
A table of contents for the *London Quarterly Review* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_london-quarterly-and-holborn-review_01.php

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Contents

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PROSPECT FOR THEOLOGY

H. H. FARMER represents a tradition of British theology which has taken severe punishment throughout much of his working life. First it was assailed by the Barthian school, which maintained that philosophy was inimical to faith and reason incapable of attesting revelation; latterly it has had its metaphysical pretensions scorned by the linguistic analysts.

This *Festschrift*[1] is itself testimony to the importance of Farmer and the magnitude of his achievement. His successor at Westminster College, Cambridge, F. G. Healey, has assembled a team of very distinguished contributors, many of them Farmer's former pupils. This great teacher has not simply written the impressive books and articles listed at the end of the volume; he has written in the minds of a new generation of Christian thinkers.

One could wish that they had inherited their master's lucidity. This from the Bishop of Durham is not necessarily the sentence of the book most in need of translation for those outside the narrow circle of philosophico-theological debate, but it is typical of a good deal else:

> Rather would I speak of the possibility of talking in terms of a personal model of that which confronts us actively in cosmic disclosure, of that for which the word 'God', when used, is a word which demands and deserves a progressively more complex contextualization in a multi-model discourse. (p. 70)

Apart from the editor's admirable Introduction, almost the only pieces in which I can be sure of the meaning of every sentence at a first reading are Gordon Rupp's *Martin Bucer: Prophet of a New Reformation* and Eric Pyle's *Diagnoses of Religion.* This volume compares ill with *Soundings* in respect of clear English style.

But one must not be too censorious about the obscurity and the jargon. The philosophic theology of our time does not do battle with the heirs of classical culture but with the cosmopolitan interpreters of a technological civilization; its task is not to convince a Sunday morning congregation of good Methodists or even good Presbyterians, but thinkers who have moved far beyond the categories of traditional apologetic. It must seek to answer questions many of us have never been asked, except silently and incoherently by the empty pews and the prevailing secularism. We must be patient. We no longer live in the world of Clarke's *Outline of Theology* or Maldwyn Hughes's *Christian Foundations.*

Many of the contributors show how Herbert Farmer's sensitive mind anticipated some of the issues of our time. 'There is the note of Christian agnosticism' (p. 8) in his writings but this arose not from a desire to limit theology to what Jones will swallow but from Farmer's awareness of 'the God-ness of God'. Paul Lehmann discovers a 'striking contemporaneity' in a wartime revision, *Towards Belief in God,* of an earlier book, *Experience of God* (p. 121). Like Ian Ramsey (p. 71), many of these scholars

are 'still walking along pathways to which he himself, with faith and learning, first introduced us'.

The third essay, on *Doctrinal Criticism,* is a characteristic offering from Professor G. F. Woods, but alas! perhaps his final completed work, since he died untimely five weeks after sending in the manuscript. George Woods I knew personally as a teacher as I have not known Herbert Farmer, and it is fitting that this journal, though he never wrote for it, should salute his careful scholarship and his gentle, Christian kindness.

I do not intend, however, to try to evaluate each of these chapters, but to see what light they throw on subjects which are not their direct concern. If they describe the prospect for theology, what may we deduce from them as the prospect for spirituality and worship? Apart from H. D. Lewis on *Religion and Enthusiasm,* there is no essay directly on these themes, but although no liturgiologist in the technical sense, Farmer is a great theologian of worship and prayer as well as a notable preacher, so to use the *Festschrift* for this purpose is very much in harmony with his devout and dedicated spirit.

It is apparent both from Farmer's own writings and from more than one of these contributions that the whole of Christian theology springs out of worship. When John Hick restates the Athanasian–Arian controversy as a modern problem (Chapter 6), we remember that Athanasius made the issue one of worship—Arius has no right to worship a creature; but the Church cannot exist without the worship of Christ.

Farmer himself has given an important definition of prayer: 'Prayer is essentially the response of man's spirit to the ultimate as personal.'[2] And so we must wrestle with Bishop Ramsey on *A Personal God* for this is crucial. This is an essay which will repay reading again and again. It is quintessential Ramsey and it offers a five-fold justification for talking of the personality *of* God without abandoning the preposition for 'in' as did Clement Webb.[3] His first point is the one from which the other four derive. Such language 'is grounded in those cosmic disclosures which are modelled in terms of reciprocity, and characterized subjectively and objectively by a mutual activity' (p. 71). Our devotion may thus be intellectually honest.

Both Ramsey and Hick, with his translation of Chalcedonian Christology from language of substance to that of *agape,* give us some oblique guidance in the revision of our service books. That certain terms must go because they have no meaning today, and others because they represent a false theology, is obvious. Transubstantiation is no longer tenable in eucharistic theology or devotion, the doctrine of the two natures is not a satisfactory interpretation of *mysterium Christi.* But this is not to deny that there is a mystery both in the eucharist and in the person of Christ, which our worship despite our modern lust for intelligibility must express. The old dogmas need restatement but not careless and indiscriminate destruction, while the language of worship needs to become more personalist without denying the Godness of God. The inadequacy of the notion of substance is that it is so impersonal and conceives of the divine and human natures as 'stuff', the latter perhaps as an envelope into which in Christ the former was 'stuffed'.

Yet it does safeguard the ambiguity of talk of 'person' when applied to God (see Ramsey, p. 70).

But there is no more pregnant concept in relation to our theme than one which is found in Ninian Smart's paper *Towards a Systematic Future for Theology*. He develops what he calls 'the principle of the conservation of richness'. There must be a dialectic between theology and modern knowledge. This, for example, will probably lead us to conclude that the myth of Adam is no longer of much value in the Christian interpretation of the universe. 'But this makes a mess of the symmetry of certain aspects of Biblical interpretation: the first Adam disobeyed in the Garden of Eden; the second Adam obeyed in the Garden of Gethsemane. The one brought us into our predicament; the other released us from it through his death and resurrection' (p. 107). Professor Smart might have amplified this by reference to Hoskyns's exegesis of 'Supposing him to be the gardener' in the great commentary on *John*. It certainly has manifold liturgical repercussions, not least in hymnody. Jettison Adam and there is a 'decrease in richness'. But may not this be more than made good, if, by recognising the dialectic with modern knowledge, we 'demythologise' Adam and state both our predicament and its cure and 'the new possibilities opened up by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus' in terms of the realities of life today as we experience them?

I cannot pretend that I find Professor Smart crystal clear. What I have written is the exegesis I had to make for myself as I was reading him. For instance, he uses 'the death of Adam' to mean the abandonment of the myth, but the phrase has another, scriptural meaning, which makes it a trifle ambiguous for the simpler student. All the same, his principles of richness and its conservation seem to me to be invaluable. By applying modern knowledge to the traditional theology we may find that we must bury the corpse of its myths and models in order that the spirit may go free. But we must do this only if greater richness results. To impoverish our understanding of the gospel, prodigally to throw away the symbols inherited from the past, is treasonable disloyalty. It could be as though a man who has married a beautiful wife divorces her at the time of the silver wedding because she has not retained her beauty, whereas, if his love has been true, the deepening personal relationship should more than counterbalance the loss of youthful bloom. The rightful test of the restatement of the faith in terms of newer discoveries about man and the universe is 'Does it increase rather than diminish richness?'

The conclusions for liturgy are obvious. Revisers must not be timid, frightened of change in language and symbolism. They must be prepared to be radical. But they must be conservative too, remembering that it is often the impatient churchman in his moods of annoyance and disillusion who would throw away bath water, baby and all, rather than the serious agnostic, just as the boredom of children with traditional services may be the invention of tired parents and Sunday School teachers who themselves have never been taught liturgical appreciation.

There are two words of warning for liturgiologists in these pages, the one

specific, the other implied. Donald MacKinnon, who is anxious to safeguard the concept of atonement as well as of redemption and who is worried by theologies of acceptance which ignore the dimension of the irrevocable (p. 172), protests against the 'eagerness to treat the words of Christ in his passion almost as if they were the solemn liturgical utterances of the celebrant of a great service. After all, what is being described or represented is not a rite but a murder and a defeat' (p. 175). This is of the utmost importance. Neither must we forget that to go to Communion is not the same as to take up the Cross (not in our country anyhow) and in our rightful desire to correct Cranmerian gloom with Easter joy, we must never forget the awful realities of the suffering through which alone we have hope.

Secondly and lastly, we turn to the very first essay. In some ways this sums up the points we have selected from some of the others. Professor H. D. Lewis writes of the element of mystery in religion which is essentially irreducible (p. 39). He also describes the scientific revolution of our time and the alterations it has made in our life and thought so that there seems no permanent setting or structure of life in which religion may shape itself (p. 41). 'The relevance of the past to the appropriate patterns of existence for today must also be discovered, both at the level of secular culture and of the religious inspirations that are organic to culture and social tradition. This in turn is bound up with a further task that is even more peculiar to our situation. The set given to our thoughts, alike as laymen and as experts, by absorption into the work of understanding our natural environment and subduing it to our purposes, needs to be corrected by renewed consciousness of sides of existence which are not amenable to scientific treatment.' Hence 'our prime need is more than ever for the sort of illumination which reason itself does not provide' (p. 42). And so the waste land of cerebral speculation needs to be watered by the springs of enthusiasm, just as liturgy itself is barren apart from the Holy and Life-giving Spirit.

And so H. D. Lewis concludes with a verse from the Welsh hymnist Pant-y-Celyn and asks 'Is there any interpreting of him which could be related to religious thought today?' (pp. 50, 51). He tells us in a footnote that Professor Hodges is learning Welsh presumably to do for Pant-y-Celyn what he has already done for Wesley.[4]

Can it be that the prospect for theology and spirituality, to say nothing of liturgy, includes a revival of the 'rapture of praise'?

GORDON S. WAKEFIELD

[1] F. G. Healey (ed.), *Prospect for Theology, Essays in Honour of H. H. Farmer* (James Nisbet & Co.).
[2] H. H. Farmer, *The World and God* (Nisbet, 1935), p. 129, cited Ramsey, op. cit., p. 60.
[3] C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality*, Gifford Lectures 1918-19 (Allen & Unwin, 1920).
[4] See Hodges and Allchin, *A Rapture of Praise* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1966).

HISTORY AND THE GOSPEL*

Dennis Nineham

THE choice of my subject was suggested to me during a previous session of Church Assembly in the course of a conversation with a diocesan bishop, who remarked that a number of his younger clergy were rather disturbed by some of the things being said nowadays about the historical authenticity of the Gospels. Since there is evidence that such disquiet is not confined to one diocese or to younger clergy—or indeed to the inferior clergy—and since we have the most explicit evidence that the historical authenticity of the biblical narrative was a matter of great concern to Bishop Gore, I thought it might be proper to use this opportunity, with which the Dean and Chapter have so generously provided me, to treat this subject, or rather to open it up in a preliminary way, which is all that time will allow.

What should be said to those who feel disquiet over this matter? First a word of sympathy and of such encouragement as comes from knowing that their disquiet is widely shared. We all feel some such disquiet. Christians, it seems to me, are bound to experience disquiet of some sort in a situation where they have felt free for centuries to accept the Gospel accounts entirely *au pied de la lettre*, and now find that they can do so no longer, or at any rate that the matter has become problematic.

And let me say at once that I do not claim to know with any certainty or finality how this disquiet is to be resolved—the issues are complex and relatively novel; but of one thing I am sure: the only hopeful way to deal with such disquiet is to have it out into the open and air it, to try to discover its basis, so that we may see how solid it is and what further thinking is needed in relation to it. In that connection we must all be grateful to the authors of the recent Anglican symposium, *Vindications*,[1] for helping to initiate just such open discussion. Anglican contributions to this discussion are especially welcome because I believe there is some truth in the view that the Anglican communion has lagged behind somewhat in this matter; in some other communions lively discussions of this and allied topics, especially in their relation to preaching, have been going on for some time.

But that said, perhaps the first point to make is that here, as always, it is important to read the primary books themselves and not other books about them. Those who feel disquiet about what is being said in certain quarters should make sure to discover for themselves what *is* being said. If they do, they may find that things are not quite as they had supposed. For example, in the symposium referred to just now it is stated, *à propos* a modern book on St Mark's Gospel,[2] that according to it (and I quote) 'virtually no trustworthy historical information can have survived the

* The Charles Gore Memorial Lecture delivered in Westminster Abbey on November 8th 1966 and reproduced by permission of the Dean and Chapter.

period of oral transmission'. When we turn to the book in question we find, under the heading *Historicity of the Gospel*, the following words: 'Whatever qualifications have to be made, the Jesus of Mark, with the language he uses, the traditional parabolic method he employs, the claims he makes, and the hostilities he arouses, is beyond any doubt a figure of early first century Palestine and not an invention of late first century Rome.' And again a little later: 'We can often be virtually sure that what the tradition is offering us are the authentic deeds, and especially the authentic words, of the historic Jesus.'[3] Perhaps that one example will suffice to show the need for accuracy and a sense of proportion in our disquiet. In particular I often find myself being asked whether I should continue to be a Christian if it were conclusively shown that Jesus had never lived. That may well be an important question for the Christian philosopher or even for the dogmatic theologian, but addressed to the New Testament historian it seems to me so wildly beyond the bounds of probability as to be hardly worth exploring (it is rather like being asked what I should do if I discovered that my mother had never existed!). Quite apart from the virtual impossibility of establishing a historical negative, the Christ-myth position, always an eccentric and totally unrepresentative one, is now just not a live option, at any rate in parts of the world where unfettered investigation and discussion of such matters are encouraged. No serious investigator doubts either that Jesus existed or that his life and ministry were—at least in their broadest outlines—somewhat as pictured in the Gospels. Rudolf Bultmann is popularly, if rather unfairly, regarded in this country as the most extreme practitioner of historical scepticism in regard to the Gospels and even he could find enough to say about the life and work of Jesus to justify his devoting a whole book to the subject;[4] and most of his pupils now feel justified in saying much more than he did.

However, so far as the clergy are concerned in their role as preachers, it is usually with individual incidents and details in the Gospels that they have to deal, and here the position is certainly rather different. Again and again we find fairly wide disagreement between Gospel scholars with regard to the historicity, or degree of historicity, of individual Gospel *pericopes*. Even here, however, I should like to plead for the greatest care in making sure we have understood the present position correctly. Some of the essays in *Vindications* once again give currency to a misconception against which R. H. Lightfoot already warned us in 1935 in the preface to his Bampton Lectures. Modern commentators frequently—and in my view rightly—assume that the stories in the Gospels were included there, and have been preserved by the early Church, because they were believed to have some religious or moral lesson to teach or some edification to provide. Accordingly, in the case of each story these commentators seek first to bring out the religious significance the evangelist and his contemporaries saw in it, and that often involves drawing attention to background material from the Old Testament and elsewhere. But to do that carries no implication about historicity, one way or the other. It is one thing to say that a particular story was *preserved* and *presented* because it was seen as teaching a cer-

tain lesson; it is quite another thing to say that it was *invented* on the basis of Old Testament passages or pagan parallels, simply to exemplify or illustrate the lesson in question. I emphasize this point because I believe these two things are widely confused; at least one of the contributors to *Vindications* repeatedly falls victim to this confusion and, indeed, most of his allegations of unnecessary scepticism in the books he criticizes are based on it.[5]

Let us then be sure of our facts, for they will help us to keep a sense of proportion. Now a point of a very different and much wider kind; and I hope I shall not seem ungracious if here again I feel compelled to take issue with some of the contributors to *Vindications*, who seem to me to be fostering a misleadingly limited understanding of our problem. It is, I believe, to distort the situation to attribute all the difficulties in it to a sort of sceptical devil which has got inside one particular group of so-called radical scholars, and to suppose that if we could only exorcize this demon, all major problems on the historical front would disappear. To that extent I want in this lecture to deepen disquiet and to broaden its base by suggesting that—radical scholars or no radical scholars—there are elements inescapably present in our situation which will continue to arouse disquiet until we have seen our way through them. To lay blame on a single group of allegedly radical, or sceptical, scholars, can thus be a way of obscuring the real situation which needs to be faced. Let me try to explain.

It is often suggested (e.g. in *Vindications*) that the trouble lies in what is called 'historical scepticism'. What would those who say this desire to see in its place? Not presumably 'historical credulity'—perhaps they would use some such expression as 'historical realism', or 'a sober historical approach'. What would that consist in? I imagine it would be said: 'in applying the historical method to the Bible in a reasonable way'. And what does that mean? Well, in practice it often seems to mean believing what the biblical text says unless there are quite overwhelming reasons for questioning it. Professor John Knox has noted the frequency with which in writings on the Gospels we meet such expressions as 'there seems no need to doubt what the Evangelist says at this point.' But if this is how theologians understand the application of historical method, it must be said at once that it is not an understanding any competent historian would accept for one moment. The matter seems to me important and I should like to develop it a little. It is, I take it, beyond serious question that in the last two centuries or so Western Europe has been the scene of a cultural revolution—a revolution which has often been described by, among others, C. S. Lewis in his inaugural lecture at Cambridge,[6] where he showed that it quite dwarfs the so-called Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in its scope and implications. Most of us probably think immediately in this connection of the natural sciences, but, in fact, historical science and the transformation that has been produced in historical understanding are probably just as significant, and might, in the long run, prove even more important.

I say so much in order to prepare you for my conviction that the various historical problems which confront theology today are genuinely novel; and that, being part and parcel of an all-embracing and continuing cultural

revolution, they have deep roots and wide ramifications, and so are likely to be with us for a long time, and to involve for their solution a great deal of thinking and re-thinking on many topics. Any suggestion that biblical theology is now 'over the hump' or 'into a post-critical phase' is, I suggest, dangerous nonsense. One of the disturbing but stimulating things the cultural revolution has taught us, or should have taught us, is that there can never be definitive and timeless solutions of intellectual problems in the conditions of historical existence as we know it.

One outcome of the cultural revolution which is important for our subject is that historians have come to adopt a quite new—and still changing—approach to historical documents. No doubt, as Professor Herbert Butterfield insists, the roots of the new attitude go back a long way into the past,[7] but nevertheless he would be the first to allow us, or rather to require us, to see something distinctively, and significantly, novel in the modern historian's approach. Perhaps, at the risk of gross over-simplification—and greatly daring, for I am no historian—I could put it like this:

What any historian is concerned with is past events, but the modern historian emphasizes that once an event is past we can have no *direct* access to it or relationship with it. All we can have are data relating to it. These data may be of many different kinds: words, written or spoken, archaeological remains, later events needing earlier events for their explanation; in fact, vestiges of the past of any and every kind. But whatever they are, the historian insists they are never more than data. A sworn affidavit by an eye-witness of an event, for example, is only a datum; he may be lying or mistaken. A tape-recording of a conversation is only a datum; it may have been doctored or it may not be a recording of the particular conversation it purports to record. Even my own memories of an event at which I was present are only data, and the psychoanalyst is always on hand to remind us what highly selective, and often distorted, data our memories in fact provide.

I emphasize this matter of the status of data because it needs to be grasped before we can understand the historian's procedure in dealing with his data. Just as, in Bacon's phrase, the natural scientist 'puts nature to the question', so a historian puts his data to the question; as Collingwood strikingly expressed it, he 'tortures his evidence', that is to say, he sifts it, analyses it, compares it with all other relevant data, in fact does to it everything he can think of which will make it yield its secret, what it has to disclose about the event to which it relates.

Even were I competent, time would fail me to describe the historian's testing techniques in detail; but for our purposes it is not necessary because I rather *think*—and I speak as a fool—that in the last analysis they amount simply to a sustained and rigorous application of commonsense.

You have all read detective novels, so you know the sort of thing involved. At the beginning, the police detective, or at any rate the local man, gets it all wrong precisely because he fails to 'torture', or test, the clues in the way described. There is the suicide note, there is the gun found beside the dead man with his fingerprints on it; and there is the testimony of several witnesses

that he had been unusually agitated and depressed for some weeks past. Taking all this at its face value, the local man concludes that he is dealing with a straightforward case of suicide. But then along comes Holmes or Poirot, Maigret or Inspector French. He insists on sifting the data minutely; on giving full weight to some small but vital clue which will not fit into the local man's reconstruction; he discovers the relevance as data of facts and events apparently quite unconnected with the case. And as a result of his collecting and thorough 'torturing' of all the relevant evidence, a quite different picture of the original event emerges; it was not a suicide at all, but a murder committed by someone totally outside suspicion on the basis of the data as naïvely defined and accepted by the local man. In practice, we may suspect, life is not often quite so complicated, but the principle stands. Data are nothing more than data. It is only by testing and sifting them in every possible way, and by refusing to take any of them at their face value, that a historian can arrive at a picture which deserves to be called a genuinely historical reconstruction and will win respect from his fellow historians.[8]

To convince you what great significance a modern historian attaches to this, let me quote you some words of R. G. Collingwood about a historian's obligation: 'If anyone else,' he writes, 'no matter who, even a very learned historian, or an eye-witness, or a person in the confidence of the man who did the thing he is inquiring into, or even the man who did it himself, hands him on a plate a ready-made answer to his question, all he can do is to reject it: not because he thinks his informant is trying to deceive him, or is himself deceived, but because if he accepts it he is giving up his autonomy as an historian and allowing someone else to do for him what, if he is a scientific thinker, he can only do for himself' (*The Idea of History*, p. 256).

The historian, then, must apply his tests in all their rigour; but it is important not to misunderstand the nature of those tests. The layman—and in this context theologians are laymen—has often been misled through supposing that the historian's testing techniques are like those of the pathologist in his lab. A historical report is brought in; the relevant tests are applied with clinical objectivity; and in a few days we know whether the event reported was historical or not. Some such conception seriously misled more than one theologian in the nineteenth century. In fact, the historian's procedure amounts, as I put it just now, to a refined, sophisticated and rigorous application of commonsense; that phrase, and the illustration from the detective novel, were designed to bring out the great part played by the subjectivity of the historian in the process. What seems perfect commonsense to one person seems quite otherwise to another. That, of course, is not to deny validity to what the historian does. Attempts are continually being made to refine historical techniques so as to minimize the effects of arbitrary subjectivity; and historians of different views discuss and criticize one another's conclusions. The fact remains, however, and seems likely to remain, that one historian may feel bound to deny a statement in his sources, because perhaps he feels that 'human nature just does not work that way' or 'miracles don't happen', while another historian, after equally rigorous testing, but judging from a different background of experiences and belief, may feel

driven to accept it. And the effectiveness of the check historians exercise on one another's conclusions is limited by the fact that all share largely in the common assumptions of the age to which they belong.

On the basis of his testing a historian may feel justified in forming a picture of what happened, a process sometimes described as 'establishing the facts'. Such a way of referring to it is proper enough provided it is borne in mind that the 'facts' as established by the historian can no more be identified with the original 'event' than the data can. An event is something which can never be compassed in its fullness even by those present when it occurs; and certainly no structure of words, whether those of the historian or his sources, can ever encompass an event. One historian's account will perhaps catch some elements of it, others will be caught in the reconstruction of another; but event and 'facts' remain separate. An event, once it has occurred, does not change, but it is quite otherwise with the so-called 'facts'. Rarely, if ever, do the facts as established by one historian commend themselves in their entirety to all his fellow historians, who insist on reformulating them in an emended version. And even if they should accept them as they stand, in a given instance, we can be quite certain that the facts about the same event as established by historians two centuries hence will look very different in certain respects.

On all this two further points may be made. First, if the account I have given of the historian's procedure is true at all, it is true for all historians and not just for some special radical or sceptical group. Thus, some such picture as I have given emerges, I believe, from the writing of such different historians as Collingwood, Professor Butterfield, and the Frenchman, Marc Bloch.

Secondly, it is important not to draw false conclusions from the distinction between the event and the facts as established by the historian. To insist on their being distinguished is not for a moment to deny that there is often a very close relationship between them. There are cases where the historian is convinced—and justifiably—that the facts as he establishes them correspond very closely with the event. 'We can be sure what happened.' Indeed Father Martin D'Arcy (*The Nature of Belief* and *The Sense of History*, pp. 55-7) argues that there are plenty of cases where the data are so numerous and so consentient, where so many things presuppose by their very existence that a certain event happened in a certain way, that we can properly talk of being certain of that event. Whether philosophers will allow the word 'certainty' in this context I am not sure, but neither they nor any other sane person will entertain the slightest doubt about the occurrence of certain events in the past and their having occurred in a certain way. As examples we might cite the battle of Waterloo or the reign of Queen Victoria; and I suggested just now that the existence of Jesus in first-century Palestine also belongs to this class of events.

Which brings us back to our central subject. The Gospels, whatever else

they may be, are historical documents, so the question arises whether they should be treated exactly as other historical documents are treated by modern historians. Christian opinion, with a few well-defined exceptions, appears to answer in the affirmative; but I sometimes wonder whether some people do not make rather serious mental reservations when they give their answer. If so, it is obviously a fact very germane to the disquiet about which I am speaking, and each of us should get quite clear in his mind where he stands in the matter. I shall say only this. If we do not unreservedly answer 'yes' to the question, then we surely forfeit any right to apply the word 'historical' to the contents of the Gospels; or if we so apply it, it will not be in the sense the word normally bears nowadays. For what the word means, in the sense in which historians respect it, is that the fact to which it is applied has been declared factual on the basis of such rigorous 'torturing' of data as I have been describing.

If, however, we do answer the question with an unqualified affirmative, are we clear what is involved? First of all, it will mean that the Gospels must be regarded as data, data which can never be taken at their face value from the historical point of view, but must be tested with all possible rigour before any picture which deserves to be called 'historical' can be constructed from them. If that were realized, at least one misconception would disappear. It would be recognized that there is nothing specially sceptical about scholars who at the outset refuse to take the Gospel accounts at their face value, but insist on sifting them, raising awkward doubts about them, testing alternative constructions to the ones they directly suggest, and so on. In one sense, of course, this is sceptical, but then, as we have seen, at the first move the historian is *paid* to doubt—a controlled and reasonable initial scepticism is one of the most essential tools of his trade. He is only sceptical in any blameworthy sense if, after completing a reasonable process of testing, he always unreasonably refuses, like the famous Oxford don, 'to take "yes" for an answer'.

A second conclusion follows; or perhaps I am just restating what I have been saying in other words. No one can have the right, whether in the pulpit or in his own mind, to call his picture of a Gospel incident or saying 'historical' unless he has satisfied himself that a rigorous testing of all the relevant data has taken place and that his reconstruction is validly based upon it. At that point we are all, I suspect, sometimes tempted to give the Gospel accounts the benefit of the doubt, or perhaps I should say to give *ourselves* the benefit of the doubt. Even to work through the tests carried out by others and to assess their various conclusions, to say nothing of doing it for ourselves, involves so much labour that we are apt to say: 'After all, it is the Bible which is speaking, I will trust it as it stands.' As I shall show later, I think in certain contexts such words may be fully justified, but at the moment we must recognize that we cannot use them and at the same time claim a historical basis for our account of a Gospel incident. Maybe when you take this line you have some vague notion of biblical inspiration at the back of your mind. If so, bring it to the front of your mind and I think you will find it cannot do what you are asking it to do. Or perhaps on such

occasions you say to yourself: 'The Apostles and their followers were holy men; they would never have made up stories about our Lord which they knew to be false, so we can safely believe what they say.' As part of a general argument for the fact of our Lord's existence and his *general* likeness to the Gospel picture of him, some such argument may have considerable force; but when we are discussing the historicity of individual stories and details in them, it will not take us very far. Whatever the precise rights and wrongs of form-criticism may be, it is now generally agreed that at any rate many of the traditions found in the Gospels had a considerable pre-history before the Evangelists wrote them down. They were passed from person to person by word of mouth, often in a context of public speaking and preaching where they were being used to teach a lesson or make a point. There is a good deal of evidence that when they changed hands they were liable to be modified in greater or less degree; indeed, we can now put it like this: those who handled the tradition, so far as their moulding of it was governed by historical considerations at all, were in their way historians; each received data from some fellow Christian and on the basis of it he constructed his picture of what had happened, until at the end of the process the Evangelists committed their reconstructions to paper in the late first and early second centuries. We have already seen that one century's understanding of an historical event never commends itself in its entirety to the historians of the next century, so we should hardly expect the picture presented by the Evangelists to approve itself in its entirety to us, seventeen or eighteen centuries later.

You may feel that all this is obvious to the point of platitude. If so, all to the good—there will be no danger of your supposing that it represents the view of some small radical minority among historical theologians. It certainly does not; much of what I have been saying is said in a not dissimilar way, for example, in the excellent, though professedly rather conservative, book on our subject, published not long ago by Professor H. E. W. Turner of Durham.[9] I venture to repeat it because I am not at all sure that we have yet really taken it into our systems. If we had, it would surely have driven out some of our disquiet, or at any rate transformed it into something from which we could profit and learn.

If you want to get it into your system, the only way is to try it out in practice. Take specific Gospel passages and follow in detail as the various scholars who have written on them 'torture' the data. See *in detail* how they arrive at their sometimes rather different reconstructions. Anyone who does that will discover that, though sometimes different reconstructions simply rest back on the different assumptions of the scholars in question about general matters of principle, very often they do not. They are due to different ways of defining and testing the data, to the different data which seem relevant to the various scholars; to the different questions it has occurred to them to ask and the way they answer them; and to the different weight they attach to the questions they ask in common. In detective novels the reader is left in no doubt at the end which is the best reconstruction of the crime, but there the detective novel is not necessarily a good analogy. Imagine a novel in which Poirot and Miss Marple both play leading parts and at the

end each advances a characteristically brilliant and cogent reconstruction of the crime which, however, is incompatible with that advanced by the other! Every serious student of the Gospels knows this type of situation. Sometimes he may be convinced that A's reconstruction is distinctly more likely than B's, but he will nevertheless have to admit that B's picture also has elements of probability and cannot summarily be dismissed as impossible.

A somewhat similar situation can arise when the evidence is too scanty to allow of a firm verdict from anyone. In criminal investigations it often happens that the police find some clues as to what happened but they are too scanty and disconnected to provide the basis for an arrest and conviction; and no witnesses are forthcoming. The police may 'have their suspicions', but the clues are just not sufficient to justify a verdict one way or the other, so no case is brought. A comparable situation frequently arises for the historian. Data perhaps exist, which, taken at their face value, would suggest that an event of a certain sort occurred in a certain way. But they are very scanty and no other evidence is at present forthcoming to provide a basis for testing them, so the historian can only return a verdict of non-proven, or better still perhaps refrain from raising the question of historicity at all. The historian, writes Collingwood, should not raise historical questions unless 'he has already in his mind a preliminary and tentative idea of the evidence he will be able to use . . . To ask questions which you see no prospect of answering is the fundamental sin' (*The Idea of History*, p. 281).

It so happens that the Gospel material not infrequently gives rise to this sort of situation. Often it rests, in the last resort, on a single tradition, and we have not as yet data from outside to help us in assessing it. That does not, of course, prove it unhistorical or even prevent us from *suspecting* that it may be authentic, but it makes difficult any claim to historicity in the strict sense of the word. In such cases we do well to heed Collingwood's warning, and some of us can remember how R. H. Lightfoot was often to be heard lamenting that New Testament scholars 'are "so hot for certainties"; if only they would sometimes say, "we simply do not know" '.

What it comes to is that when we get down to the detailed, individual narratives in the Gospels, the facts can often be established only with relative probability, if at all. This is no reflection whatever on the Evangelists or their sources. They hailed from a period, and a comparatively unlettered community, which knew not the modern historian, and their concerns and purposes were in some respects very different from his.

But what of us, who share the modern historian's standards and attitudes? It is here that the rub comes. We have all been told times without number that 'Christianity is a historical religion' and that 'the revelation was given not through propositions but through events'. Yet now we are being told that these events are just what we cannot have; the most we can have are facts, facts established with a greater, or sometimes less, degree of probability. It is to the event that authority attaches, and if we cannot possess the event, are not our faith and preaching deprived of authority? Here it seems to me are questions far more taxing and significant than the alleged scepticism of one small group of New Testament scholars.

Solutions to this problem have been sought, along very different lines. Among our fellow Christians on the continent who have studied the question most intensely, one group, as you will know, is convinced that the authority of our preaching is not affected one whit. For they hold—on quite other grounds—that the only proper basis for preaching is not the Jesus of history but the Christ of faith, the Christ of the Christian *kerygma*; *he* is the one through whom God speaks and draws near to men in judgement and in blessing, and the demand is that we accept or reject him as he is proclaimed to us; *he* is God's word to man and it makes no difference what earthly events entered into the making of his picture; decision about him is a matter for faith, and historicity would not add one cubit to his stature.

I wish I had time to expound this position to you at length, for I believe there is more in it, and more to be learned from it, than is commonly recognized in this country; it cannot be dismissed as lightly as Professor Turner, for example, dismisses it. But I have no time, especially as I could not in the end commend it for your acceptance in anything like its full-blown form.

In this country, on the other hand, so far as our problem has been discussed, the general conclusion has been that we must confine our preaching to those elements in the Gospels that can be established as historical with reasonable assurance.

For those who advocate some such view the present time is propitious. Scholars of very different sorts are increasingly agreed, not only about the fact of Jesus' existence but about the nature of his person and claims. With surprising unanimity, there comes from the pens of scholars in England, Germany, and America an argument which runs something like this: None of the gospels provides a photograph, and the portraits in the various Gospels, and principal Gospel sources, differ a good deal. Nevertheless, these very differences, when combined with certain striking similarities, are of a kind which suggest a single figure, a single sitter of whom they *are* all portraits. And by studying minutely the technique and style of each portrait and the kind of impression it was intended to give, you can begin to build up a picture of the sitter in considerable detail.

In just how much detail is a matter of dispute, but so far as the reconstructions of the various scholars go, they are notably similar. Some, it is true, doubt if Jesus actually claimed, or used, messianic titles of any sort, but they agree that he did what amounts virtually to the same thing, claimed to speak and act directly in God's name. As one German scholar who takes this position puts it, 'His attitude is not that of a prophet or a sage; it is that of a man who dares to act in God's place.'[10] He claimed that people's relationship with God was essentially bound up with their relationship to him. His unconditional promise of love and acceptance was in fact God's promise made through him; and to accept his promise and follow him was already to be at one with God and to partake of God's kingdom.

Many people who cannot accept the non-historical position I mentioned just now are content with this; it satisfies their deep sense that he who demanded righteousness must have been himself the righteous one, that he

who demanded faith must have lived the life of faith, that he who promised resurrection must have died and been raised from the dead; in short, that the word must have become real flesh in a genuinely human life and death.

It will be obvious, I hope, that nothing I have said this afternoon rules out of court either this picture, or the process by which it is being built up. It is in fact the result of extremely acute and detailed work on the part of scholars who accept, and put into practice, all that I have been saying about historical method. Obviously, we must not exaggerate the unanimity of their conclusions, but with a lot that many of them say, and their reasons for saying it, I myself have considerable sympathy.

Nevertheless, it would be possible to pin one's faith to this reconstruction in the wrong sort of way. In the first place I must remind you that, however great the skill and scholarship that have gone into it, this reconstruction can provide us only with facts and not with the event itself. That means, as we have seen, that future generations are sure to want to restate these facts; and it is perhaps already possible to detect certain hair cracks in the structure of the current reconstruction which may indicate where parts will break off, so that the whole will have to be remodelled by our successors.

Secondly, if we attribute too vital a position to this reconstruction, is there not a danger that we shall lose our disinterestedness and objectivity in deciding what Gospel material can properly be brought within the scope of it?

And thirdly, I suggest that if we concentrate exclusively on this reconstruction, we shall involve ourselves in an unnecessary and impoverishing self-denying ordinance with regard to those elements in the Gospels which cannot be built into the reconstruction.

Where, then, do I stand? A great deal depends, it seems to me, on the perspective from which we view our problem, and I should like to conclude by suggesting a possible perspective to you.

To be a Christian is to be a member of the Church.

No one joins the Church, or at any rate no one remains a member of it, unless he finds in it, in large measure, what it claims to possess, peace and communion with God, community with one's fellows, the power to serve the world and the other elements of Christian faith and experience.

Anyone who does find those things in the Church—any Christian—knows that the Church must be a community created by God. Which is to say that whatever exactly the events may have been through which the Church came into being, God was active in them. Now, as we have seen, it is as nearly certain as any historical fact can be, that the events in which the Church originated were the life and activity of Jesus; so the Christian can be quite sure that in Jesus God was at work producing the community in and through which salvation should be available. Nothing the historian may show in detail can shake that conviction. Probably we shall not want to go all the way with Kierkegaard, but from this perspective we can at least see the truth he was trying to express in his famous dictum, 'The historical fact that God has been in human form is the essence of the matter; the rest of the historical detail is not . . . important. If the contemporary generation had left nothing behind them but these words: "we have believed that in such and such a year

the God appeared among us in the humble figure of a servant, that he lived and taught in our community and finally died", it would be more than enough' (*Philosophical Fragments*[2], p. 130).

No doubt there is deliberate paradox in Kierkegaard's words, and certainly no modern Christian can leave it at that. In a historically-minded age to do so would compromise our integrity and would invite misunderstanding from our contemporaries; and also, of course, it has always been a conviction in the Church that a knowledge of the original Christian event affords help and strength of many kinds for faith and life in the present.

However, as soon as we begin to investigate the event in detail, we are brought up against the fact that Jesus himself left no writings or other direct historical traces that have survived. Historically, we can know him only as he is mirrored in the response of his earliest followers to him, as that response is preserved for us in the New Testament and other early Christian writings.

Their response to him took many forms; one, for example, was the furious theological activity we find in Paul's epistles, but another was the telling of stories about the days of his flesh. The application of modern historical methods to these stories suggests that some of them may be inauthentic, in whole or part, and forces us to admit that about the authenticity of some others we have no means of deciding. But the point is that, wholly authentic or not, they are *part* of the earliest Christians' response and they are *evidence for* that response. We have only to ask how any inauthentic elements in these stories arose to realize that we are not dealing with any conscious attempt to deceive, indeed we are not dealing with any *conscious* process at all, but with an unselfconscious and entirely innocent (corporate) attempt by the early Christians to express something of the magnitude and significance of what they had experienced—in the earthly Jesus and no doubt in the heavenly Christ as well. If you suspect, for example, that the Virgin-birth stories are not wholly authentic, you can still see how they grew up in order to express the conviction of Jesus' followers that his fully human activity had been of more than natural origin, that God's initiative had lain behind it and God had been uniquely active in it.

It is this character of these stories as part of the earliest disciples' response to what had happened that we need to grasp; and I believe that if we could look at them from that perspective, we could be more relaxed about them and they would reveal profound truth we are at present missing. For while we ply them incessantly with historical questions and try so insistently to prove that this or that trait *could* have had its original in the lifetime of Jesus, we often miss truths which would become clear if once we related some of them to the period after Jesus and saw them as part of the response to him. If we were thus relaxed, perhaps we could sometimes let go the historian's hand and call in the psychologist, the poet, and the literary critic, who could help us to unpack the profound truth—often layer after layer of it—which stories of this sort can yield.

And this would be no 'flight from history', for what we should be unpacking would be the full depths of the response which Jesus, the event of Jesus,

evoked both during and after the days of his flesh. The real grounding of the truth of his resurrection lies here.

May we not even say that this response of the disciples was part of the saving event itself in which God was active? Dr John Knox has argued powerfully that it was, and certainly it seems awkward to define the saving event as the life and activity of Jesus in artificial abstraction from the effect they had on those who witnessed them. It is no argument against God's having had a hand in the disciples' response that it involved the telling of stories not entirely accurate by twentieth-century standards, or even that it included moral and religious elements which do not commend themselves to the mature judgement of the Church. We know, in any case, that God was content to entrust the treasure to earthen vessels.

In the field of Old Testament studies Dr James Barr has recently been warning us against the dangers of over-exclusive emphasis on historical categories[11], and I am wanting to say something comparable about the Gospels. Let me emphasize that I am *not* denying that many of the Gospel stories may be substantially accurate and that this is important; but whatever the meaning and truth of the slogan that 'Christianity is a historical religion', it clearly does not preclude God's having used as *one* medium of revelation stories about his Son which may in a vital sense have been 'true' without being historically accurate.

I am not at all sure that my general position need involve this last suggestion about the response of the disciples being itself part of the saving event, and I know that if such a suggestion were accepted several important Christian doctrines would need to have their traditional shape recast. I am also aware that some scholars doubt if this could be done without vital things being lost, and indeed that they are unhappy about some aspects of the position I have been describing on other grounds. What I plead is that such scholars should formulate their doubts with all possible accuracy and precision so that the dialogue may go on from there. For only by such continuing dialogue can our disquiet on this score be creatively resolved, as opposed to being suppressed. And whatever may be true in other realms, in this one repression is of the devil.

[1] Ed. Anthony Hanson, S.C.M. Press, 1966.
[2] *St. Mark*. Ed. D. E. Nineham, Pelican Gospel Commentaries, 1963.
[3] pp. 50-51.
[4] E.T. *Jesus and the Word*, Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1935.
[5] In my contribution to the forthcoming *Festschrift* for Professor John Knox I have examined in detail Professor Anthony Hanson's essay in *Vindications* and given my reasons for thinking that he rather seriously misconceived the views he criticizes.
[6] Now printed in *They Asked for a Paper* (1962), pp. 9-25.
[7] See, e.g., his *Christianity and History* (1949), p. 12.
[8] For the significance in this connexion of the differences in method between Holmes and Poirot, see Collingwood, op. cit., p. 281.
[9] *Historicity and the Gospels*, Mowbray, 1963.
[10] E. Fuchs in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1956, p. 229. See for example his *Criticism and Faith*, p. 32, or his *The Church and the Reality of Christ*, pp. 9ff.
[11] Cf. his book *Old and New in Interpretation* (1966).

JESUS AND THE CHURCH IN ST JOHN'S GOSPEL*

Kenneth Grayston

THE question from which this enquiry begins is whether Christ is Lord over the Church or one with the Church. You will no doubt feel that it is unfortunate to choose one answer rather than the other. They are not exclusive answers. Is it not true that the New Testament contains statements which lead us to say both one and the other—that he is Lord over the Church and also one with the Church?

It is indeed true, and the purpose of this lecture is to throw some light, if possible, on these two different ways of describing the relation of Christ to the Church. Even though in theory we hold them together, in practice we rely more on one than on the other. In the great central tradition of Protestant teaching we are accustomed to stress Christ's Lordship over his Church. Whatever worth the Church may possess, the real authority lies with Christ. However many benefits he may confer upon his Church, he does not delegate his authority, but retains it for himself alone and exercises it with complete freedom in judgement and salvation. If we press this view, we find ourselves agreeing with Calvin that the Church is a concession to human weakness. He begins the fourth book of *The Institutes of the Christian Religion* with a reminder that 'by the faith of the gospel Christ becomes ours, and we are made partakers of the salvation and eternal blessedness procured by him'. And then he continues, 'But as our ignorance and sloth (I may add, the vanity of our mind) stand in need of external helps, by which faith may be begotten in us, and may increase and make progress until its consummation, God in accommodation to our infirmity has added such helps, and secured the effectual preaching of the gospel, by depositing this treasure with the Church' (IV.i.1). No one could have insisted more strongly than Calvin that we have a perpetual obligation to hold to the Church; but this way of looking at it sets a particular stamp on our Protestant way of being Christian.

The Catholic tradition on the other hand—and I use Catholic in a wider sense than Roman Catholic—has relied much more on Christ's oneness with the Church. It is this conviction, developed from careful study of the New Testament, that runs through every part of a book which the present Archbishop of Canterbury wrote in 1936 when he was a theological college teacher. It was called *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* and numerous quotations would serve my purpose. Here are two. In commenting on a passage from St Paul (2 Cor. 5:14–17) the author says: 'The implication of this passage is far-reaching. Christ is here defined not as the isolated figure of Galilee and Judaea but as one whose people, dead and risen with Him,

* The Smyth Lecture for 1966, given at Magee Theological College, Londonderry.

are His own humanity. The fact of Christ includes the fact of the Church' (p. 33 f). And a little later, 'the Body is the fulness of Christ, and the history of the Church and the lives of the saints are the acts of the biography of the Messiah' (p. 35 f.). Presumably it is the same point which lies behind the description of the Church—once so favoured by Anglicans, though to me personally rather repugnant—as 'the extension of the incarnation'. And it was from this position, quite naturally, that Dr Ramsey could continue so as to establish the Catholic doctrine of ministry, sacraments, and unity. If too great an emphasis on Christ's Lordship over the Church seems to endanger the Church's existence, the opposite danger arises from an exclusive concentration on Christ's identity with the Church. It can too easily be said that the Church *is* Christ so that there is no appeal from the Church to Christ and no judgement of the Church by Christ. It is certainly not the intention of theologians in the Catholic tradition to bring us to this position, but this is certainly the image of Catholic teaching that has often been projected.

It ought to be possible to obtain some help on this problem by looking again at passages in the New Testament where the two different types of statement are made. In recent years there have been several attempts to bring New Testament teaching about the Church into a coherent whole. In 1961, Professor Paul Minear of Yale published a book called *Images of the Church in the New Testament* (Lutterworth Press) in which he examined the four master images, as he called them, by which the Church is set forth: the people of God, the new creation, the fellowship in faith, and the body of Christ. He argues that these four different ways of perceiving the Church have an effectiveness when used together that is destroyed when we rely on one alone. I believe there is much to be said for this argument, and that we can profit from Professor Minear's subtle discussion of the ways in which diverse images must be held together in religious thinking. At one point he takes issue with certain conclusions drawn by Dr Ernest Best in a book called *One Body in Christ*, published in 1955 when he was minister of Caledon and Minterburn Presbyterian Churches. This is an important study of the relation between Christ and the Church in St Paul's epistles and leads in the end to the conclusion that the Church is to be defined as a fellowship and that Christ works in the world through Christians rather than through the Church. Yet, Dr Best adds, 'the individual has no existence apart from the whole, nor has the whole apart from the individual; in other phrasing, the Church is neither logically prior to the Christian nor the Christian to the Church' (p. 201).

To me that sounds very difficult, and I have a feeling that the matter ought to be simpler than either Dr Best or Dr Minear have suggested. I will therefore put before you a much simpler proposal about the New Testament teaching: namely, that when the Church is under pressure from *outside*, Christ is said to be Lord over the Church; and when the Church is under pressure from *inside*, Christ is said to be one with the Church. I think I could demonstrate this to you from the Pauline Epistles, but it would take rather a long time and we should have to move with agility from one Epistle to another. Instead, therefore, I shall confine myself to St John's Gospel in

the hope that a short survey will demonstrate the truth of my contention.

Even so, it will not be possible to discuss the whole Gospel but only that part in which Christ's relation to his disciples is most easily discovered. I refer to two large sections: first, chapters 5–12 which have a background of Jewish hostility and would be particularly instructive to a church under external attack; and second, chapters 13–17 where Jewish hostility disappears from view and the discourses are concerned with the internal problems of Christ's followers. The Passion Narrative calls for separate treatment and is excluded from the present discussion. The two earliest sections of the Gospel have each a rather special purpose.

In the Prologue (1 : 1–18), the Logos is the life and light of all men. When he came to humanity he was rejected even though some accepted him and received the power to become what he is—they saw his glory and shared his fullness. The purpose of this section is to relate Jesus and those who are his to the totality of mankind. This is a very important theme and has a bearing on the hostility of the world to the Church as St John later describes it; but it does not directly help us to study the relation between Christ and the Church.

The next section, which extends from 1 : 19 to 4 : 54, is clearly intended to set the historical scene. It begins with John the Baptist's negative testimony to himself in reply to priests and Pharisees (1 : 19–23, 24–28), and then his positive testimony to Jesus (1 : 29–34). He points to Jesus as the Lamb of God and the Son of God, and thus enables some of his own disciples to recognize Jesus as Messiah (1 : 35–42). Then Jesus moves to Galilee to recruit more disciples, and the recognition widens when Nathanael greets him as Son of God and King of Israel (1 : 43-51). We are beginning to learn that a disciple is one who has been given the ability to say who Jesus is, even though he does not really understand what he is saying. If that sounds surprising, and to some ears hypocritical, we should reflect on what happens when people become Christians. Very often they pledge their loyalty to Jesus as their Lord and Saviour without having any clear idea what they mean, lacking any ability to put into other words what these very complex titles might convey. Indeed, how could they? It is only as they live with Jesus and his other disciples that they will discover how much their first confession includes. So also in the Fourth Gospel, the disciples are present when water becomes wine at Cana, when Jesus manifests his glory and they believe on him (2 : 1–12). When Jesus returns to Jerusalem, they observe his astonishing actions in the Temple and are provided with the clue that will enable them to understand when he has been raised from the dead (2 : 13–22). At this stage the disciples are what their name really means: observers and learners. In a short while the Gospel will demonstrate how much they need to learn, but first they are contrasted with the devout Pharisee Nicodemus who, despite his best intentions, is quite unable to learn (2 : 23 – 3 : 21). You will remember that he appears twice more in the Gospel, once proposing that Jesus should have a fair hearing (7 : 50) and once contributing spices for his burial (19 : 39)—a notable example of Johannine irony! After the conversation with Nicodemus they are contrasted with the disciples of

John the Baptist, the leader of a movement whose end is already in sight (3:22–26); whereas, in following Jesus, they belong to a movement whose future is wholly unknown. Jesus seriously meant what he said when he gave them the invitation, 'Come and see' (1:39). It is notable that this whole section from 1:19 – 4:54 lacks any suggestion of hostility to Jesus; in fact, it ends with stories in which Jesus is welcomed by the Samaritans of all people, and by the Galileans. In the Samaritan story (4:1–42), which presumably was the nearest analogy in the earthly life of Jesus to the early Christian mission among non-Jews, we find the disciples learning by experience what was involved in serving Jesus—such lessons as the need to break conventions that separate races and religions, the discovery that obedience to God keeps men going when there is no other support, and the gift of success when you have done nothing to prepare it. In the final, Galilean story (4:43–54) the disciples are not mentioned at all when Jesus responds to the appeal of an officer in the royal service on behalf of his dying son. Yet I am inclined to think that here too we have an illustration of what learning to be a disciple may involve. When Jesus answered the distraught father with the promise, 'Go; your son will live', St John comments, 'The man believed the word that Jesus spoke to him and went his way'; but later, when the father had discovered the coincidence between Jesus' promise and the beginning of his son's recovery, we are told that 'he himself believed, and all his household'. What began with the bare acceptance of a promise on the authority of Jesus alone, becomes by experience the richer, corporate faith of discipleship.

As you see, I suggest that this early section of the Gospel portrays Jesus in the role of teacher and his followers in the role of learners. It is concerned, quite naturally, with the beginnings of discipleship, whereas the two great sections that follow show us the two situations that arise when discipleship is well-established—the situation of external hostility and the situation of internal disruption.

I propose to deal now with chapters 5–12 which are marked throughout by Jewish hostility. *In chapter 5*, we have the healing of a cripple at the pool of Bethesda on the Sabbath. Because of this, Jesus is accused of breaking God's law and of making himself equal with God (5:18). There follows a great trial scene, and it is perhaps worth remarking that this has some bearing on St John's Passion Narrative. It is well known that he omits the trial before the Sanhedrin which is found in the Synoptic Gospels and merely recounts a private questioning by Annas about his disciples and his teaching. But, of course, Jesus had long been on trial before the Jewish authorities; the real issues had already been defined and settled before his arrest. In chapter 5 he defends himself against the accusations and calls his three witnesses—John the Baptist, the works which the Father has granted him to accomplish, and then Moses and the law which is the very voice of God (5:30–47). When Jesus presents his answer to the charges it is noteworthy that the dominant word is *life*:

> 'As the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom he will' (5:21).

'Truly, truly, I say to you, he who hears my word and believes him who sent me has eternal life; he does not come into judgement but has passed from death to life' (5:24).

'Truly, truly, I say to you, the hour is coming and now is, when the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear will live' (5:25).

'For as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself' (5:26). Cf. also 5:29, 39, 40.

Here is the statement of central importance. It is wholly characteristic of God, and of God alone, that he has life in himself. He is self-existent, dependent for his being on no one and nothing. We, on the other hand, are dependent creatures, deriving our existence from others, relying for our life on sources outside ourselves. Now, the Son has been granted to have life in himself, and this inherent life separates him from all others. In this great trial scene he proclaims himself the Lord and Lifegiver.

Let us turn to consider chapter 6. In a sense this is an interruption of the great flow of thought which properly continues in chapters 7–10. At this point St John inserts two pieces of traditional material, the Feeding of the Five Thousand and the Walking on the Water, which are also placed together in the earlier Gospel of St Mark. Nothing more is said explicitly about the sea-story, though its most remarkable feature is taken up in the long discourse that supplements the feeding-story. When Jesus, walking on the water, approaches the terrified disciples in the boat, he discloses himself to them with the words 'EGO EIMI; be not afraid' (6:20). Now EGO EIMI can be translated in the usual way as 'it is I'. Even the New English Bible does so, though nobody can pretend that this is English; the only correct translation, on this level, would be 'it's me'. Perhaps there is no more to it than that: Jesus simply meant, 'Don't be frightened; it's only me.' But it ought to be noticed that 'Be not afraid' is a frequent disclosure formula in the Old Testament when the divine being makes himself known to men and graciously releases them from their dread when they encounter God. Moreover, the Greek Old Testament uses the words EGO EIMI to translate the Hebrew *'ani hu* with which the divine being identifies himself when he begins to speak, as for instance in Isa. 44:6:

I AM the first and I AM the last;
beside me there is no god.

Anyone who knows the Greek Old Testament, when he hears the reassuring words of Jesus to the men in the boat, must surely find a deeper resonance in them than is contained in the usual translation. Indeed, it is not easy to find an adequate translation—though I suggest 'I AM here; be not afraid.' But whatever the precise intention of this saying in the sea-story, it is taken up and developed in the first of the I AM sayings, in the discourse on the feeding: 'I AM the bread of life' (6:35; cf. 6:41, 48, 51). At two points in the discourse a contrast is made with the manna by which God, through the agency of Moses, fed the Israelites in the wilderness (6:30–34, 49–50); and this explains why St John sees fit to insert chapter 6 immediately after the trial discourse of chapter 5. The works of Jesus are greater than those

of Moses, and this is therefore good evidence to refute the charges brought against him. It is also worth noting how Jesus and Moses are distinguished. Moses was the agent through whom God's gift of manna was presented to the Israelites; Jesus himself *is* God's gift of life to the world.

The discourse of chapter 6 also serves another purpose. In verses 53–58 the language of *abiding* makes its appearance, anticipating its later use, especially in chapter 15. 'He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me, and I in him' (6:56). If I may turn the argument of verse 53 the other way round, and paraphrase it, the only way to have life in yourself is to eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood—that is, you are to be identified with Jesus in his dying and rising again. But this identification is rejected, says St John, by many of the disciples who hear Jesus (6:60) and many consequently desert him (6:66). Only the twelve remain with him—and promptly we have the first, ominous mention of Judas (6:71) whose significance becomes plain in chapters 13–17 where the internal disruption of the body of disciples is in view. But the ending of chapter 6 throws all the rest into relief, and we see how Jesus is separated from or over against his disciples.

As I have already said, the basic argument of chapter 5 is continued in chapters 7–10. They comprise a long dispute whether Jesus or his opponents are the true interpreters of Moses. So, in chapter 7, Jesus says:

> ' "Did not Moses give you the law? Yet none of you keeps the law. Why do you seek to kill me?" The people answered, "You have a demon! Who is seeking to kill you?" Jesus answered them, "I did one deed and you all marvel at it. Moses gave you circumcision (not that it is from Moses, but from the fathers), and you circumcise a man upon the sabbath. If on the sabbath a man receives circumcision, so that the law of Moses may not be broken, are you angry with me, because on the sabbath I made a man's whole body well?" ' (7:19–23).

In chapter 8 he is charged with being a Samaritan heretical interpreter of Moses: 'Are we not right in saying that you are a Samaritan and have a demon?' (8:48). And again, in chapter 9, the Jewish authorities contemptuously say to the blind man who has recovered his sight: 'You are his disciple, but we are disciples of Moses. We know that God has spoken to Moses, but as for this man, we do not know where he comes from' (9:28–29). Incidentally, it is worth remarking that the story of the woman taken in adultery which seems to be an intrusion at the end of chapter 7 (7:53 – 8:11) and must be excluded from the earliest form of the Gospel on strong textual grounds, is also a dispute about the proper interpretation of the law of Moses. No doubt for this reason it found its present place in the majority of manuscripts.

In responding to this hostility, Jesus goes back even beyond Moses to Abraham, and cuts short the debate with the overwhelming assertion: 'Before Abraham came to be, I AM' (8:58). But a great deal of the discourse, including the healing and the parables that illustrate it, are devoted to the relation between Jesus and Moses. In chapters 7–10, the question that everyone is asking is, 'Who is this person Jesus?' Was he a good man or a false

leader (7:12)? the expected prophet, or the Messiah? (7:40–41). And the questioners are invited to begin, not with these guesses, but with the traditional offices of Moses and then to see how far their thoughts will go in understanding Jesus. So, in chapter 7, Jesus begins, one supposes, with the water-pouring ritual of Tabernacles, and discloses himself as the water-bringer (7:37–39). Whereas Moses brought water from the rock, Jesus is the new and greater Moses because, as he said, 'He who believes in me . . . out of his heart shall flow rivers of living water.' Whereas the followers of Moses were always dependent on an external supply of water, the followers of Jesus would receive an inner source of living water. And then, taking no doubt his cue from the ceremony of lights, Jesus discloses himself as the light-bringer: 'I AM the light of the world' (8:12). Just as the law which Moses brought down from Sinai is a 'light unto my path' (Ps. 119:105), the illumination which Jesus brings declares him a greater than Moses since Jesus himself *is* the light.

That Jesus does indeed bring illumination is shown by the story of the man born blind, whose recovery of sight is told with splendid subtlety. In the actual ministry of Jesus, this man blind from birth stands as a prototype of the Gentile who is not born into a community possessing the illumination of the Mosaic law. The story answers the Jewish question, 'Does he intend to go to the Dispersion among the Greeks and teach the Greeks?' (7:35), and anticipates the request of some Greeks who went up to worship at the Passover, and said to Philip, 'Sir, we wish to see Jesus' (12:20–21). It is important to realize that the story is told in such a way as to make it plain that we are not learning about a mere miracle, however astonishing —indeed, it raises the question whether there can be such a thing as a mere miracle. We are learning how *belief* is produced. That is the kind of illumination the story displays. There is a double process out of which belief emerges: first, the giving of sight when it did not exist before, and second, the self-disclosure of Jesus (9:35–38).

Closely linked with this story is the imagery of the Shepherd and the Flock (10:1–18, with 10:19–20 making the link). I shall set on one side the three verses 7–9 which contain the saying 'I AM the door', since it is not easy to know whether they indicate the door *to* the sheep or the door *for* the sheep or, indeed, both. For our present purpose it will be sufficient to regard them as an anticipation of the saying 'I AM the way' which belongs to a later section. But the saying 'I AM the good shepherd' (10:11, 14) presents no such problems. It is plainly derived from the imagery of the true and false shepherds in Ezek. 34, which itself refers back to the shepherd-king David, and appears in Jewish tradition (including Isa. 63:11 LXX) as a description of Moses. Two comments only are needed: in Ezekiel, God says, 'I myself will be the shepherd of my sheep' (Ezek. 34:15); and this image sharply distinguishes and separates Jesus from the flock.

In the long narrative of the raising of Lazarus (chapter 11), the theme of chapter 5 once more appears. The words of Jesus that 'the hour is coming, and now is, when the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear will live' are vindicated. Jesus is truly the life-giver. 'I AM the re-

surrection' (11:25). He possesses inherent life, and thereby is set over against the disciple who is brought from death to life. The Lordship of Christ is then dramatized in the triumphal entry of Israel's King (12:12–16), and by the request of the Greeks to see Jesus, to answer which request the Lifegiver declares himself willing to die (12:20–26).

In this whole section, chapters 5–12, the emphasis falls on the Lordship of Jesus, his separation and distinction from others, including his disciples and those who show such hostility to him. Throughout the section, in every chapter, the word that describes the attitude of disciples to Jesus is the verb *to believe, to have faith.* The language of faith is not abandoned in the following section, but it is far less frequent and significant; it is supplemented and partly replaced by the language of *abiding.*

So finally I turn to chapters 13–17 where the hatred of the Jews disappears. Instead the *kosmos,* the world, represents the hostile situation in which the body of disciples is set, and the chief interest is fixed on problems *within* the group. In the forefront stands the departure of Judas into the world to betray Jesus:

> 'The devil had already put it into the heart of Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, to betray him' (13:2). 'Jesus said . . . "you are clean, but not all of you". For he knew who was to betray him' (13:10–11).

Then follows his open statement at supper that 'one of you will betray me', the attempt to discern the betrayer and his reply, 'It is he to whom I shall give this morsel when I have dipped it'. So when he had dipped the morsel, he gave it to Judas, the son of Simon Iscariot. Then after the morsel, Satan entered into him. Jesus said to him, "What you are going to do, do quickly." . . . So, after receiving the morsel, he immediately went out; and it was night.' The extinction of the light was not caused by hostility from outside, by external attack (or even by external need, such as the desire of the Gentiles), but by internal betrayal. Thus the problem to be dealt with is the destruction of the group from within—and this no doubt explains the exclusive note in these chapters. It has often been noticed that the Johannine doctrine of Christian love seems narrower than the love of enemies taught in the Synoptic Gospels; for the Fourth Gospel Jesus says, ' "Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" ' (15:13). In the Great Prayer of chapter 17, Jesus says, ' "I am not praying for the world but for those whom thou hast given me" ' (17:9), and this seems too limited an object of Christ's intercession. This judgement cannot be denied, but I think it is largely explained by the dominant concern of these chapters with the internal disruption of the Church.

The action of Judas stands in the forefront, but not alone. Other disciples are sharply characterized, and every mention of them highlights their inadequacy. Peter displays his absurd self-confidence—' "You shall never wash my feet",' he says (13:8), and later, still contradicting his Teacher and Lord, says, ' "Lord, why cannot I follow you *now*? I will lay down my life for you" ' (13.37). Thomas admits, ' "Lord, we do not know where you are going; how can we know the way?" ' (14:5). Philip naïvely exposes his confusion in saying, ' "Lord, show us the Father and we shall be satisfied" ' (14:8). As

a body the disciples are unenlightened and overconfident (16:17–18, 29–32). One might suppose that this dismal portrait of a weak, corrupted Church would strengthen even more the Lordship of Christ; but the very opposite is true. There is only one action in the whole section, and it completely reverses the previous relationship between Jesus and his disciples. He who is their Lord and Teacher becomes the servant who washes their feet.

This new relationship is explored by means of the Vine symbolism in chapter 15. ' "I AM the vine," ' says Jesus, ' "you are the branches" ' (15:5). In order to bear fruit, the branches must abide in the vine. So far we have scarcely proceeded beyond our earlier understanding of Jesus and his disciples; but at this point a quite new feature is introduced.

' "Abide in me and I in you (ὑμιν)" ' (15:4).

' "He who abides in me, and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit" ' (15:5).

The relation has become *reciprocal*, there is an 'identification' of Jesus with his disciples. It is of course true that this 'identification' is at once modified in the characteristic Johannine re-statement of the same thought:

' "If you abide in me, and my words abide in you, ask whatever you will, and it shall be done for you" ' (15:7).

It becomes plain a little later (verses 13–17) that the words in question are the command to 'love one another'; and we may perhaps summarize the teaching by saying that the disciples have their existence in him, and his words are effective in them. There is a mutuality of relationship between Jesus and his own.

The same thought is developed in the famous reference to the *oneness* of disciples in chapter 17. It is notable that this theme is introduced immediately before a reference to Judas:

' "Holy Father, keep them in thy name which thou hast given me, that they may be one, even as we are one. While I was with them I kept them in thy name which thou hast given me; I have guarded them, and none of them is lost but the son of perdition" ' (17:11–12).

It is precisely because the community of disciples is broken from within that their unity is stressed. It is a distinctive kind of unity, one that reflects the mutual relation of Father and Son:

' "that they all may be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us" ' (17:21).

Presumably this does not mean that the Father has his total existence in the Son; I take it to mean that the Father acts in the Son, and the Son has his existence in the Father. So also the disciples exist in the Father and the Son, and God acts in them. Perhaps we can understand this language to mean that Jesus does not depend on the Church for his *existence*, for he has his being in the Father. Like the Father, he possesses inherent life. But, on the other hand, he is dependent on the Church for the effectiveness of his words in the world. At least something of this kind must be implied by the language of reciprocity between Christ and the disciples. It is, I think, borne out by the words which describe the commission of the disciples:

' "As thou didst send me into the world, so I have sent them into the world" ' (17:18);

and by the even more direct words of chapter 13:

> ' "Truly, truly I say to you, he who receives anyone whom I send receives me: and he who receives me receives him who sent me" ' (13:20).

It would be possible to speak of much else in chapters 13–17, including the teaching about the Paraclete which is one mode of expressing Christ's identification with his Church. But I will do no more than draw your attention to the language of Christ's departure and return which plays so large a part in chapters 14 and 16. It signifies Christ's withdrawal from his disciples and his return to be one with them. The withdrawal may be interpreted as Christ's death, his separation from the world, and his departure to the Father. His return may suggest his resurrection, or the coming of the Paraclete, or his presence in the Baptism and Lord's Supper of the Church, or his final appearance at the Last Day. St John's Gospel is so written that the reader cannot refrain from considering multiple meanings. But we can confidently say that the departure of Christ to be with God, and hence his Lordship over the Church, is deprived of meaning unless it leads to his return to be one with the Church. And, on the other hand, any present identification of Christ with the Church is not more than an anticipation of the full oneness which will be known at the Last Day.

The two must be held together, as we have always known. The Fourth Gospel demonstrates the inner logic of this Christian conviction; and shows how Christ's Lordship becomes dominant when the Church is attacked from without, his identity with us when the Church is weakened and betrayed from within. Since we live in a period when the Church experiences both attacks with considerable force, it is good for us to learn the greatness of the Lord who stands for us when we are attacked, and to acknowledge the one who identifies himself with us when we make our attack on him.

GOD'S JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AFTER DEATH*

H. Cunliffe-Jones

A THEOLOGIAN who expounds the positive content of any aspect of Christian eschatology in 1966 must take account of the fact that he speaks into a generally indifferent or hostile atmosphere, and out of a hesitant Christian tradition. This means that he must first state his assumptions and procedure before expounding the detailed content of Christian doctrine.

The justification of these assumptions is itself an urgent and large subject. Christians must continually be ready to give reasons why they hold the assumptions they do. But they must also be prepared to explore the implications of the realities they trust in, and not let their spiritual vitality be sapped by their sensitiveness to the prevalent scepticism. The exploration of Christian resources is as necessary as the attempt to show that the foundations of Christian faith are true.

So, on the basis of certain assumptions, I shall speak to Christian believers who share those assumptions, and to unbelievers who are prepared to hear how Christians develop the implications of the assumptions they hold.

Criticism which, in fact, implicitly contains a denial of one or another of the assumptions will be out of place; though it will be fair to ask whether these are assumptions Christians ought to make, as well as to call attention to the points where the insight or the argument limps.

I

THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE LECTURE IS GIVEN

Let me first briefly elaborate on what I have said about the atmosphere in which the lecture is given. There is in it scepticism and indifference arising from a denial of any trans-empirical reality, and hesitancy and uncertainty in contemporary Christian eschatological affirmation.

(a) The scepticism and indifference springs at times from a widespread denial of anything that transcends the universe in which we live. Intra-mundane transcendence, for example, in the fact that a man's mind transcends his body and can roam through time and space, presents no problem or challenge. It is still an empirical phenomenon. It is the extra-mundane transcendence, essential to Christian faith, that is denied. Here, the Being of God, though active in the universe, is other than it and the living intelligent beings it contains. His being is beyond. To use the word 'beyond' is to use a metaphor, but it is an inescapable metaphor.

For the Christian, God transcends the universe in two ways at least: in being an Energy that is the source and controller of the energy that is within

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the universe; and in being a Goodness that is different in quality from the limited goodness found in human beings, and is the source from which human beings are transformed. Christians believe that there are experiences, which come from living within the universe, which point to the transcendent reality of God. Others deny that they do any such thing. Indeed, there are some who think that Christians are being dishonest in affirming the reality of God.

An illuminating contemporary illustration of the scepticism of our times is to be found in John Osborne's *Luther*. In this play Mr Osborne has gone to very great trouble indeed to get the historical details right, as indeed he has done. The one thing that vitiates his play is that he cannot himself believe that Luther honestly believed in God. He has set himself to present dramatically a man whose central experience, taken as true, is to the dramatist essentially meaningless. So he has tried to present Luther with a central meaning that makes sense to the twentieth century—one in Osborne's view that leaves out God as an actual reality.

It is against the background of such scepticism, and the resulting indifference, that Christian theologians have to expound the content of Christian truth.

(b) Christian eschatological teaching has not always followed one pattern, but for many centuries there has been a standard and perfectly definite teaching. In this, the justice of God finds complete satisfaction in the punishment of guilty sinners in hell. God's order, shattered by sin, is entirely restored by punishment. In addition, God, out of his super-abundant mercy, has justified some and brought them to eternal felicity with him. This is a further source of praise to God, added to a divine ordering which in itself deserves our highest praise, and is beyond all possible criticism.

But that that scheme of thinking is entirely consonant with the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ has never won entire assent, and for the last four centuries has been widely questioned.[1] This questioning has set aside many things repugnant now to the Christian mind and conscience, and has brought about the possibility of a much more satisfying Christian eschatology. But it has, for the time being, resulted in a hesitance of affirmation which is bad in itself and a hurt to the commendation of the Christian faith.

The hurt comes from uncertainty at the points where confident and definite convictions are necessary to nourish Christians with resources that are available in the Gospel. This plea that current affirmations are less confident than they ought to be is perfectly compatible with a sensitiveness to the fact that our knowledge of the purpose of God and of his Kingdom beyond death is less than our predecessors thought it was. It is also compatible with serious criticism of the traditional eschatology. We still need a positive affirmation in a way that represents living conviction of crucial Christian eschatological truths.

A concrete example of the hesitancy that has been upon us may be seen in the hymns of English Congregationalism. If we compare the Congregational Church Hymnal of 1877 with the Congregational Hymnary of 1916

and this in turn with Congregational Praise published in 1951, we see a steady decline in confident affirmation. In 1877 there was at least one hymn, 'Great God, what do I see and hear', in which Christians were prepared to meet the judgement of God. The omission of the note of judgement has resulted in a hurtful vagueness and sentimentality about the whole section.

Nor are Congregationalists alone in this hesitancy. If we look at the recently produced Service for the Burial of the Dead in the Alternative Services (Second Series), recommended by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York (S.P.C.K. 1965), how faint is the note of judgement in it. It is true that one of the aims of the Burial Service is said to be (p. 106) 'to remind us of the awful certainty of our own coming death and judgement'. But the adjective 'awful' is attached to certainty, and judgement seems to have been added perfunctorily. There is certainly no elucidation of what judgement means either in the Introduction or in the actual Service.

II

FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The Christian assumptions on which this lecture is based are first—the God of Christian faith incarnate in Christ; secondly, as corollaries of that: life after death and God's judgement on all men.

In the first assumption are two strands—*God and God incarnate*. It may be that there are many who come to God only through Christ, but this is not universal, and, historically, belief in God precedes belief in God incarnate. Belief in God is not co-terminous with Christian belief, however much for a Christian, his belief in God is saturated in what comes to him through his Christian allegiance. Yet if, for many, the way they came to any apprehension of God at all, or to any living faith in God, is through Christ and through Christ alone, they should be confident that this is a good way, provided that they really come to God. And if others come to Christ from some apprehension of God, let them see to it that their understanding of God is thoroughly transformed by their discipleship to Christ.

To affirm God, let me make my own, words used by Professor H. D. Lewis in his book, *Our Experience of God* (Allen and Unwin, 1959, p. 65): 'The object of religious experience is God, and whatever else we may find it possible to say about God, it is certain . . . that we must think of God as some reality complete and perfect in a way which is not possible for any other being or finite creature. He is the Creator, himself uncreated, the Lord God before whom we bow in worship which it would be blasphemous to render to any other, blasphemous and a violation of our own nature. The sole object of a genuine worship is a *transcendent* God.'

The transcendent God is transcendent both in power and in goodness. In calling him God we affirm that he is in control of the universe; we affirm also that he has a goodness which dwarfs ours.

Professor Lewis's definition is not explicitly Christian—but it is compatible with the Christian belief in one God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which has come from reflection on the fact of God incarnate in Jesus Christ.

Both elements of God's transcendence are to be found in the Incarnation

—the ultimate power of God over nature in the Resurrection, and the ultimate goodness of God in the steadfast obedience of Jesus to his vocation, in love and forgiveness to the point of death. Both are necessary to the vitality of Christian faith.

It may be mentioned here that the notes which Dietrich Bonhoeffer jotted down as part of an outline for a book have exercised a misleading fascination for many minds. He certainly would not have kept strictly to them in the writing of the actual book.

He wrote (*Letters and Papers from Prison*, Fontana, 1963, pp. 164-5): 'What do we mean by "God"? Not in the first place an abstract belief in his omnipotence, etc. This is not a genuine experience of God, but a partial extension of the world. Encounter with Jesus Christ, implying a complete orientation of human being in the experience of Jesus as one whose only concern is for others. This concern of Jesus for others the experience of transcendence. This freedom from self, maintained to the point of death, the sole ground of his omnipotence, omniscience and ubiquity. Faith is participation in this Being of Jesus (incarnation, cross and resurrection). Our relation to God is not religious relationship to a supreme Being, absolute in power and goodness, which is a spurious conception of transcendence, but a new life for others, through participation in the Being of God. The transcendence consists not in tasks beyond our scope and power, but in the nearest thing to hand. God in human form, not, as in other religions . . . but man existing for others, and hence the Crucified. A life based on the transcendent.'

Positively, this is a passionate affirmation for recognition that in the utter selflessness of Jesus there is a quality of goodness which constrains our worship and demands our transformation.

Negatively, it is a repudiation of other aspects of Lutheran theology which, however, he still continues to presuppose, as in his reference to the omnipotence, omniscience, and ubiquity of Jesus. As a plea for recognition of a special emphasis, it is moving and convincing: as a total theology it is absurd. What Bonhoeffer was most deeply concerned to affirm finds its true place in the Christian belief in God both as Creator and Redeemer: and this is the belief which is presupposed in this lecture.

In addition to this fundamental assumption, the lecture presupposes *two corollaries from it*—the first *life after death*, the second *God's judgement on all men.*

Christian belief in *life after death* is based on a conviction that Jesus Christ in his life, death, and resurrection won a victory over sin and death.

Belief in life after death has at times been widespread in human life, but it comes to Christian faith in three ways: through the faith which came to life in Judaism through the suffering and death of the Maccabean martyrs; through the teaching of Jesus; and through the resurrection of Jesus himself.

The ground for believing in life after death is not human wishes but the purpose of God. God is sovereign over the universe, and will bring his purpose to fulfilment. Human life after death has its place within the fulfilment of God's purpose for the universe. He has created human beings for

fellowship with himself and he cannot allow this to be frustrated by death. This affirmation goes back a long way in Christian theology: it is developed in the thinking of the early centuries.

The second corollary to the fundamental assumption of one God incarnate in Christ is *God's Judgement on all men.*

Life after death in fulfilment of God's purpose means life on God's terms. Whatever the view taken of the meaning of God's judgement, life on God's terms means that human life must submit to it. And this applies to all men. We know that God's purpose is not for a section only, but for the whole of mankind. In the New Testament we read (I Tim: 2: 3-4) of 'God our Saviour. He wants everyone to be saved and reach full knowledge of the truth.' If his purpose is to be fulfilled, then all men must come to the point of being judged by God's standard, and beyond that share in the fellowship of his everlasting Kingdom. The problems connected with the possibility or impossibility of this are many and their solution is not part of the initial assumptions of this lecture. What is being assumed is that judgement is a necessary corollary of believing in God. None of us can escape the judgement of the everlasting God.

III

THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT WITHIN THE ASSUMPTIONS

Let us make clear the precise nature of the subject within the assumptions I have laid down. I do not deny that God's judgement is experienced on earth, but I do not believe that it is wholly experienced here. The transition of anyone beyond death raises important questions for Christian thinking about the worth of life and any commitment we make within it, and so I have chosen to speak on God's judgement of the individual after death. I do not speak of judgement at the Lord's Coming, because I believe that that term should now be used just as a symbol for the final Kingdom of God. Within that final Kingdom there are two distinguishable but related aspects —of which the more difficult to formulate is God's judgement on the corporate life of man in history and his final triumph. The other aspect is God's judgement of the individual for which we ought to prepare ourselves. It is about this second aspect that I have chosen to speak. Let me say that in doing so I have not attempted to formulate a theory either of the relation between time and eternity or of the relation between corporate and individual judgement.

IV

THE NATURE OF GOD'S JUDGEMENT

What is the nature of God's judgement?

God's judgement is the bringing of man inescapably before the standard that God gives him, so that in repentance and adoration he may respond, if he will, to the transforming grace of God. This standard is given in Christ in whom there is both sternness and compassion. God's judgement is all the more searching and intimate because it is the judgement of the Incarnate Lord. And this is so whether we come from Christ to God, or from God to

Christ. The element of punishment is to be found in the restraint of the wicked and the self-exclusion from the presence of God of those who finally refuse to respond to his judgement. But in God's purpose, judgement is an instrument of mercy and a means of transforming the sinner.

This theme may be expounded under four heads:

(*1*) *God's Standard*

The character of God is the crucial fact in the universe, and to find their true being all things must conform to him, and his standard for them must become actual in them. Judgement means being inescapably confronted with God's standard for ourselves.

Human life is a strange compound of freedom and possible fulfilment. By *freedom* I mean the negative freedom to dissent. By *fulfilment* I mean the realization of the true possibilities in anyone's life. Many theologians use the term 'feedom' to cover both meanings, but this is the source of confusion and untruth. God asks man for a response in freedom, but his nature is such that he has no true fulfilment except in conformity to God's standard. Uncertainty still hangs over the reaching of this fulfilment (cp. the discussion by Paul Tillich on freedom and destiny, *Systematic Theology*, vol. II, Nisbet, 1957, pp. 72-3).

Judgement means being confronted by God so that his standard is made clear before us. In itself it is our total satisfaction. Yet because of the perversity ingrained in us, it and God who requires it, are to some extent hateful to us. That element of hatefulness has to be overcome before we can attain the satisfaction of our lives. This is the element of judgement which produces dread. But God's standard is the fact that our lives have a positive meaning and that we can share in the purpose God gives to the universe.

(*2*) *In Christ*

In the New Testament and in the life of the Church, judgement is ascribed to Christ. We may note the word of the Fourth Gospel: 'The Father judges no one; he has entrusted all judgement to the Son, so that all may honour the Son as they honour the Father' (John 5: 22, 23). We may note also the fact that in the Apostles' Creed it is of 'Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord' of whom it is said 'from thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead'.

From the portrait of Jesus in the Gospels in all the ebb and flow of the wrestle for historical reliability, two traits stand out: his sternness and his compassion. The Jewish leaders did not resolve to ensure his death out of unmotivated malice: they sought to remove one who was a menace to all they stood for. It was not only a wonderful experience for the disciples to be with Jesus: it was clearly also an uncomfortable one. At any moment, through their blundering misunderstanding of the nature of his mission, they would say some word or take some action that would bring on them his sharp rebuke. They trusted him and longed to be with him: but they were afraid of him, too. The crowd which welcomed him in many ways, had come to realize some of his unwavering insistence on putting God first before they shouted for his death.

The evidence for his generous compassion, his giving new heart and hope

to many who had lost it, is too great to be ignored. But all he did in the healing of body and soul was not at any point a capitulation to immediate need, or to temporary success; it was always kept firmly within the direction of his mission. His demand for the utter obedience of heart and mind is all of a piece with his seeking and saving the lost.

So the judgement of the Incarnate Lord is all the more searching and intimate because it is the judgement of the Incarnate Lord.

This is so whether we come from Christ to God or from God to Christ.

In the sceptical atmosphere of contemporary experience, I want to affirm, though it may be offensive to many who will cheerfully say that *God* is dead, that the importance of *Christ* is *logically* just as questionable as the reality of God. If we discount the historical importance of the Christian Church with its conviction that Jesus is the light of the world at its centre; if we then ask why we should consider important for the experience of the twentieth century one who, on a neutral basis, is a first-century prophet who died an enthusiast's death, the answer is not very clear unless we assume that the Christian faith in him is true. But many who are confused and uncertain about *God*, find *Christ* in some way given to them. This comes, whether they know it or not, from the continuing influence of the Christian tradition.

But whether logically justified or not, many do find a way from Christ to God (cp. *A Religion for Agnostics* by Nathaniel Micklem, S.C.M. 1965). They find a challenge in his words and actions and in the whole intent of his life. They feel impelled to find an explanation of them all that satisfies their minds. At the heart of Jesus they find an utter goodness that impels them to think of it as not having its source in this intra-mundane sphere. The holiness of Jesus is their route for knowing God in his transcendence. And this can be a genuine awareness of one aspect of transcendent God.

For all such people who come from Christ to God, the judgement of God, just because it is the judgement of the incarnate Lord, is inevitably intimate and searching.

But this is also true for others who come the other way from God to Christ. We have learnt through Karl Barth not to set over against Christ a God of majestic but inscrutable power to whom we can give terror but not true worship. There is majesty in God, but it is a majesty in which God's power is the instrument of his wisdom and his love. And he has expressed that wisdom and love in Christ. Men have often rebelled against God interpreted as an alien tyrant, whose judgement, though inescapable, was in essence unfair, and unrelated to a true understanding of those whom he judged. But God in Christ understands our life from within. His judgement is not alien but intimate.

His is the searching judgement which is utterly true and reveals ourselves to ourselves, and lights up aspects of ourselves which we do not expose to our own scrutiny, so that against it we are defenceless. The judgement of God in Christ is one that we ourselves, when we come to know it, must acknowledge as a true and perfect judgement.

(*3*) *The Element of Punishment*

Punishment is an idea which is little stressed in the New Testament,

though the emphasis on punishment has had a large place in the history of Christian eschatology. Certain passages in the New Testament have exercised a hold on Christian imagination until the seventeenth century out of all proportion to their importance in the New Testament itself.

We may mention particularly Matt. 25:46: 'they will go away to eternal punishment, and the virtuous to eternal life'; II Thess. 1:7–11 especially v. 9: 'It will be their punishment to be lost eternally, excluded from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his strength'; II Peter 2:9: 'hold the wicked for their punishment until the day of Judgement'; Rev. 14:9–11: 'All those who worship the beast and his statue, or have had themselves branded on the hand or forehead, will be made to drink the wine of God's fury which is ready, undiluted, in his cup of anger; in fire and brimstone they will be tortured in the presence of the holy angels and the Lamb and the smoke of their torture will go up for ever and ever.' (Quotations from *The Jerusalem Bible*.)

Punishment, however, ought not to have the same place in a present-day statement of Christian eschatology. And we have learnt to revise our notions of punishment. The Jesuit teacher, Fr Joseph Rickaby, wrote in 1929, 'The punishment for final persistent defiance of the natural law is failure to attain to the perfect state and last end of the human soul, which is happiness. If existence is prolonged, under this failure, it must be in the contrary state of misery. This failure and misery is at once a natural result and Divine affliction' (*Moral Philosophy*, quoted by Lord Longford in *The Idea of Punishment*, Geoffrey Chapman, 1961, p. 93).

This is in many ways a most attenuated idea of punishment, and it is only such an attenuated doctrine that rightly has its place in our understanding of God's judgement.

The element of punishment in a true doctrine of God's judgement consists first of being confronted by the standard of God of which we have already spoken. In the very fact of this, we are rebuked for our falling short of it, and for our active hostility to it. Other elements are the restraint of the wicked; and the self-exclusion from the presence of the Lord of those who finally refuse to respond to his judgement. In all these ways the authority of God is newly asserted in relation to the sinner. The second and third aspects have still to be considered.

(*a*) *Restraint of the Wicked*

About the restraint of the wicked we may say this. Human life is lived under the burden of the temporal power of wicked men, and with evil in nature and in human life a distressing enigma. The greatness of the Psalms is to be seen in the fact that they acknowledge this fully, and yet affirm a strong, confident faith in God.

'Yahweh, how much longer are the wicked,' we read in Psalm 94, vv. 3–7,
'how much longer are the wicked to triumph?
Are these evil men to remain unsilenced,
boasting and asserting themselves?

Yahweh, they crush your people,
they oppress your hereditary people,
murdering and massacring
widows, orphans and guests.

"Yahweh sees nothing," they say
"the God of Jacob takes no notice." '

And Psalm 10:13 adds:

'Why does the wicked man spurn God,
assuring himself, "He will not make me pay"?'

The judgement of God inevitably means that the power of the wicked to oppress others is taken away. God will for ever respect the freedom of man, and will not compel a positive response to his outpoured grace. But the wickedness of man will be restrained so that it does not oppress others as it does here in our earthly life. What form this restraint will take is beyond our knowledge.

(*b*) *Self-exclusion from the Presence of the Lord*

For centuries Christians believed that the perpetual exclusion of countless sinners from the presence of the Lord was a necessary part of Christian faith. There has been a widespread movement away from this even to the extent of an insensitiveness to the stern element in the Gospel. It must, however, be realized that if men come into God's eternal Kingdom, it can only be on God's terms. Anyone who contemplates the sinfulness of the life of man must realize that its transformation into the holiness God seeks to give to man is a stupendously great work. We can be sure of the inevitability of each human life being confronted by God's judgement; we can be sure that it is God's will to save all men; and we can be sure that he will respect human freedom. We also know that if there is any self-exclusion from the presence of the Lord, this will be to that extent a failure of God's hopes and purposes. But the possibility of such self-exclusion seems to be a necessary element in the presentation of the Gospel, if we are not to minimize either the demand of God or the dignity of man.

It may be said that this is faint-hearted affirmation. Rather we ought to say that we *know* that in the end all will be saved. God is the infinite God, and there is no limit to his striving, and so to the accomplishment of his purposes. Limited, finite man cannot in the end do anything but conform to the purpose of God. However painful to the sinner the process of reclamation, we *know*, it may be said that in the end God's kingdom will be complete.

But this thinking goes against the true and important thesis so powerfully argued in John Oman's *Grace and Personality* (Cambridge University Press, first published 1917)—that we fundamentally distort the Gospel if we make God's relation to us that of an infinite force.

Just because of the urgent need of man to respond inwardly to the judgement of God in which lies the possibility of his true life, we must *keep open* the possibility that some, in the personal freedom that God will not crush, will exclude themselves from the presence of God.

(4) The Instrument of God's Mercy and his Means of Transforming the Sinner

Many people seem to treat judgement and mercy as if they were opposed: as if mercy was a soft word applicable to a God of love, and judgement a hard word applicable to a God with a very different attribute. But God's love is deep and strong: it does not cease until it has attained the true well-being of its object. It is the love of our Incarnate God. How else shall he love us except by bringing us into his Kingdom? Truly to love us means to persist in judging and cleansing us so that we may wholly respond to his love.

This is why judgement, though it has an element of dread in it, is fundamentally a welcome and hopeful word. It is the gateway to God's mercy, or rather it is an instrument of his mercy. God has no other desire for us than that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth. It is his *mercy* that men really shrink from if they did but know it. For he has made it plain in the Cross of Christ that his love is not to be traded upon. And so the Bible testifies, in both Old Testament and New. The psalmist insists that it is a fool who says in his heart that there is no God (Psalm 14:1); and the apostle warns us that God is not to be cheated (Gal. 6:7), or, to express it more colloquially, you can't fool God. His mercy is relentless in his pursuance of the redemption of the sinner.

So God's judgement is to be seen as his means of transformation. It is by confronting the sinner with the full implications of his call to be a child of God in fellowship with him, and with the full horror of the sin that defiles that relationship, that God will bring the sinner, if he will respond, into his Kingdom. Some of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ which brings its inevitable judgement of the unworthy, we see in part here on earth, and to it we make a partial and possibly a growing response. This is Christian discipleship—to be laid hold of by God's judgement in Christ Jesus and to be made new in conformity with his standard. His final judgement is the completion of the work already begun. However painful it is, the purpose of it is healing and restorative.

Apart from God's judgement, how shall his purposes be effective in us? Christ's identification of himself with the judgement of God on sin has shown us the way to eternal life. In Christ we can truly share in God's goodness as we totally and completely identify ourselves with his judgement. This is the means of transformation and the ground of hope.

This positive aspect of judgement is finely expressed in Robert Murray McCheyne's hymn (Congregational Praise 772):

When I stand before the throne,
Dressed in beauty not my own,
When I see Thee as Thou art,
Love Thee with unsinning heart,
Then, Lord, shall I fully know,
Not till then, how much I owe.

That is the goal of Christian life: but how we must be judged and cleansed before that happens! And this longing and expectation so far from excluding judgement on earth helps to enable us to enter into it.

So the hymn ends:

E'en on earth, as through a glass,
Darkly let Thy glory pass;
Make forgiveness feel so sweet;
Make Thy Spirit's help so meet;
E'en on earth, Lord, make me know
Something of how much I owe.

V

GOD'S JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AFTER DEATH

If this, then, is the nature of God's judgement of the individual after death, how shall we think of it?

It is a *great reality* the full meaning of which we can never exhaust, which is partially apprehended in our earthly life.

It is a *reality from which we shrink*, because of the holiness of the presence of God, and because we shall be unable to escape from full awareness of our own unworthiness. Yet it is also *the means through which we can enjoy God for ever* in the utter fulfilment of our lives.

So it is a source of *assurance, hope, and joy.*

God's judgement is a mystery—that is, a *reality which is so great that we can never exhaust its meaning.* This does not mean something totally incomprehensible: every true mystery has a centre of light. As we accustom ourselves to its reality we understand it more, but even so we can never fully *comprehend* the reality which in varying degrees we apprehend. God's judgement is a mystery which is 'dark through brightness', and partially hidden by its very 'splendour of light', though God's greatness is also hidden by human sinfulness.

For God's judgement is not only a great reality: it is a reality from which we shrink. And yet it is a reality for which we deeply long: for it is the means through which we can enjoy God for ever.

Truly to come into the presence of God is to become aware of his holiness —that holiness incarnate in Christ. Holiness is utter goodness with a splendour about it that cannot be hid. In our human sin-conditioned world we live with blurred shades of goodness. Every country in every century needs outstanding examples of Christian holiness to provide near at hand a greater approximation to the true holiness of God. The nearer awareness of that holiness will be an experience so far-reaching that we shrink from being made to revise our fragmentary understanding of what utter goodness is, by the presence of the absolute goodness of God.

Here we experience the true object of worship: the one to whom man's worship with heart and mind and soul and strength is rightly given; the one in whom the true fulfilment of man's being is found. But we have not given that kind of worship. We have spurned his proffered love. And so we shrink from it because it is too great for us.

One of the difficulties of our earthly life is to accept ourselves as we are: to come to terms with ourselves without illusions. Even when we have learnt to be self-critical, there is always a hidden part of ourselves that does not

come up for our criticism. The element in God's judgement which we shrink from is that we will have to accept ourselves in the light of God's presence.

For, however far we have progressed in the Christian life, Christians presenting themselves in Christ Jesus for God's judgement, have still to be tested and transformed by the full knowledge of God and the full transformation of our lives. The nearer we have approached to Christian perfection in this life, the more we will acknowledge and welcome the searching experience that lies ahead. For that judgement will show us truly to ourselves as we are, and we will acknowledge it to be fair. This will not diminish the pain of it—the pain of fully exposing ourselves for God's cleansing. But this cleansing is the only way to the fulfilment and utter satisfaction of our whole being in the everlasting God.

John Calvin gave expression to a notable expression of thanksgiving for God's judgement when he said: 'Awakened consciences, when they have to do with God's judgement, recognize this as the only safe haven in which they can securely breathe' (*Institutes,* Book III, chapter xii, para. 4). Earlier he had said: 'Hence arises a wonderful consolation: that we perceive judgement to be in the hands of him who has already destined us to share with him the honour of judging (cp. Matt. 19:28) . . . for if the Apostle dares exclaim that with Christ interceding for us there is no one who can come forth to condemn us (Rom. 8:33, 34), it is much more true, then, that Christ as Intercessor will not condemn those whom he has received into his charge and protection. No mean assurance this, that we shall be brought before no other judgement seat than that of our Redeemer, to whom we must look for our salvation! Moreover, he who now promises eternal blessedness through the gospel, will then fulfil his promise in judgement' (*Institutes*, Book II, chapter xvi, para. 18).

The reasons for thinking that God's judgement gives us an atmosphere in which we can at last breathe freely are that we are delivered from atmospheres which poison our spiritual vitality; and if we respond to God's judgement we shall become most truly ourselves and most truly set free from all that thwarts and hinders our inner being. So we shall be set free to enjoy for ever God who is the centre and fulfilment of our lives.

God's judgement after death is certain. It is *assurance* that God is a living and active God. He will not allow his purpose to be frustrated, he will not let his children go to ruin, without doing his utmost to transform and deliver them. It is only the utterly recalcitrant who determinedly refuse to respond to his judgement who may possibly defeat his purpose.

It is *hope* that gives us encouragement in a sinful world in which we see his name taken in vain, his very existence scorned, his redemption in Christ ignored or repudiated, his standard for human living denied in the individual and corporate life of man. God's judgement is hope that this is not the total experience of human life. God will bring all human experience to the bar of his transforming judgement.

It is *joy* that the everlasting God really cares for mankind. Apart from his judgement there is no final assurance of his love. His coming in Christ has not done its full work. It is the completion of that work that will reveal

its true greatness. That that completion is certain is a source of a joy that cannot be contained. God calls us to pass through his judgement to share in his serenity and blessedness. This faith is the source of our rejoicing. To God belong the Kingdom, the Power, and the Glory for ever.

[1] See, for example, D. P. Walker's researches into seventeenth-century discussions of eternal torment in his book, *The Decline of Hell* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964); James P. Martin: *The Last Judgment in Protestant Theology from Orthodoxy to Ritschl* (Oliver and Boyd, 1963); and Ulrich Simon: *The End is Not Yet* (Nisbet, 1964).

[For 'dark through brightness' cp. Robert Robinson's hymn: 'Mighty God while angels bless Thee' (Congregational Praise 68, v. 3); for 'splendour of light' cp. Walter Chalmers Smith's hymn 'Immortal, Invisible, God only wise' (C.P. 28, v. 4).]

SOME ASPECTS OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION*

Cyril Rodd

ONE aim of this address is to show the need for sociological theory beside the mere collection of data in studying religion. The popularity of 'surveys' and the general prestige given to sociology today has led to a proliferation of research projects, some with a more adequate methodology than others, but most of them of little interest or permanent value because they are carried out, either with the sole purpose of collecting 'facts', or with some minor hypothesis in mind that is quite unrelated to the body of theory that is being built up. Facts are of no value unless they are organized into a general body of knowledge. Indeed, it might even be claimed that 'facts' have no separate existence apart from interpretation.

To avoid becoming too diffuse, our attention will largely be confined to the problem of the relation of religious commitment (which we may somewhat barbarously call 'religiosity') to the individual's view of what actions are right and wrong. I shall illustrate the argument with data from a variety of published sources and also from my own work in Hall Green. Before dealing with this specifically, however, it may be useful to set out, as briefly as possible, the way a sociologist looks at society, for the sociology of religion cannot be viewed in isolation from general sociology.

I—THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF SOCIETY

The best place to begin is probably to point out that, in order to make any social relationships possible, there must be certain expected actions and responses. We see apples in a shop with a price attached to them and when we offer certain metal discs to the assistant we expect to be supplied with a certain weight of fruit in exchange for those discs. Such expectations apply to the whole of our life. You expect me to give an address which will be more or less intelligible according to your previous experiences of Commemoration addresses. I expect you to listen quietly and not barrack me.

* Commemoration Lecture, given at Handsworth College, Birmingham, 1966.

We both expect that I shall use the peculiar sequences of sounds that make up the English language. Friendship, college life, family life all depend on expected forms of behaviour that are almost invariably fulfilled. Thus we can look at behaviour as conforming to pre-determined patterns. It is these patterns which are of interest to the sociologist. He refers to them as norms.

A moment's thought will show that the norms vary widely in different human societies. To take my shopkeeper example. If we lived in some parts of the world other than England, the shopkeeper might be unwilling to accept metal discs but might demand some article in exchange. In many parts of the world the price which the salesman asked would never be accepted by the purchaser but the eventual payment would only be arrived at after a well-defined haggling procedure. Thus we are led on to the conception of culture which consists of norms, values, and beliefs—all formulated in terms of symbols.

Each individual is born into a particular culture. Various constraints are placed upon him to conform to the expected pattern of behaviour, but because the individual wants to be loved, wants to be accepted by the group into which he has entered, there is no need to apply extreme sanctions. He 'internalizes' the culture, makes it so much his own that he does many things without even thinking, and does many other things because he feels that they are not only natural but also 'right', and it would go against his conscience to act in any other way. Thus he is quite happy to play his part in the drama of social life, to conform to his role. Further, amid the many different groups in society of which he might become a member, he chooses some to whose standards he conforms more closely. They are for him 'reference groups'. Most of such groups are those of which he is already a member, but they need not be. The person who is a social climber has chosen as his reference group a group to which he does not yet belong but into which he hopes to be accepted.

This general way of thinking can be applied to religious groups and cultures. Religions differ in the culture which has been developed—in sets of beliefs, forms of association, and types of behaviour, both religious and 'ethical'. There are also found to be differences in non-religious factors—social class, sex, and perhaps race. Moreover, since we have observed that the individual cannot be isolated from the culture into which he was born or chose to enter, the sociologist can look for causes of different behaviour and belief patterns.

II—DEFINITION OF RELIGIOSITY

In order to discover causation it is necessary first to analyse the behaviour which is being considered. How is the religious person to be defined—by the frequency with which he goes to church, by his devotion to private prayer, his fastings or pilgrimages, animal sacrifice or ritual cleansings, or by the amount of knowledge he possesses about the religion he professes to believe? Clearly, religious commitment is no simple phenomenon. Glock and Stark[1] have suggested five dimensions of religiosity.

(i) Religious belief—the ideological dimension. This can be measured

partly in terms of the number of doctrines of the institutionalized religion which the adherent claims to believe. Mere number of doctrines is not the only way of looking at this, however, and Putney and Middleton examined the relationship between orthodoxy (defined in terms of fundamentalism), fanaticism (missionary zeal), importance (the degree to which religious convictions are felt to be a central and essential element of the self), and ambivalence (the awareness of holding contradictory attitudes relating to religion).[2]

(ii) Religious knowledge—the intellectual dimension. This needs to be distinguished from belief, since the atheist may have a detailed knowledge of the history and theology of the faith which he has rejected.

(iii) Religious practice—the ritualistic dimension. Here will be included not only public observances—attending church services, receiving communion—but also private practices such as prayer and fasting.

(iv) Religious feeling—the experiential dimension. This perhaps belongs rather more to the field of the psychologist than to that of the sociologist, though feelings vary according to the culture. Glock and Stark, in fact, devote a whole chapter to a detailed analysis of this dimension.

(v) Religious effects—the consequential dimension. This includes both rewards (expressed in terms of heaven or of happiness and peace here on earth) and obligations. The latter are the ethical results of religion which we are intent on examining over against some of the other dimensions of religiosity.

Scores can be devised for degrees of activity in each of these dimensions and quantitative methods then applied. This is relatively easy for such outward observances as attending church services where the number of attendances in a given period can be counted. While quantitative measures are less simple to apply to some of the other dimensions, ingenuity can produce them. For example, in the Putney and Middleton study already mentioned, various statements about doctrine, and the other three parts of belief, were drawn up and the respondents asked which they agreed with. Scores were then allocated to the different replies.

Before leaving this question of the definition of religiosity one or two comments may be made. (i) These different dimensions of religious commitment should be regarded as disparate until correlations between them have been shown. It would be quite false to imagine that a single index of religiosity can be obtained by combining the different scores, and it would be equally wrong to use the score in one dimension as an index of the total religious commitment. A single example will illustrate this. Is the middle-class suburban churchman, who belongs to the stewardship scheme of his church, is a member of several church committees, and attends Sunday services moderately regularly, more 'religious' than the man from the working class who never goes to church, but who says that he believes in God, prays when he is in a tight corner, and listens with deep emotion to 'Bless this house' sung at the working men's club? (ii) Further, it needs to be remembered that the emphasis which is placed on the individual dimensions of religiosity differs between denominations and between religions. It is there-

fore quite misleading to compare the Sunday attendance at mass among Catholics with the attendance at mattins or evensong among Anglicans and to argue that the Catholics at Hall Green are more 'religious' because 71% of Catholic males attended church on both of the two Sundays covered by the survey, while only 24% of the Anglicans did, or that the Methodists are more 'religious' than the Anglicans because 58% of Methodist males belong to some church organization and 56% hold at least one office in the church over against 34% and 32% of Anglicans respectively. The moral obligation of Catholics to attend mass, and the greater opportunity for Methodist laymen to participate in church activities has to be taken into account.

III—ETHICAL STANDARDS

The analysis of religiosity made by Glock and Stark shows that the moral obligations belonging to any religion can be viewed along two dimensions: the 'implementing beliefs', that is, beliefs about the ethical demands of the religion, which are taught and accepted within the denomination, and the consequential effects evidenced in the actual behaviour of the members. The beliefs consist of such things as, that it is wrong to drink or gamble, remarry after you have divorced your wife, or discriminate against persons of a different race. The effects may be studied by observing whether in fact the members do drink, gamble, remarry after divorce, or refuse to employ coloured workers. It therefore becomes clear that two problems emerge: (1) What relationship is there between the other dimensions of religiosity and the implementing beliefs? (For example, are the Methodists who feel most strongly that gambling is morally wrong those who attend church most frequently, belong to most church organizations, pray most fervently, have the liveliest religious feelings, and accept the greatest number of orthodox beliefs?) (2) What relationship is there between the implementing beliefs which the church members claim to hold and the actual behaviour which they evidence? In practice it is not very easy to discover reliable data on this latter problem and much evidence is indirect, as for example the fact that, in America, Catholic families seem to be little larger than those of Protestants, or that in a North Wales village it was observed that the attendance at the chapels was far above the national average, but the illegitimacy rate was higher than the national average also. One study in America, not specifically in the field of religious sociology, explained the fact that the residents of a small Kansas community drank in private, but supported the temperance morality of a traditionally 'dry' township in public, by suggesting that the official morality served to maintain the unity of the community in face of strains and tensions which might have become disruptive.[3]

It seems clear, moreover, that there are different kinds of implementing beliefs and that these perform different functions in society and are maintained by different systems of social control. A point of departure for our discussion of these different types is provided by another study by Middleton and Putney.[4] They used a fairly large sample of university students in America and divided them into believers and sceptics on the basis of replies to certain statements of belief. They then asked whether they had engaged

in certain actions in the previous three years and whether they thought certain actions were wrong. They discovered that the only difference between their two groups was that the believers were more likely to regard what they designated as 'anti-ascetic' actions as wrong, and less likely to engage in them, but that there was no significant difference in either belief or behaviour when 'anti-social' actions were under consideration. The 'anti-ascetic' actions included drinking, gambling, extra-marital sexual intercourse, and looking at pornographic pictures; the 'anti-social', shop-lifting, stealing articles from hotels, striking another person in anger, and deliberately placing unjust blame on another person for what was really one's own fault. The conclusion they draw, which does not really come within the purview of this address, is that religion is not necessary to sustain societal moral standards.

The Hall Green study provides an interesting comparison with this in so far as, beside the 'anti-ascetic' standards, there were included actions which were of a different type, yet not 'delinquent' in the way in which all of Middleton and Putney's were. It was found, as might be expected, that there were clear denominational differences on the subjects of drink and gambling, divorce and family planning, but that the answers to a series of questions concerning behaviour in work situations and a question on race revealed no substantial difference between the three denominations or the non-church sample. I suggested that the difference that was revealed was between an ethic which may be described as 'traditional and negative' and a general social ethic. The traditional, negative ethic may be characterized by three features: (i) The teaching has to be officially promulgated over a long period of time—and is ritually affirmed in church meetings; (ii) the teaching has become associated in the minds of non-members of the denomination with that particular denomination, it has become part of the stereotype of that denomination; (iii) rear-guard actions will be carried out within the denomination whenever any suggestion of change is made.[5] An interesting point which cannot be pursued here is whether traditional *positive* standards are ever found. I suspect, only rarely, and the reason for this, I suggest, is that negative norms are more readily enforceable than positive ones and can be less easily concealed from spectators.[6]

A third distinction, suggested again by Glock and Stark, is between 'explicit' and 'general' implementing beliefs.[7] The traditional negative standards are all explicit. Examples of general beliefs are such exhortations as 'You should be a steward of God', 'Exercise choice and initiative in the use of leisure time in keeping with the new life in Christ', 'Manage economic wealth in terms of Christian responsibility.' They add, 'How these general injunctions are to be interpreted in concrete circumstances is left for the individual to decide.' This is a very fruitful distinction leading to further insights into the way ethical teaching is communicated and adopted. Thus developments in official policy can be interpreted in terms of attempts by church leaders to make the teaching more (or sometimes less) explicit. For example, the many 'stewardship campaigns' illustrate the way in which a general belief is being made explicit and is being presented to the individual member in concrete terms. One factor behind this change is undoubtedly the

pressing financial needs of the churches. An example of the generalizing of an explicit standard is the removal of the question on the nomination forms of candidates for the Methodist ministry asking whether they are total abstainers, and its replacement by one which refers generally to the Conference statements on social questions. The recent controversial BCC report *Sex and Morality* is another example of this. Explicit standards are more likely to be known by the church members. At Hall Green the topics about which over 70% of members said that there is official church teaching were drink and gambling for the Methodists, and divorce and family planning for the Catholics. It is very difficult, of course, to discover what is 'official' teaching in the Church of England. Over 50% of the Anglican females, however, said that there was official teaching about divorce. By contrast only 22% of Methodist males said there was official teaching on industrial matters.

I think I have said sufficient to show that not only can implementing beliefs be classified, but that this is more than an academic exercise, since different types of standards function differently and have their own systems of social control. It is time to turn to the final topic this afternoon, the ways in which these standards are maintained.

IV—SOCIAL CONTROL

Before embarking upon the discussion about social control it is necessary to turn aside for a moment and explain in sociological terms what is happening to religion in modern society.[9] Two major differences between primitive society and modern western society are the differentiation of institutions and the multiplication of roles. By the differentiation of institutions is meant that, whereas in an undeveloped society all the norms of behaviour can be subsumed under a very few sets of obligations, now there have developed sets of norms and values connected with the family, the production and allocation of goods and services, the use of power in the community, the stratification system, education, the law and religion. Thus religion is no longer almost the sole unifying institution in society, and it has to compete among several other institutions and is often overshadowed by them. By the multiplication of roles is meant that, whereas in primitive society most of the expected behaviour could be understood in terms of relatively few positions which a man held in society, sex, age, and kin relationships being the most important, now the individual occupies a great number of statuses and has to play many different roles—as husband, father, factory manager, churchman, golf player, and so on. The effect of these multiple roles is to increase the possibility of conflict between the role expectations. The relevance of all this to the study of the way churches attempt to secure the conformity of their adherents lies in the fact that non-religious pressures are exerted upon the church itself and upon the members by the other institutions in society and by the different roles which the leaders and members play.

There may also be factors within the structure of the church itself which inhibit the maintenance of the official standards. Campbell and Pettigrew

examined the attitudes of Protestant ministers in Little Rock at the time of the desegregation crisis, and concluded that, although official church policies opposed segregation, few ministers were prepared to speak out strongly against it because the particular roles they had to perform in the churches led them to give precedence to maintaining a peaceful atmosphere in the congregation over against social reform.[9] They point out that although the ministers' own views and the support of their fellow ministers should have led them to campaign in favour of integration in the schools, they were inhibited because the hierarchies of their various churches did not desire divided congregations, alienated ministers, reduced membership and decreased contributions. In the words of the writers, 'However exalted the moral virtue the minister expounds, the hierarchy does not wish him to damn his listeners to hell—unless somehow he gets them back in time to attend service next Sunday.' Since the hierarchy is able to provide rewards in the form of transfers to good parishes, this exerts a powerful force against the ministers becoming champions of civil rights. Instead, they support law and order, peace and reconciliation. Even those who favoured segregation at heart were prepared to pray for peaceful relations. As one minister put it, 'You certainly can't go wrong by praying. Praying can't hurt you anyhow.'

Here, however, we are chiefly concerned with non-church factors. Six studies may be mentioned which collectively provide fairly substantial evidence for the theory I wish to set out, that church participation is highly important for the maintenance of church norms.

(i) William T. Liu carried out some research among Catholics in Tallahassee in Florida at the time of a bus boycott by Negroes when racial tension was heightened as a result of the Supreme Court's decision on integration in 1956.[10] Most of these Catholics had migrated from the north. The Catholic church was strongly in favour of integration—in fact, the local parish was the only integrated institution in Tallahassee where both races intermingled in all church functions. It was found that those who adhered most closely to Catholic doctrines had the most favourable attitudes towards desegregation. The extent to which the Catholics identified themselves with the southern community, however, correlated much more highly and consistently with anti-segregation attitudes. Thus, Liu suggested that only those who held strong beliefs in Catholic doctrine also saw the moral aspect of segregation, while the extent of social participation and identification with the south provided a community reference system through which the desegregation issues were perceived.

(ii) Thomas R. Ford, using a sample of about 1,500 Southern Appalachian households, sought to discover how far urbanism, education, and socio-economic status affected what he called 'religious fundamentalism', by which he meant not merely theological conservatism but also a Puritan attitude to drinking, card playing and dancing.[11] He found that higher education, status, and residence in the cities produced a marked decrease in the percentages of those who asserted that card playing and dancing were 'always wrong', and a rather lesser decrease in the rejection of drinking. This was more consistent and greater in extent than the decline in conservative theo-

logical beliefs. In his own words, 'Perhaps we have here evidence that the big cities are modern-day Sodoms and Gomorrahs, just as the rural and small town residents have suspected all along.'

(iii) In the Hall Green project an attempt was made to apply reference group theory to this problem. A major difficulty encountered was that people find it very difficult to identify the sources of influence behind their attitudes. This had, therefore, to be approached obliquely. It was discovered that those most rigorous in their views about drink and gambling, among the Methodists, were those who attended Sunday services most frequently, whose best friends were members of their church, and who held office in the church. Similar results were found among the Catholics concerning divorce. These rigorists may not unfairly be regarded as those for whom the church was a dominant reference group. (As an aside it may be added that since it is only with respect to the traditional-negative standards that church members differ between denominations or over against the wider society of non-churchgoers, it seems unlikely that religious institutions play any great part in the formation and maintenance of general societal norms.)

(iv) Further support for these suggestions is provided by the research of J. D. Photiadis in a Mormon church in America.[12] He showed that church participation and outward conformity to the non-smoking, non-drinking ethic can exist independently of religious belief. Weak believers will become outward conformists if they actively participate in church organizations, provided that there are a number of strong believers in the church. Thus he suggests that churches secure overt conformity to their moral standards through two systems, which may work quite independently: (1) the mutual dependence of belief and ritual, meaning by ritual the whole active side of religion including abstinence from tobacco and alcohol; and (2) church participation.

(v) Gerhard Lenski offers additional confirmation of this. He posits what he calls 'the principle of social hedonism' on the basis of his studies among samples of Protestants and Catholics, again in America.[13] He defines this principle as follows: 'When two established and institutionalized religious groups support opposing moral norms, the less demanding norm tends to win the less committed members of *both* groups.' He adds the interesting suggestion that these denominational ascetic norms come into existence in times of crisis amid the enthusiasm aroused with the formation of new sects.

(vi) Finally we may note the observations of N. J. Demerath.[14] Taking up the well-known distinction between church and sect, he says that one important difference between the two lies in their relationship to the secular world. The church accommodates to the world, the sect withdraws from the world. Neither is active in changing the world. He then suggests that there may exist in each denomination church-like and sect-like parishioners. The former are segmentally involved in their religion—it is one concern among many and claims only part of their allegiance among the other groups to which they belong. The sect-like church members are organically involved in their church—their commitment is totally within their religion and they are unlikely to participate in other organizations. It is the sect-like

parishioner, therefore, who will conform most closely to denominational norms.

These studies suggest that the attitudes which church members adopt towards these 'ascetic' moral norms are not solely the result of deliberate decision by the individual. The clarity with which the official teaching is expressed plays a part. The strength of the religious belief held by the individual may be a factor. But when the norms conflict with the hedonism of society, the church member is subjected to pressures which come on the one hand from that society (exemplified in some of these studies by the community of the Southern States or the large city) and on the other from the church norms. In this conflict situation it is those who participate most actively in church organizations who are most likely to maintain the ascetic norms.

Up to this point I have tried to speak with the detachment of the sociologist. I should like to conclude with the partisanship of a Methodist preacher. It seems to me that we may learn two things from these studies.

(1) If we are to secure the acceptance of ethical standards which we believe to be right (and this decision must be made on religious and philosophical grounds),[15] then it is useless to express them in *general* terms and hope that the church members will discover how to apply them in daily living. To gain acceptance they must be stated in *explicit* terms. On this ground alone, though personally I would criticize them for more specifically ethical reasons, I claim that much writing and speaking by Christians about a number of moral issues today is most dangerous for the preservation of the Christian way of life. To state the standards explicitly, of course, involves our discovering how they can be applied. But if we cannot make them explicit we may as well remain silent. It will be just as effective.

(2) I feel that we need to look again at our current enthusiasm for getting out of the church and into the world. Clearly it is important to evangelize. But unless those who go out into the world are enabled to retain their hold upon the church as the dominant reference group they are likely to abandon the church's beliefs and moral standards. What happened to some of the worker priests in France is only what one would expect. Beliefs and a distinctive morality, unsupported by a vital group, tend to be fragile things. If the theory about groups, roles, and norms has any truth in it at all, we destroy the organizations of the church at our perit.[16, 17]

[1] *Religion and Society in Tension* (Rand McNally, 1965) pp. 18–38.

[2] Dimensions and Correlates of Religious Ideologies' (*Social Forces*, 39, 1960–61, pp. 285–290).

[3] Charles K. Warriner, 'The Nature and Functions of Official Morality' (*American Journal of Sociology*, 64, 1959, pp. 165ff.).

[4] 'Religion, Normative Standards and Behaviour' (*Sociometry*, 25, 1962, pp. 141–152).

[5] An example of this is the debate in the Methodist Conference of 1966 about the alteration of the question concerning total abstinence on the nomination forms of candidates for the ministry (see the *Methodist Recorder*, July 14, 1966, p. 18).

[6] In a study of a Methodist congregation in Kalamazoo, a group of researchers found different correlations between two indices of religiosity (activity in church groups and frequency in prayer and Bible reading) and attitudes about inter-national affairs, government intervention in economic matters, and alcohol. The highest correlations were with the last of these, but there was a ϕ coefficient of ·17 ($p < ·05$) for church activity × international affairs score. The writers note that the Methodist Church had taken a 'strong and persistent

stand' in support of expanding efforts towards international cooperation and against alcohol (James Schellenberg, Leo Stein, Thomas Boynton and Fred Silva, 'Religiosity and Social Attitudes in an Urban Congregation', *Review of Religious Research* 6, 1965, pp. 142–6).

[7] *op. cit.*, pp. 34–36.

[8] For a recent discussion of this process, see Bryan Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society* (Watts, 1966), chap. iv.

[9] Ernest Q. Campbell and Thomas F. Pettigrew, 'Racial and Moral Crisis: The Role of Little Rock Ministers' (*American Journal of Sociology*, 64, 1958–9, pp. 509–516).

[10] 'The Community Reference System, Religiosity and Race Attitudes' (*Social Forces*, 39, 1960–61, pp. 324–328).

[11] 'Status, Residence and Fundamentalism. Religious Beliefs in the Southern Appalachians' (*Social Forces*, 39, 1960-61, pp. 41-49).

[12] 'Overt Conformity to Church Teaching as a Function of Religious Belief and Group Participation' (*American Journal of Sociology*, 70, 1965, pp. 423–8).

[13] *The Religious Factor* (Doubleday, 1961), pp. 174ff.

[14] *Social Class in American Protestantism* (Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 37ff, 57f.

[15] I personally subscribe to what we have termed 'ascetic norms' and I think that with the secularization of society more church norms will come into this category.

[16] On the importance of role ethics, see Dorothy Emmet, *Rules, Roles and Relations* (Macmillan, 1966).

[17] It was suggested by one of my hearers that much in this address represents a humanistic attitude towards religion. It may be worth pointing out, therefore, that sociology must necessarily deal with the external aspects of religion. Yet to accept the line of argument set out above does not mean that the sole necessary cause for religious behaviour has been discovered. Nor does the acceptance of social causation force one to adopt a rigidly deterministic view of all human action. On this last point, see *Invitation to Sociology* by Peter L. Berger (Penguin, 1966).

The Revd Dr Alan B. Wilkinson writes:

It has been pointed out to me that my quotation from an article by Dr Ronald Fletcher on page 35 of January 1967 issue of the *London Quarterly* is incomplete. I cited it from Fr. Martin Jarrett-Kerr's *The Secular Promise* without realising that he had omitted an important phrase. I should, of course, have checked the original source. The complete sentence read: 'Never accept authority: whether that of a jealous god, priest, prime minister, president, dictator, school teacher, social worker, parent, or of anyone else whatsoever, unless, in your own seriously considered view, there are good reasons for it' (*New Society* May 2, 1963). Contrary to my statement therefore, Dr Fletcher does recommend the questioning of all authorities without exception. However I still believe that the scientist, sociologist and psychiatrist do tend to be endowed with a sacral type of authority in our society.

IS RELIGION NECESSARY TO MAN'S WELL-BEING?*

C. Edward Barker

'WHAT do you mean by religion?'—Professor Joad would ask, and it is of importance to determine this right at the outset. Do we find ourselves at home with the evangelism of Billy Graham, or is Margaret Isherwood's religious syncretism as portrayed in her *Faith Without Dogma* more to our taste? By religion do we mean the 'divine encounter' of Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling* or in Barth's *Dogmatics*? Or do we rather think of 'relationship' as envisaged in the Bishop of Woolwich's *A New Reformation*? Is the key to religion a matter of as yet unexpressed relationships suggested in Nicholas Mosley's *Experience and Religion*?

As a boy I used to collect at least £5 a year so that our Christian missionaries could go to convert the heathen Hindus and Mohammedans to the only true God. Now I discover that of the few unforgettable discussions I have had on religion in my adult life, one was with a Hindu and another with a Mohammedan. The old canons of religious law have become outdated. Religious meanings are in the melting pot. Are we—as the Bishop of Woolwich suggests—going through the birth-pangs of another reformation? Or can it be, after all, that Freud was right when he said 'Religion is a universal neurosis'?

The New Testament is in the process—thanks to Bultmann—of being demythologized. In so far as this process is an attempt to get at the reality behind the symbol it is an excellent thing, but I am aware that one of our most pressing needs is that the *Church* and its doctrines be demythologized too.

About two years ago a service was held in Southwark Cathedral to elevate the Reverend J. D. Pearce-Higgins to the Canonry of the Cathedral. Mr Pearce-Higgins found it necessary to interrupt the proceedings with a statement to the effect that although he gave formal assent as law required to the thirty-nine articles ('which do contain the true doctrine of the Church of England agreeable to God's Word') he did so with his tongue in his cheek, declaring that some of these articles, which form the very structure of the Anglican Church, were quite opposed to his convictions and conscience.

Someone remarked to me the other day that the reason for the unbelievably large sales of *Honest to God* was that at last a *clergyman* had made an attempt to be honest!

These remarks by way of introduction lead me to my first main point: that THERE ARE ELEMENTS IN TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY THAT ARE ANTITHETICAL TO MAN'S WELL-BEING.

One of the most urgent needs in theology is for a new assessment of the

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nature of the Gospel. What is the Gospel—good news—of our salvation? What are we saved *from*? What are we saved *to*?

I often think there are two criteria we should hold firmly in mind in assessing the value of any doctrine of Christian belief: (1) Is this true and honest, easily understood by the generality of men and women, and (2) Does this doctrine work?

What, then, is the fundamental nature of our Gospel? I delight in many of Isaac Watts's hymns, but here is a statement of the faith I simply cannot sing:

Not all the blood of beasts
On Jewish altars slain
Could give the guilty conscience peace
Or wash away our stain.
But Christ, the heavenly Lamb,
Takes all our sins away;
A sacrifice of nobler name
And richer blood than they.

But does he? Christ died, 'the godly for the ungodly', to save us from sin, from guilt, from death, from the wrath of God. This, I suppose, could be a valid way of expressing truth as it appealed to a former century, but it doesn't make sense to the bearded Apollos in our modern youth clubs, nor to countless other people. Because I accept the sacrifice of Christ for my sin, does it save me from *further sin*? As a sinner, I know it does not. As for *guilt*, Leslie Weatherhead rightly says in *Psychology, Religion and Healing*, 'guilt cannot be transferred.' Psychoanalysts are agreed on that. Nor does Christ's atoning death save me from *death*. We know that every man-jack of us will experience death for himself when his time comes. No one can save us from the act of dying. 'But,' you may say, 'doesn't Christ's death save us from the *wrath of God*?' Here we come to confusion worse confounded. Paul Tillich says that God's wrath is the out-working of his love. And no one would like to suppose that Christ's death saved us from the experience of the out-workings of the love of God. Surely if Jesus believed that his death was to be an expiation or atonement for sin, he would have so arranged matters that it should happen on a day such as the Day of Atonement, but instead he was at pains to make his death coincide with the joyful Passover festival which represented the wedding of God with his people.

It is true that the Apostle Paul used the analogy of the Passover Lamb as an interpretation of Christ's sacrifice, but soon this analogy was swallowed up, confused with and overwhelmed by the more grandiose metaphor of the Sacrificial Lamb, the Expiator of Sin, described in his letters to the Romans, and later in the liturgy of the Prayer Book, summed up in the statement that Jesus 'by his one oblation of himself once offered [made] a full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world'.

It is significant that nowhere in the synoptic gospels does Jesus ever make such a claim for himself, nor envisage himself in such a *role*. Even in the words of institution of the Last Supper there is no suggestion either in Mark's

gospel or in Luke's that his body was broken and his blood shed 'for the forgiveness of sins'. This only appears as a studied afterthought in Matthew's account, and I, personally, believe these words to be in the nature of a later amendment. Oscar Pfister, the eminent Lutheran pastor and psychoanalyst says

'According to the view of Jesus the *one* essential for salvation is that the *moral* claim shall be fulfilled. Pursuing the path outlined by St Paul, the Christian Church has again and again obscured, distorted and attempted to refute this fundamental fact, and in doing so has done incalculable harm to the development of Christian piety. And yet Jesus never made salvation depend on the belief in any given dogma, or participation in any religious ceremonies or on subordination to the institutions of the Church. "Ye shall know them by their fruits. Not every one that said unto me 'Lord, Lord' shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father." "And when he was gone forth into the way there came one running, and kneeled to him, and asked him, 'Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?' And Jesus said unto him, 'Thou knowest the commandments, Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness'." *There could be no clearer way of declaring that it is moral action that leads to salvation and not obedience to doctrine and ritual.* The lawyer who asked what he must do to inherit eternal life was reminded in reply of the commandment to love God and his neighbour, and these words were illustrated forthwith by the parable of the good Samaritan. In the great speech about the Last Judgement Jesus points out that works of mercy are the condition for admission to the everlasting kingdom of heaven.'

It is significant that the very earliest document in the New Testament (the Epistle of St James), dubbed by Martin Luther 'an epistle of straw', is concerned wholly with moral issues and with faith; faith—not in the blood of Jesus for the forgiveness of sins but—the faith in the power of God that operates by works. This epistle is a truer reflection of the attitude of Jesus than are some of the letters of St Paul.

If all the foregoing sounds like 'a shaking of the foundations', to use a phrase of Tillich, I venture to utter it in the hope that men of this generation may have the courage to face a restatement of the essentials of Christian truth, a restatement, honest and more faithful to the teaching and spirit of Jesus; furthermore, a restatement that will give the lie to Freud's accusation that the Church is but perpetuating a universal obsessional neurosis.

I said earlier that there are two criteria we should firmly hold in mind in assessing the value of our doctrines. The first criterion, you will remember, was this: *Is this doctrine true and honest?* A brief answer to this question I have just attempted and have tried to show that a revision of doctrines and attitudes is urgent if our beliefs are to contribute to man's well-being rather than to his neurosis.

The second criterion was this: *Does this doctrine work? Does it pass the pragmatic test?* The laws of physical science cannot be applied to theology, but the laws of pragmatism can well be applied, and must be applied if we are to be honest with ourselves. William James in his *Pragmatism* says, in effect, 'A thing is what it does' and, 'If it is true, it works.'

I suggest that the old way of looking at the Cross as an expiatory, substi-

tutionary or representative sacrifice for sin does not promote man's well-being but instead tends to encourage obsessive, compulsive and masochistic tendencies. It tends to fixate men and women in a masochistic dependence upon God and so becomes an enemy to true spiritual and psychological growth. It also tends with some people to encourage an easy evasion of true spiritual challenge. All too often I have seen patients bogged down in spiritual invalidism because they felt compelled so to identify themselves with the Cross of Christ that the experience of joy, spontaneity, romance and sexual love were made impossible. The tragedianism and depression of many nervous and psychotic subjects may be traced back, certainly, to a deficiency in love on the parents' part; but such impoverishment from the parent all too often becomes projected on to the kind of 'monster' God who can only forgive at the cost of a sacrifice of his own Son. How different is this from the attitude Jesus himself showed in the story of the father and his prodigal son. The father required no sacrifice, appeasement or even sorrow for sin as the prerequisite of his forgiveness, but while the son was yet a great way off 'his father saw him and his heart went out to him. He ran to meet him, flung his arms round him and kissed him.' Nuff said.[1]

This brings me to my second main point. WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A GOSPEL THAT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY VALID AND CAN BE RECOGNIZED AS THE GROUND OF OUR MORAL AND SPIRITUAL WELL-BEING AND AS A BASIS FOR HEALTH, MATURITY, AND VICTORY?

As a consequence of nearly twenty years in the ministry followed by an almost similar length of time in professional psychotherapy, it has come to be my deep conviction that Jesus, in his mission, communicated *three great experiences* to us through which we are rescued from moral and spiritual dilemmas, liberated as far as we desire to be from our sin, misfortunes and illnesses, forgiven as far as we entertain within our imagination a new direction in life, and through which we come into the kind of destiny God intended for his creatures.

The *first* of these experiences *is that of being loved.* To put it in religious language, 'We are saved (i.e. rescued, freed for growth, maturity and ultimate destiny) by love.'

We are so familiar with such an assertion that it appears trite. Our hearts do not burst with joy and gratitude at this thought because, alas, it is for many people 'as cold as charity—as cold as the divine charity, as cold as God's love'. Here I quote from H. A. Williams in *The True Wilderness.* 'I don't mean that God's love is in fact cold. It's much too hot for most of us most of the time. But it is often made to appear cold by those who are afraid of its heat and are on the look-out for respectable reasons for cooling it down. Thus, for instance, we are often told that God's love is totally different from natural love. The warmth, the thrill, the vital peace of satisfactory natural love have nothing in common with true love for God, let alone God's attitude to us. Our love for God is a matter of will-power, not of anything we know as love at all. And as for God's attitude to us, it is cold and austere. That is the chief reason, perhaps the only reason why we sin. We deeply resent having this inhuman monster as Lord over us. To thumb-nose and

kick Him is our secret pleasure, secret very often, even from ourselves.'

God's love is so often presented to us, not as the most exquisitely warm experience we have ever known, but as a stern demand which, if we obey it, will lead to a purification of soul and to some kind of sainthood. But if God's love is *demand*, then we have completely missed our way.

As a psychotherapist I spend my working hours helping men and women in the throes of neurosis, psychosis, psychosomatic troubles and sexual deviations. What is the primary cause of all this unhappiness? It always goes back, not to the precipitating occasion when nervous or psychotic trouble first makes its appearance. It always goes back to the early infant years of life and ultimately to some deprival of love and understanding in the first year of existence. Either the mother was unable to meet the demands of the baby's helplessness, or there was quarrelling in the home, or 'a taboo on tenderness' (Ian Suttie's term). In one way or another, the sensual love and protection the baby needed was missing. The baby—bereft of true relationship by which to grow his ego through the various stages to maturity—had to make other arrangements by which to survive the blow and make life viable and safe. He found other outlets—often morbid or neurotic—to keep him in existence. He formed emotional patterns of reaction that led to strains and conflicts and eventually to breakdown. He had been unable to make contact with his first object, his mother, and probably with his father as well. As a result he became geared to an emotional existence in which, at the deepest of levels, he felt rejected and cut off, to be surviving on a substitute, some morbid satisfaction such as hate or self-hate (which is depression), humiliation, self-consciousness, masochism, sadism and usually some form of sensual and sexual immaturity as well. He lived on these substitute satisfactions because, to begin with, his fundamental need for *relationship and union* had never been satisfied in his mother's arms. As he grew up he found that a flaming two-edged sword kept him out of the garden of *relationship* whenever he ventured to press into it. He was for ever repelled from the maternal breast and so from oneness with any other living creature. Whatever the attitude of his world might be towards him, *he* feels it to be rejecting and even dangerous, and in his sense of revolt he rebels and kicks and shows jealousy and hurt.

Jesus, I believe, knew this well. He knew what was in man. In his day there were no schools of psychology or philosophy through which to express such *dynamic* concepts. But he knew well enough that the hurts of schizoid distance and separation start in the first year of life and keep us from maturity and wholeness. I believe that is why he said to that learned man of Jerusalem, 'Except ye be *born again* ye cannot even begin to see the reign of God.'

If I may become very personal for a moment I would like to mention that I had been brought up in a somewhat narrow religious tradition on the solemn Pauline admonition, 'Children, obey your parents.' My mother, as far as I can gather, though she had three children, felt quite unequal to the demands of motherhood and, after she had struggled for years with the weariness of an obsessional neurosis, died when I was five, and the reins of

government had to be held by an overworked father whose solution, though he meant well enough, was to rule with a rod of iron. It is not surprising, when I came to have a psychoanalysis, that soon I was in the throes of the back-log of this emotional situation, and it was only then that I was able to throw overboard the stern inner authority of my father. I found, however, that in throwing overboard this inner authority of my father, my faith—or at least the faith I had thought was mine—was largely thrown overboard with it. I found myself thrashing about in an unaccustomed sea of religious doubt. One evening, late, I was taking the dog for a walk and was meditating on this strange statement that 'God is love'. I had to admit to myself that whatever love was, I did not really know it. I was trying to communicate with God in a kind of meditation and I was explaining this dilemma to the Almighty in my stumbling, seeking way, when suddenly I realized what Jesus had been talking about when he spoke of being born again. He knew human need and heartbreak, and he knew where it started in the loss of relationship in very early life. He knew that the only way to come into warmth of relationship in adult years is to go right back to the beginning and to be *re*-born, but this time to be born into the arms of God and to find in him the warmth, tenderness, comfort, union, solicitude and even sensual harmony that had been missing in the first relationship. How it happened I do not know, but it seemed as if at that moment God came rushing to meet me in my need. Suddenly there was no doubt. I stood in that country lane amazed and overcome. God *loves* me. God loves *me*. Tears, until now unknown to me, rained down my face. The broken-heartedness of the years fell from me and it seemed that for the first time in my life I was at peace in the arms of God. This was catharsis. This amazing experience, the *start* of many phases of development, growth and maturity, had been made possible by *psychoanalysis*. But without the *gospel* Jesus came to give, it could not have been actualized.

Here, I feel, is the nexus of the rescuing, the healing, re-making gospel of Jesus and because I have been born again—not in some hot gospel sense, but in basic *relationship*, I can never doubt God again.

This element in the gospel is vital, I find, to weary and loveless men and women who are in the throes of nervous breakdown and who are ready to appreciate what religion may have for them. Broken and diseased men and women need to experience above everything that they are loved deeply and satisfyingly, and because they are loved it is at least possible for them to enter into *relationship*. This is only a beginning, of course. On the deepest of all levels it makes for a release of their spirit from its prison-house and the beginnings of true psychological and spiritual growth.

The *second* of these experiences that Jesus communicated to us in his gospel is *an awareness of the supremacy of spiritual reality and law*. Jesus showed us that the law of love—the Kingdom of God which he announced —though not entirely new, was a truth about God that men needed to apprehend in a peculiarly personal way. Before the time of Jesus, of course, men had discovered that there were spiritual and psychical laws that superseded the determinism and restrictions of natural law whenever men attained

to a state of mind *where they accepted this supremacy.* Such supremacy of spiritual reality and law was known in former centuries to Yogis, mystics, prophets, and even witch doctors. Elijah made rain to fall on the parched earth because of his faith in the supremacy of spiritual law. Elisha brought breath back to a dead body by the kiss of life centuries before the St John Ambulance movement learned the trick of it. Jesus demonstrated that spiritual power is not confined to an experience of 'the Sunday night feeling' or of the 'numinous'. It is not limited to what we normally call spiritual and moral ends, important though these are. Spiritual powers, both then and now, sometimes manifest themselves in activities outside the strict purview of religion.

To come to modern times, J. B. Rhine and his distinguished wife Louise, with their co-workers, have discovered facts concerning extra-sensory perception and psycho-kinesis that Jesus demonstrated two thousand years ago as 'signs' that God indeed reigned. Recently a book by Harold Sherman has been published with the title *How to Make E.S.P. Work for You,* in which he shows how telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition and other heightened powers of mind, can accomplish feats quite beyond the understanding of science. I have not yet found myself to be an adept in telepathy, but I was struck by several matters mentioned in Rolf Alexander's well-known book *The Power of the Mind.* Among other things, he mentions that when the mind is elevated to a state of consciousness which we would call 'faith', it is possible for man to display power over elements in the physical universe not ordinarily at his disposal, and he speaks in his book of experiments in dispersing light cumulus clouds of his choice simply by an act of faith. I found this claim difficult to accept at the time and wondered whether he was self-deceived. Then one day I tried the experiment myself. To my astonishment it was successful. I tried again, and again it succeeded, and since then I have made hundreds of similar experiments with excellent results and have learned much in the process.

It is possible too, by prayer or meditation, to bring things long forgotten back to our remembrance, and to make our mind work for us in creative ways during the hours of sleep. Jesus was, of course, familiar with these things. His works of healing the sick, changing water into wine, stilling a storm, feeding five thousand people with a handful of loaves and fishes, all were evidences of this kind of creative consciousness and signs of the presence and the reign of God. Such a state of consciousness is what Ouspensky calls 'the awakening', Bucke calls 'Cosmic Consciousness' and Rolf Alexander calls 'Creative Realism'. It is important in this connection to remember that Jesus did not perform his own healing victories or nature miracles in order to suggest that he had powers differing from the ordinary run of men. He made it abundantly clear that he expected his disciples to do similar works, and to continue his experiments. Indeed, he said, 'Greater works than these shall *ye* do because I go to the Father.'

Another point that intrigues me is that he did not limit himself in the performing of miracles to those that would save life or heal sickness, nor did he confine himself to performing works that had strictly an ethical end in

view. As far as we are aware, no one was made spiritually stronger by his turning water into wine at a wedding feast where the guests had already drunk all the wine provided, and there would appear to be no strictly moral significance in his walking on the water when presumably a boat would have taken him to his destination just as well. These powers were used as experiments in spiritual law and as evidences of the reign of God.

Healing miracles continued to be known for a time in the early Church, but soon the Church evaded this great challenge by becoming engulfed in its theological preoccupation with the nature and person of Christ. The Church so isolated Jesus and his powers from the ordinary run of men that these powers soon fell into decline. Since science and its determinism has held a death-grip on our world, the healing and nature miracles of our Lord have tended to be explained away and rationalized, but of recent years physicists have made the startling discovery that certain movements of atom substructures are quite unpredictable in their movements and behaviour, and they are coming to admit that there are more things in heaven and earth than were dreamed of in their materialist philosophy.

It is only possible to touch the periphery of such a vast subject here but the latest mysteries in nuclear science, taken alongside discoveries in the field of E.S.P. and P.K., are underlining the truth that where men are in the right state of consciousness, God is *seen* to be present in his world. *He* is ruling and reigning in a sense that goes beyond science. This is being observed in the healing of disease by paranormal agencies, in the beneficent alteration of difficult circumstances where men are receiving him, praying in faith, and meditating. To quote Rolf Alexander again, 'When we are able permanently to integrate our consciousness as a conscious mind, then it is probable that we shall be able easily to perform creative works far beyond the possibilities of subconscious man. Consciousness is the Kingdom of Heaven, and when that is attained "all other things shall be added".'

I have concentrated on this element in the field of spiritual reality and law because whilst the Church is ever ready to emphasize the moral aspect of eternal law, since the early centuries of its existence it has neglected and at times opposed this important element of truth. The reappearance of this element in the gospel will go far to dispel scepticism, and will do much to convince men and women that the Almighty is not dead but is busy in the midst of the world he created.

The *third* experience Jesus communicated in his gospel was *the secret of faith in action.* Wherever Jesus went he urged needy men and women to have faith in God. By this he did not mean 'theological' faith. He did not suggest that by faith in his death we change our status from that of a goat to that of a sheep. When Jesus preached faith he was urging an attitude of expectancy and belief in the power of God to heal sickness and to alter circumstances for the better.

Since St Paul's time it has been supposed that if we are to demonstrate our faith in God to this end, then we must put the self (the ego) aside and make ourselves *passive* channels through which God may work, so we 'count ourselves as inner refuse that we might win Christ' because 'we are not

sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God'. I believe that this is a misapprehension of our Lord's intention. Faith cannot be demonstrated in a vacuum and God *will* not do the works that are possible by faith without the disciple's full co-operation. 'Have faith in God,' said Jesus, and by that he was exhorting man to be an active participant. 'Oh to be nothing, nothing' is not an experience familiar to those who do the works of faith. Indeed, 'to them that received him, he gave *authority* to be sons of God'. This *authority* was not any outward distinction, but the inward authority of those who know themselves to be active sons of God. A 'son' is a junior partner and has a responsible role to fulfil. Jesus always urged men to grow more faith and if they are to develop the faith that can remove mountains, they must be sure of their place with God. God is supreme and his powers are unlimited, but for faith in action God needs man and *will* not work without him.

I wonder whether you can recall any experiment of faith where your prayer was answered and results were realized. Such an act of faith is as big an adventure as an expedition to the South Pole. It is an experiment that summons all there is of us. It is a work of creative imagination that *costs*, and we cannot go forward in any act of real faith without investing the whole of our personality, and without risking ridicule, or loss of face, or a wound to our certainty or pride.

Earlier on I mentioned some experiments I had made in cloud dispersal. I learned a lot through these experiments. I discovered I must never be careless, half-hearted or flippant. If I am mobilized as a junior partner in an act of faith, God requires all there is of me. This is, of course, at least equally true when one is engaged in any work of healing, and it is my experience in psychotherapeutic work that some challenges have all the elements of a faith experiment. To give one illustration: A man from a small Commonwealth country approached me with a request for help. He was brilliant academically—such a good mathematician that he could argue about Einstein's relativity in learned journals. He was also a barrister-at-law and the leader of the opposition in his own government. He had had a serious breakdown in health in two ways: his heart was in a parlous condition and he was bent almost double as a result of spondylitis. He came to this country on his doctor's advice to see two Harley Street specialists, one for his heart and the other for his spine. Both specialists told him they could do nothing for him and advised him to return to his country, resign his important office and end his days in virtual retirement. Before doing so, someone suggested he should come to see me at Hove, because I was not only a psychotherapist but a minister as well. He came. After a long discussion in which, among other things, we shared our faith in God, we decided to go forward on *two* fronts, psychological and spiritual. He was an excellent subject for psychotherapy. But the fact that after about three months of treatment he walked erect and was given a clean bill of health by the very specialists who had pronounced his doom, was in no small part due to an act of faith. A steady belief and constant affirmation that God wanted this man to be better to continue his work, that God's law was this man's healing, contributed to his

restoration. Every day the exercise of faith made spiritual demands on me that I shall never forget, and helped me to understand the ways of God in faith. I learned among other things that (a) the secret of such a faith is a sense of co-operation with God as his *junior partner*, for he *will not* work without us, and (b) *Attitudes are the creators of events*, and as we go through any necessary pains and trouble to clarify our attitudes, we have power with God and with men.

Over a number of years I had read from the synoptic gospels constantly. They have been my unending source of discovery. I have dug deeply into them as for hidden treasure and I have increasingly been made aware that Jesus was always urging his disciples to learn the laws of faith, and to *increase* their faith in order that mountains of difficulty or sickness might be removed. As we devote ourselves to going through this learning process we come to a nearness with God and a certainty of his operation that can come in no other way. This, I believe, is a most important element of the gospel, and one that has been sorely neglected by the majority of Christians. It is faithful to our Lord's own emphasis. It is truly therapeutic, and works for man's well-being.

And now, briefly to conclude. I believe that as we recapture these three great elements in the gospel, religion will become once again alive in this our day. It is quite true that for our religious understanding we need psychology. It is my own personal conviction that if psychology is to do the work that it can do for the healing of men, then psychology needs religious truth to promote man's well-being. And the three great truths of the gospel which I have briefly outlined here are, I believe, means for the healing of the wounds of the world. Let me enumerate them again:

(1) We are saved, rescued, made free, come to growth and maturity by the experience of *receiving love*.

(2) We come to a new vitality and awareness as we recognize the supremacy of *spiritual* law and encourage experience of it. This is, in part, what Jesus meant by the 'hidden treasure' concerning the Reign of God.

(3) *Faith in action* entails that we exercise our authority as sons of God. Attitudes are creative, and they create events for the healing and blessing of mankind.

(1) *Editorial Note*: For the ambiguity of this parable see D. M. Mackinnon in G. W. H. Lampe and D. M. Mackinnon's *The Resurrection* (Mowbray 1966) p 79-80. Cf. Mackinnon's essay in the Farmer *Festschrift*.

TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PACIFISM AND NON-PACIFISM

John Stacey

IN 1939 the Methodist Church was divided into two unarmed camps. There were the pacifists who believed that the Gospel of Jesus Christ was irreconcilable with participation in war and there were the non-pacifists who believed that, though war was evil, to permit the Nazi tyranny to flourish was even more evil. Between these two positions there was a great gulf fixed, and when war broke out the latter fought and the former did not.

It is clear to all who have thought seriously in this particular field of Christian ethics that these two positions are not what they were and it might be no bad thing if an attempt were made to describe the changes that have taken place.

The pacifism of 1939 had three characteristic marks. One was an individual renunciation of war. Members of the Methodist Peace Fellowship made their solemn covenant beginning with the words, 'I, a member of the Methodist Church, covenant with my fellow-members of the Methodist Peace Fellowship to renounce war in spirit and in act now and always, God being my helper.' For many this led to registration at the Ministry of Labour as conscientious objectors followed by a tribunal at which they were accepted (conditionally or unconditionally) or rejected. This renunciation of war was a significant act. Granted that it could never be carried through to its last, logical conclusion, nevertheless it was, in those circumstances, a meaningful action. The conscientious objector, by his peculiar behaviour, was a witness in society to the evil of war and he could never be completely ignored. Still more within the Church, the fact that numbers of young Christians took this stand affected the attitude of the Church towards the war and influenced all discussion on the relationship between Christianity and war. Consequently, when a person became a pacifist and, as an individual, renounced war, he felt he was doing something significant. This was perhaps less true of ministers than of laity because they did not go on to become conscientious objectors, but in allying themselves with the laity they shared in the same sense of purpose.

Secondly, the individual renunciation of war was made in the context of transcendental ethics. In particular, the pacifist looked at the 'Way of the Cross,' and, while acknowledging that our Lord's redemptive work for the salvation of mankind was unique, yet believed that here was a revelation of the way in which evil should be met. Overcoming evil with good, meeting hatred and violence with love, no matter what the consequences in terms of suffering, this was the 'principle' to be discovered as one pondered upon the 'Way of the Cross'. The next step was to take this transcendental 'principle' and 'apply' it to the everyday world, and it was this process that either led

the pacifist to take his stand or justified it after he had taken it for other reasons. Many pacifists did this in the 1930s with unwavering conviction. Faced with a world preparing for war and then with a world actually waging it, they gave thanks that they had this extra-mundane, transcendental and, in their judgement, incontrovertible way revealed to them and they proceeded to 'apply' it to the best of their ability. And whenever a pacifist had to argue his case, which was not infrequently, he always tried to drive his opponent back (if he were a Christian) to the 'Way of the Cross', for he thought that he would be quite unable to reconcile his adherence to war with the absolute standard of love there revealed.

Thirdly, the individual renunciation of war was generally based on absolutist ethics. Nobody became a pacifist without believing that some 'thing' was always and everywhere wrong. What the 'thing' was tended to vary from pacifist to pacifist. With some it was the institution of war itself, as in the Covenant of the Methodist Peace Fellowship quoted above. With others it was the taking of life. With others it was the practice of violence or force. But whichever it was, the pacifist had a 'thing' which was wrong under all circumstances. As a matter of principle there did not, and there could not, exist circumstances under which it could be right. The pacifist stand was absolutist. It was a stand 'on principle'. The assumption that a 'thing' could always and everywhere be wrong enabled people to send the simple postcard to Dick Sheppard, and later to the Peace Pledge Union: 'I renounce war and will never support or sanction another.'

The change that has occurred in the pacifist position can best be described as a change in these three characteristics. The arrival of nuclear weapons has meant that an individual renunciation of war in the sense of a decision to fight or not to fight is not as relevant as it was before. Some would argue that, because there is the possibility of the reintroduction of conscription or selective service or the possibility (somewhat remote) of the abolition of nuclear weapons, there is still meaning in an individual renunciation of war. Others point out that in some situations of limited war (Korea, Vietnam) and in international police action (Cyprus, Congo) the choice between taking up arms and not taking up arms is a real one. There is no doubt truth in these arguments, but the fact remains that, if we look at the situation from the point of view of pacifist apologetics and evangelism, the call for an individual renunciation of war is largely meaningless. It is asking people to take a decision *in vacuo*. They can see that, because of the overshadowing presence of 'the bomb', such a decision clearly does not have the significance it had in the 1930s. This has been proved true in the experience of the Christian pacifist societies. People, and particularly young people in universities and colleges, have been impressed with much of the pacifist argumentation but when it has come to the question of individual renunciation of war they have not found themselves in the valley of decision.

Then in ethics the existentialists have taken over, and if pacifists still adhere to the transcendental ethics of the 1930s they will be dismissed as standing shoulder to shoulder with the obscurantists. They realize that, if they try to talk to our younger thinkers about looking at the 'Way of the

Cross' and then 'applying' it to the modern situation, they will not persuade them. The new theologians think in existential terms. Their concern is with entering into situations and, instead of bringing fixed presuppositions with them (though of course they cannot avoid bringing their past experience with them), seeking to discover, if they can, what the Living Christ is already doing in those situations. John Vincent speaks for them: 'God's will is not a static "doctrine" or "dogma". It is his immediate and relevant command to the singular and unique situation confronting a man at a given time. It is where Christ is and what Christ is' (*Christ in a Nuclear World*, p. 63). They would use the word 'existential' to describe man's response to this varying and relevant command of God, though some prefer the word 'situational' as they think 'existential' might prove to be embarrassing. Clearly, existentialist or situational ethics do not preclude a pacifist attitude, for it may be found that obedience to the Living Christ in a situation calls forth exactly the same response as the pacifist would have given under the older ways of thinking. But the approach is different.

Thirdly, absolutist ethics have gone the same way as transcendental ethics. As John Robinson says in his heavy assault on pacifism, 'The reduction of every political and economic problem to a simple moral problem is a very great heresy' (*On Being the Church in the World*, p. 47). Simply to argue that the 'thing', be it war, killing or violence, is always and everywhere wrong in itself is unacceptable on a number of grounds. It is legalism pure and simple, and substitutes the law for the gospel. It prevents fruitful encounter between the pacifist and the non-pacifist as the latter regards the former, often rightly, as entrenched in positions of 'principle' from which nothing will ever move him. But it is also, as Robinson said, a heresy. Raymond Billington has argued this case in his pamphlet, 'The Basis of Pacifist Conviction'. 'Christ never said, when referring to Christian behaviour, "These actions are absolutely right, or wrong, in themselves." Instead he showed the only possible absolute for the Christian is the absolute of love: and this is not a moral absolute because love is not a particular action but the motive behind it' (p. 6). This brings us near to the existentialist position mentioned in the previous paragraph, for to ask, 'What does love demand in this situation?' is not very different from asking, 'What is my obedience to the Living Christ in this situation?' But both are very different from the legal absolutism which has decided that a thing is wrong before the situation has occurred. There is consequently some tension between pacifists who believe with John Ferguson, 'I would be a Christian pacifist even if it could be shown that my commitment made war more probable' (*Reconciliation*, August 1964, p. 157) and those who have a much greater concern with what is possible, and, in the best sense, expedient. In many, perhaps most, situations their response would be the same, but again, the approach would be different.

Turning now to non-pacifism, we find changes here too. Due to the promulgation of the 1957 Declaration of the Methodist Church on Peace and War and the publicity given to subsequent Resolutions of Conference, they are rather better known and so can be stated with more brevity. The step forward taken by the 1957 Declaration was the insistence that in war waged

with nuclear weapons in the megaton range the 'just war' was impossible. Some of the conditions laid down by moral theology as having to be fulfilled before the war could be reckoned 'just' were no longer applicable. Part of Aquinas' *recta intentio* was that the war should offer the possibility of good to be achieved outweighing the evils that it would involve. Vittoria had contributed the condition that the war should be waged with a reasonable hope of victory for justice. The *debitus modus* of Suarez was an insistence that the methods used should be legitimate, i.e. in accordance with man's nature as a rational being and with Christian moral principles. None of these conditions could be fulfilled in a large-scale nuclear war and therefore such a war could not be considered 'just'.

In the years following 1957, Resolutions of Conference amplified this conclusion:

1958—'We are convinced that global thermo-nuclear warfare would be a crime against humanity, *not justified in any circumstances*.'

1960—'The Conference demands that Christian men shall face the new situation which now exists in the world and denounces as wholly evil weapons which are immeasurable in their indiscriminate and atrocious effects upon mankind.'

This new situation brought division among non-pacifists. Not all felt able to accept the advance made by the 1957 Declaration and they were prepared, and still are prepared, to support a policy of 'massive retaliation'. Their thinking is vintage 1939. Others have accepted the new situation and believe with the Methodist Conference that the use of nuclear weapons in the megaton range cannot be justified in any circumstances. This, for the non-pacifist this time, is the 'thing' that is always and everywhere wrong. But at the same time as use was forbidden it was considered justifiable and wise to keep such weapons as a deterrent. Many non-pacifists believe that if the possession of big nuclear weapons is the most certain way of ensuring that they are never used, then we must possess them. Again, other non-pacifists have criticized this position, holding that if there is a complete absence of intention to use large nuclear weapons they can only be held as an effective deterrent under one (or possibly both) of two conditions. One is that the enemy does not find out that they will never be used; that he does not discover that we are only bluffing. This is wildly improbable. The other is that the section of the community that renounces their use shelters behind the section of the community that does not. It is all very well for Methodists to renounce the use of the big bombs (and if words mean anything at all that is what the Conference resolutions do mean), but for the deterrent to be effective and credible some people must be prepared to forgo that renunciation. Unable to accept these two conditions, some non-pacifists have come to the conclusion that if they cannot be used then they cannot be held as a deterrent. At this point a further division occurs. Some wish to extricate themselves from this position through multilateral agreement (in which negotiations they would be joined by those who are content to hold the deterrent until such agreement is reached). Others see the matter in terms of a moral imperative, a renunciation and abandonment carried through at once and in all probability alone,

because the alternative is morally unacceptable. The latter are the unilateralists who constituted the non-pacifist majority of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament before it went into decline.

The question must now be asked whether or not, in view of the change in pacifist thinking and the different renunciations of nuclear weapons by non-pacifists, a reconciliation between pacifism and non-pacifism is possible. Two further questions seem to be involved here. One is how absolutism and non-absolutism can coexist within a Church without one being right and the other wrong. The other is the more practical question of the efforts at peace-making which pacifist and non-pacifist can make together.

First, then, must we not face the fact that absolutist attitudes can only be justified as vocations? To accomplish some specific work or to witness to some specific evil, God may very well call people to be separate. The monk takes an absolutist stand when he is called to vow himself to poverty, chastity and obedience. The total abstainer would contend that he is an absolutist in order to witness against the evil caused by drink. And if we contend that war, or violence, or force is wrong for us under all circumstances, ought we not to be doing so because God has separated us to witness in this way? If pacifism is so considered as a vocation, two things follow.

One is that not every Christian will be, or ought to be, a pacifist. God will call some to witness in this way, but not others, and this will help those pacifists who have not found it easy to reconcile a belief in the Holy Spirit leading the Church into all truth with the fact that the majority of Christians, including some of the most intelligent and devout ones, have not been pacifists. It will also mean that the pre-Constantine conception of the Church is not necessarily the only acceptable one. While the revolutionary, anti-state community has its contribution to make to our thinking on the functions of the Church in the world, so has establishment. As Kenneth Johnstone says (*Roads to Peace*, p. 18), 'The Church cannot now dissociate itself entirely from the world of politics and history or retire into the gratifying role of outside observer and critic, the hair-robed prophet bursting into the secular council chamber with an occasional denunciation or an even rarer word of approval.' Hair-robed prophets will always be necessary, but not every Christian will be one.

A recognition of the other-worldliness of absolutist pacifism as far as politics is concerned also follows. This kind of pacifism only 'works' in an eschatological sense. Lord Soper, in an article in *Reconciliation* (April 1965, p. 65), said about the title 'Not so much a programme, more a way of life': 'there could not be a more accurate general description than this title conveys of what pacifism is really all about.' He continues, 'Perhaps the most difficult lesson the pacifist has to learn is that in practical terms, as things are, the applicability of his belief is in inverse proportion to its depth and comprehensiveness', and he argues that the work of the pacifist is to forge the weapons of reconciliation. Until this is done, 'the programme of pacifism is precluded'. This releases the pacifist from making naïve attempts to produce political policies which are consistent with the Sermon on the Mount. It's impossible. And it is easier to accept the assertion that one must

do what one believes to be right without regard to the consequences if this is part of a vocation to which some are called rather than a position which, ideally, every Christian should hold. In other words, absolutism and non-absolutism can coexist within the Church if the vocational nature of the former is clearly recognized.

Secondly, any reconciliation between pacifism and non-pacifism cannot be confined to a mutual recognition of the validity of the other position as it is held at the present time. It must be a reconciliation in action as well as in thought and the following are three examples of areas where such action can be taken. There are, of course, many others.

The pacifist and the non-pacifist have to witness together to the true nature of war. Each rising generation needs to be taught the sheer bloody horror of it. It also needs to be taught that it solves one problem only at the expense of causing others that are equally dangerous and intractable. This witness has to be made both to the world and to the Church, and so far as the latter is concerned the sin and blasphemy of destroying fellow-members of the Body of Christ has to be driven home. As John C. Bennett, the American theologian, says with reference to the reconciliation brought about by the Church after the last war, 'But it is not enough for the Christian community to become an agent of reconciliation after a war is over; it must always create an attitude that never allows the community across these chasms to be fully broken.'

A united witness is necessary to the dangers of the present situation with its preservation of peace based on the mutual threat of indiscriminate war. Custom can make men blind to the appalling dangers involved and pacifists and non-pacifists together must open their eyes. Sir Michael Wright, with his delightful felicity for illustration, has said that 'to base our hopes for the future of mankind on faith in a lasting balance of prudence, on the accumulation of more and more horrible weapons, which might credibly be used at any moment, but never are used, is rather like expecting a Sultan to maintain more and more dancing girls to whom he might make love, but never does'. To work for the speedy removal of the nuclear dancing girls is a commitment that, in view of their positions as described above, pacifists and non-pacifists can make together.

Then there is the political arena. So far as the pacifist is concerned, the 1967 substitute for the 1939 stand before the tribunal as a 'conchie' is the advocacy of radical action over the whole field of politics. The non-pacifist, with his concern for the expedient, has always had a deep concern with politics, though his action has not always been radical. Here we become involved with the bread and butter of international politics: United Nations intervention, disarmament negotiations, international police action, disengagement, nuclear-free zones and the rest. An example of what can be said by pacifists and non-pacifists working together in the political field may be seen in the following paragraph from the Report of the Christian Citizenship Department to the Methodist Conference of 1965. It was accepted without dissent:

'American policy [in Vietnam] is to sustain a government that would

otherwise collapse, in order to preserve a base for the military containment of Chinese Communism. But the turbulence of South-East Asia cannot be frozen by military action. Responsible risks must be taken for peace. It is not certain that the guaranteed neutrality of the States of Indo-China would be as effective a barrier to Chinese aggression as American bases, but it is probable enough, and the alternative is so dangerous, for the risk to be responsibly taken. For this reason, we would urge that Britain should dissociate herself from current American policy in Vietnam.'

This was followed in 1966 by the passing of this even stronger resolution:

The Methodist Conference:

Deplores the decisions already partially carried out by the armed forces of the U.S.A. to bomb installations at Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam;

Condemns the misguided policy pursued by the United States Government throughout this conflict, of which this terrible extension of the war is inevitable consequence;

Calls upon H.M. Government to dissociate itself completely from this policy so that Britain can play a positive and effective part in bringing about a peaceful settlement.

The controversial issue in this field will be whether or not the absolutist position on the use of force should at any point be compromised, but it is clear that an immense amount of thinking, speaking and acting waits to be done before that issue is likely to arise.

In this reconciliation something ought to happen to the word 'pacifist'. Its use could be extended to cover both the absolutist and the peace-maker who feels at some point constrained to compromise his absolutism. An eminent 'non-pacifist' has written in these terms: 'Much as I would like to. I cannot with a good conscience pledge myself to the renunciation of war in any and every conceivable situation . . . But in terms of involvement in a political situation, and in seeking practically to ensure that the probabilities of war are made more remote, and in affirming that creating the conditions of peace is a positive and constructive endeavour, I believe that I am a pacifist.' Is he to be denied the use of the word? On the other hand, there is much to be said for giving the word a decent burial. It is not a fundamental biblical word and it is much misunderstood and misinterpreted. But burying words is not as easy as all that. And you have to find better ones to replace them.

Negotiations on Christian unity have taught us many things. One is that reconciliations which did not seem possible do become possible under the leading of the Holy Spirit. And when they do the possibility must be realized. Another is that reconciliation between those who disagree about theological propositions can be achieved because they have a basic unity in Christ. Both these are true in the field of Christian ethics under discussion. Pacifism and non-pacifism were irreconcilable in 1939, but can we be so sure that they are today? And those who are absolute in their renunciation of violence and those who are not share a strong desire for peace and a unity in Christ.

THE DOMESTIC FAMILY: ITS SOCIAL FUNCTION AND ITS SPIRITUAL PURPOSE

Tom Dring

THAT the domestic family is, at the moment, giving great concern is not surprising; that it is receiving close attention is welcome. But there is much confusion of thought in this field of sociology, due to a failure to distinguish between social function and spiritual purpose. Many accept as sufficient, the social function without the spiritual purpose—a simple naturalism. Others (not least in Christian circles) assume the presence of the spiritual purpose in the social function—plain humanism. Spiritual purpose is, of course, never present automatically or of necessity, any more in the natural family than in the natural man. It is always freely and consciously accepted by either; and for the family by the two in whose union the family is founded.

The social function of the domestic family—the procreation and nurture of the young—is not in dispute or in doubt. It is written in nature for all to read, and is shared with the mating animal and the nesting bird. From this conditioning of man's earthly life there is no escape; it is ordained for him, not created by him. Nor can the vital processes of generation, birth and growth be hastened. Science here is helpless. Man waits on life. Science discovers; life creates.

Yet man is not as the beast or the bird. Though likenesses unite them, vast difference divides them. While beast and bird follow without demur the dead level of instinct, man does nothing of the kind. He cannot. He is not so made. Augustine's famous word comes at once to mind: 'Thou hast made us for thyself, and our heart is restless till it finds rest in thee.' Man is made to aspire. That is his distinction. He will aspire and ascend, or failing his true nature, he will grovel and fall low. So it is that in man the natural functions of procreation reach their highest level or their lowest depth—and every grade between, *except* the dead level of animal instinct.

When questioned on the subject of marriage, Jesus quotes: 'In the beginning he made them male and female,' and goes on to found on this creative act of God his own high doctrine of marriage: 'what therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.' And it follows that 'For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife.'[1] This high doctrine demands discipleship. Human chivalry, by the grace of God, can accept it; a pagan world cannot. 'Any fool,' said Kingsley, 'can fall in love; it takes a gentleman to remain in love.'

While setting his seal to the sacredness of the marriage tie and the domestic family, and being himself a perfect pattern of filial love and loyalty even to the hour of his last agony, Jesus was far from making the domestic family the foundation of the Family of God which he came to found. He firmly

excludes it from any such place. No one ever kept the domestic family more firmly in its place. He will allow no interference with his mission even from his mother. This very occasion arose on the occasion of his first miracle at the wedding in Cana of Galilee. With some concern for their hosts, Mary turns anxiously to Jesus and says, 'They have no wine.' His reply is prompt and firm: 'Woman, what have you to do with me? My time is not yet come.'[2] On another occasion he is even more explicit. A person in the crowd seeing his mother and brethren arrive calls attention to the fact. Jesus replies, 'Who is my mother? And who are my brethren?' And then indicating his disciples, he says 'Here are my mother and my brothers! Whoever does the will of my Father in heaven, the same is my brother, my sister and my mother.'[3] This is an entirely different foundation for the Family of God. Their family bond is with the Father in heaven; the family likeness that they do his will.

St Paul takes up this very theme and leaves us in no doubt about the true foundation of the Family of God: 'For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father, from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named.'[4] 'Not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man,' are these children born, 'but of God,'[5] says the writer of the Fourth Gospel. No words could make more clear the difference between the natural family and the Family of God. The agents in the domestic family are free—free to bow to the Father, or not. And only the dedicated family becomes both spiritually redemptive and socially constructive.

But the tie of nature is so strong that its bond may easily become a bondage. Many men with a mission have allowed themselves to be handicapped, or their vocation to be diverted by a failure to hold the domestic family in its true place. Eli was not the last instance of an indulgent father; nor Samson the last victim of a wife's interference. A fussy wife, a managing mother, a sentimental sister can work havoc with a man's vocation. The opposite sex may of course turn the tables. Family succession too may be a snare. Oliver Cromwell was not the only man whose son could not fill his father's boots. The Booth family, of Salvation Army fame, uncommonly endowed as it was with spiritual gifts, would almost certainly have been wise to forgo the hereditary principle from the first. It did not endure.

To exalt or extend the domestic family beyond its proper range and function—to make it an end in itself—is to invite trouble and ultimately to court disaster. That way lie undue pride of family, class consciousness, aggressive tribalism, and finally the nemesis of racialism and the doctrine of blood and soil. Not on the domestic family can the kingdom be founded. The nations of greatest strength and freedom are not the nations of purest racial stock. They are the nations whose blood is mixed beyond all measure. Miss Dorothy Sayers has faithfully and delightfully dealt with this feature in her *Mysterious English* who positively glory in their mongrel breeding. It is beyond all doubt that the best foundations of nationhood are contained in a moral and spiritual heritage that integrates in a living unity the common life of a people.

Let there be no misunderstanding. This is no writing down of the true values of the family. Its function is unique. There is no natural or proper

substitute for it. It is a social factor of paramount importance. The physical health, the moral sanity, the spiritual atmosphere of the domestic family are a vital concern of the community. They are the high responsibility of parenthood and a prime consideration of the state, in a partnership of unique service for the race.

Home above all others, for most of us, is the home of our childhood. That was our heritage. The home we later *make* in marriage, we make for our children. It is their home, their heritage; their welfare is our happiness and our chief concern. This is not less true for the astonishing fact that the song 'Home, Sweet Home' was written by one who never had a home. Often, without a shilling in his pocket, or a place to lay his head, the author, John Howard Payne, tells us he heard his song sung by others in their own happy homes. What nostalgia for the home of happy childhood, in the heart of a homeless boy! And who has ever measured the homesickness of a sensitive child when first separated from a happy family life?

What, it may be asked, are the sure foundations of a sound and happy family life? Here are the findings of a group of people who have deeply considered this subject. More important still, the married members of the group have put their findings to the proof with the happiest results. They affirm four conditions in the following order, and count the order itself of vital importance: (1) Spiritual unity; (2) Moral agreement; (3) Temperamental adjustment; (4) Continued companionship.

(1) Spiritual unity they hold is essential to our true nature, and is found, at its deepest level, only in God. Each partner, in a personal committal, must find God in a personal experience, and in finding God they will find each other as nowhere else. Their unity will have the joy of children—children of God.

(2) Moral agreement between persons is a condition of harmony. It is achieved by a free and mutual acceptance for each and for both of the highest standards they know—the teaching of the New Testament.

(3) Temperamental adjustment is a real adventure. It can be a thrilling one. It must be sought, for it comes neither automatically nor easily. It is perhaps the most demanding, yet worth-while discipline of the married life. For no two temperaments are alike, and the difference is both the sphere of the discipline and the measure of mutual help. There must be readiness to find our own faults. One of the wisest of spiritual leaders used to ask of his closest followers, 'Are you willing to be told your faults—all your faults —and that plain and home?'[6] With mutual willingness the time must be well chosen. To point out a person's faults casually, or in the presence of others, is positively harmful. But in a time set apart by agreement, husband and wife, in complete honesty, in deep love, may help each other to see themselves clearly and to correct their own faults willingly. Love is not blind; sentimentality is. Love seeks only the best for each. Here, it is claimed, is an effective answer to that most foolish plea of 'temperamental incompatibility' too often made an excuse for separation, especially in America.

(4) Continued companionship will flow naturally and happily from such a union; but it cannot be neglected. It will be sustained and developed by

doing things together and in the sharing of the interests of two lives made one.

As for the children, it is beyond all doubt or question that such a union of parents will hold them as nothing else will. It is equally certain that disharmony between the parents is the most disruptive influence in a family and the most hurtful to the children. In its reaction to good or evil atmosphere the child is the most sensitive of all living creatures. And the discipline that will be necessary will be both easier and more effective where there is agreement and harmony between the parents.

The domestic family achieves its true social function in fulfilling its spiritual purpose; at the same time it finds its place in the World Family of God. Lacking spiritual purpose it will fail of all. And here lies one of the deepest faults of our present civilization. Spiritual purpose has been assumed or ignored, and in either case has been lacking. For many generations now, in our Western world the scientific study of *things* has overshadowed the study of *persons*. Even psychology has dealt with the furniture of the soul and not with the morally responsible person. Science has sought for us the cunning to know; it has failed to find for us the wisdom to live. Family life has suffered deeply. Parents have sought for their children a technical training for a job, instead of an education for life. The 'life' has *not* been 'more than meat' nor even 'the body more than raiment.' The order has been reversed. 'I thought that if I made money,' said a business man to the present writer, 'I should be happy; I am now a super-tax payer, and I am not a happy man.' He had built up a big modern business; his home and family life are broken up.

A scientist of twenty-eight, a research scholar and university lecturer, on the advice of friends, sought the help of a Christian minister. A mature man of science, he had found to his dismay that he was morally and spiritually undeveloped, and 'no man for another to lean on'. He told of his home life and upbringing, for there the trouble seemed to have its root. His father, a professional man, was an agnostic; his mother, an ex-Methodist, had joined the father in his unfaith. From this the mother's love seemed to have suffered a severe inhibition. The boy had known nothing of intimate and loving conversation with her—or with the father—and had greatly felt the lack. His emotional nature had been starved. 'And your grandfather?' 'He was a schoolmaster.' Only one other question was needed to find the root of the trouble. Very quietly it was put: 'Is it possible that your grandfather was a victim of that "iceage" in English thought when such men as he were allowed to escape the moral and spiritual challenge of the Bible on a false issue—a quite irrelevant scientific excuse?' The change was instantaneous; the very question seemed to shed light and bring release. A smile—for the first time—stole over the face of the young man and a light came into his eyes, as he replied, 'I think that is the truth.' Without hesitation he was willing to begin a new life on new foundations. He entered the kingdom 'as a little child'. But a family life through three generations had suffered from the false values of an age of unfaith.

The domestic family is the true training ground for life; for, as Maurice

says, 'The idea of a Father lies hidden in the heart of every child."[7] The unfolding of this idea under parental influence until it finds fulfilment in the Fatherhood of God is the real education for life. The earthly parenthood must pass; the divine Parenthood abides; and in the consciousness of a Father in heaven the heart of man is never left 'orphan' or 'comfortless."[8] When Philip said, 'Lord, show us the Father and it sufficeth us,' he gave expression to a universal need. There should be discipline in the family. The story is told of a little girl who, with loving thought for her father's comfort, decided to warm his slippers in readiness for his return. So she put them in the kitchen oven, where they were cooked to a frazzle. The motive was altogether lovely in a little child, and was so interpreted; while the action was scarcely one to be encouraged. The motive called for direction. 'If ye call on the Father, who without respect of persons judgeth according to every man's work, be reverent in your conduct." 'Father' and 'Judge' are here closely related. We are never grown up before God. His fatherly love will judge our actions and discipline our spirits to the end. We do not honour him by our soft sentimentalities and silly weaknesses with our children. Even they do not admire them. Their own growing moral sense demands the firm discipline of love.

At the same time there needs to be given increasing responsibility and a growing sense of freedom. We are too apt to forget that freedom must be won afresh by the young of every generation, unless it is to perish from the earth, and our sons and daughters be maimed for life. It is an unlovely sight to see a father (or mother) hold the reins till they drop from lifeless hands, possibly to a helpless succession. Family succession is ordained; 'after the fathers shall come up the children."[9] It is fitting that 'young men shall see visions, and old men shall dream dreams."[10] But it is not fitting—it is fatal—that the visions of youth should be blacked out by the dreams of age. The vision may call for the correction of its focus by checking it with the dream; it is not to be blotted out. It is wise to seek counsel; it is foolish to accept dictation. But the seeking of counsel will not, in wisdom, be always on one side. The time will come for the father to seek counsel of his son. It is a beautiful and gracious thing to see a father of seventy asking the advice of his son of forty, even if it be only about the filling up of Government forms! The son has been growing up while the father has been growing old in the same generation. Both are children before God, and each alike responsible to him.

It may easily be seen that the family is a training ground for parents as well as for children. There are many penitent parents as well as prodigal sons. Sometimes when it is too late they have learned that the human material committed to their care was better than such unwisdom as theirs deserved. They did not see it with the eyes of him who said, 'Of such is the kingdom of heaven."[11] Parental mishandling is one of the most prevalent causes of disfigured or frustrated personality. A heavy penalty awaits the parents who retain too long their hold, or lay their hand too heavily upon their children. Old age may be overshadowed by the burden of a grown-up son or daughter whose freedom has never been won, and who, in consequence, is unable to stand alone or hold the way unsupported. One of the

worst and commonest cases is that of the daughter grown up and married, yet never 'weaned' from her mother. She is the product of a foolish parenthood and the cause of countless domestic tragedies. Children must be transplanted sooner or later, if they are to live a life of their own, and the best preparation for this is to give them responsibility as soon as they are able to undertake it. One calls to mind a boy of twelve whom his parents took to the great city at a time of festival and, returning home, did not miss him for a whole day, thinking he was with friends in the caravan. He was accustomed to responsibility and to taking care of himself.

We have seen that Jesus utterly rejects the domestic family as the *foundation* of his kingdom. Equally he makes it the most perfect *illustration* of that kingdom. The parable of the prodigal son is immortal. It is not the story of a particular earthly father; it is a picture in human form of the Heavenly Father. Jesus fills the human picture with a divine content and carries the imagination through familiar words up to God. As such an illustration the family never fades or grows old. It is born again at every marriage altar and at every human birth. It will not lose its freshness so long as the earth remains. It is God's own gift to man and woman that they may learn if they will, through their own hearts' experience, something of the Father's loving purpose for the world.

And so it happened to a father as he sat one morning with his children—nearly grown up—at the breakfast table. The young people began to dispute, and then to disagree with growing violence. They were hurting one another deeply, but the father most of all. Presently, speaking very quietly, he said, 'Children, I do wish you would attack me instead of one another. You see I could bear it, because of my love for you. It hurts me much more to see you hurting one another.' The young people became silent and thoughtful. In that moment the father saw through his own experience, as he had never seen before, what that Father is like who took suffering upon himself that his children might cease from fighting each other, and that the world, instead of a battlefield, might become a home.

[1] Matt. 19: 4-6.
[2] John 2: 3–4.
[3] Matt. 12: 46-50 (Moffatt).
[4] Ephes. 3: 14-15.
[5] John 1: 13.
[6] John Wesley: Rules for Band Societies.
[7] F. Denison Maurice, *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, p. 667.
[8] John 14: 18
[9] 1 Peter 1: 17.
[10] Acts 2: 17.
[11] Matt. 19: 14.

SHORTER SURVEY

John T. Wilkinson

ONE of the least understood movements in the history of Christianity has undoubtedly been that of Pietism, owing partly to its irenical quality for it has focused its interest upon the deepening of devotional life rather than upon the correctness of theological definition or liturgical form, and partly to its reformatory tendency which often made it critical of the churches. In a recent volume, *The Rise of Evangelical Pietism,* (E. J. Brill, Leiden, n.p.) by F. Ernest Stoeffler, the author expresses the conviction that 'all experiential Protestantism during the post-Reformation period can be treated as an essential unity. It constitutes a movement, which if seen in its full range penetrated all of Protestantism during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . . . and must be seen as the major manifestation of the experiential tradition within post-Reformation Protestantism'. In a valuable introduction various misconceptions are refuted: the charge of subjectivism, the concern for the emotional enjoyment of religion, an unwarranted asceticism, a narrow world-denying legalism and a tendency to fanaticism. Professor Stoeffler names four characteristics of all Pietism: 'the personally meaningful relationship of the individual to God'; its religious idealism, illustrated in the preaching of the conviction that without conversion and sanctification personal Christianity is hollow; a vital biblical emphasis; an element of opposition 'against prevailing norms of faith and life which are different in nature'. Following this useful introduction come full sections on Pietism among the English Puritans; the origins of Reformed Pietism on the European Continent; and the advent of Lutheran Pietism. Thus the development of the total Pietistic movement within Protestantism during the first one hundred years of its existence—1590 to 1690—is surveyed in detail. A full bibliography is added to this scholarly, well-documented and invaluable study.

From the S.C.M. Press come four important volumes concerned with theology in our time. In *Christ the Meaning of History* (35*s.*) Dr Hendrikus Berkhof, Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Leiden, holds the belief that the Cross and the Resurrection are the analogy of the Christ-event which is steadily being realized throughout the historical process. The book rests on the conviction that history has meaning and that its true concept is given with the revelation of God in Israel and in Jesus Christ, who is 'the end of history', yet at the same time its beginning. The consummation of history will mean 'a radical break with all the forces that hinder Christ's dominion', yet 'at the same time the consummation will be the continuation of the resurrection forces which already are active in history'. For some readers theological disagreement may arise, but this is a challenging book to be read and read again.

Alongside the above volume may well be studied *History and Faith in the Thought of Alan Richardson* (30*s*.), by John Navons, S. J., the more significant in that it is the work of a Jesuit priest who works in Rome—an evidence of how in our present time Roman Catholic theologians are alive to the labours of scholars of other traditions. In a most lucid analysis of Dr Richardson's writings, Fr Navone opens with a careful recapitulation of Anglican thought since 1889, as the context of Dr Richardson's historical thinking, which is further elucidated by an examination of Dr Richardson's relationship to various contemporary theologians, showing that in his view Barth, Brunner, Bultmann and Tillich 'have failed to give an adequate theological presentation of the biblical revelation because of their inadequate concepts of history' and 'have relegated the biblical history to the realm of a super-history'. Dr Richardson believes 'that a new approach to history enables an adequate apology for the biblical revelation'. In the second chapter Fr Navone indicates the influence of other historians upon Dr Richardson's concept of historical thinking, revealing his independence of mind, and then proceeds to evaluate him as an apologist for the biblical revelation. The Christian interpretation of history is not in terms of a philosophical theory elaborated by the intellectual effort of Christian scholars. 'The Incarnation has given history a significance and order: it is no longer a mere unintelligible chaos of disconnected events.' The final chapter offers a criticism of Dr Richardson's apology in the light of Roman Catholic teaching, and expresses a debt of gratitude for his 'valuable contribution to the Christian understanding of the historical biblical revelation'.

The Church in the Thought of Bishop John Robinson (30*s*.) is a further study by a Roman Catholic priest, Fr Richard McBrien. It is a careful examination of the Bishop of Woolwich's ecclesiology in the light of current developments in Catholic, Anglican and Protestant theology. This analysis rescues *Honest to God* from considerable misinterpretation by putting Dr Robinson's work into the general context of his developing thought. The first part is an examination of his views on the nature of the Church as the Body of Christ, and as 'the eschatological community'—'a community set "between the times" and a community of the Spirit', underlining 'the subordinate and instrumental role of Church to Kingdom of God', and equally the Christian ministry as 'a function of the Church' and never being its 'precondition', but always to be understood as 'essentially service'. The second part deals with the theology and mission of the Servant Church. To this author Bishop Robinson, though not a professional dogmatic theologian, is nevertheless 'an important figure in contemporary Christian theology'.

In *Contemporary Continental Theologians* (35*s*.) Dr S. Paul Schilling, of Boston University School of Theology the expounds, compares and evaluates the thought of eleven living Continental theologians representing three Protestant movements, Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. In the final chapter the spotlight moves from the theologians to the theological issues concerned. Thus the book seeks to indicate the theological landscape as a whole, which reveals broad agreement, wide diversity, and even sharp opposition. The first eight studies present three main groups of Protestant

theologians: 'Theologians of the Word of God' (Barth, Diem and Hromádka); 'Theologians of Existence' (Bultmann, Gogarten and Ebeling); 'Neo-Lutheran Theologians' (Schlink and Wingren). The creative contributions of Roman Catholic theologians is represented by Congar and Rahner; that of the Eastern Orthodox thinkers (relatively little of their work is available in Western languages) by Nissiotis, of the Ecumenical Institute at Bossey. Critical comments are given at the end of each chapter, particularly in relation to the normative authority of the Scriptures, and how far it is related to relevant knowledge gained from other sources. In Europe the present time is a period of creative thought, and this book affords a valuable conspectus of the situation.

A Handbook of Theological Terms (Allen & Unwin, 30*s.*), by Van A Harvey, is intended particularly for the growing number of non-professional readers of theology, and provides a useful guide to the meaning of some 350 terms employed in systematic and philosophical theology. Special attention is given to contemporary theology, and there are valuable cross-references. The writer is Professor of Theology at the Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, U.S.A.

Two volumes of key-documents of the Reformation are to hand. In *Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century* (S.C.M. Press, 42*s.*), Professor A. C. Cochrane, of the University of Dubuque, Iowa, has produced the first collection in English of the twelve principal confessions of faith of the Reformed Churches of the sixteenth century, edited with an historical introduction to each document. The scholarly introduction at the beginning gives clear indication of the importance of the work. He readily concedes that any complete collection of Reformed Confessions should include those of the seventeenth century, and admits the incompleteness of a collection restricted to the sixteenth, but justifies his selection of this limited field on the ground that the Reformation Churches were born with the Confessions of the earlier century, whereas those of the seventeenth and later centuries are interpretative and explanatory supplements to the original documents, in which there is 'the authentic and pristine witness'. The documents selected range from Zwingli's Sixty-seven Articles (1523) through the Confessions drawn up in Geneva (1536), France (1559), Scotland (1560), Belgium (1561), and the First (1536) and Second (1566) Helvetic Confessions. The Heidelberg Catechism (1563) and the Barmen Theological Declaration (1934) form an appendix. This is an invaluable collection ready of access for the student of this period.

The second volume, edited by Dr T. H. L. Parker, is in the 'Library of Christian Classics' (vol. xxvi). *English Reformers* (S.C.M. Press, 45*s.*) is a presentation of writings of the leading Anglican theologians of the sixteenth century. Faced with a most difficult choice, Dr Parker prints each writing with an introduction and bibliography. The General Introduction to the book is incisively written, and the selection includes material from Jewel, Foxe, Tyndale, Hooper, Taverner, Cranmer, Ridley and Latimer. This is a valuable addition to the Library.

Frederick Denison Maurice (1805–1872), once described by Gladstone as 'a man of spiritual splendour', stood apart from the versions of churchmanship prevalent in England during the nineteenth century—Evangelical, Tractarian and Broad Churchmanship—yet his relation to these schools of thought was not purely negative. An independent thinker, he is now regarded as one of the greatest teachers. This explains the considerable number of books recently written about him, the latest of which is by Dr Alec Vidler, *F. D. Maurice and Company: Nineteenth Century Studies* (S.C.M. Press, 30*s*.), in the first part of which are expounded the dominant themes of Maurice's writings: Christ as 'the Head and King of our race'; the Church; the Bible and Christian Social Thought. Dr Vidler's main object has been to allow Maurice to speak for himself, and he shows that his deep insight and concern for a wide Christian outlook speak to our times in words of a true prophet. In the second part of the book Dr Vidler considers Maurice's relationship with other nineteenth-century thinkers—Coleridge and Carlyle, Julius Hare, Erskine of Linlathen, Thomas Hughes and Bishop Westcott, and it is in this context that Maurice's greatness emerges even more clearly. Written in Dr Vidler's inimitable style, this book makes fascinating reading as a book for our times.

In *From Darwin to Blatchford: The Role of Darwinism in Christian Apologetic: 1875–1910* (Dr Williams's Trust, 5*s*.) Dr John Kent seeks to discover how far the statement frequently made that by the end of the nineteenth century the majority of educated Christians in Britain had 'accepted evolution' is true. Beginning with the views expressed by W. B. Pope in his famous *Compendium of Theology* (1875–6), he examines Bishop Frederick Temple's Bampton Lectures (1880); the debate between Brewis Grant, an Anglican clergyman, and Charles Bradlaugh (1875); the position of Henry Drummond in *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* (1883) and *The Ascent of Man* (1894); the onslaught upon Christianity by Robert Blatchford in *God and my Neighbour* (1903) and the rather unsuccessful attempt to refute this challenge which was made by a group of Manchester essayists (1903–4). Finally Dr Kent notes the much more positive attempt made by the Anglican theologian, F. R. Tennant, in *The Origin and Propagation of Sin* (1902–8). Dr Kent draws the conclusion that 'most theologians before 1914 had still not come to terms with a scientific, as distinct from a purely speculative doctrine of evolution' and ends by raising the further question: 'Have modern theologians accepted the doctrine of evolution at all?' We venture to suggest that the clear road to understanding and acceptance has been opened up by Teilhard de Chardin!

In *The Fourth Session* (Faber & Faber, 42*s*.), by Xavier Rynne, the author gives a day-to-day account of the concluding session of Vatican Council II, this volume having been preceded by three earlier volumes making similar record. Thus he brings to completion the only comprehensive history in English of one of the most important religious events of the last hundred years, an account warmly commended by both Roman Catholics and Christians of other traditions. The importance of this final volume lies in the fact

that the author brings out with remarkable clearness the significant change of climate following the preceding sessions of the Council. He reveals the real position of Pope Paul as a very suitable successor to Pope John, declaring particularly that by the frequent use of the favourite word *rinnovamento* —'renewal'—Pope Paul indicates his concern for 'a renewal of life and a new ardour to put into practice the message of the Gospel'. The book gives detailed and verbatim record of the debates and decrees of the Council from September 14 to December 8, 1965, and yet it is evident that the real change is to be found not so much in the contents of particular decrees as in the whole temper of the Council. The final chapter, 'Towards Vatican Council III', deserves most careful study. In the words of Cardinal Heenan, 'No one can doubt that a beginning of far-reaching importance has been made and that the Church will never retrace the path it has chosen.' Those volumes form an indispensable source for any future historian of the Council.

A number of smaller volumes deserve attention. On the basis of the Letter to the Colossians, A. van den Heuval, a brilliant Dutch theologian, who is the Youth Secretary of the World Council of Churches, applies an aspect of Pauline theology in his book *These Rebellious Powers* (S.C.M., 9*s.* 6*d.*) with intense vigour, showing how the many supra-personal powers —sex, race, money, nationalism, religion—which were created 'as service structures to keep order against chaos' have become gods and enslave men, and so are rebellious against God. 'The task of the Church is simply to join Christ in the power struggle, not making the powers our enemies but recognising them as runaway horses that must be controlled . . . as servants rather than masters.' This is an incisive book.

The author of *The Undivided Vision* (S.C.M., 9*s.* 6*d.*) is Martin Conway, a lay Cambridge graduate who serves the World Student Christian Federation as its Study Secretary, touching some eighty countries. Students have steadily been discovering that contemporary experience, as well as the New Testament, challenges the notion 'often accepted by Christians that there is a qualitative difference between the church being "saved" and the world at best waiting to be saved or condemned', and also that the church is 'responsible for drawing the line, and where possible for transferring people across it'. The theme of this book is the necessity to see God and the world at one in Christ. 'No man can look with undivided vision at God and the world of reality so long as God and the world are torn asunder' (Bonhoeffer). So the author speaks of 'worldly Christianity'—though a seeming contradiction in terms—and pursues the central idea of what such 'worldly Christianity' involves: the Person of Christ, the meaning of history, the call to mission, to worship and the education of Christians. This book should exercise a stabilizing influence.

In *Is Sacrifice Outmoded?* (S.C.M., 6*s.*) Kenneth Slack, who recently concluded ten years as General Secretary of the British Council of Churches, and is now back in pastoral ministry, seeks to establish the significance of creative sacrifice, so often rejected in our time, by showing the example of Christ and his Cross, the principle of which he applies to such issues as the

racial struggle, the hunger of the world and the unity of the churches. It is a challenging book.

The aim of Dr Joachim Jeremias in *Rediscovering the Parables* (S.C.M., paper-back, 7*s.* 6*d.*) is to present the substance of his larger work on *The Parables of Jesus* (revised edition, 1963) in a form that will reach a wider circle of readers, especially those who do not know Greek. Through this simpler version the layman has his opportunity to understand what is probably the greatest exposition of the subject, and this book should be possessed by every serious reader of the New Testament.

The Minute Particular (S.C.M., 21*s.*), by E. G. Lee, is a moving autobiography written by one, a blacksmith's son, who lost his boyhood faith in the Anglican Church and the infallible Bible, and became a Unitarian by conviction. The title is taken from Blake's *Jerusalem*—'Art and Science cannot exist but in minute organized Particulars'—and focuses itself upon the author's personal experience. 'I am one of the unknown hidden particulars forced in all the pressures of existence to say "Yes" or "No" to questions that rend life, and that have to be asked and answered if life is to go on'. After many doubts concerning religious and philosophical problems, the ultimate crisis came throughout the years of agonizing sufferings endured by his much beloved wife, a mysterious reality which he could not evade but must endure and share, and which for him traditional religion no longer helped to explain. Yet the vision of God endured at the heart of the human tragedy. 'God the inexplicable' was involved. This is the story of 'a broken man trying not to be lost'. This is a moving account, and when read one can only lay it down with a feeling of reverence in the heart.

From the Epworth Press come the following paper-backs: *Christ and Life* (3*s.* 6*d.*), by W. R. Maltby, containing three short essays on 'The Meaning of the Cross', 'The Meaning of the Resurrection', and 'Jesus Christ and the Meaning of Life'. The essays are 'the authentic Maltby'. *The Words of the Crucified* (5*s.*), by John Dover, provides a useful Lenten study of the Seven Words spoken on the Cross and has much modern insight. *Out of this World* (5*s.*), by Douglas Thompson, Secretary of the Methodist Missionary Society and President of the 1966 Methodist Conference, is a short group of five studies on the sheer relevance of the Gospel of Christ to the world as it now is, and these pages are the fruit of remarkably wide experience. *Are we yet alive?*, by Pauline M. Webb, is a collection of addresses on the mission of the Church in the modern world, given during her year of office as Vice-President of the Conference (1965–6), and form a challenging word that should not go unheeded. Six short studies by Michael J. Skinner on Matthew 5–7, entitled *The Sermon on the Mount* (2*s.* 6*d.*) (Manual of Fellowship Series), provide a useful starting point for study-groups.

Karl Barth has always expressed some diffidence in the matter of publication of his pulpit prayers, but in *Select Prayers* (Epworth Press, 6*s.*) we have a collection which belonged originally to his preached sermons. Arranged according to the Christian Year, these prayers are marked by warmth, simplicity and beauty of language and form a treasury of devotion.

None but He and I (Epworth Press, 5*s*.), by Philip Martin, Vicar of the University Church, Oxford, is a collection of forty-one lyrics and longer poems which reveal the author's sensitivity to the natural world and a rich depth of religious experience—an awareness of the Living Presence in the universe and in the heart of man—and withal a glinting humour, sometimes moving to gentle satire.

Finally, four important paper-back reprints call for mention. *Thomas Cranmer* (Oxford Paper Backs, 12*s*. 6*d*.), by Jasper Ridley, first published in 1962—'likely to remain the definitive life' (Dean Matthews); *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason* (Cambridge University Press, 9*s*. 6*d*.) by G. R. Cragg, first published in 1950—'a sound, scholarly and sober piece of work' (Prof. Basil Willey in the *J.T.S.*); *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition* (S.P.C.K., 15*s*.), by C. K. Barrett, first published in 1947; *The Trinity in the New Testament* (S.P.C.K., 15*s*.), by A. W. Wainwright, first published in 1962. These reissues will be widely welcomed.

RECENT LITERATURE

Edited by John T. Wilkinson

The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, edited by Charles W. Kegley. (S.C.M. Press, 45*s*.)

One puzzling aspect of contemporary theology is the way in which major theologians have disciples who unintentionally misrepresent them. We are familiar with a Barthianism which Karl Barth does not share and with the strange uses made of some of Bonhoeffer's aphorisms. Similarly much is said about demythologizing which bears little resemblance to Bultmann's own use of that term. Bultmann is not only an outstanding New Testament scholar but also one whose influence upon popular as well as professional theology is immense. It is, therefore, very important that he should be understood and this collection of essays is a highly signficant aid to that understanding. Continental, American and British theologians have offered their interpretation and criticism of many aspects of Bultmann's writings. They range widely, with a little inevitable repetition, over his teaching about theology and philosophy, demythologization and eschatology, the Church and Ethics. Essays are also provided about such matters as Bultmann on Judaism, the Old Testament and classical philology. To these essays Bultmann contributes replies that are of the greatest interest. In most instances he accepts the interpretations as correct; in a few cases he corrects them. At many points he offers clarification of his past writings in response to criticism. It would be invidious to select one or two of these essays for particular praise, but I venture to suggest that Paul S. Minear's appreciative and yet critical study of Bultmann's interpretation of New Testament Eschatology produces a particularly interesting reply. The volume includes a brief autobiographical sketch and a valuable bibliography. This book is essential to any theological library and nobody who seeks

to evaluate or (especially) to expound Bultmann's thought can afford to ignore it. If any reader previously doubted Bultmann's concern about the proclamation of the Word, this book should remove that doubt. It will also contribute to critical assessment of this scholar's attempt to speak that Word to this generation.

FREDERIC GREEVES

Theology Observed, by Ulrich Simon. (Epworth Press, 16*s*.)
Beyond Theology, by Alan Watts. (Hodder & Stoughton, 30*s*.)

'Theology is the problem child among the sciences. Once acknowledged as the Queen, she is now by some denied even membership among the ranks. Some hate her, few know her. The function of theology is disputed, her aim confused, her method uncertain. Yet theology not only exists but excites fascination.' These words from the dust-cover to Dr Simon's essay well describe our present situation. Rival claimants to 'new theology' remind the old of theologies that once were 'new' and are now forgotten (except that they reappear in fresh costume), whilst they excite such of the young as are interested with hopes that sometimes perish almost at birth. It is, therefore, good to discover the alert, informed, questioning mind of Dr Simon surveying the theological scene with no trace of superiority or impatience. This short book is to be recommended to all serious students of theology. Whether the author is describing contemporary man and contemporary theological man, outlining the modern curriculum for theological study or throwing out swift suggestions concerning the task of speaking about the Unspeakable, the reader is stimulated to think again about his established convictions. Simon leaves us in no doubt that theology could 'bury itself in tradition or dance with any fancy of the year'. He affirms that it may and must 'assume the part of a science which releases men from the ambiguities of a finite existence'.

Alan Watts's volume is an extraordinary one. That is the only comment which this reviewer can make without fear of being contradicted by other readers. Subtitled 'the art of Godmanship', written by one who offers himself as a theological counterpart to the Fool at Court, the book is full of quips which are often so tedious as to be sad. It is difficult to treat seriously a writer who repeatedly refers to 'Billy Graham and the other Bible bangers', and who seems to try (unsuccessfully) to shock his readers with comments about sex. The author's many previous books are not (I think) well known in this country. He tells us that his earlier attempts to provide a synthesis between traditional Christianity and the unitive mysticism of Hinduism and Buddhism are here corrected by a fresh appreciation of elements in Christianity which are offensive and yet essential. So he seeks to lead us to some kind of mysticism which is the true meaning of Christianity, in which we pass 'beyond theology' in that God is neither 'out there' nor our own ego. Our feeling of 'I' is a 'dim and distant sensation of That which eternally Is'. The Via Negativa appears here in fancy dress. There are, however, many flashes of insight which penetrate even the mind of a reader whom others may consider to be less than fair to this book.

FREDERIC GREEVES

Baptismal Anointing, by Leonel L. Mitchell. (Alcuin Club Collections, S.P.C.K., 42*s*.)

Much has been written in the last half-century about the theology of Christian Initiation, and the whole subject becomes ever increasingly a matter of urgent pastoral concern. But very little has been written about the liturgical texts of initiation rites in the early Church. This book outlines in great detail the role of

anointing in these rites up to the tenth and eleventh centuries. There are two Appendices, one on the history of anointing in the Anglican tradition, the other on Professor Lampe's book *The Seal of the Spirit.* This is a very scholarly, but also a very readable work. Some readers of the recent pamphlet by the Bishop of Woolwich, *Meeting, Membership and Ministry,* may have been surprised to find him recommending 'a signing with oil as an integral part' of the revised pattern of Christian Initiation which he proposes. But, as Dr Mitchell says, 'The rejection of anointing out of hand by the Reformers as unscriptural and medieval can no longer be sustained.' In the ancient world anointing with oil was the normal accompaniment of bathing; when a Roman went to the bath he took towel and oil. The Hebrews anointed kings and priests. Christ was the Anointed King. He anointed with his own spittle as a means of healing, and the Apostles used oil for the same purpose. Washing, anointing and the laying on of hands are all associated with healing in the New Testament, and the healing miracles were often considered to be types of baptism. There is a strong possibility that baptismal anointing was known to the authors of 1 John and Revelation. The main line of Christian development in relation to anointing is represented by Hippolytus. From his *Apostolic Tradition,* written *c.* 215, we learn that candidates were anointed with oil of exorcism before baptism, and afterwards the Bishop anointed them again and laid his hand upon each. This latter principal anointing became identified in East and West with the Messianic anointing of Christ by the Spirit. Tertullian wrote about 200: 'Then having come up from the font we are thoroughly anointed with a blessed unction, in accordance with the ancient discipline whereby, since the time when Aaron was anointed by Moses, men were anointed unto the priesthood with oil from a horn: from which you are called "christs" from the chrism, that is the anointing, which also lent its name to the Lord.' Thus a wholehearted sacramental use of God's creation is not only a perpetual safeguard against an unbiblical dualism between spirit and matter; it also in baptismal anointing represents the priesthood of all believers.

ALAN WILKINSON

The Meaning of Tradition, by J. R. Geiselmann. (Burns & Oates, 15*s.*)
Towards a Theology of Religions, by H. R. Schlette. (Burns & Oates, 16*s.*)

These are numbers 14 and 15 in a series entitled *Quaestiones Disputatae* which seeks to illustrate and pursue the kind of study suggested in an Encyclical Letter of Pope John XXIII: 'There are many points which the Church leaves to the discussion of theologians, in that there is no absolute certainty about them.' The volume on Religions has the easier task in that, it appears, remarkably little authoritative teaching on this subject has been given in the Roman Church. The author seeks to indicate the way in which a theology of religions should proceed by examining 'the general sacred history' which runs parallel to the theology of 'special sacred history'. His point of view may be illustrated by the statement: 'The Church is . . . the eschatological community . . . which . . . is to bear witness to the goal to which the ordinary ways of salvation (the religions) lead, and which at the same time demands in the name of God that the extraordinary way should be followed in obedience and humility'. The volume on Tradition is of special importance at this time. A considerable part of the book examines nineteenth-century writings about the relation between 'primitive revelation and tradition', but it is characteristic of this Roman contribution that much attention should be paid to the nature of *paradosis* in the New Testament itself. The author sees religious tradition as a universal human phenomenon and endeavours to provide

a theological basis for understanding 'tradition of revelation' through an analysis of this 'universal human phenomenon'. Both in what is said and in what is not said, this book is of interest to Protestants. If effort may be needed to enter fully into the argument, the attentive reader will also realize how mistaken he is in some of his notions about 'what Rome says'. This series should find its way into college libraries and could provide useful material for the dialogue between the denominations which is beginning to take place.

FREDERIC GREEVES

The Scientist and the Supernatural, by C. H. Douglas Clark. (Epworth Press, 35*s*.) Dr Clark, formerly Senior Lecturer in Inorganic and Structural Chemistry at Leeds University, defends Christianity against scientific humanism especially as presented by Julian Huxley in *Religion without Revelation*. Sometimes attack has been regarded as the best form of defence! Thus Clark wonders whether there might be a link between Huxley's two breakdowns and repression of sinfulness (p. 163). Although most of the arguments in the book are deployed against Huxley, Clark fears that the greater threat to the Church may be from within. 'There are highly placed ecclesiastics who . . . do much mischief in undermining the faith of ordinary individuals. . . . in five minutes, almost by a single stroke of the pen, an enemy within the ranks can undo good achieved in years of patient work devoted to preparation of books of the present kind' (p. 188). Huxley's evolutionary humanism, perhaps because of present-day disillusionment, now seems scarcely a live option. Inevitably therefore, any battle with Huxley seems rather unreal. In this case the impression of remoteness from the real issues is heightened since in their use of the gospel record neither contestant shows any appreciation of form criticism. Nevertheless it may seem to many that even if Huxley's alternative to Christianity is unacceptable, his criticisms remain formidable. Against these criticisms Clark makes a number of valid points. The section on nature miracles is less than satisfying. It is stated: 'Our answer to the question as to whether the miracles really happened is that by faith we know that Jesus worked mighty works by the power of God working through Him. This, however, is not quite the end of the matter: we must still use our critical intelligence and historical imagination to determine their exact nature' (p. 142). This invites the question, 'What then is their exact nature?' But to this there is no answer. The account given of the experiences of the late Mrs Healey (pp. 47–49) is interesting, but the absence of proper controls calls in question the conclusion that she had been outside space time, if that is what is meant by saying she 'had an experience of being outside-time'. It is particularly unfortunate in a book of this nature, the value of which lies less in its contents than in that its author is both a scientist and a devout Christian, when there is any trace of being less than properly cautious in evaluating 'religious' evidence. There are a few places where the eye of the proof reader has slipped. On p. 89 a line has been duplicated and on p. 164 the second mention of Mariolatry is incorrect.

VINCENT PARKIN

The Worship of the Reformed Church, by John M. Barkley. (Lutterworth, 16*s*.) This book is No. 15 in the series of Ecumenical Studies in Worship being published under the editorship of Professor J. G. Davies and Principal A. R. George, and is a careful and thorough exposition and critical analysis of the Eucharistic, Baptismal and Confirmation rites in the Scottish, English-Welsh and Irish liturgies. The author has succeeded admirably in the task set him, and the result is another useful contribution to understanding between the churches. There is a welcome

defence of the sacrament of the Word (pp. 61, 64), and a rejection of unfair charges against the reformers for their alleged minimizing of the Eucharist (p. 78). At the same time Professor Barkley permits himself to wonder whether 'a failure to grasp the fullness of the relationship of the Eucharist and the resurrection' has not 'prevented the Reformed Churches from recovering the practice of frequent communion' (p. 88). These examples indicate the attempt which the author has made to present a fair and balanced account of his subject.

At the same time the author makes no attempt to hide his own 'high church' predilections, and it is this fact which raises certain questions about the book—and indeed about similar contributions from other authors in the present liturgical revival. Certain assumptions seem to be becoming commonplace, but they ought not to pass without question. For instance, the author asserts (p. 91): 'In the early Church, baptism was celebrated in the Eucharistic context.' What is the evidence for this? A single reference to Hippolytus (as here) is surely not sufficient, and there is a good deal, both in N.T. and in writers in the early Church, to suggest that Eucharistic context is not essential, that Baptism is able to stand on its own feet. The attempt to fit everything into a Eucharistic framework depends, moreover, on a belief that the early Church (unless lay administration be admitted) had the necessary man-power. When has it ever been true that the Church had sufficient priests to provide a Eucharist for all Christians in every place? Was a weekly Eucharist the norm? How often has it been? Will it ever be? Calvin, we are told, wanted a weekly Eucharist, but Geneva would not have it. Why is it to be assumed that Calvin and his kind are right every time? This is not just a matter of 'civil interference' (p. 20) or 'popular and magisterial opinion' (p. 75). Other members of the people of God have a right to their opinions as much as does a Calvin. Moreover, if frequent communion, weekly communion is to become the norm, what image of the Church emerges? One of a body which declares that from its main act of worship non-members are to be excluded, or may, at most, attend as observers. Is this a Church or a society?

H. M. RATTENBURY

Urban Churches in Britain, by K. A. Busia. (Lutterworth Press, 21*s.* paper, 25*s.* board.)

This book is a balanced report of a painstaking survey of the relevance of churches in a Birmingham suburb. It was undertaken in 1962–63 by Dr K. A. Busia, a Ghana politician and sociologist in exile. It was sponsored by the World Council of Churches in association with the Selly Oak Colleges, and was supported by an Advisory Committee and the help of students and voluntary workers. The basic questionnaires and tabled replies are arranged in seventeen appendices. The population of the area was 20,571; the number of churches and religious groups involved was nineteen. Much of the material is familiar, but it is gathered together conveniently in chapters about the Evangelistic Outreach, Worship and Teaching, Home and Family, Young People, Stewardship and Finance, Social Service and Responsibility, Views about the Church from members and outsiders. The two final chapters on 'The Church's Mission' and 'Some Vital Issues' are worth pondering. Dr Busia considers that many questions concerning the nature of the church, the function of the clergy, the role of the laity, the true dimension of Christian unity, await convincing answers. For him, the most disturbing discovery in the evidence is the fact that the Bible has lost its place and relevance in daily life, and the most urgent and important task is the recovery of the Scriptural foundation of the Christian faith.

Other positive values are embedded in this report. Preaching is important. The far-reaching influence of the civic gospel preached by George Dawson, H. W. Crosskey and R. W. Dale between 1847 and 1895 still persists, and there is need and desire for Christian truth relevant to the contemporary situation. The criticism by teenagers and others reveal misconceptions about God and the Church, and offer opportunities for teaching and training. Whilst there are frequent complaints about cliques, and cleavages between classes and ages and races, and disunity amongst denominations, there are desires for community-life and good fellowship, and a growing sense of unity. In the report, there are no questions and no enquiries about the Kingdom of God. New emphasis here is surely overdue in Christian thinking and preaching.

FRANK M. KELLEY

Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion, by Richard R. Niebuhr. (S.C.M. Press, 45*s.*) In his essay 'An attempt to understand Bultmann', Barth rather sadly asks, 'But who reads Schleiermacher nowadays?' It is fitting that one who bears a famous name in theological circles should undertake the task of rescuing another famous name from near-oblivion and gross misunderstanding. Dr Niebuhr contends that Barth and Brunner are largely responsible for the serious misinterpretation that Schleiermacher has suffered; and what he undertakes is not so much a full-scale study of Schleiermacher or a full-scale attack on his commentators and interpreters as the more subtle task of presenting a photograph. The book is a collection of 'stills'. 'I have tried,' says Dr Niebuhr (p. 3) 'to focus my own mind upon a series of moments in Schleiermacher's thinking that are revelatory of the man's theological style.' Discussing four such moments, he concerns himself with the three problems of religion, theology and Christ. Quite apart from its intrinsic value as a skilful theological argument the discussion is most interesting inasmuch as it treats some of Schleiermacher's work that has seldom, if ever, been discussed by English scholars. *The Christmas Eve*, a dialogue on the meaning of Christmas, shows us Schleiermacher seeking a new direction so that we may appreciate the contrast between the Professor of 1805–6 and the author of the *Speeches on Religion*. He is more systematic in his interests and more closely allied with institutional Christianity. The lectures on hermeneutics, however, display a consistency with the dialogue. Schleiermacher appears as the student of Kant who rejects Kant's deontological ethics. The *Hermeneutics* shows his guiding interest in the nature of man as an agent in the historical world. Also, from the point of view of ethics the church and free society are of the utmost importance, though they cannot be comprehended by ethical reason alone. This emphasis on the historical and experiential is again seen in the interpretation of theology. Schleiermacher's aim here, as Dr Niebuhr so aptly says, is to be 'empirical, and empirical to such a degree, moreover, that his data be accessible not only to professional colleagues and to scholars but also to every man upon whom the communication of the Gospel has worked' (p. 141). Finally, when he comes to the problem of Christ Dr Niebuhr shows how Schleiermacher's thinking is essentially Christocentric. 'Christ exercises a forming, re-forming, informing influence upon the "matter" of human nature and human religion' (p. 211). But this does not mean that Schleiermacher justifies all that he says about God by reference to Christology. Jesus exhibits ideal humanity and he is the historical person whose presence becomes the abiding occasion for the reorganization and clarifying of the Christian's consciousness of his absolute dependence. This book is the most useful and comprehensive account of Schleiermacher's theology that I have read. When one has finished reading

this sympathetic study of the development of a theology it is easy to understand Barth's admiration for Schleiermacher, an admiration which is revealed by the little story he relates in *Dogmatics in Outline* of how he found among the ruins of Bonn an undamaged bust of Schleiermacher and had it 'rescued and somewhere restored to honour again'. And, though I find Barth's evaluation of Schleiermacher's theology more convincing than Dr Niebuhr's, I do commend this book to anyone who wishes to find out more about this forgotten giant.

J. HEYWOOD THOMAS

The Moving Image, by G. D. Yarnold. (Allen & Unwin, 37*s.* 6*d.*)

This is both a bold venture and a brilliant piece of exposition. The title comes, of course, from Plato's 'time is the moving image of eternity'. Anyone who has cracked his head in the study of time will, if he is prepared to crack it again, learn much from this new approach, which might induce those who echo Cullmann to think again. The author's purpose is to restate the ideas of time and eternity, so far as they concern Christian theology made philosophical, so as to take account of the present state of physics, the one natural science that is forced to define what it means by time. He is remarkably equipped: he was a research scientist before becoming a clergyman, and has obviously made himself a competent theologian and philosopher; and as a writer he achieves as much precision and lucidity as the subject-matter at present allows of. Some of his chapters are of the stuff and level one looks for in Gifford Lectures.

In the classical physics time is just a quantity in an equation, readable backward as well as forward. Later, the fact that in mechanical processes some energy, though never lost, becomes unavailable (hence the theory that the universe is 'running down'), required the purely forward flow of time to be written in. In our own century has come the disturbing recognition that the very methods of measuring time break down when applied to the vaster distances, and the more complex relativities, of motions discovered in the new exploration of the universe. The only mathematical way that can at present be conceived of overcoming the difficulty is to treat time as a fourth co-ordinate along with the three co-ordinates of space, i.e. to measure events in space-time units instead of purely temporal ones.

The author proposes that this revolutionary theory that time is not separably measurable and is therefore not a separate receptacle or order of events, should be made use of, as long as physics finds it indispensable, in clarifying our conception of God's eternal mode of being. That 'eternal' here means timeless, not infinitely successive, is effectively argued; and as time is unthinkable without change, the unchangeableness of God is declared to be implied. God's timeless consciousness of events—the ancient doctrine of the *punctum stans* restated—is expressed by Dr Yarnold as apprehension of the patterns or laws which He stamped on creation: He has the total perspective which the contemporary physicists have sought in taking time and space as indissoluble. A harder question is how an utterly timeless God can enter into relation with the created time-infected world, for we Christians believe that He does so in at least three respects —in creating the spatio-temporal universe, in self-revelation to the humans who live in it, and in the event-revelation of the Incarnation. It would be useless to give a bare outline of the author's answers, which are offered modestly as attempts to conceptualize in a contemporary way.

T. E. JESSOP

The Discipline of the Cave, by J. N. Findlay. (Allen & Unwin, 32*s*.)
Most readers will have had the experience of being conducted round some underground cavern and of seeing the play of lights and shadows that would have made Plato marvel, but for all the fairyland wonder it comes as a relief to see the broad light of day once more. Professor Findlay, with all the expertise of a transcendental speleologist, guides us round the cave of appearance but at the end of the volume we are still in the cave with the promise of release in the next volume of his Gifford Lectures. We are introduced to the furnishings of the cave and then invited to examine them phenomenologically and dialectically. (Hegel and Husserl, not to mention the arch-speleologist Plato, haunt the shadows of Professor Findlay's cave.) The problems of the relationship between body and mind are investigated and one possible solution after another is rejected. The argument points to a transcendental solution for it seems that we cannot understand the cave apart from some world beyond, but we never quite reach the solution. We look forward to the second volume and daylight.

BERNARD E. JONES

Revolution in Religious Education, by H. F. Mathews. (Religious Education Press, 102*s*. 6*d*.)
This book has been written for teachers and others who may have read snippets or reviews of Bultmann, Robinson, Loukes, Goldman and Acland and who wonder if there is anything left to teach in R.I. There is no substitute for reading the originals, but this fairly short and extremely readable review sets current thought in perspective. Horace Mathews deals chapter by chapter with the impact made by some of the important books published during the past few years upon religious education. Obviously the expert will be dissatisfied with a book which attempts to do so much but its purpose will be served if it helps teachers, ministers and parents to see some of the problems involved in trying to talk to children about God. Dr Mathews warmly endorses the principles of the experiential approach set out by Douglas Hubery in *Teaching the Christian Faith Today* (M.Y.D., 6*s*.). He points out that experiential teaching cannot replace the teaching of the Bible, but we must offer a child-centred approach rather than a Bible-centred syllabus. In his discussion of linguistic communication Dr Mathews enthusiastically commends the work of the Rev. Alan T. Dale of Dudley Training College whose translations and paraphrases of the Gospels have recently been published. Those who are concerned with the revision of Agreed Syllabuses will do well to study Dr Mathews's commentary, and those who have to teach to an agreed syllabus will find it challenging and informative.

BERNARD E. JONES

Christian Ethics and Secular Society, by F. R. Barry. (Hodder & Stoughton, 35*s*.)
As in his earlier book published in 1931, Dr Barry first considers the basic principles involved in making Christian ethical decisions and then discusses a series of specific issues. There is an excellent analysis of the nature of Christian ethics, and the question of rules as opposed to situation ethics is subjected to a balanced judgement. Perhaps it is a sign of the changed temper today that the whole of this section of the book is argued from a wide theological and philosophical base, with no chapters on the teaching of Jesus and the New Testament such as appeared in the earlier book. The least satisfactory chapter is the final one in which there are brief discussions of power, the state, law, crime, suicide, euthanasia, abortion, sterilization, the affluent society, and peace and war. (It is a little odd to find these

topics separated into Part Two of the book, while chastity and the family are included in the first part.) Too little space is available for an adequate treatment, and occasionally dogmatic assertions are made without argumentation, as in the attack on modern advertising and an occasional reference to race. But throughout, the bishop's wide experience and pastoral concern for individuals are very evident. The discerning, who are not misled into thinking that only extremists have an up-to-date message, will wish to read and ponder this thoughtful book.

CYRIL S. RODD

Insight and Responsibility, by Erik H. Erikson. (Faber & Faber, 30*s*.)

Professor Erikson, Professor of Human Development at Harvard, gathers in this volume a series of lectures delivered on various occasions in different parts of the world. The common theme is the ethical implications of psychoanalytical insight. The introductory lecture, entitled, 'The First Psychoanalyst', delivered on the occasion of the centenary of Freud's birth, gives some new insights into the life of Freud. The remaining lectures in varying ways throw light on man's moral values from the viewpoint of psychoanalysis, emphasizing man's need of roots and the importance of love. This latter point is vividly illustrated by the report of the experiment on young monkeys. Separated from their natural mother at birth, they were nurtured by a mechanical mother, soft and warm like the real mother, able to nurse and feed, but unable to give affection. The young monkeys became in the end 'psychotics'. They had missed the I-thou experience that the real mother would have afforded. The experience of men and women migrants, uprooted from their native country for one reason or another, is also informative and illuminating. In a lecture on 'The Golden Rule' Professor Erikson describes the strange golden rule of the Nuclear Age, 'Do not unto others—unless you are sure you can do them in as totally as they can do you in.' Man's sharpened awareness must lead him beyond this to a deeper understanding of love of neighbour. This is a further valuable Freudian contribution to our understanding of human behaviour.

BERNARD E. JONES

Marriage Partnership, by Frederick von Gagern. (Mercier Press, 35*s*.)

It is customary in these days to emphasize the fact that sex education must take account of the whole person. It must concern itself not only with the biological functions of the body, but with the emotional and spiritual aspects of human relationship. Dr Gagern, a Roman Catholic, has succeeded to an unusual degree in blending together the various dimensions of the subject. There is consequently a wholesomeness and wholeness about his book which immediately commends him as a wise and knowledgeable counsellor. The author's experience as a medical man, especially within the field of psychiatry, has shown him the need for sound sex education, and given him a very deep understanding of the questions young people, in particular, so often ask. He deals with remarkable sensitivity with the problems of physical relationship between lovers before marriage. He wisely refuses to lay down hard-and-fast rules. Rather he illumines the whole area of discussion with wise insights into the meaning of love and respect between two people for whom sexual desire is a natural expression of deepening relationship. He deals with the various aspects of the marriage relationship with the same charity and depth of feeling. An unusual feature of the book is the inclusion of a number of plates. These include some diagrams, but also many photographs. They supplement the text which sets our human sexuality in the context of God's good

purpose of making us truly human, capable of receiving from and contributing to the health and happiness of those to whom we are related. It is a good book by a good man on a good subject.

KENNETH G. GREET

Yes to Mission, by Douglas Webster. (S.C.M. Press, 9*s*. 6*d*.)
Planning for Mission, edited by Thomas Wieser. (Epworth Press, 12*s*. 6*d*.)
The first is a book of few pages, but of real value for study-groups and those who need guidance concerning the place of mission in the life of the Church, or who are finding Christian witness difficult, frustrating or unrewarding. Douglas Webster is Professor of Mission in the Selly Oak Colleges. He understands the intellectual difficulties, and has first-hand knowledge of work overseas. The book is a positive answer to the critics of mission. The urge to mission springs from certainty about doctrine. There is a Gospel, and everybody should know. Mission is considered as affirmation, proclamation, subordination (i.e. as servants of Christ), penetration (which involves the laity in making bridges into men's minds), mediation, integration (everything to be centred in God, not in man) and consummation (when all things are united in Christ). Concerning the younger churches, which, in the four ways of age, size, environment and security, are nearer to the New Testament, there can be no evangelism without understanding. Mission is costly. There is always a cross in service. The prophets, our Lord Himself and the apostles were rejected. Mission involves difficulties and suffering. Sometimes it seems that 'you just can't win', but the final paragraphs are about the achievement of the Cross.

Planning for Mission is the product of a study, authorized at the Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1961, and undertaken by the Department of Studies in Evangelism. An interim report was received and welcomed by the Central Committee at Enuga, Nigeria, in 1965. Contributors are from Western Europe and U.S.A. Terms of reference cover the Biblical background, experiments in the history of the Church, descriptions of secularization and the contemporary situation, the polarity between theology and sociology, the Church and society, the changing world, the meaning of mission, the beginnings of new forms of work and witness of the laity, the necessity for changes in congregational and zonal structures of the Church, and revolutionary missionary action. Many questions are asked and answers are beginning to be found. At present, there are more problems than solutions.

FRANK M. KELLEY

The Significance of South India, by Michael Hollis. (Lutterworth, 12*s*. 6*d*.)
Ecumenical Dialogue in Europe, introduced by Patrick C. Rodger. (Lutterworth, 12*s*. 6*d*.)
The latest two volumes of *Ecumenical Studies in History* are different in many ways but have much in common at depth. Bishop Hollis had much to do with the final break-through in South India. He was the first Moderator of the united Church and during his six years of office made a great and lasting contribution to the shape of that Church. Now, at a distance in time and space, emotion reflected on in tranquillity, he makes assessment of what happened. No one is in a better position, or more fitted, to do this. No one can regard C.S.I. as anything but significant for the course of re-union movements and ecumenism generally. It is spoken of with varying degrees of enthusiasm. For some it represented a dangerous experiment, holding more of warning than example. For others it is a pattern to be copied exactly, whatever the differences in outward circumstance. But, as Bishop

Hollis stresses, the important thing is that C.S.I. exists. Here, in one place on earth, it has proved possible that episcopal and non-episcopal traditions can come, live, grow together. How this has come to pass has something at least to teach others, both positively and negatively. And so have the events following union. Each chapter deals with a concern or aspect of the total process of unity and points to what can be learned and heeded, from South India experience, in other areas where discussions are afoot. Of these, Bishop Hollis has wide knowledge and perception and about them he has much to say that is wise and useful. Above all there is the sense of the work and presence of the Holy Spirit to whom must be attributed what happened in South India and all that is good in the C.S.I.

Patrick Rodger, when Faith and Order Secretary of the World Council of Churches, had much to do with events in Europe, especially in regard to developing relations between Roman Catholics and Protestants in France. The book introduced by him is an English translation (by W. Fletcher Fleet) of the records of the inter-confessional group of Dombes where Catholics and Protestants reached depths of understanding far beyond anything we know in Britain or in places farther west. The Dombes discussions were the fruit of the pioneer work of the Abbé Couturier, to whom this book is tribute, as the annual week of prayer is his memorial. Of them the full story, with the theological implications, is here told. It is all deeply moving and encouraging, and should be required reading for all who are involved, however marginally, in local relationships between Roman Catholics and others. Here is described a method of approach and discussion which keeps firmly to the central matters and provides a way of advance.

MARCUS WARD

Circles of Faith, by David G. Bradley. (Abingdon Press, Nashville, New York, $4.50.)

The assumption, so facilely accepted in some quarters, that all religions are fundamentally one, witnessing to the same universal truths, and equally valid paths to the same goal, does not bear the light of critical examination. The student of Comparative Religion is aware of seemingly irreconcilable differences in the cardinal beliefs of the great living faiths of mankind. In this stimulating book Dr Bradley seeks to show that the cause of religion is not served by turning a blind eye to these differences. Each living religion stands within its own circle of faith, accepting certain truths as axiomatic which are not necessarily accepted within the circle of another faith. Dr Bradley insists that one can find truth within the context of one's own faith, for truth in religion is conviction first of all and not the result of a process of inductive logic. Dr Bradley divides the religions of mankind into three groups: those which he calls Biblical religions, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity and Islam; Indian religions, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism; and religions of East Asia, Taoism, Confucianism and Shinto. He shows how, though profound differences occur between the religions in each of these groups, differences which cannot be neglected, the world view within each of these 'circles of faith' is essentially the same, but differs radically from the others. So radical, indeed, are these major differences that there is little hope of reconciling them into a higher synthesis. The author discusses in turn what the various religions affirm concerning the origin and ground of the universe, and man's nature, condition, salvation and ultimate destiny. In chapter four he points out that ethical codes and moral standards, seemingly similar, have often an entirely different basis and motivation. In chapter seven he suggests the reasons why several religions have no missionary dynamic, and compares Buddhism, Christianity and

Islam as missionary faiths in respect of universality, continuity and adaptability. The book, as its sub-title suggests, is an excellent preface to the study of the world religions. It should prove especially valuable to those preparing themselves for missionary service, as it frankly faces up to many of the fundamental differences of thought and outlook which make fruitful conversation on a high religious level difficult.

On page 183, Ch'ing T'u should read Ching T'u, and Kuang Yin should be Kuan Yin.

D. HOWARD SMITH

That Better Country: the Religious Aspect of Life in Eastern Australian 1835–1850, by John Barrett. (C.U.P., 60*s*.)

Let it be said at once that although the subject is only of peripheral interest to many in this country, this is a very good book indeed. One welcome feature of Australia's growing self-consciousness of its nationhood is a lively interest in its past. In this fashion we have had the remarkable triology of novels by Eleanor Dark, telling the Australian story until 1814; nor is it likely the sequence has ended. Amongst the Sirius series of outstanding Australian books I have just read the fascinating *Letters of Rachel Henning*. The acknowledgements in this particular book by Dr John Barrett indicate at least thirty-three contemporary Australian historians who between them have filled in the blank spaces of Australia's past. Some years ago we had from Douglas Pike a remarkable study of South Australia between 1829 and 1957 under the title *Paradise of Dissent*. Now for a roughly corresponding period we have a study of the much more populated Eastern Australia from the more limited viewpoint of religion. There is every evidence of careful research and documentation, and one is grateful for the plates and figures that illustrate the text. It will become at once the standard work of reference for the Churches of New South Wales in this period. In the background the reader will note the change from penal settlement days up to 1840 when transportation to New South Wales was abolished, and the expansion of the next decade in the years of economic growth and responsible government. During this period there was an unprecedented development of Churches, a healthy free Press and the rapid growth of elementary schools and of secondary schools. Yet even at the half-century there were large numbers of former convicts both in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania), and beneath a thin surface veneer of polite society there was crime, debauchery and ignorance. There are certain main virtues of this book. It describes carefully the close connection of Churches and Schools and the passions roused in colonists by any attempt to single out Anglicans for special aid. Yet the alternative of treating all denominations equally outraged the Anglicans, and meant an impossible burden of expense. The present system of a largely secular education where clergy and ministers just come in to give religious instruction may be due in part to Anglicans demanding too much at a time when Church schools outnumbered the voluntary schools. If only, as the author says, the Churches had learnt to pool their resources with the Government, the present situation in regard to State Schools and religious education would not have arisen.

Dr Barrett, who incidentally is a Methodist Minister, deals in a restrained yet effective manner with the influence of religion on the community, and concludes that, despite a secularism due to the beginnings of scientific enquiry and a free and easy, zestful life under a pleasant sun, the Churches had an influence disproportionate to their numbers. His sane if undramatic conclusion is that both then and

now 'the Churches have neither fully consolidated their victories nor completely succumbed to their defeats. In winning the Churches have often lost; in losing they have still held much ground.... Revival is often round the corner but it has never turned it yet.' Could not the same verdict be given nearer home?

MALDWYN EDWARDS

Israel from the Earliest Times to the Birth of Christ, by Arvid S. Kapelrud. (Blackwell, 15*s*.)

Many attempts have been made to produce a brief history of Israel, a task which becomes increasingly difficult as the mass of evidence accumulates. In this work Professor Kapelrud shows himself to be a master of the immense material and a judicious selector of what is necessary to present a concise account. It can be justly claimed that this book is 'an eminently successful presentation of the data', as the publisher asserts on the jacket. The author makes the fullest use of the history of the ancient Near East as it affects his subject, and draws upon a wide range of archaeological evidence. Textual and literary criticism is appreciated. The balance of the book is maintained by compressing the discussion of the origins and formative period of Israel into 35 pages, by devoting 70 pages to the monarchy, and then giving 40 pages to the restoration, decline and fall of Judah. Legendary material in the story of the conquest is freely recognized, and proper use is made of variant traditions in the early days of the monarchy. The suggestion that there were two campaigns of Sennacherib against Jerusalem is dismissed; the idea that Ezra came to Jerusalem in the reign of Artaxerxes II is thought probable. These and other interesting issues cannot be fully argued in so brief an account, and in each case the author simply makes a decision among the alternatives he has concisely mentioned. The few criticisms one can make do not detract from the general high value of the book. It may be asked why, in a book printed and published in England, it should be thought necessary to have American spelling. There are occasional oddities in the English of the translation (e.g. pp. 26, 28; and on p. 116 the translator invents the word 'conformance'). The map also is not fully Anglicized, giving 'Sichem' for Shechem. Mount Carmel is strangely marked as a town, and the location of Edom is too far west. On p. 24 'small flocks of cattle' should surely be 'flocks of small cattle'. The author is too positive when he suggests that the location of Ai and of Tirzah has been decisively made. But let the last word be one of praise. This is an excellent and reliable guide for the student, and will undoubtedly replace all others as the most up-to-date concise account of Israel. A useful index completes the book.

H. J. COOK

Gerhard von Rad: Old Testament Theology. Translated by D. M. G. Stalker. *Vol. II: The Theology of Israel's Prophetic Traditions.* (Oliver & Boyd, 45*s*.)

The second and final volume of Professor von Rad's *Old Testament Theology* is concerned with the Prophets and is a work of profound and impressive scholarship. It is not by any means the easiest of books to read, for the very reason that the examination and exposition of the relevant texts and ideas are carried out in considerable detail, but it may be said without hesitation that there is a vast amount of material here which is rewarding and stimulating. The book is arranged in three parts. First there is a treatment of the nature of prophetic experience, with a most interesting study of the prophetic ideas of the word of God and of time. Here in particular there is a careful and searching examination of the relation between obedience and freedom in the experience of the prophet. It is to be noted

that the author does not subscribe to the view that all the prophets are to be thought of as being in close association with the cult. Part 2 deals with the Canonical Prophets. According to von Rad the common characteristic of these teachers is their 'actualization' of the great events of Israel's past in the present situation, and their declaration that real fulfilment of the promises of God is still to come. What they say has an 'openness to the future'; that is to say, they place emphasis on an eschatological hope. The refreshing treatment of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Jeremiah is especially to be noted. In the final part the question of the relation of the New Testament to the Old is dealt with. The New Testament is to be regarded as the supreme actualization of the Old. Light from Christ illuminates the Hebrew 'saving history'. Though fulfilment here is often beyond the expectation of the Prophets it is 'entirely proper' that it should be so, for such 'transformation in the light of a new saving event... had already taken place in the Old Testament itself'. In the Preface and again in the Postscript von Rad expresses some doubt whether a really adequate Theology of the Old Testament can yet be written. This seems a disappointing conclusion to reach at the end of two weighty volumes bearing the very title which is thus placed in dispute. But it would be a great error to take these words too seriously. Professor von Rad may not, at least in his own view, have arrived at his desired destination as precisely as he wished; but in the course of his long journey he has come to many excellent resting-places where the company has been good and the conversation fascinating. Some, of course, will not agree with everything that is said. But all will be obliged to take careful note of it and will be greatly refreshed by the experience.

J. Y. MUCKLE

Grammatical Insights into the New Testament, by Nigel Turner. (T. & T. Clark, 27*s.* 6d.)

The author of this book is already well known for his work in bringing to completion, after so many years, the great *Grammar of New Testament Greek* begun by J. Hope Moulton and continued by W. F. Howard. Volume III of that work, dealing with Syntax, appeared under Dr Turner's name in 1962, and has justly earned him a reputation as one of the leading authorities on the language of the New Testament. The present work is described as 'a theological and expository expansion of some conclusions in Moulton's Grammar'. It consists of a collection of discussions (of varying length but mostly short and to the point) of passages in the Greek Testament where grammatical considerations are vital to correct understanding and exegesis. Like Moulton before him, Dr Turner has the gift of making grammar and syntax *live*. Anyone who has doubts about the relevance of an appreciation of Greek grammar to the task of expounding Scripture should be made to read this book. Greek and Semitic technicalities are explained with remarkable simplicity and clarity, so that the book can be used with profit by students who have no great technical equipment. At the same time it will be of great interest to scholars to learn how an acknowledged expert interprets so many notorious cruxes. They will not always, by any means, agree with his views (e.g., that Rom. 9^5 describes Jesus as 'God, blessed for ever', or that the Magi were 'wise men from the *west*'—i.e. from Anatolia in Asia Minor!). The stimulation and enjoyment they will experience should be none the less for that. The book concludes with a very interesting discussion of the language of Jesus and his disciples, in which Dr Turner puts forward an interesting, though hardly conclusive, case for the hypothesis that much of Jesus' teaching was delivered in a distinct type of Jewish, 'biblical' Greek. It is a pity that here and there the book

shows signs of hasty composition and careless proof-reading; for instance, in one short section (pp. 24–7) 'St Lukes' is written for 'St Matthew', the aorist participle in Mt. 1^{20} is called a '*present* participle' (presumably due to confusion with Lk. 1^{35}), and 'Matt. 2^{29}' is written for 'Matt. 2^{20}'. OWEN E. EVANS

A Critical Introduction to the New Testament, by R. H. Fuller. (Duckworth, 15*s.*)
The Theology of the Gospels, by Sherman Johnson. (Duckworth, 15*s.*)

The two most recent additions to the Duckworth *Studies in Theology* are both N.T. studies, written by Anglicans teaching in America. R. H. Fuller, formerly of Lampeter and now teaching at Evanston, has written clearly and concisely. He follows the chronological rather than canonical order of the N.T. books, explains technical terms, gives a bird's-eye view of the development of the Canon, and wisely omits the history of the Text (separately treated elsewhere in the series). The book is rather liberally spattered with misprints, and contains the occasional contradiction. On p. 11 *Ephesians* is 'almost certainly deutero-Pauline', while on p. 57 'The arguments in favour and against [Pauline authorship] are about equal in weight, and a verdict of *non liquet* is the position maintained here.' The author is particularly good on the need to recognize 'early Catholicism' in the N.T., in its strength as well as weakness, and on the breakdown of the rigid distinction (traditional, but not scriptural?) between Scripture and Tradition: 'the N.T. is the tradition of the church between 30 and 125' (p. 198). It is interesting to note how the author's removal to America has conditioned not only his language—he writes 'gotten' for 'got', and 'care packet' for 'food/relief parcel'—but also his theology. He now evidently gives much greater weight to German scholarship, and this book reflects the recent tendency for American scholars to take up a *via media* between continental radicalism and British conservatism. In *The Theology of the Gospels*, Sherman Johnson provides a succinct and up-to-date survey of the field. He brings out admirably the richly varied theological content of the Gospels and their component traditions, and makes constant and fruitful reference to the Qumran literature and *The Gospel according to Thomas*. He gives full weight to Form-critical insights, though his attitude to 'the Method' remains well this side of idolatry. (The index lists nine references to Dodd as against one to Bultmann, and that to express disagreement!) A number of judgements may be questioned. Is it true, for example, that 'Mark evidently misunderstands the nature of the parables'; or that Jesus' use of *Abba* merely gave 'a new urgency and realism' to the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God? (pp. 29, 167). There is, surprisingly, no reference to the work of Jeremias, either at this point or in dealing with the Lord's Supper or Lord's Prayer (the eschatological significance of *peirasmos* is quite overlooked). The book would have been made even more useful by the inclusion of a select bibliography such as Fuller has supplied in his volume.

JOHN A. NEWTON

The Epistle of James, by C. Leslie Mitton. (Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 30*s.*)
The Synoptic Gospels, by D. B. J. Campbell. (John Murray, 15*s.*)

Dr Mitton's Commentary on *James* has been widely and rightly welcomed as a major contribution to the understanding of this still misunderstood Epistle. For too long, choice has been limited to the massive but dated work of Mayor, and Ropes, on the one hand, and to the later but slighter treatments by Blackman, and Tasker. Simply on the ground of size this work meets a real need. A brief introduction states the main aims of the commentator: to expound the teaching as important for Christians today and to show that it is integral, not eccentric, to

the N.T. message. The assumption that the epistle was written by James of Jerusalem for the benefit of Jewish-Christian visitors is well argued in an appendix of 27 pages which takes up other matters conventionally treated in the Introduction. Dr Mitton's method has much to commend it. We come fresh to the Commentary (207 pp.), close-packed but clearly set out with suitable variation of type. Here is the great value of this book—a truly evangelical Commentary on a document to which many still deny that adjective. *Sola fide*? Yes, provided you recognize that faith is not true faith unless it is the motive power that produces Christian living. This emphasis Dr Mitton takes and demonstrates to be the characteristic emphasis and abiding contribution of *James*. He brings to his task the exact scholarship we expect from him and the profound understanding of the Gospel of one who knows, more than many, what John Wesley's doctrine of perfect love is about. It may well be that this kind of exposition of Scripture, at once faithful to the given word and percipient of current needs, is the real answer to the questions being raised in 'The Debate', bound up as it is with the ethical issues raised in the 'new morality'.

Miss Campbell has written for those who are teaching or studying the Synoptic Gospels with an examination (G.C.E. 'A' Level?) in view. The arrangement following 'the main pattern of the life of Jesus', with Caesarea Philippi as climax, and the advice to seek further information from *The Four Gospels* by R. H. Streeter (*sic*) indicate that the statement of problems and conflicting theories is on a rather limited basis. The arrangement of paragraphs of material, in single, double and triple tradition, follows roughly the pattern of *Huck*. It is surprising that no reference is made to Nelson's *Gospel Parallels* for which this book would be a useful means of study. The commentary is crisp and to the point. The explanations of difficult words and ideas are excellent. Supplementary articles deal with the miracles, the Kingdom, Parables, Son of Man, Son of God, the Jewish Sects. There are two good indices. The whole work strikes one as, in the best sense, down to earth and no nonsense. Within its limits it should prove of use also to others than teachers as a handy compendium of information, justifying the commendation by Canon Adam Fox in a Foreword. MARCUS WARD

Studies in Biblical Theology (S.C.M. Press):

No. 48. *The Collection,* by Keith F. Nickle (16*s.*)

No. 49. *Christianity according to Paul,* by Michel Bouttier (18*s.*)

No. 50. *Christ, Lord, Son of God,* by Werner Kramer (25*s.*)

In this well-known series the S.C.M. Press performs a most useful service, both by making available to English readers important monographs by established Continental scholars and by publishing doctoral theses of outstanding merit and interest by younger and hitherto unknown scholars. The three latest contributions, published simultaneously, belong rather to the latter category. Keith F. Nickle is a young American Presbyterian minister who studied at Basel under Professor Oscar Cullmann. Michel Bouttier is a French Reformed minister, now teaching New Testament at Montpellier, whose reputation in his own country was established by an outstanding book *En Christ* in 1962, but who has not yet become widely known in this country. Werner Kramer is a young Swiss scholar whose teachers have included Barth, Conzelmann and Schweizer, and who wrote his doctoral dissertation while working as Professor Schweizer's assistant at Zürich.

Dr Nickle writes with a keen awareness that the collection project which Paul organized among his Gentile churches for the indigent Christian community in

Jerusalem is of far more than mere academic and historical interest; it was 'the initial Christian attempt to avoid a severance in the Body of Christ', the study of which 'can result in a direct, creative contribution to the present concern' for Christian unity. In addition to a careful exegetical study of the relevant texts and a valuable survey of the problem of relating Galatians 2 to Acts 11 and 15 (he favours the view that the Acts passages are double accounts of the same trip described in Gal. 2, the Acts 15 account being in the correct chronological position), the author provides a useful comparison of Paul's project with contemporary Jewish practices, and a long chapter on the theological significance of the collection (as regards the realization of Christian charity, the expression of Christian unity, and the anticipation of Christian eschatology). A concluding chapter considers the influence which the collection project had upon the life of the Church up to A.D. 150, showing that, while it succeeded in its aims as regards charity and unity, 'as an instrumental event of the *Heilsgeschichte*, intended to prod the unbelieving Jews to profess faith in Christ, Paul's project was a crashing failure'.

In a Foreword to M. Bouttier's book, Professor C. F. D. Moule (one of the Advisory Editors of the series) describes the impression made upon him by the author's earlier book *En Christ*: 'it quickly became evident that, whoever he was, he brought a distinguished mind to bear on one of the most delicate and most discussed of all Pauline phrases, and had succeeded in throwing fresh light on it variegated meanings and nuances.' This high praise is confirmed by the present work (the original French title of which was *La condition chrétienne selon saint Paul*), which aims at applying the results of the more academic study in the direction of an understanding, in a devotional and pastoral as well as a theological context, of what life in Christ means. The work includes several valuable exegetical excursuses, but in the main the author succeeds in his aim to present his material in 'language that everyone can understand'. All who are concerned to understand, and to preach, the Pauline gospel will reap rich benefit from the careful study of this notable book.

Dr Kramer's is a larger work than either of the others, and takes us into the field of the Christological titles which have been the subject of so much discussion in recent years. Like the other two works noticed in this review, however, Dr Kramer's study is strictly concerned with the thought of St Paul. Its object, in his own words, 'is primarily to examine, by means of a critical analysis of text, tradition and "themes", the places at which the christological titles occur within the strata of the N.T. tradition'. He limits the scope of the inquiry to the letters generally agreed to be Pauline, because these give 'the clearest, most vivid picture'. The work is in three parts, dealing respectively with the pre-Pauline material embodied in the epistles; the Pauline material, where Paul's own contribution to christology is worked out; and some particular problems not confined simply to one stratum of the tradition. As the author himself admits, this is 'decidedly a specialist essay', and the reader must be prepared for hard work. The arguments, however, are set forth with skill and clarity, with helpful summaries at the end of each section. Dr Kramer challenges some assumptions which we in this country have been accustomed to make, e.g., that the application to Jesus of the title 'Lord' originated in the *Maranatha* of the Aramaic-speaking communities; he argues that the confessional use of *Kyrios* originated in the Hellenistic Gentile-Christian church and was quite independent of the use of *Mara* (with reference to the parousia) in the Aramaic-speaking church. Whether such arguments convince us or not, they deserve the most serious consideration. The book is an important contribution to the study of N.T. christology. OWEN E. EVANS

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BRILL (LEIDEN): F. E. Stoeffler, *The Rise of Evangelical Pietism*, pp. 257, n.p.
BURNS & OATES: Yves M. J. Congar, *Tradition and Traditions*, pp. 536. 90*s.*
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: C. R. Cragg, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason*, pp. 247 (paper-back), 9*s.* 6*d.* Eldon J. Epp: *The Theological Tendency of Codex Bezae Cantabrigiensis in Acts*, pp. 210, 45*s.* (For Melbourne University Press) J. Barrett, *That Better Country: 'The Religious Aspect' of Life in Eastern Australia*, pp. 214, $6.00 (Aust.)
CAREY KINGSGATE PRESS: John Knox, *Myth and Truth*, pp. 87, 12*s* 6*d.* R. G. Torbet, *A History of the Baptists*, pp. 555, 50*s.*
CARNEGIE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, PITTSBURG: Hayes and others, *'Starre of Poets'; Discussion of Shakespeare: Five Essays*, n.p.
CHURCH OF ENGLAND INFORMATION OFFICE: A. Ive, *The Church of England in South Africa*, pp. 108, 3*s.*
DR WILLIAMS'S LIBRARY TRUST: John Kent, *From Darwin to Blatchford: The Role of Darwinism in Christian Apologetic, 1875-1910* (Friends of Dr Williams's Library Lecture No. 20), pp. 37, 5*s.*
DUCKWORTH: R. H. Fuller, *A Critical Introduction to the New Testament* (*Studies in Theology*), pp. 221, 15*s.*
EPWORTH PRESS: Robert C. Monk, *John Wesley: His Puritan Heritage*, pp. 386, 42s. C. H. D. Clark, *The Scientist and the Supernatural*, pp. 202, 35s. Ulrich Simon, *Theology Observed*, pp. 111, 16*s.* John Dover, *The Words of the Crucified*, pp. 63, 5*s.* G. F. Nuttall, *The Puritan Spirit: Essays and Addresses*, pp. 358, 42*s.* Lord Caradon, *Dangers and Hopes at the United Nations* (The Beckly Social Service Lecture, 1966), pp. 19, 2*s.* 6*d.*
FABER & FABER: Xavier Rynne, *The Fourth Session: Debates and Decrees of the Vatican Council II*, pp. 368, 42*s.* (ed.) T. Ware, *The Art of Prayer: and Orthodox Anthology*, pp. 287, 50*s.*
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION: R. Tudur Jones: *Reconciliation in a Changing Britain* (Alex Wood Memorial Lecture), pp. 38, 2*s.* 6*d.*
HODDER & STOUGHTON: F. R. Barry, *Christian Ethics and Secular Society*, pp. 288, 35*s.*
LUTTERWORTH PRESS: K. A. Busia, *Urban Churches in Britain*, pp. 174, 21*s.* paper; 25*s.* cloth. J. R. Cobb, *A Christian Natural Theology*, pp. 228, 35*s.*
MACMILLAN (N. Y.): (ed.) J. C. Murray, S.J., *Religious Liberty: An End and a Beginning*, pp. 192, $4.95.
MERLIN PRESS: (ed.) S. Windlass, *The Church and the Worker-Priests*, pp. 156, 25*s.*
MOWBRAYS: T. Simpson, C.R., *Today's Ministry and Tomorrow's Church*, pp. 88, 8*s.* 6*d.* D. Whittle, *Christianity and the Arts*, pp. 158 + plates, 25*s.*
NELSON: C. S. Dessain, *John Henry Newman*, pp. 178 + plate, 30*s.*
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: Jasper Ridley, *Thomas Cranmer*, pp. 450 + plate (paper-back), 12*s.* 6*d.*
S.C.M. PRESS: C. K. Barrett, *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition*, pp. 178 (paper-back), 15*s.* R. M. McBride, *The Church in the Thought of Bishop John Robinson*, pp. 160, 30*s.* A. W. Wainwright, *The Trinity in the New Testament*, pp. 278 (paper-back), 15*s.* Joachim Jeremias, *Rediscovering the Parables*, pp. 192 (paper-back), 7*s.* 6*d.* M. M. Thomas, *The Christian Response to the Asian Revolution*, pp. 128, 7*s.* 6*d.* E. G. Lee, *The Minute Particular: One Man's Story of God*, pp. 192, 21*s.* John Navone, S.J., *History and Faith in the Thought of Alan Richardson*, pp. 161, 30*s.* S. Paul Schilling, *Contemporary Continental Theologians*, pp. 288, 35*s.* E. von Rad, *Deuteronomy* (Old Testament Library), pp. 214, 35*s.* M. Wilson, *The Church is Healing*, pp. 128, 9*s.* 6*d.* I. G. Barbour, *Issues in Science and Religion*, pp. 468, 45*s.* A Cochrane (ed.), *Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 336, 42*s.* T. H. L. Parker (ed.), *English Reformers* (Library of Christian Classics), pp. xxvi + 360, 45*s.* A. R. Vidler, *F. D. Maurice and Company: Nineteenth Century Studies*, pp. 286, 30*s.* Roger Lloyd, *The Church of England: 1900-1965*, pp. 620, 55*s.*
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