged in its studies to take practical rather than theoretical views of almost every department of it. Hence, they can hardly be said to be divided into different schools, or to indulge much in what may be called philosophical, historical, or antiquarian inquiries. The actual system, as it exists, is that which they principally seek to administer; and it is only occasionally that very gifted or bold minds strike out into new paths, or propose fundamental reforms."

Fortunately "gifted and bold minds" have arisen from time to time in our history, and have expanded and developed the

different departments of English law, as the circumstances of the people may have demanded; and if these men did not set themselves to construct philosophical or historical theories, their efforts for the improvement of our law were directed by those principles of ethics and natural justice to which we have so often referred. The great judges, such as Nottingham, Hardwicke, Mansfield, and Stowell, to whom our law is so deeply indebted, were always guided by such principles, and they improved English law by embodying in their decisions the rules of natural justice. In the same direction, and to the same effect, have tended the writings of philosophers, publicists, and statesmen, whose works have helped to build up the substance and spirit of our national law, such as Bacon, Hooker, Milton, Cudworth, Sidney, Locke, Somers, Cumberland, Rutherforth, Blackstone, Burke, Romilly, Mackintosh, and many other writers of our own day. If a general agreement as to the necessity of basing law on great moral principles, and not simply on convention, may be accepted as constituting a ground for a distinct school of law, then all the great English judges and writers we have mentioned may be fairly said to form an English school of jurists; and if there be any propriety in applying the word "practical" in this way, we think this might be called the "practical school of English jurisprudence." The term "practical" so applied, would, however, refer rather to the method of English lawyers than to their principles, because these, as we have seen, were essentially philosophical; but still the general principles were practically worked into our law by the judges and jurists. Perhaps it would better describe these English jurists of the past if we might call them the "old English inductive school," using the word "inductive" in its enlarged sense, as covering the observation of internal as well as of external experience, and as taking cognisance of the facts of consciousness as well as those of history.

With the rise of a more scientific study of jurisprudence in recent times, different theories as to the foundation of law, and what we know about it, have appeared in England as well as in Germany. Thus Mr. Reddie mentions two schools: 1. The Analytical, consisting of Mr. Bentham and his close followers; and 2. The Historical, that is, the German historical school. Mr. Reddie does not give the names of English writers who belong to the historical school. The chief distinction between these sects is this, that while the analytical jurists seem to despise the teaching of history,

and found their reasoning on the doctrine of utility, the historical jurists rely solely on historical experience, and neglect considerations of present utility. Mr. Austin and his disciples have generally been spoken of as constituting our historical school. We have mentioned these jurists as forming the historico-analytical sect. In his work named at the head of this article, Professor Lorimer, referring to the questions raised as to the sources of our knowledge of natural law, remarks :—

"The methods, however, to which they (the questions) give rise, differ so essentially, and commend themselves to temperaments and races and generations of men so different, as to have originated various schools of jurisprudence, each of which, in its turn, has claimed exclusive possession of the key of knowledge. Of these the most clearly distinguishable are—1. The Theological School; 2. The Inductive or Observational School (subjective and objective); 3. The Subjective or Philosophical School; 4. The Objective or Sensational School."

As a statement of the possible methods in which the questions raised respecting the source of our notions of law may be considered, this enumeration may be useful; but Professor Lorimer does not illustrate its relation to the actual cultivation of jurisprudence, either in this country or elsewhere, by saying what jurists belonged to each school, and what has been the effect of the labours of the different schools on the progress of the science. Without undervaluing Professor Lorimer's classification, we venture to arrange English jurists under somewhat different heads. Our object is simply to make a division, under which English philosophers or jurists may easily be placed.

I. *The School of Hobbes.*—In reference to the foundation of morals, law, and government, Hobbes originated a distinct school of thought in England; or, if we say he revived the doctrine propounded by the Sophists and Epicureans of old, he materially modified their theories, recast them, and reasoned them out according to modern methods of inquiry. All the works of Hobbes are marked by originality and vigour. The views of all subsequent English sensational thinkers have been largely moulded by his doctrines, as in the case of Bentham, Austin, Mill, and Maine. Hobbes certainly said much about "the law of nature;" but then, with him, natural law and civil law were identical, or, to use his own words, "the law of nature and the civil law contain each other, and are of equal extent." He did not, therefore,

believe in an independent natural law that was the source of the permanent element in positive law. According to Hobbes, instituted law created right and wrong, justice and injustice, and moral distinctions, and there was no higher ground on which we can justify law. His definition of law and of a good law will enable the reader to judge of his theory, so far as our subject is concerned. He says:

"I define civil law in this manner. Civil law is to every subject those rules which the commonwealth have commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of, for the distinction of right and wrong,—that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary, to the rule." "By a good law, I mean not a just law, for no law can be unjust."*

Thus, every law is just, and it is just by its institution or appointment, or by the will of the sovereign power that makes it. Hobbes laid it down that law was "a command," set or appointed by the sovereign power in a State, and that nothing else was law; and Bentham, Austin, Mill, Maine, and their disciples, have repeated this *dictum* after him; a few able thinkers have embraced and defended the principle of Hobbes; and after the Restoration his writings were much relied on by the supporters of arbitrary power; but at no time could it be said his disciples were numerous or influential, or that his doctrines exercised much influence on the legislation or law of England.

II. *The Analytical School of Bentham.* — The mind of Bentham was essentially analytical. This is shown in the wonderful analyses and classifications he made of pleasures and pains as the sources of human action. Through this analytical process, Bentham reached the conclusion that utilitarianism is the foundation of morality and law. He did not seek the nature of law in abstract justice, in natural law, philosophical principles, historical research, old codes, or "early forms of jural conceptions," but in what he believed to be immediate objective utility. Although Bentham always affected to despise abstract reasoning, and professed to consult actual facts, yet he deduced his conception of what law should be from his theory of pleasures and pains as the constituents of human felicity. This was abstract and theoretical enough. The tendency of this school to abstract reasoning is strikingly illustrated in the treatise on jurisprudence by Mr. James Mill, one of the most acute of Mr. Bentham's disciples. Like Hobbes, Bentham taught that law was a command, set

* *Leviathan*: Molesworth's Edition of Hobbes's Works, Vol. III. pp. 251, 355.

by the Supreme Power, and that nothing but formal and express commands were entitled to be called law; but he differed from Hobbes in seeking for a justification of law, not in the will of the sovereign, but in general utility. Austin* strongly urges that Bentham belonged to the historical school. There could scarcely be a greater mistake. Few men have had less respect for historical inquiry than Bentham, and he would have ridiculed the idea of attaching importance, as Savigny and Maine do, to the "early forms of jural conception." The labours of Bentham have been a great power in effecting useful reforms, both legal and political. If it cannot be said that he did much for jurisprudence as a science, yet all will admit that the diffusion of his views has produced a very salutary effect on the laws and institutions of this country. Mr. Holland has shown that law reform in England has hitherto related to the matter or substance of the law, and not to its form; and he remarks that "the object at which Bentham chiefly aimed was the re-expression and re-arrangement of the law according to a scientific method;"† but this certainly has not come out of Bentham's labours, but a very different result—a change in the substance of the law itself.

III. *The Historico-Analytical School of Austin.* — The general nature of Mr. Austin's system of jurisprudence has been already briefly described, and we need not further enlarge upon it. Austin founded his jural doctrines upon the utilitarian theory of morals. This is an essential part of his system, and hence the name we have given to his school. Some of Austin's recent disciples seem anxious to separate his doctrines about law from the doctrines of utility; or, indeed, from ethics altogether; but we cannot see how this is possible, if we would ascend to the foundation on which law rests. Thus, adopting Austin's conclusions as to the nature of law, Mr. Markby says, "They in no way depend on the theory of utility discussed and advocated by Austin."‡ In the same way Mr. Poste, while expressly adopting Austin's explanation of the nature of law, remarks, they "are unconnected with the hypothesis of any particular school of ethical speculation."§ This view seems to us unphilosophical, and certain it is that Mr. Austin did not separate his doctrines about law from his theory of morality.

IV. *The Inductive School (Subjective and Objective).*—

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* *Jurisprudence*, p. 702.
† *Essays on the Form of Law*, p. 29.
‡ *Elements*, p. 4.
§ *Comment on Gaius*, p. 2.

We have used the phrase "Practical School" to describe the method of cultivating law that was pursued in England before the rise of the new movement which regards jurisprudence as a science; we now take Professor Lorimer's phrase as descriptive of those English jurists of our time who seek to establish jurisprudence as a science, but who cannot accept the doctrines laid down by the schools just named as to the nature and foundation of law. These jurists follow the philosophical school in recognising natural justice as the underlying principle, or permanent element, in all law, but they also take into account all facts, internal and external, that relate to the inquiry. And thus, through the aid of philosophical principles, historical research, experience, and all legitimate facts, they labour to build up jurisprudence into a science that shall have both a theoretical and a practical side. They reject the dictum laid down by Hobbes, and repeated by Bentham, Austin, Mill, Maine, and others, that the essential nature of a law resides in its being a command set by the sovereign power in a State, and they ground their views on this point on a broader, deeper, more scientific basis—a basis which they find in the moral nature of man, and the facts inevitably generated through the developments of this moral nature in society. To this school belong such writers as Mr. Reddie, Dr. Whewell, Dr. C. J. Foster, Mr. J. G. Phillimore, Sir Robert Phillimore, Mr. Herbert Broom, Mr. W. M. Best, Mr. C. S. M. Phillipps, Mr. Lecky, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, Dr. John Grote, Professor Blackie, Professor Lorimer, and many others, whose writings are now moulding English thought on legal questions. In reference to America, we may say that Mr. Chancellor Kent, Mr. Justice Story, Mr. Wheaton, and other eminent American jurists, belong to this school.

V. *The School of Roman Law.*—By this phrase we do not design to describe a body of jurists that have propounded views respecting the nature of law distinct in principle from those held by the sects just mentioned; but our object is merely to point to the fact that the study of Roman law has been revived among us, and is now being prosecuted with considerable zeal by many able thinkers. Men of every school cultivate Roman law, but there is a marked difference in the importance which is attached to it. Some regard the study as desirable, as a means of securing an acquaintance with the admirable mode in which jural conceptions are developed and applied in that law. But men like Savigny and Maine go further than this, and seem to regard Roman law, in its substance and form, as the model of all law, and

that it might be adopted in every country, or incorporated with the law of every state.* Such appears to be the drift of what Savigny, Maine, Dr. Tomkins, Mr. Poste, and some others, say on this subject. It seems to us an error. We rejoice that an interest has been awakened in England in Roman law, and that more attention is being given to it in places where law is studied. Besides the lectures now given on Roman law, it is satisfactory to know that many useful works, as Mr. Cumin's *Manual of Civil Law*, Sandars's Version of the *Institutes*, Poste's *Translation of Gaius*, Lord Mackenzie's clear and simple exposition, afford the student every facility for the mastery of Roman jurisprudence.

We have not space to enter upon anything like a critical examination of the doctrines advanced by the adherents of the different schools we have mentioned. From the distinctive views of Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin as to the nature of law, we entirely dissent. It is cheerfully admitted, that Bentham and Austin have rendered signal service to the cause of law amendment. In the first place, their dogma that law is necessarily a "command," is based on an inadequate conception of its very nature and sources.† The question cannot be discussed here, but we may say that the fallacy of the position is shown in the writings of Foster, Best, and others that we have referred to, and by Professor John Grote in the ninth chapter of his *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*; and the point is still more fully and profoundly argued in the able pamphlet, *Considerations on Law*. Then, secondly, the writers belonging to these empirical schools regard natural law and natural justice as fictions and absurdities. Mr. Austin speaks of the reasoning about these matters as "pernicious jargon," and Bentham uses very similar language. Now, without a sense of justice, have we any means of ascertaining the character of a law? How can we estimate that character? If there be no moral test, the whole matter

* We see something of this spirit in Maine's paper in the *Cambridge Essays*, and in his work on *Ancient Law*; in so excellent a book as the *Compendium of the Modern Roman Law*, by Tomkins and Jencken, and in some other recent publications on the subject. This is the fault of the historical school. Mr. Best speaks of this leaning as "superstitious admiration" and "blind adoration of the Roman law."

† It results from this dogma, that all customary law,—the most important part of the real law of every people,—and international law, is not law at all, because not formally appointed, "set," or commanded, by a "determinate superior"! This is shallow, sophistical, and unsatisfactory. Rather say, with Professor Grote, that "Law is the public reason of a society, participated in more or less by the mass of individuals, enforceable upon all who will not participate in it." This question is fully reasoned out in *Considerations on Law*.

resolves itself into this: *Is might the test of right?* If so, there is no reality in moral distinctions, and the words "right" and "wrong," "just" and "unjust," as applied to law, mean something totally different from what intelligent men have used them to denote. They must simply mean what is appointed or prohibited by the sovereign power. In opposition to this doctrine, we say the moral nature of man demands a justification of a law in the nature of things, or in something behind the mere will of the lawgiver. We say with Burke, "We are all born in subjection, all born, equally, high and low, governors and governed, in subjection to one great, immutable, pre-existent law, prior to all our devices, and prior to all our contrivances. . . . This great law does not arise from our conventions or compacts; on the contrary, it gives to our conventions and compacts all the force and sanction they can have." * Man's moral nature demands that the act itself of the lawgiver in making law should be justified. In the next place, we see no force whatever in the explanation these writers offer about a law being "*legally* just." Hobbes said, "No law can be unjust." In this he followed out his principles to their logical issue. Austin defends the remark of Hobbes, and says he only meant to say that no law could be *legally unjust*. But what is meant by "*legally* unjust?" The question comes back upon us,—Is a law legally just simply in virtue of being appointed by the sovereign power? Does not "legally," with Hobbes and Austin, mean lawfully appointed by the sovereign? If so, Austin is either reasoning in a circle, or simply removing the point at issue a step further back. We want to know what constitutes the *appointment* of a law—its *enactment*—its *legality*—just? We say this act itself requires to be justified by something higher, greater, and more abiding than the will of the lawgiver. Further, the doctrine of some of these empirical schools separates law from ethics, from moral principles, and the moral nature of man. In doing this, we submit, it separates law from its natural and necessary foundation. They require us to reason about the most moral things in human life—laws, rights, obligations, duties, and wrongs—apart from moral facts and moral principles. These points raise some of the most important questions in theoretical and practical morals, which we have not space to consider, but must leave them with the hints now thrown out.

At the head of this article we have placed the titles of

* *Works*, Edition of 1852. Vol. VII. p. 357.

several recently published works that deal, more or less directly, and more or less fully, with the great subject we have been considering. These books represent different schools of thought; and, from our quotations, and reference to their contents in the course of the discussion, we apprehend the reader will have little difficulty in saying to what party each of the principal writers belongs. From the bare title-page of Professor Lorimer's *Institutes*, it will be evident that he is an expounder of natural law as the ground of positive law. The reader will also be prepared to refer Dr. C. J. Foster to the same class; while he can hardly fail to conclude that Mr. Markby represents the opposite, or historical school. Judging from what has appeared about the treatise by Professor Amos, the reader may fairly be in doubt as to where he should place him. As only some slight incidental indications have thus been given of the character of these works, we should have been glad if we could have noticed at greater length the principles and methods unfolded by these writers; but this is impossible, and we shall conclude with a word or two about their general nature.

The object of Professor Lorimer, in his *Institutes of Law*, is to expound the nature of natural law, show what are the sources of our knowledge of it, how we become acquainted with it, and how it becomes the permanent element in positive law. This is an important theme, and it is a theme on which English literature lacked a good book. If the Professor's work is not all that was wanted, it is still an able and learned contribution to the discussion of a question vital to the establishment of jurisprudence on a scientific basis. In several respects the work is disappointing; in the frequent expression of opinion on current political questions, in the amount of space devoted to other minor or irrelevant matters, and in its want of scientific method; but, notwithstanding these shortcomings, we welcome the *Institutes* as a masterly exposition of the nature, sources, and authority of natural law, and of its relation to positive law. At a time when ably written works are appearing from the opposite schools, we are thankful for Professor Lorimer's opportune defence of natural law, and would earnestly recommend his work to the students of jurisprudence and philosophical inquiry.* Mr. Markby's

* The same may be said respecting two other works that have been mentioned more than once. Professor Foster's *Elements of Jurisprudence*, and Mr. Phillipps's *Jurisprudence*, 1863. These books supply scientific expositions of the foundations of jurisprudence as based on natural law. Mr. Phillipps's second book, on *Natural Jurisprudence*, is invaluable.

Elements of Law is not a controversial work, but it opens with a brief statement of the fundamental principles held by the historical school. This is followed by a lucid explanation of the fundamental doctrines of jurisprudence. It is designed as a sort of text-book for students who seek to obtain some knowledge of law as a science before they enter upon its practical details. If we could speak of it apart from its fundamental principles, which in some degree colour most of its expositions, we should regard it as an admirable attempt to supply a real want in our literature. The aim of Professor Amos is very different from that of Professor Lorimer. His *Systematic View* is not occupied with an examination of the various questions connected with the nature and foundation of law, but it is rather devoted to the unfolding of the constituent parts of the science in a systematic form. In this respect the undertaking is well executed, and the book will be valuable alike to the student of jurisprudence and to the thoughtful general reader. The chapters relating to the distribution of the parts of a legal system, to the classification of laws, to the law of contracts, to procedure, and to international law, contain some admirable discussions of important questions. Professor Amos does not follow exclusively the principles of any of the schools we have described: his method is inductive, and his leaning is towards the historico-analytical sect. The pamphlet entitled *Considerations on Law* is an exceedingly able and well-reasoned examination of the source and foundation of law. Without being formally controversial, we think it most effectually disposes of the view of the empirical schools that law is simply a command.

ART. II.—1. *Origin and Development of Religious Belief.* 2 Vols.

2. *Iceland: its Scenes and Sagas.*

3. *Post-Mediæval Preachers.* By S. BARING-GOULD, M.A. 1859.

4. *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages.* 1872. New Edition.

5. *A Hundred Sketches of Sermons for Extempore Preachers.*

6. *Werewolves, Natural History of.*

7. *Legends of Old Testament Characters, from MSS., Talmud, and Other Sources.* 2 Vols.

8. *Lives of the Saints.*

9. *Curiosities of the Olden Time.*

10. *Essays in Orby Shipley's Collection.*

MR. BARING-GOULD is a voluminous and also a many-sided author. He has attacked all manner of subjects, from *Werewolves and their Natural History* to the *Mysteries of Hegelism applied to Christianity.* He is equally at home beside the great Geysir, discussing an Icelandic saga, and among the Israelites of Frankfort, collecting Talmudic legends and gleaning the latest news about the Wandering Jew. In his last work, the *Lives of the Saints*, he has a task before him which will for many a day put a stop to his essays in comparative mythology, if indeed, without attempting to rival the unapproachable Bollandists, he aims at even the relative completeness of Alban Butler.

We have read a great deal of Mr. Baring-Gould, and we seem to understand why his range of subject is so wide. "The Church," he tells us, must, being catholic, find room within itself for every form of belief that has ever entered into the heart of man; therefore he, a faithful son of the Church, takes an interest in the most opposite kinds of literary work, whether in detailing the absurdities of monkish legend, the childish nonsense of the Talmud, and the wild vampire tales which used to make us turn pale in the nursery, or in making out that Hegel is the main prop of the Church, nay, that the only salvation for Christianity is by "reconciling the antinomies" through an immediate adoption of the Hegelian method.

This is so important a discovery that we at once turn to the two volumes which we have placed first on Mr. Gould's list, though they are by no means his earliest work.

It is startling to be told that Christianity, answering to the whole instincts of humanity, must have a dash of the Mylitta and Ashtaroth worship in it, and that hence comes the markedly erotic tone of Jewish sacred poetry, and of all Christian song. It seems cynical, too, to remind us that "the Church adopted so many heathen usages, and that her very creeds have in great part come down from heathenism, because Christianity is the reintegration of all scattered religious convictions." It is, moreover, a strange way of justifying the doctrine of "the perpetual presence of Christ in the Eucharist" to say that "idolatry and fetishism are expressions of man's desire to fix attention on one point, to have a centre of devotion: they are present wherever worship is offered, therefore they must have their expression in the Christian Church. They are appeals to God; and God's answer is the Incarnation, which, therefore, could not cease to be manifest to men after thirty-three years. *We want a prolongation of Christ's objective presence.*" That is—we want the Mass.

But of this more anon. At present we merely remark that when Mr. Baring-Gould says "true religion must be the complement and corrective of all the wanderings of the religious instincts," and, again, "if Christianity be true, it must be true to human nature and thought," he says what is unquestionable. Other men have laid down the same axioms, and have shown that in almost every religion there is some dim foreshadowing of Christian truth. Mr. Maurice, in his *Religions of the World*, found testimony to the truth of the Gospel in the upward longings, the vague aspirations after a Father, which breathe through all creeds, even the most degraded. According to Mr. Baring-Gould, Christianity has room for the bad that every religion has developed, room for everything that is not a "negation"—"negations" being, as far as we are informed, the infallibility of the Pope, and also all distinctively Protestant doctrines.

This is the difference between the two: Mr. Maurice says that all that is best in the creeds is prophetic of, and akin to, Christianity; Mr. Baring-Gould affirms that all that is gross and earthly in false religions finds its place in Christianity, because man's nature is complex.

The first looks on Christianity as the archetype after which man's best efforts strain, and have always strained, to which

his noblest thoughts aspire and have always aspired. He argues as if the rule "be ye perfect," whereby men are led to grow up to the measure of the stature of the fulness of the Christ, did not first come into play when it was formulated in the Gospels and Epistles, but that human nature had been unconsciously working up to it from the outset. The latter seems to fix a wrong meaning on the word catholic, and sometimes comes very near making the Church catholic in the sense in which a cesspool might be so styled, as receiving garbage of all kinds.

No doubt man has a twofold nature; and the Sacraments appeal to both parts of this nature of his. But surely it is an unfair stretching of the Sacramental idea, an unfair glorification of man's baser part, to say that a religion, all-embracing because it is Divine, must involve coarse elements, must give scope for all the longings of our lower nature. At this rate, what becomes of that "working out the beast" of which the poet speaks? Such a notion, reduced to practice, results in practical Romanism,—*i.e.*, fetishism of the grossest kind for the masses, whatever esoteric explanations and "reconcilement of antinomies" may save the consciences of the more educated.

Religion, we hold, purges out man's dross; but Mr. Baring-Gould delights in the letting dross and all remain together; he is (to use a homely illustration) like those coffee-drinkers who insist on drinking up the dregs.

But, besides being unsatisfactory, he is unpractical into the bargain. "Catholicism (he says) must contain everything that heretical and schismatical bodies believe and affirm, affirming in totality what they affirm in part." Fancy a Church catholic which should offer an asylum to men of all beliefs, which should say to James Martineau, to Mr. Voysey, to Mr. Purchas, and to Cardinal Cullen, "Give up your negations, and you will straightway find each his place in our vast building." This is surely making the Church more comprehensive than Archbishop Tait at Tunbridge lately said the Church of England ought to be—yea, wider than even the broadest Churchman, who can preface his treatise with an extract from "the invocation to the God Ram," could desire to see it.

On the whole, we are forced to say of Mr. Baring-Gould's most important work that it is rather startling than original: what is new in it is not true, and what is true is not new. The first volume is a fair summary of the ancient faiths and philosophies, such as might have been worked up from col-

lege notes helped out by a course of Lewes or Ritter. The second is a bold attempt to harmonise Mansel and Maurice, to show that the philosophy of the Unconditioned is not incompatible with that of the Theological Essays.

It is a bold attempt; and, if attempted, deserves more careful working out than Mr. Baring-Gould has bestowed on it. Assertion does not go far now-a-days. Of what use can it be, for instance, to tell a materialist that "to conceive the annihilation of the conscious self is simply impossible; try?" And this is only one out of hundreds of assertions which our author makes with the dogmatism of a schoolman, or of a Hegelian, who is (he confesses) a schoolman *redivivus*, plus just a very little that the other lacked.

The idea of taking the opposite course from that usually adopted in theology, and going to the facts of man's nature and consciousness, instead of to historical evidence or to assumed *à priori* truths, is a good one.

"Dogma (he says) was at first readily accepted by men (should he not rather say it was secreted by an already corrupt Church, as some trees secrete poison?). It was then forced on men by the Church: it is now insisted on on the authority of the text. Can we attain to Christianity by starting from the facts of human nature and the laws which they reveal, instead of by resting on authority, whether of an infallible text or an inerrable Church?"

This is indeed a weighty question; but it cannot be solved by a crude mixture of French generalisations and German trichotomy. It is as if Mr. Baring-Gould, when reading the Abbé Gabriel and his other Frenchmen, had felt that they could not stand by themselves, and so had fetched Hegel and Feuerbach and the rest to prop them up. The result is novel but not encouraging. We do not think much will ever come of philosophic attempts to "harmonise Christianity with modernism," as it is called. Believe, and you will see that all fits into its proper place; but, if you believe not, you will not be convinced by arguments to which it is always possible to take exception. Argument will never do instead of faith: to think that it may, at any rate to some extent, do so, is a failing of others besides Mr. Baring-Gould. Both Mr. Farrar (in the *Witness to Christ of History*) and Mr. Fowle, for instance, argue for the truth of Christianity because it is the religion of the strongest and most progressive races. No doubt this is true; but the unbeliever might fairly point to the time when the same might have been said of Buddhism, and afterwards of Mahometanism. Nay, there was a time when the strongest race in the world professed an eclectic

heathenism, taking the poetry of its worship from Greece, its spiritualism from Etruria, and its everyday prose from its own Apennines. Nor is it true to say (as Mr. Fowle asserts) that no religion is making way in the world except Christianity. Have not Mr. Carlyle long ago (in his *Hero Worship*) and Mr. Winwood Reade just lately (in the *Martyrdom of Man*) told us how Mahometanism advances steadily through Central Africa? Do we not often read of its progress in China? And have we not been told that in Hindostan its converts are reckoned by thousands yearly?

Arguments of this kind are of just as much avail against the infidelity of to-day as "Apologies for the Bible" and the like were against that of a century ago. It was not works like these, whether weak or able, it was the preaching of Wesley and Whitfield, and the mighty upheaval which followed outside, and afterwards within, the Establishment, which then beat down unbelief for a time; and nothing but a similar revival will do the same work now.

We fear that Mr. Baring-Gould's attempt savours too much of the unprofitable argumentative kind. The fallacies both of political economists and of their opponents come from neglecting Aristotle's rule, and applying strict logic to a subject which does not admit of such strictness. It is the same with religion; "inexorable logic" will surely lead to impossible absurdities one way or another. Mr. Baring-Gould is perfectly right that "if you stick to the limiting, you become an atheist; if to the unlimited, you become a pantheist;" but the true way is surely is to stick to neither. You must appeal to faith. Men are so far all alike, that the well-known method of the Moravians with the Esquimaux is the only true method with any of them. After years of argumentative preaching, without making a single convert, the Moravians suddenly changed and preached only Jesus Christ and Him crucified; and almost at once a whole tribe was brought to God. So it must be with the philosophers. On the theory of the absolute there can be no such thing as moral order; for else the absolute could be conditioned, restrained, thereby. Neither can God have any power; for power is the exercise of superior force against a body that resists, and such exercise conditions and limits the absolute. And so the idea of infinity leads to the denial of all God's attributes. And in order to get a world at all, Mr. Baring-Gould is obliged to leave Hegel, and to go to something very like the first step in Hesiod's cosmogony. As he expresses it (but why should such strange phraseology be used at all?) "God the absolute, who by

His essence is all, abases Himself by creation to the sphere of relations; He consents to be not-all, that He may re-become all by the act of His creature; for by the love of the creature for its Creator all the problems of reason are resolved, and the work of creation completed." There may be a class of minds to whom this, and much more like it, will afford satisfaction; but for mankind (except the Hegelians), difficulties like these, which our author tells us are answered by "the trichotomy," disappear in practice. *Solvuntur ambulando*, or, in our Lord's words, "if any man will do the works, he shall know of the doctrine."

Premising this much, we must give a very brief analysis of Mr. Baring-Gould's method, interspersing a few of his most startling phrases.

Not assuming, then, the existence of a God or the truth of revelation, and quoting the Bible as if it was any other book, our author sets himself to show what are the religious instincts of humanity, and then how Christianity, by its fundamental postulate, the Incarnation, assumes to meet all these, how far it does so, and how far failure is due to political or social causes. In his own words:—

"The question of the truth of revelation is one on which I do not touch. We have a Revelation in our own nature. An historical revelation is necessarily subject to historical criticism, and can never be proved to be true. The revelation of our own nature is never antiquated, and is always open to be questioned. On this revelation the Church of the future must establish its claims to acceptance."—Preface to Vol. I.

And with this object he begins from the beginning, giving us a great deal about primordial cells and "grey vascular matter oxidised by having blood passed over it, the result being thought," and about thalami and corpora striata. This, we suppose, is to conciliate the physicists, who will no doubt acquiesce in the statement that "mysticism is due to the combustion of grey matter in the sensorium," though we much doubt whether they will deign to admit that "religion undertakes to co-ordinate the mind and the sentiment, to develope equally and harmoniously the cerebrum and the sensory ganglionic tract, to unite subjectivity and objectivity in a common work." There is much in the first of these two volumes which we admire; for, though Mr. Baring-Gould speaks (with the approval of the *Tablet*) of "the miserable apostasy of the so-called Reformation," we are anxious to find all the good we can in his writings. We hold with him that "mythology was not the invention of priests," as the

sceptics of a generation or two ago were never tired of repeating; and we hold, too, that "the belief in causality has brought about the progress of the race." We can fully go with him in saying that "true religion must be the complement and corrective of all the wanderings of the religious instinct," but (as we have shown) we differ with him in the way in which we suppose it to be complementary.

The universe may be "infinite analysis infinitely synthesized;" everything may be "an antinomy," and error may be "the negation of one factor in this antinomy." Indeed, these grand phrases seem needless when it is explained that the antinomy in religion, as in morals, is between reason and faith, while in politics it is between individual rights and duties (*i.e.*, between liberty and authority). But we do not think that the need of a mediator is forced on us by the feeling that "absolute being is equivalent to entire negation;" nor can we consent to base the existence of a God on the Hegelian law that contraries imply one another (as night implies day), and that, therefore, God must exist as "the opposite pole to the world of finalities."

Such being Mr. Baring-Gould's way of accounting for God, we are not astonished to find the Incarnate Word spoken of as "the axis uniting the type with the antitype, the positive with the negative pole."

Our author is sanguine enough to think that he gives the *coup-de-grâce* to Paley's clock-argument by simply asking, "but who made the clockmaker?"—and that he is right in saying (in spite of Bishop Butler) that "natural religion cannot stand; it is based on induction founded on hypothesis—the hypothesis of the existence of the outer world;" though it is somewhat confusing to be told, immediately afterwards, that "revealed religion is deduced from the existence of a God, when the reality of our existence, and of that of the world, has been demonstrated."

But we really cannot see how statements like the following have any practical value:—

"Reason and faith being always set in opposition to each other, the theologian taking up with the one, the philosopher with the other, we must have some simple indecomposible idea, which will harmonise these complex terms, and serve as a mean between them. This is the idea of the indefinite, that which is always defining itself without ever being completely successful, and which has, therefore, two faces, one intelligible to the reason, the other accessible to the sentiment by faith. This idea of the indefinite at once supposes and excludes limitation."

Not thus, we are very sure, will the infidelity of to-day be successfully answered. Mr. Baring-Gould may repeat as often as he pleases his belief that "if the modern intellect is to be reconciled to the dogma of the Incarnation, it will be through Hegel's discovery." Our Darwinians and Huxleyites have passed far beyond "subject-object" and the other Coleridgian formulas; and even Coleridge himself would have confessed that little light is thrown on the Trinity by defining it as "the Absolute traversing three moments."

A select few, well versed in Fichte and Schelling may be amused by Mr. Baring-Gould's method, as the audience is by the demonstrations at a chemistry lecture; but how is it possible for conviction to be wrought in any single mind by bare assertions, no matter how true, positively backed up by nothing better than a wild metaphysical jargon? It is no doubt a grand truth that "there is nothing against the law of the strongest but the authority of God, who has made right dogmatic;" but are not our philosophers continually asserting that nothing can or ought to withstand this law of the strongest, and that all the arrangements whereby our civilisation seeks to defeat it are but palliatives?

Better than this are our author's strictures on "the right of private judgment run mad," as where he reminds us that "if I hold my judgment the measure of absolute truth, I make myself God." Though, here again, he flounders wildly whilst searching for the "basis of truth." "Private judgment," he tells us, "is, after all, the criterion" (of relative truth, we presume), "and every one's private judgment must be believed in; you must admit all ideas, because all exclusion is a denial of the absolute." Here crops up once more that fatal error as to the true meaning of catholic, which meets us again and again in the work.

His other fatal error is that of the schoolmen, the mistaking dialectic, an instrumental art, which has nothing to do with the truth or falsehood of its object-matter, for a means of discovering truth. "I put together" (says our author) "two sentimental truths, and arrive at a third, which is a rational truth." No doubt, if the two sentiments are true. But Mr. Baring-Gould will have to persuade men of this before his Hegelian method will force them to adopt his conclusions. No doubt it is a new and graceful way of putting a truth to say:—"God did not create the world from necessity or from duty. The idea of the world is irrational; for what can be more irrational than something added to perfection? Nevertheless the world exists: reality is superior to reason. . . .

The purpose of creation must be sought outside the Creator, and so he must find his motive in what is not as yet; for a relative will towards that which is not could only be a creative will. . . . God wills the creature *for its own sake*, and the exercise of this will is the supreme manifestation of love." But the Christian believes this already, while the Fichteist denies the existence of the world, and the physicist scouts the idea that love is exhibited in creation, and holds that—

> Nature, red in tooth and claw,
> With ravin, shrieks against a creed

so opposed to the facts of experience.

As Mr. Baring-Gould well says,—

"The god of reason cannot be the object of religion, for reason traces the nerves of man's necessities, not to satisfy them, but that it may look on them and pass by on the other side. If the ideal, uncorrected by reason, rushes on into the abysses of passion, the reason withdrawing God from the range of the emotions, leaves man pulseless and despairing. Then Christianity steps forward with its great hypothesis of the Incarnation as the only escape from the dilemma. God who condescends to create has condescended further to meet the exigencies of the nature which He made by taking manhood into Himself. . . . It is a contradiction in terms, irrational even as the existence of the world is. . . . As matter is a mode of Force,—Force entering into a modification of itself, exteriorising itself,—so the Incarnation is the manifestation of the love of God, which is itself a mode (a Personality) of the Absolute. . . . If the Incarnation hypothesis is true, God is still all that the reason can conceive of Him; He is also all that the heart can desire in Him."

All this may pass. It is not new, but it is well put. But again we ask, *Cui bono?* Whom can it possibly convince? To what class of mind does it appeal?

It is true that the Creation leads necessarily to the Incarnation. It may be true that "the Word is the mediator between two antinomical factors, without confusion of nature or absorption, any more than of the North Pole by the South, which poles the axis of the earth unites by separating. . . . So Christ is the eternal equation of the finite and the infinite;" but we will not believe that "the Hegelian trichotomy, fully apprehended, casts a flood of light over the argument of St. Paul, *and makes intelligible to us what was probably only obscurely seen and vaguely felt by himself.*" No wonder a man who writes in this way should assert that it was Hegel's *Lutheran prejudices* that made him fail to perfect the union between Christianity and philosophy.

As we hinted, Mr. Baring-Gould studiously depreciates the historical evidence for the Incarnation; but, mixed with many wild statements, there is much in his chapter on this subject with which we can agree. Thus,—

"The real evidence for the Incarnation is our own nature crying out to see God and live. . . . Religion is personal, and must spring up from conviction in the individual breast. Therefore we shall fail if we make the Bible or the Church the starting-point of religion; they may help in universalising our beliefs, but they cannot strike in us the spark of conviction."

But almost immediately we are met by such paradoxes as this:—

"How can two such opposite theories as Pantheism and Deism be reconciled? I cannot explain; but I affirm that each is simultaneously true, and must be true, for each is an inexorably logical conclusion, and a positive conclusion; and all positive conclusions must be true, if Christ is the ideal and focus of all truths."

Our author's chief strength, however, comes out in his way of contrasting "the Church" and the sects. "He who passes out of a sect into the Mother Church is not *required to renounce any dogma*, but to admit that which heretofore he rejected." This would be all very well, were it not that your distinctive doctrines will, very probably, be explained to be *negations;* and therefore, since a negation is nothing, you will have to give them up all the same. Thus, "Catholicism proclaims faith and good works; Luther omitted the second; added a negation of the second point which the Church affirmed,—*i.e.*, he added *nothing*." This is annihilating one's adversaries with a vengeance!

The same chapter contains some very garbled extracts from Luther's *Table Talk* and elsewhere. Thus, Mr. Baring-Gould seizes delightedly on this (from Luther on *Galatians*):—"Morality is obedience to the law of the land, and in no way affects the conscience;" and he accuses the Lutherans of establishing the doctrine of justification by faith, and then hacking away all its consequences. Thus (we are assured) Luther "was led to deny the sinfulness of sin and the holiness of God." Equally unfair is the way in which our author classes Feuerbach and Proudhon among the Reformers, while, in his quotation from the latter, "Come, Satan, thou calumniated and proscribed one; come, that I may embrace you!"—he seems to take the Frenchman's bitter irony for grave earnest.

Then follows some strange stuff about the contrast be-

tween Protestant and Catholic society—the latter displaying mutual trust, confidence, and sympathy, the former showing distrust, suspicion, and alienation. Our author's experience singularly differs from that (among many others equally unprejudiced) of MM. Erckmann-Châtrian, who, in the *Sous-maitre*, tell us that in Alsace the Lutheran and Jewish villages are far ahead of the Romanist. The Gemmi Pass (says Mr. Baring-Gould, on the contrary) divides courteousness in the Valois from brutal coarseness in Berne. "The ill weeds of blackguardism, snobbishness, and vulgarity, stare you in the face at once in Holland or Prussia." This is as ridiculous as the old joke about your being able to find out by the smell when you had got across the frontier into a Catholic canton; and in a professedly argumentative book it is sadly out of place. Indeed, from this point onward, the greater part of the work is a tirade against Protestantism. Protestantism would seem to be far worse than Rome, though Rome sometimes (as when she assails scientific truths) is infected with the same spirit: "And Philip II. was a greater Protestant than William the Silent." Here is one of Mr. Baring-Gould's choice *morceaux*:—"The Tridentine anathemas were hurled at no positive belief; but every Protestant confession has been charged with explosive material to kill the faith of the simple, and mangle that of men of wider compass."

To men of this frame of mind, schism is far worse than the most hopeless corruption. Our author confesses that the Church "did worse than forget the rights of man: she chained thought, which in the slave was free;" and yet a few pages after (in the chapter on the social aspects of the Incarnation), he lays down the following propositions:—"Wherever truth is there is Christ, wherever Christ is there is the Church;" and "to say that outside the Church is no safety, is equivalent to saying outside the truth is no truth." This Church, however, is not to be subservient to the State: "Till Church and State—*i.e.*, moral and effective authority—are severed, the Church can never fulfil her mission. . . . The union of Church and State caused the Papacy, which grew up to resist secular interference." And the emancipated Church will be perforce a very strict disciplinarian:—"No member of it may deny a dogma which he does not believe. . . . If any body declares all that is within the range of his own beliefs, and accepts as true all that is authoritatively declared by the representatives of all, he is a Catholic. He may not himself be able to believe, but he

holds the measure of truth to be universal, not individual." Mr. Gould does not make clearer the old definition of St. Vincent of Lerins: "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus." It is painful, however, to reflect that the whole object of all this elaborate chapter is to glorify the "perpetual Sacrifice of the Mass:"—

"The Sacraments are a prolongation of the Incarnation,—a materialising of grace to bring it within the compass of man's affections. . . They make the Incarnation not a mere history of the past, but an ever-present reality. . . . God's help is given, according to the law of man's nature, in a material form. . . . This principle makes not only the Sacraments, but also *scapulars, images, and other gifts of the Church to be grace-giving.* . . . Our reformers hacked away the lower steps of the ladder to heaven, by which the feeble and ignorant lift themselves up, and now they lie in sullen despair on the ground."—Vol. II. p. 276.

But we are tired of making quotations. Protestantism, we learn, has been wholly deserted by the spirit of worship. "As the virtuous man is a perpetuation of Christ's moral life, as the Sacraments are the perpetuation of Christ's grace-giving life, so in the Eucharist Christ is perpetually present to receive our homage and worship."

It is hard to foresee how ecclesiastical courts will proceed in any special instance; but surely our author lays himself open, over and over again, to the charge of which Mr. Bennett, of Frome, so narrowly escaped being found guilty. "In vain" (he adds) "have we thrown open our churches; worshippers will not come, till we restore to our altars the presence of our Incarnate Lord, under the form in which He is content to dwell with us."

After this we read without astonishment that "the Atonement is not an expiation for men's sins, but the sacrifice to man of everything as a complete epiphany of God's love;" and that "the Communion is the application to men of Christ's atonement" (p. 314); and further, that "the Mass is the recoil-wave of the Divine love, man saying to God,—You have given me all, I give You back all that I value most,—*i.e.*, Christ. . . . An observer smiles at the interchange of small presents, but the moment he himself loves, the most trivial offerings are consecrated." The appositeness of which illustration is only equalled by the adaptation to prove the same point of those glorious lines,—

> "Love so amazing, so Divine,
> Demands my love, my life, my all."

And this is to end in a *monstrance*, in a wafer placed behind a glass plate, and surrounded with gilt rays. Verily, fetishism has a considerable part in Catholic faith as expounded by Mr. Baring-Gould.

But we must leave this, the most serious of our author's works, first remarking that passages like those quoted might be almost indefinitely multiplied. Thus, "in the French or Italian peasant, *thanks to his Church*, the animal has not wholly mastered the man," while the English middle class is sneered down with a quotation from Matthew Arnold.

We have lingered long over this work, not because it is ever likely to be as much read as some of the others, but because it is our author's most serious work,—that by which he himself would wish to be judged. It is, moreover, a dangerous book, because it pretends to prove its point by pure logic,—its point being the establishment of what we hoped was an exploded error.

Turn we now to our author's other works, in which he shows himself a lively writer, and by which he has earned a well-deserved popularity. If we cannot acquit him of a certain rashness of assertion, and an unscholarly habit of rushing to conclusions after imperfect induction, we have not only the book already noticed to bear us out, but also we remember some extraordinary statements in his *Popular Myths*, published several years ago, and just re-published for the third time. He there deliberately and repeatedly asserts his conviction that the rites and creed of the heathen Britons have somehow revived under the form of Wesleyanism! He says, for instance,* speaking of *the pied piper of Hamelin*, and the kindred stories, such as the Erl-king, and the Demon-pipers of Abyssinia, and the variations of the Hermes Psychopompos myth:—

"It is curious that a trace of this myth should remain among the Wesleyans. From my experience of English Dissenters, I am satisfied that their religion is, to a greater extent than anyone has supposed, a revival of ancient Paganism, which has long lain dormant among the English peasantry. A Wesleyan told me, one day, that he was sure his little servant-girl was going to die, for the night before, as he had lain awake, he had heard an angel piping to her in an adjoining room. The music was inexpressibly sweet, like the warbling of a flute. 'And when t'aingels gang that gate,' said the Yorkshireman, 'they're boun' to tak' bairns' souls wi' 'em.' I know several cases of Wesleyans declaring that they were going to die, because they had heard

* P. 425, edition 1872.

voices singing to them which none but themselves had distinguished. . . And I have heard of a death being accounted for by a band of music playing in the neighbourhood. 'When t'music was agate, her soul was forced to be off.'"

On which choice sample of hasty generalisation we need make no comment, except that it is matched by the suggestion that Dr. Faber's popular hymn, "The Pilgrims of the Night," is, probably, an unconscious revival of early Dissenting reminiscences." For our consolation, Mr. Baring-Gould goes on to say that he himself *has consciously adopted the same idea* in a hymn on the severing of Jordan :—

> "Sweet angels are calling to me from yon shore,
> Come over, come over, and wander no more."
> —*People's Hymnal*, 8.

He is careful to explain that he does it on the principle which led the early Christians to adopt the figure of Orpheus as a symbol of Christ; by doing which he is surely opening the door to that distinction between esoteric and exoteric religion, which has been so fruitful in mischief.

Again, with regard to the Sangreal, which Mr. Baring-Gould is quite right in styling not a Christian, but an old Celtic myth, adapted to the feelings of later times in the Mediæval romances, after identifying the Grail with the "basin of the old Druids,"—who were the Druids, and how do we know, supposing they ever existed, they had any basins more authentic than the now discredited rock-basins ?—and, perhaps, with the sacred head of the Templars, he makes the following astounding remark :—

> "A careful study of bardic remains, &c., will, I am satisfied, lead to the discovery, that, under the name of Methodism, we have the old Druidic religion still alive, energetic, and, possibly, more vigorous than it was when it exercised a spiritual supremacy over the whole of Britain. With the loss of the British tongue, much of the old terminology has died out, and a series of adaptations to Christianity has taken place, without radically affecting the system."—P. 627.

We are, of course, tempted to ask, "What of the Welsh Methodists, who have not lost the British tongue? have they kept the old terminology?" But such statements are best left to themselves, unless, indeed, we were to follow up the subject by "proving," after the fashion of a comparative mythologist, that John Wesley himself is a myth, the reproduction, in a modern form, with suitable "adaptations," of one of the countless old solar heroes. The thing could be done, just as the French Protestant Roussel (Mr. Baring-

Gould styles him "some French divine") gave his reasons "*pourquoi Napoléon n'a jamais existé;*" and then the similarity between Methodism and Druidism would be much more complete.

Surely all this (and there is a good deal more of it in the volume which stands first on our list) is a too eager endeavour to turn the tables on "the Dissenters," after the fashion of advocates who desire to withdraw attention from the weakness of their own side. It was "the Church," to which Mr. Baring-Gould is always appealing as keeper and expounder of the faith, which systematically incorporated heathen practices into its ritual, and placed heathen gods and heroes on its calendar. Whether at Rome itself—where,to give one instance out of a thousand, we have the *ambarvalia* going on, as of old, in the name of St. Anthony—or at the very extremity of the Roman world, in Ireland—where every holy well, and every conspicuous cairn keeps, slightly "adapted," the name and ritual of its Celtic divinity*—the Roman faith was always equally receptive, equally "catholic" in the sense of assimilating, "adapting," and adopting the local beliefs of the countries where it was spread. This was both the cause and the result of the great corruption of Christianity which began at least as early as the third century. Roman missionaries did not deal with the faith as St. Paul had done when (to the Corinthians) he denounced all attempts to "adapt" the Lord's Supper to a temple-feast, or an assembly of believers to a *pervigilium*. They had their reward in the ease and rapidity with which they overlaid Western Europe with a nominal Christianity; but it is strange that those whose main work has been to enter an active protest against this merely nominal Christianity become hereditary, should be accused (p. 557) of holding "a distinct religion, radically different from the Christianity of which it passes itself off as a spiritual form; its framework and its nerve being of ancient British origin." And it is all the stranger that our author should venture on such assertions, while he is quite ready to confess that "the ancient myths have penetrated and coloured Mediæval Christianity," and while, with reference to the well-known and outrageous story of St. Ursula and the 11,000 virgins, he laments that "the Church should have lent herself to establish this fable by the aid of

* *E.g.* St. Senanus is the eponym of the Shannon, or Shenan. Can his reappearance at St. Sennen, near the Land's End, be explained on the principle on which the fount of Aganippe makes its way across to Sicily?

fictitious miracles and feigned revelations." Well may he ask why it is that, "when minds weary with groping after truth turn to the Church with yearning look, she repels them from clasping the Cross by her tenacity in clinging to these idle and foolish tales, founded on Paganism and buttressed with fraud?" At any rate, we hope that Mr. Baring-Gould will admit that the Wesleyanism which he holds to be founded on Paganism (or, at least, on that shadowy something or nothing called Druidism) is not buttressed with fraud.

But we do not notice these allegations with the view of answering or refuting them. That was, as Mr. Baring-Gould remarks, sufficiently done at the time when his book first appeared; though he is still unconvinced, and believes as strongly as ever in the "remarkable coincidence between modern Wesleyanism and the religion of our British forefathers." We have only reproduced them in order to remind our readers of the sort of mind with which we are dealing: fond of theory, and most tenacious of a theory when framed; given, therefore, unconsciously to shape facts accordingly, but at the same time thoroughly ingenuous and translucent; a mind which "thinks aloud," and whose harshest utterances are therefore softened by the feeling that they are all that is meant, that there is nothing harsher still in reserve.

And now for something about these minor and more popular books. Of *Iceland*, we will only say that it contains a lively account, by an appreciative traveller, of the sights of that strange island, and also a spirited translation of several of the most characteristic *Sagas*. It did not succeed in bringing its author's name into the repute to which it has since attained. The surface ground had been pretty well worked out before. Iceland travel is not an inexhaustible topic; and Mr. Baring-Gould's book made no attempt at being exhaustive. The combination of travel and legend is usually unsatisfactory, and Lord Dufferin had already written a book with which everybody was delighted.

The next book on our list is one of far higher pretensions. As to Mr. Baring-Gould's *Post-Mediæval Preachers* we cannot help feeling sorry that, with such a grand subject, it is not more worthy of it. The field is a rich one, but our author has not even aimed at working it thoroughly. Men like Meffreth and Matthias Faber, and even Jean Raulin, may be among "the most characteristic" preachers of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, but they are certainly not the most attractive. Still we are thankful for what is

done; above all for the introduction, which in sixty pages gives a good sketch of the history of preaching, especially during the three centuries under consideration.

While we naturally differ with Mr. Baring-Gould on many points, we heartily agree with him in his condemnation of the cut-and-dried style of sermon. Wherever this is heard, whether in the Established Church, from an old-fashioned "High-and-dry," or from a degenerate "Evangelical," or (as too often happens) among Nonconformists of various denominations, its effect is the same: the hearers sleep metaphorically, if not with the eyes of the flesh. No good is done —nay, much harm, the harm of ever-increasing deadness— by what is "the foolishness of preaching" in quite a different sense from that in which St. Paul used the phrase. Quoting Dr. Neale (*Mediæval Sermons*), Mr. Baring-Gould comes down with scathing scorn upon the system of dividing and subdividing into a multitude of heads, which, he says, though getting into dishonour in England, is still the accepted mode in Scotland. "Mr. Simeon's twenty-one volumes of *Horæ Homileticæ* consist of several thousand sermons treated exactly in the same ways, in obedience to precisely the same laws, and of much about the same length. Claude's Essay had laid down certain rules, and Simeon's discourses were their exemplification." This Procrustean system deserves all that Dr. Neale and Mr. Baring-Gould can say against it; it tends to verbiage, and is hopelessly destructive of unction. The besetting sin of the young preacher (unless he is a born orator) is lingering too long over the introduction, "tarrying so long at laying of the cloth (as an old divine has it), that no time shall be left for the dinner;" and the subdivision into heads directly favours this weakness. What with the circumstances under which it was spoken, and the comparisons and contrasts which it suggests, the "painful" preacher can (on the Claude-Simeon plan) get two-thirds through his sermon without one sentence needing earnest thought, or likely to touch the hearts of his hearers.

Preaching, like anything else, may, to a certain extent, be taught; just as, with diligence and good instruction, anybody will, at last, be able to paint landscapes in which the clouds shall not be wholly like wool-packs, nor the trees like cabbages at the end of broomsticks, nor the green fields like sheets of malachite. But no amount of training can give eloquence, just as no teaching can turn a mere stainer of canvass into a Claude or a Hobbema. Earnestness may do a good deal, but it must be combined with careful training and previous prac-

tice. Whatever may be the case with poets, of neither painters nor preachers can it usually be said that their *coups d'essai sont des coups de maitre*. This need of training has long been recognised by most Dissenting bodies: the Establishment at last has adopted the same plan—not as a body, but in that sporadic way in which it prefers to adopt even the most necessary reforms. The young "deacon, fresh from a course of port-wine and . . ."—we will not so decry the two ancient Universities as to name what Mr. Froude (who ought to know Oxford) coupled (in his *Shadows of the Clouds*) with the traditional drink of squires, parsons, and undergraduates —may still make his *début*, as of old, and gain his experience, and learn (if he ever does learn) at the expense of his congregation how to make decent sermons. No bishop can refuse orders to any one who comes armed with the voucher that he has attended an University theological course, and who passes the chaplain's examination. But young men are no longer almost encouraged, if we may so express it, to begin the most solemn work that a man can undertake thus wholly unprepared. Youths, indeed, are still ordained by the score with nothing in the way of special teaching beyond the "hall lecture"—a *vivâ voce* reproduction of Pinnock, or some other cram "analysis of Scripture," supplemented with a few notes on the Fathers, such as the student would make in attending the course of "Patristic Theology." But now-a-days no one need be content so to be ordained. The theological colleges at Cuddesdon, Wells, and elsewhere, are a direct imitation of the training schools long common among other bodies; and in them the candidate for orders may learn both dogmatic theology and the practice of sermon-making and preaching, and may also gain some experience in parochial work. The High-Churchmen, by whom these colleges were originated, and among whom they have chiefly found favour, are wise in their generation; the Low-Church plan of going for a preliminary year or so to some well-known clergyman, and helping him as a lay assistant,* better in theory, is not found so successful in practice as that of bringing men together under college rules: nor, while the Established Church maintains her present position, can we think that St. Aidan's and St. Bees, and similar theological colleges which do away with the need of an Oxford or Cambridge course, are likely to produce such

* The very High-Church, in their priests'-houses, have begun to adopt this same plan.

useful men as those trained at the older Universities, and then specially prepared at a theological college. Anyhow preaching ought to be a matter of special and careful training. The outcry against sermons which the *Times* used to make every slack season was mainly justified by the fact that, as we said, the art has been learnt, by five Church clergymen out of seven after they have begun to practise it. "*Habitans in sicco*" might have found his wilderness a fruitful field, and "old Dr. Mumble" might have thrilled his hearers with what Cicero calls the *docti senis compta et mitis oratio*, had theological colleges been in vogue some three generations ago.

Training can give fluency, training and earnestness can very nearly (though not quite) do instead of eloquence; and, as eloquence is rare, and nine-tenths of mankind must be content to put up with fifth-rate cooking, badly arranged houses, ill-fitting clothes, and other fallings-short of the ideal, so they may well be content to do without the power of golden speech, which is one of God's rarest gifts. But, if inborn eloquence is wanting, both training and earnestness are needful. Earnestness alone will not do: the notion that it is enough in itself has done great harm and caused much scandal in the Churches. "Unadorned eloquence" is a fine thing; but that unstudied fluency which some speakers mistake for it is essentially a bad thing. It disgusts the refined and educated hearer, and it lowers the standard of thought and requirement among the less educated.

Nor is training alone enough. One of the dangers of theological colleges, with whatever Church they are connected, is that they may occasionally turn out theological pendants, though the counterbalancing advantages (such as the common life, common library, interchange of thought, &c.) are so much greater as to make this the most desirable mode of training preachers. Of this danger, which certainly exists to some extent, the remedy, in nine cases out of ten, is earnestness, earnestness from which flows *unction*; and without unction a preacher might as well be silent. On this point Mr. Baring-Gould tells an apposite Mediæval legend:—

"Once an evil spirit entered a monastery, passed his novitiate, and became a full brother. In preaching one Advent to the assembled friars he so graphically depicted the terrors of hell that the blood of his hearers curdled, and some of the weaker brethren fainted away. By-and-by the friar's true character was discovered, and the superior said how astonished he was that a fiend should preach such a powerful sermon, calculated to terrify hearers from ever venturing on the road to

that place which he had so faithfully described. 'Think you,' said the devil, with a hideous sneer, 'think you my discourse would prevent a single soul from seeking eternal damnation? Not so; the most finished eloquence and the profoundest learning are worthless beside one drop of unction: *there was no unction in my sermon.*'"

Nothing can supply the lack of unction; but we must not, therefore, fall into the error that learning and culture are destructive of this primary essential, or that the untaught man, who has got up a set of phrases, and who has self-confidence to go ahead, regardless of the sense and connection of what he says, is necessarily full of unction because he is loud and fluent. But we must not dwell too long on this deeply interesting topic. It is impossible to notice a book about old preachers without asking what good we can get from them; and to estimate this we must settle what we mean by useful preaching. *Blackwood* (for May, 1872), in a paper on Church Reform, says:—"We want our sermons to be more modern in their cast of thought. They should suit this nineteenth century as those of the great preachers of earlier times met the needs and awoke the feelings of men in their own day. The mass of sermons appeals to too narrow a circle of ideas." Naturally, the writer goes on to praise Church at the expense of Dissent, by saying that the Dissenters' sermons are generally narrower and more in a groove than those of Church clergymen. To make this more than a mere statement would need a far wider experience of sermons than we can pretend to. But those who want novelty must remember that the Gospel, and not the politics or the social difficulties of the day, is what the preacher has to tell of. Other matters he may usefully introduce, but they must be strictly subordinated to his main subject, not allowed (as they were sometimes in the stirring discourses of the late Mr. Robertson, of Brighton) to overshadow it and keep it out of sight.

Another danger which a good course at a theological college is pretty sure to check is undue aiming after originality. Many are the strange and indecorous freaks to which this has led on the part of those who, seeking to be original, have only succeeded in being singular. And singularity can rarely be in place in the pulpit: a good rousing sermon is an excellent thing; but smart sayings only disturb and distress the quiet part of the hearers, without doing good to anybody. The "things new" which the scribe instructed in the kingdom of heaven is to mingle with the old, are surely not such

as will alarm good men. Nothing is gained by sharpness; the mind is quick to detect the difference between the flashing two-edged sword and its pasteboard counterfeit, however adroitly the latter be brandished before the eyes.

To return to Mr. Baring-Gould: all that he gives us about early Christian preaching is a list of names — Salvian, "master of bishops," head of the great monastery of the Isle of Lerins, follows in his list close upon Augustine of Hippo. Much of the patristic preaching is only Scriptural exposition; and most of us know how fanciful a great deal of it is, how little is to be gained from comments like that which (for instance) in the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, explains "the dogs who came and licked the poor man's sores" to be the preachers of the Gospel whose ministrations were his comfort in his sorrow? As the Word of God became better known, the sermon, as we understand it, almost superseded the exposition. The best of all models had long been before the Christian world. Mr. Baring-Gould, and all Christians will thank him for so doing, shows that the Sermon on the Mount is not (as too many of us sometimes think) a string of unconnected maxims, but that, under analysis, its finished arrangement comes out with wonderful clearness.* Unhappily this pattern was not followed; the Mediæval preachers aimed at startling effects, the result being much present popularity, but no permanent good to souls. Some of them, like Foulque de Neuilly (13th century), were idolised by the mob. Foulque, we are told, had to put on a new cassock almost every day, so eager were his hearers to get a scrap of the blessed man's garment. This wild *ad captandum* style got stereotyped, until at last sermons were written and printed with marginal notes, *e.g.*: "Sit down. Stand up. Mop yourself. Ahem!—ahem! Now shriek like a devil." But the pretence of earnestness was not likely to win such favour as that to which De Neuilly is said to have attained. The deadness and formality of the whole system had become terrible in the age just preceding the Reformation; and only shows (what we have hinted) that it is quite possible to imitate, nay to stereotype, your imitation of that rousing eloquence of which the original is so delightful.

To imitate, and not to originate, being the rule, of course there were plenty of imitators of the classics. "Christ is our Bellerophon," says Camus, Bishop of Belley, in a Christmas-day sermon, "who, mounted on the Pegasus of His humanity,

* Page 7.

winged by union with the Deity, has overcome the world, that strange Chimæra, lion as to its front by its pride, dragon behind in its avarice, goat in the midst by its pollution! He is our youthful Horatius, overcoming the three Curiatii of ambition, avarice, and sensuality! He is our Hercules, who has beaten down the triple-throated Cerberus, and who has in his cradle strangled serpents." When he gives quotations like this, no wonder Mr. Baring-Gould should feel moved to "cap" them with the old story of the peasant who had heard so much in his priest's sermons about Apollo that when he died he left his old cart-horse to "M. Pollo, of whom the Curé had said such fine things." At any rate, he cannot accuse the "modern dissenting ministers"—who he says are "much of the same stamp as the popular friar-preachers, the hedge-priests, who took with the vulgar, because they spoke in their dialect, understood their troubles, knew their tastes, and did not shrink from riveting their attention by burlesque"—of the worse than absurdity of foisting classical allusions into their discourses. Whether all modern popular preachers can wholly escape the charge of grotesqueness may be doubted, though very few in any age have equalled Father Guérin in this respect. Here is a sample of his strictures on Viand, the author of *Le Parnasse des Poètes*, a book so immoral that it was condemned to be burnt, along with its author, in 1625:—

"Cursed be the spirit which dictated such thoughts. Cursed be the hand that wrote them. Woe to the publisher, woe to the reader, woe to all whoever made the author's acquaintance. But blessed be M. le premier Président, blessed be M. le Procureur Général, who have purged our Paris of this plague. You have brought about the plague in this city. You are a scoundrel, a great calf. But, no! shall I call you a calf? Veal is good when boiled, veal is good when roasted, calf-skin is good for binding books; but yours, miscreant, is only fit to be well grilled, and that it will be to-morrow. You have raised a laugh at the monks, and now the monks will laugh at you."

Another of these offensively ridiculous preachers is Gabriel Barlette (end of 15th century). Preaching of the Temptation, he says: "After Christ's victory over Satan, the Blessed Virgin sends him the dinner she had prepared for herself—cabbage, soup, spinach, perhaps even sardines." Rebuking distractions in prayer, he thus describes a priest at his morning devotions:—"Pater noster qui es in cœlis—I say, lad, saddle the horse; I'm going to town to-day. . . Sanctificetur nomen tuum—Cath'rine put the pot on the fire . . Fiat

voluntas tua—take care! the cat's at the cheese . . Panem nostrum quotidia-anum—mind the white horse has a feed of oats." He asks, "is this praying?" Surely, whatever it is, it is not preaching. Another of these comic preachers was Michael Menot of Paris (1518). Here is a sample of his logic:—"The dance is a circular way; the way of the devil is circular (he goeth about seeking whom he may devour, &c.); therefore the dance is the devil's way."

Mr. Baring-Gould thinks that a great change for the better came about in the 16th century, and that the "great preachers who came and stood in the gap did more to stay the tide of the Reformation than great theologians like Bellarmine." Here, as elsewhere, we object strongly to our author's tone in speaking of the Reformation. He finds that "the Roman Church, after the first shock, recovered ground on all sides, for her clergy rose to meet the emergency, and turned to the people as the true source of strength to the Church, and leaned on them instead of putting their trust in princes." He thinks it was pulpit oratory, and not persecution, which destroyed the Huguenot party in France; "for persecution strengthens, but never destroys." Surely everything depends on the way in which the persecution is carried on; there are instances in which it has been thorough enough to uproot a faith—witness Bohemia and Salzburg; but in general, men being better than their words, its efforts have been partial, spasmodic—like our own efforts to supplant Popery in Ireland. Pulpit oratory, doubtless, did something to defend Romanism against the onslaught of the Reformation: the fierce harangues of zealots no doubt often carried their hearers along with them. But many other causes—notably the firm hold which the Jesuits managed, in many countries, to get of the education of lower as well as higher classes—contributed, far more than preaching, to support the failing strength of Rome. Nor can we think that the Protestant preachers of the Reformation and the century which followed it were deficient in power or in unction. Mr. Baring-Gould pities them, "cut off as they were from that vast storehouse of learning and piety, the writings of the saints and doctors of the Church in all ages; the vast encyclopædias and dictionaries of theology, moral and dogmatic, filled with matter which a preacher of the meanest abilities could work up into profitable discourses; great collections of anecdote and simile to which he might turn for illustration; and, above all, exhaustive commentaries on every line, aye, and every word of Scripture. The Protestant had but his own brains to draw

from; the Catholic had the great minds of Catholic antiquity to rest upon." Hence (says our author) a marked contrast between the two in their dealing with Scripture; the Reformers make but a scanty use of it; the Romans display a wondrous familiarity with every part of it. Is the former statement correct? Are not the writings of our Reformers and their successors saturated with Scripture at least as much as those of their opponents? One thing we will concede to Mr. Baring-Gould—the rapid change for the worse in modern Romanism: "it has quite drifted from primitive traditions." Hence it comes to pass that, whereas no one would dream of reproducing a modern Ultramontane's sermon, there is much in the discourses of some Romanist 16th-century preachers which we are able to take almost as it stands.

Perhaps, of the preachers whom our author has selected for illustration, the best known is Francis Coster of Mechlin, born in 1531, received into the new order of Jesuits by Loyola himself at the early age of twenty-one. Loyola soon found out his talents and his rare spirituality, and set him, at Cologne, in the van of the army of the Church, and in the thick of the fight then waging. "He is said to have brought back to the Church multitudes who had fallen away at the first blush of Protestantism, and to have strengthened numerous souls which wavered in doubt." It will be noticed that our author's sympathies are always in the direction wholly opposed to our own. Coster may have been an effective and successful preacher, and the stories which Mr. Baring-Gould quotes from him may be very touching; but it was error and not truth to which Coster brought back those whom he was able to influence. His dreamy style may be judged from his story about the two young pupils of the good priest of Lusitania who used to come over early to help at Mass before ever they ate their breakfast or said their lessons. Service over, they would put out the altar-lights, and then take their little loaf and can of milk to a side-chapel. One day the elder lad said to his master, "Good father, who is the strange child who visits us every morning when we break our fast?" "I know not," answered the priest. And when the children asked the same question day by day, the old man wondered and said, "Of what sort is he?" "He is dressed in a white robe without seam, and it reacheth from his neck to his feet." "Whence cometh he?" "He steppeth down to us, suddenly, as it were from the altar." "And we ask him to share our food with us; and that he doth right willingly every morning." "The marks" are then described:

and a great awe falls on the priest; but at last he says, gravely:—"Oh, my sons, know that the Holy Child Jesus hath been with you. Now, when He cometh again say to Him, 'Thou, O Lord, hast breakfasted with us full often, grant that we and our dear master may sup with Thee.'" The Child Jesus smiles sweetly, and replies, "Be it so; on Thursday next, the day of the Ascension, ye shall sup with me." On Ascension Day the children come early, but they bring not their loaf, nor the can of milk. Mass is sung; but when the *Pax vobiscum* has been said, they remained on their knees, kneeling behind the priest. And so they gently fell asleep in Christ, and sat down, with their master, at the Lamb's marriage supper.

A touching story, but surely dreamy, and tending to efface the boundaries between fancy and reality, and to foster that state of mind which M. Renan tells us is the normal state of all Orientals and was eminently that of the first founders of Christianity. No doubt, Father Coster told it in solemn seriousness, but is it wise that such tales should be so told nowadays? Had not Mr. Baring-Gould better have relegated it in his book of Mediæval myths, as an instance of the Cleobis and Bito story Christianised, instead of giving it among the sermons of men whom he sets up as models?

But he will hardly say that Coster should be imitated in the length of his discourses: one, on the first Sunday in Lent, fills forty-seven quarto pages, close print, double columns, occupying about 5,000 lines! And when we find that in this monster sermon, having mentioned the words "forty days and forty nights," he notes, "that forty represents the law as amplified by the Gospel, 10×4! . . forty days did Goliath defy the armies of the living God," and so on through all the forties of the Old and New Testament, we easily see how it would have been better for being shorter. Here, from the same sermon, is a choice argument for transubstantiation:—"If Christ by a word can change stones into bread, can He not change bread into His true and sacred flesh?" Here, again, "Christ left Satan in doubt as to whether He were the Son of God or not, *teaching us pious reserve on the subject of spiritual favours.*"

This, again, has been overlooked in recent controversies: "Christ's words imply the full inspiration of Scripture. He says man shall live by every word, and not by the general sense."

This is quaint:—"Christ's great love is here noticeable in suffering Himself to be borne hither and thither as the

tempter listed. So He afterwards suffered Himself to be dragged by the wicked Jews to Golgotha and to Calvary. So, too, now does He suffer His sacred body to be in the hands and mouths of unworthy priests and lay people, and to be offered in the meanest chapel, and carried to the filthiest hovel of the sick."

Here, too, is something racy, applicable to other times besides the writer's own :—"Christ was exalted to a pinnacle of the temple by the devil, even so many a holy man may be raised to the episcopacy by the vilest of means."

The following is far better :—"Satan garbles Scripture. He omits the words, '*to keep thee in all thy ways*,'—*i.e.*, in the ways of God's commandments, not in breaking those commandments."

But we soon come again to such far-fetched, mere trifling as this :—"Satan tempts Christ to fall down. His deceits all have one object, to accomplish our fall." Though the closing remark is well worth reproduction :—"Conflict with Satan does not lead to conquest : Christ took no spoils by His triumph. It is rather the victory of successful defence."

We have quoted a good deal from this sermon, because our readers can thereby form a better opinion of the sort of thing which our author sets up as infinitely superior to most Protestant discourses. He calls it "a marvellous sermon, abounding in thought, overflowing with suggestions;" and bids us pass from it to Scott, Matthew Henry, or D'Oyley and Mant, if we would see how poor and weak our lights are, compared with the Jesuit luminary. Alas for us!—"the veil is on our heart." Foreign reformed theologians are ignorant of the first principles of theology. The English Church, having always studied the Fathers, and loved them, is sundered by no great gulf from the Mediævals. But those who, "knowing nothing of the master-expositors of early and Mediæval days, go to the study of God's Word with the veil of self-sufficiency on their hearts, become hopelessly involved in heresy."

Marriage, thinks Mr. Baring-Gould, is fatal to exegetical success. Protestant clergy, commenting on Scripture "amidst the bustle of their ministerial avocations and their connubial distractions," are as helpless as a farm-labourer would be who should excogitate for himself a treatise of astronomy without reference to any existing treatises.

But how such far-fetched twaddle as a great deal of these samples are (and we must suppose they are the best of their kind) can help in explaining Scripture difficulties, we cannot

possibly imagine. We must be excused from making the effort; for Mr. Baring-Gould's mental attitude and ours, with reference to his favourite writers are so wholly opposite that no amount of arguing could bring us nearer together. What he looks on as fine gold is for us chaff (or sand, since much of it is heavy), with here and there a fragment of precious grain,—a bright thought amid such a mass of quaintness as after a time becomes wearying to all but enthusiasts like our author.

Another of our author's representative preachers is Jean Raulin, born at Toul, in 1443, who, he confesses, is given to torturing Scripture to illustrate his minute subdivisions; in fact, trifling with God's Word, and degrading it to a tissue of Sunday puzzles. Here are two examples, taken (we are told) haphazard from Raulin's works :—

"Why did the Spirit choose the form of a dove at Christ's baptism?

"1. A dove is without gall, representing the character of those born of the Spirit.

"2. A dove carried the olive-branch in token of God's being reconciled; and by baptism we are reconciled to God.

"3. A dove has seven qualities, resembling the Spirit's sevenfold gifts.

"(1.) It moans instead of warbling; this represents the spirit of holy *Fear*.

"(2.) It is gentle, and is offered in sacrifice, representing thus the spirit of *Piety*.

"(3.) It is granivorous; thus shadowing forth the spirit of *Knowledge*.

"(4.) It dwells in the clefts of the rocks; thus showing the spirit of *Fortitude*.

"(5.) It brings up the young of others; thus manifesting the spirit of *Counsel*.

"(6.) It rends not what it eats, but swallows whole; a type of the spirit of *Understanding*.

"(7.) It dwells beside waters; thereby displaying the spirit of *Wisdom*."

Fancy each of these points drawn out at length, and examined minutely; and then try to realise a congregation being gravely assured (in a sermon on the "Miraculous Draught of Fishes") that the little fishes are like the faithful in the Church, because,—

"1. Fish have their eyes at their sides, and so can always see about them; and faithful Christians are ever watchful.

"2. Fish move forward by wagging their tails; and good Christians have to move on by remembering the end of all things!

"3. Little fish are eaten by big fish, and so of the faithful it is said, 'Men shall devour you.'"

Surely "the pious sentiment of Scott," which Mr. Baring-Gould makes so light of, is more profitable than stuff of this kind.

Raulin was not only fond of the most out-of-the-way allusions, he was also given to witticisms. For instance, he asks, in an Easter sermon, why are women greater chatterboxes than men? Man is made of clay, woman of bone—of Adam's rib. Rattle a sack of clay as much as you will, and there will be no noise; but try a bag of bones, and you'll have clatter enough."

He was also fond of the conceits which Dr. Donne and George Herbert, and others, tried to popularise among ourselves. Thus, when a hermit was praying to be saved, Satan, transformed into an angel of light, said, "You must give to God three things united,—the new moon, the disc of the sun, and the head of a rose." The hermit is nearly driven to despair; but a real angel explains that the new moon is a crescent,—*i.e.*, a C; the disc of the sun is an O; the head of a rose is R. These united make COR: offer this to God, and the way of salvation is open to you.

Raulin was so popular that his Advent sermons went through six, his Lent sermons through five, editions. So was Meffreth of Meissen (1443), of whom, nevertheless, our author confesses that it is impossible to read him without feeling that his great object was not the saving of souls, but the display of his own learning and ingenuity. Meffreth was fond of natural history: he begins almost every sermon with some fact (?) which he allegorises. Thus: "The owl eats the jackdaw's eggs at night, because at night it is strongest. But the jackdaw carries off and eats the owl's eggs by day, because by day the owl is feeble. Thus the devil devours man's good works in the night of sin, and so ought man, in the day of grace, to destroy the devil's works by works of repentance." He sometimes tells a pretty story, such as that of the two hermits who each planted an olive; but the first prayed for rain, and it came; and then for sun, and the sun shone; and then for frost to come and brace it; and then for a warm wind, and the south wind blew on it, and—it died. The other left his tree to God, who knew best what it wanted; and it throve. Philip von Hartung, a Bohemian Jesuit (1645), is apparently, Mr. Baring-Gould's model preacher; he is certainly a man of a higher stamp than

Raulin. *A propos* of him our author makes the following remarks:—

"In style Hartung resembles the more earnest preachers of Dissent, because he speaks from the heart. If our preachers had the zeal and the love of God which was found among the great Catholic orators, *and is still to be discovered among Dissenting ministers*, there would be fewer complaints of the barrenness of the land, less deadness to the calls of God in professed Church-goers. . . . The sermon, however eloquent and finished in style will never convert sinners unless its inspiration is derived from God; and that inspiration can only be obtained by prayer. He who prays much is filled with a power of winning souls quite inexplicable."—P. 182.

The whole passage is very remarkable; the estimate which it gives of Dissenters contradicts in the strangest way that which Mr. Baring-Gould would seem, from other portions of his writings, to have formed.

From Hartung we will only quote the remark that "Mary Magdalene saw Jesus suffer so much before and at the crucifixion, yet she shed not a single tear. But on the Resurrection Day, when all else was joyous, she wept so bitterly that she did not see the angels. Why? Because they had taken away her Lord."

Our last quotation shall be the following: it is Stella, the Franciscan, commenting on St. John xiv. 23:—

"If a man love Me, he will keep *My Word;* he that loveth Me not keepeth not *My Words*. Love makes one commandment of many: of him who loves, it is spoken in the singular; of him who loves not, in the plural. Eve said that God had bade them *neither eat nor touch* the fruit: a chilled heart made one command into two, whilst a heart full of love, like David's, could sum up the 613 precepts of the old law into one cry—'What love have I unto Thy law.'"

This passage illustrates at once the strength and the weakness of this class of preachers; and with it we leave this strange mixture of chaff and grain, in which (as in the lump from which it is taken) we feel sure our readers will agree with us that the chaff very largely predominates. Our author might surely have done better if, instead of going to old volumes, some (he tells us) of exceeding rarity, he had looked into the discourses of those "sectaries who have nothing Catholic about them," whom he nevertheless unhesitatingly places far above the average preachers of his own Establishment. One good thing he has done—he has worked out the vein which he has discovered. No one will care to give much time to Post-mediæval preachers, seeing that one so anxious

to admire them as Mr. Baring-Gould could get nothing more out of them.

When Mr. Baring-Gould first wrote his *Curious Myths*, comparative mythology was by no means the popular study which it has since become. Max Müller spoke chiefly to scholars, and Mr. Cox, his prophet and interpreter, was only beginning to get a hearing. Our author has done a good deal to accustom people's minds to that cardinal truth—the transmission of the myth. In these Mediæval tales he is careful to point out the Pre-mediæval element. Thus Melusina, the wonderful serpent-bride of the De Lusignan family, mother of Geoffrey with the tooth, of whose real existence the Emperor Charles V. and afterwards Catherine de Medicis got what they supposed to be proofs, is radically the same story as Lohengrin and Undine, these having been altered by Fouqué and others from the original legend, which Grimm says is undoubtedly Celtic, and in which the fay-bride, after her disappearance, comes again periodically as Banshee to her husband's family. About the Banshee Mr. Gould quotes the old story from Lady Fanshawe's memoirs, and notes, correctly enough, that though the same as the *Dame blanche* of popular French folk-lore (found also in Wales and Brittany), she is of quite a distinct order of spirits from the White Lady of German fairy tales. But Mr. Gould is not content with identifying Melusina (or Pressina, as she is called in other romances) with the Banshee; she is (he tells us) a mermaid, or, at least, as closely related to mermaids as river-fish are to sea-fish. Oannes, who is figured on Babylonish seals and in the sculptures at Khorsabad, and Dagon (the fish-god) are her kinsmen; so are Ammon, Artemis, Dionysus, Thammuz, Derceto, and the Mexican Quetzalcoatl, or rather Cox-cox, and all the sun-gods and moon-goddesses; for do not sun and moon spend half their time under the waters? and what, then, more natural than to represent them as half-fish? Mylitta (another name of Atargatis, or Derceto) became in Greek Melissa, which, introduced into Gaul by the Phocæans of Massilia, is the Melusina of romance. That is a fair sample of Mr. Gould's method: how far his conclusions will stand the test of more recent research we leave Mr. Cox to decide; but we can only say that if "the moon, a water-goddess, and a deity presiding over child-birth," are all one, and if "Venus, born of the sea-foam, is unmistakably one with the moon," there seems a great deal of difficulty in saying who is who in the once well-marked hierarchy of Olympus.

After all this popularised comparative mythology, Mr. Baring-Gould gives us twenty pages of mermaid stories, one of which (telling how six Shetland fishermen caught a mermaid) he seems disposed to believe. Writing for the many, he finds his account in heaping together matter of every degree of value, in a way which (while it makes his books amusing, and gives us the opportunity of reading over again the old tales of wonder which delighted us as children) a good deal detracts from their scientific value. Some parts of this volume, however, are suggestive enough. For instance, the William Tell myth, which many still believe to be historical, is admirably traced through its collateral stories. Tell's date is fixed in 1307; but in the 12th century Saxo-Grammaticus, the Dane, tells precisely the same story of one Toki, Gessler being replaced by the tyrannical Harold Bluetooth. There are three or four other Norse tales closely resembling this; among them the spear-throwing of Hemringr and King Harold Sigurdson. Much the same tale is found in Finland (not Turanian, thinks Mr. Baring-Gould, but due to Swedish influence). A trace of it appears in Persia, though there the page who is shot at dies of sheer fright, the arrow, of course, not even grazing his skin. It is, therefore, a regular Aryan myth, with a possible physical interpretation; though Mr. Baring-Gould confesses that to make the tyrant the power of evil, and the bold archer the storm-cloud, with lightning arrow and iris bow, bent against the sun, which rests like a coin or a golden apple on the edge of the horizon, is "an overstraining of a theory."

Less doubtful is the reasoning which makes the legend of St. George a solar myth. The saint is identified by hagiologists with "the certain man of no mean origin," of whom Eusebius tells* that, at the first publication of Diocletian's persecuting edict, he took it down from the wall of Nicomedia and tore it in pieces. Gibbon, however (following Dr. Reynolds), assumes him to be the same as "the infamous purveyor of provisions, John of Cappadocia,† whom the Arians made Bishop of Alexandria, in opposition to St. Athanasius." But it is quite past belief that an Arian partisan should have been accepted as a Catholic saint. It is safer to hold, with our author, that some real martyr, a soldier by profession, has gathered round him a number of heathen myths. The Mussulmans have a similar story; and in the very curious book of Ibn-Wahshiya the Chaldæan (about A.D.

* *Eccl. Hist.* viii. 5. † *Decline and Fall*, xxiii.

900), the Thammuz legend of the old Nabathæans is identified with the story of St. George. On this book, perhaps the most curious of the many out-of-the-way works to which our author refers, readers should consult the *Christian Remembrancer*, No. CXII., Art. Tammuz, and also Renan's *Essay on the Age of Ibn Wahshiya's Book of Nabathæan Agriculture*. St. George there appears as a Semitic god Christianised. Astarte, Aphrodite (Thammuz being Adonis), becomes the pious widow with whom the young saint lodges. Persephone, Queen of Hades, who with Aphrodite claims a share in Adonis, becomes Alexandra, Queen of Diocletian (or Datian, as the legends call him), who is converted by St. George's constancy, and is martyred along with him. And so the legend gives a correlative for every feature in the classical myth. George, then, is the sun; the widow is the moon when visible; Alexandra is the waned moon (Nepthys as opposed to Isis, in the Egyptian system); and, as the torments of St. George and his resurrections last seven years (or in some versions seven days), so Thammuz is sought for seven days, and is mourned over by the seven stars.

But where is the dragon all this time? Alas, it was unknown till, so to speak, it clomb up out of the abyss, appearing for the first time in Jacobus de Voragine's *Golden Legend*. Thence it got into the office-books, so that at Sarum the hymn—

> "O Georgi, martyr inclyte,
> Per quam puella regia
> Existens in tristitia
> Coram dracone pessimo
> Salvata est"—

was regularly sung every 23rd April, till Clement VII., reforming missiles and breviaries, cut out this story, and left St. George simply as a martyr. Naturally the dragon story is the Perseus and Andromeda tale (made popular even for non-classical readers in Mr. Kingsley's *Heroes*): it is the story of Sigurd and the dragon Fafnir; and again, of Indra and the snake Ahi. Its interpretation (says our author) is as follows: The maiden whom the dragon threatens to devour is the earth, the monster is the storm-cloud, the hero the sun with his glorious sword the lightning-flash. This is clearly seen in the *Rigveda*, where Indra is described as "striking Ahi, scattering the waters upon the earth, unlooking the torrents of the heavenly mountains (*i.e.*, the clouds). Yea, he strikes Ahi with his sounding weapon, and the waters, like cattle rushing to their stables, have poured down on the earth."

With these dragon-myths Mr. Baring-Gould connects the series of Norse sagas, in which the gold-seeker descends into a cairn, and, after a struggle with its occupant, carries off a vast treasure. This, again, is the sun descending into the tomb of winter, and overcoming the power of darkness, from whom he takes the sword of the lightning and the treasures of fertility. The dweller in the cairn is not dragonised till much later, when the dragon-myths of other nations have made their way into the North. St. George got his dragon (we are told) through a misunderstanding; the old panegyrics on the saint say that "he conquered the dragon, that is, the devil." How natural that in an age when the symbol often took the place of the thing symbolised, the metaphorical dragon should have become a real monster, with a story invented for its special behoof!

Speaking of misunderstandings, we are reminded of the notable mistake (before alluded to) which transformed Sta. Undecimilla into the eleven thousand virgins (undecim millia) whose skulls may be seen ranged in pigeon holes round the walls at St. Ursula's church at Cologne. Mr. Baring-Gould's remarks on this myth are justly severe: "It exhibits a series of misconceptions and impostures we should hope unparalleled. To this day thousands visit Cologne relying on the intercession of a saint who never existed, and believing in the miraculous virtues of relics which are those of pagans." Nay, Ursula is Hörsel in Swabia, Holda in Saxony, Bertha (the shining) in Austria, *i.e.*, the moon-goddess, the multitude of attendant virgins being the stars. The tale of Tannhäuser presents her under other aspects.

Well may Mr. Gould remark: "Is this a pious belief, which can trust in moon and myriad stars, and invoke them as saints in Paradise? It is truth which men are yearning for, and sacred truth, when taught by a mouth which lends itself to utter cunningly devised fables, is not listened to." And surely such an experience should make our author chary of putting faith in "a mouth" which he confesses does not cease to utter lies.

We half suspect that Mr. Gould began his study of Mediæval myths "for catholic ends," believing that thereby the strange fabric whose latest battlement is Ritualism might be strengthened. As he went on he found Mediævalism, on this side, at least, to be rotten, "based on misconceptions and impostures;" and, we hope, learnt a lesson as to the danger of being led away by other aspects of it. As it is in regard to the myth of Hörsel, so is Mediævalism always; truth for it is

of no account; it realised fully what M. Renan calls the Oriental state of mind, in which the real and the unreal have no sharp boundary between them: that which is is not so certain that we can insist on it, of that which is not we do not care to affirm as a positive fact its non-existence. We hope the St. Ursula fable and other like samples of "Catholic" honesty, or "pious fraud," have cured our author of his hankering after Mediævalism.

But we must not linger longer on this interesting book. Our readers must see for themselves how Browning's pied piper of Hamelin is another form of the Orpheus tale—a solar myth, in fact—the rats, creatures which love darkness, disappearing at the coming of the Lord of Light. Bishop Hatto and his rats are traced back to the human sacrifices made in times of famine; but the rat and mouse have a further symbolism: the soul takes this form when it leaves the body; and so Hatto's rats are the souls of those whom he did to death by his tyranny.

The man in the moon, again, is a Norse myth: Mâni (the moon) stole two children, Hjuki and Bil (our old friends Jack and Jill), and they, with their pole and bucket, were placed in heaven. The girl soon dropped out of popular lore; the boy aged into a venerable old man, he retained his pole, and the bucket was transformed into a faggot or a bundle of vegetables; and the moon's theft was transferred to him, while (especially in Bible-reading countries) the notion of Sabbath-breaking was substituted for that of theft. Such is the way in which the myths are altered almost beyond recognition. One word about the *Legend of the Cross*. Those who know anything of Creuzer's *Symbolik*, or of Bryant's *Universal Religion*, will wonder that Mr. Gould says nothing about them in his remarks on pre-Christian crosses. His conclusion is much the same as theirs: "that there was a primeval religion which taught of the Trinity, the war in heaven, Paradise, the Flood, Babel, the birth of the Virgin's Son, the bruising of the Dragon's head, and remission through bloodshedding. The use of the Cross as a symbol of life and regeneration is as widely spread as the belief in Noah's ark. May be the shadow of the Cross was cast further back into the night of ages, and fell on a wider range of country than we suspect." Whatever may be the meaning of this last sentence, it is no doubt true that in Egypt, in heathen Norway, in Central America, and in the prehistoric kitchen-middens (*terramores*) of Emilia in North Italy, the Cross is abundantly figured. It seems to have been a sacred

sign among the Gauls, and Mr. Gould gives a very curious account of some diggings at a Gallo-Roman palace near Pau, where this emblem took the place of honour among evidently heathen mosaics.

We have lingered so long over three or four of Mr. Baring-Gould's books that we have no space to devote to the rest on our list. His legends from the Talmud are such as we might expect—trifling, childish, sometimes indecent. Not one in the whole collection has the slightest ethical value, nor does our author make much attempt to fix the antiquity of the various groups; or, in regard to those parallels which he quotes from heathen nations, to determine which are really indigenous and which due to missionary influence.

That Adam was colossal, reaching to the seventh heaven, and that his death was caused by the butting of a black goat; that the satyrs and other such creatures are misshapen, because the Sabbath came and God had to postpone the rest of His work till Sunday; and that Eve was not taken from Adam's head lest she should be vain, nor from his eyes lest she should be wanton, nor from his mouth lest she should be gossiping, nor from his hands lest she should be meddlesome, nor from his feet lest she should be a gad-about, nor from his liver lest she should be jealous—are not particularly edifying statements. The last reads singularly like a page out of one of our author's favourite preachers. Nor do we care to know that Adam left his staff to Seth, from whom it came to Jethro, who gave it with his daughter to Moses, who used it as his "rod."

The picture of the ark, with the hippopotamus towed on behind by its horn, the pig and cat created (one to devour the filth, the other the rats and mice) during the voyage, and Og, sole survivor of the giants, astride on the roof, through a hole in which Noah benevolently feeds him, is as amusing as the episode of Solomon and Queen Balkis, and the way in which Zuleika, Potiphar's maiden-wife, is, after all, married to Joseph.

But enough of Mr. Baring-Gould. Our readers will be able to form, from what we have laid before them, a fair estimate of his position and value as a writer. As a man he is known to be active and energetic, managing, besides his Yorkshire parish, a successful penitentiary on the Clewer model. One extract (from his contribution to the *Church and the Age*) must be our last:—

"Christianity is assailable in only two ways: Arius assailed it in one, the Reformers in the other. The Anglo-Catholics do not now go over to Rome, because they have got fully convinced of the Catholicity

of the Church of England. . . . As for the Protestant, his day is passed for ever. 'Who gives anything to poor Tom?' Let him lie in his shivering fit in the quagmire that he has elected for his bed, while all those who are sane and thoughtful divide into two parties, those rejecting and those accepting a revelation (the latter must needs assume a Catholic position). In the struggle Tom will be trodden down into the dirt he loved so well."

And so we take leave of Mr. Baring-Gould, reminding him, in parting, that we too hold the need of close and personal communion with God; "the want" (as he says) "is grounded in man's nature." So far we go together, but there we diverge. Wesley's grand aim was at this closer union; his grand protest was against the dryness which is the besetting sin of establishments, leading men to shrink up into themselves instead of expanding heavenwards. But Wesley's aim was after intelligent communion, heart to heart, spirit to spirit; Mr. Baring-Gould would knowingly push the world back to fetishism, with a vague esoteric "trichotomy" for those whom fetishism will not satisfy. He talks much about development; surely this is such a development as takes place when a carcass is dead, and vile fungoid growths begin to take the place of the one strong life which held the whole together.

ART. III.—*The Ancient Stone Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great Britain.* By JOHN EVANS, F.R.S., F.S.A., Honorary Secretary of the Geological and Numismatic Societies of London, &c., &c., &c. London: Longmans and Co.

THIS is a genuine book. The author prepared himself to write it by much investigation in paths of literature rarely trodden; by extensive travel for the sake of enlarged and accurate observation; by working in flint and other stone manufacture himself, that he might the better interpret the relics of former times; in short, by the assiduous study of his subject in all its branches; and he has given us a work which, by reason of its extent of information, lucid arrangement, clear and complete references, abundance of excellent pictorial illustrations, and its indexes—the first of which, however, is very defective—must be at once accepted as the standard book on the matters it comprises. Having studied it, we can highly appreciate the very modest terms in which the writer describes it. "The work itself will, I believe, be found to contain most of the information at present available with regard to the class of antiquities of which it treats."

Notwithstanding its excellence it will not be popular, although, for a fine volume of 650 pages, enriched by five hundred figures finely engraved—which might, indeed, be reckoned as a thousand, because both a front and side view of most of the objects is given—twenty-eight shillings is a very moderate charge, it is sufficiently high to limit purchasers to the few, especially as, to use Mr. Evans's own words, "the subject is one which does not readily lend itself to lively description; and an accumulation of facts, such as is here presented, is of necessity dull:" which confession will be rendered quite intelligible by the light of a single quotation, as a specimen of hundreds of pages:—

"Fig. 280 is from the neighbourhood of Icklingham, Suffolk, of flint become nearly white by weathering, and carefully chipped on both faces, one of which is, however, more convex than the other. I have a large but imperfect specimen of the same form from Oundle. A nearly similar arrow-head, of yellow flint, from Hosne, Suffolk, is engraved in the *Archæological Journal*. It was supposed to have occurred in the same deposit as that containing large palæolithic imple-

ments and elephant remains, but nothing certain is known on this point; and from the form there can be little hesitation in assigning it to the neolithic period. A rather smaller arrow-head, but of much the same character, found at Bradford Abbas, Dorset, is engraved in the same journal. Professor Buckman has several leaf-shaped arrows from the same neighbourhood. Some of them are long and slender, more like Fig. 286."—P. 333.

It will be evident, from this specimen, that the volume is one of instruction, not of amusement. It is a register of small pieces of stone found, for the most part, in England, and known, or supposed, to have been shaped by design long ago. These are described in words, and many of them by the tool of a skilful graver. They are very carefully classified, and generally we are told in what collection they are now to be found. The author interests his readers by the ardour of his archæological zeal, and commands their confidence by his truthfulness. It is right to add that his work, though revealing here and there very doubtful opinions, is distinguished by great caution, and seldom offends by the confident assumptions into which M. Bouchier de Perthes, Sir Charles Lyell, and Sir John Lubbock have been betrayed.

If the subject Mr. Evans brings before us be devoid of popular interest, it is well fitted to attract and fascinate the thoughtful and intelligent few who have time and opportunity for studying it. In England, as elsewhere, men ignorant of metals, or unable to procure them, availed themselves of the stones which they found ready for their use, and employed their ingenuity in fashioning them to subserve a variety of purposes in social life, in the chase of wild animals, and in war. For many years antiquarians have diligently collected these memorials of former times, and by carefully observing the positions in which they are found, namely, graves, caves, &c., and by studying the practices of modern savages, they have thrown much light on the condition of our barbarous predecessors, tracing stone implements from rude types to the most skilled workmanship of which the material admitted. Flakes of flint, so thin that a dozen of them do not weigh an ounce, have been elaborately wrought into cutting instruments, and into shapes which arrest the eye of an artist by their beauty. No verbal or pictorial description can do justice to these curious manufactures. They must be seen to be appreciated. Specimens may now be found in most museums, and fine specimens in many. Mr. Evans makes frequent mention of "the unrivalled collection" of the Rev. W. Greenwell, F.S.A.; and certainly no one who has

seen that rich antiquarian store will wonder at the enthusiasm which "ancient stone implements" have excited.

Of the manner in which they are used for the purposes of chronology, we shall be compelled to write in a very different strain. Mr. Evans adopts the common nomenclature, dividing the times of mankind into palæolithic, neolithic, bronze, and iron eras; in plain English, into—1. The old-stone age; 2. The new-stone age; 3. The bronze age; and 4. The iron age.*

It is supposed that the implements of the old-stone age were fashioned by chipping only, and were not ground or polished, the material used in Europe being almost exclusively flint; that the implements of the new-stone age, though comprising many of rude make, were, as a whole, of a superior kind, various species of stone being used, and grinding practised to improve the shape. Bronze is copper mixed with tin, a process more easy than the smelting of iron, and therefore more speedily discovered. Of course, stone implements manufactured by men possessed of bronze are of very superior workmanship. Last of all comes the use of iron, the best material for tools. It is assumed that the new-stone age overlaps the bronze, and the bronze the iron. The connection between the old and new-stone ages, if it existed, is untraced.

Mr. Evans applies this division of ages, at present, not like Sir John Lubbock, to Europe and contiguous regions, but only to Western Europe, and without informing us where he draws the line between the East and West. In Denmark, Mr. Evans thinks the iron age goes back to about the Christian era, the bronze age one or two thousand years farther, the stone ages comprising "all previous time of man's occupation of that part of the world." To how remote an era these last ages conduct us is doubtful. Even the new-stone age is now called pre-historic, and the old-stone age is to be reckoned backwards by many tens or hundreds of thousands of years. In fact, our author deems it probable that the traces of men belonging to a much more remote time, and

* The old-stone age includes the river-gravel or drift, and the cave period. "It must not be supposed that there exists of necessity any demonstrable difference in the age of the two classes of relics" (p. 426). We suppose Mr. Evans means that there is no difference between the two, or that he sees none. He had better have said so, and not plagued us by saying, "It must not be supposed there exists *of necessity* any *demonstrable* difference." This is one of a hundred cases in which, by putting "if" before his premisses, or by throwing in an obscuring expression, the author denudes his sentences of force and almost of meaning.

the miocene strata, may hereafter be detected. "Judging from all analogy, there can be but little doubt that the human race will eventually be proved to date back to an earlier period than the pleistocene or quaternary." "The mind is almost lost in amazement at the vista of antiquity displayed" (pp. 426, 622). We have to show that the nomenclature of the antiquaries is false, that they have discovered no manufactures of pre-historic times, that the new-stone age is traceable only within narrow limits, and that the old-stone age is "the baseless fabric of a vision."

There neither is, nor has been, an iron age; for in some parts of the world stone is used still, and iron unknown: much less was the year of the Christian era an iron age, though, according to Mr. Evans, it was so in Denmark. If, as he suggests, there were a stone age in Denmark four thousand years ago, that was not a stone age in Palestine or Egypt. In truth the four terms, as our author admits, are applicable only to different places at different times; whereas, by constantly writing about the stone, bronze, and iron ages, archæologists convey an impression of their reality as general measures of time. Their nomenclature is a cheat. Why do they not say what they mean—for example, the stone, bronze, or iron age of Denmark, of Britain, of Tahiti, or of any other place?

Evidently, it was the purpose of the Creator, who stored the earth with materials for the use of men, to leave them to find out, by the salutary and pleasant exercise of their faculties, the various uses of those materials. That purpose was kind; for, though it is well to be taught, it is far better to discover or invent. The cry "εὕρηκα!" has ever been among the most gladsome utterances of the human voice; and immeasurably greater would have been the amount of such gladness had men employed their powers wisely, instead of prostituting them ignobly. Assuming—and why should we not?—that the first of our race were left to discover and invent as one beneficent part of their education, we must infer that the knowledge of metals and of the art of smelting was gained by slow degrees.

"There are even Biblical grounds for argument in favour of such a view of a gradual development of material civilisation. For all, including those who invest Adam with high moral attributes, must confess that whatever may have been his mental condition, his personal equipment in the way of tools or weapons could have been but inefficient, if no artificer was instructed in brass and iron until the days of Tubal Cain, the sixth in descent from Adam's outcast son, and

that, too, at a time when a generation was reckoned at a hundred years, instead of at thirty, as now."—P. 3.

It should be borne in mind, also, that the discovery of metals may be long prior to the skilful use of them. Copper and tin must both have been found, the means of mixing them ascertained, and the proper proportions, before the ancient bronze implements now brought to light were manufactured; and, great as is the distance between iron in the ore and iron from the furnace, not less is the distance between the bar of rough iron and the knife or lancet of steel. A fine-edged flint would probably be the sharpest cutting instrument known, long after the discovery of copper, and tin, and molten iron. In such "gradual development of material civilisation," we recognise a law of God wise and good.

Had the human tenants of this world been philanthropic, or even humane, the discovery of metals and their use, when once made, would have been quickly diffused everywhere, and never lost anywhere: and, in that case, the division of time into the palæolithic, neolithic, bronze, and iron ages, might have been correct and useful; the first being briefest, the second brief, and the metal times comprising almost the whole chronology of mankind. But, while some have advanced from ignorance to knowledge, others have sunk from knowledge to ignorance. Three hundred years' cessation of intercourse with Europe terminated the iron age on the farther coast of Greenland, and introduced, or re-introduced, a stone age. As Western Europe emerged into light, Eastern Europe and the contiguous parts of Asia sank into darkness. Teman and Babylon were once centres of civilisation and power, but both relapsed into weakness and ignorance, till, at length, "their memorial perished with them." If "curious flint or chert implements have been found in southern Babylonia" (p. 571), we have no right to assume them to be older than the brazen gates of Babylon, for they are very likely to have been chipped since the second century of the Christian era. The changes in the social condition of mankind have been marked by every variety, as of progress, so of retrogression; and where there has been progress, it has not always, probably not often—if ever, for that has yet to be demonstrated—been by the four steps which antiquaries are very fond of assuming. Four hundred years ago, half the world in extent was in the stone age, and since that time it has passed into an iron age at a bound, the intermediate term of the series—

that is, the bronze—having had no existence. And probably when there was little intercourse between different parts of the world, as tribes of men were thrown back or fell back in the scale of humanity, and the scenes of abundant population were deserted, an iron age would die away into a stone age. Mr. Evans's metaphor of the rainbow is inappropriate.* The kaleidoscope would represent the social usages of past generations much better than the prism or the spectrum. It is but just, however, to remember, that, though Sir John Lubbock applies the fourfold classification — old-stone, new-stone, bronze, and iron—to Europe, and thinks that it might be extended much further, Mr. Evans is much more wary. The wide difference between the *dicta* of these recognised authorities is very suggestive.

The phrase "pre-historic times," emblazoned on the title-page of Sir John Lubbock's volume, occurs very seldom in the work before us. In fact, we remember but one instance of its use by the author, as expressive of his own opinion; but that is such as to show that he sanctions the phrase. Now the eras, two, three, four, five thousand years before the Christian epoch are not "pre-historic times;" much less are more recent eras. Yet antiquarians, finding relics which, like Stonehenge,† are ancient, and of date uncertain, but possibly far later than the landing of Julius Cæsar in Britain, write of them as belonging to the pre-historic age, and in so doing are guilty of imposing on the public. We protest against this use of plain words in a non-natural sense by the priests of science, and regret that Mr. Evans has not avoided

* "Like the three principal colours of the rainbow, the stone, bronze, and iron stages of civilisation overlap, intermingle, and shade off the one into the other, and yet their succession, so far as Western Europe is concerned, appears to be equally well defined with that of the prismatic colours, though the proportions of the spectrum may vary in different countries."—P. 2.

† Stonehenge is un-historic: but that it was reared in pre-historic times, or even in the pre-historic times of Britain, no man knows; and, therefore, no man has the right to affirm. In the diversity of existing opinion it were presumptuous to speak confidently of its origin, but it is well known that the Romans were encamped in that neighbourhood in great force. The region round Stonehenge is covered with burial mounds, looking like a great Roman cemetery of the west. The vast stones forming the imposing structure must have been drawn for miles up-hill, and then raised aloft, which would be no slight task even now. They show a great amount of spare labour, mechanical skill, and perseverance, which it is hard, if possible, to suppose that the Britons possessed before the time of Cæsar. The Romans had all these qualifications. It was their policy to find their soldiers employment, and also to sanction and incorporate the religion of their vassals. Moreover, it might please them well to impress the Britons by Druidical structures compared with which the native erections were puny and contemptible; and above all might it gratify them to give a character of sanctity to the resting-place of their dead.

it. Precision of language in such cases is not difficult. Professor Daniel Wilson, describing Scotch antiquities which he supposes to be older than any written records of *the country*, accurately entitles his book, *Pre-historic Annals of Scotland*; and Captain Oliver writes in the *Athenæum* of Nov. 9, 1872, of the *Non-historic Monuments of the Mediterranean*. So, if geological antiquaries were to write of the pre-historic relics of Mexico, or of the non-historic flints of Denmark, or of Grimes's Graves, near Brandon, their language would be worthy of science; but when they describe these latter, and similar relics, as belonging to "pre-historic times," they assume what has not been proved, and suggest what may be grossly false. A man gazing on his grandmother's clock might be looking on that which was to him non-historic, but if he spoke of it as belonging to pre-historic times he would deserve only ridicule.

The second chapter of Mr. Evans's book, which is full of interesting information, is, in its title, most objectionable. In that chapter the writer explains the manufacture of gun-flints for exportation to Africa, as carried on now in Suffolk and Norfolk, gives an account of the interesting explorations at Grimes's Graves conducted by the Rev. W. Greenwell, F.S.A., who, discovering there a number of bowl-shaped depressions, from twenty to sixty feet in diameter, examined one, and found that horizontal galleries had been driven at considerable depth through the chalk in many directions in quest of the buried flints. Mr. Evans names places in Switzerland, France, Britain, Australia, and other countries, where flint manufacture has evidently been carried on in past times, describes the process as Torquemada saw it among the Indian workmen, and as seen by other witnesses in other regions. In short, the purport of the chapter is to show, and chiefly by processes now carried on or described by travellers, how the wrought-stone implements discovered in different parts of the world must have been made. The true title of the chapter would be—"On the Manufacture of Stone Implements." The title attached to it is—"On the Manufacture of Stone Implements in Pre-historic Times." Of its truth there is not a tittle of evidence. Far nearer the truth would it have been to entitle it a chapter "On the Manufacture of Stone Implements in *Historic* Times."

Within an entrenchment at Cissbury, near Worthing, are some fifty funnel or cup-shaped depressions, thirty of which were opened and found to contain, amongst the rubble with which they were partially filled, well-chipped flints,

celts,* and ruder implements; quantities of splinters and minute chippings of flint; flakes, some worked on one or both faces; some few boring tools and scrapers; and many stones that had been used as hammers. Most of the flints had become quite white on the surface, as is often the case when they rest on a porous soil."—P. 70.

"Colonel Lane Fox suggests a question, whether the implements found at Cissbury belong to the neolithic or palæolithic age, and seems almost to regard the distinction between the implements of those two ages as founded merely on the minor point whether they are chipped simply, or also polished. The associated fauna in this case is, however, purely neolithic, or, as Mr. Boyd Dawkins would call it, pre-historic."—P. 72.

Referring (p. 439) to Mr. Boyd Dawkins, Mr. Evans quotes him, and apparently with approbation, as writing of "the prehistoric or neolithic period:" and certainly Mr. Dawkins (p. 72) assigns the remains found at Cissbury to the prehistoric age. There are about Cissbury many indubitable traces of Roman occupation; but that particular spot is distinguished by rude earthworks, and by the absence of water, which the Romans ever regarded as essential to their camping-ground. By excavating the ground there abundance of flints have been discovered, so rude in form that the workmen employed all their lives in digging in a chalk district did not suspect them of having been manufactured, and could not without difficulty be induced so to regard them.† To this treasure-house Mr. Evans devotes four pages of description; and to it he refers in seven other parts of his volume. Col. Lane Fox seems to lean to the opinion that these relics belong to the old-stone age. Mr. Boyd Dawkins assigns them to the new-stone, or, "as he would call it, the prehistoric" age. The remains of horse, goat, and ox, and fragments of charcoal and pottery found, place the modern date of the things discovered beyond all reasonable doubt. "The associated fauna is purely neolithic" (p. 72). What is the conclusion to which the common sense, highly lauded by Dr. Carpenter in his address to the British Association, leads? Is it not that natives, wanting the power and resources of the Romans, threw up the earthworks for defence when compelled to flee to the heights for safety: and that at some

* "There can be no doubt as to the derivation of the word, it being no other than the English form of the Latin *celtis*, or *celtes*, a chisel." It is found in the Vulgate translation of Job xix. 24. P. 50.

† *Archæologia*, Vol. XLII. p. 58.

time, which may have been long after, but certainly was not before, the Roman occupation of Britain, the excavations in search of flints were made? The earliest historian who names the place is Camden, who informs us that it received its name from Cissa, the second Saxon king of those parts, the date being A.D. 472, which completely accounts for a fact with which Mr. Evans has not indulged us, namely, that pottery unquestionably Roman was found there.* We are far from wishing to underrate the archæological interest attaching to the place, or the fruits of recent explorations there; but that intelligent men, observing the flints found there, should imagine themselves to be gazing on manufactures outlying the bounds of all human history, fills us with wonder. The fair inferences yielded by Cissbury are these:— 1. That the pretence to distinguish between the older and the newer instruments by their shape is wholly futile; 2. That the antiquities are to be certainly dated in the Roman or Post-Roman times of Britain; and, therefore, 3. That Mr. Boyd Dawkins' notion of their belonging to some pre-historic age is as far from reality as the tale of *Jack the Giant Killer*. This Cissbury of "pre-historic times," with its Roman pottery, is no unfair specimen of the chronology of geological antiquaries. *Ex uno disce omnia.*

Reckoning about two thousand years for the iron age in this country, Mr. Evans names two thousand years more for the duration of the bronze and new-stone periods (p. 618), suggesting, however, that it is a guess in defiance of probability, and ridiculously small. Still, it is his estimate; he gives no other; and, we presume, would not have trifled with his readers by assigning that date unless he had felt it was about the utmost limit to which he could advance with entire confidence. He thus leads us back over four-sevenths of the historic ages as in his opinion certainly included in the new-stone era of Britain. We admit that the antiquity of four millenniums is not to be scorned, and may therefore inquire whether the guess can be confirmed? We learn from an eyewitness, Julius Cæsar, that 1,930 years ago Kent was peopled by colonists from Gaul, who were so far civilised as to cultivate the ground, and use for money brass which was imported and rings of iron, the iron being found in small quantities near the coast. Cæsar did not penetrate very far into Britain, but learned by inquiry that lead was found in the interior, and that, with the exception of the parts near to

* *Archæologia*, Vol. XLII. p. 55.

Gaul, the island was peopled by natives, who fed on flesh and milk, wore skins, and stained their bodies with dye. This account fairly yields the inference that the Britons generally, that is, the population of almost the whole island, were destitute of metals, lead excepted; and, consequently, must have used stone implements. Thus far we tread on firm ground; but how can Mr. Evans expect us to accompany him when he leaps in the dark over nineteen other centuries, and tells us what the people were doing in Britain in the days of Abraham, there being not the slightest *proof* that in those days there was, or ever had been, a single inhabitant of the island? In truth, Mr. Evans's facts respecting the new-stone era do not lead us out among "the eternities," nor open before us a "vista" which in perspective vanishes to a point and is lost in infinite space, but point to times not very remote from our own. Grimes's Graves and "pre-historic" Cissbury are fair examples of the relics of the new-stone era. The use of stone implements prevailed after the Romans left this country to a far greater extent than it is convenient to antiquaries to recognise; and even after the use of metals had become common, habit, among people who could not travel far or much, would perpetuate the use of stone for a long time; and superstition would probably retain long and widely the custom of placing flints in graves. Mr. Evans fixes on the year 1,100 A.D. as the time when the new-stone implements were no longer in use in this country; informing us however, afterward, that they were in use in some of the islands north of Scotland in this century, and giving as the latest instance in point the use of a flint instrument in the island of Lewis for cutting out a wedding garment in A.D. 1824. In summing up the results of the nineteen chapters descriptive of the "antiquities of the Neolithic or Surface Stone Period," that is what we have called the new-stone period, Mr. Evans says:—"When we attempt any chronological arrangement of the various forms, we find ourselves almost immediately at fault. From the number of objects found we may, indeed, safely infer that they represent the lapse of no inconsiderable interval of time, but how great we know not; nor, in most cases, can we say, with any approach to certainty, whether a given object belongs to the commencement, middle, or close of the polished-stone period of Britain" (p. 423). We are told, "We may safely say that the use of bronze must have been known in this country five or six hundred years B.C., and therefore that at that time cutting tools of stone began to be superseded." The author gives us no

authority. If he be thinking of bronze instruments found here, and of older date than the Roman invasion, let him produce and verify them. If he be thinking of the Phœnicians trading to Cornwall, let him prove the date and the facts. At present, Mr. Evans's history of the days of Abraham is as legendary as the tales which make Brutus the ancestor of Victoria and Japheth's son the first monarch of England. Not one new-stone implement found in Britain can be proved to be 1500 years old. According to Mr. Evans's own showing, the new-stone era comes down to about A.D. 1100, not to say A.D. 1824, and, in most cases, we are unable to say, "with any approach to certainty, whether a given object belongs to the commencement, middle, or close of the polished-stone period of Britain." Will Mr. Evans inform us which are the exceptional cases; or, at least, have the kindness to furnish us with one?

We now proceed to some notice of the old-stone period, including implements of the cave and of the river drift, but shall trouble the reader only with the latter, for, "as to the date at which those cave deposits were formed, history and tradition are silent; and, at present, even geology affords but little aid in determining the question." "So far as we at present know, not a single instrument from the river drift has been sharpened by grinding or polishing."

This palæolithic or old-stone era conducts us to a remoteness almost inconceivable, extending beyond the supposed glacial period. When that occurred our authorities do not explain with exactness or agreement. They refer to the eccentricity of the earth's orbit, which Sir John Lubbock estimates might freeze the earth two hundred thousand years ago, and Sir Charles Lyell eight hundred thousand. The theory is not worth discussion.* Much weight is also attached to the time assumed to have been occupied by the rivers scooping out the valleys in the sides of which flints are found. The valley through which the Somme runs is thought to have been made by that river; the valley in which London stands to have been produced in the same manner; and the time requisite for making the Wealden valley has been reckoned at four million years. Mr. Evans gives in his adhesion to the opinion that on the further side of such vast interval of time—whether measured, to use his own phrase, by

* The variations in that eccentricity, itself a very small quantity represented by a ratio of $\frac{1}{20}$, are so minute, and depend on so many perpetually varying causes, that little, if any, reliance can be placed on calculations extending over such periods as Sir Charles Lyell and Sir John Lubbock introduce.

"many times 10,000 years," or by millions, matters little for the purpose of our inquiry—human beings existed on the earth and chipped flints. Whether they belonged to the same race as we do, or whether there were any link of connection between us and them, he doubts. We think he leans, as well he may, to the conclusion that the cold killed all the earlier men, and that we are a new race. In which case, we suppose, he must in all consistency hold that the same causes destroyed animated existence generally. This prodigious creed is now palmed on mankind by geologists, and they deem him ignorant who objects to their headstrong hypotheses. On what evidence do they rest?

That the valleys of London and the Somme, and many others, were produced in the manner described above, is a supposition ingeniously contended for by Mr. Evans, by others rejected, and certainly not proved.* The traces of lake dwellings about the Somme indicate the existence of a lake or lakes in that district heretofore; and we are informed that the water level in England was formerly a thousand feet higher in relation to the land than now. And supposing it were not so, where did the water creating the valley in which London stands come from? It is needless further to discuss that hypothesis—for such it is, and therefore no firm foundation for other hypotheses—till it has been proved that the flints obtained from the gravels are manufactured. The distinction which Mr. Evans draws between the old and new-stone flints is, that not a single implement from the river drift has been sharpened by grinding or polishing. Among the new-stone implements all degrees of perfection and imperfection are met with.

"Cissbury is without doubt a Saxon fortification, and this is proved by some of our oldest historians, who say that after the battle fought at Mercreadesburn, in the year 472, they founded this place for their defence."

"A trench ten feet square, seven feet deep, was dug. It produced remains of the horse, kid, &c., oyster, cockle and mussel shells, fragments of baked pottery, some of which were rudely scored in a cross

* Mr. Alfred Tylor, F.G.S., asserts "that the surface of the chalk in the valley of the Somme had assumed its present form prior to the deposition of any of the gravel or loess now to be seen there" (p. 613). "The sections which I have given demonstrate that the gravels of St. Acheul are not fluviatile, and were never formed in an ancient river bed."—*Flint Implements.* By N. Whitley. Longmans and Co. This gentleman, who is one of the honorary secretaries of the Royal Institution of Cornwall, has surveyed the Somme district perhaps more completely than any other Englishman. He gives four distinct reasons for his opinion.

pattern and marked with the impress of the fingers, and one piece of red tile scored in parallel zigzag lines, of undoubted Roman manufacture."

"Cissbury has produced specimens of nearly every type known to have been found among flint implements from the drift and cave up to the surface period."

The reader then will bear in mind that the new-stone implements comprise all classes: the old-stone implements, according to our authorities, are all of a rude kind, and neither ground nor polished.

When M. Boucher de Perthes began his researches, the men whose employment was digging gravel, had never suspected that the flints which fell out had been wrought by human hand. Mr. Evans tells us that "ordinary labourers require some instruction before they can be brought to recognise even the best wrought forms of flint implements." Colonel Lane Fox mentions "the great difficulty which was at first experienced in getting the workmen to notice the artificially formed flints as they fell from the shovel" at Cissbury, "notwithstanding that all of them had passed their lives in digging in a chalk district."* Does it seem more likely that men of common sense should live and move all their lives amidst manufactured articles without suspecting that they had been wrought, or that learned men are the dupes of their own credulity? In case some of our readers should not have the opportunity of looking at palæolithic implements, we offer them a specimen on the opposite page. These twelve flints were presented by Mr. Evans to the Antiquarian Society of Cambridge, and they are no unfair example of the kind of evidence on the ground of which we are called upon to believe that man lived on this earth "many times ten thousand years" ago.

That the kind of flints dug from the gravels of the Somme are such as have just been described, is on all hands admitted. That flints unquestionably the work of man, and obviously so to every beholder, are found in the bottom of the valley, is well known. We believe there is a common opinion that such indubitable pieces of human workmanship have been found in the gravels far up the sides of the valley. We have diligently inquired in various directions for a single article of this kind found there, and in vain. We have been either pointed to specimens taken from the peat or bottom of the valley, or referred to a mass of rough flints, as proving,

* *Arch.* Vol. XLII. pp. 55, 58.


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when together, what separately they were confessedly insufficient to prove. We are obliged, however, to admit one exception, and it is a flint discovered by Messrs. Prestwich and Evans in the year 1859, and to be again referred to in the sequel.

In the theory we are discussing it is assumed that, for an enormously long period, men had no weapons or tools but of stone, and almost exclusively of flint, and never advanced beyond the rudest shapes. Common sense revolts against this notion.* In every age and country the tools in use will present great variety of both laborious and hasty construction. It is practice and patient toil that make perfect. Savages will spend years in perforating "cylinders of rock crystal by twirling a flexible leaf-shoot of wild plantain between the hands, and thus grinding the hole with the aid of sand and water;" and others will spend "a whole life in making a stone tomahawk without entirely finishing it" (p. 47). It is altogether incredible that men should live through "many times ten thousand years," and make no improvement in processes which are as surely improved by practice as the manufactures of the present day. There is a man well known in England whose name is Edward Simpson, but who has been *alias* "Fossil Willie," "Cockey Bill," "Bones," "Shirtless," "Snake Billy," "The Old Antiquarian," and "Flint Jack." Picking up some knowledge of fossils while a servant, he began to collect them about Whitby, and sell them, earning a good living. A dealer in curiosities showed him a flint arrow-head, and asked him if he could make one like it. He took the hint, and became the prince of fabricators of antiques, flints of every form, celts, stone hammers, ancient pottery, inscribed stones, fibulæ, querns, armour, and every conceivable thing. His productions have taken in the most learned, and are to be found in the cabinets of collectors everywhere. He produced a stone with a cross on it, surrounded by the letters Imp. Constant. Ebur., which was sent about to various antiquaries, and, strange to say, baffled their skill. He produced a flint comb, and the *savans* could make nothing of it, unless

* "At any given period of the history of an original race the varieties of any particular class of implements actually in use, if fully collected and arranged, will within certain limits exhibit all the links of connection between present and past forms. This fundamental maxim is capable of clear demonstration in any well assorted collection of early and savage implements, and embodies, I believe, the pith and marrow of nearly all that can be extracted from the study of pre-historic and comparative archæology."—*Arch.* Vol. XLII., p. 70.

that it might have been used for tattooing. Scarborough, Hull, Newark, Grantham, Stamford, Peterborough, were enriched by his treasures. Finding out the metropolitan market where his Jewish salesman traded, he proceeded to London to do business on his own account. "Did you take them in at the British Museum?" "Why, *of course* I did.... They have lots of my things, and good things they are too." Leaving the curiosity shops of the great city well supplied, Jack went northward again by Bedford and Northampton, at which latter place he was very successful. Market Harborough proved a barren town to him, but at Leicester he got to the Museum and succeeded. At Nottingham he found two antiquaries, and duped them both. Durham and the Lake district, York, Leeds, Manchester, Liverpool, the West of England, Scotland, and Ireland—in which last-named country he found an excellent market—have been supplied with his productions, which he sometimes adroitly mixed with a few real fossils. The secret at length came out, and Jack reached the climax of his fame. A meeting of the Geological Association was held in London, at which it was understood some curious discoveries would be made. The place of meeting, except the seats reserved for dignitaries, was fully occupied; when in walked a man in tattered clothes, boots heavy and dirty, his face like a gipsy's, his hair hanging in lank locks, a greasy hat in his hand, and a bundle in a dingy red cotton handkerchief. Putting his hat on the ground on one side, and his bundle on the other, he seated himself amid the titter of the ladies on the reserved seats, seemed quite at his ease, and then, approaching the table, carefully inspected the curiosities exhibited on it. When some preliminary proceedings were over Jack, at a signal given, producing from his bundle nodules of flint and a piece of iron, astonished and greatly amused the spectators by the skill and speed with which he prepared any sort of flint implements desired. He was the hero of the evening, and left with his pocket well furnished with sixpences, the price of his manufactures.* Mr. Evans imagines that men went on chipping flints throughout unnumbered ages, without there being one Flint Jack, or any advance on the very rude forms of flint work. It is wonderful that intelligent men do not perceive that the theory carries its own refutation. Can he cite a single instance in which a savage tribe has gone on even for centuries with no manifestations of skill beyond a

* *Reliquary*, Vol. VIII. p. 65.

piece of barely chipped flint? We suspect he felt the difficulty, and, to shield himself, had recourse to the desperate expedient of suggesting that possibly the men of the Palæolithic age were a different race from the present!

Another curious circumstance connected with these ancient flint implements is their vast number. They have been found by hundreds and thousands in various places. "The number almost exceeds belief." * "They may be said to be ubiquitous" (p. 251). Mr. Whitley informs us that half a ton weight was collected in less than an hour, and that he found whole strata of these "flint implements." The inference seems to us perfectly clear. That savages should trouble themselves to manufacture myriads of such flints, and throw them away, is not likely. The bits of flint which are found on the surface of the ground in every flinty region, and which may be dug out of every gravel bed; which the workmen never suspected of being artificial till they were set to look for them, and paid for finding them; are no more artificial than the pebbles on the seashore. The palæolithic, or old-stone age of men is a fiction.

The reader may inquire if there are not better and unquestionable specimens found in the valley of the Somme. Geologists have certainly contrived to produce the impression that there are; and very few persons, probably, are aware of the tenuity of the evidence they present. We have inquired in various quarters for a flint certainly wrought, and found—not at the bottom, but—in the gravel at any considerable height on the slopes of that valley: and inquired in vain. Let us, then, observe how our author supports this part of his case. In 1859, when M. Boucher de Perthes had been for many years paying the workmen for their discoveries, Mr. Evans went to Abbeville and Amiens, in company with Mr. Prestwich, not suspecting, apparently, that there was a Flint Jack there, much less that there might be many such. The two learned gentlemen *obtained many specimens from the workmen*, but searched the gravel in vain themselves. It was understood that they were very desirous of seeing a specimen in the gravel bed, and, as Flint Jack would say, "of course" one was soon found. The telegraph fetched the travellers back when they had gone a few miles, and, to their exceeding joy, they saw the flint in its matrix, photographed, and extracted it. Less than Flint Jack's shrewdness might have enabled them to interpret this discovery, but their eyes were

* *Arch.* Vol. XXXVIII. p. 296.

blinded. During the same year Sir Charles Lyell visited the spot and obtained seventy flint tools, but did not find them, and saw only one of them extracted. Since 1860, Sir J. Lubbock has been there several times, and examined all the principal pits, without finding one perfect implement. To settle the doubts hanging about the worked flints of the gravels of the Somme, a man accustomed to the use of the pick-axe in gravels, not unacquainted with geology, and who is now Curator of the Woodwardian Museum, Cambridge, was sent to explore them. He remained there eight days, and could not find a single implement, but *was guided to the sites of seven by workmen.* On his return, he made no secret of his belief that the French diggers knew well how to make implements, and how to hide them in the gravel that the learned antiquaries might find them. Sir Charles Lyell has described their craftiness. "Observations by Mr. Evans, and others by Mr. Keeping, establish beyond a doubt the important fact that some of the workmen were in the habit of forging and burying flint tools. I feel no confidence that I might not have been myself deceived had I been present in April, when so many flint tools of 'the new type' were dug out." Such, then, being the workmen and their proceedings, Mr. Evans saw *one flint*, unmistakable in its workmanship, *in situ*. That discovery turned scepticism into faith.* Writing more than twelve years afterwards, Mr. Evans still leans for support on that one flint he was summoned by telegraph to see in 1859. Take away that one flint, and Mr. E. would lose the corner-stone of his case; for there has been no other such discovery, unless, indeed, it be the skull which the workmen put in the gravel, and the news of the finding which was exultingly proclaimed through Europe.

Much stress has been laid on relics found beneath masses of stalagmite. One sentence is sufficient in reply. "The rate of deposit of stalagmitic matter varies so much with different conditions that its thickness affords no true criterion of the length of time during which it has accumulated."—P. 432.

Our author attached great importance years ago to the time requisite for disguising a newly-fractured flint. It is now known that the change in appearance is not slow, and may be rapid; and Mr. E. writes cautiously. The reader will notice the want of definiteness by the words we put in italics. "The surface of a *newly* chipped flint can in *almost*

* Lyell, *Ant. of Man*, p. 102.

all cases be at once recognised by its peculiar dull, lustreless appearance, *especially* if it be black flint, such as is best adapted for being chipped into form." (P. 575.)

Many traces of man have been discovered in England in conjunction with remains of animals now no longer found here, the remains of the mammoth being the most remarkable of all. Answer. Teeth of mammoth, and fragments of the horns of deer, and teeth of some ruminant—probably deer also—and of a small horse, have been found at Shrub Hill in the gravel. Can it be necessary to say that things may be buried together which did not live together? The fragments of mammoth do not prove the deposit to have been ancient; the remains of deer and horse do prove it to have been recent. When a finely-shaped and brown stone adze is said to come from drift belonging to the series of glacial deposits, or the remains of sheep are found underneath the bones of elephants and other pleistocene mammals, our authorities tell us that "there must have been some misapprehension." (Pp. 123, 441.)

We have wearied ourselves, perhaps our readers, and hasten to the conclusion of the whole matter. The arguments presented show, we venture to think, that the first of the eras Mr. Evans assigns to man is wrongly assigned to him, and that all pretence to prove his existence through, or in, the remote time supposed, finds its very best support in that one flint with which some Flint Jack cheated Messrs. Prestwich and Evans. Respecting the new-stone era, we must once more cite our author into court, and present to the reader three of his sentences :—

"We have, as yet, in this country no means at command for assigning with certainty any of these roughly chipped forms* to an antiquity more remote than that of the carefully finished celts, with their edges sharpened by grinding, though in all probability some of them must date back to a very distant period."—P. 77.

Respecting Denmark :—

"I do not remember to have seen any specimen, unless possibly a mere flake or rough block, which, if placed before me without comment, I should have taken to be palæolithic."—P. 569.

* We assume that in the above sentence by "these roughly chipped forms," Mr. Evans means neolithic, but his words are ambiguous. If he mean palæolithic also, the words yield a far wider and more destructive inference than we have drawn from them.

We had expected to find a much stronger case than this made out for the neolithic flints. From Mr. Evans's premisses given above, it follows that there has not been found a single neolithic implement in Britain, nor probably a single neolithic implement in Denmark, which can be proved to be as old as the Christian era. The dates of Chinese vanity, once highly prized, are gone. The monstrous chronology of our geological antiquaries has come down, from the lofty confidence of Lyell and Lubbock, to the tremulous hypothetics of Mr. Evans. Its doom is first pity, then oblivion.

ART. IV.—*Middlemarch, a Study of Provincial Life.* By GEORGE ELIOT. In Four Volumes. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1871—72.

IT is pretty generally conceded, and has been for some years, that the author of *Adam Bede* and *Romola* holds the highest place among our living prose poets—among those who may be fitly called the epoists of modern English life. When, on one memorable occasion, the power of producing perfect work in prose seemed insufficient to prevent the diversion of George Eliot's invaluable didactic influence into the channel of verse, we spared no pains* to dissect the result, and show where and how, in our opinion, it fell short of the greatness of her earlier efforts. Following her artistic course from the publication of *Adam Bede* to that of *Felix Holt the Radical*, we discerned a clear progression of masterly handling, in the domain of prose fiction, such as pointed to a special faculty; and our analysis of the artistic processes employed in her poetic venture, *The Spanish Gypsy*, demonstrated, or was meant to demonstrate, that that work could not, in the nature of things, be other than a failure, however noble in thought, feeling, and doctrine. We expressed the view that it would be no less than a national calamity if the author left her own peculiar walk of art altogether, to continue producing such works as *The Spanish Gypsy;* and in direct proportion to that view are our feelings of gratulation and pleasure on the issue of *Middlemarch.*

For over five years most of the lovers of George Eliot's books—not few or lukewarm—were, to all intents and purposes, quite deprived of the blended pleasure and edification which those books afford; for though it may be true that her intellect is fully represented in the poems published during those five years, the artistic side of her writing, including the profounder depths of her moral influence, had no adequate representation whatever. The greatness of this privation makes it all the more a matter on which to congratulate her readers that *Middlemarch* is perhaps more of a masterpiece than any work from the same hand except *Romola.* The prelude to this new novel of English life is in itself a small, but

* See *London Quarterly Review* for October, 1868, article "The Spanish Gypsy."

noble poem in prose; and, as it not only strikes the key-note of the book, but also exhibits the easy mastery over thought, feeling, and language that the artist has when she works in prose, we can scarcely do better than extract it entire:—

"Who that cares much to know the history of man, and how that mysterious mixture behaves under the varying experiments of Time, has not dwelt, at least briefly, on the life of Saint Theresa, has not smiled with some gentleness at the thought of the little girl walking forth one morning hand-in-hand with her still smaller brother, to go and seek martyrdom in the country of the Moors? Out they toddled from rugged Avila, wide-eyed and helpless-looking as two fawns, but with distinctively human hearts, already beating to a national idea; until domestic reality met them in the shape of uncles, and turned them back from their great resolve. That child-pilgrimage was a fit beginning. Theresa's passionate ideal nature demanded an epic life; what were many-volumed romances of chivalry and the social conquests of a brilliant girl to her? Her flame quickly burned up that light fuel, and, fed from within, soared after some illimitable satisfaction, some object which would never justify weariness, which would reconcile self-despair with the rapturous consciousness of life beyond self. She found her epos in the reform of a religious order.

"That Spanish woman, who lived three hundred years ago, was certainly not the last of her kind. Many Theresas have been born who found for themselves no epic life wherein there was a constant unfolding of far-resonant action; perhaps only a life of mistakes, the offspring of a certain spiritual grandeur ill-matched with the meanness of opportunity; perhaps a tragic failure which found no sacred poet and sank unwept into oblivion. With dim lights and tangled circumstance they tried to shape their thought and deed in noble agreement; but after all, to common eyes their struggles seemed mere inconsistency and formlessness; for these later-born Theresas were helped by no coherent social faith and order which could perform the function of knowledge for the ardently willing soul. Their ardour alternated between a vague ideal and the common yearning of womanhood; so that the one was disapproved as extravagance and the other condemned as a lapse.

"Some have felt that these blundering lives are due to the inconvenient indefiniteness with which the Supreme Power has fashioned the natures of women: if there were one level of feminine incompetence as strict as the ability to count three and no more, the social lot of woman might be treated with scientific certitude. Meanwhile the indefiniteness remains, and the limits of variation are really much wider than any one would imagine from the sameness of woman's coiffure and the favourite love-stories in prose and verse. Here and there a cygnet is reared uneasily among the ducklings in the brown pond, and never finds the living stream in fellowship with its own oary-footed kind. Here and there is born a Saint Theresa, foundress of nothing,

whose loving heart-beats and sobs after an unattained goodness tremble off and are dispersed among hindrances, instead of centering in some long-recognisable deed."

The reader has not far to seek for the Saint Theresa of *Middlemarch*, who is found at once in Dorothea Brooke, a young lady of great beauty, full of noble aspirations, holding in Puritanic scorn most youthful frivolities, and even somewhat intolerant of the sound common-sense of her younger sister, Celia. Eager to be of real service to her fellow-beings, she receives coldly the advances of an easy, open-hearted baronet, Sir James Chettam, and leans favourably towards a suitor of some fifty years, the Rev. Edward Casaubon, whose life-long labours have secured him a high local reputation for a work (still far from completion) meant to demonstrate "that all the mythical systems, or erratic mythical fragments in the world, were corruptions of a tradition originally revealed." An undertaking of such apparent piety seems sublime to Dorothea, who accordingly, in the secret tiring-room of her imagination, decorates a mean-souled, jejune clergyman, of well-nigh thrice her years, with many noble qualities that exist, not in him, but in herself; and in the work of aiding him in this seemingly great undertaking, she at once discerns a sphere of operation for her aspiring energy.

It does not require much insight to perceive in this situation a capital error on the part of Dorothea, such as might with equal probability enfold consequences of the deeply tragic order, or mere inconveniences of a painful but scarcely tragic character: there is nothing impossible in such a girl as this marrying a narrow-minded elderly man, and finding herself not so far deceived in his character but that she can live with him comfortably and faithfully: in this instance, however, a subtle element of the artist's method comes into play, so as to render such a possibility an absurd hypothesis at the very outset. In life we look upon our neighbours, and know their external appearance pretty well, guessing here and there somewhat of their inner nature, and blundering only too often in our conjectures as to the feelings of those with whom we are most intimate. But this writer, to whom the manifold aspects of the human soul lie as naked as a dissected preparation to an anatomist, takes us with her behind the multiform veil of flesh, distance, and separation; lets us see through her eyes the minutest workings of the yearning heart, the troubled spirit, the guilty conscience; and puts into our

hands a legible scroll of destiny, where actual circumstance would fling us an impenetrable hieroglyph or a Sphinx's riddle. By aid of the analytic and descriptive side of the artist's method, we know that Dorothea's marriage *must* be a failure: the external disagreeableness of Mr. Casaubon, apparent to almost all the characters in the book except the heroine, is laid before us faithfully, almost ruthlessly: from the mouth of the observant Celia, with her common-sense, we learn what moles he had on his face, in what bat-like manner he blinked, and with what repulsive audibility he took his soup; and in his written offer of marriage, a most pungent piece of satire, we are made to see in the clearness of noonday the complete uncomfortableness to which the spiritual exaltation of Dorothea renders her utterly blind. We have no comfort whatever in the contemplation of her immediate future on hearing of her engagement to this man; and, indeed, so revolting to the ordinary heart is such a sacrifice, that one needs all one's intelligence to glean a little pleasure from the refined and noble motives that urge the girl to this fatal act.

We are not among those who would complain of the artist's taste or feeling in bringing such an unpleasant situation into her scheme: we do not blind ourselves to the fact that, as in life, so in the highest walks of fiction, these unpleasantnesses occur more or less constantly. In treating of mere cobbler's work in literature it is fair for a critic to say that this or that patch is either bad in itself or inharmonious with some neighbour patch; but in dealing with a high and truly creative literature, the critic's first duty is that humility of attitude so largely lacking in our current press criticism, and which, when found, is mainly traceable to the critic's knowledge that the work he is dealing with is in a great measure the result of the uncontrollable intuitions of genius. We have been surprised at complaining remarks passed by not unintelligent critics on the alleged hardness of the author in dealing with some of her characters, on her alleged indulgence in dealing with others, and even on her want of consideration for the reader in such a matter as this of Dorothea's voluntary sacrifice; as if an artist who rouses, and fires, and attaches her multitudinous readers as George Eliot does, had a free choice of all model circumstance and all the model flesh and blood of the earth, instead of being borne along by inexorable creative perceptions! We wonder whether these critical complainants are able to persuade themselves that Milton considered his readers much when he sung the hideous and

incestuous loves of Death and Sin, or that Webster thought of catering for the delicate susceptibilities of his audiences when he shaped the many relentlessly terrible scenes of *Vittoria Corombona* and *The Duchess of Malfi*? It is a general fact, to which the whole history of literature and art bears witness, that genius of the first order has never shrunk from the awful aspects of the universe, the diabolic aspects of human nature, or the painful, even harrowing, situations of life; and we earnestly believe that we owe to George Eliot the gratitude due to genius of the highest order, in that she has not shrunk from putting life before us in just such colours as it takes to her far-sweeping eye,—that she has accepted her characters as a revelation, and not descended to palter with their destinies in view of the squeamish susceptibilities of over-critical dilettanti.

It may be a truth that Dorothea Brooke is a character of such grandeur and beauty that, according to the best known precedents of artistic literature, the reader would be justified in anticipating for her some notably majestic part in the drama of life, whether in high achievement or in tragic downfall; and it is intelligible enough if, to some minds, there is disappointment in the course of her story. Those who look but superficially at the book may deem it a commonplace turn of events that a girl, professedly a modern type of Saint Theresa, should "find her epos," or think she has found it, in the humdrum task of supplementing the fading eyesight and waning vitality of a clerical "Dry-as-dust," engaged in compiling a "key to all mythologies;" that her mistake should bring her no immediate consequences more openly tragic than the manifold disappointments natural to an enthusiastic and expansive young heart on finding itself sacrificed before a cold, suspicious, unappreciative nature; and that the remoter reaction on her life should be expressed in terms no more soaring than could be embodied in the codicil to a will. Dorothea's innocent kindliness to Will Ladislaw, her husband's young cousin and dependant, leading sooner or later to love on both sides (though not on her side till after Casaubon's death), and exciting such mean suspicions in the mind of Casaubon that he places a testamentary bar between his wife and cousin, may also seem to such readers commonplace enough; and her ultimate marriage with Ladislaw, at the expense of the considerable wealth left by Casaubon, is not a striking *dénouement*, when looked at, as a bare, ungarnished fact. But it is not in what is called the "plot" of her books that one discerns the strength and weight of

George Eliot's intellect or the wealth of her imagination: the latter is always most notable in the solidity and completeness of her characters, the former in her wide and deep scientific knowledge, her absolute insight into the significance of every-day things, and that keen vision of the links in the chain of common circumstance whereby the most trivial act seems to become in her books the aperture through which she sweeps down a vista of constantly accumulating results. In *Romola* this power seemed to have been developed to such a height that one felt justified in deeming that the limit had been reached; but in *Middlemarch*, it is scarcely rash to say, the achievements of *Romola* in this kind have been surpassed.

The multiplied lapses of the selfish and unprincipled Tito are managed in *Romola* with such consummate artistic cunning, as well as with so great a power of maintaining a large whole unobscured by the progress of infinite details, that no subtlety and might of handling that could follow need surprise; but we incline to think that the inner life of Bulstrode is shaped in *Middlemarch*, and strung upon a chain of comparatively trivial circumstance, with a subtlety and vigour surpassing the former instance, and with an increased development of psychological science. Bulstrode too, like the rest of the artist's best-wrought characters, is thoroughly typical; and all those parts of the work that relate to him are priceless to those who would profit by the study of humanity: indeed we might venture to say that no one, student or otherwise, could follow the workings of the man's mind and heart attentively without profiting by the new acquaintance. A man of a distinctly pious turn, he yet becomes, through simple egoism—that is to say, through constitutional inability to view things from any but his own point of view—what is neither more nor less than a murderer. The tremendous proportions into which the consequences of a comparatively small sin may be developed under unforeseen circumstances are made to appear in this instance positively terrific; and yet they do not surpass by one iota the actuality of life,—if only men were gifted with insight and foresight to judge *which* trivial sin was doomed to enfold these terrible results!

It is difficult to sympathise with a piety that is used to convince the owner how it is for the glory of God that he, the pious individual, should obtain the inheritance of the fatherless through an act of passive deceit; and yet, from the first slippery lapse from rectitude whereby Bulstrode gets to wife

the widow of the wealthy usurious pawnbroker,* in whose employ he has been, to the last fatal moment when Raffles, the only man acquainted with this early part of his life, lies temptingly easy to be got rid of, we are obliged to admit that there is a certain mean and narrow godliness of intention in this Bulstrode, though it is too feeble to resist its habitual tendency to merge itself in his devouring egoism. We are allowed to know that, when he was trying to win his first wife, with her princely fortune, the only obstacle on her side being an uncertainty as to the life or death of a runaway daughter, he gained his point by suppressing the result of a search undertaken with the express view of solving the widow's doubts; we are allowed to know that, having ascertained that the runaway *and her son* were living, he suppressed that fact, and persuaded himself it was for the glory of God that he, rather than they, should direct the uses of this wealth; and we are made to feel that he really thought that much. Thus, whenever in the course of the story of Bulstrode's mental struggles, we are let see a twinge of pain, we cannot withhold from even him the outgoings of sympathy, we cannot find it in our hearts to exult in his well-earned misery. Thus, when the obnoxious and inconvenient Raffles, who has full power and some will to blast the name of Bulstrode in the eye of all Middlemarchers, including the second Mrs. Bulstrode, lies with life in one scale and death in the other, and Bulstrode by the turn of events can weight either scale, we watch through the terrible night with the man of mean piety as breathlessly as he is shown to watch, and shrink with terror from the horrible impending sin when we see which scale is to kick the beam. We know of nothing more subtly terrible than those passages of analysis that are

* It may be thought unworthy, even in a foot-note, to pass criticism on a default of actuality in this part of *Middlemarch;* but we think it worth recording that, even in a work so exact as to almost all matters, even such as are not strictly amenable to the criterion of exactness, history occasionally gets falsified: the falsification here is not of the highest importance, as it mostly consists in giving a man a fortune which he could not have made, in the way stated, at the time specifically indicated. *Middlemarch* professedly depicts English provincial life before the Reform Bill; and Bulstrode's fortune was made some twenty or thirty years before the opening of the story—at a time when, owing to the then existing state of the law, no pawnbroking business could possibly have realised the results attributed to the business that gave birth to this fortune. The legal restrictions that made this part of the story an impossibility were only removed at a later date. We should not deem this in the least a flaw if it were not evident from the rest of the work that historic and scientific exactness is aimed at—if it were not clear, for example, that medical science and history have been carefully studied for the sake of another principal personage, Tertius Lydgate.

given to us in describing the watches of the night during which Bulstrode, after taking instructions from the doctor, Lydgate, sits up to watch by the sick man, and grows gradually more and more fascinated with the idea of his removal. When we have learnt how certain symptoms of Raffles's derangement begin to threaten exposure of Bulstrode in the presence of Lydgate, we read as follows:—

"Bulstrode's native imperiousness and strength of determination served him well. This delicate-looking man, himself nervously perturbed, found the needed stimulus in his strenuous circumstances, and through that difficult night and morning, while he had the air of an animated corpse returned to movement, without warmth, holding the mastery by its chill impassibility, his mind was intensely at work, thinking of what he had to guard against, and what would win him security. Whatever prayers he might lift up, whatever statements he might inwardly make of this man's wretched spiritual condition, and the duty he himself was under to submit to the punishment Divinely appointed for him, rather than to wish for evil to another, through all this effort to condense words into a solid mental state, there pierced and spread with irresistible vividness the images of the events he desired, and in the train of those images came their apology. He could not but see the death of Raffles, and see in it his own deliverance. What was the removal of this wretched creature? He was impenitent—but were not public criminals impenitent?—yet the law decided on their fate. Should Providence in this case award death, there was no sin in contemplating death as the desirable issue, if he kept his hands from hastening it, if he scrupulously did what was prescribed. Even here there might be a mistake: human prescriptions were fallible things. Lydgate had said that treatment had hastened death,—why not his own method of treatment? But of course intention was everything in the question of right and wrong. And Bulstrode set himself to keep his intention separate from his desire. He inwardly declared that he intended to obey orders. . . . Strange, piteous conflict in the soul of this unhappy man, who had longed for years to be better than he was, who had taken his selfish passions into discipline, and clad them in severe robes, so that he had walked with them as a devout choir, till now that a terror had risen among them, and they could chant no longer, but threw out their common cries for safety."—Vol. IV. pp. 125, 128.

In the meantime, he has taken an opportunity of lending Lydgate a thousand pounds, which he had refused to lend before, though he knew it was urgently required; and the analysis is continued thus:—

"The banker felt that he had done something to nullify one cause of uneasiness, and yet he was scarcely the easier. He did not measure the quantity of diseased motive which had made him wish for Lydgate's

good will, but the quantity was none the less actively there, like an irritating agent in his blood. A man vows, and yet will not cast away the means of breaking his vow. Is it that he distinctly means to break it? Not at all; but the desires which tend to break it are at work in him dimly, and make their way into his imagination, and relax his muscles, in the very moments when he is telling himself over again the reasons for his vow. Raffles, recovering quickly, returning to the free use of his odious powers, how could Bulstrode wish for that? Raffles dead was the image that brought release, and indirectly he prayed for that way of release, beseeching that, if it were possible, the rest of his days here below might be freed from the threat of an ignominy which would break him utterly as an instrument of God's service. Lydgate's opinion was not on the side of promise that this prayer would be fulfilled; and as the day advanced, Bulstrode felt himself getting irritated at the persistent life in this man, whom he would fain have seen sinking into the silence of death: imperious will stirred murderous impulses towards this brute life, over which will by itself had no power. He said inwardly that he was getting too much worn; he would not sit up with the patient to night, but leave him to Mrs. Abel, who, if necessary, could call her husband. At six o'clock, Raffles having had only fitful perturbed snatches of sleep, from which he waked with fresh restlessness and perpetual cries that he was sinking away, Bulstrode began to administer the opium according to Lydgate's directions. At the end of half an hour or more he called Mrs. Abel and told her that he found himself unfit for further watching. He must now consign the patient to her care; and he proceeded to repeat to her Lydgate's directions as to the quantity of each dose.... He had sat an hour and a half in this conflict by the firelight only, when a sudden thought made him rise and light the bed-candle, which he had brought down with him. The thought was, that he had not told Mrs. Abel when the doses of opium must cease. He took hold of the candlestick, but stood motionless for a long while. She might already have given him more than Lydgate had prescribed. But it was excusable in him that he should forget part of an order in his present wearied condition. He walked up-stairs, candle in hand, not knowing whether he should straightway enter his own room and go to bed, or turn to the patient's room and rectify his omission. He paused in the passage, with his face turned towards Raffles's room, and he could hear him moaning and murmuring. He was not asleep, then. Who could know that Lydgate's prescription would not be better disobeyed than followed, since there was still no sleep? He turned into his own room."—Vol. IV. pp. 132—136.

But this temptation does not end here. Lydgate had ordered that no brandy be given to the man; and we read that before Bulstrode had undressed, his substitute at the sick bedside came to suggest, naturally enough, that she should be provided with the very thing the doctor had pronounced fatal.

"'If you please, sir, should I have no brandy nor nothing to give the poor creetur? He feels sinking away, and nothing else will he swaller—and but little strength in it if he did—only the opium. And he says more and more he's sinking down through the earth.'

"To her surprise, Mr. Bulstrode did not answer. A struggle was going on within him.

"'I think he must die for want o' support, if he goes on in that way. When I nursed my poor master, Mr. Robisson, I had to give him port wine and brandy constant, and a big glass at a time,' added Mrs. Abel, with a touch of remonstrance in her tone. But again Mr. Bulstrode did not answer immediately, and she continued,—'It's not a time to spare, when people are at death's door, nor would you wish it, sir, I'm sure. Else I should give him our own bottle o' rum as we keep by us. But a sitter-up so as you've been, and doing everything as laid in your power——'

"Here a key was thrust through the inch of doorway, and Mr. Bulstrode said huskily,—'That is the key of the wine-cooler. You will find plenty of brandy there.'

"Early in the morning—about six—Mr. Bulstrode rose and spent some time in prayer. Does anyone suppose that private prayer is necessarily candid, necessarily goes to the roots of action? Private prayer is inaudible speech, and speech is representative: who can represent himself just as he is, even in his own reflections? Bulstrode had not yet unravelled in his thought the confused promptings of the last four-and-twenty hours. He listened in the passage, and could hear hard stertorous breathing. Then he walked out in the garden, and looked at the early rime on the grass and fresh spring leaves. When he re-entered the house, he felt startled at the sight of Mrs. Abel. . . . Bulstrode went up. At a glance he knew that Raffles was not in the sleep which brings revival, but in the sleep which streams deeper and deeper into the gulf of death. He looked round the room, and saw a bottle with some brandy in it, and the almost empty opium phial. He put the phial out of sight, and carried the brandy-bottle down-stairs with him, locking it again in the wine-cooler. While breakfasting he considered whether he should ride to Middlemarch at once, or wait for Lydgate's arrival. He decided to wait, and told Mrs. Abel that she might go about her work—he could watch in the bed-chamber. As he sat there, and beheld the enemy of his peace going irrevocably into silence, he felt more at rest than he had done for many months. His conscience was soothed by the enfolding wing of secrecy, which seemed just then like an angel sent down for his relief. . . . The moments passed, until a change in the stertorous breathing was marked enough to draw his attention wholly to the bed, and forced him to think of the departing life, which had once been subservient to his own—which he had once been glad to find base enough for him to act on as he would. It was his gladness then which impelled him now to be glad that the life was at an end. And who could say that the death of Raffles had been hastened? Who knew what would have saved him?"—Vol. IV. pp. 136, 139.

We know of few examples in literature in which retribution follows as precipitately on the climax of sin as in this instance of Bulstrode's doom. Almost immediately after the death of Raffles, the early life of the banker gets babbled about Middlemarch, together with ugly suspicions about the manner of Raffles's death; and though the law of the land can get no hold upon the criminal, the law of reaction is heavy upon him. At the very moment when he is helping Raffles into his grave, that early part of his life that it is his most devouring wish to conceal is already beginning to creep out naked and villanous in the sight of Middlemarch; for Raffles has *already told.* Had he known this, he would doubtless not have paltered with his conscience in the matter of the opium and brandy; and he has the more awful burden to bear, in that he has paid the frightful price of a fellow-creature's life to secure an immunity that was already past securing.

We have dwelt more particularly on this man's character and career, not because he is one of the principal characters in the drama of Middlemarch life, regarded from an artistic point of view, but because all that relates to him is of vital interest to every serious-minded person, and is not so difficult to separate from the book as some portions of greater beauty and more artistic importance. He is also a factor of some consequence in the destinies of several characters intrinsically more important, — notably of the two chief personages, Dorothea and Lydgate; and he is an integer in the triply embodied conception of the futility of exclusively self-seeking efforts. Peter Featherstone, with his property in land and funds, and his desire to show his power in disposing of the same; Casaubon, with his inordinate vanity, that will sacrifice all to his worthless book and his unreasonable jealousy and suspicion; and Bulstrode, with his insatiable desire to appear as a shining light before all men, are all frustrated through that narrow-minded egoism that has no eye for the inexorable influences of external circumstance. What may perhaps be regarded as the main conception of the book, is embodied in the two characters that we have already pointed out as the chief personages, Dorothea and Lydgate, whom we may perhaps venture to designate as psychological correlates: both are imbued with an admirable enthusiasm, but the elements of that enthusiasm are compounded in different proportions in the two characters; and the combination in the woman's character is by far the nobler. Dorothea yearns to do some great good, and is prepared to sacrifice herself in doing so,—thus keeping clear of all meaner feelings that we

might set down under the head of ambition. Lydgate aspires to reform medical practice, and investigate the sciences of his profession, so as to be eminently a man of good service; but he is scarcely prepared for much self-sacrifice; and both fail almost tragically for mere want of insight into character, and knowledge of the probabilities of things. Dorothea, whose emotional nature is so grandly developed, and whose excellence is so magnetic, that she is able on one occasion to dilate into momentary goodness the utterly selfish and shallow woman whom Lydgate has made his wife, has yet a certain obtuseness that one sometimes sees as inseparable from perfect, unsuspecting truthfulness and sincerity. Lydgate, at once powerful and acute in intellect and noble in heart, is yet so far at fault in instinctive perception, that he is wholly deceived about the character of Rosamund Vincy, and, through marrying her, has gradually to sink away from his own high ideal of life. The sorrowful inference we are to draw from these failures appears to be one of little comfort to those who would fain think it an easy matter to live *virtuously enough*,—namely, that no virtue is virtuous enough if less than absolute; that utter failure and downfall may lie in germ in small misdeeds, just as fatally as in great ones; that, so far as practical results are concerned, we are terribly deceived if we deem it possible to measure the importance of our smallest faults, even such as may almost be said to be accidental, and not wilful.

Some such teaching as this might be drawn from almost all the contrasted characters and events of this great book: the exquisite presentation of English life in so many phases is now no new thing to us; and it is impossible to accord more than a general word of gratitude for the new friends we meet here,—the Vincys, the Garths, the Farebrothers, the Featherstones, and the numerous characters of less importance, who all take shape and substance in the mind individually, while we discern that, in fact, they are but a collective background of flesh and blood for solemn conceptions, such as we have already referred to. What is newest in *Middlemarch* is that, in front of these conceptions again, and of paramount importance in the work, is the discussion of certain psychological problems of the last consequence to us all, which we follow in learning the inner life of two or three persons. It is strange that in anything so eminently modern as this study of English provincial life, we should find so large and various a development of the antique tragic motive of doom springing up unexpectedly from some small flaw of action, that would scarcely be remembered on its own merits, or rather demerits.

ART. V.—1. *The Æneid of Virgil.* Translated into English Verse by JOHN CONINGTON, M.A., Corpus Professor of Latin in the University of Oxford. 1866.

2. *The Æneid of Virgil.* By JOHN BENSON ROSE. 1867.

3. *The Æneid of Virgil. Books I. and II.* Translated into English Verse in the Spenserian Stanza. By E. F. TAYLOR. 1867.

4. *The First Two Books of the Æneid of Virgil.* By E. E. MIDDLETON. With Explanatory Notes. 1870.

5. *The Globe Edition of Virgil.* By Rev. JAMES LONSDALE, M.A., and S. LEE, M.A. 1871.

6. *Virgil, or English Rhythm.* By Rev. R. C. SINGLETON. A Manual for Master and Scholar. Second Edition, Rewritten and Enlarged. 1871.

7. *The Æneid of Virgil. Books I—VI.* G. K. RICKARDS, M.A. *Books VII.—XII.* By LORD RAVENSWORTH. 1872.

8. *The Poems of Virgil.* Translated into English Prose. By JOHN CONINGTON, M.A. 1872.

THE list of recent translators of Virgil at the head of this article is some evidence that the greatest master of the Latin epos still lives in the hearts of English scholars, at a time when it is too much the fashion of eminent critics to cry up Homer at the expense of Virgil. In Mr. Gladstone's critical eyes, filled as they are with the vision of Homer's transcendent beauty and fascinated with his marvellous magic, Virgil, the "maestro" of the Italian Dante and the model of our English Milton, is but "a copyist of Homer," and the *Æneid* is but a stately strain of "courtly adulation" addressed to a Roman prince, as contrasted with the *Iliad*, which sang the glory of the Grecian race. It is a matter, we think, of regret, that Mr. Gladstone should have thus given the weight of his great name, as a most accomplished classical scholar and critic, to charges which have in reality no other recommendation to the favour of the general public. Neither a "copyist" nor "a courtly flatterer" was the great Mantuan. No poet, Homer and Shakspeare alone excepted, has been more creative, and not one more patriotic. The epic, in its truest sense, as the poetical expression of the highest and widest

sympathies of our nature, was the creation of Virgil, not of Homer. Essentially Homer is idyllic, not epic. In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* the interest is centred in the man, and in the man only; not, as in the *Æneid*, in the man as the father of a mighty empire, as the founder "of the long glories of majestic Rome." In the *Iliad* the action revolves around, and ends with, "the wrath of Achilles;" in the *Odyssey* it follows and ends with the wanderings of the far wandering Ulysses. Neither of these so-called epics ever rises to the loftiest aim of the epic poem, personal adventure being at once their centre and their circumference. They have no national tale to tell of the past, no national grandeur to forecast for the future, as we see in the Virgilian epic, whose very hexameters march with an imperial and stately step, as if echoing in their martial music the majesty of the imperial race whose triumphs they celebrate. That critics have traced, in "the tale of Troy divine," the greatness of an international struggle between Greece and Troy, we admit; but we urge, on the other hand, first, that Homer himself nowhere impresses us with the belief that this was in reality the burden of his immortal song, and next, that such an preterpretation of the Homeric song was not accepted by the generations which first listened to his lays. A national poet of Greece, inspired by patriotism to sing the glories of his country in an international struggle with Troy, could not have pretermitted, as Homer has done, the sacking of the hostile city—the very end and aim of the war, the very crown and consummation of Hellenic heroism and Hellenic glory. No poet, with a national object before him, could have devoted the entire length of so long a poem as the *Iliad* to a mere subordinate episode in such a struggle, making so little of the glory of Greece and so much of the "anger of Achilles," who was neither the generalissimo of the Greeks, nor the Greek chieftain mainly injured by the rape of the Argive Helen, "causa teterrima belli." Nor is this all. Helen, for whose recovery the war is waged by Greece, is left by the poet unrecovered at Troy; and Paris, for whose punishment ten years of warfare are waged, is left alive, untaken and unharmed. Few will be disposed to maintain that Homer glorified Greece in his Greek hero Achilles, as Virgil glorified Rome in Æneas; for the character of Achilles is not cast in the mould of magnanimous heroism, ferocious and barbarous as he shows himself even at his best, and forfeiting, at every fresh development of his character, all claims to our interest and respect. His horrible prayer that his countrymen may be slaughtered by thousands by the enemy, merely to gratify

his own personal spite against Agamemnon, and his exultation in the terrible havoc wrought in the ranks of Hellas by the slaughtering hand of Hector, are worthy of a fiend, whose nature imposes no reserve, no restraint upon his ungovernable impulses. That a poem with such a character as its chief hero should have been designed as a national poem, and inspired by patriotism, is simply inconceivable. The nationality of Virgil's epic, on the other hand, lifts the imagination throughout to a higher sphere than that of personal adventure—a sphere of Virgil's own creation, and the grandest poetic creation that had hitherto dawned upon the mind of man. In the *Æneid* personal interest is everywhere kept subordinate and subservient to the national interest, the individual to the imperial interest. No poem was ever more intensely, more essentially, national and patriotic than this greatest of Roman epics. Its constant appeals to Roman sentiments and sympathies, its touching reverence for Roman legends and traditions, its idealisation of the most characteristic graces and gifts of the Roman race, all attest its all-pervading nationality, its unfailing patriotism; and these, we must remember, touch but the accessories, and not the spirit and the purpose, of the poem, the hero of which, the "pious Æneas," is not merely the embodiment of Roman virtue and valour, but the symbol of the Roman state in its progress from trial and suffering to empire and glory.

Æneas, the self-sacrificing patriotic hero of the *Æneid*, is a contrast in everything but in valour to the hero of the *Iliad*. Neither the charms of the queenly Dido, nor the generosity of the kingly Acestes, nor love, nor sword, nor fire, nor sea, nor the threats of foes, nor the terrors of friends, can cool the ardour of his unquenchable devotion to his gods, and of his love to the land of his sires. With the religion and patriotic spirit of old Rome pulsing from hexameter to hexameter in this grand national epic, with the heroism of Roman heroes and the rise and growth of Roman glory as the all-pervading burden of its song, can it be any matter of wonder that such an epic should have been styled "the history of Rome," "the mirror of the Great Republic," and "the imperial poem," and that this poem rose with a rapidity so marvellous to the fullest measure of popularity and to the highest literary fame amongst the poet's countrymen? The muse of the great Mantuan was no syren singing merely to charm the ear of an Augustus, and to pay the tribute of "courtly adulation" to the throne of the Cæsars, but a patriot, proud of her country, singing, in the *Georgics*, of agriculture, in the interests of her countrymen,

who suffered for its neglect; and singing, in the *Æneid*, of a heroism that conquered the world, and of a wisdom that governed and civilised the world. Patriotism is the very keynote of the *Æneid*. From the first book of this national epic, where Jove promises the empire of the world to the Roman race, with no limit to its territory except the ocean, no bound to its fame except the heavens, down to the Last Æneid, where the divine founder of the Roman state wins his victorious way to an Italian throne, Virgil paints the most captivating pictures of patriotism ever painted. To paint the portraits of Rome's immortal patriots the poet brings down the hero Æneas to the land of spirits, in which he allots the highest happiness to the souls of the patriotic, and describes unspeakable agonies in the lowest depth of Tartarus as the penalty of the "traitor who sells his country for gold." To impress upon the mind of the world the loveliness of the Italian land, Virgil introduced his hero to its most charming scenes, upon which he lingers with the affection of a lover. In singular contrast to Homer, the Latin poet has performed for his Italian fatherland precisely that labour of love which, in modern times, Scott, under the inspiration of patriotism, performed for Scotland, in immortalising the enchanting scenery of the land he loved so well. True to the universality of his inventive genius, Homer laid all creation under tribute to glorify the shield of his hero Achilles; but Virgil, true only to the patriotic requirement of his national epic, emblazoned the shield of Æneas, not with the beauties of nature, not with scenes of festive revelry, as in the Greek poet, but with the trophies of Roman valour and the triumphs of the Roman race.

That there is much in the national epic of Virgil savouring of compliment to Augustus and the dominant house of the Cæsars, we admit; but on such ground to charge the poet with having composed his greatest poem merely to flatter the emperor, is as far from the truth as it would be to charge Tennyson with having written his Idylls to flatter "Albert the Good," to whom they are dedicated by the admiring and grateful Laureate. The truth is, that all classical Paganism, after Alexander the Great, accepted the belief that divinity was embodied in earthly sovereignty; and what has been on this score attributed to Virgil as a grave fault, is to be found even in a greater degree in most of the Roman poets of the Empire, and especially in Horace and Ovid, who fawned upon the imperial purple even to the loss of self-respect. Nor was this, the besetting sin of the Empire, at all limited to the

poets and the rhetoricians, found as it is in the grave pages of Tacitus, or in the business-like Letters of Pliny. If Virgil sang merely to pour the strain of his adulation on the ear of Augustus, whose throne was erected upon the ruins of the great Republic, and cemented by the noblest blood of Rome, how can it be possible to explain the ardent and unbounded admiration with which the poet rings forth, in the grandest of his stately hexameters, the glory of the Republican Decii, of the Catos, of the Gracchi, of the Scipios, and even of the "avenging Brutus" ("ultoris Bruti")—a name of evil omen to the throne of the Cæsars?

A recent writer in the *Saturday Review* commits himself to the statement that "no author before St. Basil expressed an appreciation of the beautiful in scenery, and that the English poet Gray was the first of all poets who dealt in the *picturesque*." This is a mistake, for a close study of Virgil, and a comparison of him with his brother bards, will at once point him out as the father of the picturesque in poetry. In no ancient or modern poet did the divine loveliness of nature hold a higher place than did "divini gloria ruris" in the heart of Virgil, albeit he kept it always subordinate to his passionate love of Italy. The loveliest of his scenes are Italian landscapes. As we recur to his pictured pages, how many images of natural loveliness crowd upon our memory! Visions of a bay, beneath whose tower-like cliffs the breaking billows from the distant sea sleep in unbroken repose; visions of woodland haunts and cool vales, where the silence is only broken by the lowing of kine, or by the gurgling of the stream; visions of mountain heights, the impassioned scene of rural revelries, where the dense grove darkens the blaze of the burning sun, and the revellers, outstretched beneath the overhanging shades, gladden their hearts with the boon of Bacchus; visions of a land where the sweetness of spring is eternal, and where the balmy breath of summer tempers the blast of winter; pictures, too, of mountains, whose trees are never shorn of their tresses; pictures of mossy fountains, of lakes of light, of hills ever blushing with the purple grape, and ever green with the vine-leaf; pictures of the woodlands of Velencis, radiant with roses; of Pæstum, that twice in the year bears the blossom of the rose; of the river Mincius (Mincio), with its banks of bloom, and its fringe of tender reed; of Benacos (Lago di Garda), swelling with an ocean swell, and roaring with its roar,—entrancing and sublime in its grandeur; pictures, too, we find, of the flower cut down by the remorseless ploughshare, and

perishing in the brightness of its bloom,—a tender image of youthful beauty cut off in its prime; pictures, too, of the golden grain waving to the wind; of the goat hanging from the briery crag; of the bee winging its way through the flowery fields; of the bird singing, the live-long night, to the solitude of the woods, the story of its stolen nestlings; or of beast and bird charmed to slumber by the noiseless night. This passion for the picturesque everywhere colours and shapes the local epithets and the synonyms of the poet. Hence his constantly recurring *curvum* littus (the *winding* shore), and hence his discriminating use of scopulus (the high rock, or peak), rupes (the broken rock, or the cliff), cautes (the scaur), and of other distinctive terms, painting, as he does to perfection, a natural object in a single word, or by a single attribute.

It is scarcely within the limits of the truth to make Virgil a debtor to Homer for his metrical form. Virgil did not adopt the hexameter from Homer. It came down to the Augustan age from Ennius, who, two centuries before Virgil's age, adopted it in its rough vigour and in its inartistic crudeness, as he found it in the *Iliad*.

The hexameter of Virgil stands far apart and alone as the perfection of metrical form in the modulation of exquisite taste, regenerated, as it was, by the genius of the Roman poet, who breathed into it a spirit of the tenderest grace, of the sublimest harmony, and endowed it with a variety of tone and pause, capable of expressing every variety of feeling, and with a stateliness of movement, that seems to echo the majesty of the mighty empire, which cost gods and men so much toil to build.

"Tantæ molis erat, Romanam condere gentem."

The verse of Homer sweeps on like the mountain torrent, rapid, resistless, thundering on the ear, and blinding the eye with the misty spray of its boiling waters. But the verse of Virgil flows on like the flood of a majestic river, winding amongst cultivated fields, through smooth-shaven lawns, murmuring the most melodious of music to the ear, and reflecting to the eye, in its crystal depths, the loveliness of its surroundings: like the river of Longfellow, darkened by shadows of earth, but reflecting an image of heaven.

Professor Conington's version, which heads our list of recent translations, is one of unusual merit. Since the translation of "glorious John," it is the only rhymed version really worthy of serious attention. Its rapidity of move-

ment, its terseness, its sympathy with the spirit of the great original, its fidelity to the letter of Virgil, and the skill and elegance of its measured music, give it a high rank amongst all rivals. Its most fatal blunder, however, is the adoption of the ballad measure of Scott's *Lord of the Isles*, which is too deficient in grandeur, in majesty, and sonorous volume, as a metrical vehicle for the epic. As Mr. Rickards well observes, in the preface to his own version,—

"The metre of which Professor Conington, so unjustly to his own powers, made choice, is not only ill suited in itself to represent the grandeur and stateliness of the *Æneid*, but it has had a deteriorating effect on the whole tone of the composition. The work throughout is pitched in too low a key. The metre has reacted on the diction, which in many passages is deficient in elevation, and is disfigured by modernisms that jar with the classical model. The associations connected with the measure have a tendency to lower the great heroic drama to the level of modern minstrelsy, and the figure which rises behind the translator's page is not that of Publius Virgilius Maro, but of Walter Scott."

That blank heroic verse is the most appropriate vehicle of a heroic poem is admitted both by Dryden and Conington, who shrink from attempting the material form their better judgment approved, from its acknowledged and multiform difficulties. These difficulties, we conceive, would have vanished altogether before the cunning hand that has performed so many and such astounding feats of metrical dexterity on an instrument confessedly inferior. The example of Milton is of some authority in this matter: his immortal epic is presented in heroic blank verse, which has made the nearest approach in our language to the stately march and the rich and varied cadences of the Virgilian hexameter.

It is not a little singular that the first English poet who wrote blank verse was Lord Surrey, who selected it from the *Italian* as the most appropriate vehicle for the Latin epic, and used it in his vigorous rendering of the Second and Fourth Æneids of Virgil. Now what Virgil did for the hexameters of Ennius, that precisely Milton did for the blank verse of Surrey, in increasing its compass and capacity by the addition of cadences and pauses, and in perfecting its music by breathing into it a new spirit of harmony and majesty.

The faults of Conington as a translator are partly peculiar to himself, partly those he has committed in common with others. To the former class belong such occasional archaisms as "treen" and "eyen," and his fondness for particular phrases and metaphors, most persistently repeated, as—

"Night ascends from Ocean's *womb*;" "With night and tempest in its *womb*;" "May Earth unseal the horrors of her *womb*;" where there is not a syllable in the original to warrant this very frequent metaphor of the Professor. The imported metaphors of Conington are, for the most part, unfortunate in the extreme, as in such lines as this,—

> "Tall columns, *germs* of scenic pride."

Nor is this the last limit of his blundering with metaphors. Often he proves himself most inconsistent in dealing with the selfsame metaphors—a failing almost unknown to Virgil. Take, for example, such monstrosities of taste as these:—

> "But Venus either traveller *shrouds*
> With thickest *panoply* of clouds."

Or take—

> "There, in the *bosom* of the town,
> The tall horse *rains* invasion down."

While, earlier, this translator writes of the same horse, in the same book (Book II.)—

> "And steel-clad soldiery find room
> Within that *death-producing womb*."

It is due, however, to Conington to credit him with having very rarely missed the sense of his original. In this respect he leaves almost all his rivals far behind, yet, notwithstanding his accurate and finished scholarship, which gave him so incalculable an advantage over all his rivals, he seems to us to have missed altogether some of the poet's finest and most masterly touches of art. Take, for example, Virgil's description of the bird-shooting in Book V., where Mr. Conington makes "atra in nubila fugit" a simple statement of the bird's flight into the clouds, and omits all notice of "atra," the emphatic word which gives colour to the Italian picture, and point to the passage. Here the poet, we conceive, evidently wished us to understand that the bird fled into *the darkness* ("atra in nubila") of the clouds, to escape from the shafts which threatened his life.

On two general points, Mr. Conington has ignominiously failed, in common with almost every other translator. Of all Latin poets, Virgil is the most *alliterative*. He is the most careful, the most elaborate, in the use of his frequentative verbs, so effective in painting a picture at a single stroke, in literally telling a story in a single syllable. Now we take it that a translator, true to his functions, is bound to reproduce, not merely the meaning of the original, but, as far as possible, its manner, its tone, and its form. In Virgil's

case, this duty becomes all the more imperative, when we remember how much of the fascination of this poet is treasured in his very manner and form of presentation. Our main charge against Mr. Conington and his rivals is that they have persistently ignored the alliterative and frequentative characteristics of the original. Here Mr. Conington's fault is all the more heinous, because he sinned against the full light of knowledge, for his commentary on Virgil—which is a mine of Latin scholarship—makes it clear that he was familiar with these characteristic traits of the poet. It may be that "the apt alliterative art" did not find favour in Conington's eyes, as a trick unworthy of his imitation, or as adornment unsuited, as some have openly maintained, to the genius of our poetry. However this may be, it is certain that Shakespeare, Milton, and Tennyson, the greatest masters of the rhythmical music of our language, have abundantly availed themselves of its alliterative resources in their most effective passages, which strike the imagination and charm the fancy none the less because their alliterative harmonies fill the ear with delight. We do not look on such alliterations as the following as undesigned, which we take from Shakespeare, Milton, and Tennyson:—

"In maiden meditation, fancy free."

"With ruin upon ruin, rout on rout."

"But kindly man, moving among his kind."

That alliteration in poetry is not averse from the genius of our language, is further shown by the fact that our earliest English poetry consisted of nothing but alliteration, with no rhyme, and with but little rhythm. In one of the oldest relics of our English poetry, *The Widsoll, or The Travellers' Song*, more than thirteen hundred years old, we have such verses as—

"And *Chelic* swayed the Fins
Hahen Holmrich,
And Henda Glenming
Wilta wielde the Swedes."

Against all recent translators, then, Lord Ravensworth alone excepted, we have to complain that the most graceful and effective alliterations of Virgil, if known, are purposely and persistently ignored, both in rhyme and blank verse, and this, too, against the practice of our greatest masters of metrical melody, against the genius of our language, and the examples of our purest and best literature. Lord Surrey, however, and the earlier translators, were not so blind to this

beauty of the Virgilian verse, and, accordingly, they abound in imitations, more or less happy, of the alliteration of the original. Thus Surrey renders Virgil's—"Molem mirantur equi," by—"All wondering at the *hugeness of the horse;* and his—"*S*uadentque *c*adentia *s*idera *s*omnos," by—"*S*liding *s*tars provoke to *s*leep." In many of the Virgilian alliterations, the sound is a perfect and harmonious echo of the sense; and the translator that does not, in these cases, give us some equivalent for the combination in some sense, inflicts an injury on the sense in his author, independently of the form. Take, for example, the alliterated and highly expressive simile of the tempestuous ocean, in the Eleventh Æneid, *v.* 620, where every letter is poetic to the ear, and let us see what each of the translators have made of it. Virgil writes,—

"Qualis ubi alterno *p*rocurrens gurgite pontus
Nunc ruit ad terras, *s*copulosque *s*uperjacit undam
*S*pumeus, extremamque *s*inu *p*erfundit arenam:
Nunc *r*apidus *r*etro atque æstu *r*evoluta *r*esorbens
Saxa, fugit, *l*ittusque vado *l*abente relinquit."

The very sound of these verses, with their recurrent r's, s's, and l's, echoes to our ear the roar, the swell, and the tumultuous plunge of the watery tempest, described by the poet. Conington here gives us, in his rhymed version,—

"Thus ocean, swaying to and fro,
Now seeks the shore with onward flow,
Rains on the cliffs the sprinkled surge,
And breaking, bathes the sands' last verge,
Now draws the rocky fragments back,
And quits the sea-board, faint and slack."

His prose version runs thus:—

"As when the sea, advancing with its tide that ebbs and flows, one while sweeps towards the land, deluges the rocks with a shower of spray, and sprinkles the sandy margin with the contents of its bosom, one while flees in hasty retreat, dragging back into the gulf the recaptured stones, and with ebbing waters leaves the shore."

Mr. Benson Rose, whose version is by far the most unworthy of Virgil on our list, and with whom we shall not again trouble our readers, renders this simile after this fashion:—

"Thus, in a shelvy bay of rock, the sea,
With force, ultimate presses on the strand,
And heaves the rattling beach and sweeps the sand,
Then, back returning, re-absorbs its foam,
Madly retreating, to its lonely home."

Professor Lonsdale, who has given the English reader by far the best prose version in our language, not without an echo of the Virgilian rhythm and the Virgilian alliteration, translates thus,—

"As when the sea rushes forward with alternating swell, at one moment it rolls to the land, and casts its waves over the rocks, and foams, and pours over the farthest sand with its covering surges, then, again, rapidly retires backward, and in its flow sucks the stones, and flies, leaving the shore with its retiring waters."

Mr. Singleton is not unhappy in his rendering, notwithstanding its patent faults, and its needless harshness and dilutions:—

"As when, advancing with alternate flood,
The ocean now swoops onward to the lands,
And with its surge the rocks o'erlays in foam,
And drenches with its curve the farthest sand;
Now, backward swift, and sucking in again
The shingle, by the tide rolled, it flies,
And with retreating shallow quits the shore."

Mr. Rickards, who has translated the Eleventh Æneid, besides the first six assigned to him in his joint translation with Lord Ravensworth, presents the passage in this way:—

"As when the wave's alternate flood and fall
Beats on the shore, and now, with brimming flood,
Foams o'er the rocks submerged, and floods the strand,
Now, refluent, sucks the rolling pebbles back,
Ebbs from the beach, and leaves the shallows bare."

As an approach to the alliterative form of the original, we venture to suggest some such rendering as the following, imperfect as it is:—

"As when the ocean, tossing to and fro,
Now leaps upon the land, and o'er the cliffs,
Surges all spray, and in its bosom's depths
Engulfs the beach, e'en to its utmost bound,
Then rushes rapid back, whirling along
The riven rocks from the abandoned beach."

The omission of the highly significant metaphor—sinus—(the bosom of the ocean) by all the translators of this passage, with the single exception of Conington (who gives it in his prose, and strangely ignoring it in his poetic version, where it was most needed), is only one of hundreds of cases, where translators have ignored much of Virgil's beauty and style by ignoring his metaphors. Few passages of Virgil

have suffered more from translators and commentators than the storm-scene in the Third Æneid, where the poet writes (*vv.* 194, 195),—

> "Tum mihi cæruleus supra caput astitit imber,
> Noctem hiememque ferens, et *inhorruit unda tenebris.*"

Conington's verse offers in exchange,—

> "When, o'er my head, a cloud there stood,
> With night and tempest in its womb,
> And all the surface of the flood
> Was ruffled by the incumbent gloom."

His prose rendering runs thus:—"Then came a murky storm-cloud, and stood over my head, charged with night and winter tempest, and darkness ruffled the billow's crest."

Professor Lonsdale translates: "Then, over my head, gathered a dark cloud of rain, bearing with it gloom and storm, and the wave ruffled beneath the darkness."

Mr. Singleton gives it in this form:—

> "Then, o'er my head, a dingy rain-cloud came
> To a near stand, night bringing on, and storm,
> And 'gan the wave to crisp beneath the gloom."

Mr. Rickards, with more spirit, and more sympathy with the metaphorical language of the original, writes thus:—

> "Herald of night and storm, the rain-cloud broke
> O'erhead, and *darkly frowned the furrowed deep.*"

Here we take Virgil's "inhorruit unda tenebris," as simply and literally "the wave shuddered at the gloom" (of the brooding storm-cloud). Virgil's metaphor is scarcely as bold, and much more appropriate than the well-known metaphor of Dryden applied to the same subject of *water*:—

> "The conscious *water* saw its God, and blushed."

A literal rendering of the metaphor is the only rendering that gives harmony to the several parts of this descriptive passage. In Virgil's eye the storm-cloud overhead was *brooding* (not *breaking*, as Mr. Rickards renders it) over the deep. It was dark with the darkness of the storm that was gathering around, and, accordingly, the billow beneath is made to *shudder* (not to "*frown*," or "curl," "crisp,") beneath the threatening and brooding gloom. That anyone at all familiar with the personifying tendencies of Virgil, or the poetic wealth of his metaphorical language, should have missed so obvious an interpretation of so remarkable a passage is to us, after all, less a matter of wonder than that such scholars as

Conington and Lonsdale should have so entirely missed the literal and luminous poetic force of "inhorruit," which is the very keynote to the passage.

Naturally, in connection with this point we may lay it down as the safest rule for translating poetry that we should keep as closely as possible to the literal and simple language of the original, because poets especially select their diction from the freshest, the most direct, and simplest forms of language. The observance of this rule would save translators from many incorrect, and from a multitude of imperfect, renderings; as, for example, in the case of Virgil's (*Æneid*, II.), "Vos quibus intiger ævi sanguis"—"O ye whose blood is yet untouched by age"—which, with a singular blindness to the safe and obvious beauty of the passage, none of our translators has rendered literally. Lonsdale gives us a paraphrase, "Ye whose blood is in the *perfect* glow of youth;" Conington's verse renders it—

> "'You, you,' he cries, 'bestir your flight,
> Whose *blood* is *warm*, *whose limbs* are light!'"

In his prose version, the Latin Professor renders it, "You whose young blood is *untainted*, whose strength is firmly based and self-sustained, it is for you to think of flight." Singleton renders it, "O ye, with whom *your blood in age is unimpaired*, he cries, and firmly stand your powers in native might." Mr. E. F. Taylor, in his Spenserian version of the first two books of the *Æneid*, renders the passage thus—

> "Go ye
> Whose blood is *warm with youth*, whose sinews stay
> Are firm with strength, plan ye the flight for me."

Mr. Middleton, who has also rendered the same books of the *Æneid* in bombast of the coarsest grain, omits the passage altogether. We think the following specimen of Mr. Middleton will be quite enough as our plea against any further discussion of it—

> "O sweet revenge! we sipped it to the fill,
> Then sent the dead to live in hell and grill."

—a singularly free translation of Virgil (*Æneid*, II. 392): "Multos Danaum demittimus Orco."

Mr. Rickards is not more fortunate than his rivals in dealing with Virgil's "intiger ævi," as he renders the passage thus—

> "'For you,' he cried,
> 'Whose limbs are firmly strong, whose pulses beat
> With unabated life, 'tis well to fly.'"

That most of our translators should miss the force of the Virgilian frequentative verbs is not so much a matter of surprise, as that these frequentative forces should disappear altogether from the versions of scholars so accomplished as Professors Conington and Lonsdale, who, to take the example, render the Virgilian "rogitans" and "occultantur," as if they were dealing with the simple forms "rogans" and "occultantur," in passages where the whole point of the passage is made to turn, as on a point, upon the frequentative force of the verb. At the close of the First Æneid, Virgil describes Dido, like a true lover, *repeating her questions* in the infatuation of her overwhelming passion, "Multa super Priamo rogitans, super Hectore multa." Here Lonsdale gives us, "Many a question did she ask touching Priam, many touching Hector." Conington translates in his verse—

> "Much of great Priam asks the dame,
> Much of his greater son."

And in his prose version we have not she asked *again and again*, as we might fairly expect, but "She asked much about Priam, about Hector much." Then, in the speech of Laocoon (*Æneid*, II. 41), instead of the frequentative rendering of the frequentative verb, "Either Greeks are shut up and *kept concealed* in this wood"—"Aut hoc inclusi ligno *occultantur* Achivi"—Conington gives us (prose), "Either the Achæans are shut up and *hiding* in this piece of wood;" and in his verse rendering—

> "Perchance, who knows? these planks of deal
> A Grecian ambuscade conceal."

Lonsdale renders the passage, "Either the Achæans are enclosed and concealed in this frame."

Hitherto we have, for the most part, dwelt upon those sins of commission and omission that are common to our Virgilian translators; we now turn to a consideration of what is special and characteristic in the various versions before us, with the exception of Mr. Conington's, which we have already discussed, and of the versions of Mr. Middleton and Mr. Rose, which are beneath criticism.

Of all prose versions of Virgil that of Professor Lonsdale rises to the highest rank. Almost every line of it bears the impress of a most elaborate carefulness, and the dexterity of a most accomplished master of Latin and English. Professor Conington's prose is simply nowhere in the race of comparative excellence, when set side by side with Professor Lonsdale's.

In the former, we look in vain for the Virgilian taste, refinement, terseness, modulation, and the graceful diction which mark the latter. Rhythmical, simple and elegant, Professor Lonsdale's version abounds with a countless number of felicities of translation, which none could have given but one who has drunk deeply of the Virgilian spirit, such, for example, as "The sister of her heart" (sororem unanimem) and "filled her bosom with a burst of tears" (sinum lacrymis complevit obortis). The faults of this version, which it shares in common with others, we have already noted. Its own special sins are neither very heinous nor very numerous. We think Professor Lonsdale gives us English brass in exchange for Latin gold, when he renders *Æneid*, IX. 530, "Et meministis enim, Divæ, et memorare potestis," by "For you remember, *Ladies*, and from your memory can relate." The Virgilian "Pergama" he renders by the same term, and not by "citadel," which it evidently means. We doubt, too, whether his English readers will at all comprehend the force of "Pergama." Then, again, in Virgil, "infandus" often means, not "unutterable," as Professor Lonsdale renders it, not that which *cannot* be uttered, but that which we do *not like* to utter, what we cannot bring ourselves to utter, hence the real force of the line, when Virgil tells us of the love that Dido sought to beguile, because she cannot bring herself to speak it out ("*infandum* si fallere possit amorem"), and which Lonsdale has entirely missed. Mr. Singleton's version has many merits, but its harshness of tone, its slavish literalness, and its archaic diction, go far with its many inaccuracies to detract from its general excellence, as a respectable attempt to solve the problem of Virgilian translation. The chief merit of this version is its general closeness to the original, and the abundance of the parallel passages chosen from English powers, "from Chaucer to Cowper," given in illustration. Its diction is often pedantic in the extreme; in the effort to render Virgil word for word, he is committed to a sort of lexicon fidelity to the letter, most dangerous to the spirit. Thus "Oscula libavit natæ" is rendered "The liplets of his daughter sipped," which, after all, is something of an improvement upon Richard Stonyhurst's version of the same passage in 1553, "As he bust (kissed) his pretty, prating parrot;" as well as upon the version of Sir James Harrington, who rendered it with more imagination than fidelity—

> "Jove, with the smile that clears the weather, dips
> His coral in the nectar of her lips."

Often Mr. Singleton utterly misconceives his author, as in such renderings as "*ghastly* shades" ("pallentes umbræ") "*taintless* wine" (merum), "*felon* death" ("acerbo funere"), "a race *ungovernable* in war" ("genus *intractabile* bello," which and Virgil himself explains in *Æneid*, IV. by "genus *insuperabile* bello").

Mr. Taylor's beautiful version is, unfortunately, limited to two books of the *Æneid*, as we have already intimated. It is, too, equally unfortunate in the metre adopted, the Spenserian stanza, which lacks the flexibility and dignity required to reproduce a rhythm at all correspondent to the Virgilian hexameter. It is, however, very happy in many of its renderings; and the charm of the rhyme, which is managed with considerable skill, is its most marked characteristic. We quote the following passage, partly as a fair specimen of the scholarly translator's best and worst qualities, and partly as an example of Virgil's power as a picturesque poet; though in this passage (*Æneid*, I. *v.* 29) his translation has not by any means done justice to the finished and calm beauty of the elaborate original:—

> "The nearest shore the wearied Trojans seek,
> And steer to Libya, worn with labour's sleep.
> There lies a haven in a wintry creek
> Formed by an island barrier. Shoreward sweep
> The white-foam breakers, arching from the deep.
> Here giant cliffs; there, on the left and right,
> Twin crags threat heaven; below, the calm waves sleep;
> Above, through sylvan scene, the glancing light
> Peeps, and a gloomy grave frowns threatening o'er the height."

In reserving Lord Ravensworth's version for our concluding remarks, we have kept our best wine for the last. The five books of the *Æneid* (VII.—XII., with the exception of the XI.) rendered by their noble author into blank verse, we place without any hesitation over the heads of all their metrical rivals, as having come the nearest to the style, the spirit, and language of Virgil. Many of his lines seem to us the very perfection of graceful, simple, musical English. Take it where we will, this translation reads more like an original poem than any of its rivals, written as it is with a certain easy strength, and a striking tone of individuality, which we miss elsewhere. No lover of English poetry will be disappointed with its poetic charms; no Virgilian scholar will be dissatisfied with it as an unfaithful and ungraceful interpretation of what Mr. Gladstone has justly called, "the most magnificent poem ever produced by the European mind."

Lord Ravensworth's version has, notwithstanding, many faults to detract from its perfection. In metre, the most besetting sin of the noble author is the recurrence of two consecutive lines ending with the same accented vowel. Occasionally he changes the metaphorical language of Virgil for the worse, as where he transfers "rosy" into "ruby." ("The ruby Sun:"—"Sol roseus.") Occasionally he gives us too much of the Latin element and too little of the Saxon element in his diction, as when Vulcan is made "Ignipotent," and where, describing the shield of Æneas, this translator gives us "the shield's *inexplicable text*," when Conington does much better with "the shield with *fold on fold*, a prodigy of *art untold*." These, and such like faults, weigh little in our minds against the far more numerous points of excellence which distinguish this version. One of these excellences we must specially note. Virgil abounds with many memorable lines, partly gnomic, partly proverbial, often in the mouths of speakers and writers because of their peculiar force and directness in giving terse and pointed expression to numerous experiences of various kinds.

These Virgilian saws (if we may so call them, for want of a better term), are everywhere rendered by Lord Ravensworth, and only by him, with a spirit and terseness worthy of the consummate qualities of the original. What, for example, can be happier as a rendering of the Virgilian saw—

> "Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo,"

than the terse antithesis of Lord Ravensworth's—

> "And gain from Hell, the aid I've lost in Heaven!"

Isolated lines, however, even at the best, are unfair, because inadequate exponents of the merit and demerit of a translation. Lord Ravensworth's version must be read as a whole to be appreciated in its fulness. Yet, the following passage, which we take at random, will, we venture to think, dispose some of our readers to look favourably upon this masterly reproduction of Virgilian poetry in English. We quote from the description of the battle of Actium (*Æneid*, VIII., *v.* 800):—

> "Actian Apollo in the clouds was seen
> Bending his bow; thence, terror-stricken, all
> Th' Egyptian and the Indian host, and all
> The swarm of Arab and Sabæan hordes,
> Trembled and turned to flight; the Queen invokes
> The winds, with cable loosed and sails unfurled.

> Her, pale and stricken with the fear of death,
> Had Vulcan painted with the tide borne back,
> Where grieving Nile his bosom opened wide;
> And called the scattered armament to seek
> Safety and refuge in his reedy stream."

Strongly as we feel that the joint version of Lord Ravensworth and Mr. Rickards is a remarkable advance on all preceding metrical versions of the *Æneid*, we are as equally strong in our anticipations that a version by Mr. Tennyson would leave all other translators at an unapproachable distance. The problem of Virgilian translation can be solved only by a poet of a kindred genius, of a congenial spirit, and only by a consummate master of the English language and its metrical resources. The signal failures of Dryden and Wordsworth, who attempted a task for which neither was qualified, are not without their lessons of warning. The poetic spirit of Wordsworth, and still less of Dryden, had no affinity to the spirit of Virgil. Neither of these poets had an ear for the interwoven harmonies of the Virgilian verse; neither of them at all understood the felicities of the Virgilian phrase, its condensed vigour, its suggestive silence, its eloquent iterations, and its charm of alliteration. Of all English poets, none, we hold, has so much of the style and spirit of Virgil as Tennyson. These two poets are alike in the imposing splendour of their style, in their inimitable grace and beauty of their diction—alike, too, in their exquisite and self-exacting taste, which has carried them to a felicity and delicacy of execution absolutely unrivalled in the art of poetry. No other poets have shown an equal mastery over the language in which they have written, and none have trusted their name and fame, as poets, so conspicuously and completely to their power of expression. In both the wealth of language is wrought out into a variety of new shapes, to the very perfection of power, to gild the most common-place act or event. In both new thoughts are suggested, and old ones transfigured with a new glory under the guise of semi-inversions or seeming tautology, or of the recasting of an old phrase, or the coinage of a new word. In both the greatest beauties, the happiest felicities are *untranslatable*, simply because in both they have the deepest roots in the language in which they are planted, and resemble the plant of Milton which "bears its bright and golden flower only in its own soil." And lastly, to apply to both, what M. Taine asserts of one, "Every word is a tint, curiously heightened or softened by the neighbouring tint, with all the hardihood and the success of the happiest

refinements." In both we find a sustained excellence of rhythmical execution, a fulness of linked sweetness long drawn out, which lingers like music in the ear, like a haunting memory in the imagination. The Laureates of Augustus and of Victoria have not only handled the delicate passion of love with a kindred variety, a power and fidelity to nature, rarely, if ever, equalled by any poet, but they have handled it with a kindred purity of thought and a kindred depth of pathos and tenderness, which no poet, with the exception of Scott, has ever approached. We venture then to hope that a poet with so much in common with Virgil will add to his fame and to our obligations by translating the *Æneid*, for which he has so many qualifications.

Art. VI.—*Napoleon III.*

If the old rule, "Of the dead nothing but good," be of universal and unconditional application, then the biography of Napoleon III., by whomsoever it be written, must be worse than useless. In truth, the adage is one of those sayings which have wrought no little mischief. It has converted an amiable weakness into a precept of obligation. Originally, the proverb was probably a satirical reference to a common foible rather than an exhortation to unjust leniency. It arose out of the insincere eulogiums spoken over a dead man's bier and the fulsome epitaphs graven on a dead man's tomb. No historian worthy of the name can accept it as a binding command. His foremost duty is to teach the present and the future generations by the lives of the past, and that duty he cannot discharge unless he is at liberty to point to the errors which have been committed by the men who made history. Nor must he shrink from the office of judge. He is bound to pass sentence on actions, to point out how far they were wrong and injurious, and to condemn the men who did them. There, indeed, his province ends. The degree of guilt does not come under his jurisdiction. How far a man yielded to the temptation of ambition, or any other unworthy and blameable motive, it is the historian's duty to point out. No less is it his duty to indicate the disastrous consequences which followed and punished misconduct. This is the historian's highest mission. It is not for him to determine the strength of the temptation, nor in how far it was or was not accompanied by extenuating circumstances, though these may fairly be pointed out. What the man did is within the scope of the historian's office. What the man was must be left to the Judge who alone can judge justly, because He alone knows what is in man. It is in this spirit that we shall strive to deal with the dead discrowned Emperor who, three months ago, finished his stormy voyage amid "the waves of this troublesome world."

By one of the strange coincidences of history Napoleon III. was born on the very eve of the day on which Spain became a French province; that Spain whose choice of a new

sovereign sixty-two years later was to be the knell of the Second Empire. Born in Paris,* on April 20th, 1808, the guns which announced his birth to the French people and his father's Dutch subjects, had scarcely ceased firing when the tidings reached the head of the house of Bonaparte that Charles IV. of Spain and his son Ferdinand VII. had resigned their claims to the Spanish crown in his favour. The news might well have flushed the cheek of Napoleon I. The Grand Monarque had had to sustain an unsuccessful war with the great powers merely because his grandson had been chosen King of Spain. But he, the upstart Corsican artilleryman, had set aside the royal house altogether, and politically annihilated the Pyrenees, by making the Peninsula an appanage of France. How short-lived his triumph was there is no need to tell. Is it not written in the brilliant pages of Sir William Napier? Out of that country was to arise the avenger who eventually destroyed the imperial robber. It was at Badajoz and Salamanca, at Vittoria and St. Sebastian, that the first of those blows was struck which seven years later overthrew the monstrous image of brass, and iron, and clay that had so long affrighted the world. Napoleon I. claimed to rule over Spain, and the claim brought him to destruction. Napoleon III. claimed to prevent Leopold of Hohenzollern from ruling over Spain, and that claim brought him to destruction.

Napoleon III. was not happy in his parentage. Between his father, Louis Bonaparte, then King of Holland, and his mother Hortense, daughter of Josephine, soon to be the divorced wife of Napoleon I., there was little affection. They lived apart for a great portion of their wedded lives, and scandalous tongues went so far as to say that the child born in 1808 was not a Bonaparte at all. By the chief of the Bonapartes his birth was celebrated with every mark of satisfaction. At that time childless himself, he seems to have centred his hopes in this infant. It is not clear why he should have done so. The late Emperor was the youngest of three sons. One, indeed, who had been baptized by the Pope, died in infancy in 1807; but the second survived, and in the ordinary course of events should have been selected as heir presumptive. Nevertheless Napoleon I. passed by that child, and his younger brother was accepted by the Emperor and the nation as heir to the throne. He was accordingly inscribed at the top of the family register of the Napoleon dynasty confided to the keeping of the

* The generally received belief that Napoleon III. was born in the Tuileries has been denied since his death, and it is stated that his birth took place in what is now called the Rue Lafitte.

Senate. It was not till the child was two and a half years old that he was baptized in the names of Charles Louis Napoleon by Cardinal Fesch. Prior to that the Emperor had inflicted a cruel wrong upon the child's grandmother. Josephine had been divorced, and the infant's godmother was that grandmother's rival and successor. Notwithstanding the birth of the "King of Rome"—that Napoleon whom Rochefort said he loved the best because he never reigned—the Emperor seems to have retained his partiality for his nephew-grandson. After his return from Elba, Napoleon took the child to the Champ-de-Mars, and presented him to the army: a splendid scene which Napoleon III., though then only six years old, never forgot. Then came a sad parting at Malmaison, in which the nephew could scarcely be separated from his uncle's embraces. Seated on the Emperor's knee, the child implored him to remain at home, for if he went his enemies would take him away, and he—the child—would never see him again. The stern, selfish man was moved by this display of affection, and handing the child to his mother said, "Take your son, Hortense, and look well to him; perhaps, after all, he is the hope of my race." There did not seem much hope of any kind for the Bonapartes after Armageddon had been fought on the plains of Belgium. The overthrow of Waterloo brought back the Bourbons, and the Bonapartes had to leave France. Five years before that King Louis had abdicated his throne, because, as it was announced, "he could not reconcile the interests of France with those of the people he was called to govern;" and partly, no doubt, because he found it impossible to submit to the dictatorial and brutal language wherewith the Emperor assailed him. He went to reside at Grætz, in Styria. His wife, from whom he was finally separated, took the name of Duchess St. Leu, and with her two sons went to Geneva. She resided there for a time, and afterwards at Aix, Baden in Bavaria, Switzerland, Rome, Augsburg, and eventually at the Château of Arenenberg, on the banks of Lake Constance. She took great pains with her children's education. They repaid the trouble which she bestowed. The younger showed great quickness in learning, and studied under the Abbé Bertrand and M. Le Bas. He had a special liking for history and the exact sciences. He also became an accomplished swimmer and horseman. At Thun he studied military science under General Dufour, and for a time served as a volunteer in the Federal camp at that place. The revolution of 1830 arrived, and Louis Napoleon and his brother prayed that they might be allowed to return to France.

Louis Philippe refused the request of the living Bonapartes, little dreaming that he would, ten years later, commit the stupendous blunder of bringing back to France the body of the dead Bonaparte, between whom and the bourgeois king there was a contrast as great as it was dangerous to that king's dynasty. Baffled in their hope of revisiting their native country, the young Bonapartes betook themselves to Italy. The peninsula was all astir. The Italians, from the Alps to the Faro of Messina, seemed ready to throw off the yoke of foreign sovereigns who divided the country amongst them, and so rendered Italy what Metternich scornfully called it, "a geographical expression."

At Rome Louis Napoleon and his brother joined the Carbonari, and even carried the tricolor through the streets of the Eternal City. It was all in vain. Nearly a generation was to pass before Solferino would be fought, and the Austrian power would be broken. The Tedeschi joined their forces to the Papal and the French troops, and the rising was put down with a minimum of bloodshed. Sentence of banishment was pronounced against the Bonapartes. One of them was soon to be out of the reach of friends or foes. The elder brother fell dangerously ill at Ancona, and died in the future Emperor's arms. Louis Napoleon himself narrowly escaped capture by the Austrian troops, and eluded them through the exertions of his mother and the assistance of an English gentleman, who lent the Prince a lackey's dress. Mother and son fled to Cannes, and after spending a night there went on to Paris, intending to make a stay of some days. But Hortense considered it to be her duty to apprise Louis Philippe of her presence in the French capital, and to beg permission to remain there for a brief space. A polite but decided refusal was the answer, and so the travellers crossed over to England. They did not tarry long in that country, but returned to Thurgovia, in which canton Arenenberg is situated. At the close of this year, 1832, the young Duke of Reichstadt, the Napoleon II., who, like Louis XVII., never reigned, died. He had always been a sickly youth, and there never was much prospect of his wearing the imperial crown. His removal, following so soon after his cousin's death, left the way clear to Louis Napoleon. If the Bonapartes were ever to be restored to the throne, then Prince Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was the rightful heir. Thenceforward he began to see visions and to dream dreams. He kept certain journals in his pay. He himself wrote pamphlets and more important works. In his *Rêveries Politiques* he had endeavoured to show that

the restoration of the Empire was the only means of healing the bleeding wounds of France, by combining the Empire with the principles of the Revolution. That he had faith in that "rêverie" is shown by the fact that he refused to become a suitor for the hand of the young and newly widowed Queen of Portugal. Queen Maria, it is generally believed, would have accepted him, but Louis Napoleon preferred two birds in the bush to one in the hand—preferred to be Emperor in his own right on some far-off day, to being merely King-Consort at once. This is how he explained the matter in a letter which he wrote to the Queen:—

"The noble conduct of my father, who abdicated a throne in 1810, because he could not unite the interests of France with those of Holland, has not left my memory. My father, by his example, proved to me how far the claims of one's native land are to be preferred even to a throne in a foreign country. I feel, in fact, that trained as I have been from infancy to cherish the thought of my own country above every other consideration, I should not be able to hold anything in higher esteem than the interests of France. Persuaded as I am that the great name which I bear, and which must ever recall the memory of fifteen years of glory, will not always be proscribed by my countrymen, I wait with patience in a free and hospitable land the arrival of the day when the French nation will call back to its bosom those who, in 1815, were driven into exile by the will of 200,000 strangers. This hope of being able to serve France even yet as a citizen and a soldier is that which gives strength to my soul, and, in my opinion, is worth all the thrones in the world."

Perhaps he might have come to a different conclusion if he could have foreseen that he would have to wait the best part of twenty years before setting the crown upon his head; that he would reach it only through a river of blood, and that he would lose it amid the carnage of the hugest capitulation which the world has ever seen.

For a time he was content to wait until France showed signs of desiring a Bonapartist Restoration, and while he waited he wrote his *Projet de Constitution*, and his *Deux Mots à M. de Chateaubriand sur la Duchesse de Berri*, and other works. But the quiet student days at Arenenberg soon became irksome; and, as the popularity of Louis Philippe waned, so did Louis Napoleon's hopefulness and impatience wax. Staying for a time at Baden-Baden, he made acquaintance with some of the officers of the Strasbourg garrison. Chief of these was Colonel Vaudrey, who commanded the 4th Regiment of Artillery, in which the first Napoleon had fought his first

battle, and which, more than any other regiment, preserved the Napoleonic traditions. Vaudrey seems to have been almost as hare-brained as the Prince. It seemed to them that Louis Napoleon had only to show himself to the army, and it would declare for him *en masse*, and he would march from Strasbourg to Paris as easily as his uncle marched thither from Elba. Of preparations worthy the name there were none. Leaving Arenenberg on Oct. 25, 1836, he took leave of his mother as though he were going on a hunting expedition. Three days later he entered Strasbourg. He found his friend Vaudrey full of devotion, but also profoundly dismayed. The Prince kept up his spirits, and was cheered by his friend Fialin, afterwards to become famous as the Duc de Persigny. At five in the morning of the 30th, Vaudrey assembled the troops in the barracks and presented the Prince to them. He appealed to their former exploits under the leadership of the Prince's famous uncle, and they responded with acclamations. But Vaudrey's superior officer, Lieut.-General Voirel, who had previously been sounded, and who had refused to have anything to do with the enterprise, still declined to take part in it, and he was placed under arrest. Another regiment was won over; the Prince showed himself to the rest of the garrison, and the older soldiers were greeting him with acclamations, when the rumour spread that the Prince was an impostor, was no Bonaparte at all, but was Colonel Vaudrey's son. That rumour added nearly a dozen years to Louis Philippe's reign. The Prince was arrested, and he then showed that remarkable agility in falling which characterised him on one or two other remarkable occasions. Suddenly he collapsed. He who had just seen himself in imagination marching to the Tuileries at the head of applauding legions, gave up the game at the first check. He not only surrendered his sword when it was demanded, but allowed the epaulettes to be torn from his shoulders with every mark of contumely. Some of his friends escaped; among them Fialin and Madame Gordon, the actress, who had joined the expedition for romantic reasons. The news startled the bourgeois King. It revealed to him the alarming fact that a large part of the army was disaffected and not to be depended upon. If Louis Philippe had ordered Louis Napoleon to be shot, he would have been able to plead the example of the First Napoleon who shot the Duc d'Enghien, and that he was but avenging the murder of his relative upon the representative of the murderer. Public sentiment, however, would not have suffered so barbarous a reprisal. When those of Prince Napoleon's fellow conspirators

who were taken were brought to trial, it was impossible to get a jury who would convict them. The King, therefore, did not venture to deal harshly with the Prince. He was banished to America for ten years, taken to L'Orient, shipped on board the *Andromeda*, and, with questionable taste, accepted a gift of £600 from the King he had sought to dethrone. The whole affair was as free from any approach to chivalry as could be imagined. Nor can much be said for the subsequent stage of this adventure. After a long cruise, the *Andromeda* reached the United States; and soon after her arrival there, Prince Napoleon heard of the dangerous illness of his mother. He did not consider himself bound in any way by the clemency of the man he had wronged, but took passage to England, and on his arrival in London had the effrontery to ask for a passport to France. Being refused it, he set out for Switzerland without it, found his mother in a desperate condition, and received her last breath two months later, October 3rd, 1837.

Napoleon was once more close to the French frontier, ready, as the Government of Louis Philippe supposed, for a fresh act of treason. They believed that he was preparing one; for, at this juncture, Lieut. Laity, who took part in the Strasbourg *fiasco*, published an account of it. Thereupon the Government prosecuted Laity, had him sentenced to five years' imprisonment and £400 fine, and requested the Swiss Government to decree the departure of Napoleon from Swiss territory. The little Republic has always been as jealous as England over its rights of asylum, and it declined, in the most positive terms, to accede to the request. The French minister at Berne demanded his passports, 20,000 French troops were moved to the frontier, and there seemed every prospect of a serious collision, when Napoleon, showing proper spirit, at last came forward, and said he would not be the cause of a sanguinary contest, but would show his gratitude to the country which had befriended him, by leaving it. He crossed back to England, and took up his abode in King-street, off St. James's-square. Though poor, he was a good deal courted, and he had the *entrée* to the best set, including Gore House, where Lady Blessington and her brilliant son-in-law did the honours. But the Countess and the Prince do not seem to have been altogether friends. In after years, when the Prince was Emperor and the Countess was in difficulties, they met in Paris. Napoleon, who generally was cordial to his old English friends, remarked, in a freezing tone, "Ah, Lady Blessington, how long do you remain here?"

"I do not know: how long do you?" was the caustic reply. The Dukes of Montrose and Hamilton were patrons of his. They, as well as his other English friends, were astonished to find how confident he was of restoring his dynasty. The miserable failure at Strasbourg seemed, in their eyes, to render all such expectation chimerical, but it had not, in any way, disillusionised him. That was shown by his *Idées Napoléoniennes*, in which he not only defended his uncle's career, but represented his rule as emanating from the sovereignty of the people, and consecrating all the facts and ideas of the Revolution. The work was translated into almost every Continental language, and had a wide circulation. Louis Napoleon was thought by many persons to be as stupid as he was dull and uninteresting. It is said of him that he used to frequent the shop of a fashionable tailor in Regent-street, and gaze out at the window for an hour or two at a time, without once breaking silence. In society he was often equally taciturn. In the life of Mr. Thomas Duncombe, M.P., it is related that the Prince was present at a party given by the late Lord Lytton at the pretty villa on the Thames at Fulham, which he then owned. The editors of the *Examiner* and the *Literary Gazette*, Count D'Orsay, Mr. Disraeli, and other well-known persons, were also guests. But the Prince was "taciturn as usual, and amused himself with a row on the river." The strange thing was that this uninteresting man should have had the acquaintance of such thorough-going men of pleasure as D'Orsay, Lord Alvanley, Colonel Dawson Damer, and Mr. Duncombe. The Prince himself, however, had his gallantries and *amours*. He was at the celebrated Eglinton tournament, not merely as a spectator, but as a combatant, and engaged an English knight with such ardour that the two had to be separated. Holland House was open to him, because Lady Holland always had been a great Bonapartist. Lord Combermere used to invite him, and had a much higher opinion of his abilities than most of the fine ladies and gentlemen who used to meet him and declare him dull and uninteresting. "Yet," says Lady Combermere, in the Life of her husband, published in 1866, "notwithstanding his apparent indifference, he was always ready to discuss in an agreeable manner those social questions which interested him." His love for art was an early passion. At his residence in King-street he had collected many artistic gems and family relics, which he highly prized, and a few days before his last departure for Paris he invited Lord and Lady Combermere to inspect them. It was

at their house that he used to meet Mdlle. Montijo, who was destined to be Empress of the French. She was known in London society as the Spanish beauty; but, handsome as she then was, "her loveliness (says Lady Combermere) had not expanded into that full splendour which it afterwards attained."

These English grandees were, at this time, not the Prince's only friends. He had others of a very different character, obscure enough then, but destined to become conspicuous. They were manifestly denizens of Leicester-square and the region round about, and with them the Prince conferred much about this time. The result of these conferences was the Boulogne expedition,—an adventure more extravagant and ridiculous even than the Strasbourg *fiasco* was. The Prince and his fellow-conspirators chartered a steamer, the *City of Edinburgh*, embarked at Margate, August 5th, 1840, and steamed away for the French coast. Many of those who had gone on board had not been informed of the errand on which they were bound. But Napoleon, standing up in one of the carriages which he had provided, presumably that he might make in it his triumphal entry into Paris, harangued the company, gave them uniforms and money, of which there was a goodly supply, and having aroused their enthusiasm, the party fell upon the very copious commissariat which had been provided, and passed the night in banqueting. At daylight they were close to Boulogne. The steamer anchored, and a small boat was lowered, into which fifteen of the passengers entered and made for the shore. They told a false story to the custom-house officers, and were allowed to land, and instantly seized the lieutenant of the guard and two of his subordinates, so as to prevent their giving the alarm. The Prince offered a bribe to the lieutenant if he would join him, but it was refused. Meanwhile the other passengers landed, including a tame eagle, which was "intended to fly to the top of Napoleon's column." The expedition, consisting of thirty officers and thirty privates, then marched towards the town, giving out that Prince Napoleon was at the head of the insurgents, and would be crowned Emperor by an enthusiastic nation. The cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" was raised, and, as the people came crowding out, copies of an address were distributed to them. Colonel Puygellier, commandant of the garrison, was attracted to the scene, and him Napoleon attempted to bribe; but he was as little open to bribery as General Voirel had been at Strasbourg. The Prince, who had entered the barracks, was told

to leave at once. He resisted: a pistol which he had went off accidentally, and wounded a grenadier. The National Guard assembled, and the Prince and his friends, pushed by numbers, had to retreat to the beach; there they were captured. While confined in the Conciergerie prison at Paris, the Prince was visited by Chateaubriand and other eminent Frenchmen. He was put upon his trial, and was defended by the eloquent Berryer, the same famous advocate who afterwards defended Montalembert under the prosecution ordered by Napoleon, as Emperor. The Prince was sentenced to perpetual imprisonment in the fortress of Ham, close to the Belgian frontier. A few months later, as if Louis Philippe wished the world to see how little importance he attached to the pretensions of the imprisoned invader, the remains of Napoleon I. were brought back from St. Helena to Paris with the utmost pomp.

While at Ham, Prince Napoleon wrote and read much. One of his favourite books was the exquisite story of *Picciola*. He wrote a poem *To the Shades of the Emperor*, also *Historic Fragments*, and a work on *The Extinction of Pauperism*, in which he proposed to establish state colonies in the waste places of France, and astonished political economists by the familiarity which he displayed with the "dismal science." It would seem as if he were, for the first few years of his captivity, tolerably contented. But after a time he began to concoct, with his English friends, means of escape. In 1846, he heard that his father was dying, and prayed to be allowed to visit him, promising to return to his prison. The request was refused, and the prisoner then set to work the more earnestly to effect his own deliverance. Mr. Duncombe was his chief adviser. Money, of course, was wanted: that was to be obtained on certain conditions. The wealthy and banished Duke of Brunswick wanted to get back his dominions, and a treaty was drawn up between the banished Duke and the imprisoned Prince, by which each was to aid the other to recover his throne, and whichever of the two was successful first was to help the other with arms, soldiers, and money. This most curious document was signed in the presence of Mr. Duncombe's secretary, and is fully set forth in the *Life of Mr. Duncombe*, published by his son (Vol. II. pp. 10, 11). The history of the Prince's escape has been so often told, that there is no need to repeat it here. That he did escape was due to the devotion of his fellow-prisoner and physician, Dr. Conneau; and it should be remembered, to the Emperor's credit, that in the days of his greatest prosperity he always

maintained for Conneau the closest friendship, and that this friendship is inherited by the sons of emperor and physician. It was on May 29th, 1846, that the Prince reached London, and he lost no time in writing to the French ambassador, to inform him of what had happened. He wrote to Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen to the same effect, and then went into society to receive the congratulations of his friends. They were glad to see him back, but most of them must have deemed his chance of returning to France more hopeless than ever. What he could not accomplish for himself his rival was accomplishing for him. Louis Philippe was fast losing the friendship of foreign powers and the respect of his own subjects. The trickery, not to say treachery, displayed by the King and his Minister with respect to the Spanish marriages, and the avarice which made him hoard up riches for himself and his sons, did much to shake his throne. There were certain other matters, tragedies of a very ghastly character, which greatly scandalised the not too squeamish Parisians. At the very time when Louis Napoleon was an exile in England, and his physician and valet were kept in close confinement, the Prince had friends in Paris busily working for him, yet not even suspected. "One of these," says the biographer of Mr. Duncombe, "had the means of getting at state secrets by a key that could open the best-secured *bureau* in the palace of the 'citizen-king.'" There was another conspirator, M. de Morny by name, supposed to be very closely connected by birth to the Prince, but who, being, as it was supposed, absorbed in horseflesh, was never suspected of taking any interest in politics. Besides the illegitimate son of Queen Hortense, there was also the illegitimate son of Napoleon I., known afterwards as French Ambassador in London, and at another period as French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Walewski. "He kept in the background, but added another wheel to the complicated machinery that was being secretly put together. In due time there were wheels within wheels acting in unsuspected localities; everywhere they were going on without noise, without display, in the faubourgs, in the garrisons, in the theatres, in the churches—always concealed from observation, always in concert."

At last the expected crisis arrived. The spark which fired the train was the prohibition of the Reform Banquet. On Feb. 24th, 1848, the "king of the barricades" was a fugitive, and four days later Louis Napoleon was in Paris, and had recognised the Provisional Government, *faisait acte de bon*

citoyen. But the pear was not ripe. It was by no means an emperor that the Parisians were then wanting. They were enthusiastic for a republic, and a republic they were to have for well nigh four years. The Prince's friends attempted to pour contempt on this form of government and on democracy in general. Some of them went so far as to suggest the restoration of the Empire. Napoleon had returned to England, and the Provisional Government, while allowing the other Bonapartes to re-enter France, had specially exempted him. He remonstrated by letter; his friends issued a proclamation which concluded thus:—"Let us place at our head the only man who is worthy of us—let us place there Louis Napoleon. *Vive l'Empereur!*" This proclamation was posted extensively (nobody knew by whom) in the Department of the Ardennes, that very department where, twenty-two years later, Napoleon met his overthrow, and from whence he left France never more to return. Men now began to talk about Napoleon. For once the epigram had not proved true—"laughter," had not "proved fatal" to him, in spite of his torn epaulets at Strasbourg and his tame eagle at Boulogne. Retiring from France immediately after swearing allegiance to the Provisional Government, he pointed to his retirement as a proof of the "purity of his intentions and of his patriotism." There were to be many protests of this kind during the next few years. It is to this portion of the Emperor's career that we would especially draw attention, because it has been slurred over and condoned, to the great injury of political morals.

Louis Napoleon did not offer himself as a candidate at the general election of the Constitutional Assembly; but, at the partial elections which took place in June he was elected for four constituencies. One of them was Paris, and here he found himself in strange company, for among his colleagues were his afterwards bitter foe, Victor Hugo; his rival for the presidency, Changarnier; Proudhon, the Socialist; and his successor, as chief ruler of France, Thiers. In consequence of Napoleon's election, the Republican Government, on the 12th June, declared that the law against him should be enforced. So he wrote a letter to the President, in which he expressed his regret at seeing his name, "the symbol of order, nationality, and glory, serve to augment the troubles and the throes of his country." Then followed other words, which produced a suitable uproar:—"If the people should impose upon me duties, I shall know how to fulfil them." The Left denounced this assertion vehemently, declaring that it was a declaration of war on the part of a pretender. Taught

patience by the Strasbourg and Boulogne failures, he wrote from London, on June 15th, resigning his seat; surrendering, for the tranquillity of France, the advantages which he had acquired, and professing a desire to be permitted to return, as the humblest of her citizens. Corsica replied by electing him almost unanimously. Once more he resigned his seat, expressing sentiments of moderation, but clearly seeing that the terrible events in Paris were working in his favour by discrediting the Government. New elections were to take place on September 17th, and on the eve of them he made public his desire to take his seat among the representatives of the people. The Department of the Seine thereupon elected him with 110,752 votes, and four other departments gave him large majorities. He chose the first because it contained his native city, that Paris which he was afterwards to render the most beautiful city in the world, but which he never could reconcile to himself, and which at the last election that occurred during his reign returned candidates in every instance hostile to the Empire. In consequence of his success he was encouraged to return to France, and on September 26th he was present in the Assembly, and read a very conciliatory speech, which prepared the way for his candidature for the Presidency. A month later a strong attempt was made to check this step, but it was too late: the law proscribing the Bonapartes had been repealed on October 10th. On November 24th, he issued an address to the people of France, in which he condemned the "fatal tendency" of the State to undertake duties which the people could very well accomplish for themselves. He concluded with a quotation from his Boulogne address: "When one has the honour of being at the head of the French people there is an infallible means of doing good—to will it." These promises rallied around him the *bourgeoisie* and the democracy. His name alone had been sufficient with the ordinary masses, and on December 10th, out of more than seven and a half million votes recorded on behalf of the candidates for the Presidency, Napoleon received 5,562,834, while General Cavaignac had 1,469,166, and the Red Republicans, Ledru Rollin and Raspail, divided 400,000 between them. Ten days later, the "Prince-President" took the oath as President—the oath to respect the constitution and to maintain the Republic: "In the presence of God and before the French people, represented by the National Assembly, I swear to remain faithful to the Democratic Republic, and to fulfil the duties which are imposed upon me by the Constitution." Such were the words

uttered with hand lifted towards heaven, and scarcely had they been spoken when a salvo of artillery at the Invalides informed the public outside the Assembly that the vow had been made. Formal note of it was recorded by M. Marras, President of the Assembly. "We call God and men," he said, "to witness the oath which has been taken. The National Assembly records it, and orders that it shall be transcribed in the proceedings, inserted in the *Moniteur*, and promulgated in the form of legislative acts." That nothing might be wanting to add solemnity to this scene, the new President ascended the tribune, and made a speech in which these words were uttered:—

"The suffrages of the people and the oath which I have taken prescribe my future conduct. My duty is traced out, and I shall fulfil it as a man of honour. I shall see enemies of the country in all those who attempt to change by illegal means that which the whole of France has established. Between you and me, citizen representatives, there cannot be any real difference. Our wishes, our desires, are the same. I, like you, wish to replace society upon its basis, to confirm its democratic institutions, and to seek all proper means for alleviating the sufferings of that generous and intelligent people which has given me this splendid testimony of its confidence. . . . We have, citizen representatives, a great mission to fulfil—it is to found a Republic in the interest of all, and a government just and firm, which shall be animated by a sincere love of progress, without being either reactionary or Utopian. Let us be men of our country, and not men of a party; and by the help of God, we shall be able to do some good, if we are not able to do great things."

This speech was very warmly applauded. It seemed to disarm the most suspicious. Men of the highest honour like Montalembert were deceived by it. Because they were so honourable, they were deluded; for they could not conceive that any one could be so base as to be plotting treason against the constitution at the very time when he was solemnly swearing to uphold it. Montalembert would approve, but other Frenchmen must have been staggered by Napoleon's foreign policy in the year following. One of the greatest crimes of his career was the despatch of a French army—an army belonging to a country still governed by a Republic—to put down the Republic in Rome. Ledru Rollin and the Reds attempted an insurrection in June, 1849, but it was suppressed, and Rollin had to fly. A rising in Lyons met with no better success. The accession of De Tocqueville to the ministry about this time seemed to augur well; but the pro-

mise was not of long duration. Suddenly, on October 31, the President struck the first blow at parliamentary government, by dismissing *proprio motu* his whole administration. He formed a new one out of men who were at that time very little known, though some of them afterwards attained celebrity, chiefly MM. Rouher and Fould. Very ominous of evil was the speech which the President made to the Assembly respecting these changes. He said:—

"To strengthen the Republic, threatened on all sides by anarchy, to secure order better than has hitherto been done, and to preserve to France that high position which she has hitherto occupied among nations, we require men who, animated by patriotic devotion, are *alive to the necessity of a single and firm direction*, and of a policy distinctly announced, who will not compromise power by any irresolution, who are as much impressed with my responsibility as their own, and who may be ready in action as in words. I wish to inspire in the country by my sincerity, my perseverance, and my firmness, such confidence as may permit affairs to resume their usual course. The letter of the constitution has, without doubt, a great influence on the destinies of the country, but the manner in which it is worked has a greater still."

There was more to the same effect, all meaning that the President was to interpret the constitution as he chose. This was well seen in Paris, and in the Assembly itself. The popular members thereof complained. "This is the government of one man; the shadow even of constitutional or parliamentary government is at an end."* The provinces, always jealous of Paris, viewed the matter in a very different light. The elect of the people had emancipated himself from the tyranny of the Socialist clubs. The power of these clubs was still very great. In March, 1850, elections to the Assembly took place, in order to fill the vacancies caused by the expulsion of the members who had taken part in the insurrection of the previous June. In Paris the Socialists returned all three of their candidates, Carnot, who was first on the list, polling 14,000 votes more than Fay, who was foremost of

* It was but three months before this date, on July 22, 1849, that Napoleon, revisiting the scene of his old captivity, Ham, said he had been justly punished for attacking an established government. He added: "When one has seen how the most justifiable revolutions bring misfortunes after them, one comprehends with difficulty the audacity of having wished to take upon oneself the responsibility of a change. I do not complain, then, of having expiated by an imprisonment of six years my boldness against the laws of my country. It is with happiness that, in this same place where I have suffered, I propose to you a toast in honour of the men who are determined, in spite of their convictions, to respect the institutions of their country."

the Conservatives. It was not surprising that, with the two Socialist revolutions of June 1848 and June 1849 still fresh in memory, these elections caused considerable consternation in Paris. Rentes fell 2½ per cent. The President convened a meeting of the leaders of the different parties in the Assembly, and it was attended by Thiers, Molé, Montalembert, the Duc de Broglie, and others. The President asked them what should be done. They gave different and irreconcilable counsels, and they separated without any practical result. Eventually, however, the urgency of the crisis, and the knowledge that a new insurrection was planned for May, induced the Assembly to pass an important law, the effect of which was to exclude a large number of the dangerous classes from the franchise.

This law was enacted on May 31st, 1850. A little later (August 16) the President, showing a considerable amount of moral courage, visited that hot-bed of Red Republicanism—Lyons—and made a speech there, in the course of which the following words were uttered :—

"Proud of my origin and of my flag, I shall remain faithful to them. I shall be entirely at the disposal of the country, let it require of me abnegation or perseverance. Rumours of *coups d'état* have, perhaps, reached you ; but you have not believed them. I thank you for that. Surprises and usurpations may be the dreams of parties which have not any support in the nation ; but the elect of six million votes executes the wishes of the people, does not betray them."

Three weeks later, the President, addressing the people at Caen, said :—

"Since everywhere prosperity appears to have revived, he would be culpable who attempted to check the source by the change of *régime* which now exists, however imperfect it may be. Even if stormy days should reappear, and if the people should wish to impose a new burden upon the head of the Government, that head in turn would be himself culpable to desert this high calling."

These declarations were well received ; and the other large towns which the President visited during the autumn of 1850 declared themselves strongly on his side as against the Assembly. At military reviews, the troops had more than once cried, "*Vive Napoléon !*" and the Deputies became seriously alarmed. They had chosen an ill-selected ground of quarrel with him before he commenced his tour. His Ministers had asked that his salary might be increased from the absurdly inadequate sum of £24,000 a-year to that of £120,000, and

this demand had been refused. Another grievance arose after Napoleon returned to Paris. At a review, which took place on October 10th, the infantry passed him in silence, without saluting. This conduct was the more marked as the cavalry who followed defiled amidst loud cries of "*Vive Napoléon! Vive l'Empereur!*" Investigation showed that the silence of the infantry was due to instructions from General Neumayer, who commanded one of the divisions. It could not be shown that General Changarnier, the Commander-in-Chief, was responsible for this order; but about three weeks later, he virtually endorsed it by directing that the troops under his command should utter no cries while under arms. This prohibition was looked upon as a declaration of war on the part of the General against the President. Louis Napoleon did not act immediately. Two months later, Changarnier issued another order, and then the President went down to the Assembly and demanded either that the instructions should be declared apocryphal or that the General should be censured. The Assembly would do neither, and the Minister of War thereupon resigned. Much excitement followed. The President offered to yield all points of dispute to the Assembly, but insisted upon retaining "the right which the constitution gave him of dismissing an inferior officer." On that point he prevailed; Changarnier was superseded; but not without a protest. In the debate which followed, M. Thiers urged "There are but two powers in the State. If the Assembly yields now, there will be but one power; the form of the government will be changed. The word will come when he pleases; that is of little moment, let it come when it may, the Empire is made." This speech was followed, January 15, 1851, by a vote of no confidence in the Ministry, carried by a large majority. Shortly afterwards a modification of the Ministry took place.

This modification was nominal rather than real, nor did it in any way put an end to the strife between the President and the Assembly. There was in the spring of 1851 an undignified dispute about his salary, in which it must be fairly admitted that he came off best. When the Assembly refused to grant him the sum which he deemed requisite, he reduced his expenses, but not, it is affirmed, his charities. More important questions were pending. The time was come when a revision of the Constitution might be legally brought forward. All parties but one wished a revision, each party believing that it would profit by a change. That exception was the Bonapartist faction, which, being in possession, thought that any alteration

would be for the worse. Before any alteration could take place it had to be sanctioned by three-fourths of the members of the Assembly. When put to the vote, July 19, a revision received 446 votes, and as there were 278 votes against it, the majority was insufficient. The law of suffrage was another subject of contention. Napoleon had favoured the law of May 31, 1850, restricting the suffrage; but, finding himself at issue with the Assembly, he determined to throw himself upon the masses, and to advocate universal suffrage. In doing this he acted directly contrary to the advice of his Ministers. They considered that this appeal *ad populum*, or rather *ad plebem*, would give a majority to the Socialists, and ruin both the Government and the country. Finding that their arguments did not avail, they resigned *en bloc*, and were succeeded by men who, with one exception, General St. Arnaud, Minister of War, were, and continued to be, unknown to fame.

Now came the critical time. The existence of the Assembly would legally expire in the following March, and the President's term two months later. If Paris were a fair test of France, Louis Napoleon had little prospect of re-election. But despite solemn oaths and repeated pledges, he was not going to suffer deposition. If the Constitution was incompatible with his rule, so much the worse for the Constitution. The country was greatly agitated by conflicting rumours. There were numerous arrests and press prosecutions, and on Oct. 21 the Departments of Cher and Nièvre were declared in a state of siege. Men's hearts began to fail with fear. When the President met the Assembly on Nov. 4, the opening day of its last session, he did nothing to allay that fear. On the contrary, he uttered the most alarming language. He said:—

"A vast conspiracy of demagogues is organised in France and in Europe. The secret societies have spread their ramifications in the most remote rural districts. Whatever there is of insensate, violent, and incorrigible in the various parties, has, without having agreed upon men or things, fixed on a rendezvous for 1852, not to consolidate but to destroy. It is in the zeal of the magistracy, the strength of the administration, and the devotion of the army alone that we can hope for the salvation of France. Let us then unite our efforts to deprive the genius of evil of the hope of even a momentary success."

Notwithstanding this announcement of the Socialist propaganda in the remote rural districts, the President proposed an extension of the franchise, which would virtually place political power in the hands of the inhabitants of those districts.

In urging this change, he repudiated the charge that it was prompted by personal interest. "My conduct (he added) during the last three years ought to refute any such allegation. The good of my country, I repeat, will always be the only motive of my conduct." In the same message to the Assembly, and at the very time when his plans for a *coup d'état* were almost ready for execution, he said, "Whatever may be the solutions of the future, let us understand one another in order that it may never be passion, surprise, or violence, which shall decide the fate of a great nation." All these assurances were much needed, for the actions of him who gave them were greatly at variance with his words. The Assembly became alarmed, and voted urgency for a resolution giving its officers power to require the assistance of an armed force for its protection. This was undoubtedly an encroachment upon the President's power, and the debate, which took place on November 17th, was very animated. During the course of it General St. Arnaud not only admitted that he had ordered the removal of the decree of May 11th, 1848, directing the soldiers to obey the orders of the Assembly, but contended that such a decree was fatal to discipline in the army, and that "passive obedience is the vital principle of an army." This declaration was considered a prelude to civil war, and amid the greatest agitation the resolution was put to the vote. 300 deputies voted for it, 408 against it. The news was taken by M. Rouher to the President, who was ready to put himself at the head of the army had the decision been otherwise. For the next fortnight there was much conference among the leaders of the different political parties. Various propositions were discussed, among them the re-election of the President for ten years, a proposal supported by Thiers. But the matter was to be taken out of the hands of these politicians in very rude fashion. The generals, twenty-one in number, had their conferences also, and they declared their intention to stand by the President, and swore a solemn and secret oath to that effect. No suspicion of any immediate violence seems to have arisen among the Assembly. On December 1st, that body was discussing the proposed Lyons railway. On that same evening Changarnier went to the Opera with De Morny, and the President gave a reception at the Elysée, where he showed his usual calmness and impassivity. When the company had retired, the President and his familiar friends, St. Arnaud, De Morny, De Maupas, and De Béville, Colonel of the *Etat Majeur*, retired to a private apartment, and arranged the details of the bloody drama that

was about to be performed. De Béville undertook to print off the proclamations. De Morny was to sign all warrants of arrest, and De Maupas was to execute them. By this time the early hours of the forty-sixth anniversary of Austerlitz had arrived. By two o'clock of that morning the leaders of the various parties were arrested, and dragged out of their beds to prison. Changarnier had an opportunity of testing the friendship of his companion at the opera; for on asking to see the warrant of arrest, he found that it bore De Morny's signature. When the Parisians awoke and betook themselves to their *cafés*, they saw the walls covered with a proclamation, announcing the dissolution of the Assembly, the abolition of the law of 31st of May, the re-establishment of universal suffrage, the convocation of the whole electors for December 14th, the dissolution of the Council of State, and the declaration of a state of siege in Paris and the environs. In his address the Emperor asked the people to trust him, and give him the power to "close the era of revolutions." It was a strange request for this arch-revolutionist to make. He proposed a new constitution on the following bases:—1st. A responsible chief elected for ten years; 2nd. A cabinet appointed by him alone; 3rd. A Council of State, consisting of the most eminent men, who were to prepare new laws, and support them before the Legislative Body; 4th. A Legislative Body, chosen by universal suffrage without a scrutiny; 5th. A Second Assembly, formed of the most eminent men in the country. The rotation in which these proposals were placed was ominous enough. The principal thing was the establishment of the President; and in order to secure this position he was to appoint his own Ministers, who would not be in any way responsible to the people, and he was to be free to manipulate the rural vote. The establishment of the Legislative Body and the Senate were of only secondary importance.

The members of the Assembly who met that morning were treated with as little consideration as their leaders had been. They were arrested and marched between files of soldiers to a cavalry barrack. The elect of France were carried off like felons, in the sight of the whole capital, and yet the Parisians made no sign. They seem to have been too stupified to understand what had happened. When the President, accompanied by his fellow conspirators, rode through Paris a little later, he was hailed with acclaiming shouts by the troops. The people kept silence. After the lapse of a few hours, the working-men recovered from their stupor, and quickly threw up barricades. Then followed that terrible scene which has

been described by the master hand of Mr. Kinglake. There is no need to describe it here. The number of slain will never be known. The writer of the official account of the *Coup d'état*, with manifest untruthfulness, placed the number of troops killed at 26, and of troops wounded at 184; while he reckons that only 175 "insurgents" were killed, and 115 wounded. Mr. Kinglake mentions that the colonel of one French regiment alone stated that his men had killed 2,400 men. There were about twenty regiments engaged in the massacre, so that it is probable that the victims thus murdered were not less than five figures. This quasi-fighting was not, however, the whole of the butchery. It is stated that large numbers of persons were shot or clubbed at night in the gardens of the Luxembourg, and on the terrace of the Invalides. Even the devoted Bonapartist agent, Mr. Duncombe's private secretary, Mr. Smith, who was in Paris during the massacre, wrote:—"Nobody can tell how many killed — Johnson said this morning 7,000; everybody but Government says 3,000, and Government say in all about 800." Whatever the number of victims, there can be no doubt that a horrible crime had been committed. These were for the most part peaceful citizens, who had been suddenly fusilladed without provocation, and who had so little expectation of what was in store for them, that they, with their wives, were quietly looking on from their own windows, watching the movements of the troops, just as the householders at Brighton look on when the volunteers are down for the Easter review.

But it is impossible for the Parisians to be sobered even by the most frightful catastrophe. Mr. Duncombe's secretary, writing from Paris, December 12th, said:—"Paris is just as gay as though nothing had happened, and actually the scene of carnage, bloodshed, and much more, is become quite the centre of a fête, for all classes are out visiting the different places, and everybody seems to be boasting of the risks they ran." The end and the beginning of the Empire were alike. It had a bloody rising and a bloodier setting. On each occasion the Parisians kept festival as though the slaughter on the Boulevards, and the still more destructive slaughter at Sedan, were victories over their enemies instead of over themselves.

On December 8th, Napoleon issued a proclamation declaring that the disturbances were appeased, and that this was due, in great measure, to the "calm attitude of the people of Paris." On the 14th, the appeal to universal suffrage gave 7,439,219 votes in favour of the election of the President for

ten years, and 640,737 votes against it. That result was too decisive to be due only to manipulation of the ballot-boxes. The Prefects had been told what was expected of them, and they responded accordingly. The army voted without the protection of the ballot, and, so to speak, by beat of drum. Yet it is scarcely possible that, even if the President and his accomplices had abstained from all undue influence on the electors and falsification of the voting papers, the national verdict would have been materially modified. The very week which saw the Paris streets run red with blood saw the French funds rise 9 per cent. The Parisians, for all their brilliant qualities, have something of the spaniel in their nature. They love the hand that whips them.

Having committed an atrocious crime, Napoleon wished to get absolution for it at the hands of respectable and honest statesmen. Like the promoter of a bubble company, who thinks to make it go down with the public by announcing a number of substantial City men and M.P.'s as directors, without asking their consent, the author of the *Coup d'état* published a list of his advisers, which contained several unexceptionable persons. One of them, Léon Faucher, wrote to the President that he had seen, "with painful astonishment," his name on the Consultative Committee whom the President had appointed. "I did not think" (added M. Faucher) "that I had given you the right to do me this injury. The services which I have rendered you, believing that I was rendering them to the country, authorised me to look for another kind of recognition from you. My character, in any case, merited more respect. You know that in my career, already long, I have denied the principles of liberty no more than my devotion to order. I have never participated, directly or indirectly, in any violation of the law; and in order to decline the mission which you impose upon me, without my consent, I have only to remember that which I have received from the people, and which I still preserve." M. de Goulard wrote more briefly from his prison at Mazas, that he refused, "in the most absolute manner," to fulfil the mission which the President imposed upon him, and which "honour and conscience did not permit him to accept." M. Joseph Périer, Governor of the Bank of France, wrote that if he were to consent to serve on the Commission, now that the law of the country had been audaciously violated, he would lose the respect of all honest men. These were brave words, seeing that they were uttered at a time when no one could tell that they might not be followed

by condemnation to a living death at Cayenne. More than 26,000 Frenchmen were consigned to that fate. It is probable that the total victims of the *Coup d'état* did not fall much short of 50,000. Nevertheless, undeniably honest men, like Montalembert, were so scared by the "Red" spectre, that they declared in favour of the President, believing that he really was what he claimed to be, the saviour of society, and that "the only alternative to the *Coup d'état* was anarchy."

The year 1852 opened with a grand *Te Deum* in Nôtre Dame. During the months that followed, many important changes were made. The inscription, *Liberté, Fraternité, Egalité*, was removed from all public buildings. Already it was out of date, already the Empire was all but established. Two or three plots, probably factitious, were got up, and the dangers, from which the President escaped, were made an additional reason for conferring upon him the divinity "which doth hedge a king." In October, Louis Napoleon convoked the Senate, in order to consult upon a change of Government; and in his message to the same body, on Nov. 4th, he announced the contemplated restoration of the Empire, and ordered the people to be consulted. On Nov. 21st, the *Plébiscite* took place, and the numbers were even more decisive than they had been four months before. For the Empire there were 7,839,522 votes; against it, 254,501. On the first anniversary of the *Coup d'état*, the Prince-President was declared Emperor, and assumed the title of Napoleon III. He had followed the example of his uncle almost slavishly in other matters, and he followed it, too, in asking the imperial family of Austria for a wife. But he was in this matter less successful than Napoleon I. Being thus prevented from contracting the *mariage de convenance*, which he had designed, he allowed his personal predilection to have sway, and he married, with great pomp, Eugénie, the beautiful Countess of Téba. The result of that marriage is well known. A son was born three years later. This only child received his "baptism of fire" when he was fourteen.

"Baptism of Fire!" But—"The Empire is Peace." The founder of the Empire himself said so within two months of its foundation:—"*L'Empire c'est la Paix*," said the President at Bordeaux, Oct. 8th, 1852. "*L'Empire c'est l'Epée*," said the wits, a little later. Within six months from the time that the President became transmuted into Emperor, the Russian ambassador had withdrawn from Constantinople, and on June 13th, Napoleon had won a great political vic-

tory, for on that day the English and French fleets anchored side by side in Besika Bay. The Anglo-French Alliance was now a great fact. The virtuous and constitutional Queen Victoria was now the close ally of the author of the December Massacre. The triumph for him was all the greater, because it was notorious that towards him the Prince Consort entertained a very strong repugnance, so strong as to bring about the fall of the most popular and powerful Foreign Minister whom England has had during the present century. The war which followed there is no need to detail. It is said to have cost Europe £280,000,000, of which sum France had to pay £60,000,000, besides the loss of 100,000 soldiers. Let us be just to Napoleon, however. In making this war he does not seem to have been influenced by any idea of territorial aggrandisement. That he might have obtained without a war, for Nicholas was quite disposed, and actually suggested to the French ambassador, to share in the estate of "the sick man," as he had suggested to our own ambassador, Sir Hamilton Seymour. Peace was made abruptly, perhaps prematurely, at last, mainly through the determination of Napoleon not to persist in the war,—a determination, perhaps, due to the extreme unpopularity of the war among the French people. While it was still waging, visits of State were paid by the two sovereigns of England and France, and by their consorts, to the Courts of St. James's and the Tuileries. At the very height of the conflict, an international exhibition was held in Paris. Napoleon about this time escaped two attempts at assassination, both made in 1855.

In 1857 there was a formidable conspiracy to murder the Emperor. It followed shortly after the elections at which Cavaignac was elected deputy. He declined to take the oath, and died four months later. A still more serious attempt upon the Emperor's life was made in January 1858, as he was driving to the opera. On this occasion the peril was very great. One bomb exploded just before the Emperor's carriage, and wounded twenty persons. The coachman whipped his horses, in order to urge them onward, but a second bomb exploding, struck one of the horses, which fell to the ground. The third bomb so wounded another horse that it died soon afterwards. The coachman was wounded in the head, Napoleon received a slight cut from a splinter of broken glass, and the Superintendent of Police, who opened the carriage-door, was dangerously wounded. At the moment of the last explosion, a man was seen to rush to the carriage, armed with a dagger and a revolver, and was seized. Other

arrests were made on the spot, and on that same night Orsini was taken. He confessed that he had thrown one of the bombs. The conspirators had hatched their plot in Pigott-street, Birmingham, and in that town the bombs had been made. Orsini and Pierri were executed. Lord Palmerston, to please Napoleon, introduced the Conspiracy to Murder Bill, and, in so doing, brought about his own downfall.

Orsini had not died in vain. These numerous conspiracies had been set on foot chiefly by Italians, angry because the Emperor, now that he had the power, would not fulfil an early vow to free Italy. The result was that, within six months from Orsini's execution, there took place at Plombières that interview which was to be so fruitful of changes in the map of Europe. At that meeting Napoleon said—"There are but three men in the world, and two of them are in this room." Probably he placed himself first, Cavour second, and Palmerston (if Palmerston was the other) third. Shortly after this interview, there was another at Compiègne between Napoleon, Palmerston, and Clarendon. Of this second meeting we have no details, further than that it led to the publication of the pamphlet, *Napoléon III. et l'Italie*. Of the first, the particulars are given in M. De la Rive's Biography of Cavour That statesman then saw, or thought he saw, within his reach the completion of the great object of his life. It was to this end that he had striven strenuously and unremittingly. The liberation of Italy had made him persuade his sovereign to take part in the Russian war; had made him claim a place at the Congress of Paris which followed the war; had made him take advantage of the impression produced upon Napoleon by the frequent plots against the Emperor's life, which had been designed by Italian conspirators. There can be no doubt that the war of May and June 1859 was determined upon at that Plombières interview in July 1858. The memorable declaration made by Napoleon on New Year's Day 1859, to the Austrian ambassador, Baron Hübner, was the first public intimation of what had been privately arranged. Profound was the agitation which spread throughout Europe; so profound that, when a little later the well-informed *Indépendance Belge* described at length the imperial project, the imperial organs were instructed to denounce the statement as an entire fabrication, and to declare that there was no chance of war. At one period during that eventful spring, it really seemed as if the catastrophe were not to come off; and Cavour learnt with dismay, akin to despair, that the contemplated campaign must be deferred. Meanwhile,

well-meaning but feeble Lord Malmesbury, then Foreign Minister, was doing his best to prevent a collision. He sent Lord Cowley, our ambassador at Paris, to Vienna, in order to act as mediator between the French and Austrian Governments. It seemed likely that he would succeed, and that the only part of Cavour's programme to be carried out would be the marriage of his sovereign's eldest daughter to Prince Napoleon. But the danger which Cavour feared passed away. Military preparations were hastened on. Austrian troops crossed the Ticino. France declared war against Austria, and the Emperor Napoleon landed at Genoa, May 12th. The result of that campaign is too well known to need description now. We detailed it eight years ago in describing the formation of the kingdom of Italy.* Despite Villafranca and the bitter disappointment which that premature peace caused to Cavour and the Italians, this war, with its victories of Montebello, Palestro, Magenta, Melegnano, and Solferino,—sonorous names to be inscribed upon the Arc d'Etoile,—rendered the Empire more popular in France than it had ever been, or than it was ever to be again. When Napoleon returned to Paris on July 17th, and with his conquering troops passed through the banner-decked capital, he was at the height of his power. His sun had reached its zenith; it was thenceforward to travel with unequal speed, and with occasional pauses and halts, to its setting.

The first great blunder which the Emperor made was to demand payment for a war which he had claimed to undertake solely for an idea, and that the noble one of freeing an oppressed and kindred race from alien and hated rulers. Bitter were the gibes, angry were the reproaches addressed to the victor of Solferino, when he claimed Nice and Savoy as his guerdon for the services which he had declared to be wholly disinterested. The annexation did not, of course, anger the French people. With them, love of territory is almost as strong a passion as love of glory. They had won the second, yet they saw no reason why they should not also have the first. It was otherwise with other nations. From that time forth the *entente cordiale* which had united the two great Western Powers relaxed. Lord Russell said, in the heat of anger, that England must thenceforward look for new allies, and that purpose was steadfastly pursued in cool blood. Fortunately one of the most beneficent acts of the Emperor's reign was not affected by this change of feeling. The treaty

* See *London Quarterly Review*, July, 1865.

of commerce had been virtually settled before the annexation of Nice and Savoy had been announced. The commercial treaty was signed January 23rd, 1860; the treaty of annexation, March 24th. In fact, England and France were to unite their arms in two other countries, once during that same year, and again during 1862, in Asia; once during the following year in America. But there was no longer the cordiality which there had been, and the Emperor who had been wise enough to see that his uncle was destroyed by his hostility against England, and to profit by his example, soon learnt how much he had lost by betraying the confidence of English statesmen. In truth, there was little cordiality between French and English combatants in either of their two last joint wars. Lord Elgin, whose life we reviewed three months ago, has revealed how much friction there was between the chiefs of the two expeditions. In Mexico, this difference of opinion led to an actual secession. England had gone thither solely to enforce payment of the money due to her; France had gone to found a Latin Empire by way of counterpoise to the Anglo-Saxon race, extending rapidly over the whole continent which the Spanish Columbus had discovered. Such an object had naturally no attraction for an Anglo-Saxon people, even had they deemed it likely to be realised. The more prudent among them doubted if it would be realised, albeit Napoleon had chosen the most favourable time for it, the period when the Anglo-Saxon inhabitants of the United States were engaged in a deadly internecine war, and were thus temporarily unable to give effect to the Monroe doctrine.

At first it seemed as if Napoleon would succeed. He persuaded the brother of the Emperor whom he had defeated at Solferino to ascend the throne of Montezuma, and a certain portion of the Mexicans rallied round the standard of Maximilian. But this success was soon shown to be only very partial and very superficial. It became clear that the Mexican Empire would survive only so long as the Confederate Government in the United States survived. Hence Napoleon's urgent representations to our statesmen that we should join with him in recognising that Government. It is possible, though not probable, that but for the memory of Nice and Savoy, Lord Russell might have consented. As it was, he steadily refused; and scarcely was the civil war ended, when Napoleon was warned, in the most peremptory manner, that he must clear out of Mexico. Nothing more tragic has happened in the history of this tragic century than the close of this "Latin

Empire." It was while its founder seemed to be at the height of his power, at the very moment when he had gathered together in his imperial palace well-nigh half the crowned heads in Europe, that the news came of the murder of the amiable and accomplished Maximilian, that prince whom he had induced to accept the crown of Mexico on the condition that he should be supported by French troops, and whom he deserted, recalling those troops, and leaving him to his most melancholy fate. The handwriting on the wall which told Belshazzar that he had been weighed in the balances and found wanting, and that his kingdom had been given to another, was scarcely a plainer warning of coming destruction than were those dire tidings which reached Napoleon in the midst of the international revels of the great Paris Exhibition of 1867.

Prior to this date there had been other memorable events in Europe. In 1863 the Polish insurrection caused great excitement in France, so much so that it seemed at one time as if Napoleon would have aided that unfortunate race against the Russians. But it is a long march from Paris to Warsaw; and Austria and Prussia were, no less than Russia, interested in the suppression of the outbreak. So, on Nov. 4, 1863, Napoleon sent invitations to the great powers to attend an international conference of sovereigns. Lord Russell could not see what was to be gained by it, and declined the invitation with unnecessary bluntness. In the following year, the German invasion of Denmark took place, and it was then Lord Russell's turn to receive a rebuff. He proposed a joint naval expedition to the Baltic in the interests of Denmark; and Napoleon, after having allowed the English Ministry to believe that this proposition would be accepted, and to commit themselves accordingly, suddenly declined, and the war went on. Necessarily Denmark succumbed, though not until after she had made a most gallant defence. The Treaty of Vienna, signed Oct. 30, 1864, inflicted upon the little State the loss of the three German duchies and a heavy fine. That treaty contained the seed of a new war. Austria and Prussia had fought side by side in Denmark, yet not through any love for each other, but because neither could afford to allow the other to be more prominent and energetic than itself. It was probably of set purpose that Bismarck introduced the provision for the joint occupation of the Dano-German duchies. It furnished him with a pretext for quarrelling with Austria two years later. Before the strife reached its climax, Bismarck visited Napoleon at Biarritz, Oct. 1865, and sought

to obtain from him the promise that he would be at least neutral during the coming conflict. Something was said about a rectification of frontiers, whereby France would benefit. Napoleon deemed it the height of astute diplomacy not to commit himself to any formal undertakings, nor to sign any formal treaty. His intention was to let the two combatants exhaust themselves, and then to strike in and name his own terms. As usual, the official French journals wrote of peace at the time that their master knew war to be certain. At length he himself gave indication of his intentions, and on May 6, 1866, speaking at Auxerre, he declared his "detestation" of the treaties of 1865. The extreme rapidity of the war which followed, two months later, disconcerted all his movements. Scarcely had Sadowa been fought, than Napoleon demanded his promised reward—the rectification of the French frontier. But Bismarck knew nothing of any promise. He had failed to extract any from Napoleon at Biarritz; he was not going to consider himself more bound than Napoleon had done. That was a terrible blow to the French Emperor. It made the French Empire reel. Prussia had gained Hanover, Cassel, part of Saxony; had driven Austria out of the Germanic Confederation, and established a strong North German power, instead of that weak, because always divided, agglomeration of states whose representatives used to meet at Frankfort. At the same time that this new strong power had been raised up on the eastern frontier of France, the work which Napoleon had left unfinished in 1859 had been carried on, and Italy was "free from the Alps to the Adriatic." All the imperial finessing had, therefore, resulted only in this, the establishment of a strong Germany and a strong Italy, together able to hold France in check; and France unable to gain a single fortress. The anger of the French people knew no bounds. Thiers told the Imperial Ministry that they had not a fault left to commit. The Emperor affected to treat Bismarck's rebuff with indifference. It was of no consequence, he gave out. But from that time forward, he prepared for war, and was constantly making expeditions to foreign courts in order to find new allies. Then came another rebuff, a few months later, when Napoleon would have bought the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and found himself threatened with war by Prussia. That bargain had to be broken off shortly before the news of Maximilian's death arrived. The splendour of Paris *fêtes* could not appease the mortification which these repeated disasters caused. They rendered

inevitable one of two things: constitutional government or war.

The further progress of the decline of the Empire we traced at length two and a half years ago.* We need not now repeat the dismal tale on the present occasion. Napoleon tried the first of the two alternatives, seeing that it was utterly impossible to maintain personal government. But he would not consent to make the trial thoroughly. He reserved to himself the right to appeal from the Corps Législatif to the people; to override a vote of his Parliament by a Plébiscite. That obstinacy compelled Count Daru to resign, and his place was taken by that most incompetent foreign minister the Duc de Gramont. He had been ambassador at Vienna, and his appointment was part of the intrigue which had been set on foot whereby France, having declared war upon Prussia, was to have the assistance of Austria. Here, again, Moltke's swiftness of movement frustrated the conspiracy, as it had frustrated Napoleon's purpose four years before. Once more, and for the last time, Napoleon's foreign policy had grievously blundered. It was the last, but it was also a fatal blunder. All those journeyings to and fro, from capital to capital, which had worried and wearied Europe, had been in vain. At the last, he had to fight and perish alone. His foreign policy had been one great series of thwarted designs. As the present writer has observed elsewhere†:—

"He was brought into more or less intimate relations with most of the crowned heads of Europe, but his enmity hurt them little, his friendship profited them less. Against the Emperor of Russia he levied successful war eighteen years ago, and compelled his successor to sue for peace. The only loss which the Czar sustained through his defeat was made up to him two years ago, when the Black Sea was once more thrown open to his war-ships. He very nearly paid dear for Napoleon's friendship. It was as his guest, driving with him in the same carriage, that he well nigh fell a victim to Berézowski's bullet. The Emperor of Austria seemed to have sustained a severe blow on Midsummer Day, 1859; but though the defeat of Solferino involved the loss of Lombardy, it brought about the consolidation of the Austrian Empire by the reconciliation between Austria and Hungary, and the establishment of Constitutional Government. Afterwards, when Napoleon offered some sort of compensation for Solferino, and placed the brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph upon the throne of Mexico, he was preparing for the House of Hapsburg a day of tribulation and mourning; for the Emperor he had made he had to abandon, and could not even save him from execution. The King of

* *London Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1870. † *Daily News*, Jan. 18, 1873.

Prussia, whom Napoleon never loved, and whose humiliation he would gladly have witnessed, became, by his own instrumentality, the most powerful sovereign in Europe; and while residing as a victor in the Palace of the French kings, restored the German Empire, and assumed the imperial dignity. Napoleon did indeed lay the first stone of the Italian kingdom, but he never intended to build that structure. His ideas were far other than that when he first declared that he would free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic." After the peace of Villafranca, he used all his efforts to prevent Italian unification, and twice sent his troops to protect the Pope's temporal sovereignty. It was quite in accordance with his usual ill-luck that the kingdom, whose establishment he would have frustrated, became established, and that the sovereignty, which he would have upheld, became overthrown. The very first check which Napoleon sustained in his last fatal campaign heralded the completion of the Kingdom of Italy, and the termination of the Papal rule. His friendship for Queen Isabella of Spain as little availed to save her from expulsion, as his interposition on behalf of another Bourbon, Francis II. of Naples, had saved that king from the like fate. Our own Queen, almost alone of all the sovereigns with whom he was on terms of friendliness, did not suffer thereby. It is well to point this moral, for we learn from it how little, after all, is the permanent influence which any one man has upon the political condition of the world. The Archduke Maximilian shot at Queretaro, King William proclaimed Emperor of Germany at Versailles, each of these events was a terrible anti-climax, revealing alike the powerlessness to establish, and the powerlessness to overthrow. The sovereign, whose words had agitated Europe from the Ural Mountains to the Bay of Biscay, lived to see every one of his designs set aside and overturned; and he himself, the great schemer, shared the fate of his schemes."

It is not easy to pass judgment upon Napoleon's domestic policy. It did not fail so manifestly and so entirely as his foreign policy. So far as regards material prosperity, France benefited greatly under the Empire. The great cities, especially Paris, were beautified to a degree for which there is no parallel in modern history. The country was covered with railways and traversed by roads. The commerce of France increased to a marvellous extent under the impetus given by Free Trade. The peasantry were able to save money to an extent which surprised the whole world, when, after the late disastrous war, they brought forth their hoards from many a chimney corner and old stocking, to invest them in the new loan. Some of these benefits were purchased at too high a price; and the reckless manner in which Baron Haussmann plunged the Parisians into debt, made them confess that even gold might be bought too dear. But, after all, it is when we have to speak of the political and moral condition

of France that we feel most impelled to pronounce the Second Empire a failure. It did nothing towards teaching the people to govern themselves. They are just as divided, and just as much broken up into irreconcilable factions which would end in fighting each other to-morrow, if M. Thiers were to die, as they were during the Presidency from 1848 to 1851. The boldest prophet would not venture to predict what form of Government will be existing in France two years hence. The morals of France can scarcely be worse than they were during the closing scandalous days of Louis Philippe's reign. But the Empire did nothing to make Frenchmen purer, nobler, or more religious, than they were before the overthrow of the Orleanists. It is very much the fashion in some quarters to laud the late Emperor, as if he had been an Augustus and a Vespasian; but no one of his most devoted adherents has ventured to suggest that he was a Marcus Aurelius. In truth he was notoriously profligate in private life, and his Court was decent only by comparison with that of Isabella of Spain. Under these influences the youth of France grew up enervated and selfish, and the late war showed how little of heroism and chivalry there was among the people. This was inevitable under a *regime* which suppressed such works as the Duc d'Aumale's *History of the House of Conde*, and licensed the filthy novels of Feydeau. It is difficult for a high moral tone to be regained when once lost, and there seems little hope of any general restoration among a people divided into worshippers of relics and worshippers of Voltaire. Doubtless, the Emperor wished and meant well for France. He desired not only to establish his dynasty, but to make his country the foremost in the world. That he has failed in both objects is due, in part, to the people over whom he ruled, but, in large measure, to himself.

ART. VII.—1. *Traité du Saint-Esprit.* Par Mgr. GAUME, Protonotaire Apostolique, Docteur en Théologie, &c.

2. *Expose Sommaire de la Doctrine de l'Eglise sur le Saint-Esprit.* Par HENRI DE GUINAUMONT, Donniol, Paris. Paris: Gaume Frères.

MORE than once within the last few years we have charged the doctrinal system of Rome—whether undiluted or diluted Romanism—with a pervading suppression or neglect of the Holy Ghost. Here are two works just now published which might seem to contain a vigorous disproof of this allegation. How far that is the case will be seen in the course of our observations upon the more important of the two books, that of Monseigneur Gaume: a book, it may be said at the outset, worthy of the genius, learning, and ability of its distinguished author, however unworthy, on the whole, of its high subject, the economy of the Holy Ghost in the redemption of mankind.

We are justified in paying this tribute to the ability of our author, concerning whom, as one of the most important factors in modern Roman Catholic controversy, it may not be uninteresting to furnish our readers with a little more information. He belongs to a family abounding in characters eminent for devotion to the See of Rome: in the present generation it has given two eminent writers to the cause, and a publishing firm the colossal enterprises of which have laid even the enemies of Romanism under great obligation. He himself is one of the few survivors of a school of modern Romanists which De Maistre may be said to have founded, the fundamental principles of which are intense devotion to the Pontiff, and an extreme ardour in the defence of supernaturalism as against the secular and atheistic tendencies of the age. Mgr. Gaume has been an indefatigable writer for a long series of years. He has been remarkably consistent in his maintenance of one great principle, that the spirit of faith is absolute and peremptory in religious matters. Rationalism has been the deadly enemy which, in a voluminous series of catechisms, histories, and essays for the times, he has attacked, using weapons both of reason and unreason.

Whilst many of his contemporaries have striven to conciliate the doubting and scrupulous spirit of the times, he has known nothing of compromise. He has pursued his way like one who had made a compact with his reason never to ask for light upon mysteries that faith had settled, and to him settled for ever. Shielded by this early covenant of abnegation from the inquiries and speculations and searchings of heart that make up the solemn probation of those whose religion has not taught them the necessity of abdicating private judgment, he has gone on his way confirming, of course, those whom he finds like-minded, but without any power to convince and win those who have perverted right reason into the service of Rationalism. Very often a successful pleader for the doctrines of the Sacred Trinity and the world's redemption through Christ, he is also very often a blind man leading the blind. His works have been exceedingly popular among the more bigoted sections of Romanism; they have won for him high distinction in the Roman curia; but they have never enlisted the sympathy of Romanists who yearn for clearer light. In thus speaking of Mgr. Gaume, we are not expressing the result of our own study of his writings, but the estimate formed by the aid of trustworthy notices on the part of those who have read them. We have no sympathy with the school or its books. We believe that its essential principles are wrong; that they are false to Christian truth and to the liberty of the evangelical spirit. We neither read them, nor advise others to read them; but, for the reason assigned at the outset, this work riveted our attention, and a careful study of it has not been without its reward.

To pass then from the author to the work. It is satisfactory to find that the Introduction admits all that we have said as to the neglect of the Holy Spirit in Romanist theology. In the following characteristic, though somewhat melodramatic, terms, the subject is touched upon in the introduction:—

"The Father is known, He is respected, He is loved. Could it be otherwise? His works are palpable, and always present to the bodily eyes. The magnificence of the heavens, the riches of the earth, the immensity of the ocean, the tumult of the waves, the rolling of the thunder, the wonderful harmony which reigns in all the departments of the universe, declare, with an eloquence intelligible to every man, the existence, the wisdom, and the power of God, the Father and preserver of all that is. The Son is known, He is respected, He is loved. Not less numerous than those which proclaim the Father, and not less eloquent, are the preachers who speak of Him. The touching history of His birth, of His life, of His death; the cross, the temples, the

images, the pictures, the sacrifice of the altar, the festivals, popularise the several mysteries of His humiliation, of His love, and of His glory. Finally, the Eucharist, which makes Him personally present in the tabernacles, causes to gravitate towards Him the entire Catholic life, from the cradle to the tomb. But is it the same with the Holy Spirit? His peculiar works are not sensible, like those of the Father and the Son. The sanctification which He effects on our souls, the life which He everywhere diffuses, escapes the sight and the touch. He was not, like the Son, made flesh. He has not, like the Son, dwelt in human form among the children of Adam. Only three times did He exhibit Himself under a sensible, though transitory emblem: as a dove at the Jordan, as a luminous cloud on Mount Tabor, as the tongues of fire at Pentecost. To represent Him the arts have not been able, as in the case of Our Lord, to diversify their pictures. Two symbols are all the plastic means at the disposal of piety to represent to the eyes of piety His existence and His benefactions."—P. 7.

The author then proceeds to dilate upon the dearth of doctrinal works in his communion devoted to the person and work of the Spirit. He declares that for some centuries all that has been done in this way is to be sought in subordinate chapters on the Trinity, on the Creeds, and on the Sacraments. In the Diocesan Catechisms little more is found than bare definitions. Direct teaching has been most meagre, especially in France. Among all the sermons of Bossuet, there is not one to be found on the Holy Ghost; not one among the eloquent and diversified orations of Massillon; and only one discourse in all the works of Bourdaloue. Hence, this honest writer feels his soul stirred within him; his zeal is fired on behalf of the dishonoured Spirit. He mourns over, and condemns, in no measured terms, the utter absence, amongst most Catholics, of the fundamental elements of knowledge concerning the influences of the Third Person. He does not scruple to apply to them the confession of the neophytes of Ephesus:—"If there be a Holy Ghost, we have not heard Him spoken of; we know but little about Him, and we invoke Him still less." Nothing can be conceived more vigorous than his description of the withering effect upon spiritual life of a systematic neglect of the influences of the Divine Spirit, the source of all spiritual life. It might be supposed that the work which is introduced by these solemn confessions and protests would be a thorough and searching exposure of the mechanical and carnal system of Romanist worship, and of the perverted doctrine on which that worship rests. How terribly in earnest the writer is, the following sentences will show:—

"What are we to say of those innumerable multitudes who are found in the heart of our cities or fill our country districts, without any other religious knowledge than the necessarily very imperfect teachings of their catechism, which are always very swiftly forgotten? what can we suppose the Holy Spirit is to them? We do not fear to affirm that He is the unknown God whose solitary altar St. Paul found on entering Athens. If they have preserved some notions of the principal mysteries of the faith, experience teaches us that concerning the Holy Ghost, His necessary influence, the process and final end of His successive operations, they live in an ignorance almost entirely unrelieved. These multitudes form, no one can dispute, the immense majority of the nations of the world. It is in this sense that I find the sad justification of the motto which I have chosen for my book: *Ignoto Deo, To the Unknown God.*"—P. 9.

This is a stern impeachment of the influence and results of the Roman Catholic teaching in Europe. It is honest and unreserved; not referring to Protestant communities, or those countries in which the Church's mission has been thwarted or paralysed by dissent, but applied to the very centres and chosen seats of Catholicism. The effects of this deplorable defect are traced with as much fidelity as the cause of it. Page after page describes the ascendency of the evil spirit, "Satanism or Paganism," throughout Catholic Christendom, and under the very shadow of the Vatican. Echoing the language of the *Civittà Cattolica*, our author avows that Europe, Italy, Rome herself, are pervaded by Paganism. The modern world is returning by rapid steps to heathenism. Without reviving its grosser idolatries, it is renewing its Paganism in its thoughts, in its affections, in its tendencies, in its works, in its words. So true is this that, "if from the immense sepulchre which is called the Roman soil were to emerge alive the people contemporaneous with Scipio and Coriolanus, and if they were to regard, not our temples and our worship, but solely the thoughts, the aspirations, the language of the great mass, they would find between themselves and us no sensible difference, save in prostration of soul and imbecility of ideas." Quoting still from that Ultramontane paper the words of Father Curci, he goes on to say: "Looking at society and the family, listening to the common interchange of conversation, reading the current books and journals, considering the evident tendencies of all things, it is hardly possible to find anything but nature, nature alone, and always nature." He confesses that the consuming worm at the heart of modern society is not Protestantism, nor Indifferentism, nor any other social malady that may receive

a specific name, but the Paganism that pervades all, the Paganism "that has all the degradation and all the abominations of that which is obsolete, without its originality and its grandeur, born of the corruption of Christianity, or rather of its decrepit and gangrened civilisation."

We must not be misled by these abject confessions and sweeping charges into the supposition that Mgr. Gaume has any distrust of the foundations of the system that he has spent his life in defending. If we look carefully into the heart of those denunciations we shall find that they, in reality, impute to a certain undefined tendency of the age, called rhapsodically Naturalism, or Satanism, or Paganism, what really should be imputed, so far as Roman Catholic territory is concerned, to the corruptions of Roman Catholic doctrine and worship and government. In the spirit of the notorious *Syllabus*, the scientific tendencies and materialistic hypotheses of the age are made the cause of a general withdrawal of the Holy Ghost, instead of being made the effect of it. So far as the impeachment is true—that is, so far as modern science is "nature only and nature always," which, through God's mercy, is very far from being universally the case—Romanist unfaithfulness to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost is very largely the cause of it. Not, of course, the only cause. The same unfaithfulness has been only too manifest in Protestantism, and has been followed by the same melancholy results. But with Protestant denials of the supremacy of the Divine Spirit we have not now to do. We have a work before us the professed object of which is to rouse the Roman Catholic world to a juster appreciation of the study of the Holy Ghost, as a glorious Person irradiating theology; and we shall have to show, though not in a systematic way, that the doctrine of the Spirit here laid down is not such as we can suppose that Divine Spirit to accept and ratify by the tokens of His acceptance. It is not such, on the whole, especially in that part of it which concerns His functions in the spiritual edification and sanctification of believers. As to some other points, it is wonderfully clear, forcible, convincing, and even fascinating; for it is the labour of a man of genius, of learning, and of evident sincerity.

First of all, and before passing beyond the threshold of this work, we are encountered by the fatal error that the supreme source of instruction as to the Holy Ghost is not the words which *the Holy Ghost Himself teacheth*, but those words as interpreted by the Fathers, and especially, strange to say, by those doubtful Fathers, the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages.

Well does the author say that the love of loyalty and desire towards the Divine Spirit must be awakened by a true knowledge—*Ignoti nulla cupido*—and that the knowledge required must be more than a general and merely philosophic or theoretic knowledge, that it must be intimate, experimental, and determining practice. Now, there is nothing more certain than that the Holy Ghost alone can declare the counsel of His own method for man's salvation. If in any department of theology the Author of Scripture reserves for Himself the conduct and process of instruction, it must needs be in that which concerns the laws, conditions, and evidences of His most mysterious operation on the soul of man. But in this book the first place is really, and most avowedly, given to the Schoolmen. It is not that Mgr. Gaume is ignorant of the Holy Scriptures, or neglects their teaching; he is profoundly versed in the Bible, and in its original tongues; and there are few passages which do not contribute their sound, at least, to the exposition of these volumes. But it is, after all, the traditional interpretation of the Fathers that reigns everywhere. Evidence of this may be found by way of anticipation in the following enthusiastic sentences, which are very suggestive as coming from an author who is never weary of alleging against Protestants their violation of the Saviour's command not to call any man "Father" on earth :—

"Are we dealing with dogmatic truths in the way of vigorous definition, giving the last reason of things, or showing the hierarchical connection which unites the elements of our religious being and growth? In such critical questions, St. Thomas has been our master. May the abundant citations from his pages make him more and more known, and hasten the movement which draws serious minds in the present day towards this incomparable focus of all true science, human and Divine! Is it not time to return from the aberration which has been so fatal to the clergy, to the faithful, to the Church, to general society? There is extant a genius, unique in his kind, whom the admiration of ages terms the *Prince of Theology*, the *Angel of the Schools*, the *Angelical Doctor*. In a vast synthesis this genius embraces all the theological, philosophical, political, social sciences, and teaches them with a clearness and depth which are incomparable. Although as it respects the form and sometimes the substance, his teaching here and there has the inevitable impress of human infirmity, it is, nevertheless, so rare in its general character that at the Council of Trent his writings were, according to tradition, considered worthy—by a privilege unknown in the annals of the Church—of being placed by the side of the Bible. This great genius is a saint to whom the Vicar of Jesus Christ, canonising his virtues, rendered this solemn homage: 'As many articles as Brother Thomas has written, so many miracles

has he wrought. He alone has done more to enlighten the Church than all other doctors. He is an encyclopædia that renders all others needless. In his school we profit more in a year than during a lifetime in the school of other doctors.'"—P. 18.

Of this quotation we will say no more than that it fairly exhibits the inconsistency of the Romanist theory of tradition and the Church's authority. If into the treasure-house of one man, late in the history of the Church, were gathered all the riches of the religious knowledge of the ages, what becomes of the voice of the Councils and of the older Fathers? What becomes of the living, never-failing infallibility of the utterances of the Pontiff, delivered from his chair, for every emergency. The language of Pope John XXII., just quoted, and that which we shall now quote from Mgr. Gaume once more, seems to us to place Romanism and Protestantism on the very same level as it regards sources of theology,—with this difference, however, that there is no doctor in Protestantism before whom any body of Protestants bows down with such prostration of intellect, placing his writings on the level with the Scriptures. We shall probably have a few quotations from Thomas Aquinas to adduce, and the following testimony may be remembered when they come. It seems to us to betoken an exceedingly unhealthy theological tone in the infallible Church.

"In short, that nothing may be wanting to his glory, his genius is of such grandeur, that an heresiarch of the sixteenth century was not afraid to say—*Tolle Thomam et ecclesiam dissipabo:* 'Take away Thomas, and I will destroy the Church.' Thus we may consider St. Thomas, placed in the middle of the ages, at once as a reservoir to which have converged all the streams of Eastern and Western doctrine, and as a sieve, percolating through which the waters of tradition, disengaged of all that is not high and pure science, reach us fresh and limpid, without having lost anything of their fertilising power."—P. 19.

We are inclined, with Bayle, to doubt whether Bucer ever said this; but, if he said it, his meaning was clear enough. The entire system of the Church of Rome, as such distinctively, is built upon a foundation more modern than that of the Apostles and prophets. Roman Catholic theology, so far as it is distinctively such, is a systematic, gigantic elaboration of Mediæval elements. Bucer would have been quite right, understanding by Thomas the whole corpus of Mediæval canonists, jurists, and theologians. If Mgr. Gaume honestly means what he goes on to say, the confession is a deplorable one. He does not scruple to affirm that the Roman *Renaissance*,

which had banished Thomas from the seminaries and colleges, had almost ruined Catholic doctrine. "Without knowing it, we have ourselves fulfilled, in part at least, the wish of the heresiarch." That is, by neglecting the public and private study of Thomas, theology has been robbed of its science; philosophy has been dwarfed; jurisprudence has been wrested from its foundation; the depth, breadth, solidity, and nutritive virtue of the doctrine diluted in modern works, books, essays, reviews, conferences, sermons, catechisms, have been reduced to the lowest point. From the melancholy review of modern theological literature, the author turns to the one consolation that is left: "How much more pleasant it is to hail the movement that betokens a return towards Saint Thomas. Happy were I if these lines, springing from the most intimate depths of my soul in its sorrow and love, should tend to make that return more general and more swift."

No dispassionate mind can fail to see that in all this there is the most refined exercise and defence of that private judgment against which Rome so persistently protests, which she so absolutely interdicts to all but herself. Such divines as Mgr. Gaume are not such blind devotees of the Church's infallibility as they are supposed to be; or, in other words, they are consciously or unconsciously dishonest to their professed allegiance. They use the Scriptures as we use them, with the same tacit acknowledgment that they are the only standard or canon by which doctrine is to be tested. This work abounds with illustrations of perfect professed loyalty to the Word of God; a loyalty more honourable in itself than true to the Romanist theory. But then the meaning of that Word is elaborately deduced by private judgment, guided, not it appears by the decisions of Councils, or the voice of an infallible Pontiff, but by the teaching of the Fathers as concentrated and vocal in St. Thomas. What is the difference between Romanists and other men as to the great principle of the personal proving of all things and holding fast the good, as applied to the interpretation of Scripture? Only this, that other men avow the principle and act upon it, while Romanists, in a large majority of cases, adopt the principle in their practice, while denying it in their theory.

In the discussion of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, Mgr. Gaume takes the widest and most comprehensive view possible of his subject. For instance, one of his two octavo volumes is devoted to such aspects and relations of the doctrine as belong to extra-redemptional theology, and are confined to

the broad universe of things and the Old Testament domain. Now this method of treatment is, to a certain extent, greatly to be commended. At any rate, so far as the Old Testament is concerned, there is a rich and wonderful field which the theology of the Holy Ghost has not generally been anxious to explore. Our author leaves no room for the imputation of neglect to himself. But inasmuch as the Old Testament leads up to the originals of things, and links the human scene and its actors with the outside universe, there is obviously a danger of connecting the doctrine of the Holy Ghost with canonical theories and the foundations of human knowledge. Mgr. Gaume has seized the idea of Augustine's *City of God*, and makes his first volume a reproduction, to some extent, of that vast work, only with the Holy Ghost, or God as a Spirit, for the governing idea. Our observations on this part of the subject will be brief and fragmentary, as we have more concern with the proper subject of the work, the special office and functions of the Holy Ghost on the economy of Redemption.

Passing by the disquisition at the beginning on that principle of "catholic theology and high philosophy," that "all corporeal beings are governed and maintained in their order by spiritual beings, all visible creatures by creatures invisible,"—a principle which neither sound theology nor sound philosophy can understand or accept,—we pass to the origin of evil. The dualism, or antagonism between the two spirits on earth—the spirit of evil and the spirit of good—is only the reproduction or reflection of a dualism in heaven itself. The entire supernatural order of the universe, proved by the movement of matter which requires a universe of spiritual agents to produce that everlasting motion, is divided into good and evil, in consequence of a great decision formed in heaven above. The text of Scripture in which the origin of evil is found, and, therefore, contains "treasures of light," is that which in the Apocalypse narrates the combat between Michael and the Dragon. The combat was a spiritual one, and purely intellectual: an opposition between pure spirits, in which some said "*Yes*" to an eternal truth, and the others said "*No*." The truth which divided heaven was a supernatural revelation: that of the coming Incarnation of the Word. This was proposed to celestial intelligences, and divided heaven. The acceptance or rejection of it was the test of angels and of men. We are saved or lost according as we believe or deny that Christ has come: they are saved or lost according as they accepted or refused to accept the

fiat of God. But a sentence or two must here be given from the author, writing much under the inspiration of Saint Thomas :—

"'And Michael and his angels fought against the Dragon.' Scarcely was the dogma to be believed proposed, when one of the most glorious archangels, Lucifer, uttered the cry of revolt, '*I protest.* The purpose is to bring us down : I will go up. It is intended to abase my throne : I will exalt it above the stars. I will sit on the covenant-wall : on the sides of the north. It is I, and not another, who will be like the Most High.' (Isai. xliv. 13, 14.) A portion of the angels repeat,—'We protest.' At these words, an archangel, not less glorious than Lucifer, cries,—'Who is like unto God? Who can refuse to believe and to adore what He has given to the faith and the adoration of His creatures? I believe and adore.' The multitude of the celestial hierarchy repeat,—'We believe and adore.' Immediately punished, as they are guilty, Lucifer and his adherents, changed into horrible demons, are precipitated to the depths of that hell which their pride had thus prepared."—P. 31.

The word "protest" is carefully chosen for the initial word of all sin in the universe. Lest the reader should not notice the force of it, a foot-note adds :—"Such is the first origin of Protestantism. In this sense it may flatter itself that it is not of yesterday." But our author forgets that Michael and the good angels also "protested" against the protest of the evil ones ; and if we take the liberty of making their remonstrance the prototype of our Protestantism, there is no valid power to dispute our rights. But to return. Some slight effort is made to trace this theory of the origin of evil to the earlier and more trustworthy Fathers, but to no purpose. It remains the heritage of Thomas and his school. Suarez speaks the sentiment of the modern school when he says that it must be held as extremely probable that Lucifer's sin was the desire of his pride to attain for himself the hypostatic union. Hence, his eternal enmity to Jesus Christ. "A God-man, a man-God, a virgin-mother, the highest elevation of the humblest creature, human nature preferred to the angelic, the obligation to adore in a man-God their inferior become their superior! On this revelation the pride of Lucifer revolts, and his jealousy bursts forth."

And now the scene of the conflict passes from heaven to earth. "And the Dragon persecuted the woman who brought forth the child." What woman is on earth the object of this never-ceasing persecution? "It is the woman *par excellence ;* the woman of whom it was said to the Dragon himself, immediately after his first victory, 'I will place

enmity between thee and the woman, between thy seed and her seed: he shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt lay snares for his heel.'" For thus does the Vulgate read,—"*Ipsa conteret caput tuum, et tu insidiaberis calcaneo ejus.*" "Listen to the voice of ages past, and of present ages: all here echo the one name—MARY." The key-note thus struck, the strain goes on in a tone which ages past disavow, which present ages do not accept, and which, we make bold to say, will be forgotten in the ages to come. Mary is the immortal woman. She lived in Eve forty centuries before her birth. This Satan well knew. She still lives in the Church, and Satan knows it now. Mary was, in Eve, the mother of all the living. Hence, his dire and fatal enmity against woman in particular. "In woman, in the Virgin especially, he sees Mary. He sees her who should bruise his head, therefore, at every cost, he will torture, degrade, and persecute woman, partly to avenge his defeat, partly to prevent the world from believing in the incomparable dignity of the woman, and thus to shake the very foundations of the dogma of the Incarnation: *Persecutus est mulierem.*"

We must not continue our extracts. Suffice that we express our deep distrust of the theology that appeals in everything to Scripture, and interprets it, not by itself, "comparing spiritual things with spiritual," but by the Mediæval Schoolmen. Mgr. Gaume knows the Bible well. He must know that those earliest words of the Gospel, preached on the threshold of Paradise, announced the woman's seed, and not the woman, as the Vanquisher of Satan. Indeed, he tacitly admits this when he says that "while the Vanquisher of Satan is the Son of the woman, nevertheless, without Mary, this Conqueror would not have existed, and Satan would have continued, as before, the king of this world." Can blindness go beyond this, to make the existence of the world's Redeemer dependent on a human mother! He believes that the same Apostle who wrote the text in the Apocalypse, wrote also the Gospel, in which the Saviour Himself declares His coming victory over Satan in every variety of form, but never with the slightest reference to the coadjutorship of His virgin-mother. But he is not an exceptional violator of the Church's sublime ascription of its triumph to the Son alone. He is only the eloquent mouthpiece of all modern Romanist theology. He is not worse nor is he better than his fellows, when he says that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception has "glorified the eternal enemy of Satan with a glory till then unheard of,"—though the

words have a fearful truth in them, that was not in his thought—and that "when the triumph of Mary was thus raised to its highest limits, the last echoes of the thunder threatened against him six thousand years before, fell on Satan," and that "only to-day has the virginal foot of the woman rested with all its weight on the head of the Serpent," adding, with an exquisite touch of the Frenchman, "Let Pius IX. suffer untold anguish: he has deserved it all!" And he is rather moderate than otherwise when he rejoices in the well-known words of the Breviary: "Rejoice, Mary; for you alone have destroyed heresy throughout the world;" and makes the Church the daughter and extension or prolongation of Mary upon earth, her blood Divine having engendered the Church; and crowns all with the apostrophe: "Woman of Genesis and of the Apocalypse, placed at the beginning and the end of all human things, blessed art thou!" What an inexpressible change, and what an inexpressible relief to turn from these words of earth to the heavenly words of St. John and St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians!

It is pleasant to pass to those characteristics of the former volume which are worthy of praise. The contrast between the City of God and the City of Evil, between the celestial hierarchy and the powers of darkness, between the true religion and its myriad caricatures and distortions in heathenism, is exhibited chapter after chapter in a style that has not been surpassed for fulness and dramatic power since Augustine first suggested the topic. The only drawback—and it is not an inconsiderable one—is this, that the anxiety to make out a clear case of imitation or parody on the part of Satan drives the writer to a thousand forced analogies and doubtful resemblances. The sublimity of the truth that the god of this world has studied and counterworked the kingdom of Christ throughout the ages is grievously lowered when the awful truth is pursued into innumerable details of illustration, and with a fertility of fancy that knows how to turn the slightest allusions to account. This has a remarkable illustration in the long and learned chapters which are devoted to the sacrifices of heathenism. It is shown, in a multitude of particulars, that the king of the City of Evil has taken into his service every element of revealed truth and Divine appointment concerning sacrifices. As sacrifice was the proclamation of the divinity of the Being to whom it was offered, Satan has specially delighted in sacrifices, down to the most petty detail mimicking the temple service. But chiefly has he delighted

in the blood of man. The direction which the author's reflections take will be indicated by the following words :—.

"The history of human sacrifices reveals the profoundest depths of the hatred of the great homicide to the Incarnate Word and man his brother. Hatred could go no further than in this direction, nor have a greater object, nor, indeed, a wider range of illustration. On the one hand, total destruction is its design, and, on the other hand, human sacrifice has made the circuit of the world. It even now reigns everywhere where the king of the City of Evil has an uncontrolled sway. . . . Among the sacred rites prescribed to Moses none was more mysterious, and none more celebrated, than that of the scapegoat. Two goats, provided and nourished for this purpose, were brought to the high priest, at the entrance of the tabernacle. Laden with the sins of the people, one was immolated in expiation, the other was chased into the desert to mark the removal of merited chastisement. The sacrifice took place every year: this Divine institution has been fearfully imitated. But in this way: instead of the blood of a goat, he requires the blood of a man."—P. 280.

Then follows a long and exhaustive and valuable—painfully valuable—account of the human sacrifices of ancient and modern times. There is a terrible solemnity about this detail which makes us forget the parody of Divine things on which it is supposed to be based. But when the writer goes on to show that all the accessories and minor characteristics of sacrifice are caricatured in the heathenism and unorthodox Christianity of modern times, his subject loses its sublimity in his hands and becomes grotesque.

For instance, the manifold expressions of holy joy that accompanied the sacrifices of the Jewish temple are represented as reproduced, not only in the wild dances and orgies of heathenism, but also in the religious frenzy of many Protestant sects. Pages are devoted to the camp meetings of Methodism in America and England: to say the least, a very far-fetched illustration of Satan's methods of parodying ancient sacrificial gladness. Not a sentence, however, is devoted to illustrations that might with equal propriety have been selected from the convulsionary extravagances of many forms of Mediæval and more modern Romanism. We have no disposition to enlarge upon this subject. But the question of Anthropophagy is more suggestive and more worthy of consideration. It is singular to find this horrible practice of barbarous nations elevated into a Satanic travesty of the sacred ordinance of eating the sacrificial victims. The fearful array of evidences here accumulated abundantly prove the degradation to which mankind have been reduced by the

powers of darkness; but the author fails to show that the cannibalism of uncivilised races, and the delight in human sufferings exhibited by the more refined nations, were intentional devices of the enemy to caricature and mock the sacred institute of the incarnate expiation and sacramental participation in the One Sacrifice. Much more may be said as to the strange diffusion of serpent worship in ancient and modern times. This topic is here exhaustively treated. But we shall not discuss the vast question of the Satanic corruption of Biblical worship and ceremonial; and that for two reasons. First, the thorough consideration of this subject must needs lead to the inquiry how far much of the popular superstitions of Romanists might be traced to the same unholy travesty of the simplicity of the Gospel, a subject which does not enter into our present design; and, secondly, the topic does not belong necessarily to the theological aspects of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, and to this we wish to confine ourselves.

The question of modern Spiritualism, so called, comes, of course, more directly within the scope of that doctrine. There is no part of the volume more interesting than the concluding chapters which trace the lineage of modern traffic with departed spirits. Mgr. Gaume treats every subject thoroughly, and this one in particular he investigates philosophically, statistically, and religiously, with as much fulness as if his work were devoted to it alone. His fundamental principle is straightforward and outspoken. Spiritism, in every form, is an attempt of Satan to re-establish his empire and expel Christianity from the world: in his conception it is, what however he does not term it, the Antichrist of the present time. He seeks to show, by a copious array of Pontifical deliverances, that Rome alone has been faithful in the protest against it. Perrone, the Jesuit theologian, gives him his text:—"Animal magnetism, somnambulism, and spiritism, in their combination, are nothing but the restoration of Pagan superstition and the empire of the Demon." Our author is filled with apprehension when he contemplates the steady advance of these practices from theory to theory, from achievement to achievement, from bad to worse, and the worst of all. He has no tolerance for the opinions of those who think that delusion is at the bottom of these wonders, or that science will detect their occult secret. Augustine's word rings in his ear: "Even as the spirit of truth has always drawn men towards fellowship with the good angels, so the spirit of error leads them ever to unite themselves with

demons;" and still more the Apostle's word: "The Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the last days men shall forsake the faith, giving heed to lying spirits and doctrines of demons." These are some of the most forcible of his words:—

"To concentrate our attention on other points, however important they appear, and leave out of view this threatening fact, under the assumption that time will do prompt justice to the spirits, as it has done to their predecessors, would be, in our eyes, a deplorable illusion. We say, on the contrary, that Spiritism is a power with which we must most seriously reckon. On the one hand, it is the *religious incarnation* of the revolution, that is to say, of Paganism, as Socialism would be its *social incarnation*; on the other hand, notable differences distinguish it from mesmerism, magnetism, somnambulism, and other demoniacal practices of past ages. These differences are as follows among others:—the extent of the phenomena, its rapid propagation, its avowed negation of Christianity, the establishment in it of a religion of spirits. Let us pause at this last point of difference. The great danger of Spiritism is that it comes at its time. To think that the actual weakening of faith leads the world to Protestantism, Judaism, Mahomedanism, or Atheism, would be a mistake. Unbelieving Europe does not think of becoming Protestant, Jesuit, or Mahometan. As to Atheism, it will never be, as men think, the last religion of humanity. Atheism is a negation. The world cannot live by negations; by them it has never lived. It is under absolute necessity of having a religious affirmation. Now, let us never be weary of repeating it; between the religion of Christ and the religion of Belial, between Christianity and Satanism, there is no middle term. The modern world which turns its back on Christianity, where is it going? It is on its way to Satanism, and Spiritism is no other than Satanism;—*imperii dæmonis instauratio.*"—P. 366.

Apart from a certain extravagance, and refusal to distinguish things that differ, it is impossible to doubt that there is much truth in this. But here, again, the author is most unjust to Protestantism in his virtual imputations. He does not see, it does not seem to occur to him, that very much of the modern revolt from the true doctrine of spiritual agency is due to the exaggerations of Romanist teaching as to the world beyond. The angelic hierarchy, as opened to the popular faith of the Roman allegiance, is something very different from the simple exhibition of Scripture. The intermediate state, or what is called the spirit world, is in that system very different from the Hades of the New Testament, and the many and serious errors taught by this kind of Christianity have had their necessary result. The simplicity of violated truth has deeply suffered, and great has been the resulting

evil. But our author thinks, or speaks as if he thought, that the one sole enemy of unholy spirit-intercourse is his own creed; the following extract will speak for itself, and with it we leave the subject:—

"One thing alone hinders Spiritualism from bringing forth all its fruits, and that is Catholicism. Now, Catholicism is personified in the Papacy. Better even than Mazzini and Garibaldi, Satan knows it. Hence what we see: his fierce and unrestrained war against Rome. From the time of his Babel council, down to the advent of Messiah, the persevering efforts of the Prince of Darkness had one only end; to found his gigantic state, and make Rome its capital. He succeeded. Master of Rome, he was master of the world. Thus no sooner were the Apostles armed by the Holy Ghost, than Rome became the object of the combat. ROME OR DEATH was the battle-cry of the City of God and the City of Evil. For three centuries this cry resounded from east to west. Eleven millions of martyrs attest the extent of the strife, and the desperation of the contest. For the Incarnate Word, *Rome* meant empire; for Satan, *death* meant the loss of Rome and of empire. Who would not be struck to see, after eighteen centuries, Rome once more the prize of combat, and the battle-cry, ROME OR DEATH, once more the rallying word of two great opposing camps?"—P. 580.

And thus the question of Spiritualism glides into the great theme: the City of God, Pontifical Rome, against the City of Evil, all outside.

It is not until we come to the second volume of this elaborate work that we enter on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as a department of theology. It commences with a description of the question of His veritable Divinity. And it is a thorough discussion, containing some very remarkable references to the dogma of the Holy Trinity as apprehended by the ancient Jews. To reach this we have to pass by a long induction of passages from the Fathers, cited to establish the demonstration of the doctrine by the analogies of inorganic, organic, and rational beings. They serve no good purpose, though, in some instances, profoundly suggestive in the region of speculative theology. Their value in argument rises no higher than the following apostrophe:—"The Trinity, according to Lactantius, St. Athanasius, St. Dionysius of Alexandria, and Tertullian, is the dogma which is incessantly proclaimed to those who have ears to hear by the universal round of being. The noblest creatures repeat it with distinct voice. Would it be possible to be otherwise? Thus the sun, the tree, the fountain, are eloquent preachers of the Trinity. In the unity of the same essence, they show us the fossil, the tree, and the ray, and the heat; the second, the root, and the trunk, and

the branches; the third, the reservoir, and the outflow, and the stream." Not much more valid is the incessant argument from number, measure, and weight in nature; from unity, beauty, and order; from intellect, will, and love in intelligent creatures. This kind of demonstration was once common to all kinds of theology; but modern Protestant theology has no parallel to this Romanist exhibition. Take, for instance, the eloquent words of Bossuet:—

"This Trinity, uncreated, sovereign, Almighty, incomprehensible, in order to give us some idea of His infinite perfection, has produced a trinity created upon earth. If you would know what created trinity I speak of, sink into yourselves and you will find it. It is your own soul. In truth, as the august Trinity has a source and foundation of Deity, as the great Fathers say, a treasure of life and intelligence called the Father, whence the Son and the Holy Spirit never cease to draw; similarly the human soul has its treasure which gives it its fruitfulness. All that the senses bring to it from without it collects within; it makes of it a reservoir which we call the memory. And as this infinite treasure, that is to say, the eternal Father, contemplating His own riches, produces His Word who is His image, so the rational soul, full and enriched with noble ideas, produces that interior word which we call thought, or conception, or discourse, which is the living image of things. For, do we not perceive, Christians, that when we conceive any object, we ourselves make for ourselves an animated picture of it, which the incomparable Augustine calls the son of our heart, *Filius cordis nostri?* In short, as, in producing within ourselves that image which our intellect gives us, we take pleasure in apprehending it, we consequently love that intellect, so from this treasure which is the memory, and from this intelligence which it produces, is born a third thing which we call love, in which all the operations of our soul find their termination.

"Thus, from the Father who is the treasure, and from the Son who is reason and intelligence, proceeds this infinite Spirit who is the term of the operation of the One and of the other. And as the Father, this eternal fulness, communicates without exhausting Himself, so this invisible and interior treasure which our soul encloses in its own bosom, loses nothing in diffusing itself; for our memory is not exhausted by the conceptions that it gives truth to, but it remains always fertile as God the Father is always fertile."

The eloquence of this extract from Bossuet's *Sermon sur le Mystère de la Saint Trinité* is lost in the translation. The peculiar psychological phraseology is reproduced, but must be understood in the sense in which Augustin framed it when he said, "The rational creature is formed in the image of God. There, as in a mirror, they see who are capable of seeing the Divine Trinity in His three faculties, *Memory*,

Intelligence, and Will." But, leaving the question of terminology out, we cannot but pause on the style of teaching of which these words are a favourable specimen. Surely it would be well if Mgr. Gaume and other divines of the same school were more consistent in their subordination of reason to faith. These desperate and utterly hopeless attempts to recommend to human reason a mystery which it must accept from faith, savour too much of the very spirit that is so unsparingly condemned in Protestantism. It is vain to say that, the doctrine being accepted on the authority of the Church, it is lawful to find analogies everywhere to confirm and illustrate it. If such defences and illustrations were lawful, the Holy Ghost would have told us so, and given us His own examples. Let any one follow out the suggestions of this line of argument, and his Trinity must needs become a Sabellian Trinity, or something perilously near it. For ourselves, we are content to think that man was created in the image of God as a rational, self-conscious intelligence, originating his own action; and that it is the new man, created anew in Christ Jesus, who is not fashioned in the similitude of the Trinity, but consecrated to bear the impress of the Triune God, and to be the shrine of His operation and inhabiting according to the measure of the working of the Three Individual Persons. The style of reasoning which we condemn, which is now more florid than ever in the Romanist theology, has descended lineally from the early Fathers through the Schoolmen, augmented as it has come down. The private judgment of Protestantism has in its reverence discarded it; the unreasoning Church would do well to follow its example.

As to the ancient acceptance of the Trinity by the earlier Judaism, we have one strong scruple. So, indeed, Mgr. Gaume seems himself to have; for he says, and his words are worthy to be quoted: "The intellectual and moral perfection of a society is always in the direct rules of the notion that it has of God. As much as the clear knowledge of the unity of God elevated the children of Israel above the Pagan nations, so much does the revelation of the Trinity elevate the Christian peoples above the Jewish. Whether baptized societies know it or know it not, it is in the depth of this eternally fruitful dogma that the hidden source of their superiority, in all respects, is found. The Trinity is the pivot of Christianity. Take away this dogma, and the Incarnation of the Word is nothing more than a chimera, the redemption of the world is a chimera, the effusion of the Spirit a chimera, the commu-

nication of grace a chimera, the Sacraments and all Christianity a chimera, and society a ruin." With that we heartily agree, and think that the glory of the Christian revelation is the expansion of that glorious doctrine which was not known to the Fathers, but brought to the knowledge and faith of the Church by our Lord Himself, who gave His last evening before the Cross to the full disclosure of it, and, as His last act before ascending to heaven, made it the Sacramental badge and formula of His baptized Church. But Mgr. Gaume quotes with a certain complacency the words of Epiphanius, who, however well instructed in the history of his own nation, overstepped the truth when he said that "the enlightened had in all ages, and with an entire certitude, taught the Trinity in the unity of the Divine essence." He also gives an extract from M. Drach's work on the *Harmonie de l'Eglise et de la Synagogue*, a very striking testimony of a converted Jew, which will have interest for our readers:—

"In the four Gospels we do not find any new revelation of the Holy Trinity, the fundamental point and real pivot of the Christian religion, any more than of some other doctrines already taught in the synagogue before the coming of Christ, such, for example, as original sin, and the creation of the world without pre-existing matter, and the being of God. When our Lord gives to His disciples, all of whom He had chosen from among the Jews, the mission to preach His Gospel to all nations of men, He commands them to baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. It is clear that these words, the *only ones* in the four Gospels which unite in one formula, and expressly, the three Divine persons, are not spoken as with the object to *reveal* the Holy Trinity. If the Saviour pronounces here the adorable names of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, it is to prescribe the sacramental formula of baptism. The mention of the great mystery under these circumstances, on occasion of baptism, produces on the mind of anyone reading the Gospel the impression of an article of faith already known and fully admitted among the children of Israel. In a word, the Evangelists take, as their point of departure, the mystery of the Incarnation. They reveal it to us, and prescribe its belief. As to that of the Trinity, which precedes it, which is its basis in the faith, they lay hold on it as a truth already manifest, and admitted in the faith of the ancient law. Hence they do not say "*Know*" or "*Believe*" that there are Three Persons in God. In fact, whoever is familiar with what was taught by the ancient doctors of the synagogue, especially those who lived before the coming of our Lord, knows that the Trinity in one God was a truth admitted among them from the most distant times."

Here we have the zeal of a proselyte overstepping itself. If the mystery of the Holy Trinity had been already thus

lodged in the minds of the teachers of the people, we may be sure that our Lord would have appealed to it. This, however, He never does. Every reference to the doctrine is reserved for the disciples, and of them the most interior circle; and it is revealed only in its elements and constituents, ready for the further revelation of the days after the Resurrection. Yet, it is only an exaggeration of the truth. The Logos, intermediate between God and the world, was familiar to Jewish theology, and the Holy Spirit, as the head of the creation of God, had become a Personality. Thus, the doctrine of the Trinity, as in the Jewish mind, took just the form which it long held in the minds of the Christian heretics before the Council of Constantinople.

It is remarkable in this volume that the Scriptural evidence of the Divinity of the Third Person is much more satisfactorily dealt with than the Patristic. Making allowance for a little influence of rhetoric on the exposition, the Old and New Testament testimonies to this proper Deity are exhibited with remarkable fulness. But Mgr. Gaume has not cleared up sundry difficulties in the catena of Ante-Nicene allusions. The peculiar view of subordination in the Holy Trinity—difference in order but not difference in the substance of Divinity—which the earliest of the Fathers held, required more scientific precision in the statement of it than they were capable of exhibiting. Their language is faithful to the supremacy of the Holy Ghost, but it lacked the firmness of tone and distinctness of definition which marked the theology of the fourth and fifth centuries. In fact, it wanted the invigoration of the first two creeds. Meanwhile, two testimonies are brought forward in a very forcible manner by our author. One was the bitterest enemy the Christian Church had. Like Balaam, or Caiaphas, Lucian delivered an oracle better than himself. He introduces in his dialogue *Philopatris*, a Christian who requires a catechumen to swear "by the sovereign God, by the Son of the Father, by the Spirit who proceeds from Him, who make One in Three, and Three in One, which is the true God." If these words are genuine, and there can be no doubt of that, Lucian was a better theologian than he wished to be. The other is Tertullian's remarkable declaration about the heretic Praxeas:—"Pander of the Devil, he has come to Rome to do two works of his master: he has chased away the Paraclete and crucified the Father. The Praxean tares have germinated. God helping us, we will root them out; and nothing is needed but to oppose to Praxeas the symbol which comes down to us from

the Apostles. We believe, then, always, and now more firmly than ever, in one only God, who has sent to the earth His Son, who, in His turn, has gone up to the Father, and sent the Holy Spirit, Sanctifier of the faith of those who believe in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit. Although They are inseparable, nevertheless One is the Father, Another is the Son, Another is the Holy Spirit." Undoubtedly, Lucian expressed rightly the pure faith of the Church, and his language surpasses in force and clearness anything in Tertullian.

The history of the heresies, which, after the Nicene declaration of the eternal consubstantiality of the Son, assailed the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, is very vigorously sketched. Macedonius is regarded as their leader, a Patriarch of Constantinople, whose peculiarity it was to be the enemy alike of the Arians and of the Catholics: of the former, by his defence of the Divinity of our Lord; of the Catholics, by his assertion that the Holy Spirit was no more than the highest of the creatures. Dying, A.D. 361, he left his heresy to the conduct of others, who, after earning, by twenty years of warfare against the Holy Ghost, the name of Pneumatomachoi, were condemned in the General Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381. The Nicene Creed, which had enlarged the Apostles' on the subject of the Son, was now again enlarged to declare that "the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life," proceeded from the Father, and with the Father and the Son was worshipped and glorified, and spake by the Prophets. The anathema appended was afterwards omitted, to re-appear, however, in the Athanasian Creed. The decree of the Council of Constantinople was essentially an Oriental confession of faith. It did not spring from Rome, but was accepted and confirmed by the Western Church. It established the faith in the Holy Trinity, which was never again assailed until the times of the more pronounced and thorough heresy of the Socini in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

But in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed there was no assertion that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father *and the Son*. This doctrine of the double procession might seem to have been taught by some of the Western Fathers, although it is open to doubt whether, in declaring that the Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son, they meant more than that His temporal mission, or procession in the mediatorial economy, was from the Father through the Son. But, when the scattered relics of the Arian and Sabellian heresies rolled

back upon the west, a council in Spain, which suffered most from their influence, boldly inserted in the Great Creed the words *Filioque, and from the Son*, and thenceforth privately recited the Confession of Faith with this addition. This went on for three centuries, until the time of Charlemagne, who, in 807, was asked by his bishops for permission to chant publicly the augmented creed. They were referred to the Pontiff, and he peremptorily refused the request. He did not deny the truth of the dogma, but fell back on the established principle that only an Œcumenical Council could alter by a single syllable the Confession of Faith established by an Œcumenical Council. Leo III., the infallible organ of the faith, as we are now taught, was so much in earnest on this point, that he caused to be engraven on two shields of silver, in Greek and in Latin, the Constantinopolitan symbol without the addition of *Filioque*. These were placed in the Basilica of St. Peter, on the right and left of the older creed, as an eternal protest against the innovation.

Thus falsified, it was natural that the Oriental communion should rebel. Before the century closed this one word finally and irrevocably divided the two sections of Christendom. Into the history of the contest which subsequently raged—the three leading crises of which are connected with the name of Photius in the ninth century and of Celularius in the eleventh, two Patriarchs of Constantinople, and with the abortive attempt at union in the Florentine Council of the fifteenth century—it is not our province to enter. What we are concerned with is, the inconsistency of denouncing as the great heresy of the East its refusal to accept an innovation which Rome itself had so expressly disavowed. The doctrine itself is sound, and its statement exact. As an expression of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son in the economy of mediation, it is necessary to the full confession of faith, and as an expression of those more interior, immanent, and absolute relations which subsist in the Eternal Trinity, it is supported by some plain declarations of Scripture. We ourselves rejoice in this article of the Nicene Confession, and avow it *ex animo*. We should not be unwilling to regard it as a testimony concerning Himself which the Spirit has sanctioned, and which the universal Church should accept as such. But this does not shield the Western community from the charge of vacillation, bigotry, and inconsistency in its thousand years of controversy with the East on this question.

A chapter is devoted to the Preparations of the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament. The characteristics of His mission, as

it is temporal, in contradistinction to the eternal procession; as it implies subordination, but not inferiority; as it was promised to be, like that of the Messiah, both visible and invisible; as it was to be dependent on the incarnation and glorification of Christ; and as it was to include the sum of all sanctifying gifts,—are all brought out with great fulness and general fidelity to the prophetic utterances. On such subjects as these there is a clearness and precision in the language of the best of the Fathers, instances of which are given in liberal quotations from Augustine, which leaves the ordinary theology of modern times far behind it. But this entire section is marred by an excessive refinement upon the number seven, as stamped upon all the prophecies concerning the "promise of the Father." To what issues this leads may be gathered from the fundamental principle in Cyprian, which is here dilated upon in a profuse and almost reckless manner:—

"The number Seven is made up of Four and Three. Dignified by reason of its mysterious significations, it is infinitely more so by reason of the parts of which it is composed. By three and four are expressed the primitive elements of all things—the Workman and the work, the Creator and the creature. Three marks the Creating Trinity, Four the universality of beings comprised, in substance, in the four elements. In the person of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, we see the first days of the world, Three reposing on Four: the Trinity in the four elements confounded together in the unformed mass of Chaos; then in His goodness the Creator embraces the creation; Beautiful, He renders it beautiful; Holy, He sanctifies it, and unites it to Himself in the bonds of an indissoluble love."

But the number seven is supposed to express in Isaiah the perfect gifts that rested upon the Elect Servant of God, the New Man, the Representative of the new creation, and the Source of all holiness to His saints. Now, we do not find in the New Testament any such formal reference to these seven gifts in their distinctness and individuality as would justify the elaborate systematisation of them that reigns throughout this treatise. Mgr. Gaume only follows in the train of a long catena of Fathers when he represents the seven gifts imparted to the Christ as reproduced in the Christian in an inverted order. In Him they end, with us they begin, with the fear of the Lord. However anxious we may be to do honour to the profound symbolism of Scripture, we cannot approve of this incessant straining after numerical distributions of grace. The number seven is by no means preserved and defined in the great Messianic prophecy of Isaiah xi.; and, if it were,

the meaning would be that the Incarnate Son of God was furnished for His mission by an absolutely perfect impartation of all qualifications necessary for His office. If we ponder the catalogue they bear no analogy with the gifts that create, and discipline, and mature the Christian. No ethical arrangement of the graces of the regenerate character will correspond with them; and, generally, it is not well to draw the parallel too carefully between the Incarnate excellences of our Pattern and our own. He came from heaven with His perfection, or they descended upon Him from heaven; we rise to them from the dust and degradation of sin. The free, spontaneous, and diversified gifts of the Spirit are, indeed, distributed to us—but not in number, although in measure—according to our need and use of them, they have no prescribed sevenfold foundation. The Beatitudes are not seven, though one of these chapters is based upon an elaborate harmony of them, as such, with the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The fruits of the Spirit, as enumerated by St. Paul, are not seven. These remarks condemn a large portion of the treatment of the subject, and a great number of beautiful quotations, which plead mightily by their tenderness to be spared. But it seems a duty to demur to such excessive subjection to the empire of symbolical numbers, which combines most strangely what is most transcendental in mysticism with what is most frigid and mechanical in the perfect opposite of mysticism.

The remainder of our observations will be directed to the Four Creations of the Holy Spirit which make up the substance of the earlier part of this treatise. Each will furnish occasion for some assent and much dissent, indications only being possible in each case. The first of these creations is that of the Holy Virgin; the second, that of our Lord; the third, that of the Church; and the fourth, that of the Christian. In this quadruple creation the whole of the Spirit's functions in the New Testament are summed up. Here it is observable that one creation is included, and indeed placed in the forefront, which the Scripture does not recognise, which the early Church never dreamed of, and the introduction of which is a great and pervading error. It is also to be noticed that one creation is altogether omitted, of which the Scripture abundantly speaks, and that is the Holy Scripture itself. The entire, or almost entire, omission of this is a great drawback to the completeness of this work, even on its own principles, and is an evil sign as it regards the character of its theology.

As it regards the first, we cannot do better than leave the subject with an extract or two, which will serve instead of any exposition or declamation of ours on the tremendous novelty of modern corrupt Christian theology. It will be observed that the quotation does not now carry us higher than Saint Thomas, "the angel of theology." Whatever tendencies that way may be observed in the earlier and healthier Christian writers, we find nothing in the first six centuries approaching the quotations here given, and surpassed by Mgr. Gaume's reflections:—

"Placed by the Holy Spirit between the ancient and the modern world, she is like an ocean which unites all the miracles of the two Testaments. All the rivers (says the seraphic Doctor) find their way to the sea, and the sea does not overflow: so, all the qualities of the saints have their *rendezvous* in Mary. The river of the grace of angels flows into Mary. The river of the grace of the patriarchs and prophets flows into Mary. The river of the grace of apostles flows into Mary. The river of the grace of martyrs flows into Mary. The river of the grace of confessors flows into Mary. All the rivers flow into this sea, and it does not overflow. What is there astonishing in the fact that all grace converges in Mary, seeing that so great grace comes to all through her; *per quam tanta gratia ad omnes defluxit?* What is this ocean? This ocean, without limits and without bottom, is composed of all the riches of nature and grace, of all the theological and cardinal virtues, of all the gifts of the Spirit in a super-eminent degree. 'The Incarnate Word,' says St. Thomas, 'possessed in its perfection the plenitude of grace; but it was begun in Mary.'"—P. 134.

It is not to be denied that the Divine Spirit was to the mother of our Lord the Spirit of prophetic inspiration: this is proved by her immortal canticle, which places her at the head of the inspired women of Scripture; and all that may be predicated of human excellence may be said of her: her dignity and blessedness are safe in the records of Holy Scripture, and in the reverence of all true Christians. But the tone of this more modern theology has no justification in the Bible, or in its fundamental theological principles. There is no vestige or even germ of the dogma that the original sin of our race was prevented by any miraculous intervention of the Holy Spirit from extending its influence to her. The holy humanity of our Lord does not require this suspension of a universal law and universal decree. The dogma of the Immaculate Conception, which our generation has now for the first time imposed upon the faith of the Roman Church, has given a new and wonderful development to this branch of traditional and unscriptural theology. This work is one of

the most striking illustrations of this fact. One extract will confirm this remark: it must stand for many similar that might be selected:—

"The Creator Himself contemplates His work with infinite complacency. Mary is created to be the spouse of the Holy Ghost and the mother of the Word. Marriage supposes the free consent of the parties: let us see in what manner that of the august Virgin is solicited. The Three Persons of the Holy Trinity send an ambassador charged to ask her in marriage. Astonished by so much honour, Mary is troubled; but she makes her conditions, and treats with God as equal with equal. 'I will consent,' she says, 'on condition of preserving inviolate my virginity.' Thus a young maiden of twelve years holds in her hands the salvation of the world. On her will depends the accomplishment of the work to which, from eternity, all the Divine counsels referred. The august Trinity appears as a suppliant before Mary. Unspeakable transaction, which contains, in brief, an entire moral revolution. Woman, till then the most abject being, becomes suddenly the being most respected. Will the human race have a Saviour? The reply of a woman will decide. Mary reflects. Accepting the double title of spouse of the Holy Ghost and mother of the Word, she knows that she accepts that of the queen of martyrs. Before her eyes are unrolled a long series of bloody and doleful images: the scourge, the Cross, the Calvary, will be for her, for they will be for her Son. . . . Thus the young Virgin of Judæa, become the Spouse of the Holy Ghost and the mother of the Word, is the relative of the whole Trinity, the *consanguinea Trinitatis*. So much glory is not for her alone. As Eve and Adam were the bases of the City of Evil, Mary and her Son will be the bases of the City of Good, raised upon earth to its highest perfection. Known throughout the earth under the uncommunicable name of the *Catholic Church*, this glorious city acknowledges Mary as her mother and mistress. To the Chinese, to the Thibetans, to the savages of this age as to the Greeks and barbarians of other ages, who demand of her her origin, she replies, 'I am the daughter of the eternal Word, conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of the Virgin Mary.'"—P. 149.

These are sentences which need no comment. We quote them from one of the most elaborate and scientific theological treatises of Romanist theology, and mourn over them. They do not represent a doctrine that will reconcile the Churches or win the world; a theology, rather, that robs the Redeemer of His glory, and savours of the Christian Talmud. These two impeachments are proved by the following words, with which we dismiss a painful subject:—

"The Church does not hesitate to pay her homage as the destroyer of all the heresies. It gives her the glorious name of the helper of Christians—*auxilium Christianorum*. By the splendid sanctuaries

raised in her honour in all parts of the earth, by the enthusiastic manifestations of their filial confidence and love and gratitude, individuals and peoples have repeated, since the beginning of Christianity, with a voice which impiety will never suffice to silence, 'Mary is the succourer of Christians, the pillar of the Church, the terror of Satan, the hope of the desperate, the consoler of the afflicted, the health of the rich, the salvation of the world, the corner stone of the City of God.' The Synagogue echoes the Church: it proclaims the glory, the power, and the beauties of the Virgin of Judah: 'It was, say they, by love for the immaculate Virgin that God created the world. Not only did He create it in love to her, but for her love He preserves it. Long ago the crimes of the world would have destroyed it had not the mighty intercession of the gentle Virgin saved it.' (*Onkelos*, on Prov. viii. 22.) St. Bernard shows that the most orthodox faith finds no exaggeration in the words of the Rabbins, when he cries: 'It is for Mary that all Scripture has been made, for her the universe has been created. Full of grace, it is by her that the human race has been bought, the Word made flesh, God human and man God.'"—P. 151.

The second creation of the Holy Spirit is the God-man. The brief chapters devoted to this subject, the grandest and the most difficult in theology, are very slight and superficial. Not an error can be detected, but, on the other hand, there is a studied avoidance of all those questions which have occupied the minds of all the profoundest theologians of all ages and all Churches: such as the specific relation of the Holy Spirit to the human nature of our Lord, and also to His Divine nature; the exinanition of the Person of the Son of God in the Incarnation, and many other topics which it would be folly to call subtile and needless, connected with the mysterious subordination of the Son Incarnate to the Spirit before the Resurrection, whom afterwards He sent as His Deputy. However, as the work gives us nothing to ponder here, we pass on to the third creation, the Church, the treatment of which, of course, bristles with matters of offence and scruple to our Protestant ears. The leading error is the limitation of the subject to the history of the Day of Pentecost, omitting the wonderful teaching of St. Peter and St. Paul in their Epistles concerning the nature, and constitution, and destiny of the Church. The elaborate exposition of the Pentecostal effusion is marred by the assumption which, to a plain reader, seems unaccountable, that the tongues of fire, the symbol of the Spirit's consecration, inhabitation, and sanctification to Christian service of the Church, collectively and individually, were the badges of an authority committed to the Apostles alone. They had undoubtedly their high

prerogatives; but the Day of Pentecost found them in the midst of the waiting Church, and did not in any respect add anything to their authority that the Saviour had not already given them. Hence they are found undistinguished among the believers during the morning of this first day of the Church: the whole Church proclaimed the wonderful works of God, and thus used and illustrated their gift of new tongues. After the morning of the great day had declared for ever that the gifts of the Spirit are the heritage of the entire Christian community, its afternoon and evening mark out St. Peter and the Apostles in their special pre-eminence as the centre of Christian preaching and doctrine. It is a perversion of the history to make the descent of the Holy Ghost a descent upon the Apostles alone, or upon the Apostles pre-eminently. The Spirit Himself declares the contrary. The foundation of the Church was not the foundation of an Apostolate and clerical order. The Christian religion will never be truly represented upon earth until that primal error and widespread delusion has been altogether extirpated. For the rest, nearly two chapters out of three, on the Spirit's relation to the Church, are spent in fond disquisitions upon the relation of Mary to the Church as its mother and patroness.

The great omission here, however, is one which no Romanist, no high Sacramental theology can ever fail to exhibit; that is, the absolute, independent supremacy of the Holy Spirit within the Body of Christ. In the only records which we acknowledge as describing the Spirit's relation to the Church, we never hear of His distinguishing any order of men, inheriting a special administrative function over the impartation of grace, from the rest of the community. We accept the testimony that those who believed, "continued steadfastly in the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship," and can understand that those who came out of the world were joined to the Apostles. But the saved are "added to the Church." The dispensation of gifts and graces is universal, impartial, and free to all. Everywhere and always the preaching of the everlasting Gospel is the elect instrument to which is ascribed the gathering of sinners into the fold, and their growth as believers into the perfection of holiness. The Sacraments have their appropriate place as signs and seals, and instruments, too, of the bestowment of covenant blessing; but not *en opere operato*, not by any virtue stored up in them to be dispensed at the discretion, after the intention, and as the exclusive prerogative, of any order of men. This is the

doctrine of the Holy Ghost in the Church which is here taught; but it is very different from what the Spirit Himself "saith to the Churches."

The last creation is the Christian, and upon the Spirit's relation to the sanctification of the individual, much is said that is of great value; though when the subject goes on to the mediation of the Seven Sacraments, we feel that we have left the domain of the Holy Ghost, and must leave the author to go his own way. The basis of grace in the formation of a Christian is thus described:—

"Man is the son of man by human generation. He is the son of God by a Divine generation. This generation, which renders him a participant in the very nature of God, is effected by Grace. Grace is a gift, a Divine element, which makes man a child of God, and an inheritor of His glory. The mystery is effected thus: the Holy Spirit descends personally into man, and unites himself with him in an union the most intimate next to the hypostatic union. In virtue of this union, charity, of which the Spirit is the source, is diffused immediately through the essence of the soul. It introduces all the virtues, all the constitutive principles of the supernatural or Divine life, since it is itself that life. Without losing its own nature, the soul, in contact with the Divine element, is rendered Divine, even as iron, remaining iron still, when thrown into the fire, takes all its qualities." —P. 251.

Here we have a noble recognition of the fundamental principle of the new life that the Holy Spirit personally united to the soul is its agent and spring. It rebukes the modern sacramental theology which teaches that the Spirit is in the Church, but not in the individual; that the principle of life in the Christian is the sacred humanity of the Redeemer sacramentally imparted to each, though it may be by the presence of the Spirit giving effect to the priestly act of the Church. The doctrine we refer to is taught rather by the Romanisers outside Rome, than by Rome herself; though, in insisting so strongly on a personal indwelling Spirit as this extract does, Roman theology convicts itself of inconsistency. This extract, as it stands, lays the foundation of the true, Divine life, the union of the Spirit of Christ with the human spirit uniting it with Him, conforming it to His death and to His life, and sanctifying it in all its natural energies, raised to supernatural energy, after His moral image. Not, indeed, that the charity infused by the Spirit is itself the Divine life. That is an error, for charity is a fruit of the new life, not the life itself. The thorough apprehension of this lays bare the root of much of the difference between our theology and that

which we condemn. The new life is the resurrection of the true man, in his own personality and in all his powers, to communion with the Lord; and the spiritual growth of that new man is effected by the constant application of the truth that sanctifies. The Scripture affords no warrant for the mechanical process of the soul's advancement through life to perfection, which is taught in the following theory of the Seven Sacraments :—

"The sacraments are instituted for the healing of the maladies of the soul; but how do they attain their end? Baptism is instituted as defence against the lack of the Divine life; Confirmation against the weakness natural to infants; the Eucharist, against the evil inclinations of the heart; Penitence, against mortal sin or the loss of Divine life; Extreme Unction, against the remainders of sins, and the languor of the soul; Orders, against ignorance and the dissolution of the Christian society; Marriage, against personal concupiscence and the extinction of the Church, which would be the cessation of the Divine life upon the earth. Here is the most complete aggregate of the preservative and curative remedies for all the maladies of the soul, death itself being included. Who conceived this? who established it? who gives the whole its efficacy? The Holy Ghost."

This is the full-formed sacramental theory of later times, which has been developed slowly into a finished doctrine. It has its wonderful beauty and symmetry, but it is absolutely without foundation in Holy Scripture. It belongs to an unwritten and traditional teaching which scarcely pretends to depend upon the written Word for most of its elements. Hence, it is curious to observe in this treatise that the Fathers, and chiefly the Mediæval successors of the Fathers, are mainly appealed to. Between this system and the teaching of the Epistles as to the processes of the believer's sanctification, his redemption from sin, and preparation for death and the judgment, there is a wide gulf fixed. So wide is that gulf that we seem to pass into the economy of "another Gospel" when we pass from the one to the other. Where in the Scripture is the Eucharist represented as a preservative against inclinations to sin, or any sacrament set forth as standing between daily sin and daily forgiveness?

This leads us finally to notice the great defect which mars the completeness of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost as here presented. Nothing is said of that creation of the Spirit of Inspiration which has given to the Church of God the Holy Scriptures of Truth as the one standard of doctrine, faith, and promise to the end of time. Beyond a few references to the

action of the Holy Ghost on the ancient prophets—references introduced in a very subordinate and desultory manner—these volumes never indicate any perception of the unspeakable grandeur of that mediatorial function of the Spirit, the discharge of which from age to age has produced the volume of inspiration in its development towards perfect unity. A treatise on the dogma of the Holy Spirit which omits the inspiration, gradual construction, and abiding authority of the Scriptures, seems strange indeed. Of course, such a chapter on the doctrine would be very embarrassing. It would derange and disconcert many of the chapters which now have excluded it. Not that Mgr. Gaume undervalues the Scriptures. Neither he nor the theology which he represents neglects the Scripture. In the course of these volumes probably every passage that could be pressed into the service is introduced, and with the homage of absolute submission. Granted that the translation, however "authentic," is not to us authoritative, and that the traditional gloss attends the text everywhere: still the fact remains that the tesselation of Scripture authorities is perfect. But all this is vain, so long as another and concurrent unwritten Scripture is ever at hand to correct, qualify, and expound the written. That unwritten Scripture is vital to Romanist theology, and nothing must be permitted to imperil it. It would, however, be imperilled by a fair and thorough exhibition of the office of the Holy Ghost in Holy Scripture. The Saviour vindicated the dignity of the ancient oracles of the Spirit against the traditions of men, putting a difference between the two that never can be explained away. And a thorough, honest, exhaustive examination of the Spirit's relation to the Apostle's settlement of Christian doctrine would show that no room was left for the co-ordinate authority of any body of men in determining truth necessary to salvation. Two oracles, the written and unwritten, cannot coexist. In fact, to sum up, the omission of the Bible as the "work" of the Holy Ghost is a silent intimation that God's Word is regarded as rather coming to us from the Church than from the Spirit.

Mgr. Gaume dilates, in the close of his great undertaking, on the Mediæval Brotherhoods of the Holy Ghost. We cannot follow him in his description of them, nor can we share, or indeed sympathise, with his fond regrets over these extinguished glories, and longings for their restoration. They represent a carnal, earthly, and unscriptural method of honouring the Deity, which ought not even to be mentioned in the Church which worships God as a Spirit. The restora-

tion of the worship of the Spirit which the present estate of Christendom cries out for, is something very different from this. We want not distinct orders and fraternities for the special "devotion of the Holy Ghost," who seeks to be honoured only in the unity of the Father and of the Son. What is needed in all Christian communions is a more vital and pervasive conviction that Christianity is a "dispensation of the Spirit;" that in the present constitution of the Christian Church, He is the Supreme Representative of the Holy Trinity, revealing the Father through the Son, and the Son through His redeeming offices, to the whole community, and to every member of it, by direct communications of His light and grace. What is needed further is the right adjustment in Christian Theology of the relations of the Administrating Spirit to the means of grace,—the Word of Scripture, the Sacraments, and Prayer. Here there are abounding errors on the right hand and on the left: errors of those who forget that the Holy Ghost uses His own appointed instrumentalities in the edification of the Body of Christ; and errors of those who so limit His efficacy to Sacraments in the hands of a mediating priesthood as virtually to deprive Him of His immanent and never-ceasing working in the Church. It is the latter error that these volumes present to us in its most subtle and dangerous form: all the more subtle and dangerous, because the offices of the Divine Spirit are, in so many respects, worthily treated. It is with a feeling of indescribable regret that we lay down a book which so loyally and fervently defends the Personality, the Divinity, and the Agency of the Third Person, and yet neutralises all by omitting to give Him His honour as the only Vicar of Christ, as reigning absolutely, through His own Scriptures, over the Faith of the Church, and as the sole bond of union between the believing soul and the Son of God. There is a faint light arising out of this darkness: there never was a time when the theological doctrine of the Holy Ghost was so profoundly studied by every community of Christians as it is now studied. The work we have been reviewing is only one of many evidences that Romanism is deeply engaged in that common study; and now, as in the ancient times, the Spirit may be thus preparing to *renew the face of the earth.*

LITERARY NOTICES.

I. THEOLOGY: ENGLISH AND FOREIGN.

Lectures on the Reunion of the Churches. By John J. I. Von Döllinger, D.D., D.C.L., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Munich, Provost of the Chapel Royal, &c., &c. Translated, with Preface, by Henry Nutcombe Oxenham, M.A., late Scholar of Balliol College, Oxford. London: Rivingtons. 1872.

In the present state of thought respecting the union of the Churches, these Lectures will be welcomed by very many persons of different schools of religious thought. They are not the hasty words of an enthusiast, but the calm, well-considered, and carefully prepared writings of one whose soul is profoundly moved by his great subject. They form a contribution to the literature of this grave question, valuable alike for its breadth of historical survey, its fairness, the due regard paid to existing obstacles, and the practical character of its suggestions.

That the Lectures should be conceived in a spirit favourable to Roman Catholic views need excite no surprise; but few will be prepared to find words so severe as are here used against the Roman Catholic Church, words as condemnatory of Papal assumptions as could be used by a Puritan. The Protestant Reformation needs no abler justification than this volume contains. Protestants would do well calmly to ponder this question from the Roman Catholic point of view as well as from their own.

A brief but ample review of the present religious condition of the world, and of the distribution and character of the Churches, forms an appropriate introduction to a consideration of the duty of Christian nations to extend to the heathen the benefits of civilisation and the discipline of the Christian Church. But "the great hindrance" to the performance of that duty, presented by the diversity of the Christian testimony and the rigidity with which sectarian views are held, does not receive the forcible illustration we might expect, considering that the necessity for union is supposed to be based upon it. The older division of the East from the West, and the later revolt of the German and English from the Roman Churches, together with a glance

at the reaction towards union in the seventeenth century, are succinctly treated, and the difficulties in the way of intimate reunion and the grounds of hope for its ultimate accomplishment are frankly stated. Comprehensive, earnest, fair, and respectful, these Lectures deserve, and will well repay, careful reading by all sections of the Church.

The visible representation of the living unity of the Church of Christ is a beautiful ideal which instantly commends itself to the Christian judgment; while the repulsiveness of the many sharply divided Churches, with their conflicting interests and mutual animosities, is obvious to all; and any honest effort to remove the grounds of separation and to bring the scattered particles into contact can deserve only commendation. But that unity is to be attained by no predetermined conditions to which all must be subjected. It seems to be a condition to which in maturity we arrive, rather than one from which we set out.

If the unity contended for demands similarity of belief on difficult questions, whose solution is not within easy reach, such unity is at present impossible. For, either men must unthinkingly acknowledge rulers and guides, or, using thought, approach the general views of the Church or recede from them according to their individual culture, ability, and traditions. Either the Church must in its comprehensiveness allow the diversities of freely growing individual life, or it must embrace sects, classes of persons whose opinions have some coherence or similarity. A unity which would exclude diversity of opinion cannot be hoped for. But the true unity of the Church is not destroyed by mere diversity of opinion; the causes of division lie far below that.

The divisions over which the Churches have to mourn had their origin less in doctrinal divergences than in unbecoming, un-Christlike, oppressive assumptions. There are Churches standing wide apart, severed by rancour and jealousy, which recite the same creeds; while others, holding different doctrinal views, are united in friendly relations. The Church can grapple with the heretic, but not with the schismatic; and that schismatic is as often within as without the boundary. The blight to the Church is not in free thought, but in ecclesiastical tyranny. It was the pride to which unity itself ministered that at the first broke the bond of that unity.

We trespass neither against truth nor charity in saying that the Roman Catholic Church is responsible for the Protestantism of the last three centuries, as Jesuitism is for the new school called into existence since the sessions of the Vatican Council, by whose decrees "the bridge for corporate union has now been broken down."

Dr. Döllinger sees clearly enough that any union with the Roman Catholic Church is quite impossible so long as the present faction keeps the upper hand, and never can take place without recantation. A union that is to embrace Ultramontanism is simply an impossibility without a crushing defeat of the whole religious sentiment of the West. But this would be no union. "Certainly no other Church

will think of uniting with a body which assumes the right, never before claimed or heard of throughout the Christian world, of making new dogmas, and places this right at the absolute disposal of a single individual. And for this reason, that in dealing with a Church so despotically constituted there cannot be any union, from the nature of the case, but only unconditional submission and renunciation of all knowledge and judgment of one's own. The notion of binding one's self to accept articles of faith to be hereafter fabricated and as yet unknown, contradicts the fundamental principles of Christianity." On other grounds the Jesuits present an impassable barrier to union, being "the old, well-proved, and implacable enemies of ecclesiastical union—the men to whom any union which is not an unconditional surrender is an abomination;" whose system "every page of history convicts of spiritual absolutism and falsehood."

It is plain no union can be suddenly effected; nor can force or compulsion be once named. The Churches must approach, not from external constraint, but from the free impulse of a pure spirit. There is, however, nothing to hinder the Churches which have a common basis, and a near approach to each other in faith, cherishing that spirit in the flames of which numerous antagonisms would be rapidly consumed. The essential unity—the unity which is seen and acknowledged by the Church's Head in the midst of its diversity, and which must precede all external union—is expressed in "the unity of the spirit." Unity of faith, if that means identity of belief, is a condition far ahead, towards which, perhaps, all slowly, if unconsciously, move; but the unity of the spirit precedes the unity of the faith, and leads to it; and every professor of the faith is guilty who does not strengthen that bond. Faith and hope are noble graces of the spirit; but there is one greater than they—one which nourishes them, and, without which, they being alone, are dead. "The greatest of these is charity." Neither truth nor charity demands that each section of the Church should trumpet the errors of the rest; but both would be served by the silencing of words of recrimination, by burying jealousies, by patiently bearing with each other's peculiarities, and by testifying our fidelity to our own convictions and our due respect for the convictions of others, less by denunciation of them than by avoiding them. The curse of division lies not in our separate estates, but in our separated spirits.

Much may be done by the leading spirits of the Churches—much by the fervent prayers of the faithful, by prudent teaching, and by friendly intercourse, to promote the noble purpose of this troubled, anxious, earnest thinker; and very much by every section enlarging its horizon by a careful and unbiassed study, not of its own views alone, but of those of others also. An approach to unity will be made by the belief that there may be truth beyond our own boundaries; but "when each party starts with the conviction of its own absolute perfection, and seeks nothing but victory and the conversion

of opponents to its own views," every struggle but defers the desired end.

We cannot unite with Dr. Döllinger in some of the doctrinal statements contained in this book; but we can join him heart and soul in the following words of peace:—

"As being baptized, we are all, on either side, brothers and sisters in Christ; we are all, at bottom, members of the universal Church. In this great garden of God let us shake hands with one another over the confessional hedges, and let us break them down so as to be able to embrace one another altogether. These hedges are the doctrinal divisions about which either we or you are in error; if you are wrong, we do not hold you morally culpable, for your education, surroundings, knowledge, and training, make your adhering to these doctrines excusable and even right. Let us examine, compare, and investigate the matter together, and we shall discover the precious pearl of religious peace and Church unity, and then join our hands and forces in cleansing and cultivating the garden of the Lord, which is overgrown with weeds."

Chronologisch-geographische Einleitung in das Leben Jesu Christi. [Chronology and Geography of the Gospels.] Von C. E. Caspari. Hamburg: 1869.

This is a very valuable work, which fills a place not occupied before. The author makes it very clear that there cannot, in these days of critical lives of Jesus, be anything more important than a thorough investigation of the framework of that life. "It is sometimes said that the chronological and the geographical elements in the Lord's history are comparatively of no importance. Many think that it is matter of indifference to know whether Jesus publicly laboured several years or only a few months; whether He was crucified in the thirtieth or any other year; whether the day of His death was the preparation day or the day of the Passover proper; whether Capernaum lay in the land of Gennesareth or at the north of the Sea of Tiberias; whether Sychar was or was not identical with Sychem; whether the Church of the Holy Sepulchre defines or not the places of the crucifixion and resurrection; whether Jesus was once or oftener in Jerusalem. Such externalities may be done without, provided only the spirit and doctrine of Christ are rightfully desired. But all this is great and perilous error. If Jesus Christ is in this wise spiritualised, and rent from the framework of His relations to place and time, the false spiritualism that affects it must be avenged by the objective historicalness of the Lord's person being made doubtful and idealised away. For historical reality has its root in place and time. Many of the most important doubts as to the genuineness of the Gospels have their ground in geographical and chronological errors. Two chief arguments which impugn the authenticity of the Gospel of John belong to this category. This Gospel says that Jesus went in one

day from the place where John baptized to Cana in Galilee. Now it is assumed as certain that the place of baptism was in the neighbourhood of Jericho, which town was three days' journey from Cana, hence no eyewitness could have made such a mistake. But the objection vanishes when we discover that John baptized, not near Jericho, but at the north of the sea of Gennesareth, a place which is within the requisite distance from Cana.

So also we constantly hear that the Synoptics assign the crucifixion to the 15th Nisan, while the Fourth Evangelist assigns it to the 14th, the day of preparation, thus being not only at variance with the other three but with the true Apostle John, who, according to the tradition of Asia Minor, taught that Jesus was crucified on 15th Nisan. But this objection vanishes also, when it is found that not only the author of the Fourth Gospel, but with him the Synoptics and the Asiatic tradition, agree in making 14th Nisan the day of the death of Jesus. These examples show the importance of what is called externality.

The work which thus proclaims its object, and vindicates it, is strictly faithful to that object throughout. It omits nothing of any importance, and shrinks from no difficulty. The author is conversant with every modern theory which has undertaken to account for the genesis of the Gospels, and he does full justice to what may be said against the harmony of the Four. But his thorough and independent investigations tend to show that the believers in the historical verity of these documents have nothing to fear.

The following is a sketch of the author's theory as to the synopsis of the Gospels. The Gospel of Mark is by no means a meagre extract from the First and Third Gospels, but an original work which Mark composed under the personal influence of the Apostle Peter, and which exhibits the work of Christ's last year so far as Peter was himself an eyewitness. It is an error ruinous to the understanding of the evangelical narrative, if we proceed from the assumption that all the Apostles were always and everywhere, from beginning to end, the Lord's companions. This was true, with some exceptions, of the last year, but not of the preceding. Each of the Apostles returned, after short intercourse with Jesus, to their own town and calling. Peter, in particular, followed Christ when He was in Galilee, and remained in Bethsaida when Jesus went into Judæa; for he accompanied Him to Jerusalem only at the Last Passover. Now, as he delivered to Mark only what he saw and heard, the scene of this Evangelist must needs be Galilee. But, taking Mark's Gospel as original, we can explain its relation to that of Matthew only on the supposition that the latter took Mark's as the foundation and frame in which to place his collection of the Lord's discourses. This might the more easily happen, as Matthew was of the same neighbourhood, and, like Peter, followed the Lord in Galilee. Luke, coming later, made these two documents, resting on Apostolical authority, the basis of his work, but extended their framework when necessary for the enlarged material he had gathered. The Apostle John, on the contrary,

was from Jerusalem, where he was known and had a dwelling (Jno. xviii. 15; xix. 27). He began to know Jesus by the Sea of Tiberias, accompanied Him to Jerusalem, and remained there, accompanying Jesus only when He was in Judæa. Hence the scene of John's Gospel. The life of Jesus is onesided and fragmentary, if we adhere only to the Synoptists or only to John; we must unite them all for the Harmony. Now it is of great importance to determine sure points of contact between them. All four agree that the public manifestation of Jesus was mediated by John's baptism. Then they separate till they meet at the miraculous feeding. Separating again, they meet at the Passion, which they all combine to record.

It would be unfair to criticise this theory without careful examination of its proofs. Generally, we think it exaggerated. It is not necessary to contradict so fully the testimony that these disciples "companied with Jesus" from the beginning. And St. Luke's Gospel is not fairly accounted for. Moreover, it ought never to be forgotten that, after all that industrious investigation can do, there remains very much for the specific supernatural influence and, as it were, editorship in the construction of the Gospels.

Novum Testamentum Græce. Ad antiquissimos testes denuo recensuit apparatum criticum omni studio perfectum apposuit commentationem isagogicam prætexuit Constantinus Tischendorf. Editio octava critica major. Volumen II. Fasc 5. Lipsiæ. 1872.

The final sheet of this work now lies before us; and the greatest critical edition of the Greek Testament is now complete. This exhibition of the text of the Apocalypse has the advantage of presenting the full results of a collation of the Sinaitic manuscript, besides one or two other important codices not before used in this service. The volumes, as they are now finished, ought to be in the hands of all who make the Greek Testament their study. Very much of the processes indicated by the citations of authorities may be beyond the understanding and appreciation of many who, however, will be able to weigh the evidences of many of the more salient and important readings which Tischendorf has decided upon. When we say that the work is completed, there is a most important reservation. The *Prolegomena* are to follow in a third volume, which the author hopes to prepare in the course of the present year. We can only express our hope that the indefatigable critic may have strength to accomplish his task, the remainder of which is deeply desired by all who understand the importance of the textual criticism of the New Testament. Any further reference to this last work of our greatest authority must be deferred till its completion.

Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century. By John Tulloch, D.D., Principal of St. Mary's College in the University of St. Andrews, &c. Two Vols. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1872.

THE seventeenth century is known, in broad outline, perhaps better than any other period of English history; for it irresistibly attracts attention as the epoch at which the permanent diversities of English character stood most plainly opposed to each other in concrete shape. From it are derived by direct inheritance the greater part of those differences of opinion, creed, and training which lie at the root of our present divisions on politics, religion, and philosophy. Yet, though so much studied, the time of the great Civil War can scarcely be said to be understood. It is the battle-field of irreconcilable principles, the treasury of arguments and instances for modern discussions, rather than a clear and well-arranged addition to our national experience. This is, no doubt, chiefly to be accounted for by the very closeness of the ties that connect us with the parties that struggled during the reigns of the Stuart kings. Yet some part of the loss must be attributed to our habit of looking at a period of great complexity and rapid change as though it were all to be explained by the application of two or three rough distinctions. The great factions shaded off into one another through many minute gradations, and there were several smaller sects and parties whose influence cannot be rightly estimated, while they are undiscriminated from the main division of the nation.

Such a party was formed by those members of the Long Parliament who, after gaining distinction as the advocates of the popular demand for redress of grievances, transferred their support to the king when Pym and Hampden seemed to be going too far. The acknowledged leader of these Moderates was Lord Falkland, whose own early and melancholy death is an apt type of the fate of his policy amid the fierceness of faction. In those days, when civil and ecclesiastical questions were inextricably complicated together, every school of opinion has its bearing upon theology as well as politics. Dr. Tulloch devotes his first volume to expounding, in consecutive but detached essays, the religious position and influence of Falkland and his friends. The vivid, if not impartial, pen of Clarendon has made famous the *convivium theologicum* that used to gather at Great Tew before the civil troubles called its master away. Hammond, Sheldon, and Morley are afterwards foremost men on the side of Prelacy. Earle, Suckling, Digby, and Montague were distinguished in literature or politics. But the work of impregnating the national thought with Falkland's liberal and calmly sensible spirit was accomplished by the writings of the Viscount himself, together with Hales and Chillingworth. The same rational tone and moderate conclusions

are to be found, probably by direct indebtedness, in Taylor's *Liberty of Prophesying* and Stillingfleet's *Eirenicon*.

The two latter works, and the *Religion of Protestants*, are the only formal and elaborate exposition of the views held by this school. Falkland's "Speech on Episcopacy," his "Discourse on the Infallibility of the Church of Rome," together with the "Reply to the Answer thereto," make but a thin volume together; while Hales left only two or three tracts, a few sermons, and several letters. Great part of his writing has little to do with that advocacy of a reasonable faith, a simple elastic creed, a charitable demeanour, a wide, loose organisation, which distinguishes the theological Moderates alike from Prelatist and from Puritans. The letters written by Hales from the Synod of Dort, at which he was a spectator only, are the earliest memorials of the Broad Church in the Seventeenth Century. They are inestimable too, as revealing one chief source of this intellectual movement in England. It has the closest connection with the sacred spirit of inquiry spread among the Protestant Churches by the Arminians. Dr. Tulloch devotes his opening chapter to the general history of theology at this period among the Evangelical communions. He treats the Arminians, indeed, in a way that suggests the fear lest the Scotch ministers be ill acquainted with the system he so lightly yet dogmatically sets down as illogical and substantially obsolete; yet he fully recognises the great obligation of professors of reasonable theology to the Dutch Remonstrants. Hales, like most of his school, is professedly averse from the anti-Calvinistic, anti-Augustinian doctrine, yet shows at every turn its influence. Unwillingness to rest content with the conclusions of doctors and Synod unconfirmed by Scripture; instinctive recoil from a hard, dry, consistent theory; distrust of repulsive tenets based only on deductions, however apparently flawless, from a few obscure texts; the claim to exercise private judgment, and the refusal to give any faith on another man's logic, are fundamental fibres in the texture of mind both of the English and the Dutch opponents of dogmatic rigidity.

Hales's writings, to some extent, and Falkland's, and Chillingworth's more completely, show how the position of their party, and the form in which its views were expounded, were determined by another influence special to their time and country. There is ample evidence to show that, in the year preceding the Long Parliament, the emissaries of Rome were peculiarly numerous and active in England. The patronage of the Queen, and the great development of the Catholic side of Anglican Christianity, under Laud's primacy, gave much encouragement to the Jesuit fathers. Nor were they without distinguished success. As early as 1622, the mother of the powerful Duke of Buckingham became a pervert. Many of Falkland's nearest relatives disowned their Protestant faith. His mother even became obnoxious to the Court of High Commission for her proselytising zeal. Chillingworth, it is well known, passed some time in the Seminary of Douay. The confirmation of him, of Buck-

ingham, and of several others, to the reformed religion, was put forward by Laud as proof of his own loyalty to Protestantism. It is remarkable that all our "Rational Divines" (except Stillingfleet, who is of later date) had a connection, in some cases very intimate, with the High Church Primate, whose mind seems, indeed, to have been rather Anglican than Romanist in its type. None of this group of theologians seems to have had much personal acquaintance or spiritual sympathy with the Puritan side of religious England. They were all Royalists, and, with only one exception, sacrificed much for their cause. The bold simplicity and obtrusive vehemence of the ultra-Protestant party, together with its incurable tendency to split up into innumerable sects, impressed them so strongly that they show little appreciation of the true grandeur, or even the real stand-point, of the Puritans. They all contend that even schismatics should have full toleration. Taylor is at once wide and definite in his charity, and Stillingfleet advocates large concessions. But all this strikes one as the studied firmness of a calm and liberal mind, not as the natural prompting of a widely sympathetic heart really holding a position midway between contending factions, or uniting contradictory creeds in a higher synthesis. The "Broad Church" party (as Dr. Tulloch calls it) of the seventeenth century reveals something of the spirit of sectarian liberalism, which so prominently marks its modern successors. The dogmatic assertion of uncertainty, the impatience at any one's holding for essential what the advanced theology deems unimportant, the readiness to impose terms of conciliation upon unwilling consciences, the imperfect toleration which cannot tolerate what it thinks bigotry—all these defects lie, undeveloped germs it is true, in this early "Rational Divinity." It has, however, one great advantage over the kindred school of to-day in the recognition of a standard more lasting than the individual judgment—namely, the Word of God.

To the discussion of this group of theologians Dr. Tulloch devotes the earlier and, to our mind, the most valuable of his two volumes. He himself regards the Christian Philosophy of the Cambridge Platonists as embodying Falkland's principle in the noblest form, carrying them on to the highest result, and constituting the great contribution of the seventeenth century to our religious and speculative literature. Probably, however, the current estimate of Smith, Cudworth, and More is nearer the truth than the enthusiastic eulogy of their latest expositor. They enriched the history of English thought with a striking episode. They gathered into systematic expression the thought and feelings of meditative, moderate, and earnest men, which the brief and scattered writings of the Pre-restoration period had, perhaps, inadequately embodied. They showed that Puritanism could produce scholars and speculative thinkers. They furnished a temporarily useful corrective to the one-sided philosophy of Hobbes. And they transmitted the "liberal" spirit of Churchmanship to those who, for good or evil, gave it undeniable weight in the next

generation. In a word, they are an important link in our intellectual ancestry. But the intrinsic worth of their labours is small. The philosophy of Cudworth represents the theory of innate ideas in its most dogmatic and least convincing form. It was a poor reply to Hobbes, with little but its orthodoxy to recommend it, and had no chance of holding its ground against Locke, in whom a clear-sighted man is joined to a deeply religious spirit. It is somewhat of a defect in the work before us that the author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, of the *Letters on Toleration*, and the *Commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles*, is omitted from among the Rational Theologians and Christian Philosophers of his century.

The Cambridge School has no name greater than that of its founder, Whichcote, who bears more resemblance to the *terse, fragmentary* writers that preceded him than to his voluminous and systematic disciples. Liberality in theology is better and more potent as a spirit. It suffers by being compressed into a definite body of dogmas. Cudworth and More exemplify very strongly an infirmity of philosophy, which is the fruitful mother of heresies. They harmonise Scripture and Plotinus, by modifying their theology to suit their philosophy. It was their misfortune too to adopt the most baseless system of the times of Greek decadence at the very epoch when the progress of modern thought was beginning. To reconcile Christ's teaching with the forged works of Hermes Trismegistus was lost labour in the age of Bacon and Descartes.

Dr. Tulloch deserves thanks for recalling fresh attention to two such groups of writers, whose feelings and thoughts, like their circumstances, were far nearer to ours than a superficial glance would show. His book is always interesting and suggestive. It is, however, marred by frequent grammatical errors (some of which must doubtless be set down to the printer. The inaccuracy of the notes especially is surprising). A more serious drawback is the irritating tone in which the catch words of modern liberalism are constantly employed to describe the seventeenth century. There is a recurrent air of dogmatism that jars with the subject of the book, and a want of sympathy with any other party but his own, which shows that the author has only imperfectly learnt the lesson his favourite writers are constantly inculcating.

A General View of the History of the English Bible. By Brooke Foss Westcott, D.D. Second Edition, Revised. London: Macmillan and Co. 1872.

Canon Westcott's is the classical history of the English version of Scripture; and we hail the reappearance of his work in a new and enlarged edition, as betokening at once a merited homage to the intellectual and literary power of the writer, and a growing interest in the subject to which he has consecrated his pen. The most marked peculiarity of Canon Westcott's volume, and its chief excellence, is the

cautious yet vigorous manner in which he developes the *internal* history of the English Bible, showing "how it was made, with whose help, on what principles, by what laws it was modified from time to time, and how far our Authorised Version bears in itself the traces of its gradual formation." The author here had all but virgin soil before him, and he has made a noble commencement with the task of bringing it under cultivation. Ripe learning, patient analysis, critical insight, broad sympathies, and inviolable moral fairness were necessary for the enterprise; and they have all found their representative and exponent in Canon Westcott as he appears in this masterly and charming history. There is not a touch of what is slipshod, vague, pedantic, narrow, or cowardly in the entire volume. On the contrary, every page testifies to the conscientiousness, judgment, acumen, and scholarly exactness which have presided over the execution of every part of it.

The external as well as the internal history of the Version comes within the author's plan, and is treated with characteristic grasp and freshness. Henceforward, though earlier and more detailed accounts of the life and fortunes of the English Bible may not cease to have their value, they must all be used subject to the corrections of Canon Westcott's succinct, but critically accurate, narrative; and no one of them can hold its ground in competition with the work before us as a forcible, adequate, and trustworthy portraiture of the facts which it records. It is refreshing, in days of literary affectation and charlatanry, to meet with a work like this of Canon Westcott's, conceived and executed in the strong, straightforward spirit of true Christian genius, and impressed throughout with the stamp of a pure taste and of a generous, yet delicate culture. The sketch which the writer gives, in this second edition, of the rise and progress of the scheme for the revision of the Authorised Version of Scripture, as at present in course of accomplishment, adds a new feature of interest to a volume which claims the best attention of Christian students and readers of every class.

The Restoration of Paths to Dwell in. Essays on the Re-editing and Interpretation of the Old Testament Scriptures. By the Rev. Benjamin Street, B.A., Vicar of Barnetby-le-Wold. Strahan and Co. 1872.

A WORK which is not recommended by its title, but will be read from beginning to end with deep interest by those who are interested in the Revision by the Old Testament translation and questions of Biblical criticism generally. The author has an inquiring mind, writes in a lively and forcible style, and boldly raises many questions as to the arrangement of the text of the Old Testament, and its traditional interpretation by the Christian Church, which he has the misfortune not satisfactorily to answer. Such questions should not be raised by the reverent interpreter of Scripture, unless he is prepared

thoroughly to sift them. This book is destructive in its tendency, though not in its intention. It is full of suggestion, but little more than suggestion, and everywhere leaves the unwary reader an uneasy feeling. The author is under the influence of a mania which the following quotation will do something to explain:—

"What was then done as to the New Testament, in the way of vindicating its original from interested translation, was not then done, nor ever has since been done, as to the Old Testament, so as to vindicate its original from prejudiced Jewish translators. Consequently it is still exhibited in that fashion and with that meaning which the Jews chose to discern in it, because it was one which gratified their conceits. For, though the compilers of the English Version confronted, as St. Jerome did, the Septuagint with the Hebrew, they yet embodied, without modification, into their version the views and opinions of the Septuagint on all the legislation and transactions recorded in the Old Testament; and, since the views of the Septuagint are the views taken by the Jews three hundred years before Christ, the Church still borrows the key of the Rabbi for admission into the mysteries of the law, not the key of David (Rev. iii. 7), except in those cases where Christ or His Apostles have opened for her. The fetters which galled men's minds before the Reformation gall them no more; and many will no longer submit to be bound by an imposed interpretation of the Old Testament which represents the law as commanding in its days what He forbade in the days of the Gospel. Men rise half inspired from the perusal of the Gospel, and cannot identify the Lord who wept at the very thought of the destruction of Jerusalem with the Lord who, as the Jews represent it, ordered that nothing which breathed should be left alive, but all slaughtered in that town, among others, in a former age.

"This is not the fruit of rationalising; it is the true effect of that faith which holds that the Lord God, the Redeemer under the Gospel covenant, is the same Lord God spoken of in the Old Testament, who said of Himself, '*I change not*,' 'Conditor utriusque Testamenti.' It is not the theologian, nor the Rationalist, but it is a reasonable faith, which asserts, on seeing in the Gospel a resurrection of the Old Testament, which, having fallen asleep in Malachi with the words of hope on its lips, and having been buried without seeing corruption, rises again vivified and spiritualised in the new Dispensation, which is to the old as Christ's body at His resurrection was to the body which He had before. Therefore the task that lies before the Church of England is no mere modernising of obsolete words, nor mere polishing of the surface, but it is no less than to set forth the Old Testament in such wise, that it shall not be rebuked by the Gospel, and to supply the English-voiced intellect in the whole world with a homogeneous Bible."

There are many very apt criticisms in this volume, which, to some slight extent, may seem to justify the line of these remarks. But generally, and on the whole, there is a deep fallacy running through

the theory. The spirit of the Old Testament cannot be explained out of its holy severity; nor can the New Testament be proved to have corrected or reformed its sternness. The Saviour did more than weep over Jerusalem. The Septuagint has not moulded the Christian interpretation of the Old Testament. Nor is it competent to the Christian Church to undertake the remodelling of the ancient text which our Lord has handed down to us without any suggestion of the necessity of such changes as are here vindicated. We admire many things in this little book; but regard it, on the whole, as an immature and reckless, and sometimes very superficial, treatment of a grave subject.

Kritisch exegetischer Commentar über das Neue Testament. Von Dr. H. A. W. Meyer.

Vierte Abtheilung. Handbuch über den Brief der Paulus an die Römer. Funfte verbesserte und vermehrte Anflage. Göttingen. 1872.

THE veteran exegete celebrates the fourth decennium since the commencement of his great commentary by an enlarged edition of his Epistles to the Romans. This edition is extended by more than a hundred pages, these, however, being mainly devoted to a criticism of the rival exposition of Dr. Von Hoffmann. Between the two we give the preference to the older and sounder theologian. But it does not appear to us that so much polemical stricture—directed against other exegetes—serves the cause of Biblical exposition generally, or adds in particular to the value of this one. Especially is it useless for the English reader, who will find himself often at a loss to understand the state and bearings of the controversy. Meyer's exact criticism and exposition—combining philological and grammatical skill of the highest order with a general fidelity to Lutheran orthodoxy—makes his works a most valuable treasury to the student. We understand that Messrs. Clark propose issuing them in an English form. We shall then take the opportunity of giving our estimate of Meyer more fully.

The Circle of the Church's Life. Translated from the German of A. Tholuck, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Halle, Councillor of the Supreme Consistory, Prussia, by Robert Menzies, D.D. London: James Nisbet and Co. 1873.

THIS little volume contains a number of devout meditations for the principal seasons of the Christian year. In the introduction to a larger volume, *The Circle of Human Life*, Dr. Tholuck wrote as follows:—"I have been young, but now am old—I have spent a whole life-time in battling against infidelity with the weapons of apologetical science, but I have become ever more and more convinced that the way to the heart does not lie through the head; and

that the only way to the conversion of the head lies through a converted heart which already tastes the living fruits of the Gospel." In this belief Dr. Tholuck has sought to serve the Church of Christ, not only as a theologian, but as a writer of devotional books having for their aim the kindling and encouraging of personal Christian life. His contributions to the department of religious literature are prized in Germany, and will be welcome to English readers in the admirable translations of Dr. Menzies. They are simple in their style, touched with quaintness, and a certain tendency to mysticism, from which German devotional writings are seldom free, true to the cardinal doctrines of redemption, and sincere in their expression of the experience of the Christian heart. The value of works of this class, however, is very different to different people. It is a matter in which the instinct of a pious reader must be trusted; for there needs to be not only a certain doctrinal agreement between the reader and the writer, but it is even more a question of spiritual kinship or affinity that will determine the value of a particular author to any one. There are, for instance, good people to whom the *Saint's Rest* is an invaluable aid to devotion, who would find nothing whatever in Augustine's *Confessions*, or the *Imitatio Christi*; and others again to whom Henry Vaughan and George Herbert are very dear as Christian poets, who care but little for Cowper or Charles Wesley.

Systematic Theology. By Charles Hodge, D.D. Vol. III. London and Edinburgh: T. Nelson and Sons.

THE third and last volume of this great work has just reached our hands. We can do little more than announce it, with that kind of hearty recommendation which we can give to a system of Divinity the principles of which we do not on some points approve, but the thoroughness of which on every point is evident to the slightest inspection. This volume takes up the doctrines of Regeneration, Justification, and Sanctification, dealing with them according to the standard of the Westminster Confession. On these subjects our Methodist theology is sometimes widely at variance with Dr. Hodges. The ethical part of the treatment falls under a close, vigorous, and exhaustive examination of the Decalogue. Here we, for the most part, can take Dr. Hodge as a sure guide. On the Means of grace and Eschatology nothing is wanting to the completeness of the exposition. As a course of dogmatic theology on Calvinistic principles, these volumes are indisputably the best in the English language. We cannot, of course, recommend it as a guide to our students, but, as a work of reference to accompany other guides, it ought to be on the shelves of all who are aiming at a comprehensive acquaintance with Divinity.

The King's Highway. A Journal of Scriptural Holiness. Vol. I. London: A. Osborne. 1872.

THIS is the first complete volume of a monthly publication edited

by four Wesleyan Ministers. "The single purpose of *The King's Highway* will be the promotion of belief in the doctrine, and attainment of the experience and life, of Scriptural holiness; meaning by that term full consecration of heart and life to God, purity of nature effected by the atonement—perfect love to God and man." This purpose appears to us fairly to rule the whole volume, which is earnest and intense in spirit, and contains some excellent papers on Christian character and privilege. We think it likely to contribute to the high end its editors have in view.

The Preacher's Lantern. Vol. II. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1872.

THIS publication has gained very fair acceptance with the class for whom it is designed. Young ministers and theological students will find many of their own topics well touched upon. This volume contains a series of sermons by the late Dean Alford, and an Exposition of the Book of Joel, by the Rev. Samuel Cox, worthy of their respective authors. To the general reader, perhaps, the sketches entitled "Model Preachers" will be the most interesting.

Sermons by the Rev. J. W. Boulding. London: J. Bemrose and Sons. 1872.

A VOLUME of sermons which reach to a high degree of excellence. Fresh, thoughtful, and thought-stirring; they are poetic, fervent and spiritual. It is impossible to read them without attaining an elevation of thought. There is in them a subtle, if not formal, exposition; a true theology, if theological forms are avoided. In saying they are highly picturesque, we strike upon their one obvious fault; they are too descriptive. They are lacking in hortatory matter, and that pointed application which, in our judgment, is essential to a complete sermon. Truth stated, as it is throughout this volume, is sure to insinuate itself to the heart of the reader; but it is not consistent with the definition of a sermon that it should be left to do so.

Sermons to a Country Congregation. By Augustus William Hare, A.M., late Fellow of New College, and Rector of Alton Barnes. Eighth Edition. Two Vols. London: Hatchards.

We welcome with no ordinary pleasure a new edition of Augustus Hare's *Sermons to a Country Congregation*. They are the precious relic, or perpetuation rather, of a life comparatively short and spent in quiet paths; for Augustus Hare died at forty years of age, after a ministry of only three years, spent in a small rural parish of less than 150 inhabitants. Resigning his Fellowship at Oxford, he went from the work of a College Tutor to take charge of one of the smallest parishes in England, throwing himself with all the spirit and high-toned thoroughness of his family into his new duties. How he taught his little country congregation these sermons live to show. They were not published in his lifetime: they were not written for publication, but prepared for the farmers and labouring people of a Wiltshire village. There is no sign of "preaching down" to the hearers; nothing strained in the simplicity of style and homeliness of illustration; no trace of condescension or effort to put himself on the people's level. They are *teaching* sermons from first to last. Christian doctrine is explained, and Christian duties are enforced with the utmost clearness, with what the Scripture calls "all authority," and yet with power of sympathy that never seems to fail. In tone they have just that even level of earnestness which marks an earnest worker engaged in familiar and accustomed duty. Let it be said for the parochial system, not perfect certainly, and capable of great abuse, that, where the true man is forthcoming, the relation of the country parson to his flock is as favourable for the exercise of teaching and pastoral influence as any the Church has ever hit upon. After the death of Augustus Hare, his brother Julius selected fifty-six of his MS. sermons, which, on their publication in 1885, secured an immediate and wide-spread popularity. That popularity they are not likely to lose. They are models of their order, almost if not quite, unrivalled in the class to which they belong. The preacher will see in their simplicity and ease an art which he may account himself happy if he can attain, and laymen will find what they want—strong, plain speech, carrying direct home to them the invitation and commands of the Gospel, and the laws and precepts of Christian life. They cannot be called *great* sermons. Here are none such, for instance, as the sermons on the *Victory of Faith*, with which Julius Hare made so profound and lasting an impression upon the younger Cambridge men of 1839. But on the other hand it was not given to Julius to unlock the hearts of the country people as Augustus did. "To them his sermons often of fifty, sixty, seventy minutes were mortal long and hard. The more homely the illustrations the more entirely they misunderstood them. He spoke of the danger of men 'playing at ninepins with

truth,' and they thought he was warning young labourers against beer and skittles. He likened fiery controversialists to men who 'walked with lucifer matches in their pockets,' and the farmers thanked him for the zeal with which he watched over their farm-yards and stocks. He referred, by way of illustration, to the devotion of Italian peasants to the Madonna, and he was reported to have told his congregation that they ought to worship the Virgin Mary, and believe that she would bless them if they prayed to her."

Though Augustus Hare's sermons have long since won their place in the literature of the English pulpit, they are not well known to the younger readers of the present day, and we are rather apt to forget how soon a new generation rises whom it may be necessary to introduce to our old friends. To such then as have not made acquaintance with them we cordially recommend these volumes, seasonably republished at a time when so many are reading with deep interest the memoirs of the remarkable family to which their author belonged.

The Young Life Equipping Itself for God's Service. Four Sermons, Preached before the University of Cambridge, October and November, 1872. By C. J. Vaughan, D.D. London: H. S. King and Co.

Whilst we were wondering why these sermons did not satisfy the expectation raised by the author's much respected name, our eye happened to fall upon an advertisement at the end of the book, where no less than twenty-six volumes of sermons by Dr. Vaughan are announced, the majority of them certainly published quite recently. We are afraid the quantity begins to account for the quality. The sermons of this last series have all the writer's characteristics of devoutness, purity, and high moral tone; but they are diffuse, somewhat vague, and, as University sermons, it appears to us, below what one has a right to expect from Dr. Vaughan. The sermon on Prayer, for instance, has neither the confident tone of dogmatic teaching, nor the skill and logical acuteness of the controversialist. Language like the following seems to us to belong neither to the one order of preaching nor the other. "Brethren, it cannot be wicked to pray. It is no intruding into things forbidden. It is the visiting a home which was ours in our infancy, which shall be ours for ever and ever when the childhood of our perfection shall at last be attained. Prayer is going home. Prayer is coming to Him who is our rest. Prayer is awakening out of earth's sleep, letting in the light of day upon night's dark dank chamber, and beginning to live." This is hardly the strain in which we shall either comfort our friends or discomfit our adversaries. If Dr. Vaughan would only give us something more like his Notes on the Epistle to the Romans, how glad we should be.

Sermons Preached in Trinity Church, Glasgow. By William Pulsford, D.D. Glasgow: Maclehose. 1878.

The preacher who succeeds in presenting the old and familiar truths of Christianity in fresh forms and aspects has achieved an important success. Yet the attempt in this direction becomes a way of peril to many. Beyond a certain point, distinguish as nicely as we may, the garb of truth cannot be varied without affecting the substance; and novelty of mode too eagerly sought is apt to become novelty of matter.

These *Trinity Church Sermons* are an admirable example of the way in which a reverent and cultured mind may treat religious matters, with freshness of manner, and that without mis-statement or understatement of revealed truth. They have no characteristic more noticeable than the pervading presence of Christ Jesus in every part. The following extract from an admirable sermon on *The Captivity of Thought* (2 Cor. x. 5) is a fair example of Dr. Pulsford's style. "But there is a last and highest authority who submits His claims to the conscience, namely, He who speaks in the Word. Last, because, without the Word which addresses the conscience through the ear, we should be ignorant of Him. His voice without words, whose 'chord is gone out through all the earth to the end of the world,' fails to awaken a sense of His presence, much less to teach the knowledge of His will; and 'the light which lightens every man' comes to us through an atmosphere that is so dense that its source is hidden. With light everywhere men know not God. 'How shall they believe in Him,' asks Paul, 'of whom they have not heard?' . . . In Jesus Christ, 'The Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory—the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father—full of grace and truth.' In Him we have, though last, one highest authority for the obedience of our thoughts. And, when He is once seen, like the risen sun, He accounts for, and claims as His, all the light that preceded Him. He is the centre and source of every attraction. No sooner is He 'lifted up' than our whole nature submits to Him. Our affections are won by His charms, our will gladly submits to His will, and our thoughts become free in His captivation. With His reign set up in the heart, submission becomes a devotion, obedience a worship, and the whole life moves in charmed circles of rectitude and peace" (p. 40).

While Dr. Pulsford dwells lovingly, and with great effect, upon the peculiarly human features and aspects of our Lord's life on earth, he never—as the manner of some is—keeps his hearers so long in this sacred but outer court as to neglect to lead them through "the veil"—"His flesh"—into the holiest of all.

The preface tells us that these discourses were not read, but preached, and that from "brief notes." In the warm and earnest utterances of their extempore delivery, we can readily believe that there was a clearer and more personal application of the truth con-

cerning the *way* of faith than we find in this their printed form. Supposing this one important deficiency were made up, this volume would leave but little to be desired as a specimen of faithful Christian preaching, specially adapted to a well-educated congregation.

Lectures and Sermons. By the late Dr. Alexander Dyce Davidson, of Aberdeen. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1872.

Dr. Davidson, as we learn from the preface to this volume, was ordained a minister of the Scotch establishment in 1832. Nine years afterwards, when the Church was rent by the Disruption Controversy, he "came out," to use the phrase of the time, and formed one of the devoted band who, under the leadership of Chalmers, organised the Free Church of Scotland. It was not, however, as an ecclesiastic, though none held the principles of his Church more firmly than he, but as a pastor and earnest preacher of the Gospel, Dr. Davidson was best known. For the unusually long space of thirty-six years, he ministered to one of the largest and most influential congregations in Aberdeen. And if his pastorate was unusually long it was characterised at the same time by unusual diligence and zeal. His fervour was not cooled by the lapse of years, nor did his long continuance in one sphere of labour induce, as it too often does, a mechanical or negligent discharge of its duties. Up to the last his ministry retained its early freshness and power, and all throughout was rich in those spiritual fruits which never fail to attend the faithful delivery of the message of Christ by a man to whose own heart it has come as "glad tidings of great joy."

Some conception of Dr. Davidson's industry may be gathered from the fact that besides many discourses which he destroyed, and others which he published, he was found to have left upwards of 1,800 lectures and sermons. From these the forty which compose this volume have been selected. They are interesting as being very favourable samples of Scottish preaching, especially of that kind of preaching which has fed and developed the spiritual life of the Free Church. Their theology is that of the Westminster Confession, but they are not by any means dry disquisitions on doctrine. The preacher never forgets that he speaks to "all sorts and conditions of men," some of whom need to be roused to repentance, others to be taught and comforted, and built up on their most holy faith. The varied experiences of the Christian life, its sorrows and joys, its struggles and its victories, its hopes and aspirations, are skilfully and faithfully described, and all are referred to the Person of a once crucified but now risen and glorified Lord as their Source and Fountain-head. The sermons, indeed, cannot be said to discover very great originality or depth of thought. They have not the rich suggestiveness that gives their chief value to the sermons of Dr. Ker, nor the sparkle and subtle analyses of Candlish, nor the glow of Guthrie. But to those who enjoy a pure and graceful diction, which not unfrequently rises into

true dignity and stateliness, and who wish to be led into those simple yet profound truths which constitute the glory and preciousness of the Gospel of Christ, this volume will be most welcome and most profitable reading.

The Beatitudes of the Kingdom. By J. Oswald Dykes, M.A. London: James Nisbet and Co. 1872.

With one or two exceptions, these are not great sermons. Yet there is not one of the ten which does not stand upon a high level of excellence, and perhaps the last is the best. The exposition is thoughtful, precise, and reverent, evidently the fruit of wide study and of a sincere desire to help men to the attainment of Christian blessedness. Of course Mr. Dykes does not wander through all possible interpretations of the thirteen verses from St. Matthew which he has selected as his text; but as a rule he chooses that which is most in harmony with the context, and which can be brought to bear most directly and practically upon his hearers. To do more would have been to comment rather than to preach. Enough is said to stimulate Christian activity to the further study and appropriation of these beatitudes, and to make many breaches in the indifferentism, or vanity, or mental indolence within which it is the fashion for men to fortify themselves. Two excellences are worthy of especial notice:—the beautiful harmony in Mr. Dykes' treatment of these beatitudes, and the sagacity with which he turns his weapons against sin in many of its multitudinous shapes and degrees. Of sensationalism or heterodoxy there is absolutely none. Very occasionally an uncouth word crops up: still less frequently the gold-leaf is beaten perhaps a little too thin. But on the whole, we have been pleased with the high tone and power of these sermons; and one, at least, is almost worthy to be adopted as a model, for the purity of its language and the symmetry of its form.

The Laws of the Kingdom. By J. Oswald Dykes, M.A. London: James Nisbet and Co. 1873.

This volume is in continuation of the work above noticed, and the author proposes to devote a third to the treatment, in a similar style, of the rest of the Sermon on the Mount. The first half is an exposition of that law of the Kingdom, "not destruction but fulfilment," which our Lord announced as the purpose of His coming. "These words are a protest, on the one side, against the blind spirit of revolt, in the radical reaction, whose impulse is to tear itself loose from all that went before, and to destroy the good along with the evil in that which is; on the other side, against the rigid unprogressive conservatism, which in its idolatry of the past would arrest development, and which refuses to fulfil the spirit of existing systems by a wise superseding of their form." We do not think Mr. Dykes is very happy in the exposition to which the above passage leads; but in

dealing with the examples of our Lord's moral legislation respecting murder, adultery, &c., he reaches a higher level. The subject is a very serious one,—part of it, indeed, delicate and difficult to handle; but it is undertaken in a manner worthy of all praise. There is much yet for Christian ministers to do in explaining and enforcing Christian ethics. In the second part Mr. Dykes passes to what he calls "the law of secrecy in religion," not the best way, perhaps, of naming that principle of right motive which our Lord lays down as essential to all right doing. Here, again, in the further illustration and application of our Lord's teaching, considerable power is shown. The chapters on Almsgiving and Prayer are admirable. On the whole it is a high order of preaching that is represented in these two volumes.

The Temptation of Our Lord. By the late Norman Macleod, D.D. London: Strahan and Co. 1873.

Dr. Macleod will long be remembered with affection in the Churches. If he did nothing of the very highest order in any one department of Christian service, there were many in which he was remarkably able and effective. These sermons exhibit some of their author's best qualities, his clearness, good sense, and power of practical Christian teaching. The sermon on the Tempter is worth a careful reading; it is an admirable exposition of the New Testament doctrine concerning the person and agency of Satan. "Let me here remark that we are apt to fall into two extremes regarding the power of Satan; by either exaggerating it, or making light of it." He points out that his power is limited by the fact that he is a mere creature, by the providence of God, by man's will, and by the very fact of his wickedness. . . . "The evil eye, if I may so speak, sees only in the dark. There Satan is at home, and quite understands the forces which direct, and the things which attract those who, like himself, prefer darkness to light. But the kingdom of God, because of its brightness, blinds him, so that it is practically to him a land of darkness, as darkness itself; and of the shadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darkness. His greatest puzzle, therefore, is a man who loves God."

Disciple-Life. By the Rev. D. Maccoll, Author of "Work in the Wynds." Glasgow: James Maclehose. 1872.

"By Disciple-life is meant here that life of faith whose first necessity is continuous Divine teaching. The whole Bible implies such a life. . . . Yet it seems more especially the function of the Gospels to make this prominent and plain. Here the Divine preacher . . . speaks at last by His Son. . . . The life of the first disciples becomes thus part of the teaching we need. . . The first and most essential element of Disciple-life is to know the Lord, to be with Him, and to learn Him. . . studying the Master in every phase of His life and work,

and in every form and illustration of His doctrine; for He is not only Preacher, but Example. To see how the Disciple-life was developed, and how employed, we must go to the Acts, then to the Epistles of the Apostles, then to the Epistles of the Lord, and then back by a new path to the histories of the Old Testament, "for New and Old complete the idea of the Kingdom of God." Here, however, "it is only intended to present a few specimens of this idea, as it has been found helpful in gathering hints for personal, pastoral, and Evangelistic work." It is thus that Mr. Maccoll opens to us his design in this volume. And the design is executed with much loving earnestness and zeal. Some of the most impressive and instructive scenes of our Lord's life are unfolded to our view; and so unfolded as to show us that the Gospels "give us what is no doubt past; but yet what is ceaselessly present." In the ministry of Christ, and the life of "The Inner Circle" of disciples, Mr. Maccoll finds symbols of the life, experiences, privileges, liabilities, duties of those who cultivate the Disciple-life throughout all time. Some of the parallels on which the symbolisms rest are too far-fetched and fanciful to suit our taste, *e.g.*, that between Christ sleeping in the boat during the storm, and Christ in our hearts, or in His Church, during some special dangers. It is difficult to know in what sense we have a "sleeping Christ" in the boat with us now; and the somewhat mystical language used here places Christ in too subjective a relation to His people and His cause. Nor do we admire one or two textual and other expositions. But these are comparatively small matters. The book breathes throughout the spirit of Christ-like devotion and zeal; it is full of vigorous thought and sound instruction.

The Practical Philosopher. A Daily Monitor for the Business Men of England; consisting of Brief and Suggestive Moral Readings on the Book of Proverbs for Every Day in the Year. By David Thomas, D.D. London: The Book Society.

This is a very big book, and the author has presented *ten thousand copies* of it, to be sold within two years, to a "Committee formed for the erection of a thoroughly undenominational Church in the Clapham Road." We are not in a position to estimate the likelihood of Dr. Thomas's wish being realised; but we think the aim is pitched somewhat high. It contains many very good things on indolence, intemperance, fraud, selfishness, and their opposite virtues; but the plan of the work tells heavily even on so practised a writer as Dr. Thomas. To produce 365 short and readable homilies on the Book of Proverbs is a tremendous task, and he who undertakes it had need be very sure of himself and his resources. It is almost inevitable that the writer should, after a while, take refuge in the commonplace, or else struggle to avoid it by being epigrammatic or pithy, in season and out of season. The author has not wholly escaped the dangers of his undertaking; he would have been more than mortal if he had.

Facts of Truth. Eight Discourses on Religion. By Samuel Pearson, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1873.

These discourses are pleasant, easy reading, and give us a favourable impression of Mr. Pearson's qualities as a preacher. Recent developments of scepticism are referred to, and the claims of Christian doctrine intelligently maintained. They are good as far as they go, though rather too slight to contribute much to the theological discussions of the day. By-the-bye, these fanciful titles to published sermons are becoming a literary evil. Let sermons be announced as sermons, and if they do not live for their own sake, they will hardly be helped by a fantastic title.

The Days of the Son of Man. A History of the Church in the Time of Our Lord. By William Lee, D.D. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood and Sons. 1872.

We have examined this book with much pleasure. Though we cannot claim for it a striking originality, either in its method or in the illustration of its subjects, though it leaves many difficult questions still unanswered, and though the style, which is ordinarily chaste and vigorous, is sometimes faulty, yet it is a practical and useful treatise. Written to illustrate the history of the Christian Church in its earliest period, it sketches, in clear outline, the characteristic features of Palestine in the days of our Lord, its geography, the various classes of its inhabitants, their language, civil institutions, forms of worship, and conditions of religious life. It treats of the personal ministry of Christ, of the general position and character of His disciples, and of some peculiarities of His doctrine. And it briefly treats also of the early forms of religious observance, and of the history of the disciples after the ascension. Much useful information on these subjects is collected from various sources, and arranged on a clear simple plan. The earlier portions of the book may be read as a brief introduction to the study of the New Testament; while the whole will aid the student in his conceptions of the external conditions of the life of the early Christian Church.

John, Whom Jesus Loved. By James Culross, A.M., D.D. London: Elliot Stock, 62, Paternoster Row. 1872.

This is an attempt to do, for St. John, something similar to what Krummacher has done for Elijah; not, indeed, with such detailed and searching analysis, or in so pictorial a style, but with considerable ability and discernment. The man, the author, the theologian, are the three aspects under which Dr. Culross approaches his subject; and whilst correcting many mistakes into which superficial readers and thinkers are apt to fall, he draws such a picture as commends itself generally to the Christian judgment. Probably, it

did not fall within the author's plan to notice specially current objections to the authenticity of St. John's Gospel; yet, there are occasional references and hints which denote acquaintance with the literature of the subject, and for which a devout student will be thankful. The three Epistles are translated beautifully and correctly, and invested with new interest by brief accounts of the stories which lie behind them, and of the influences in the Church which they were designed to counteract or encourage. An appendix contains some of the more notable of the legends and traditions which cluster round the Apostle's name. Above all, there is, on every page, a rare blending of reverent spirituality, fearless conviction, and good sense, which make us grateful to Dr. Culross, and which qualify his book alike for the study and the closet.

Sermons, Preached for the most part in Ireland. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. London: Macmillan and Co. 1873.

A VOLUME of brief, practical, useful homilies, distinguished by lucidity and plainness of thought and expression, but which scarcely rise to the character or pretensions of sermons. They were written with ease; were preached and heard, we should think, without labour. They give us the notion of a current of thought, rapid it may be, but neither deep nor wide. They will be read, however, with pleasure.

The Divine Sequence. A Treatise on Creation and Redemption. By F. M. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1873.

THIS little book, reverent alike towards Holy Scripture and Church authority and interpretation, deals with the revelation of God through the medium of creation, through Mary and the Incarnation, the Church and hierarchy, in accordance with the Scotist school of Roman Catholic writers. It is skilful, occasionally beautiful, sometimes profound (to us a dark profound), it is speculative, spiritual, mystical. We need scarcely say we differ widely from many of its conclusions, though we greatly admire the tone of religious feeling running through the whole.

Angels and Heaven. By Thomas Mills, Author of "Sure of Heaven," &c. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1872.

THE Scriptural teaching on the nature and occupations of angels, and on the future heavenly life of man, is classified in a manner at once clear and simple. The treatment of these subjects is characterised more by breadth than by depth and penetration, and is impaired by occasional feebleness both of thought and style. With the

sole exception of the views on the future abode of the glorified, it has the merit of not wandering far beyond regions already known and well traversed.

Synoptical Lectures on the Books of Holy Scripture. Second Series. Isaiah—Acts. By the Rev. Donald Fraser, D.D. London: James Nisbet and Co. 1873.

We noticed the first series of these lectures in our last number. Dr. Fraser is successfully carrying out his plan, and continues to put into small space a good deal of matter, introductory and explanatory, relating to the several books of the Bible. We are glad to see that many of the best preachers are leading their congregations more and more to study the Scriptures. Nothing is more needed, and if preachers would bear it in mind, something considerable in this direction might soon be done.

Indian Missions. By Sir Bartle Frere, G.C.S.I., K.C.B., D.C.L. Reprinted from the "Church and the Age." London: John Murray. 1873.

We are glad to see Sir Bartle Frere's essay on *Indian Missions* published in a separate form and at a low price. For the writer's sake it will be received with respect by those who regard the witness of what are called "interested parties" with more or less of suspicion. Sir Bartle Frere is one of that class of public servants whom it has been the honour of our Indian Empire to produce, and by whom that Empire has been administered with such high average of political and military skill. Englishmen in India have shown capacity not only for fighting, for holding conquered provinces, and for raising revenue, but for touching with marvellous tact and success the great problems of race, religion, and national life. And, perhaps, nowhere else in the service of this nation have so many eminent men exhibited with firmness and consistency the distinctive Christian character. It would seem as though the gravity of our country's duties towards India had demanded public men of exceptionally elevated character, and such, by the good providence of God, have seldom been wanting. To such men the question of Christianity in India cannot but be of the profoundest interest. Though the subject may be dismissed with a sneer by a certain order of slightly-travelled men, or treated in a manner half-contemptuous, half-patronising, by the more cynical portion of the English press, men like Lord Lawrence and Sir Bartle Frere have given it their most careful attention, and leave us in no doubt as to their judgment and convictions. This essay is written from the point of view of an English Churchman, and has special reference to the work of the Church of England, but the references to other Christian bodies are

entirely in the right spirit, and will satisfy most candid Nonconformists. Perhaps the highest tribute paid to any one Missionary in India is that which is given to Dr. Wilson, the venerable head of the Free Church Mission in Bombay. Sir Bartle Frere speaks of him as "a man who will be remembered among the Christian Apostles of Western India. Dr. John Wilson possessed in an eminent degree all the typical excellences and powers of a highly educated Scotch clergyman. He neglected no branch of human learning which came in his way. Classical and Oriental scholars, philologists and antiquaries, geologists and politicians, all lamented that he did not pay exclusive attention to their own favourite branch of study; but none could complain of him as negligent or indifferent. All his human learning, however, was devoted to the Missionary cause, and mainly to education, which he believed was intended to be the chief handmaid of Missionary work in India; and all his proceedings were directed with a prudence, judgment, and consistent perseverance which are rare in any profession."

It is well known that opinion has differed among Indian Missionaries as to the degree in which education should be relied on in Missionary effort. But the discussion of this question can hardly be of much service until it is agreed what "Missionary work" and "Missionary progress" are. On the whole we are inclined to think that the Churches at home take too narrow a view of this question, and fail, in consequence, to estimate a good deal of the work done in India at its real value. If they will not look with interest on other signs of Missionary progress beside the conversion of individuals to Christianity, they will do great injustice both to the work and the workers. Sir Bartle Frere contends for the broader view. "I would speak of Missionary progress, in its least restricted sense, as including all that tends to bring the population of India generally as much within the Christian pale as are the inhabitants of Western Europe. All that tends directly and intentionally to produce this result I should regard as Missionary work." It seems to us that this view must be shared by every one who considers the vast difference between a heathen population and a population even nominally Christian. In the case of the latter there is both a code and a tradition of morals, and a level of moral sentiment incomparably higher than any to be found in heathenism. For public opinion to be so far Christian that in its gravest decisions and ultimate appeals it pays homage to the Word of God, is in itself a victory won. The members of such a community are "not far from the kingdom of God;" compared with them a heathen people lie under terrible disadvantage and disability, both from what they inherit and from what surrounds them. Is it not possible then to think of the formation of Christian sentiment in a country apart from such conversion of individuals as results in the open confession of Christianity? To men upon the ground progress of this kind is continually revealing itself, though it cannot be made to take its place in statistics furnished to the Church at home. As Sir Bartle

Frere says, "Statistical facts can in no way convey any adequate idea of the work done in any part of India. The effect is often enormous where there has not been a single avowed conversion, and is manifested in very different ways according to the nationality, the creed, and even the professions in life, and place of residence, urban or rural, of the native community."

There is not a page in this interesting little book which the friends—or, for the matter of that, the enemies—of missions will not do well to read; but one or two of the author's judgments on particular questions may be briefly noticed here. It is frequently urged that Missions in the East should be organised upon a plan entirely different from that adopted, with various modifications, by the different Protestant societies. It is said that the Missionary should be unmarried, that he should disengage himself from European associations, that his type of life should be ascetic, and conform as nearly as possible to that of the natives of the country. As is well known this has been the mode adopted by many of the Roman Catholic Missionaries, the organisation of that Church being peculiarly favourable to such a method. Under this system considerable results have been obtained, and it has been assumed, somewhat too readily, that no other class of labourers has shown similar devotion and self-sacrifice. Sir Bartle Frere's judgment in this matter appears to us to be thoroughly sound and sensible. It is admitted that *for particular men* the celibate and ascetic life does afford the best conditions for successful labour. A Mr. Bowen, of the American Mission in Bombay, is referred to as a remarkable instance of this. "For many years past he has lived in a crowded native bazaar, a life such as no hermit in a Libyan desert or Hindoo ascetic in a jungle solitude could surpass in its simple and unaffected austerity. Labouring with his own hands in editing and printing a religious periodical, after earning the barest subsistence according to the strictest Hindoo idea of sufficiency, he has devoted his whole time to preaching the Gospel in the bazaars of the native town." But allowing for exceptional cases Sir Bartle Frere declines to admit the superior efficiency of a celibate agency, and approves of the principles on which the Protestant Churches generally act. "No doubt there are times when any prudent soldier of the Cross would wish to be, like St. Paul, unencumbered by any worldly ties, however dear and sacred. . . But in the long run, and looking to the majority of cases, and to the whole of the work the Christian Church has to do in India, *my opinion is decidedly against the superior efficiency of celibate or ascetic agency.* We see and hear much of its power when efficient; but I am convinced, from close personal observation, that the per centage of inefficient agents is, in quiet times, far greater among celibates and ascetics than among Missionaries who are permitted to marry, who live as our Protestant Missionaries generally do in India, frugally and soberly, after the manner of life to which the same men and women would be accustomed in any active and laborious calling. In judging of this question, few are aware of or calcu-

late the enormous sacrifice of life, health, and efficiency which celibacy and asceticism, as practised by the active Roman Catholic Missionaries, entail in India." We would particularly direct the reader's attention to Sir Bartle Frere's observations on the present aspect of Mohammedanism. We need not be surprised that his views differ considerably from those of some other authorities, Mr. Palgrave for example. It is clear that the vitality of Mohammedanism differs greatly in different countries. We have recently called attention to the statements of the latter writer respecting the revival of Islam throughout the Ottoman Empire. He ascribes to it a quickened life, manifest both in zeal for doctrine and elevation of moral character. In Northern and Western India this does not appear to be the case. Sir Bartle Frere refers to "a very curious change which has within the last few years been coming over the feeling of at least the educated portion of the Mohammedans with regard to Christianity." It appears that for controversial reasons there has been an increased disposition on their part to examine critically and carefully the Scriptures; and, singularly enough, the study of the Prophecies has most of all contributed "to exercise a depressing effect on the Mohammedan student regarding the future of his creed. . . We are not likely to see in Mohammedanism any eclectic phase such as we are now witnessing in Hindooism; modifications of this character appear incompatible with the simple and definite principles of their creed. But a revolution of some kind seems impending; the popular feeling regarding it among Mohammedans themselves is not one of hopefulness, and the Christian Missionary is now listened to by the young Mohammedan student with an inclination to examine what he says, of which the Missionary of thirty years back saw few examples."

The distinguished writer of this essay, after thirty-five years' service in India, is now entrusted by the Government of this country with the honourable task of bringing to an end the East African slave trade, a task as congenial to his humane disposition as to his eminent abilities, and one in which all Englishmen will wish him entire success.

The Idolatrous and Immoral Teaching of some Government and University Text Books in India. By John Murdoch, LL.D. Madras: Caleb Foster. 1872.

Dr. Murdoch has a right to be heard on the subject to which his pamphlet refers. He is the Indian agent of the Christian Vernacular Education Society, and for more than a quarter of a century he has laboured to procure "pure literature" for the youth of India. In the pamphlet before us he brings two very serious charges against the Directors of Public Instruction in the different Presidencies of our Indian Empire, and sustains both by quotations more than sufficient for the purpose. The first touches the vexed question of "perfect

religious neutrality." That phrase means to the highest educational official of the Bombay Presidency, nothing for Christianity, anything for Hinduism or Mohammedanism. Accordingly the Government Press issues primers, poems, and selections from English authors "from which every Christian allusion" is "effectually weeded." Dr. Watts is not permitted to speak in his own poetry of Christ, Solomon, or Satan, but must be tortured to make room for the platitudes of "European morality," or the "truths of natural theology." But is the same expurgating rigour used on the other side of the question? It is sufficient to reply that in the vernacular school books issued by the officials, the Hindu is furnished with his customary invocation to Ganesa, the god of difficulties, "whose body is as red as coral, and who has an elephant's trunk;" and the Mohammedan is assisted to salute Mohammed as "the accepted intercessor, the liberal minded prophet, gracious, portly, smiling, sealed." Neutrality like this is the echo of an old cry, "Not this man, but Barabbas."

The second charge is, if possible, more serious than the first, namely—that passages inculcating immorality of the most repulsive form are left intact in the school books issued under the direction of the Heads of the Educational Departments. Dr. Murdoch having in vain called the attention of the authorities in India to this matter has reluctantly submitted to a necessity which, to him, must have been most painful. He has printed translations of these passages in his pamphlet "for special circulation only." We have said enough to indicate that Dr. Murdoch's facts deserve the most serious consideration of the committees of the various Missionary Societies, and it might not be amiss if some "Honourable Member" finding the Secretary of State for India in his place, would put a question to him as to how long her Majesty's servants in the East would be permitted to pursue a course insulting to her Majesty's faith and mischievous in the extreme to the youthful portion of her Majesty's Indian subjects.

II. EDUCATIONAL WORKS.

Education and School. By the Rev. Edward Thring, M.A., Head Master of Uppingham School. Second Edition. London: Macmillan and Co. 1867.

Although Mr. Thring's book has been published some years, it is not out of date with regard to the matters discussed—matters still occupying attention, and likely to do for some time to come. The questions in practical education which Mr. Thring regarded as unsettled, have not received conclusive settlement since, though, perhaps, the means for arriving at correct judgments are a little better in hand. These questions are not, the reader may assure himself, the vexed and thorny questions of primary education on the one hand, or the political and religious re-adjustment of universities on the other. The writer is a public-school man, heartily believing, as he has good reason to do, in the general efficiency and success of the great schools of the country, and desirous to set them right with the nation at large, as being equal, with some necessary modification, to the peculiar circumstances of the time. He sees that, owing to the rapid increase of the middle, or well-to-do classes, there is a great strain on the established means of higher education in this country. As population has outgrown the parochial system, so has it outgrown the public-school system; but he would plead, in the one case as in the other, that wisdom lies, not in the abandonment, but in the extension, and, where needful, the remodelling of the old system. Without joining in the positive worship of the past, one would be extremely sorry if, in our modern educational methods, we should lose that power of producing, on the whole, vigorous, manly, and fairly-cultivated men which the old public schools undoubtedly possessed. Mr. Thring has a good deal to say that is very sensible and true on what education is, and is not. He is very vigorous in repudiating the notion that "intellectual progress makes men perfect, or is the true advancement of mankind." He cares very little for knowledge apart from training. "Nothing can be said before the distinction between the *strong* mind and the *stuffed* mind, between *training* and *cram*, is thoroughly recognised and decided. The whole tendency of the present day is to glorify quick returns—various knowledge, cram, in fact—and to depreciate thought, training, and strength." Of course, this is not new or unheard of; but it wants saying often, and saying well, and we commend Mr. Thring's lively and original way of putting it to the reader's notice. As there are so many people just now giving the whole of their attention to the

question of National Primary Education, we may take the liberty of saying that there is other education beside that called primary, which is of national importance. It is too much the fashion to suppose that all the great problems of modern life have to do with the working classes. That this is so to a considerable extent we do not, of course, deny, contending only that there are other classes whose interests are quite as worthy of attention, and, in the long run, fully as important to the nation. From many causes the middle-class type of life is predominating among us. In a great industrial nation this is sure to be the case. Manufacturing and commercial success leads every year to innumerable promotions from the lower to the middle class of society, as well as to promotions within the middle class itself. Thus families are founded, and take their place, with more or less of ease, in the region of social comfort and prosperity. The middle classes form, we believe, as yet, the real depositary of power, and give the main direction to public opinion in the country, however much their ascendancy may be threatened in the future by new forces acting from beneath. It appears to us, then, that the general culture of the middle classes is as important to the nation as a whole as the primary education of the working classes, and that the ignorance which takes the form of inability to read or write is not the only evil of the kind to be feared. There could hardly be a greater national evil than that the rich and influential classes of a country should be badly educated, and, in consequence, wanting in cultivated intelligence, in the power of correct thinking, and in that general training which, though no substitute for moral qualities, is necessary to give them their real value, and make them tell as they ought to do on the national life. It is disappointing to see how, in many cases, for want of better education, good and valuable men become immensely inferior to themselves as soon as the precise line of their own experience is left. The insight, or energy, or other faculties which they show in their own department of things, they fail to carry into regions that lie ever so little away from their immediate concerns. Here is one of the principal differences between the trained and the untrained mind. The former will readily apply its powers of observation and analysis under fresh conditions, and to subjects other than those with which it was familiar; the latter can do little except in the particular departments where it has acquired experience.

To return to the volume before us. It is in the main conservative, but not, we think, unduly narrow or traditional. It pleads that classics should retain their position in our education, that large, well-governed public schools are better than any others for the purposes of physical, mental, and moral training, and that masters should be men of the very best sort, with every inducement to devote themselves for life to the duties of a noble office. All this is set forth with much earnestness, and in a style the very reverse of pedantic. Indeed, Mr. Thring is a trifle too free, almost rollicking, in the matter

of style. Illustrations like this are not quite worthy of the Head Master of Uppingham: "Reading a really bad book is about on a par with kissing a monkey; both are so pitifully [like and unlike humanity." A better specimen of his spirit and manner of writing is the following:—"The life-blood of England should not be let run to waste. It is no hireling work. Free men must do it in a free spirit, or the nation will rue the end. Not least on this account are the old foundations a great saving power in the land. Whatever their faults may be, they are generally free from meddling, free from the necessity of always producing some show, something saleable. They are able to stand a storm without shrinking, and to face with calmness the morning letter-bag and the penny post. But, above all, they are strong in the fact that their origin dates from the liberality of the dead. Their roots are in the hallowed past; and out of the grave of great and good men, great and good at all events so far as not grudging money in a good cause, grows the shelter under which the work of education is carried on. Those who believe in education believe also in this; and feel a deeper, truer sense of life and work from carrying on a good man's purpose, are freer from not being beholden to living task-masters, are chastened into more patient endurance by the memory of the trust they have received. It gladdens and cheers them that they are links in a chain of life and light—'*Vitæ lampada tradunt*,'—and not merely sitting in the Temple as money-changers."

Manual of Mythology. By Alex. S. Murray. London: Asher and Co. 1872.

THE need for a new and convenient handbook of mythology is unquestionable. There are few branches of knowledge in which greater progress has been made of late towards clear, sound, and intelligible views than in that which deals with the old legends of the gods and heroes. The uncritical compilations (of which Lemprière's *Dictionary* furnishes the most familiar type) have long been rendered antiquated by the results of the historical and comparative methods of inquiry, supplemented as they have been by the splendid combinations of the science of language. But the views that have long been familiar to scholars have remained almost wholly strange to our popular manuals; and English schools have been taught as though Welcher, Preller, Kuhn and Cox had never written on the subject. Mythologies so little resembling each other in spirit and in their ruling conceptions, as those of Greece and Rome, have been inextricably confused, and the most repulsive legends have been recounted without any reference to the simple natural phenomena from which they derive an easy and becoming explanation. Mr. Murray does not live in the pre-scientific era, and he deserves the credit of knowing this. The more flagrant errors of his predecessors he has avoided, and he is evidently not unacquainted with the juster views on mythology which happily now prevail. Hence his *Manual* is on

the whole, perhaps, the best that is accessible to an English reader. But it is still disfigured by numerous and serious blemishes. Some of these are due to the unfortunate plan on which the book has been constructed. Mr. Murray has taken the greater part of the substance of the work from the popular handbook of Petiscus, *Der Olymp;* but this book, as he admits, is quite behind the time, and it has been necessary "to reject many of the observations made by the author, and to adopt in their place the results of more recent research." The natural result of this has been numerous inconsistencies: here a fact truly and clearly stated, and there a phrase or a statement which tacitly ignores it. For instance: few things are of more importance than to bring out into prominence the very different ideas held by the Greeks of Zeus and by the Romans of Jupiter. Mr. Murray, in his Introduction (which, on the whole, is sound and sensible), recognises this; but under the head of Jupiter we find such a group of titles as this: "Stator, Hospitalis, Nuptialis, Abretanus (from Abretana, in Mysia)." Does Mr. Murray really believe that Jupiter was worshipped in Mysia? Would not a student be misled into thinking that such was his teaching? We do not know (we may note in passing) whence Mr. Murray derives his form of the Greek epithet that is so queerly inserted here. Strabo speaks of Ζεὺς Ἀβρεττηνός. And this is not the only instance of carelessness; while many words, sure to prove *cruces* to young students and to those "general readers" for whom the *Manual* is especially intended, are left unmarked, such as Tisiphone, Erebos, Hessiera, Amphion, Pandrosos, Abderos, and many others, we are tortured by such forms as Melete, Keleos.

The close resemblance suggested between Hera and Demeter, Dione and Gæa, is a somewhat daring defiance of the results of comparative philology; and the identification of Hermes as the god of rain (Introduction, p. 22) is at variance alike with Mommsen and with Cox, while matters are not mended by his unqualified identification in p. 145 with the Roman god of commerce Mercurius. A passage like the following would infallibly lead a student into the worst kind of error, which lies in a distortion of the truth: "It has been discovered that the various ancient languages of Europe—Greek, Latin, Germanic and Slavic [why not add "Celtic?"]—bear to each other some such resemblance as do various streams which flow out of one lake. . . . *Their common fountain-head has also been found in the Sanscrit, the ancient language of India.*" A writer who has yet to learn that there is no Indo-Germanic language which does not approach in some respects nearer to the fountain-head than the Sanskrit, ignores the most elementary results of comparative philology. One word must be added on the wood-cuts, which are thirty-five in number, representing seventy-six mythological subjects: they are roughly executed; but where the figures are on a large scale, they are sufficiently effective. The heads of Zeus, Hera, and Aphrodite are decidedly good; and some of the smaller cuts are fair, but others again are little better than

caricatures. But it is certainly a drawback in a work intended "for the use of schools, *art students*, and general readers" that we have no statement of the sources from which they are severally drawn.

In conclusion, we cannot but consider many of the faults of Mr. Murray's *Manual* to arise from the unfortunate selection of a basis to work upon. If he had given us an independent abridgment of the two great treatises of Preller; or if he had adopted in the place of the antiquated Petiscus a more recent treatise such as that of Kurts or Stoll, we might have had a serious deficiency in our school-books worthily filled. As it is, the utmost that can be said is that Mr. Murray's book is probably better than any that has yet appeared in England, and that it is to be devoutly hoped that it will not be long allowed to retain this credit.

The Satires of A. Persius Flaccus. With a Translation and Commentary by John Conington, M.A., late Corpus Professor of Latin in the University of Oxford; to which is Prefixed a Lecture on the Life and Writings of Persius, Edited by H. Nettleship, M.A. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1872.

The comparatively early death of the late Professor Conington was felt to be the removal of one of the brightest ornaments of English scholarship. As a learned editor and an ingenious and tasteful translator of the classics, his fame was fully established. Virgil, Horace, Æschylus, and Homer had all been brought nearer to modern readers by his labours. The only consolation to those who lamented his premature silence was that he was known to have left several valuable works in a forward state of preparation. The long anticipated volume that was to complete his edition of Virgil was soon published. The *Miscellaneous Writings* contributed an admirable prose rendering of his favourite author; and now we have the unexpected pleasure of seeing another most difficult and interesting Latin poet translated and annotated by the same scholar.

Many thanks are due to Mr. Nettleship for postponing the fulfilment of his own high promise as a student and critic to the humbler but still honourable task of supplying the final revision and completion to Professor Conington's interrupted labours. Persius, if only from the acknowledged difficulty of his writings, has always had a strong attraction for editors and readers, while the actual matter of his six short Satires well repay the trouble necessary to discover his true meaning. The indispensable assistance which the reader of Persius requires he is, at the present day, most likely to seek in the great work of Jahn, or in the useful school edition of Mr. Pretor. The book before us will be for the future a necessary part of the ripe scholar's apparatus, and sufficient for the purpose of the ordinary student. It contains copious notes in the compressed, minute, and broadly intelligent style characteristic of the editor. It furnishes

a running commentary that avoids no difficulties in the translation, which is an unusually good specimen of the hard art of rendering poetry into elegant prose. It needs only to compare it with the accurate but lumbering versions of classical poets put forth by the distinguished Cambridge scholars, Messrs. Munro and Paley, to see the rare excellence of the Oxford Professor's style. The ideal of a translation—fairly approached by Mr. Conington—is to express the author's meaning as he himself would have done had he been writing in a modern tongue. It is a greater departure from a true representation to make a skilful writer of Latin talk unskilful English than to fail to render into current idiom an antique grammatical construction.

It is, however, hardly too much to say that the most valuable part of this *Persius* is the introductory lecture. Beside a careful summary of all that is known of the poet's life, and an estimate of the influences that seem to have affected him, there is an admirably complete and lucid discussion of the whole subject of Latin satire, and an exquisite dissertation on the Stoicism of the Roman Empire. The essay will, on this account, be prized, not only by classical specialists, but by all who take a wide interest in the history of philosophy or religion.

There still remains to be written a thorough work, fit to be a standard, on Stoicism, considered not merely as a system of philosophical tenets, but as a tone of thought and theory of human life, and as an influence enduring and powerful at the central crisis of the world's history, and subtly working even now in many an unsuspected direction by means of the deep and long-lived ideas which the world owes to the Stoics. Luminous essays, fragmentary discussions of special aspects of the subject, learned treatises on questions of detail, we have in abundance, but there is nowhere a satisfactory presentation of Stoicism in all its bearings. Yet it is a most interesting and important chapter in the history of thought and morals, and connects itself with many of the most eagerly worked departments of research. The Stoics are the greatest of the later Greek Schools. In them and in their chief opponents, the Epicureans, the historic result of all the brilliant course of Hellenic speculation on truth and duty was mainly seen. This was the great practical comment on Plato, Aristotle, and their forerunners. Stoicism was the highest outcome of intellectual activity in the obscure centuries of the Macedonian rule over the Greecised East. It belongs essentially to the post-Hellenic period. Greek ideas are strong in it. Its language, as a rule, is Greek, but it is spoken by men born and trained amid the influences of other lands. Cyprus, Soli, Tarsus, Sidon, Carthage, supply its most prominent adherents. Athens and the cities of the Ægæan, though not unrepresented, are no more than on a level with the lands of the barbarian. Soon the new school establishes itself firmly in Italy, and acquires fresh importance as the favourite creed of the Imperial world. Stoicism, again, is the highest example of what philosophy, unaided by the knowledge of Divine truth, can accomplish in the

reformation of mankind. It is the character rather than the tenets of its disciples that we value most. When we hear of the Stoics we think first of the noble life and exquisite personality of Epictetus and Antonine, and afterwards of the opinions they held or the sources from which they drew them. Stoicism was, in one sense, the most formidable, because the most truly admirable, rival of the Gospel. For it was far more truly, as Bacon calls it, "the religion of the Gentiles" than the effete and degrading superstitions that love that name. It is not improbable even that the greatest of the Apostles, coming as he did from a renowned seat of the sect, was familiar with and adopted many Stoics' ideas and phrases.

Stoicism as a philosophical system died like its contemporaries, but, unlike them, its spirit passed into and modified the great influences that continued to mould the world. Roman law largely, and Christian historic theology to some extent, bear the impress of the Stoics. The conception of Cosmopolitanism and of Nature, of the Law of Nature, the State of Nature, the Life according to Nature, the philosophy of Hobbes and Shaftesbury, the jurisprudence of Grotius, and the political principles of Rousseau are all largely the offspring of the Porch.

A subject so vast and diversified might well occupy the time and secure the fame of a great historian. Professor Conington has given a good contribution towards such a history in this admirable edition of the poet of Stoicism.

Clarendon Press Series. Livy, Book I. With Introduction, Historical Examination, and Notes. By J. R. Seeley, M.A., Professor of Modern History, Cambridge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1871.

Bibliotheca Classica. The Annals of Tacitus. With a Commentary by the Rev. Percival Frost, M.A., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. London: Whittaker and Co. 1872.

These two volumes are the most recent specimens published in England of the edited writings of Roman historians. Each is the work of a distinguished Cambridge scholar, already known for learning and ability, and both are of great value to the student of Latin literature. In each a careful compilation of the best comments of former editors is supplemented by original notes that place at the reader's disposal the benefit of the present annotator's own sentences and reading. Mr. Frost's note on the mood of *abstulerat*, in *Annals*, I. 10, is only one of many proofs that he possesses much of the pure scholar's power of seizing minute distinctions, perhaps in some cases too subtle to be trustworthy. His collection of quotations to illustrate the Latinity of Tacitus (Introduction, pp. xxvii.—xxxi.) is very useful to such as are interested in the subject. Professor Seeley's

elucidation of the little-noticed obscurity in Livy I. lvii. 7, shows, however, a more valuable exercise of the same faculty. The explanations of difficulties of detail in the matter of the author are, however, as a rule less satisfactory and less definite in the Tacitus than in the Livy.

Considered as an edition of a classic, Mr. Frost's book, besides that it is larger, is perhaps the more excellent. But, regarded as an attempt to place an ancient historian properly before a modern reader, Professor Seeley's is beyond all comparison the better. It is, indeed, a fine example of how such a writer as Livy should be edited. Mr. Frost comments only the author; Mr. Seeley directs his attention mainly to the historian. The former, in his preliminary *Life of Tacitus*, examines at length the merits and defects of his style, the excessive love of the picturesque and rhetorical, and the sacrifice of truth to effect; but we look in vain for any but the most meagre and incidental criticisms of the value of Tacitus's evidence to the facts and principles of Imperial history. There is no estimate of the real character of Tiberius or Nero; scarcely an allusion to their modern defenders; no exposition of the true meaning and *raison d'être* of the Roman Empire; no attempt, in short, to deal with any of the great problems inevitably raised by the perusal of the *Annals*. This fashion of editing might suit a poet, but is simply delusive when applied to the greatest of Latin historians. Mr. Seeley, on the other hand, prefaces his annotated text with a long but admirably compressed account of the sources and character of early Roman history. This obscure and complicated subject is treated with all the lucidity and literary power that was to be expected from the author of *Ecce Homo* and the noble volume of *Lectures and Essays* published a short time ago. This edition, we are told, "owes more to Niebuhr, Schwegler, Becker, and Marquardt, Newman, Lewis, Mommsen, Ihne, and other authors of the same class," than to philological commentators. Without wandering from his task, as an editor of Livy, the writer of this historical examination has produced a unique guide to the study of the beginnings of Rome. If succeeding volumes keep up the promise of the first, this form of the ten earliest books of Livy will be invaluable to the historical student.

Selected Letters of Cicero. With Notes for the Use of Schools. By the late Constantine E. Prichard, M.A., formerly Fellow of Balliol College, and Edward R. Bernard, M.A., Fellow of Magdalen College. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1872.

Selected Letters of Pliny. With Notes for the use of Schools. By the late Constantine E. Prichard, M.A., and Edward R. Bernard, M.A. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1872.

Nothing could be better by way of introduction to the *Letters* of Cicero and Pliny than these neat, handy, and well-edited selections

by Messrs. Prichard and Bernard. The notes will not, from a schoolboy's point of view, be considered copious, but they are quite sufficient, and in the hands of a teacher will be very useful indeed. Schoolboys will not of their own accord follow up a friendly reference to Madvig's grammar, or turn to the parallel passages from various authors which have been collected by laborious editors, but all this will be done, and found interesting enough, if the teacher cares to take the matter in hand. With regard to the *Letters* themselves, it is hardly possible to overestimate their importance, once granted that Roman thought, character, and philosophy are important to us at all. As a correspondent, Cicero is without a rival in the ancient, and, it might even be contended, in the modern world. Though the busiest of men, he always found time to write letters, before day-break, at meal-times, on his journeys, and even dictating them during his walks. Whole volumes of them are lost, but about eight hundred letters remain, grave, tender, playful, pedantic as the case may be, but always characteristic, and always interesting. They not only throw light as nothing else can on those stormy, eventful, latter days of the Republic, but they preserve the thousand details of common life which at the time are not supposed to have any historical value, but are precious to after ages, helping us more effectually than anything else to set before ourselves a people and a period long since passed away. Cicero's extant correspondence covers no less than five-and-twenty years, and a great part of it is written entirely without reserve, so that it would be strange if we did not know the writer well. In his letters to Atticus, especially, we are sure that we see the real man; this is not merely his correspondent but his friend, his confidant, his second self. Of him he asks, "What will history say of me six hundred years hence?" With all his vanity, Cicero little dreamt what pains would be taken, nearly two thousand years after his time, to estimate his character, and pronounce upon the part he played. As a philosopher, he would find himself placed disappointingly low by us; as an orator, as highly ranked as he desired; as a statesman, a verdict with general consent is not yet arrived at; but as a man, we are ready to say of him, with all his faults and weaknesses, that if there is no Roman—Horace perhaps excepted—that we know so well, there is none we like so much. He owes it to his *Letters* that he is not a dead and gone Roman, but a living one, for whom lovers of literature are pretty sure always to have a kindly feeling, though it may not often rise to the height of Erasmus's enthusiasm, who thought him worthy to be canonised as a saint of the Catholic Church, but for the single drawback of his not having been a Christian.

Second only in their human interest to Cicero's *Letters* are those of the Younger Pliny. They bring us more than a century and a half onward in the history of the world. And what a century and half! It is the Republic now no more, but the Empire, and there has been time already for a Nero and a Domitian. They were evil days indeed when Pliny began life. In his *Letters* we have vivid pictures of Domitian's

reign of terror; and the impression which the times made on a still great mind may be seen in the introduction to Tacitus's *Agricola* and in his *Historiæ*. But by far the profoundest movement of the age was unrecognised alike by Tacitus and by Pliny. That heartless profligates such as filled Rome and ruled half the provinces, when Christianity arose before them, saw "no form or comeliness" in it, need not surprise us; but we are surprised, and reckon it indeed one of the most pathetic of historical facts, that grave, high-souled men like Tacitus, men of gentle nature and virtuous habits like Pliny, and rulers as enlightened and humane as Trajan, so completely failed to see that the kingdom of God was amongst them. The correspondence between Pliny, when Governor of Bithynia, and the Emperor Trajan is, from this point of view, almost painfully interesting. Here is the Pliny whom we know as the centre of some of the pleasantest family-pictures that have come down to us from antiquity, full of tenderness and sympathy for wife, friends, servants even, writing to Trajan to know how he must deal with "Christians." True the only facts he could discover were that they had a custom of meeting together before daylight, and singing a hymn to Christ as God, and were bound by solemn oath not to commit theft, adultery, or fraud. "I judged it necessary to get at the real truth by putting to the torture two female slaves who were called 'ministræ;' but all I could discover was (*superstitionem pravam immodicam*) a culpable and extravagant superstition." We know the explanation that is urged. The Christian brotherhood would appear to be a secret society of the most dangerous character. The principles that created it could not but be fatal in the long run to the order of things then in the world established, and the world's instinct seems to have felt that before the Christian Church itself was wholly conscious of it. Hence it was inevitable that there should be persecution bitter and intense; but it is part of the miserable confusion of evil that ranked such men as Trajan and Pliny amongst the enemies of a religion that they would have been the first to receive had they but seen its face aright. But "their eyes were holden;" and so to Tacitus, faith in the Lord Jesus Christ was "*exitiabilis superstitio*," and to Pliny, "*superstitio prava et immodica*," while the constancy of those who counted not their lives dear unto them was no more than "*inflexibilis obstinatio*." But after all there are few heathen writers divided from the Christian reader by so narrow a gulf as the latter. In the language of the Editor of this selection from his *Letters*; "There are many characters in antiquity of more massive greatness than that of Pliny, both intellectual and moral, but there is none more engaging both in the grace and accomplishments of his mind and the kindliness and purity of his heart."

Scenes from Euripides. Rugby Edition. By A. Sidgwick, Late Fellow of Trinity, Cambridge, and Assistant Master in Rugby School. "The Ion." "Iphigenia in Tauris." "The Cyclops."

Scenes from Aristophanes. Rugby Edition. By A. Sidgwick. "The Clouds." "The Frogs." London: Rivingtons. 1872.

These are attractive little books, novel in design and admirable in execution. They are intended for the use of beginners, who usually find it impossible to get through an entire Greek play. The way is not merely cleared for them by the excision of all the choruses and exceptionally difficult passages, but enlivened by descriptions of the scenery and some ingenious stage directions. By weaving the extracts into one connected plot or narrative, Mr. Sidgwick has obviated one of the most formidable objections against many books of extracts, namely, that they fail to keep up any interest in the minds of their young readers. It is no small recommendation of this plan, moreover, that objectionable passages are omitted in the most unobtrusive, and therefore the most harmless way, an advantage by no means always to be found in ordinary expurgated editions. It would hardly be possible to find a better introduction to *Aristophanes* for a young student than these little books afford.

The cleansing process, alas so necessary, takes away little of the sportive fun and audacious brilliancy, unrivalled and inimitable, while the explanation of far-fetched jokes, and still more the sympathetic suggestions of the by-play in every scene, will add much to the reader's amusement as well as his appreciation of the author. But let none think that he can really appreciate *Aristophanes* till he has read some of his wonderful choruses. In them the man who was usually content to be a bitter wit and a satirical politician, does occasionally appear in his true colours as a poet of purest melody and inexhaustible fancy; with far more comic power than Shakespeare, he could, when he chose, write lyrics worthy of Sophocles or Shelley. We have no doubt, however, that many young readers of these editions will be tempted to increase their knowledge of this wonderful poet. *Euripides* has less to gain by this sort of treatment, but his plays are often little more than prettily told stories which gain, rather than lose, by the removal of the choral odes. We are glad to see an edition of the *Cyclops* which is fit for the school-room; it is poor stuff in itself, but its unique position as the only satiric drama now extant, gives it some interest and importance.

The grammatical notes seem to us the least satisfactory part of these volumes. They are necessarily too short for any detailed explanations of the difficulties which occur, yet long enough to give young pupils a welcome excuse for not consulting a grammar. References to any standard grammar would surely have been better than this, and the

capital grammatical index would still have been of great service. The size and price of these editions seem to have precluded the best plan for *young* pupils—compact but not too condensed notes on all grammatical difficulties as they occur. There are one or two new terms used, which are scarcely worth introducing; "an immediate aorist," or "aorist of immediate pastness," is an awkward, if not misleading phrase. Mr. Sidgwick's brief account in his notes on *The Ion* of the idiom he styles by this name is not quite satisfactory. Donaldson and Jelf, though differing from each other, both give better explanations of it.

The frequent use, too, of the word "irony," in its peculiar Greek sense, without any hint of its special meaning, is surely presuming too much on the knowledge of young readers. These, however, are little things. The books as a whole are a real boon to teachers and pupils, and, certainly, none the less so because their binding and typography form such a pleasant contrast with the shabby German editions still so much used in schools.

Physics and Politics, or Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of "Natural Selection" and "Inheritance" to Political Society. By Walter Bagehot. London: Henry S. King. 1872.

The conception of the "International Scientific Series," of which Mr. Bagehot's work is the second volume, is an excellent one. But, to judge by this specimen, the execution is not successful. It is intended, we are told, to embody "the results of the latest investigations in the various departments of science at present most prominently before the world." This would, doubtless, be of essential service to the general public of intelligent readers, and especially to solitary students who have to rely on books for the guidance which is best given by personal teachers. In the present day, when scarcely any branch of science is stationary, every beginner must have felt the need for some one to direct him to the best writers upon the subject in which he is interested, and to give him sufficient knowledge of their chief tenets, to enable him to read critically and form an independent judgment. Most original authorities assume their reader's familiarity with the greater part of what has been said already by previous or contemporay inquirers in the same field. Yet the student's time would be ill-spent in mastering the imperfect theories of antiquated authors, even if, as is often not the case, he knew where to find them. A short and simple handbook, aiming only at setting before him in a connected view the present state of opinion in that department of knowledge, might save him from the "flounddering" which self-taught men so frequently experience.

Mr. Bagehot has not been content to do this. He has preferred to bring out thoughts of his own, confessedly crude, and to set them forth within limits too narrow for their adequate expression. Con-

sequently he, the sole representative among the authors of the "International Series" of modern political philosophy, puts a few novel speculations on one or more disputed problems in the place of a comprehensive statement of the results fairly established in one of the most fruitful fields of recent thought. Maine, Tyler, Lubbock, Austin, Mill, and Herbert Spencer (to mention only English writers), together with the great modern historians and historic critics, have enlarged our political philosophy in a way very imperfectly understood by men of only general culture. A critical and correlated account of their often conflicting doctrines, would have been of far more real service to the "International Scientific" world than Mr. Bagehot's ingenious attempt to add Darwin to the list of political philosophers.

After protest, however, against the position claimed, rather by the publisher than the author, for *Physics and Politics*, it may be added that the book itself is a very interesting and suggestive collection of essays on an important subject. The cause and the course of progress in political society are, Mr. Bagehot thinks, susceptible of considerable elucidation, if regarded as cases of the working of "natural selection" and "inherited tendency." He wishes, indeed, after the brilliant example of Mr. Spencer's *First Principles*, to show how a law, more or less acknowledged in certain classes of phenomena, extends its influence to others. Like Mr. Spencer, too, he assumes as established, theories still vehemently controverted. The principle of evolution in its two processes of conflict and transmission is first postulated and then invoked to explain the rise of civilisation and the formation of national character. The "struggle for life," which Mr. Darwin has so profusely illustrated as regards the lower animals, goes on continuously in the external and domestic life of nations. In the early times, especially when fighting was the principal business of every man, the minutest advantage which one tribe had over another was utilised for military purposes. And there exists in all men, says Mr. Bagehot, a physical tendency to transmit to their descendants all acquired varieties of strength or versatility in body, mind, or character; so that all improvement of one generation, if not counterbalanced by deterioration in another, is stored up for posterity as a permanent advantage to start with. Therefore, the superior tribe either kills out the inferior, or forces it in self-defence to imitate the conquering race. The same process works within the bounds of each people, only there the conflict being less of a literal warfare, imitation rather than extermination is the chief assimilating force. The essential steps of progress, the taking of which ensures superiority to a nation, are in the earliest age the forming of a firm and binding body of customs; in the second period the emancipation of the race from the tyranny of routine, when unyielding usage has done its work of solidification. Subsequent advance depends on the judicious union of stability and variability, or in other words, upon the possession of a high degree of "animated moderation." Military

necessity, religion, mixture of race, and, in later stages, commercial intercourse and free discussion, are the principal motive forces that cause these steps to be taken, and that temper the national character into the winning combination of qualities. There is a danger, realised by the great majority of nations, lest progress should be arrested at some stage or other. Rome, and the nations of Western Europe, into whom her spirit has passed, are the only cases of hitherto continuous advance.

As to the condition of mankind antecedent to progressive civilisation, Mr. Bagehot, without being dogmatically confident, inclines to the Darwinian hypothesis of development from brute creatures. He certainly prefers the theories of Sir John Lubbock and others, that society was preceded by a state of isolated and bestial savagery, to the doctrine of Sir Henry Maine, that the primitive organisation is that of the family. Yet to us the high scientific character of that great writer is in nothing more apparent than in his refusal to abandon the firm ground on which he stands for the dubious inductions which support the "savage" theory of primitive man.

Mr. Bagehot illustrates and amplifies his opinion with many curious facts and ingenious comparisons. He writes in an easy popular style, disfigured, however, by the constant repetition of phrases, by newly coined words, and by colloquial expressions, scarcely to be distinguished from vulgarity.

Milton's Areopagitica. A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing. With Notes for the Use of Schools. By T. G. Osborn, M.A., Fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and Head Master of New Kingswood School, Bath. London: Longmans. 1873.

It is only by an effort of the "historical imagination" that we can enter into the controversy of other days respecting the liberty of the press. We should suppose that nowhere, except, perhaps, in a debating society, could discussion be now provoked upon a subject whose history is that of fierce and passionate conflict. For Englishmen the question is exhausted. The problem of former ages has become the truism of our own. It should be understood that in Milton's time the question was not whether a man should be held responsible for what he published, but whether he should be allowed to publish at all without the license of censors appointed for the purpose. The difference between these two positions is enormous. It would be to slay the already slain to enumerate the arguments against a licensed press. None the less, however, should students of history and literature know by what noble passages at arms our freedom has been won. Mr. Osborn has prepared an edition of the *Areopagitica* which is not only a good school-book, but thoroughly interesting to the general reader. It is neither so cheap, nor so elegant, as that published in Mr. Arber's series of English reprints; but the admirable

notes give it greater value as a school edition. It is prefaced by a sketch of the history of the press-licensing laws in our country, by a short dissertation on Milton's orthography and style, and by a careful analysis of the argument.

Handbook of Moral Philosophy. By Rev. Henry Calderwood, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Edinburgh. London: Macmillan and Co. 1872.

It is impossible to recommend Dr. Calderwood's work either to the student or to the general reader. It is heavy in style, confused in arrangement, and obscure in expression. It is devoted to the exposition of the author's personal opinions, which appear to consist of a very barren and rigid form of the Intuitional theory joined to, not combined with, an arbitrary selection of minute points from the doctrines of inimical schools. The accounts of opposing systems are meagre in the extreme, and marked by misstatements that show at least culpable carelessness. The volume is loaded with references, but they are for the most part to books that must be quite familiar to every beginner in moral philosophy. The suspicion is irresistible that the *Handbook* owes its orgin to the hasty publication of an unassimilated collection of notes made by Professor Calderwood for his own lectures.

Select Plays of Shakespeare. The Rugby Edition. "Macbeth" and "As You Like It," edited by Charles E. Moberly, M.A., and "Coriolanus," edited by R. Whitelaw. London, Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons. 1872.

Surely these are good times for students of our literature. The number of scholarly, well-edited handbooks, and annotated editions of masterpieces, both in prose and poetry, is continually augmenting. The introductions in this edition are particularly good, rising above the dull level of antiquarianism into a region of intelligent and sympathetic comment and analysis not often reached in school-books. We know by experience that Shakespeare may be so read in schools as to combine a considerable amount of philological and grammatical teaching with a cultivation of the imagination and taste, perhaps more serviceable still. The Rugby Edition will do well either for school or home reading.

A Companion to the Old Testament. Being a Plain Commentary on Scripture History Down to the Birth of Our Lord. London: Rivingtons. 1872.

This will be found a sufficient text-book for teaching Old Testament history. There are no lengthy comments, and the plan of the work excludes arguments; but the historical narratives are well condensed, and the explanatory notes are scholarly and clear. The tone of the book is thoroughly reverent and Christian.

A Companion to the Lectionary. Being a Commentary on the Proper Lessons for the Sundays and Holy Days. By the Rev. W. Benham, B.D., Vicar of Margate. London: Macmillan and Co. 1873.

THE plan of this work is fairly explained in the title. The author follows the new *Lectionary*, and his commentary affords a pleasant, useful handbook to such portions of the Old Testament as are appointed for Proper Lessons. Its purpose is to assist in the devotional reading of the Scriptures, not in their critical study, and to lead the reader "to love the Word of God, and to seek therein for deeper and fuller knowledge of Christ." We heartily approve the author's aim, and, as far as we can see, it is well carried out.

Science Primers: Physical Geography. By Archibald Geikie, LL.D., F.R.S. With Illustrations. London: Macmillan and Co. 1873.

THIS is the third publication of the admirable series of *Science Primers*, edited by Professors Huxley, Roscoe, and Balfour Stuart. It is written in the simplest manner, pre-supposing no knowledge of the subject on the learner's part, and recounts and explains the great facts and processes of nature, on land and sea, in winds, clouds, rain, and rivers. Children will find it thoroughly interesting, and may easily master it while under the nursery dispensation.

III. GENERAL LITERATURE.

Shelley's Early Life, from Original Sources. With Curious Incidents, Letters, and Writings, now First Published or Collected. By Denis Florence MacCarthy, M.R.I.A., Author of "Dramas and Autos from the Spanish of Calderon," &c. London: John Camden Hotten, Piccadilly.

SHELLEY'S title to the very highest rank as a lyric poet—a title that we are justified in regarding as pretty firmly established—is based upon the twofold ground of importance in matter and perfection in manner. His best-known works exhibit, throughout, that downright earnestness in looking at the world and man, that wide keen vision, and that uncompromising truth-telling, which we meet only in the noblest minds; and, whatever were his conceptions of good and evil, they show us that he loved the good and hated the evil (as conceived by him) with that same fervid torrent of love and hatred that rolls below the thunderous periods of Æschylus, the gigantic laughter of Aristophanes, and the exquisite tenderness and grim chastisements of that great Dante, who—

> "loved well because he hated,—
> Hated wickedness that hinders loving."

As lyric poetry of the most exquisite melody and harmony, Shelley's best works will stand beside those of any lyrist whatsoever, English or foreign, ancient or modern; and, at his maturest period, he spun off these masterly productions, weighted and freighted with thought and feeling, to a degree that has no parallel in modern times.

It is this twofold nobility—perfection of art and elevation of soul—that gives an almost unlimited interest to any facts tending to throw light on the little-known passages of his life. With the exception of Thomas Chatterton, we know of no single mind in the range of English literature offering so wide and interesting a field for psychological study; and Shelley, as compared with Chatterton, has this advantage over and above the advantage of higher genius,—that he appears to have lived out his life in striving for an end in no way selfish, while the other threw away his life and *stole* his death in the pursuit of ends that held, alas! but too much of self-seeking and vanity. Whatever Shelley's intellectual errors, whatever the flaws in his judgment, he acted on an uncontrollable impulse to do the good

work as he *thought* he saw it lying before him; and this cannot be said of that boy of "sphinx-like personality who divides with William Blake the highest place in English lyric poetry immediately before the great outburst." And yet, of the growth of Shelley's mind and fiery poetic heart, we know but little—so little, that a biographer or biographic student who establishes one fact in this connection, disposes of one commonly-received falsity, or elucidates one dark point, merits the hearty thanks of all who believe in lyric poetry—or rather in lyric poets—as a living power in the destinies of men.

The book before us is extremely interesting, as treating with much care and minuteness just that portion of Shelley's life concerning which we know least—his college life, so amusingly misrepresented by the voluble and irreverent biographer, Thomas Jefferson Hogg, and his "Irish Crusade." Its interest and utility are, further, greatly enhanced by the reproduction of prose works of Shelley's, not very easy to see, and next to impossible to obtain. We do not refer to the two early romances, *Zastrozzi* and *St. Irvyne*, which do not appear here, nor to the famous *Declaration of Rights*, printed here, but previously given by Mr. William Rossetti in an article which appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* for January, 1871; the really important reprints given in Mr. MacCarthy's volume are those of *An Address to the Irish People* (Dublin, 1812), *Proposals for an Association of those Philanthropists who, convinced of the Inadequacy of the Moral and Political State of Ireland to produce Benefits which are, nevertheless, attainable, are willing to unite to accomplish its Regeneration* (Dublin, 1812; we have given the whole title as eminently characteristic), *A Proposal for Putting Reform to the Vote Throughout the Kingdom* (London, 1817), *We Pity the Plumage, but Forget the Dying Bird*, and *An Address to the People on the Death of the Princess Charlotte*. Of the two Irish pamphlets, Shelley avowed the authorship in the title pages; the other two he issued under the pseudonym of "The Hermit of Marlow."

The service rendered in this book, whereon Mr. MacCarthy himself appears to lay the greatest stress, is the discovery of the existence of a certain poem, no copy of which is known to exist. It seems one Peter Finnerty, sometime Editor of *The Press*, was imprisoned and generally oppressed on account of his political opinions and the unguarded ventilation of them in the columns of his print: it seems, further, that a gentleman of the University of Oxford (at the time Shelley was there) published a poem, entitled *A Poetical Essay on the Existing State of Things*, and devoted the profits made on the sale of this poem to the alleviation of the said Peter Finnerty's miseries. It is alleged that the profits on that undertaking amounted to some hundred pounds; and notwithstanding that part of the evidence, Mr. MacCarthy seems perfectly satisfied that he has established beyond all possible question, not only the existence of the poem, but that Shelley was the author. Now it is extremely unlikely that Shelley ever made a hundred pounds by anything he published; indeed, it is

well known that all his recognised books were failures from a mercantile point of view; but if we give up belief in the hundred pounds, such is the nature of the evidence that the whole connection with Shelley is shaken. We do not care to forestall such readers as care to go into this question themselves, or to weary such as do not; but having weighed for ourselves the evidence adduced in favour of Mr. MacCarthy's hypothesis, we are indisposed to admit that he has established more than a strong probability of the volume in question having been written by Shelley. This much, however, we admit cordially and receive gratefully; and we would urge all persons interested in Shelley to be on the look-out for a copy of the book whereof we have quoted the title above; because the internal evidence of the work, duly canvassed in public, might give very valuable aid in settling the authorship.

We must not withhold the confession that this thick important-looking volume of Mr. MacCarthy's strikes us as not being, on the whole, worthy of its subject. It seems to us to partake far too much of the character of a review of other people's books about Shelley,—and a review written, for the most part, in a cantankerous and small spirit. Mr. MacCarthy's style is quite the reverse of elegant, and his manner of expression towards *Shelleyists*, whom we venture to think at least his equals (often his superiors), is repulsively snappish and litigious. With a certain little acuteness that has doubtless been serviceable in the work, Mr. MacCarthy has yet proved himself as prone to adopt theories on insufficient grounds as any of those against whom he charges the like proneness; and, while we regard the volume as interesting, we cannot but regard it as flippant and patchy,—in a word, a made-up book, and made up with too much material of the wrong sort.

The Cavalier and His Lady. Selections from the Works of the First Duke and Duchess of Newcastle. Edited, with an Introductory Essay, by Edward Jenkins. London: Macmillan and Co.. 1872.

This also is a made-up book, but one in strong contrast with the last-mentioned. Selection and editing bear a larger proportion to "original matter" in its pages; and while it has far less of vital interest for students of the poetic mind than is to be found in the volume of Mr. MacCarthy, it is a much more pleasant and elegant volume. The Duke and Duchess appear to have been a charming couple, and to have produced a good deal of really excellent verse; but the gem of the collection is a prose piece, entitled, "A True Relation of My Birth, Breeding, and Life: written by the Thrice Noble, Illustrious, and Excellent Princess, the Lady Marchioness of Newcastle," which was attached to the first edition of the Duchess's *Nature's Pictures Drawn by Phancie's Pencil*, published in 1656, but at once suppressed, so that very few copies of it, as far as is known, existed before the present reprint was executed. This narrative is,

as Mr. Jenkins remarks, "written with unaffected naturalness and simplicity; the character of the mother is drawn in lines so noble and pleasing as to challenge for both mother and daughter the admiration of posterity." The little autobiography in question shows, moreover, a certain acuteness of self-judgment that gives it something beyond a personal value, judged as a study of a woman's inner nature, and we should not be surprised if it helped largely towards popularising the Duchess's almost forgotten works. There is a want of substance in most of her work, whether in verse or in prose; but she often seems to have hit on some happily expressed truth—never very deep—and some of her songs are very delicately fanciful, as, for example, that one "by Lady Happy, as a Sea Goddess," from which Mr. Jenkins has seen fit, however, to omit several verses "for the sake of both symmetry and harmony." We give this song below, as here printed :—

"My cabinets are oyster-shells,
In which I keep my Orient pearls;
And modest coral I do wear,
Which blushes when it touches air.

"On silver waves I sit and sing,
And then the fish lie listening:
Then resting on a rocky stone
I comb my hair with fishes' bone:

"Then whilst Apollo with his beams
Doth dry my hair from soaking streams,
His light doth glaze the water's face,
And make the sea my looking-glass.

"So when I swim on waters high,
I see myself as I glide by;
And when the sun begins to burn,
I back into my waters turn,

"And dive unto the bottom low:
Then on my head the waters flow
In curled waves and circles round,
And thus with eddies I am crowned."—Pp. 95, 96.

We confess we should have preferred the whole song, exemplifying the Duchess's notion of harmony and symmetry, to a portion of it exemplifying the Editor's; and the same remark applies to the other numerous liberties he has (avowedly) taken with his text. In our opinion it is an editorial misdemeanour to tamper with a text in reproducing it, and a still worse one, having done so, to leave the changes made without specification; and Mr. Jenkins has done both, done it too, under such circumstances that the reading public have virtually no means of knowing whether he has not rewritten half the book. Concerning one of the Duke's poems, entitled "The Philosopher's Complaint," the reader is merely told in a foot note that "the verses marked with an asterisk have been materially altered," while others have been omitted because "their clumsy form made them unpresentable;" and it is quite impossible, without seeing the original, to say whether this note takes credit for too much or too little. We give

the following verses as a specimen of the Duke's writing; but, in the absence of the original, we have little confidence in quoting them as his.

" Beasts do despise this Orient metal,
Each freely grazing fills his maw;
After love's procreating settle
To gentle sleep, sweet Nature's law.

" They're not litigious but are mute,
False propositions never make,
Nor of unknown things do dispute;
Follies for wise things do not take:

" They use not rhetorick to deceive,
Nor logic to enforce the wrong,
Nor strains of tedious history weave,
In tiresome and distracted song:

" Nor study the enamelled sky,
Thinking they're governed by each star,
But scorn man's false astrology,
And think themselves just what they are.

" Their pride not being so supreme,
Celestial bodies moving thus,
Poor mortals cozened with the dream
To think those lights were made for us!

" Nor are they troubled where they run,
What the sun's matter it might be?
Whether the earth moves or the sun—
And yet they know as well as we!"—Pp. 161-2.

Love is Enough; or, the Freeing of Pharamond: a Morality. By William Morris. London: Ellis and White, 29, New Bond Street. 1873.

As we have noted more than once, in reviewing the works of Mr. William Morris, there are two chief sources of legendary inspiration on which he draws for his subjects—the imperishable Greek myths and legends, and the no more perishable, if less widely-known, myths and legends of the North. The subject of the present "Morality" is distinctly of the Northern division; but the form and method of treatment are widely different from any other work of Mr. Morris's, whether Northern or Greek in subject. We are not aware of the source of the story that runs through the book, or whether it has any source outside the poet's own imagination; it may well be that this is a quasi-northern theme of his own invention; but, as the thread of incident is less remarkable than the form and general handling in this particular instance, we will not tell our readers more of the story than is given in the argument, namely, that it is "told by way of a morality set before an emperor and empress newly wedded," and that it "showeth of a king whom nothing but love might satisfy, who left all to seek love, and, having found it, found this also, that he had enough, though he lacked all else."

It will probably be thought that the most noteworthy feature in the workmanship of this beautiful poem is the metre in which the

main portion is composed—a blank anapæstic metre that we believe to be quite new to the English language, and having its origin as far north as the subject. The lines might be classified as Icelandic anapæstic, though they don ot abound in the alliterations that mark Icelandic verse: the nearest likeness we have seen to them in English exists in some of the author's translations of songs from the Elder Edda, appended to his exquisite version of the *Volsunga Saga;* and we observe that the complete title, *Love is Enough; or, the Freeing of Pharamond*, reads as a very harmonious line of the same character. We are not, however, disposed to commit ourselves to the view that the introduction of this anapæstic measure into modern verse *is* the most noteworthy feature in the workmanship of *Love is Enough;* perfectly successful as the attempt has been, full, and vigorous, and various as the lines in question are, and well-suited as they are to the setting forth of a quasi-dramatic subject, we are yet inclined to think that the richness and intensity of the rhymed iambic couplets spread throughout the work form matter more worthy of special remark; and that we have something still higher, in point of executive art, in the exquisitely modulated cadences of those lyrics, eight * in number, dividing the parts of the work, and specified as "the music." Anything nearer to complete excellence, as a song for singing—more like a song which really seems as if it must have been sung before being written—than the best of these lyrics, we have not seen in these latter days of English literature that are so rich in lyric measures. The poem is written with great earnestness and some sadness; and it is probably this combination of motive forces that has betrayed itself in the added weight and intensity of the craftsmanship as compared with the earlier works of Mr. Morris's, that are likely to excel, in popularity, the present book.

The distribution of metres is altogether admirable. We have first an introductory dialogue between Giles and Joan, two humble spectators of the coming pageant, written in four-foot rhymed couplets. Then comes the dialogue of the Emperor and Empress as they enter to witness the performance of the "Morality," and this is written in five-foot triplets, separated by the recurring burden of "way" and "day." In the next division the Mayor takes occasion to introduce the "Morality" in a speech composed of blank anapæstics. After another dialogue between the Emperor and Empress, and before the curtain rises, Love enters, crowned as a king, and delivers the first of his orations on the subject in hand; and this, like all its successors, is given in five-foot couplets, among the finest in the language for melody and clear-cut beauty of verbal counterpoint. Then follow the several quasi-dramatic scenes, done in blank anapæstics, and separated by the lyrics in rhymed anapæstics of increasing richness and beauty as the reader goes on, as well as by the several disquisitions which Love, in various disguises, delivers.

* Nine, if we count one introduced in the middle of a scene.

After the curtain has fallen, Giles and Joan, the Emperor and Empress, and the Mayor, let us gradually down (in their respective metres) from the intense atmosphere of "the Music" and the high-strung utterances of Love, to the common ground.

As a sample of the blank anapæstics, we give the following lines, uttered by Pharamond, after he has found Love and lost his kingdom:—

"Pass on in contentment, O king, I discerned not
Through the cloak of your blindness that saw nought beside thee,
That feared for no pain and craved for no pleasure!
Pass on, dead-alive, thy place! thou art worthy:
Nor shalt thou grow wearier than well-worshipped idol
That the incense winds round in the land of the heathen,
While the early and latter rains fall as God listeth,
And on earth that God loveth the sun riseth daily.
—Well art thou: for wert thou the crown of all rulers,
No field shouldst thou ripen, free no frost-bounden river,
Loose no heart from its love, turn no soul to salvation,
Thrust no tempest aside, stay no plague in mid ocean,
Yet grow unto thinking that thou wert God's brother,
Till loveless death gripped thee, unloved, unlamented.
—Pass forth, weary king, bear thy crown high to-night!
Then fall asleep, fearing no cry from times bygone,
But in dim dreams dream happy that thou art desired,—
For thy dull morrow cometh, and is as to-day is."—P. 109.

With the keenness and wisdom of a master over the materials of language and metre, Mr. Morris has seen and circumvented the tendency of such a measure as this to become monotonous: he has made the scenes many and short, and made "the music" between them of such a character and quality as to harmonise perfectly with the scenes while in strong contrast with them. The following lyric seems to us the easiest to detach, as a specimen, from its position in the book:—

"Love is enough: it grew up without heeding
In the days when ye knew not its name nor its measure,
And its leaflets untrodden by the light feet of pleasure
Had no boast of the blossom, no sign of the seeding,
As the morning and evening passed over its treasure.

"And what do ye say then?—that spring long departed
Had brought forth no chill to the softness and showers;
—That we slept and we dreamed through the summer of flowers;
We dreamed of the winter, and waking dead-hearted
Found winter upon us and waste of dull hours.

"Nay, spring was o'er happy and knew not the reason,
And summer dreamed sadly, for she thought all was ended
In her fulness of wealth that might not be amended;
But this is the harvest and the garnering season,
And the leaf and the blossom in the ripe fruit are blended.

"It sprang without sowing, it grew without heeding,
Ye knew not its name and ye knew not its measure,
Ye noted it not 'mid your hope and your pleasure;
There was pain in its blossom, despair in its seeding,
But daylong your bosom now nurseth its treasure."—P. 27.

We do not care to do violence to the discourses of Love himself by separating any portion of them from the context: indeed the

whole series of them develop a connected purpose not usual in the delightful works of Mr. Morris; and whoever of our readers wishes to place himself at the standpoint of the poet, and understand the burden and teaching of a sad but beautiful work, would do well, after reading the volume as a whole, to read attentively the several speeches delivered by Love, in various disguises, between the scenes. These, with the same characteristic quaintness and objectivity observable in other work from the same hand, are thoughtful and deep, and written with the air of one who really desires to deliver a message.

Ode to the Mikado of Japan. By R. H. Horne, Author of "Orion," the Tragedies of "Cosmo de' Medici," "Gregory VII.," "The Death of Marlowe," "Ballad Romances," &c. London. 1878.

THE veteran author of the works mentioned in this his last title-page, and of a long array of other works that it would take a long title-page to mention, keeps up with the current of the age more closely than some of his younger brethren of the poetic "faculty;" and, although he does not exhibit in print to his admirers any of that hoard of manuscripts whereto we shrewdly suspect his twenty years' Australian life of having given birth, we see ever and anon such glimpses as the present of his renewed activity in England. His interest in the right side of human affairs appears to be as vivid as it was thirty and twenty years ago; and in this *Ode* to the Japanese ruler, he displays that interest in a manner at once spirited, brilliant, and characteristic.

As an epigraph to the *Ode*, Mr. Horne has affixed the following extract from the *Daily News* of the 5th of September last:—

"Certainly the Mikado of Japan is the most resolute throned reformer of his day. He has just issued a decree by which the library of the ex-Tycoon, containing a hundred thousand volumes, is thrown open to the public, whether Japanese or foreigners."

We are disposed to think that this act, and other acts of the Mikado, give him a clear title to the distinction conferred on him by the *Daily News*, for we know of no other *throned* reformer in this day who is worth accounting in the noble ranks of reformers; and we are heartily glad to see a poet, such as Mr. R. H. Horne, fixing his thoughts on so *ode-worthy* a potentate. The following stanza has reference to another of the Mikado's liberalities, whether a political act, or simply an expression of personal intention, we do not recall:—

"The mind of man
Once open'd, claims a boundless span;
Thou canst no more
Contract its shore
Than make a flood-tide ebb at thy command.

Take then thy stand
On Nature's constant love and youth,
Her heart and truth;
And thy resolve to search and weigh
All creeds that ferment 'neath this pregnant day,
Then choose the loftiest—hold thou fast,
And thy rare-flowered crown shall ever last
In star-like record when its bloom hath passed."—P. 4.

The Mikado, it seems, will have no such State Church as the traditions of his land could afford him; and we should presume his intention is to lay down the law of perfect freedom of conscience in things spiritual. Let us hope that, when he does make choice of a religion, it may be such an one as shall be worthy of a full following among the remarkable people he governs. It is difficult to imagine these people, exquisite as are their perceptions and intuitions in some matters, embracing the creed of Europe, in any of its forms; but stranger things than this would be are recorded in the annals of our faith. If the Mikado adds to his other good deeds this—to lead his people to the religion which alone can effectually elevate their conceptions in matters moral and spiritual, he will indeed be worthy of the place in Japanese history which Mr. Horne foresees for him, conditionally, when he says,—

"The ancient splendours of Japan
Will dwindle to a painted fan,
And the rich flowers of all her kings,
Beside thy *fruits*, be childish things!"—P. 7.

The Tragedy of Israel: Part I., King Saul. By George Francis Armstrong, M.A. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer. 1872.

It is Mr. Armstrong's misfortune that *not* being a poet of consummate genius, he has attempted to dramatise a subject with which the genius of a Shakespeare could scarcely have dealt successfully, and which his keen practical sense would certainly have kept him from attempting.

The chief personage of this drama is, of course, Saul, the King of Israel; the others are but vague sketches which serve as a sort of dramatic setting. Indeed, the whole may be regarded as a poetic study of a single character—that of Saul. The Saul of the Old Testament is a brave and skilful leader; but withal, of a fitful temper, proud, obstinate, and disposed to a sullen revengeful brooding over his wrongs. To this must be added that he lacked that reverence, that real and proper regard for God, which is of the essence of true religion. Unchecked by this principle, the evil dispositions of his nature gradually became dominant, and finally brought about his ruin. But Mr. Armstrong has sought to heighten the interest of his subject by introducing certain quite modern elements. He makes Saul a man who is before his age; a man whose moral instincts revolt

against the apparent cruelty of the Divine decree requiring the extermination of the Amalekites. He is, in consequence, punished with visitations of madness; is led into deeper questionings and perplexities, drifts ever further from the religious beliefs of his age; and, without being able to discern any other light to guide him on his lone and perilous way, is caught in the tempest of his own wild passions and whelmed in the gulf of despair. Such a picture of Saul is quite unlike the one given in the Bible story; yet it is poetically allowable, and enables the author to convey a moral for the benefit of those self-reliant spirits of our time who, repelled by the moral difficulties of Revelation, and still more by the hollow explanations, or rather, apologies, of too many theologians, launch out in the boundless deep of speculation they know not whither.

The conception of Saul's character and situation is clear and well wrought out; but we are bound to say that the author has so managed, or *mis*managed, that while the sympathy of the reader is strongly drawn towards the king as a sort of proto-martyr of free-thought, the speeches of Samuel and David quite fail to provide any antidote. In this respect the poem reminds us somewhat of Byron's *Cain*. Of the poetry, we can only say just a word or two. It is marked by unusual vigour of style, great power of description, and close analysis of mental conditions. But it lacks variety and repose. Everybody talks in the same lofty and impassioned strain. A little more sweetness and tenderness here and there would have lightened and relieved the gloomy picture. We can only say, in conclusion, that we are sorry that the marked poetic ability which Mr. Armstrong undoubtedly possesses should have been wasted on a subject which is and must be, even for the purposes of chamber drama, except, perhaps, to poets of the highest genius, so unprofitable.

Memoir of Nathaniel Hawthorne, with Stories now First Published in this Country. By H. A. Page. London: Henry S. King and Co., 65, Cornhill. 1872.

We have here another tribute to a departed genius, in the shape of a volume partly compilation and partly original writing; of the three volumes, Mr. H. A. Page's is by far the pleasantest, and, so far as original writing is concerned, the most meritorious. The stories of Hawthorne here first given to the British public have not the recommendation of throwing light on any obscure period of the author's life; nor have they the important standing of a collection culled from his whole works, and strung together as best representing his genius; but they simply come together on the good general ground that whatever Hawthorne published was worth publishing, and that these do not happen to have been previously published in England. By far the best and most important of them is "Mother Rigby's Pipe," a story in which realistic treatment and fantastic incident are combined in a manner truly characteristic of Hawthorne, and in which, moreover, the clear dominance of an earnest though somewhat bitter

thought might stamp the authorship readily enough in the sight of any admirer of Hawthorne meeting the story accidentally for the first time. To give a deliberate and circumstantial description of the manufacture of a scarecrow by a witch, of her endowing him with life as of a real human being, and then, not merely to interest the reader in the thing's fate, but to strike out a vein of very real tragedy in the *dénouement*, are matters demanding no common powers, but just such powers as Hawthorne showed elsewhere, and just such as are shown in full vigour in this brief sketch. There runs through it a vein of bitter sarcasm on the abounding hollowness of human character, recalling Thackeray to the mind, but saved from cynicism by a certain air of serious concern that runs throughout Hawthorne's works and redeems from utter bitterness the bitterest of his qualities; the same sarcastic thought, similarly tempered, comes up in the admirably graphic "Passages from a Relinquished Work," standing next to "Mother Rigby's Pipe" in this volume,—"Passages" that leave the reader keenly regretful of their incompleteness. The same defect of incompleteness is all that one has to sigh over in the next section, "Sketches from Memory," which, nevertheless, have a clear autobiographic value; of the remaining contents of the book,—or rather of Hawthorne's portion of it,—"The Duston Family" and "A Prize from the Sea" are quasi-historical, and valuable chiefly for occasional intensity of feeling and for that exquisitely clear style that the author had in such complete command; "April Fools" is a brief sententious essay, which the title of "Stories" will certainly not admit, however stretched; while "A Virtuoso's Collection" is another strange, weird fiction, realistic in treatment, full of thought, bitter and otherwise, and of a texture thinner even than that of "Mother Rigby's Pipe." The Virtuoso, who turns out to be no less a person than the Wandering Jew, doomed to eternal life in this world, has preserved in a museum a vast collection of animals, attributes, and various articles, of legendary or historical celebrity, from the horses Bucephalus and Rosinante, and the wolves who respectively ate Red Riding Hood and suckled Romulus and Remus, down to the girdle of Venus, the box of Pandora, and even the shadow of Peter Schlehmihl. Some of the answers of the Virtuoso to his visitor's questions are of a biting and subtle satire truly Hawthornian,—as, for instance, his reply to a remark on the absence of Pegasus from his collection of noted animals:—

"He is not yet dead; but he is so hard ridden by many young gentlemen of the day, that I hope soon to add his skin and skeleton to my collection."—P. 250.

Of the same quality is his reply as to why a certain stuffed goose figures in his collection:—

"It is one of the flock whose cackling saved the Roman Capitol. Many geese have cackled and hissed both before and since; but none, like these, have clamoured themselves into immortality."—P. 252.

Sometimes the reflections on the fantastic collection contain

home-truths solemn enough, as when the visitor, eager to inspect the contents of Christian's burden of sin, there preserved, is told to look into his own consciousness and memory, where he will find *a list of whatever the burden contains*. The discovery of the Virtuoso's identity is extremely artistic: the visitor asks to whom he is indebted for his afternoon's gratification.

"The Virtuoso, before replying, laid his hand upon an antique dart or javelin, the rusty steel head of which seemed to have been blunted, as if it had encountered the resistance of a tempered shield, or breastplate. 'My name has not been without its distinction in the world for a longer period than that of any other man alive,' answered he; 'Yet many doubt my existence; perhaps you will do so to-morrow. This dart which I hold in my hand was once grim death's weapon. It served him well for the space of four thousand years; but it fell blunted, as you see, when he directed it against my breast.'"—Pp. 278—279.

Of the *Biographical Sketch* that precedes this little collection, it would be difficult to speak too well; but its solidity and conciseness fit it rather to go before a complete edition of Hawthorne's works, than to be the prelude to these small gleanings of his pen's produce. It not only sets the man very vividly before us in what we feel convinced is his true character *as a man;* but it examines his works in a spirit of acute and profound criticism, and appraises his artistic worth in a style at once appreciative, exhaustive, and perspicuous. When we say that Mr. H. A. Page is an enthusiastic admirer of Hawthorne, we only accord to the critic and biographer a quality without which no critical and biographic study can have the slightest value; because, if a man's works are not such as deserve enthusiasm, a study of them has no *raison d'être*; and if they are such as to deserve enthusiasm, they cannot be rightly criticised by a mere cold and accurate intelligence. There is one general characteristic of the work Mr. Page has bestowed on this volume that, perhaps, more than any other, gives it a high place among the labours of the like class, and which all persons employed on similar tasks would do well to emulate; we refer to the entire absence of the discursive and controversial spirit, and of any such bitter turn of thought as might easily be caught up by a close student of Hawthorne. The absence of these things leaves the biographer solely bent on making clear the character of the man and his works; and it is on the testimony of this absense, as well as of the presence of the positive qualities already named, that we should characterise these hundred and thirteen pages of *Biographical Sketch* as an artistic and vigorous essay in criticism and biography.

A Concise History of Painting. By Mrs. Charles Heaton, Author of "The History of the Life of Albrecht Dürer of Nüremberg." With Illustrations in Permanent Photography. London: Bell and Daldy, York-street, Covent-garden. 1873.

Unfortunately in these days of rapid and voluminous literary

production, it is but of a small percentage of the volumes issuing from the press that a critic can conscientiously say, "there is *room* for these books in the reading world;" but Mrs. Heaton's *Concise History of Painting* comes to supply (at all events partially to supply) a real want, and is one of the books to which we can truly assign a place in the small percentage for which the reading world has room. Mrs. Heaton has observed that "art-history, which is so important a portion of art-culture, is almost the only history entirely untaught in our schools;" and, holding the opinion that the cultivation of æsthetic tastes is a necessary counterpoise to the "stern pursuit of science, to which an age that calls itself practical incites its children," she has produced this volume in the hope that it may prove a help towards the enjoyment of good art to some who need such help.

The task Mrs. Heaton has here set herself is a very different one, though in the same branch of literature, from that undertaken in writing the history of Dürer's life; and we cannot but think the present volume gives evidence of the task being better suited to Mrs. Heaton's talents than the old one. In making a "concise history" from a large mass of materials, there is less necessity to be original and striking than there is in elaborating an extended monograph; and this handbook, which is also something considerably more than a handbook, shows much judgment in selection and rejection of materials. Furthermore, the volume must not be understood to be a mere compilation, inasmuch as the whole of the materials are carefully and intelligently worked up, so as to form a work with a decided character of its own.

The arrangement of the contents is simple and clear, and made on the principle of locality. The first three books treat of Egyptian and Asiatic painting, Classic painting, and early Christian painting. Then follow four books treating of the several divisions of the art in Modern Europe, and forming the bulk of the volume. The book on Italy is divided into five chapters, and that on Germany into two,—divisions which are amply justified. The book on Spanish Art has not, and needs not, any subdivision; while that on painting in the Netherlands is divided into four chapters: (1) on the School of Bruges (the Van Eycks, Memling, and others); (2) the School of Antwerp (Quintin Matsys, the Breughels, and others) and the early School of Holland (represented by Lucas Van Leyden); (3) the Flemish School of the Seventeenth Century (Rubens and his followers); and (4) the Dutch School (Rembrandt and the "little masters"). The two concluding books are on French and English painting.

It will be seen that Mrs. Heaton's programme is an orderly and easily intelligible one; but it is impossible to write a book of this kind that shall satisfy all art-lovers and art-critics; and we might indicate many points on which we are dissatisfied or at variance with the author of the present volume. We will, however, be content with pointing out the capital mistake made in omitting, from the English

division of the work, so important and splendid a painter as William Blake.

The photographs are well selected and well executed; indeed, the whole material production of the book is excellent.

The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. By Charles Darwin, M.A., F.R.S., &c. London: John Murray. 1872.

In our last issue we expressed a conviction that this is the most powerful and insidious of all the remarkable writings of our gifted author. The reason for this lies not in the subtlety of its speculation, nor the fascination of its facts, for in both of these respects *The Descent of Man* and *The Origin of Species* surpass it in the bold and unhesitating manner in which it makes the doctrine of natural selection a necessary truth. We—and we believe theologians generally—have no objection, abstractedly, to Mr. Darwin's speculations, provided that it be remembered that they are speculations and nothing more. But when they are taken for granted as great laws of Nature, —when the *modus operandi* of the physical expression of man's mental emotions is explained to us on the assumption that natural selection *must* be true, we object. Let it be remembered that, during the whole period that has elapsed since the publication of this ingenious speculation, not a single fact in indubitable support of it has been found. It has created a new epoch for Biology, and has roused hundreds of students from torpor into intense aspiration and activity. From the minutest to the broadest fields, the most enthusiastic research is being prosecuted, and again and again we hear of "facts" for Darwin which, on careful scrutiny, it is found may fall into harmony with his hypothesis or with some other. But as to the great principles on which the doctrine rests, not a single shred of evidence is brought in their support. We know that under domestication almost all animals are subject to variation. But these variations are abnormal, they are produced and retained under strain. Take off that strain, and nature reasserts herself. The domesticated variety of the wild form returns to its primitive state. So that *natural* selection is unknown; not an authentic instance can be given. While under the strain of domestication no single species has ever been produced. *Species* produce infertile hybrids; but the progeny of domesticated *varieties* are prolific. Yet without, as Mr. Darwin admits, a single instance of specific transformation in nature—without a single transformation-link between the enormous gulf that separates the highest ape from the lowest man, he ventures to substantiate "natural selection" by taking it for granted that the modes in which man expresses his emotions can be explained by it alone!

What it is that is *subject* to emotion is not hinted at; nor have we the slightest reason to conclude that it is anything other than brain and nerve. The mind *per se* as an agent is ignored. The question is purely a physical one. That matter may be affected by mind, and

that opposite states of mind might produce opposite conditions of the nerve and muscle on which it acts, and so cause emotion to find expression, Mr. Darwin stays not to consider. Nor does he remember that a comparative similarity of object must involve a comparative similarity of instrument. Terror, joy, rage, impotence, are emotions that must more or less definitely exist in all the higher brutes: so must organs of respiration. So far as they share these conditions with man, there must be a similitude in the instruments. The same end has to be accomplished, and there must be more or less precisely the same means; but does it therefore follow that the one was developed from the other? This is what this book takes for granted; nay, insists on; and we do not hesitate to declare this adverse to every dictate of a sound philosophy.

Mr. Darwin has undoubtedly thrown light on many of the more remarkable expressions common to man and animals, and laid bare, with much clearness, the mechanism by which such expression is effected. But when, instead of attributing the origin of their action to mind, he assumes that their activity, displayed in this or that way, is the mere residue of the habit of some brutal ancestor who flourished in the indefinite past, he simply shows himself as the special pleader for evolution in his own darling method, and not the man of science seeking truth.

Three principles are laid down as competent to account for most of the expressions used involuntarily by man and the lower animals under the influence of emotion. The first is that of serviceable associated habits, which, put concisely, means that when any action or set of actions has been found useful or necessary under a certain state of mind, whenever the same state of mind is produced there is a tendency, from the force of habit and association, to repeat those movements although they are (now) of no service. Thus cats dislike wetting their feet, and shake them with a brisk vibratory movement when they are wet. Mr. Darwin observed that on pouring some water violently into a glass close to the head of a kitten, it shook its feet in the usual manner, from which it is inferred that the associated sound excited the habitual movement, even when there was no tactile impression. Or again,—occasionally dogs turn round several times before they lie down to sleep even on a floor or rug; a practice which, having been found useful to the wild ancestors of the dog, who slept among coarse grass and herbage, is by the law of associated habit continued still, although of no use. There is undoubtedly very much that is true in this general principle. The power of association is very great, and its unconscious results very many. But its universal application is simply preposterous. Mental states are forgotten. Associated habit, not mental feeling, incites to and accounts for the expression of our profoundest emotions. Nay more, the very animals from which by associated habit we have derived certain modes of unconscious expression are not even allowed to have had a desire to express, but simply arrived by accident at a suitable mode of doing

so. There is no more, according to this assumption, involved in the fact that an *animal* expresses a certain emotion in a distinct way than there is in the fact that its dentition is of a certain class. It is simply acquired because it is serviceable. When a polar bear expresses her affection for her whelp, there is no more in it than there is in the fact that she has white fur! But can this be true? Is there not an anterior *desire* to express? If not, how would expression in one animal be understood by another? What constitutes the difference between a dog's manner, when simply going to take food, and when receiving the caresses and attention of his master? In the first case, he is merely intent; in the second, a prodigality of antic and expression is seen. In both cases the existence of pleasure in the dog may be assumed: but why so different in their manifestation? Simply because the pleasure is merely *realised* in the one case, and there is *an intense desire to express it on the other*. Thus, then, even in the animal, in any and every form, and in any and every age, the *expression* of emotion must have been governed by the desire for its expression. We entertain no objection to this principle of associated habits in its own sphere. Thus Mr. Darwin explains the almost universal expression of affirmation by nodding, and of negation by shaking the head by means of this principle. He reminds us that with infants the first act of denial is performed by refusing food, which is constantly done by withdrawing the head on either side from that which is offered; while in accepting food their heads are inclined forwards. One inclination suffices; but there may be several lateral movements. From this the habit of inarticulately expressing affirmation and negation is inferred. This may be; as also the habit of animals who fight with their teeth, drawing their ears back in order to defend them, and who therefore keep them back when enraged, in contrast to those who, as the goat, never employing their teeth in conflict do not use this gesture. But when Mr. Darwin seeks to infer the expression of human emotion from the inherited habit of a brute, there is not a single fact adduced in confirmation, nor can there be. *Human* associated habit has engendered certain modes of emotional expression. So with the expression of the brute. But that there is any community between them Mr. Darwin has failed to afford a single proof.

With the accurate and careful illustrations that enrich this part of the subject, there are others that are, in the highest degree, unsound and unscientific. A catch is made at any physiological assertion, however ill authenticated, that will sustain, in appearance at least, the favourite theory of the author. In illustration of this, Mr. Darwin gives (p. 86) his sanction to a quotation from Dr. Maudsley, in which he affirms of a decapitated frog, which, of course, cannot feel, or perform consciously any movement, that if a drop of acid be placed on the lower surface of the thigh, it will rub off the drop with the upper surface of the foot of the same leg. If this foot be cut off it cannot thus act; and, eventually seeking some other way, it makes use of the foot of the other leg, and so rubs it off! We declare this

to be a simple fable. We venture to say, that not a single English physiologist has, by experiment, substantiated Pflüger's statement. We have been witness of experiment after experiment, every instance of which was negative. And more, in five cases out of seven, the foot of the opposite leg was not attempted to be used even when the frog was *not* decapitated. But even if the assertion, which Darwin sanctions, were true, could it be a case of associated habit? In all probability neither that frog, nor his greatest grandfather, ever performed such an action before. How, then, could it be the effect of association? And how is the unconscious decapitated frog to conclude that one leg, failing of its object, he must try the other?

Still more open to objection is the use Mr. Darwin makes of his second principle, which he calls Antithesis. It declares that certain movements being the natural accompaniment of a given state of mind, the entirely opposite movements will express the reverse state of mind. For example, a dog approaching with hostile intentions, does so with firm attitude, head raised, tail erect and stiff, the hair bristled, the ears pricked, and the eyes staring. Let the dog discover that the person he approaches is not a stranger but his master, and his whole attitude is changed; his body sinks, his tail is lowered and wagged from side to side, the hair is smoothed, the ears depressed, and drawn backwards, and the lips loosened. Mr. Darwin asserts that these movements are of no value whatever to the animal; but they result simply from the fact, that the attitudes are opposite, hence their expression is antithetical. But surely an appeal to the mental condition of the dog leads to a simpler explanation. In rage, and the feeling of hostility, there is a tension, as it were, a rigor, exactly correspondent to the rigidity of every prominent feature of the canine body; in the opposite mental state of affection, a delicious complacency is felt; there is no mental tension, merely receptiveness, hence the opposite condition of body. The antithesis is not physical in its origin; it is mental. Besides, this takes for granted that the existence of any emotional expression in an animal involves its opposite. But there are animals that exhibit humility, and possess not a trace of rage; and others in which rage exists without a trace of gentleness. Nor is this all; such a doctrine makes hostility the emotion out of which affection springs!

There can be no love until its antithesis, hate, has been realised! But is it not much more consonant with fact to find affection developed before rage is ever shown? Does not the tiger's cub have affectionate feelings for its mother before it rages on its foe? And in both cases is it not the result of a desire to express these emotions, rather than a mere accidental result? In truth, Mr. Darwin's reasoning here is the Positivist's dogma over again; the means exist, not for the end, but the end is accomplished because the means exist. Certain expressions are expressive because they were originally of service; not of service because they were expressive, and yet in a careful study of brute and human life, is not the latter the natural conclusion? In

man, an almost universal mode of expressing helplessness is a shrugging of the shoulders, a contraction of the muscles of the forehead, exactly opposed to those contracted in a frown, the lower jaw is dropped and the hands are opened. These are the reverse activities to those used in the expression of rage. They are therefore supposed to sustain the doctrine of antithesis as their cause. But here, again, mental tension and mental relaxation, acting oppositely on the physical system, produce opposite results. It is not the inheritance of an old serviceable habit from the brute, but the direct action of mind upon nerve and muscle.

The third principle affirms that certain expressions of mental states are wholly independent of will or habit, but are the direct results of the constitution of the nervous system. Thus, trembling, when excited by fear or rage, is of no service to the being so affected, but is the immediate result of nervous excitement. The hair changing colour under the influence of grief is another example. The intense excitement of the great nervous centres interrupts their normal action. But our author concludes that even this superfluity of power may expend itself along certain channels, so as to be serviceable to the animal; and to this cause partly the bristling of the hair in enraged brutes is ascribed, while a frequent accompaniment of insanity is a bristled condition of the hair. There is, undoubtedly, truth in this last principle, and its application is far wider than either of the two preceding. It ascribes to the direct action of the brain, and therefore (as we maintain) of the mind, emotional expression. A very careful consideration of the causes of blushing is given us under this head, and with results that from a physical point of view are extremely satisfactory.

Blushing is a peculiarity of man. It is shared by none of the brutes; but it has been observed in almost every human race. Mr. Darwin denies that it is a special endowment for the expression of modesty, because it is invisible in the darker races of men. It is caused, he says, by self-consciousness, directed mostly to personal appearance, especially to the face; and he suggests that attention directed solely to any part of the body interferes with the ordinary action of the small arteries of that part, from which cause they relax and become filled with arterial blood. Blushing may cover a large proportion of the body, but is chiefly confined to the face: that is the part constantly exposed, and to which attention is specially directed. The probability of this being an approximately correct explanation is heightened by Dr. Beale's recent discovery of the distribution of minute nerves to the capillaries themselves, thus bringing the entire circulation under the influence of the nervous centres. But we apprehend that blushing is rather a symptom of feeling than its expression. It is almost always obnoxious to the person conscious of it and would rather be suppressed, if possible, than expressed, proving that mental states do, and must, directly influence the physical system.

On the whole this book may be read with profit by those interested in the question, provided it be remembered that none of the facts given by the author are necessarily sequences from "natural selection." The manner in which this is attempted is sometimes revolting. For example, the power which music has at times of exciting in us in an undefined but majestic manner, the profoundest emotions, is ascribed to the recalling of the "strong emotions which were felt during long past ages, where, as is probable, our early progenitors courted each other with vocal tunes!" Thus the howl and quiver of an impassioned brute was the origin of the sublime ecstasy which uplifting music may awake within the soul! Again, Mr. Darwin says, that when we perform a little action that is difficult—such as the threading of a needle—we close our lips firmly, he presumes, in order to prevent disturbance by breathing. Now, he saw a young orang killing flies on a window pane with its knuckles—a difficult task—and at each attempt the lips were firmly pressed as in man. Hence ours is an inherited peculiarity! Of course the fact that both man and monkey, in their performance of delicate acts, would require to exclude the disturbing element of breathing as much as possible, might explain its independent origin in both; but this is too simple for Mr. Darwin. Similarity of organ, or similarity of action, no matter how otherwise this similarity may be explained, are marshalled by our author as indubitable evidence of a common origin. While all this is put forth *as* speculation, we need not mind, but when, as is frequently the case in this book, it is treated as though it was indisputable truth, we hold it to be inimical to the best interests of science, and in the last degree unsound in philosophy.

A Manual of Palæontology for the Use of Students; with a General Introduction on the Principles of Palæontology. By Henry Alleyne Nicholson, M.D., D.Sc., &c., Professor of Natural History, University College, Toronto. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Son, 1872.

This is a really valuable contribution to modern scientific literature. The want of a good treatise on this subject has been felt by students for years past. We have had numerous works on geology constantly appearing and reappearing, but a careful and concise treatise on fossils, giving the latest results of research, has been wanting hitherto. This want Dr. Nicholson has supplied, with his usual clearness, and more than usual completeness, accuracy, and care. This book is everything the student can require, and the latest and most trustworthy authorities are without exception consulted. The chapters on the principles of Palæontology present some clear and convincing as well as fearless reasoning, proving that similarity of rock structure does not imply contemporaneous origin, nor does identity of fossil remains prove a deposition in the same epoch. And these are points of the highest value in interpreting geological facts.

In the second part of the book the entire question of fossils in all their relations is carefully discussed; and a division of much value is here adopted, into Palæozoology, embracing the fossils of the animal, and Palæobotany, embracing those of the vegetable kingdom. The latter is not so elaborately discussed as the former, but they are both so rendered as to place this book immensely above either its predecessors or its contemporaries. It is well and copiously illustrated, and is a book which every geological student should possess.

History of Bokhara from the Earliest Period down to the Present. Composed for the first time after Oriental Known and Unknown Manuscripts, by Arminius Vambéry, Ordinary Professor of Oriental Languages and Literatures in the Royal University of Pesth. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1873.

It is probable that by the course of political events the veil of mystery is about to be lifted from Central Asia. War and diplomacy are among the principal forces that give stimulus to the study of geography; let the history of the last few years bear witness, from 1854, when average Englishmen discovered the Crimea, to 1872, when they heard of the existence of San Juan just as the Empire was about to lose it. Few regions of the world, inhabited by historic races, are so little known to us as Transoxania, or, to speak more precisely, the Khanate of Bokhara. The country is remote, and was thought to lead to nowhere in particular, until it suddenly dawned upon us that it was on the direct road from Russia to British India. Until lately, too, its affairs have been disconnected from the general world-system; and, however unhealthy that system may be, the nations that share it are vastly better off than those that lie outside. Although for so long a time cut off from intercourse with the great nations of the earth, it must not be supposed that Bokhara has been the home of a race ethnologically pure, or of a civilisation consistent and progressive. Transoxania was exposed for centuries to the onward roll of the stream of the neighbouring Turanian races, and the disruption of both her political and social condition was in consequence fearful. The tyranny of conquest here, as elsewhere, has not only devastated flourishing plains, but has also uprooted all the finer qualities of the human mind. Central Asia is, at the present day, the foul ditch in which flourish together all the rank vices which are to be found scattered singly throughout the Mohammedan countries of Western Asia.

While we are asking for some little description of the country and the people, that shall at least take the edge off our ignorance, and are thankful for the scraps of information to be had from merchant adventurers, and the like, M. Vambéry comes forward, not merely to touch the topics of momentary interest, but in the most laborious manner to fulfil the office of historian. The difficulties of

his undertaking have been such as few men could overcome. He traverses a region where he has few, if any, predecessors. "It must always be a difficult task to write the *first* history of any country, and it becomes doubly so, when the country in question has only emerged in the present generation from the thick mist of darkness in which its annals had for centuries been shrouded." In the second part of his book M. Vambéry says, "the data are hitherto little known, or entirely unknown, even to the world of scholars, for they bring before us a series of princes, and even whole dynasties, regarding whom scarcely anything has as yet been written in Asia, and not a single word in Europe."

Most readers will, we imagine, turn first to the end of the volume; in this particular instance it may be well to do so. They will find in the last three chapters an excellent summary of the events which have at length turned European eyes toward Bokhara, and brought about the Central Asian question. The whole of its modern history is melancholy in the extreme. All possible vices and iniquities abound, and the miserable succession of its tyrants culminated in Emir Nasrullah, who came to the throne in 1826. "One must be able to form to oneself an idea of the society of the Bokhara of that day, crippled by boundless hypocrisy, crass ignorance, and unscrupulous tyranny, and sunk in the swamp of immorality, in order to imagine the mixture of cunning and stupidity, of pride, vainglory, and profligacy, of blind fanaticism, and loathsome vices, which made up the character of Nasrullah Khan. . . . After he had executed in cold blood, on the banks of the Oxus, three of his younger brothers, and a great number of the adherents of his former rivals, Nasrullah arrived at the undisputed possession of power, and during his long reign of thirty-four years afforded the world an example of how many atrocities a prince of Mohammedan Asia can commit, and what amount of tyranny a people enslaved by religious bigotry can endure." In 1842 he put to death, after horrid tortures and humiliations, Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly, "the first ambassadors of the Christian West who had entered Transoxania since the time of Clavijo, an interval of more than 400 years."

This monster's end is well described by M. Vambéry:—"Just vengeance did not, however, reach Nasrullah. His external enemies were not in a position to call him to account, and his successor had to suffer for the sins of Nasrullah. In the interior, namely in Bokhara, everybody was paralysed with fear. Fathers saw their sons and daughters carried off by force into the 'Ark,' as the palace was called, without daring to breathe a word of discontent, for, according to the teaching of the Mollahs, the prince could deal as freely with his people as the shepherd with his flock. About the year 1840—I could not ascertain the exact date—a large party of the discontented was formed, and it was suspected that Mozaffar-eddin, the eldest son and presumptive successor of Nasrullah, was at their head. The slightest suspicion was sufficient to doom to instant death. More than forty

of the conspirators were handed over to the executioner, and Mozaffar-eddin was removed from the governorship of Karshi to that of Kermineh, where he had not only a more limited field of operations, but was more under the eye of his father. The more Nasrullah advanced in years, the more frequent and violent became his paroxysms of rage, which in 1860 put an end to his life after he had reigned thirty-four years. Besides the repeated revolts of Khokand, the obstinate struggle maintained against him by his brother-in-law, Velinaam of Shehri Sebz, embittered his last years. He was already in his last agony when the news arrived that that fortress was taken. Scarcely able to express his meaning, he yet gave orders to put to death his rebellious brother-in-law and all his children. But as he could not satiate his eyes with their blood, he had his own wife, the sister of Velinaam, brought to his bedside. This poor woman, the mother of two children, trembled, but that did not move the dying tyrant: he had her beheaded before his eyes, and gazing on the blood of the sister of his principal enemy, he breathed out his detestable soul."

Let the reader trace the steps by which the corrupt and worthless Bokhariot power came into fatal conflict with Russia. It was inevitable, and for humanity's sake the sooner it was brought about the better. On the 14th of May, 1868, the Russian flag was hoisted on the citadel of Samarcand, and the old history of the country closed. Henceforth, for good and for evil, "Bokhara the Holy" belongs to the Modern world. The first contact of Asiatics and Europeans is always of high importance. To the former it is often an issue of life or death that is submitted to them by the mere presence of a new civilisation and a religion more potent still; to the latter it is an ordeal in which justice, and conscience toward God and man are tested by strong temptation. It is not easy yet to say what new life awaits these old lands of Central Asia, but up to the present hour the changes wrought are of the first magnitude. Remembering that in the East, even more than in the West, religion and politics are related, the concluding sentences of this volume are profoundly suggestive:—

"The Russian successes in Central Asia have dealt Islamism the severest blow it has ever received from Christendom in the course of their thousand years of struggle. In modern days the powerful influence of Christian Europe had permeated and filled all parts of Mohammedan Western Asia; the holy places of Mecca and Medina themselves had not escaped the innovating spirit of the times; but for a time the Mohammedanism of the distant parts of Central Asia retained its primitive character pure and undiluted, the faith flourished unopposed and uncontroverted. Bokhara, and not Mecca, had become practically the spiritual centre of Islamism. Thither came the ascetic, the pious member of a fraternity, and the enthusiastic theologian; and, though not generally known, it is an undoubted fact that zealous Moslems in all parts of the Ottoman Empire, in Egypt, Fez, and Morocco, received thence the inspirations which excited their religious enthusiasm; the sight of this holy ground profaned by

the presence of unbelievers, and ruled by them, this must be intolerable to all pious souls of the Islamite world, and the dust raised by the fall of this chief pillar of Islamism, as Bokhara has always been called, will long hang as a dark cloud overshadowing for many a day, if not for ever, the horizon of the future prospects of Islam."

Professor Vambéry's work is of no mere passing interest. It is a history, and one in which many of the highest qualities of the historian are displayed. To the learning of an accomplished Orientalist, he adds the experience of a most observant traveller, while his clearness of style, his moderation, and unfailing good sense, win the reader's confidence and respect. It is a thoroughly valuable book, likely to be for a long time to come the chief authority upon the subject.

Wanderings in Spain. By Augustus J. C. Hare. With Seventeen Illustrations. London: Strahan & Co. 1873.

Those who have read Mr. Hare's admirable *Walks in Rome* will turn with interest to his *Wanderings in Spain*. It is no disparagement of the latter to say that it is not equal in value to the former. Spain is not and cannot be to us what Rome is. Our whole intellectual life would require to be made over again, and our imagination educated by a different set of associations before we could find as much to move us in the entire Spanish Peninsula as in the one eternal city. But Mr. Hare is as good to "travel" with as to take "walks" with. He has that power of understanding a country and a people which is by no means common. If even a landscape demands something from a traveller in the way of attention to its characteristic features, much more is it necessary for a stranger to try to understand a people before beginning any distribution of praise or blame.

Perhaps all Europe does not contain a greater contrast than the English and the Spanish types of character. In their ways of thinking on religious, political, and social matters, it is curious to notice how, almost invariably, they diverge, how often they reach precisely opposite conclusions. The idea of "progress," as we generally understand it, and which rules in all communities of our race, is almost wanting in the Spanish mind. "Spain is not likely to improve," says Mr. Hare, "she does not wish to improve. The traveller reaches one of the grand old cities, which seem to have gone to sleep for five hundred years, and to have scarcely waked up again; where you step at once out of the reign of Amadeo or Isabella II. into that of Philip II., and find the buildings, the costumes, the proverbs, the habits, the daily life, those of his time. You wonder what Spain has been doing since, and the answer is quite easy—nothing. It has not the slightest wish to do any more; it is quite satisfied. The Catholic sovereigns, Ferdinand and Isabella, made a great nation of it, and filled it with glorious works. Since then it has had, well—reverses, but it has changed as little as ever it could." It is very

difficult, also, for Englishmen and Spaniards to understand one another's ideas of courtesy. How brutal must the manners of an average Englishman appear in a country where you "ask his worship the Porter to have the graciousness to assist you in lifting your portmanteau, and implore his worship the Beggar, your brother, for the love of God, to excuse you from giving him anything." In Spain it is the towns, not the country, that one goes to see; of scenery worthy to be called beautiful, there is next to none. The travelling is slow, the inns poor, and luxuries, which the modern tourist has come to consider indispensable, are entirely out of the question throughout by far the greater part of Spain. And yet for a well-equipped and capable traveller Spain has attractions for which he may be content to break away from the more familiar and accessible "playgrounds" of Europe. There is a proud stateliness in her sleepy old cities, a half-decayed and yet surviving grandeur in her mouldering palaces and huge old churches, which has a charm for many minds far more intense than that of scenery, however glorious. Mr. Hare gives the palm for beauty and interest to Granada, above all the Spanish towns, "a place which alone is worth all and tenfold the fatigue and trouble which may be undertaken to reach it." No one intending to wander in Spain should fail to read this volume; it is more than a "handbook," yet trustworthy in detail, and full of the practical suggestions which are useful to travellers. But it is pleasant reading for stay-at-home people, who will not easily find a more interesting sketch of modern Spain, and of that older Spain, whose monuments fill the land. Mr. Hare does not contribute much to our knowledge of Spanish politics, and certainly did not prepare us for the great event which has taken place since the publication of this volume, the abdication of King Amadeo.

The Mormons and the Silver Mines. By James Bonwick, F.R.G.S., Author of "The Last of the Tasmanians," &c., &c. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1872.

This book is what it professes to be, "a record of such change and of its cause," as has lately taken place in Mormonism. It notices the most recent internal and political influences which have developed themselves in or been brought to bear upon that system, and contains the opinion of a traveller of considerable experience as to its destiny. Chapters on "Mormon Nonconformists," "The Mormon Press," "Woman's Rights in America," and on "The Religion of the Mormons," in which a digest is given of an official "Catechism for Children," are of especial interest, and the whole conveys a very good idea of the origin, history, and prospects of Mormon belief and practice. With the exception of a few pages and scattered paragraphs of an extreme sensational type, the book is written in a very readable and suggestive style, and by the student of religious eccentricities, as well as by the ordinary reader, will be found full of information

which at times it is difficult to command. Good as the former part of the book is, the latter is better. Twenty-one years ago Mr. Bonwick was caught by the gold-fever, and left Melbourne for the diggings. Since then he has kept himself well abreast of the subject of mining, and as an authority on the subject adds to his qualification of experience, chemical knowledge of the gold and silver ores found in the mining districts of the States, geological examination of the strata in which they occur, and practical acquaintance with the latest and most profitable processes of mining. There is an interesting account of the latest improvements, especially of the Stetefeldt process of chloridising sulphurets by the use of common salt and heated air, and of the system of hydraulic ground-sluicing, by which two hundred thousand tons of earth can be washed daily. In a chapter on the "Labour Question," Mr. Bonwick traces the history of the Coolie inundation, and whilst for several reasons deploring, views as inevitable its progress, until Coolies monopolise such labour as requires endurance and energy, leaving to Negroes only that with which unruffled shirt-fronts and the dignity of laziness are compatible. All who are interested in Utah and the adjoining territories, with their strange geological formations and stranger religious development, especially such as contemplate emigration or mining speculation, would not regret consulting Mr. Bonwick. He has had some practice in writing books of this sort, and this, his last, will not lower his high reputation.

Our Seamen: An Appeal. By Samuel Plimsoll, M.P. London: Virtue and Co. 1873.

In common with very many of our contemporaries, we were favoured with a copy of this most remarkable book. It is not a question for Reviewers, but for Parliament, the shipowners, and public opinion generally; and it has secured widespread attention throughout the country. All will admit that the perils of the seas can never by any skill or carefulness be entirely done away. The problem of navigation can never become an exact one while the variable conditions of weather remain. But if a tithe of the charges contained in this book are true, then, in addition to the necessary dangers of sea-going, our sailors are continually exposed to deadly perils entirely due to fraud, desire of gain, and wicked carelessness. Ships rotten and falling to pieces from sheer old age; new vessels put together with "devils," or sham bolts, which are little better than bolt-heads; insured far above their value, and then sent to sea overloaded—one ship being despatched to the Baltic in mid-winter with *her main deck two feet ten inches below the level of the water*—such is the state of things, says Mr. Plimsoll, "wholly disgraceful, shameful, and afflicting," which a Royal Commission would disclose. The anger and excitement with which this book has been received in certain shipowning circles may be imagined; and in the absence of those

proofs which there has been no opportunity of examining, it is as well to reserve one's judgment. Certainly the *primâ facie* case is very strong, and it is impossible that the matter can rest here.

The action of the promised Commission will be watched with much interest.

Men of the Third Republic. London: Strahan and Co. 1873.

THE sketches that compose this volume appeared first in the *Daily News*. They are now reprinted, with considerable additions, in the more permanent form which they deserve. As portraits of contemporary statesmen, orators, and novelists, they possess much merit, and, on the whole, are temperately and fairly drawn. "Those rascals, the Whigs, get the worst of it,"—in other words, the Empire and its adherents suffer at the hands of the writer, as, in our opinion, they deserve to do. The list of sketches includes not only such political celebrities as Thiers, Gambetta, and the leading men of the Assembly, but ecclesiastics like Bishop Dupanloup, and writers like Victor Hugo, Edmond About, the younger Dumas, and MM. Erckmann-Chatrian. Their literary execution is very effective; somewhat hasty, of course —likenesses struck off by a few clever strokes of the pen, and characters explained by an epigram. Some of the subjects have their career before them yet, and the outline drawings may hereafter prove to have been incorrect enough; but they are done by a clever hand, and show real power of insight and interpretation. To most English readers the information given will be in great part new, and it will add to the interest with which they observe current events and contemporary men.

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