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LATIN TEXTS

ST. AUGUSTINE'S TREATISE

ON

THE CITY OF GOD

TRANSLATIONS OF CHRISTIAN  
LITERATURE. SERIES II  
LATIN TEXTS

ST. AUGUSTINE'S TREATISE  
ON  
THE CITY OF GOD

[Abridged]

BY

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## PREFACE

### *The occasion of the work.*

THIS colossal work, a monument of pious wisdom and painstaking research, was undertaken by Augustine shortly after the sack of the Imperial City (A.D. 410), which Gibbon describes so pathetically in his *Decline and Fall* (Book II. c. xxxi.). Then, the State which had played so prominent a part in the history of the world was given over to the unbridled passions of the tribes of Scythia and Germania, who for six days worked out their lust and rage upon the defenceless citizens and their wives and children. Such a national calamity, not even to be paralleled by the fall of Paris, filled the Roman world with the greatest fear and consternation. "My tongue cleaves to the roof of my mouth, and sobs choke my utterance, to think that the city is a captive which led captive the whole world," was the exclamation of Jerome when the report reached him in Bethlehem. The clergy were confident that the end of the world was coming because of the evil deeds and "plagues" of the great world-city, while the Pagan writers were as firmly convinced that the fall of Rome was due to the neglect of her country's gods. Yet those awful scenes of murder and outrage worse than death were not unredeemed by some "rare and extraordinary examples of barbarian virtue," as Gibbon himself admits, and even he relates some of the generous deeds of the Christian ladies in that

terrible time. It was a difficult matter, however, for men, even though they were Christians of the Arian sect, to remember at such a time, when they had the power to indulge every evil passion, the principles of a faith they had but half learnt. However, on the whole, Church property was respected, and thousands of the pagan Romans who had taken refuge in the churches were saved from the fury of heretic Goth and unbelieving Hun.

The fall of Rome was due, in a measure, to her overweening confidence in the power of her wealth and the prestige of her name; the demoralization of the middle class; the corruption of the officials; the luxury of the rich and the sloth of the masses, and that supreme contempt for the barbarians, whose tide of invasion, checked for a moment here and there, was, after some six centuries of unceasing efforts, to surge over the barriers with irresistible force, swallowing up all opposition in the waves of its mighty onset, sweeping onwards towards the inviolable boundaries of the doomed city in a deluge that was not to be resisted. The sack of the city assumed, however, a different aspect in relation to the Christian Church, which was to reap the fruits of this downfall of the State by means of its efficient system of organization, and by reason of its inspiring principle of spiritual regeneration. Here was a subject for the rhetorician. But who was to undertake it? A providential chance seemed to ordain that the lot should fall upon Augustine.

*Letter from Marcellinus to Augustine.*

Some two years after the event referred to, a group of Pagans and Christians were debating the relative merits of Christianity and the old religion of Rome, when one of the former, Volusianus by name, as we learn from a letter to Augustine, proposed that the Christians present should explain how the Master's precept of "turning the other cheek" could be reconciled with the Roman policy

of rule, and endeavoured to show that Christianity was a weakness in the State, and had accelerated its fall. Marcellinus,<sup>1</sup> who was present, reported the matter to Augustine, who answered the charge in a letter, which we are to regard as the germ of the great treatise *On the City of God*. In that letter (138 *ad M.*) the great father entered as fully as space allowed him into the matter, pointing out that the Gospel is not opposed to a righteous war; that Christian principles, instead of being a weak point in the armour of a State, must prove its safeguard; that the work of the city's ruin had long ago been set in motion by the venality, corruption, and immorality of her own citizens, and that the Cross was now her only hope. Such were the dominant ideas that were afterwards worked out in the *City of God*, which was commenced in 413 A.D., and concluded after many interruptions in the year 426, four years before the author's death, and which may be regarded as one of the greatest efforts of Latin Christianity.

*Augustine's survey of his work.*

In the second book of his *Retractions* (c. xliii.) he thus describes his object in writing this treatise:—"After the storming and the sack of Rome by the Goths under their king, Alaric, the worshippers of false gods or heathen, as we call them, tried to prove that this calamity was due to the Christian religion, and began more fiercely and bitterly than ever to blaspheme the true God. This it was that kindled my zeal for the House of God, and induced me to defend the City of God against the calumny and misrepresentations of her foes. After many serious interruptions this great undertaking, which was extended over many years, was at length finished in twenty-two books. Of these, the first five are written in answer to those who believe that worldly prosperity is

<sup>1</sup>The Tribune and Notary who presided at the Conference between Catholics and Donatists at Carthage, June 411 A.D.

insured by the old polytheistic religion of Rome, and that calamities have followed by reason of its neglect. The next five are addressed to those who admit that the human race is always exposed to such misfortunes, and yet believe that the old religion is a good preparation for the life to come; . . . while the last twelve books of this extensive work are devoted to a comparison of the different origins, histories, and destinies of the City of God and the City of the World."

He also makes two corrections in the tenth and seventeenth books. Referring to his description of the flames that descended from heaven, he tells us that it was a mistake to regard it as a miracle, seeing that it occurred in a vision, and he alters the statement with regard to Samuel that "he was not of the sons of Aaron," to "he was not the son of the priest."

*Notices of the 'De Civitate Dei.'*

Such is the brief summary Augustine himself gives of this, his greatest work, which Gibbon in his sorrow for the fall of the city of letters was unable to appreciate, and dismissed with the brief and bitter notice:—"The learned work, concerning the City of God, was professedly composed by St. Augustine to justify the ways of Providence in the destruction of the Roman greatness. He celebrates, with peculiar satisfaction, this memorable triumph of Christ; and insults his adversaries by challenging them to produce some similar example of a town taken by storm, in which the fabulous gods of antiquity had been able to protect either themselves or their deluded votaries" (ii. 346). This statement is unjust; for though Augustine does certainly trace the plagues of the pagan city to her pagan cult, he does not do it in the spirit of rivalry or partisanship. He sits, as it were, amid the ruins of the city of Rome, and beholds a vision of the City of God descending from heaven, the new Jerusalem which is to take the place of the worn-out social

organization which has succumbed alike to the will of God and the violence of man. Generally speaking the work may be styled as "a confused mass of excellent materials," with regard to the variety of subjects discussed in it, or perhaps more suitably as "the encyclopædia of the fifth century," inasmuch as it is a book in which one may read the predominant feelings and ideas of the age. We have to put ourselves, at least in imagination, in the times of Augustine, and endeavour to enter into the feelings and sentiments of his age, if we are to fully appreciate this grand *résumé* of classical philosophy and religion, which has been so well described by Ozanam as "the first genuine effort to produce a philosophy of history." We shall now glance at the various editions and manuscripts of the text.

*Editions and Manuscripts of the text.*

The first corrected edition of modern times of the *City of God* was made by Juan Luis Vives under the direction of the great Erasmus, and published by Froben of Basle, 1523. A copy of this book was sent to King Henry VIII. of England, who replied by saying that he did not know which of the two to congratulate most—Lodovicus on his learned and masterly performance, or Augustine on the restoration of his ancient text from the obscurity and mutilation of the past.

*Lodovicus Vives' Edition.*

In his introduction, Vives tells us that Erasmus, after his labours on Cyprian and Jerome, was anxious to emend the text of Augustine, and gave him the twenty-two books of the *De Civitate* to work upon. "These books," he tells us, "were faulty beyond all description, and misrepresented Augustine's views by wrong readings. Hence I had no small difficulty in correcting the ancient copies and in guessing the reading; and, indeed, the true

reading had often to be conjectured. Having to return to Bruges in bad health, I set about collating some of the books with the old copies (*exemplaria*), of which Marcus Laurinus gave me one, the Carmelites of Bruges gave me another, and Erasmus gave me a third, which had been sent to him from Colonia Agrippinensis, written, they say, by the hand of the late Bishop Lutger. . . . There is a remarkable discrepancy in the MSS., each of the copyists thinking himself at liberty to use his own words, as if transcription was not the best interpretation. Thus you will find in one book 'arbitror,' and in another 'puto'; in this 'ergo,' in that 'igitur'; in this 'aeternus,' in that 'immortalis'; in one 'flexisse' and in another 'deflexisse,' to say nothing of the omissions, additions, and inversions! How often have errors sprung up from their desire to adapt the reading of the Septuagint, which Augustine always uses, to *our* version (*i.e.* the Vulgate), and to make one (*i.e.* conflate) reading out of two different texts! To examine these variants and to reduce them to their different sources, was to me a work of extreme difficulty and labour." This great work of Lodovicus Vives formed the foundation of later editions, and some of his emendations have been retained in the last recension of the text (Dornbart's). Of these 'incensum Capitolium' for 'incensum' (iii. 17) is perhaps the best.

*Benedictine Edition.*

The next edition of Augustine's works was published in Paris (1679—1700) by the Benedictine Fathers.

*Deubner's Edition.*

Of the new Parisian Edition (1836—1839) Deubner is responsible for the *City of God*. This reviser had access to several important MSS. The oldest of these he calls the Corbeiensis (C.), now Germanensis, belonging

to the seventh century and the old monastery of Corbey. This is an uncial, and only contains the first nine books and the arguments of ten. He had also the use of seven other MSS. of a later date, three hailing from the same monastery in Picardy, and the other four from the Royal Library at Paris. In two of these, numbered respectively 2050 and 2051, the Vulgate readings of Scripture are found. This edition often errs through a misunderstanding of the sense and construction. For instance, it reads 'animalium' for 'animarum' in v. 9; 'nascentis sorte' for 'nascendi sorte' (the birth-lot) in iv. 12; 'afficiendum medicina' for 'accipiendum medicinâ' (ironical; cf. *egote miseris jam accipiam modis*: 'accipere' being Plautine for 'treating') in v. 2; 'honore dignos ducunt' for a well-known idiom 'honori ducunt' (ii. 11); and 'ei adolemus incensum' for 'eum adolemus incenso' (x. 4), but preserves the important reading 'Credo' (v. l. cedo) in Vergil vi. 848. This editor also had a tendency to finish off and simplify a sentence, e.g. reading 'prosperatus est' for 'prosperatus' in v. 25; 'significaverunt et prænuntiaverunt' for 'significata et prænuntiata sunt' in v. 32.

*Dombart's Edition.*

The last and best edition of the text was edited by B. Dombart, and published by Trübner, 1876. This editor had the assistance of Dr. Charles Halm, Librarian in Munich, who lent him three ancient MSS., hitherto not collated, belonging to the library of Munich, which are lettered respectively R, A, and F. Monacensis R, formerly Frisingensis, containing Books XV.—XXII., is a clearly written parchment of the latter end of the tenth century. Monacensis A, formerly Augustanus, and containing all the books, shows traces of interpolations, and substitutes the Vulgate readings for the Italian, agrees with the oldest MS., the Corbeiensis, more than any of the others, and belongs to the tenth century; and Monacensis F,

formerly Frisingensis, containing the first eighteen books, and of the *ninth century*, is by different hands; XII.—XVII. being copied by an older and more careful hand from a slightly better original than the others. Dr. Hoerner collated for Dombart the readings of the Veronensis, Codex V., an ancient MS., thought to belong to the seventh century, and containing books XI.—XVI., while he himself examined the readings of K., Coloniensis, now in Darmstadt, containing Books I.—X., of the eighth century, and much interpolated, and of L. Alderspacensis, containing all the books, belonging to the twelfth century, and fairly sound. Dombart blames Deubner for not reading more of his own emendations and newly-discovered readings in the text, and for following the Benedictine recension too faithfully. He himself, having so many excellent MSS. and commentaries to examine, succeeded in recovering several good readings, of which we may mention the following:—‘*citius*’ for ‘*inertius*’ (i. 14); ‘*litor*’ for ‘*lictor*’ (vi. 10); ‘*nobilitatae*’ for ‘*nobilitate*’ (viii. 4); ‘*diserta*’ for ‘*secura*’ (viii. 4); ‘*initio vitiatæ*’ for ‘*vitio vitiatæ*’ (xii. 3); ‘*ratione gaudentes*’ for ‘*cluentes*’ (ix. 8); ‘*nec quisquam ex eorum stirpe iniquitate committeret quod damnatione reciperet*’ (*i. e.* sow in crime to reap in consequence) for ‘*iniquitatem committeret quod damnationem reciperet*’ (xiv. 10); ‘*de superbia transgressoris*’ for ‘*de superbia transgressionis*’ (xiv. 14, heading); ‘*omnino*’ for ‘*omne*’ (xii. 22), and ‘*vinculo*’ for ‘*cingulo*’ (xxii. 8). He cleverly restores the punctuation of the Veronensis in xii. 3, ‘*Sed vitium, quia malum est, contrarium est bono,*’ where the Parisian edition destroyed sense and grammar by punctuating: ‘*sed vitium. Omne quod malum*’; and rather happily suggests ‘*nisi unus esset*’ for ‘*si unus esset*’ (xv. 5). But his emendation in Book V. (c. 5), ‘*publice sacro et sacrificio colere quemque,*’ is most unhappy, and is due to his not observing the double use of ‘*colere.*’ He adheres to peculiar spellings, *e. g.* ‘*zabulo*’ for

'diabolo' (R) in xx. 5, and 'zaritum' for 'Diarrhytum' (V.R.) in xvi. 8.

*The Versions of Augustine, Tertullian, and Jerome compared.*

All of the MSS. used by Dombart, with the exception of A., which follows the Vulgate, adhere to the Septuagint readings. If Augustine did use, as he is said to have done, the old Latin version, the Peshitto of the West, which was made in North Africa in the second century, and the principal MS. of which is the Codex Speculum Augustini, now in Rome, it must have been a different recension of the text from that used by Tertullian, as is evident from a comparison of the following pairs of passages :—

Matthew xv. 24 :—

Non sum missus nisi ad oves quae perierunt domus Israel (Tertullian and Vulgate).

Non sum missus nisi ad oves perditas domus Israel (Augustine).

John xxi. 13 :—

Ipse vos deducit in omnem veritatem (Tertullian, *De P. H.* c. 22).  
Docebit vos omnem veritatem (Augustine and Vulgate).

Colossians ii. 8 :—

Videte ne quis vos circumveniat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum traditionem hominum (Tertullian).

Cavete ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum elementa mundi (Augustine).

For the difference between the text of the Scriptures which Augustine seems to use and that of the Vulgate,<sup>1</sup> compare the following passages :—

*Versions of Augustine and Jerome compared.*

Matthew viii. 22 :—

Sine mortui mortuos suos sepeliant (Aug.).

Dimitte mortuos sepelire mortuos suos (Jer.).

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<sup>1</sup> See also page 51. For another view see "The Old Latin and the Itala," by F. C. Burkitt, who holds that the *Itala* commended in *De Doctrina Christiana* by Augustine was the Vulgate itself. See p. 54.

Colossians ii. 8 :—

Cavete ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum elementa mundi (Aug.).

Videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam, secundum traditionem hominum, secundum elementa mundi (Jer.).

They agree, however, in a strange reading of 1 Cor. xv. 51, Augustine noticing on *De C. D.* xx. 20, a variant in the MSS. for 'omnes resurgemus,' for which he says some MSS. read 'omnes dormiemus.' In this passage the Vulgate and D\* (Claromontanus) read 'omnes resurgemus'; while N and C read 'omnes dormiemus.' Here the A.V., following the best attested reading, translates, "we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed."

*Augustine and the Septuagint.*

A reading not now found in the Septuagint on 1 Samuel xv. 23 is preserved in xvii. 7: 'Ipse minatur et non permanet.' It is also not improbable that a variation in the Greek of the Epistle to the Hebrews xi. 17 is preserved in xvi. 32: 'Fide praecessit Abraham' (προενήνοχεν for προσενήνοχεν). Augustine adheres so closely to the Greek that he follows the Greek construction even when it differs from the Latin. For example, in his rendering of the 88th Psalm in xviii. 9, he reads *nocebit eum* after the Greek κακώσει αὐτόν, which is correctly rendered *nocere ei* in the Vulgate. In his translation of Genesis xiii. 14, in xvi. 21, Augustine retains *eam*, which is in the Greek (αὐτήν), but is omitted in the Vulgate; and in Genesis (xvii. 1 sqq.) he renders διαθήκη by 'testamentum,' whereas the Vulgate following the Hebrew reads 'pactum.' He also had evidently before him the Alexandrian variant ἐν σημείῳ, which he translated 'in signo,' while Jerome has 'in signum.' Augustine also follows the order of the Codex Alexandrinus of the Septuagint in 1 Samuel ii. 1. There is, however, a divergence on this point among the MSS. of the *De Civitate*; A in particular adhering to the

Greek on several occasions, *e. g.* in Psalm xlii. 6, reading 'in saeculum saeculi' (instead of '*in saecula saeculorum*'); 'oleum' instead of 'oleo' in v. 7; 'perfecit' (*κατεργάσατο*) instead of 'perficit' on 1 Cor. vii. 8; and in Genesis iv. 22, malleator aerarius (*σφυροκόπος χαλκεύς*), for which the Vulgate has 'malleator et faber.' R also follows the Greek more closely than other MSS. in certain places, reading 'quam' for 'qua' (Vulgate), and 'eligit homo' for 'elegit homo' (Vulgate, *parci*) in Malachi iii. 17 *sqq.* In xxii. 18 we notice a departure from the Greek text of Ephesians i. 22, which is also made by the Vulgate, "et ipsum dedit caput super *omnem* ecclesiam quae est corpus ejus" (a translation of *ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν*, which seems preferable to *ὑπὲρ πάντα τῆ ἐκκλησίᾳ*).

*Augustine on the Canon.*

Jerome in his Vulgate limited his special work of recension to the books of the Hebrew canon, saying, "Whatever book is beyond these must be reckoned among the Apocrypha." He was with difficulty persuaded to make a hasty version of Tobit and Judith, and drew the line very sharply between the ecclesiastical and the canonical books; writing in his preface to the books of Solomon (A.D. 404 *circa*), "As the Church reads the books of Judith and Tobit and Maccabees, but does not count them among the canonical Scriptures, so let it read these two books (Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus) for the edification of the people, and not for the authoritative declaration of doctrine." Augustine would also seem to emphasize the difference between the Hebrew Canon and the Apocrypha, and to regard the former books alone as canonical. He allows that the books of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus are not of unquestioned authority, and of the books of the Maccabees he writes (*De Civ.* xviii. 36): "from the date of the restoration of the temple not kings but princes ruled until the time of Aristobulus; the chronology of this period not being

found in the holy scriptures which are called canonical, but in other writings, among which are also the books of the Maccabees, which the Jews did not regard as canonical, but which the Church considers such on account of the marvellous 'passions' of certain martyrs." In theory, Augustine followed the famous distinction of Jerome, but, in practice, he would seem to disregard it, permitting such books as Tobias, Judith, and the Maccabees to be read as canonical scriptures (*vide* decree of Council of Carthage, and *De Doctrinâ Christianâ*, ii. 12). Not reading Hebrew he had a strong prejudice to the great work of criticism on which Jerome was engaged, and indeed wrote a letter (397 A.D.) beseeching him to desist from it. It is to be noticed that Augustine quotes Jerome's statement concerning the prophet Malachi, that he was Esdras the Priest, which is found in the prologue to that prophet's writings in the Vulgate (xx. 25).

*Augustine's Quotations.*

The quotations in the *De Civitate* are both numerous and varied. The following classical authors are amongst those laid under contribution:—Apuleius, Cicero (*passim*), Claudian, Ennius, Eutropius, Florus, Homer, Horace, Livy, Lucan, Persius, Plato, Plautus, Pliny, Plotinus, Porphyry, Sallust, Seneca, Terence, Varro, and Vergil.

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ST. AUGUSTINE'S TREATISE  
ON  
THE CITY OF GOD

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ARGUMENT OF BOOK I.

THE CHURCH'S ANSWER TO PAGANISM.

[IN his opening chapters Augustine introduces his glorious theme of the City of God by a comprehensive review of the varying fortunes of the earthly city, the queen of the world and the slave of her own ambition. The success of Rome in past centuries, he declares, was not due to the false gods she worshipped but to the old Roman virtues. Much less is their present calamity to be attributed to the Christian religion and the neglect of the old pagan deities.<sup>1</sup>]

PREFACE.—The illustrious City of God, whether in this temporal stage on its pilgrim's progress among the wicked, and living by faith, or established in yonder eternal habitation which it now patiently awaits . . . . I have undertaken, according to an old promise, my dear son Marcellinus, to champion against those who

<sup>1</sup> As a complete version of the *De Civitate* would not be possible within the limits of this series, the author has adopted the plan of selecting the most important passages for translation, linking these together by arguments in brackets.

prefer their gods to its Founder. In this great and arduous work God is my helper. . . .

Ch. I. It is from Rome that the enemies arise against whom the City of God must be defended. Many, indeed, of such have been reformed and become worthy citizens in this City, but numbers are incensed with animosity against her, and ungrateful for the manifest benefits of her Redeemer. For they would not be able to raise their voices against her to-day, were it not that they had received that life, of which they are so proud, in her sanctuaries where they had fled from the foeman's sword. Were not those very Romans, whom the barbarians spared for the sake of Christ, the enemies of that name? . . .

Ch. II. Let them read the history of all the wars waged before the founding of Rome, or after its rise and dominion, and let them show in any similar instance of a city taken by men of a different<sup>1</sup> nation, when and where the enemy spared those they discovered taking refuge in the sanctuary of their gods, or when and where any foreign general gave orders that when a city was stormed, no one should be touched who was found in this or that temple. Did not Aeneas see Priam amid the altars,

“Defiling with his blood the fires he blessed”?<sup>2</sup>

Did not Diomedes and Ulixes,

“Slaying the guards who kept the citadel,  
Snatch forth the sacred image, and with palms  
Blood-stained pollute the chaplets on her brow”?

Nor yet was there

“An ebb and flowing-past of Danaan hopes;”

---

<sup>1</sup> *Alienigenis* v. *l. alienis* (A)—not so good; cf. “*et haec non ab alienigenis hostibus sed a Catilina et sociis ejus*” (*L. J. c. v.*), where the fact of *birth* is emphasized as here.

<sup>2</sup> All translations from ancient and modern poets in this little work are the author's own.

for afterwards they prevailed; afterwards they sacked Troy with fire and sword; afterwards they slew Priam as he fled to the altars. Troy did not perish because it lost Minerva. For what had Minerva previously and fatally lost herself? Was it not her own custodians?

*Conquered gods bad omens.*

Ch. III. And what divinities are they to whom the Romans boasted their city was entrusted? . . . What of Aeneas himself, often called the pious? Did he not say:—

“The son of Othrys, Phoebus’ priest, drags here  
The vanquished gods he worshipped and his child  
From citadel, in mad haste to my doors”?

Does he not say of the gods themselves, whom he does not hesitate to describe as vanquished, that they are consigned to his charge rather than he to theirs? If Vergil, then, speaks of such deities as vanquished, and as entrusted to the care of man, that somehow, although vanquished, they might escape, what madness is it to think that Rome was wisely committed to the keeping of such guardians, and could not be destroyed while she had them safe!

Nay, what is the worship of conquered gods as one’s guardian angels but the keeping of those who are not good divinities but bad omens? How much wiser would it be to believe, not that Rome would have been saved from such disaster had they not been previously lost, but that they would have been lost long ago, had not Rome saved them as long as she could? . . . But now, as I have arranged, I shall deal for a short space with the case of those ungrateful ones, who blasphemously attribute to Christ the misfortunes which their own perversity has duly brought upon themselves. They do not deign to remember that even such as they were spared for His sake. Nay, in their profane and mad impiety they

come forth from their retreats, where their lives were shielded by the sanctity of His name, and turn all the bitterness of their tongues against that name which they had loudly professed or silently pretended to adore when danger threatened.

*The sanctuaries of the heathen compared with the sanctuaries of Christianity.*

Ch. IV. Compare now that sanctuary (asylum), I do not mean of any ordinary god or of one among the crowd, but of the sister and spouse of Jupiter himself, and the queen of all the gods, with the basilicae of our apostles. There, temples are burnt and the spoils stolen from the gods are carried away, not to be restored to the vanquished, but to be divided among the victors; whereas, here, whatever is found to pertain to these places is restored with the most reverent ceremony and homage. There, liberty was lost; here, it is preserved; there, captivity holds fast; here, it is forbidden; finally, it was the pride and avarice of fickle Greeklings that selected that temple of Juno, but it was the mercy and humility of even ruthless barbarians that spared those churches of Christ. . . .

Ch. V. Even Cato,<sup>1</sup> so Sallust a truthful historian writes, did not omit to mention "that virgins and boys were outraged, children torn from their parents' arms, matrons dishonoured, *sanctuaries and houses plundered.*" . . . And these things the Roman temples feared, not from the hands of foreign foes, but from Catiline and his associates, leaders in the senate, citizens of Rome.

Ch. VI. Let us look at the Romans—the Romans, I say—who have made it their special boast that it was ever their principle

<sup>1</sup> It was Caesar, not Cato, that made this speech recorded in Sallust, but as the principal MSS. C, A, K, F read Cato, we have no authority to make a textual alteration, and therefore would draw attention to Augustine's mistake.

“To spare the humbled, and subdue the proud.”

Marcus Marcellus, a noble Roman, who took Syracuse, a handsomely built city, is said to have wept to think of its fall. Fabius, the conqueror of Tarentum, is praised for sparing the images. . . . “Let us leave,” he said, “the Tarentines their angry gods.” . . . Would it not have been recorded if they had spared any men in honour of these gods, and forbidden slaughter or slavery in any one temple?

Ch. VII. Such deeds of red-handed violence, of fire and sword, as were perpetrated in that most recent calamity of Rome ever followed in the train of wars; but as to the new thing that has been done, the strange clemency of those savage barbarians in setting apart and selecting the most spacious churches, where the people might find refuge, where no one should receive hurt or injury, where many through the compassion of their captors might be brought to freedom, whence no one through the cruelty of his foes might be led to slavery—that has been solely due to the name of Christ and the Christian age. Whoever thinks otherwise is blind. . . .

*Augustine here enters into a discussion on the relative uses of prosperity and adversity.*

Ch. VIII. Some one may ask, “Why, then, was that divine mercy extended even to the ungodly and ungrateful?” Why, but because it is from Him Who maketh His “sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust”? . . . It is a divine patience that invites the wicked to repentance, while it is a divine penance that educates the good in patience. He has willed that good and evil should be common to the righteous and the unrighteous, that we may not covet the good things which the evil as well as the good enjoy, and that we might not shrink from the evils which the good often endure. . . . Good and bad suffer alike in this world, but though the sufferings be the same the

sufferers are not. . . . Hence it is that the good pray and praise in the same misfortunes in which the wicked curse and blaspheme. The difference accordingly lies, not in the suffering, but in the way in which it is borne.

Yet all the time God's working can be plainly seen in the present distribution of good and evil ; for, if every sin were now clearly punished, nothing would seem to be reserved for the last judgment ; while, on the other hand, if no sin were manifestly punished here, the providence of God might be denied. In like manner, with regard to the good things of this world ; if God did not respond to some requests with abundant kindness, men might say that He had not such things at His disposal ; while if every such petition were answered, one might suppose that it was only right to serve Him for these worldly things. . . .

*Sundry reflections on the benefit of trials to the righteous who are not sufficiently weaned from the lusts of the flesh and the ways of the world, who are too slow to find fault with the sins they would not commit themselves, and too ready to effect a compromise with the customs of society.*

Ch. IX. The good are offended by the life of the wicked, and they do not, therefore, fall into the condemnation which is prepared for such after death. But because they deal leniently with the notorious sins of others through dread of reprisals for their own venial offences, they are justly made to share the temporal chastisement of the wicked, although they are not to be punished eternally. Being afflicted by God with the rest, they are duly made to feel the bitterness of this life beguiled by the sweetness of which they were loth to be bitter to its sinners. . . . Finally, another excellent reason why the good, like Job, suffer tribulation, is that the human mind may be proved, and the measure of its love to God may be known to itself.

Ch. X. Having considered and examined into these things closely, now see whether any evil can happen the

good and faithful which might not be converted into a blessing for them. . . . They lost all that they had. But did they lose their faith? Did they lose their godliness? Did they lose the treasures of the heart? This is the wealth of the Christian. . . . Wherefore, our dear friend Paulinus, the Bishop of Nola, a man of the amplest means, who in the fulness of his heart became extremely poor, yet abundantly sanctified, after the barbarians had looted the country, and while he was kept a prisoner in bonds, used to pray in his heart, as I afterwards learnt from him,—“Lord, let me not be troubled for gold and silver, for where all my treasure is, Thou knowest.” . . .

*Augustine now passes on to other topics; the period of life, the rites of burial, and the infamy of suicide.*

Ch. XI. It is not a material thing whether life be long or short. For there can be neither a better nor a worse, a longer nor a shorter where there is no existence in either case. But what difference does it make how a man dies, seeing that he is not called upon to die a second time? . . . I am not unaware of the fact that men choose more readily<sup>1</sup> to live long under the shadow of so many forms of death than to die once for all and be free, once and for all from that fear. . . . That death is not to be regarded as a calamity which was preceded by a good life. . . .

Ch. XII. Nor are pious people much distressed by the fact that the rites of burial can not be given when there has been a long list of casualties. . . . Many bodies of Christians have not been covered with earth, but no one can separate any of them from the heaven and the

<sup>1</sup> Citius MSS., Parisian edition of 1838, had *inertius* (more slowly), perhaps through reading the *m* of *quam* twice over, a frequent cause of error in MSS. *Inertius* is manifestly wrong, conveying the very opposite meaning. (Cf. viii. 23.)

earth which is filled with the presence of Him Who knows from where to raise that which He has created. . . .

Ch. XIII. Tobias is commended by an angel for his service to God in burying the dead. . . . The Lord also, though about to rise on the third day, praised the good work of the pious woman which was done for His entombment, and desired that it should be preached in all the world. And they are honourably mentioned in the gospel who took the body from the cross and gave it a decent covering and burial. But these authorities do not prove that there was any sense in those dead bodies, but that such pious offices are pleasing to God because they cherish faith in the resurrection, and because His Providence embraces the dead as well as the living. Accordingly, when the bodies of Christians slain in that sack of the great city or of other towns lie unburied, it is neither the fault of the living who cannot give, nor is it an affliction to the dead who cannot perceive the lack of funeral rites.

*Augustine discusses other lamentable incidents in the war, and declares that to escape violence and dishonour after the manner of Lucretia and Cato is to obviate one evil by another.<sup>1</sup>*

Ch. XVII. He who kills himself kills nothing less than man (lit. is a homicide). . . . But why should a man who has done no wrong, commit an offence against himself, doing himself, though innocent, to death, lest he should become the victim of another's violence? Why should he perpetrate a felony upon himself merely to save another's hand from guilt?

Ch. XVIII. But some one may say, there is a reasonable fear that the lust of another may bring pollution.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Augustine deals briefly with the absurdity of a remote motive for suicide, *i. e.* after baptism, that the soul may go straight to heaven.

<sup>2</sup> It is hinted by our author that certain women killed themselves at the sack of the city to escape worse things. Gibbon sneers at his intimation (II. c. xxxi.).

It will not pollute, if it is another's; and if it does pollute, it is not another's. . . . For if chastity is lost in this way, surely it cannot be a virtue of the mind, and is not to be reckoned among the things which are essential to a good life, but must be counted among personal advantages such as physique, beauty, health, and strength,<sup>1</sup> or as something of that kind. . . . Away with this delusion. Let us rather be assured that as personal sanctity is lost when the mind is defiled, although the body has not been touched, so the personal sanctity is intact, if the mind be pure, even when the body has been violated. . . .

Ch. XXIX. Accordingly, the whole family of God Most High and True has a consolation of its own, one that does not fail, and one that is not anchored to the hope of wavering and unstable fortunes, so that even this mortal life in which a man is trained for life eternal is by no means to be regretted. For the pilgrim enjoys but is not engrossed by its advantages while his character is tested and formed by its sorrows. And let those who scoff at her uprightness<sup>2</sup> and say to her when she has fallen upon unhappy days, "Where is thy God?" tell us where are their gods when they suffer calamities, from which those gods are supposed to save them. For she replies, "My God is everywhere present, wholly everywhere, confined by no special locality, Who can be present though unseen, and absent though unmoved; when He exposes me to suffering, it is to prove my faith, reprove my faults, and to prepare my soul in the stern school of adversity for the eternal reward." . . .

Ch. XXXV. In such terms, or perhaps more fully and aptly, the redeemed family of our Lord, the pilgrim city of the King Christ, would reply to her enemies. . . .

<sup>1</sup> *Sanitas valetudo* (so C), v. l. *sana valetudo* (A, K, F) not so good. However, *valetudo* may be a gloss on *sanitas*.

<sup>2</sup> *Probitati* is read by C, A, K, F. The Parisian edition of 1838 reads *probationi*—probation.

Since those two states are intimately connected and promiscuously blended with one another in this life until they are separated by the final judgment, I shall set forth, with the help of God, all that I think can be said of the rise, progress, and ultimate issue of each. For so the glory of that state of God will appear all the more excellent by comparison.

## BOOK II.

### THE CHURCH'S INDICTMENT OF PAGANISM.

[Having replied to the direct attack made by the heathen, whose ignorance had given rise to the proverb, "There is no rain, the Christians are the reason"<sup>1</sup> (c. iii.), Augustine now assumes the rôle of the attacking party. He traces the worst of all the calamities which have befallen the Imperial city of Rome, her social degradation, and her immoral licentiousness, to that State religion which disparaged purity, and that philosophy which despised godliness (chaps. v.—vii.). The Roman honour, he points out, had been tarnished, and the Roman republic had been ruined by Roman depravity, exemplified in the obscenity of her public entertainments and embodied in her Syllas and Marii long before the advent of Christ (chaps. viii.—xx.). This sweeping statement is supported by a long quotation from Cicero's work, *De Republicâ*, of which the peroration shall now be given]:—

Ch. XXI. ". . . What now survives of that primitive morality which Ennius<sup>2</sup> described as the safeguard of Rome? It is so antiquated and obliterated that so far from being practised it is now forgotten. What shall I say of the men? Morality has perished through the want of good men. It is our fault and not our misfor-

<sup>1</sup> Pluvia deficit, causa Christiani sunt.

<sup>2</sup> Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque.

tune, therefore, that our republic is now but a tradition and a name." . . .

### BOOK III.

#### EXPOSURE OF THE PAGAN DEITIES.

[Augustine continues his relentless exposure of the helplessness of the Roman divinities in times of danger to moral and physical life, and passes in review the disastrous episodes in the thrilling story of the rise and fall of the pagan city, those

“ Moving accidents by flood and field,”

from the death of Remus by his brother's hand down to the days of Augustus—in whose reign Christ was born—among which are numbered Sabine foray, Latin warfare, Punic victory, Parthian massacre, and Gaulish triumph,—dire events, crowned by the suicidal slaughter of the civil wars. In c. xvii. the author rises to a great height of eloquence, and presents his point with telling force.]

Ch. XVII. Where then were those gods, on whose worship is thought to depend the trivial and transient happiness of this life, when the Romans, whose service they had won by consummate falsehood, were harassed by such adversities? Where were they, when the Consul Valerius was slain in the defence of the Capitol which had been scaled by exiles<sup>1</sup> and slaves? . . .

Ch. XXX. With what a face and daring, with what insolence, presumption, aye madness, do they avoid imputing those misfortunes to their own divinities, and yet ascribe these to our Christ? . . .

Ch. XXXI. Such is the folly which we have to endure, and to which we are forced to reply. . . . Which of those

<sup>1</sup> *Incensum* (Lod. Vives), v. l. *incensum* (fired) MSS. and Parisian edition.

calamities would it not attribute to the Christian religion, if it happened in a Christian age? And yet they do not ascribe those calamities to their own gods, whose cult they now demand to have restored as a safeguard from the lighter evils of the present, although such deities were never able to save their votaries from the greater reverses of the past.

#### BOOK IV.

##### TRACES OF SPIRITUAL RELIGION AMONG THE PAGANS.

[Augustine proceeds to show that the glory and extent of the Roman power is to be ascribed not to this or that tutelar divinity who were altogether powerless, but to the "one true God, the author of all human felicity and authority" (c. xxxiii.). In c. xi. he gives an interesting *résumé* of the mythological deities, which were identified by the pagan doctors with Jupiter. In c. ii. he combats the opinion that an extended empire is a proof of prosperity or wisdom.

In c. iv. he asks, "What are kingdoms without justice but organized brigandage (*latrocinia*)?" The extension of the Roman name cannot, he argues, be ascribed to those gods to whom, as Cicero says, "Homer transferred human qualities; would that he had in like manner transferred divine ones to us" (chaps. xxvi.—xxviii.). He traces a tendency to unify the deity in Varro and Cicero (c. xxxi.), the former of whom he tells us (c. ix.) believed that Jupiter was venerated by those who worship one only God, though without an image, and under a different name.]

Ch. XXXI. That most acute and learned authority (Varro) also declared that they alone seem to him to have a true conception of the Deity, who believe that He is Soul controlling the world by motion and reason. Accordingly, although he had not yet grasped the whole truth (for the true God is not a soul, but the maker and creator

of the soul), still, since he could rise so superior to the prejudices of custom as to confess and argue that men should worship one God, our only question to him would be why he had called Him Soul, and not rather the Creator of soul? For he asserts that the ancient Romans worshipped their gods for more than one hundred and seventy years without an image. And he observes, "if they had adhered to that custom, their worship would be purer to-day." In confirmation of this statement he appeals to the Jewish nation, and does not hesitate to conclude his remarks by saying that they who were the first to set up images of their gods for their nation removed them and fear of them from their States. For it was his just inference that the gods in the stolid form of images would easily pass into contempt. . . .

Ch. XXXIII. The Lord therefore is the author and giver of felicity, because He only is the true God. It is He Who entrusts kingdoms to good and bad alike, not without design and not by chance, but according to some arrangement hidden from our ken, but well known to Himself; an arrangement, indeed, to which He is not subservient, but of which He is the controller. But He only confers happiness on the good.

## BOOK V.

### THE LIBERTY OF CHRISTIAN AND THE FREEDOM OF PAGAN ROME—A CONTRAST.

[In this book Augustine discusses the perplexing problem of the relation of the Divine fore-knowledge to the human will, but returns from this digression to his theme, the contrast between the heavenly and the earthly city, and points out with due appreciation the virtues of the ancient Romans, and the noble deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice of which they were capable, when inspired by the love of their country and the praise of men.]

Ch. VIII. One need not enter into a long and laboured controversy of words with those who mean by fate not the disposition of the stars at a conception, birth, or commencement, but the whole connection and order of causes in the history of creation. For that very order and connection of causes is attributed by such to the will and power of the supreme God, Who is believed most truly both to know all things before they are made, and to leave nothing unarranged for, and from Whom proceeds every authority, although the wills of all are not from Him. That some are accustomed to describe under the name of fate that very will of God supreme, Whose power dominates all things, may be proved by these verses, which, I believe, are by Annaeus Seneca :—

“ Father supreme ! Lord of the heav'ns above,  
 Lead on where it pleaseth Thee, I am here  
 Not loath, but ready ; were it otherwise,  
 Weeping I should be forced to follow and  
 Bear all the good may wreak upon the bad.  
 Fates drag reluctant, lead the willing hearts.”

Ch. IX. Against these (the Stoics) Cicero tries to establish his case by putting divination out of the question. And this he did by asserting and maintaining with all his might that there is no knowledge of the future either in God or man, and no such thing as prediction. Accordingly he denies the foreknowledge of God, and endeavours to set aside every prophecy which is as clear as the light of day by foolish arguments, and by setting up certain oracles as men of straw to be knocked down with ease, and yet he is not able to do it. . . . They are far less provoking who even hold starry influences on destiny than he who denies foreknowledge of the future. For to confess that there is a God and to deny that He has this prescience is a sure proof of insanity. . . . What is the reason, then, why Cicero objected so much to the prescience of the future, that he sought to overthrow it by a most vicious form of

argument? Apparently because if all things future were foreknown, they would occur in that order in which it was known beforehand that they would occur; and if they should occur in that order, there would be a fixed order of things for the God Who has the foreknowledge; and if there were a fixed order of things, there would be a fixed order of causes, for nothing can happen which has not been preceded by an efficient cause; but if there is a fixed order of causes ruling the progress of life, everything which happens must happen by fate. And if that were so, nothing would be in our power, and there would be no freedom of will. This would mean that human life would be ruined, that laws and censure, praise and blame, would be rendered null and void. Nor could punishment be meted out with any justice to evil-doers, much less rewards be made to the righteous.<sup>1</sup> It is to avoid such a dreadful and disastrous result that he resents the doctrine of prescience, and forces the religious mind to such a dilemma that it must choose one or other of two alternatives, the free agency of man or foreknowledge, holding that if we choose one of these, the other is removed; and that if one is taken the other will be left. . . . But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both in its piety and faith.<sup>2</sup> Again, Cicero argues that if aught lies in our power there can be no prescience, in this way—If there is freedom of will, everything is not regulated by fate; if everything is not regulated by fate, there is no fixed order of causes; if there is no fixed order of all causes there can be no fixed order of things in the mind of God that foreknows, and if there is not this order there can not be the foreknowledge of all things in the mind of God. . . . Now the very concession that Cicero makes, that whatever happens

<sup>1</sup> Because they would no longer be responsible agents.

<sup>2</sup> The gist of this argument is, that while the freedom of man's will is reconcilable with the foreknowledge of God, that freedom could not exist side by side with blind fate.

must be preceded by a cause, will suffice to render his position untenable. For what advantage does he gain by saying that nothing can happen without a cause, while he allows that every cause is not fatal, there being the fortuitous cause, the natural cause, and the voluntary cause? It is sufficient for our purpose that he admits that anything that happens must have had a preceding cause. . . . For we do not deny that those causes which are called fortuitous, are causes; they are only latent, and we impute them either to the will of the true God or some spirit. The natural causes cannot be separated from the will of the God of nature, while the voluntary causes are either the wills of God or angels, or men or animals (if, indeed, those natural instincts of seeking or avoiding in souls<sup>1</sup> devoid of reason can be called such). . . . Hence, we gather that the only efficient causes in the world are the voluntary, and that they belong to the domain of spirit. The Spirit therefore of life . . . is God Himself, at least, Spirit uncreated; in His will lies supreme power. . . . As He is the creator of every nature, He is the giver of every power, but not of wills. For the evil wills do not proceed from Him, being contrary to the nature which is given by Him. . . . But all things are subject to the supreme cause, the Will of God, to which also all wills are subservient because they have no power but such as He grants. . . . Therefore God is the cause of things, the Maker who is not made. . . . How then can an order of causes which is fixed for the foreknowledge of the Deity undermine our freedom of will, when in that very order of causes our own wills have a place? Let Cicero, then, argue with those who call this order fate, a word we dislike on account of its name, which is often misunderstood. But indeed we urge our case against him more vehemently

<sup>1</sup> The Parisian edition reads *animalium*: the MSS. have *animarum*, which we prefer. This passage shows Augustine in the light of a natural historian as well as metaphysician.

than against the Stoics because he denies the certainty of the order of causality and the Deity's cognizance of that order. For, either he denies the existence of God, . . . or if he admits that there is a God, but One Who is ignorant of things future, he does the same as the fool in the proverb who says, "There is no God." For he who has not prescience of things yet to be is at any rate not God. Wherefore, our wills have just so much power, extent, and work as God willed them to have, and foresaw that they would have.<sup>1</sup>

Ch. X. It does not follow, however, that there is nothing in the power of our will, because God knows what lies therein. For He Who foreknows, does not foreknow nothing, but something. Therefore we are right to retain both the prescience of God and the freewill of man. . . . Be it far from us to deny His prescience in order that our freedom of will may be established, seeing that our present and future freedom rests with Him. For man does not sin because God foreknew he would. But it is the man himself who sins when he does sin. For it is not fate or necessity that God foreknew would or would not sin, but the will of man.

[Having vindicated the compatibility of the integrity of the human will with the omniscience and omnipotence of the Divine Foreknower and explained this *antinomy* of faith, as far as it was possible for the limited capacity of man to do, Augustine now resumes his subject, the contrast between the standards of the two cities, the heavenly and the earthly.]

Ch. XVIII. . . . These are the two motives, liberty and desire of human praise, that inspired the Romans to do noble deeds. If, then, for the freedom of mortals and for mortal fame a man (*i. e.* Brutus) could put his sons to

<sup>1</sup> This argument may be expressed in the following syllogistic form:—God has foreknowledge of the effects of every cause. The human will is a cause. God has foreknowledge of all effects of the human will.

death, is it a great thing for us not indeed to sacrifice our children but to be reckoned among the poor children of Christ ; and this not for the sake of false liberty, but for that which frees us from the thralldom of sin, death, and the devil ; nor for the sake of human popularity, but for the love of delivering men not from King Tarquin, but from demons and the prince of demons? . . .

Ch. XXIV. Nor do we call certain Christian emperors<sup>1</sup> fortunate because they have reigned long . . . or have been successful in subduing their public enemies and crushing their secret foes. . . . But we count them happy if they rule justly, if in the midst of the flattery and servility of a court they are not lifted up, but remember that they are but men ; if they fear God, love and worship Him . . . and if for their sins they do not neglect to offer the sacrifice of humility and prayer. . . .

## BOOK VI.

### THE DEITIES OF ROME, UNABLE TO CONFER ETERNAL LIFE, UNWORTHY OF WORSHIP.

PREFACE.—In the first five books I think I have sufficiently answered those who maintain that the gods of the heathen, proved by Christian truth to be worthless images, unclean spirits, pernicious demons, and

<sup>1</sup> The account in c. xxiii. of the destruction of the barbarian Rhadagaisus, King of the Goths, and more than 100,000 of his soldiers by the army of Stilicho in which not even one casualty occurred, must be acknowledged to be what Gibbon described it, "pious nonsense." In c. xxv. he gives an interesting account of the prosperity and successes of Constantine, and devotes the concluding chapter to the goodness, faith, and bravery of Theodosius, quoting the well-known lines of Claudian :—

"O thou dear child of Heav'n, for whom the God  
That rules the winds poured forth an host of storms  
From secret haunts : for thee yon Aether wars  
And winds conspiring blow their trumpet-blasts."

creatures, should be venerated and adored with that worship and homage which is called in Greek *λατρεία*, and which belongs to the one true God, for the sake of temporal and earthly prosperity. . . .

Ch. I.—So now, I am bound by the plan of my work to answer and refute those who maintain that the pagan deities, which are overthrown by Christianity, have in their hands the eternal welfare of men. . . . But who could endure such a statement and tolerate such a contention that they can bestow eternal life, they who have even in the most trivial concerns their special province marked out? And with regard to those well-read and learned scholars, who make it their boast that they have given instruction on such matters as the reason why each god should be supplicated, and what is to be sought from each, lest (to avoid such frivolities as are caricatured in the mime) water should be sought from Liber and wine from the Lymphae, do they indeed advise that, when wine is asked from the Lymphae and they reply, "We have water, you must get wine from Liber," one may rightly answer, "If you have not wine, at least give me eternal life"? Is it possible to conceive anything more preposterous? . . . Is the human heart so foolish as to imagine that this worship of such gods, which it recognizes as absurdly unprofitable for even those temporal and transient advantages of life in which each god has his own special gift, can be profitable for life eternal? . . .

*Varro brought into the witness-box against his own people.*

Ch. II. Who has studied these matters more thoroughly, weighed them with more pains, and written upon them with greater fulness and accuracy, than Marcus Varro; who, though by no means graceful in diction, is so of thought and argument all compact that in the domain of letters which we call secular, but they liberal,

he teaches one who is interested in facts as much as Cicero delights one who is a student of composition?

In fine, even Tullius himself says of him, in his books on the Academy, where this person is introduced, that he had a discussion with Marcus Varro, a man clever beyond all others, and without question the most learned. . . .

Ch. III. He wrote forty-one books on Antiquities, treating of human and divine affairs, giving twenty-five books to the human and sixteen to the divine. . . .

*The 'Antiquities' of Varro examined by Augustine.*

Ch. IV. Varro, himself, alleges as his reason for giving human affairs the precedence of divine matters, that States were established before their institutions. True religion is, however, not a thing established by a State, but it truly is the foundation on which the heavenly State is established. It is the true God Who inspires and teaches His true servants. This, then, is the argument of Varro, who has followed this order and regarded religion as an affair of state:—"As the painter is before the picture, so states are before those things which are instituted by states." . . . He did not, therefore, intend to put human concerns before divine subjects, but he decided to put truth before falsehood. . . .

Ch. V. With reference to his own division of theology, that is of the knowledge of the gods, into three departments, the mythical, the natural, and the civil, he says:—"That kind is mythical which the poets use, the physical being the subject of the philosophers, and the civil belonging to the common folk. In the mythical religion which I have mentioned first, there are many fictions which are contrary to the dignity and character of the immortals, such as the birth of one god from a head, another from a thigh, another from drops of blood, and, in fine, such thievish and lewd practices that would not be becoming in a man, nay, that would not be tolerated even in

the worst of men." . . . "The second class which I have pointed out," he goes on to say, "has been discussed in many books by the philosophers who have written on the gods, who, where, and what they may be; whether they have been for a stated time, or from everlasting; from fire, as Heraclitus held; or from numbers, as Pythagoras affirmed; or from atoms, as Epicurus taught; and such other topics which are more suited to the school than to the street." . . . "The third kind," he says, "is that which citizens in cities, and, above all, the priests, ought to know and administer. The work of this department is to arrange what gods shall be worshipped in public, and what sacrifices and offerings shall be made in the worship of each.<sup>1</sup> The first kind of theology is especially adapted to the stage, the second to the world, and the third to the city. . . ."

Ch. IX. Lastly, Varro himself proceeded to describe and enumerate the gods from the very conception of man . . . showing what is the special function and gift of each, but in all that work he never named or pointed out any god from whom one should implore the eternal life, on account of which alone we are really Christians. Who then can be so slow as not to perceive that that man, in his capacity as a writer on the popular religion, by carefully exposing its similarity with the fabulous, indecent, and impure religion, and by showing that the latter was but a division of it, left no place in the mind of man for any religion but the natural, which he said was the domain of philosophers? And this he did with such cleverness that while he did not dare to disparage

<sup>1</sup> There is a gap here in the MSS., which the old editions supplied by *quae*. The construction, "In quo est, quos deos publice quae sacra et sacrificia colere quemque par est," is difficult, but we have been told that Varro was not a stylist. The verb *colere* here does double duty by the figure *syllipsis*, and therefore such an alteration as "publice sacro et sacrificio colere quemque" (suggested by Dombart) is uncalled for.

the popular religion, he was able to expose it in his indictment of the so-called mythical religion and to recommend the natural religion to the intellect and refinement of his day.

*Having shown how one Roman philosopher undermined the legends and folk-lore of the rustic population, Augustine now makes another philosopher, Seneca, appear against the more elaborate but equally besotted superstition of the city.*

Ch. X. The freedom of openly censuring the religion of the State, which was very similar to that of the theatre, although withheld from Varro, was exercised to a certain degree by Annaeus Seneca, who is proved by many things to have flourished in the time of the apostles. . . . When discussing the subject of images this philosopher ventured to write:—"They dedicate images of the holy and inviolable immortals in the vilest and stiffest material. These are fashioned after the appearance of men, beasts, and fishes, mixed sexes, and heterogeneous bodies. Such things men call deities, but if they should receive life and come face to face with them in the road, they would regard them as monsters." . . . Varro was not so brave. He only dared to censure the theology of the poets, but spared that of the people which Seneca cut up. . . . But if we look at the matter in its true light, the temples where these rites are performed are really worse than the theatres where those myths are represented. And so when Seneca was dealing with sacred matters, he drew the attention of the philosopher to these features of the State religion not as embodying the principles of religion but as representing its popular form. "For," said he, "the philosopher will observe and do all these things as the laws decree and not as the gods ordain."

Ch. XII. Accordingly, from the three theologies, which are called in Greek mythical, physical, political, but in Latin fabulous, natural, and civil, eternal life cannot be expected; not from the fabulous, which has

been most freely censured by men brought up in all the associations and traditions of that superstition; nor from the civil, of which the other is a much inferior department. After what has been said, no one should believe for a moment that any of these gods whose worship is characterized by such infamy can be the bestower of happiness. And how can he who cannot give happiness grant eternal life? For that we call eternal life where there is happiness without end. But if the soul lives in eternal punishment, by which the unclean spirits themselves are tortured, that is eternal death rather than life, since no death is worse or more terrible than that death from which death does not release ('ubi non moritur mors'). But because the nature of the soul, being immortal, cannot exist without some life, the supreme death is separation from the life of God in an eternity of punishment. Therefore life eternal, that is, the life of unending happiness, He alone can give who can confer true felicity.<sup>1</sup> . . .

*Seneca's opinion of the Jews.*

Ch. XI. He (Seneca) also censures, among other superstitious practices of the popular religion, the sacraments of the Jews, and especially their sabbaths, saying that it was utterly useless for them to waste almost a seventh part of life in idleness, and so to allow many things which required constant supervision to be spoiled. Yet he did not venture to make any reference, good or bad, to the Christians who were even then most hostile to the Jews, not willing to praise them contrary to the custom of his nation, and loth to censure what he himself did not condemn. But, speaking of the Jews, he says, "meanwhile the customs of that most accursed nation have gained so much ground that they have now

<sup>1</sup> It was necessary to transpose the order of chaps. xii. and xi., as the latter does not bear directly upon the point at issue.

been received in all lands, and the vanquished have given laws to the victors." <sup>1</sup>

## BOOK VII.

### NATURAL THEOLOGY INSUFFICIENT.

*Varro's statement "God is the soul of the world." Criticism.*

[In this book Augustine continues his theme—the worthlessness of the pagan superstition—by exposing the infamous rites connected with the worship of the "select" gods, Janus, Jupiter, Saturn, Ceres, Liber, Mater Magna, and others. He shows that the opinion of Varro that God is the soul of the world, which the Greeks call *κόσμος*, marked a great advance beyond this elementary stage of crude superstition, and in the direction of Theism, although it is in its turn marred by the corresponding statement that "this world itself is God" (c. vi.). In c. xxiii. Augustine deprecates this material pantheism, which would confound the Creator with the work of His hands, and would regard "the very stones and earth in the world as the bones and nails of Deity."]

Ch. XXIX. With respect to all these matters which their theology teaches them to refer, without any scruple on the score of impiety, to the world for their explanation, rather than to the true God Who made that world, and created every soul and every body, we would observe that we worship God, not the heaven or the earth, of which two parts the world consists, not a soul or souls diffused through every living thing, but God Who made heaven and earth and all that is therein, Who created every soul, no matter how it exists, whether devoid of sense or reason, or whether sentient and intelligent.

<sup>1</sup> He had, however, the grace to acknowledge that "the Jews knew the reasons for their rites and ceremonies, whereas the majority of the people act without knowing the reason why." Seneca, the tutor of Nero and the brother of Gallio, proconsul of Achaia, flourished B. C. 4—65 A. D.

## BOOK VIII.

## PLATONISM, THE HIGHEST PHILOSOPHY OF THE PAGAN WORLD, INFERIOR TO CHRISTIANITY.

[This concluding sentiment of the seventh book prepares us for the elaborate discussion of the eighth book, in which Augustine takes up the third order of theology mentioned by Varro,—the natural; and debates the question whether the gods of the natural theology can confer that eternal blessedness which the popular and fabulous gods can not. In this book, by far the ablest in treatment and the grandest in conception, Augustine joins issue with the Platonists, who held at this time the first rank in logic and philosophy, and whose tenets more nearly than those of any other school approach the doctrines of Christianity. In fact, this book may be regarded as a compendious treatise on Greek philosophy from a Christian standpoint. He concludes by comparing the creed of the Neo-Platonists with that of the Christians.<sup>1</sup>]

*Augustine and the Platonists.*

Ch. I. The following discussion requires greater attention than the problems and subjects of the preceding books. . . . For we are about to compare notes on

<sup>1</sup> This Neo-Platonism was a mixture of Platonism and Orientalism, that grew in favour with the upper classes of pagan Rome, because it could accommodate its teaching to the ancient mythology of the city, and found a fervid disciple in Plotinus, who dreamed of founding a Platonic Republic in Campania, and entreated his audience to fly to "that beloved fatherland, where the Father is and all things are," and who was succeeded by Porphyry, the determined foe of a religion that would brook no rival and accept no myth. With these unexpected allies of paganism, the champions of the Christian faith had now to cross swords. The unsparing logic of the *City of God* inflicted a crushing blow upon this new foe.

natural theology, not with the general public, but with the philosophers, a name which means, by interpretation, lovers of wisdom. And further, if God is wisdom by whom all things were made, . . . the true philosopher is a lover of God. But since the thing, of which this is the name, is not found in all who glory in it, we must confine our debate to foemen worthy of our steel. Nor, indeed, have I undertaken to refute all the false tenets of the philosophers, but I am compelled to restrict myself altogether to the domain of theology, and particularly to the opinions of those savants who, while believing that there is a divine nature, and that this divine nature is concerned with the world and the affairs of man, still deny that the worship of the One True God is sufficient for the securing of eternal blessedness, and therefore have invented a number of intermediary and lesser divinities. These are nearer the truth than Varro. For while he could regard the world and the soul as extensions of the deity of God, they believe in a God Who is above and beyond the whole nature of the soul, Who is not merely yonder visible world which is called heaven and earth, but Who has even made every soul, and Who enables the rational and intellectual soul of man to participate in His own incorporeal blessedness and unchangeable light. . . .

Ch. II. In the Grecian literature, the most distinguished of all, there are two schools of philosophy, the Italian and the Ionic, . . . the former founded by Pythagoras of Samos . . . the head of the latter being Thales of Miletus, one of the seven wise men. [Here follows a brief summary of the metaphysical and natural science of these two schools.]

Ch. III. Socrates is, accordingly, said to have been the first to turn the attention of all philosophers to moral questions and principles, all who preceded him having devoted themselves principally to physics and natural investigations. . . . Distinguished both in his life and

his death, Socrates left behind him many disciples who rivalled one another in the zeal with which they discussed the *summum bonum*, in which the happiness of man consists. But this had been so obscured by the destructive method of their master that they took from this system what pleased them and regarded what seemed good in their own eyes as the goal of life. But so divided were their opinions on this subject that some like Aristippus declared that pleasure, and others with Antisthenes maintained that virtue was the final good.

*Superiority of Platonism to the other pagan philosophers.*

Ch. IV. But Plato fairly eclipsed all the other pupils of the great master. . . . Socrates is praised for his excellence in practical philosophy, and Pythagoras seems to have devoted all his energies to contemplation. But Plato is said to have brought philosophy to the highest pitch of perfection by combining the wisdom of the one with the studies of the other, and making a threefold division of it; the first, moral, relating to action; the second, natural, which is engaged in investigation; and the third, rational, as being concerned with the discrimination of the true from the false. . . . With regard to each of these three parts, the end of all action, the cause of all natures, and the light of all intelligences, it were difficult to say what Plato believed. . . . But it is most probable that Plato's closest and most appreciative students do believe that God is at once the cause of existence, the rational basis of human knowledge, and the standard with reference to which human life is to be regulated. . . . For man was so created that he should reach that which transcends all things by that which excels in himself, that is the one true and good God without Whom no nature subsists, no doctrine instructs, and no practice is of any use. Let Him therefore be sought where all things are eloquent to us, let Him be

discerned where all things are certain to us, and let Him be loved where all things are right to us.

Ch. V. If, then, Plato has declared the wise man to be one who imitates, loves, and knows this God, and shares in His blessedness, why should we consult the rest? These have made the nearest approach to Christian doctrine. . . . For the doctrines of the fabulous and civil religion are clearly inferior to the teaching of the Platonic philosophers, who declare that the true God is the author of all things, the illuminator of the truth and the bestower of happiness. And other teachers, who, devoted as they were to materialism, could only imagine material elements of things, must yield position to such followers of so great a God.

Ch. VI. For them a material body is not God. They saw that naught variable can be deity supreme. They therefore transcended every soul and every changeable spirit in their search after the supreme God. . . . But as everything pertaining to both body and soul was more or less a semblance from their standpoint, if this semblance were removed there would be nothing left. They were, therefore, compelled to infer that there must be something of which the first form is unchangeable and therefore above comparison, and rightly held that the principle of things lies in that which is the maker of all things and made by none. . . . Thus God manifested to them all that is known of Himself, since these invisible things were understood and perceived through the things that are made.<sup>1</sup>

Ch. VIII. With regard to the remaining branch of philosophy, the ethical, which dealt with the subject of the chief good, the standard of action, that which we seek for itself and for nothing beneath itself, and on account of which we seek all other things, but this only for its

<sup>1</sup> Augustine is not quoting Rom. i. 19 directly on this occasion but he does in the tenth chapter, where his rendering is almost a word-for-word translation of the Greek.

own sake, . . . this same school excels all others, declaring that he is a happy man who enjoys not the body or the mind, but God. . . . It is now sufficient to state that Plato defined the final good as the life according to virtue which is possessed only by him who has the knowledge of God, and imitates Him, and is happy for no other reason. Accordingly he did not hesitate to say, that to be a philosopher is to be a lover of God, Whose nature is above change.

[Having shown how closely the Platonists approach Christianity in theory, Augustine now proceeds to show how far they and their followers, the Neo-Platonists, still fall short of the pure doctrines of Christianity, by reason of their performance of sacred rites in honour of many gods, and their belief in demons as mediators between God and man.]

*The Neo-Platonists and their belief in demons as mediators.*

Ch. XIV. All things, they say, which have a rational soul are divided into three classes,—gods, men, and demons.<sup>1</sup> The gods occupy the highest, men the lowest, and demons the middle position. The latter have corporeal immortality in common with the gods, but animal passions in common with men. . . . But what could Apuleius himself find to praise in the demons beyond the fineness and firmness of their bodies and the superiority of their habitation? For when remarking on their morals, among other things, he said nothing that was good, but much that was bad. . . .

Ch. XVI. He declared that they are moved by the same passions as men are, being irritated by injury, mollified by flattery and presents, pleased at the observ-

<sup>1</sup> Augustine refers to the work of Apuleius Platonicus, *De Deo Socratis*, in which the philosopher of Madaura (born A.D. 125) discussed the relation Socrates had with the other world, and in particular with the demon by which he was said to be accompanied. This chapter is a *locus classicus* on this work of Apuleius.

ance of their rites, and displeased at their omission. Briefly defining them, he says the demons are of an animal (*i. e.* possessing *anima*) nature—passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body, eternal in time. . . .

Of these five things, the three first are common to them and us, the fourth is peculiarly their own, and the fifth is common to them with the gods. . . . How much less worthy of worship (*i. e.* than the true God) are these beings who are only rational that they may be capable of misery, passive that they may be really wretched, and eternal that they may not be able to end their wickedness?

Ch. XVII. Is it not a foolish and unhappy mistake to humiliate oneself in veneration to one from whose life you pray your own may differ; and to worship one you would not obey, seeing that it is the highest religion to follow whom you serve? . . .

Ch. XVIII. It was foolish for Apuleius, then, and for those who think with him, to confer this honour upon the demons, and place them between the heaven and the earth to convey to God the prayers of men and to carry back to men the answers of God, according to the principle of Plato that God has no direct intercourse with man ('*nullus deus miscetur homini*').<sup>1</sup> . . .

*Augustine attacks the system of spiritualism by which the Neo-Platonists pretended to have intercourse with the other world.*

Ch. XX. Truly wonderful is the sanctity of that divine presence, which holds no communion with the man who prays, but has communion with an arrogant demon, and has no intercourse with a penitent soul, but has intercourse with a deceitful demon. . . .

Ch. XXII. Accordingly, we do not believe that such demons are mediators between gods and men, but that

<sup>1</sup> In this point Plato differed from his pupil Aristotle, who believed in a pervading intelligence.

they are spirits of evil and malice, remote from righteousness, swollen with pride, enviously jealous, and falsely cruel, who dwell, indeed, in this upper air, being banished from the heights of heaven by reason of their unpardonable sin, and condemned to this prison.

[Augustine here digresses from the subject of demons, to which he returns in the following book, in order to explain the difference between the Christian reverence for, and the pagan adoration of, the departed.]

*Augustine on the cult of the dead.*

Ch. XXVI. It is, indeed, remarkable that Apuleius,<sup>1</sup> when lamenting that the time would come when these institutions, made, as he allows, by an unbelieving people who had gone far astray and were very remote from true religion, would be removed from Egypt, says, among other things:—"Then that land, the most sacred abode of sanctuaries and temples, will be replete with the sepulchres of the dead." . . . It seemed to trouble him that the shrines (*memoriae*) of our martyrs should occupy the sacred and hallowed sites of his country. But they who read his words with a mind prejudiced against us might be led to conclude that gods were worshipped in the temples by the pagans, but that we practise the cult of the dead in the cemeteries. Men are so blinded by impiety that they stumble against mountains and will not see the things that lie before their eyes, so that they do not remark that in all the literature of the pagan world there are found scarcely any gods who have not been men, raised to divine honours after death. I pass over the statement of Varro that all the dead are regarded as *manes dii* by them,

<sup>1</sup> In *The Aesculapius*,—a discourse between Hermes Trismegistus and Aesculapius on God, the World, and Man, p. 90. Augustine also quotes from the *De Mundo*, the *De Magia*, and *De Deo Socratis*, of this once famous rhetorician.

which he establishes by reference to the sacred rites which are paid to almost all the dead. . . .

Ch. XXVII. Nor yet do we build our temples and ordain priests, rites, and sacrifices to these martyrs, for they are not our gods, but their God is our God. We, indeed, respect<sup>1</sup> their shrines as the shrines of holy men who contended for the truth even to the death. But no one ever heard a priest of the faithful say in prayer, as he stood by an altar erected to the honour and worship of God: "I offer to thee a sacrifice, O Peter, or O Paul, or O Cyprian!"

For it is to the true God Who made them both men and martyrs that the sacrifice is offered at their tombs, that so we may thank the true God for their victories, and may be stirred to imitate their crown of virtues by calling to our aid the same God they invoked. Our religion does indeed honour the last resting-places of the martyrs, with ornaments suitable to their memory, but not with sacred rites, and not with sacrifices offered to dead men as if they were gods.

## BOOK IX.

### THE DEMONS OF PAGANISM AND THE ANGELS OF CHRISTIANITY.

[In this book Augustine answers those who make a distinction among the demons, and call some good and others bad; a distinction which, according to our author, throws no light on the subject, inasmuch as to no demon, but to Christ alone, belongs the power of granting eternal blessedness to men. Speaking of the passions of the demons he is led (c. iv.) into a digression on the supposed difference of opinion between the Stoics and Peripatetics on the subject of perturbations, and quotes a

<sup>1</sup> *Vide original.* Augustine does not say *colimus* (worship), but *honoramus* (respect).

long passage from the *Noctes Atticae* of A. Gellius to prove that the Stoic's mind may be moved but not shaken by the terrible and unexpected; in the words of Vergil—

“His mind is fixed, her tears do idly flow.”

As he has dealt already with the axiom of Plato that “there is no communion between man and God,” and as he will recur in another place to the mediation of Christ, we shall hurry through this book with a glance at the following passages.]

Ch. XVII. But I wonder very much that men of such education, who have declared the inferiority of everything sensible and corporeal to the spiritual and intelligible, can speak of the pleasures of touch when a happy life is the question. Where is that expression of Plotinus? “We must take refuge in that beloved fatherland where our Father is, where our all is.” “What fleet or flight,” he exclaims, “can bear us on to the likeness of God?” If, therefore, the more like to God means the nearer to Him, remoteness from Him must be due to want of resemblance.

Ch. XXIII. We should not argue much about the name when the thing is so clear. But our statement that angels are sent from the number of those happy immortals to announce the will of God to men does not please them, because they hold that this ministry is not carried on by those whom they call gods—that is, the happy immortal but not happy. . . . Although it seems a dispute about a name, yet the name of a demon is so detestable that we should remove it altogether from the holy angels.

## BOOK X.

THE WORSHIP OF THE TRIUNE GOD, AND THE DOCTRINE  
OF THE INCARNATION.

[This book is a thesis on the true worship of God, to Whom alone the good angels wish that divine honour to be paid which is given by sacrifice, and is called *λατρεία* (a word always rendered in Scripture as service).]

*Augustine states in what the true service of God consists.*

Ch. I. The question now before us is, whether the angels desire us to offer sacrifice and worship, and to consecrate by religious rites our possessions and ourselves to them or only to God, their God and our God. . . . That service which the apostle exhorts the servants of God to yield to their masters is called by another name in Greek (*i. e.* *διακονία*). But *λατρεία*, as used in the sacred records, means always, or nearly always, that *servitus* or service which is due to God alone. The word 'cult,' however, is not peculiar to God, as it signifies also the payment of respect to man by honourable mention or constant attendance. . . .

Ch. II. But we do not join issue with these the most noble of the philosophers on every point. For they have noticed, and set it down in many eloquent passages of their writings, that they owe their happiness to the same source as we ourselves, namely, a certain illumination of the reason which is divine to them and different from them, so that they have light and happiness and holiness through sharing in its light. . . .

Ch. III. Accordingly, if the Platonists and others, whoever they are, who perceived this, knowing God as God, were to glorify Him and thank Him, and not wander off into various questions, and lead or suffer themselves to be led by the mass of people into error, they would surely acknowledge that there is one God of

gods, both their God and our God, to be worshipped by those happy immortals and by us wretched mortals, if we are to become as they are. To Him we owe that service, which is called in Greek *λατρεία*, both in the sacraments and in our own life. For we are one and all His temple. When the heart is raised ('sursum') to Him, it is His altar; His Only Begotten is our Priest Who makes the propitiation; to Him we offer bleeding victims when we contend for the faith to the death; to Him we offer the sweetest incense<sup>1</sup> when we burn with religious love and zeal before Him; to Him we devote and return His own gifts in us and ourselves; to Him we consecrate and set apart the memory of His kindnesses to us by a calendar of feasts and holy days, lest forgetfulness and ingratitude should steal upon us; and to Him we sacrifice the host ('hostia') of humility and praise on the altar of the heart with the fire of fervent charity. . . . He is the font of our blessedness and the object of our desire. Choosing Him, or rather choosing Him again (for we had lost him through neglect)—choosing Him, therefore, again, for that is the meaning of religion,<sup>2</sup> we strive towards Him, that we may find rest and happiness for our souls in Him.

Ch. V. No one can be so foolish as to imagine that God is profited by any oblation of property or even of righteousness. A fountain is not benefited by our drinking from it. The fathers of old time, indeed, offered animal sacrifices to God, which God's people read of but no longer do, for those sacrifices only signified the things which are done *in* us for the purpose of drawing near to God and prevailing upon our neighbours to do likewise. A sacrifice is, therefore, the visible sacrament or sacred

<sup>1</sup> The MSS. read "eum suavissimo adolemus incenso." In ignorance of this construction (for which see Vergil, i. 704, "flammis adolere Penates"), the editor of the Paris edition read "ei suavissimum adolemus incensum."

<sup>2</sup> Hunc ergo religentes, unde et religio dicta perhibetur. This derivation of 'religio' may be fanciful, the meaning certainly is.

sign of an invisible sacrifice. Wherefore the penitent with the prophet, or the prophet himself when imploring God to deal mercifully with his sins, said, "If Thou hadst wished for sacrifice I had given it. Thou wilt take no pleasure in burnt offerings. The sacrifice of God is a contrite spirit, a contrite and humbled heart God will not despise."<sup>1</sup>

We shall now see, that when he said that God did not require one kind of sacrifice he showed He desired another. For He does not demand the sacrifice of a slain beast, but the sacrifice of a sorrowing heart. The sacrifice, therefore, that God does not demand, *i.e.* the slain beast, is merely the symbol of the sacrifice which He does demand, *i.e.* the sorrowing heart. God does not require sacrifices, then, to gratify His own pleasure, as some are foolish enough to imagine, and had He not wished that the sacrifice of a sorrowing heart should be symbolized by the sacrifices of slain beasts, the latter had never been ordered by the Law. Moreover, the passing and temporary nature of these old covenant sacrifices is a proof of their symbolical nature, and is a warning to us not to imagine that the sacrifices themselves rather

<sup>1</sup> Ps. l. 16—18, after the LXX. Augustine seems to follow a version which was literally translated from the Greek of the Septuagint, and was said to have been commenced in North Africa in the second century. But it is difficult to discover whether he is quoting from memory, or translating directly from the LXX., or is merely using an emended copy of the old Latin Bible, which was used long after it had been revised, with the help of Greek, and in the light of the Hebrew by Jerome. Generally speaking, the readings are very different from those found in Tertullian and others found in the old Italian edition which Jerome took as the foundation of his Vulgate. For example, in the passage from Micah, the old Latin version which is followed by Jerome has "aut in *multis milibus* hircorum pinguium," while Augustine more correctly reads "aut in *denis milibus* hircorum pinguium," which is nearer to the Greek, ἢ ἐν μυριάσι χιμάρων πιδίων; which, in its turn, arose from a confusion of χιμάρων and χιμάρων. See also Preface, p. xiii *supra*.

than the things symbolized by them were acceptable to God. As he says in another place in a different psalm :—  
 “If I were hungry I would not tell thee; for Mine is the world and the fulness thereof. Shall I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats? Offer unto God the sacrifice of praise, and pay thy vows to the Most High, and call on Me in the day of tribulation, and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify Me.”<sup>1</sup>

And in another prophet we read :—“Wherewith shall I find the Lord, and take hold of my God Most High? Shall I find Him in burnt offerings, in calves of a year old? Shall the Lord accept (me) in thousands of rams, or in tens of thousands of fat goats? Shall I give my first-born of impiety, the fruit of my womb for the sin of my soul? Is it not announced to thee, man, what is good? Or what doth the Lord require of thee but to do judgment, and to love mercy, and to be prepared to walk with the Lord thy God?”<sup>2</sup>

And in the words of this prophet it is distinctly stated that God does not require those sacrifices for themselves, but that He does require the sacrifices they represent.

And so when it is written, “Mercy I prefer to sacrifice,”<sup>3</sup> we must understand that one sacrifice is preferred to another, for that which in ordinary parlance is called a sacrifice, is nothing else than the symbol of a sacrifice. But mercy is the true sacrifice. That is the meaning of the words I have already quoted, “with such sacrifices God is well pleased.”<sup>4</sup>

The many divine precepts, then, that are read in the service of tabernacle or temple have reference to that love to God and our neighbour in which they find their significance, and on which “hang all the law and the prophets.”

<sup>1</sup> Ps. xlix. 12—15, after the LXX.

<sup>2</sup> Micah vi. 6—8, after the LXX.

<sup>3</sup> Hosea vi. 6, following the LXX.

<sup>4</sup> Heb. vii. 16.

*Augustine now gives that grand definition of sacrifice which rises equally above the material conceptions of the many and the fantastic theories of the few, and which comprehends every species of the genus sacrifice, material and immaterial, literal and spiritual, bloody and unbloody, pagan and patriarchal, Mosaic and evangelical.*

Ch. VI. Accordingly a true sacrifice is any work done to unite ourselves in holy fellowship with God, that is, work which has reference to that supreme good and end by which alone we can be truly blessed. Wherefore even that mercy which comes to the assistance of another, is not a sacrifice if it is not done as for Him. For although it be made or offered by a man, a sacrifice is a divine act, for that is the original meaning of the Latin word. So man consecrated in the name of God and dedicated to Him is a sacrifice in so far as he dies to the world that he may live to God. Our body, likewise, when we chasten it by temperance is a sacrifice, if we do this as we should, for God's sake. . . . And the soul itself, so much superior to the body, is a sacrifice when it offers itself to God, that so being kindled by the fire of His love it may receive somewhat of His beauty, becoming pleasant to Him, losing the form of worldly lust, and being refashioned in the image of abiding loveliness. As the apostle adds:—"Be not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed in the renewing of your mind, that ye may examine what is the will of God concerning what is good and well-pleasing and perfect."<sup>1</sup>

Sacrifices being therefore works of mercy to ourselves or others, done with a reference to God; and works of mercy being done for no other reason but that we may be free from unhappiness or attain happiness (which can only pertain to that good man of whom it is written, "It is my delight to cling to God"), it follows that the whole redeemed city, the congregation or community of the saints, is offered to God as a universal sacrifice

<sup>1</sup> Romans xii. 2

through the High Priest Who offered Himself in His passion for us, that we might be members of so glorious a Head. It was in the form of a servant that He offered it ; in it He is Mediator, in it He is Priest, in it He is Sacrifice.

When the apostle, therefore, exhorted<sup>1</sup> us to present our bodies a living host, holy, pleasing to God, which is our reasonable service, and not to be conformed to this world, but to be reformed in the newness of our mind, to prove what is the will of God, which is good and well-pleasing and perfect, *it was because we ourselves are the whole sacrifice.* This is the sacrifice of Christians: the many who are the one body in Christ. This is the sacrifice which the Church continually celebrates in the sacrament of the altar known to the faithful, in which she teaches that she herself is offered in the offering she presents to God.

*Augustine criticizes Porphyry's conception of the Holy Trinity.*

[In the concluding chapters of this book, Augustine has some light-giving remarks on the cardinal doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement. In the first place, he points out the mistake of Porphyry, who as a Platonist taught that the soul was purified by three distinct principles or hypostases. "Of these he called one God the Father, another God the Son, Whom he termed the mind of the Father, and between these two he placed God the Holy Ghost, concerning Whom he has written nothing plainly" (c. xxiii.).]

Ch. XXIV. Now we do not mean by God two or three principles, since we cannot speak of two gods or three gods, although we do say of each Divine Person of the adorable Trinity that He is God ; but yet we do not say with the Sabellians, who are heretics, that the Father is the same as the Son, and the Holy Spirit the

<sup>1</sup> Romans xiii. 1—3.

same as the Father and the Son, and that the Holy Spirit is identical with the Father and the Son, but we say that the Father is the Father of the Son, and the Son is the Son of the Father, and that the Holy Spirit of the Father and the Son is neither the Father nor the Son. It was, therefore, truly said that man was changed by a Principle, although it is wrong to speak of principles in this connection.<sup>1</sup>

[Moreover, Porphyry refused to acknowledge that Christ is the Principle by Whose Incarnation we are purified.]

Ch. XXIV. But Porphyry, spurred on by the powers of envy, of which he was ashamed and yet afraid, would not understand that our Lord Christ *is the Principle by Whose incarnation we are purged.*<sup>2</sup> Forsooth, he despised Him in that flesh which He assumed on account of the sacrifice of our purification. For he did not understand this great sacrament by reason of that pride of man which the true and merciful Mediator brought low by His humility, showing Himself to mortals in that mortality which the deceitful and malignant mediators having not, bear themselves proudly, and in their character of immortals promise an assistance which they have never rendered to wretched men. Accordingly, that good and true Mediator showed that it is sin and not the substance or nature of the flesh that is evil, seeing that this latter could be assumed, together with the human soul, and retained without sin, and could be laid

<sup>1</sup> The Platonists of the Alexandrian School recognized a Trinity of their own: 1st, the One, or the Good; 2nd, the Word, or Intelligence; 3rd, the Soul of Nature. This theory falls very short of the glorious doctrine of the Three Persons and one God, a Trinity in Unity and a Unity in Trinity. In the religion of the Hindu we also find a trinity of Gods, the so-called Trimurti of Brahmā, Vishnu, and Siva, respectively described as Creator, Saviour, and Destroyer. But we acknowledge three Divine Persons and one God, in Godhead not to be divided, in Personality not to be confounded.

<sup>2</sup> *Principium cujus incarnatione purgamur.*

down in death and changed by the resurrection to a better form. Moreover, he demonstrated that even death itself, the punishment of sin, which He nevertheless endured for our sakes, yet without sin, is not to be avoided by a wrong course; but, if occasion offer, must be endured for righteousness' sake. And, therefore, by dying He was able to loose our sins from us, because He died, and yet not for His own sin. But that Platonist did not recognize Him as the Principle, else he had acknowledged Him as purificative. Yet it was not the human flesh or soul that is that Principle, but the Word by which all things were made. The flesh does not, therefore, purify by its own power, but by virtue of the Word, Who assumed it; what time the "Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." For when Jesus was speaking in mystical language of the eating of His flesh, and they who did not understand Him had withdrawn, saying, "This is a hard saying, who can hear it?" He answered and said to the rest:<sup>1</sup> "It is the Spirit Who gives life, but the flesh profiteth nothing." The Principle,<sup>2</sup> therefore, by assuming flesh and soul, purifies the flesh and soul. Accordingly, when the Jews asked Him Who He was, He replied that He was the Principle.<sup>3</sup> But this, we carnal and feeble men, prone to sin and buried in the shadows of ignorance, could by no means understand, did we not receive cleansing and healing through that which we both were and were not.<sup>4</sup> For we were men but we were not righteous, while in His Incarnation there was a human nature, but it was

<sup>1</sup> John vii. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Augustine does not use the word Principle in the sense of an impersonal emanation from a Person—an error of which he has just before convicted Sabellianism—but in the sense of a Personal Power, a Person acting in and through the life of humanity, being both the principle of renewal and the principle of life by reason of His Incarnation.

<sup>3</sup> τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι καὶ λαλῶ ὑμῖν. ("In the beginning." R.V.)

<sup>4</sup> *i. e.* sinless humanity.

righteous. This is the mediation by which, as it were, a hand is stretched out to the lapsed and the fallen. This is the seed ordained of angels, by whose disposition the law was given, by which also the worship of the one God was ordained and the advent of the Mediator was promised.

Ch. XXV. It was by piously living in the faith of this mystery that all the saints of old, both under the law and in former ages, were justified. For it was in those times that the prophets lived, by whom, as angels, the same promise was proclaimed, and of whose number was he whose noble and divine sentiment concerning the end and *summum bonum* of man I have quoted some while back, namely: "It is good for me to cleave to God."

[Here follows an excellent summary of the 73rd Psalm, in which the writer deals with the perplexing problem of the prosperity of the wicked, and relates how his own peace of mind was restored by attending the public worship of the sanctuary, where the righteousness of God and the final triumph of goodness was brought home to his soul. The climax of this psalm Augustine considers to be the verse, "It is good for me to cleave unto God" (v. 28). This union with God will then be finally accomplished when all that which was to be redeemed has been redeemed. But for the present, we must place our hope in God; for "It is good to put my trust in the Lord," as the writer says, adding, "that I may declare all thy praise *in the gates of the daughter of Zion.*"<sup>1</sup> The next two chapters, xxvi. and xxvii., Augustine devotes to exposing the impiety and weakness of Porphyry<sup>2</sup> in his wavering between the confession of the Incarnation and the cult of demons.]

<sup>1</sup> This verse in the original ends with "praises" or "works." The concluding phrase, "in the gates of the daughter of Zion," was interpolated in the LXX., and is also reproduced in the Vulgate of Jerome.

<sup>2</sup> Porphyrius, born 232 A.D. at Tyre, Neo-Platonist pupil of

Ch. XXVIII. You admit that ignorance and the many vices that arise from it cannot be purified by any rites of initiation, but by the *πατρικὸς νοῦς* alone, that is the Mind or Intellect of the Father, which is conscious of the Father's will. But you fail to see that Christ is that Mind, for you despise Him on account of His birth from a woman and the shame of His cross . . . not perceiving that there was in these things a fulfilment of the words of the holy prophets, "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will *condemn* ('reprobabo,' LXX. *κρύψω*) the prudence of the prudent."

[Cf. expansion of these words in 1 Cor. i. 19 *sqq.*]

Ch. XXIX. . . . But the Incarnation of the unchangeable Son of God, by which we are saved ('*quâ salvamur*') . . . you will not acknowledge. Yet you believe in grace, seeing that you admit that it is *granted* ('*concessum*') to a few to reach God by virtue of their intelligence; and by using the word *granted*, without doubt you recognize the favour of God and not the sufficiency of man. . . . But, if you only knew the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, and His very Incarnation, by which He assumed a human soul and body, you would have found therein the highest manifestation of grace. . . . The grace of God could not have been recommended to us with more grace than by the peerless<sup>1</sup> Son of God remaining unchangeable in Himself, taking upon Him humanity, and giving the hope of His love to men by the mediation of His manhood, through which men might have access to Him Who was so far off, by reason of His immortality from the mortals, by reason of His justice

Plotinus, attacked the Christians in his work, *κατὰ χριστιανῶν* (Eusebius, *H. E.* vi. 19). Augustine quotes from his *Letter to Anebon*, and his *Return of the Soul*.

<sup>1</sup> 'Unicus' means more than 'only.' It expresses an uniqueness, a singularity in the relation of the Son to the Father which the word 'only' does not convey, involving also a contrast with other sons.

from the unjust, and by reason of His blessedness from the wretched. And, because He has endowed us with the natural desire for blessedness and immortality, He Himself remaining blessed but assuming immortality that He might give us our hearts' desire, He taught us by His own endurance to scorn what we are wont to fear. . . . But to see and rest in this truth you require humility, a virtue which would not easily commend itself to you. For what is there incredible, especially to you who are engaged in studies which should predispose you to accept this?

*Augustine employs an argument ad hominem.*

What is there incredible, I say, in the expression that God assumed a human soul and body?<sup>1</sup> You, at least, attribute so much dignity to the intellectual soul, which is, at all events, a human soul, that you say it can become consubstantial with that paternal mind, which you confess to be the Son of God. What, then, is there incredible in His assuming some one intellectual soul in an ineffable and unique manner for the salvation of many? Now Nature itself teaches us that a union of soul and body is essential to the completeness of our nature. But this would be a very hard thing to believe, were it not the most ordinary; for it were easier to believe in a union of spirit and spirit, or, to use your own expression, "of the immaterial and the immaterial," even though the one were human and the other divine, the one subject and the other superior to change, than in a union of a body and a spirit. Are you offended by the unparalleled offspring of a virgin's womb? This fact ought rather to lead you to our faith, seeing that

<sup>1</sup> The creed of Porphyry that every body is to be shunned (*omne corpus est fugiendum*) runs parallel to the doctrine of Nirwana, but contrary to the doctrine of the Incarnation.

the wonderful One was born in a wonderful way.<sup>1</sup> Or do you find a difficulty in the fact that our Lord rose

<sup>1</sup> Augustine sets forth the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation in his 187th Epistle, where he maintains the integrity of both the humanity and the divinity of our Lord.

"His humanity," he says, "consisted of body and soul; the human soul, not being a physical or animal soul (as Apollinarius held), but a reasonable soul." After death His human body descended to the grave, and His soul into Hades.

Then he proceeds to unfold the doctrine afterwards known as the 'Communicatio idiomatum':—

"For since Christ was God and man, He was able to say as God, 'I and My Father are one,' and as man to say, 'My Father is greater than I.'" And as He was at once the Son of God, the Only Begotten of the Father, and the son of men of the seed of David according to the flesh, we must consider when Scripture speaks of Him to which nature reference is made. "For as reasonable soul and flesh make up one man, so Word and man is one Christ."

It is interesting to compare this sentence of Augustine with the corresponding clause in the Athanasian Creed, almost word for word identical with it—

Augustine—*Nam sicut unus homo est anima rationalis et caro sic unus Christus est Verbum et homo.*

Creed of Athanasius—*Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est Homo; ita Deus et Homo unus est Christus.*

This doctrine of *interchange of properties* helps us to understand in what sense it might be said that the *Lord of glory was crucified*, and in what sense it might be said that He created the world.

"In His character as the Word, Christ is Creator, but in His character as man, Christ is created and crucified."

It is pointed out by some who would find parallels to all the tenets of our faith in the Pagan world that the Hindus believe in the incarnation, Avatâra, or descent of their God Vishnu in human form, and that they speak of this God as their Preserver; accordingly the God Krishna, in whom Vishnu was supposed to have become incarnate, said—

"For the preservation of the good and the destruction of the wicked,

For the establishment of religion, I am born from age to age."

But if any one could have the patience and self-control to read the account of this infamous Krishna and his abominable life, one would see that in no sense does it offer the smallest parallel or approach to the Incarnation of our Lord.

again from the dead and carried His body, changed by being made incorruptible and immortal, up to heaven, when you remember that Porphyry taught you in his books on the return of the soul that every kind of body is to be shunned, that the soul may dwell in blessedness with God? And yet, he seems to merit censure for that opinion, and you likewise, seeing that you hold with him such strange notions about the soul of the world. Plato, forsooth, taught you that the world was an animal and a very happy one.<sup>1</sup> It is never freed from its body, and yet it never loses its happiness. How then do you say that every body must be avoided if the soul is to be happy? You forget or pretend to ignore the very things you discuss and teach when the faith of Christ is offered to you. You make that very thing which you yourselves believe an objection to our Christian doctrine. I am afraid it is your pride that keeps you from the lowly Christ. . . . We know not what will be the precise nature of the resurrection bodies of the saints; but we all hold firmly that they will be everlasting and after the likeness of Christ's resurrection-body, . . . and that they will present no impediment to the soul's free contemplation of God. Why then do you hold that every body should be shunned if happiness is to be secured? . . . Are you ashamed to be corrected? Forsooth, it were a great degradation to pass from the school of Plato to that of Christ Who taught a fisherman by His spirit to say: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not"—the prelude of the holy gospel according to St. John, which a certain Platonic philo-

<sup>1</sup> Timaeus 30 *sqq.*

sopher, as Simplician afterwards the bishop of the church in Milan used to tell us, declared should be inscribed in letters of gold in the most conspicuous place in every church. . . . But such a master is despised by those proud ones, because "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us." Such are not merely sick, they rejoice in their sickness, and are ashamed of the remedy; and their end will not be a higher rise, but a greater fall.

*Augustine points out that Porphyry ventured to prefer truth to Plato. Therefore let us prefer truth to Porphyry is the inference we draw from this argument.*

Ch. XXX. If it is thought presumption to alter any of Plato's dogmas, why does Porphyry himself venture to correct some yet unimportant opinions of that philosopher? Plato believed that the souls of men returned after death to the bodies of beasts. But Porphyry rejected this opinion, which was also held by his own master (*i. e.* Plotinus), and taught that the human souls returned to human bodies, but not to the bodies they had left. Forsooth, he scrupled to believe that a mother, changed into a mule, might carry her own son, but he could hold it possible that a mother changed into a girl might wed her own son! How much nobler and more worthy of credence is the belief taught by the holy and true angels of God, delivered to us by prophets who spoke as moved by the Spirit of God and preached by Him Whom the prophets foretold would come as the Saviour, and proclaimed by His disciples! How much more honourable is the faith that the souls return once for all to their own bodies than that they come back again and again to different ones! . . . In this matter we have a Platonic philosopher differing for the better with his master, seeing what he did not see, and preferring the truth to merely human authority.

Ch. XXXI. Why then do we not rather believe that divine authority as it pronounces on those subjects which

human ingenuity *cannot* fathom, and as it declares that the soul was not co-eternal with God, but was created when as yet it was not? Although the Platonists do not believe this, alleging that the soul was never created but always existed eternal with God, inasmuch as nothing could be everlasting which had a beginning; yet Plato, writing of the world and the gods in it made by the Supreme God, expressly says that they had a beginning, and yet would have no end, but would remain eternally by the sovereign fiat of the Creator. But they have managed to discover that he meant not a temporal but a causal beginning.

Now, if the soul has been from everlasting, what of its wretchedness? Did it always exist? And if there is something in the soul, which was not from eternity but began in time, why is it impossible that the soul should begin to exist in time? . . . For we find that its blessedness began in time, and yet has no end. . . . In this matter, therefore, human incapacity should yield to divine authority, and credence should be given to those blessed ones who do not seek sacrifice for themselves but bid us sacrifice to Him Whose sacrifice we and they together ought to be, being presented through that Priest Who offered Himself to death, a sacrifice for us in that humanity which He took upon Himself, and according to the conditions of which He willed to become our Sacrificing Priest ('sacerdos').

Ch. XXXII. This is the religion, which contains the Catholic (universal) way to deliverance for the soul; this is the royal road towards the kingdom which is established on the eternal foundation. But when Porphyry states at the end of his book *On the Return of the Soul*, that he has not yet been received into any sect which commands the Catholic road to emancipation, by reason of the excellence of its philosophy or its system of morality (as in the case of the Indians),<sup>1</sup> or its calculation (such as that

<sup>1</sup> The Gymnosophists.

of the Chaldeans), or by any other method, and that he has not yet in all his historical investigation discovered it, he undoubtedly admits that there is some way, but that it has not *yet* come to his knowledge. Accordingly, he was not satisfied with what he had learnt and appeared to others to know concerning the redemption of the souls, for he felt that he had not reached the supreme seat of authority on this subject.

What then is the plan of universal redemption which that astute person said must be somewhere? Living as he did in times when that Catholic road to redemption, which is none other than the Christian truth, was allowed to be persecuted by the worshippers of idols and the tyrants of the world, so that the order of the martyrs might be consecrated as the witnesses to that religion, from whom men might learn that every bodily affliction is to be endured for the faith of religion and the vindication of the truth, he could not see in a religion which seemed thus doomed to a speedy extinction, the universal way of the soul's deliverance. This, then, is the method by which all men may find salvation, and the knowledge of it now comes to one and anon shall come to others. But let no one ask, "Why so soon?" or "Why so late?" seeing that this is part of the inscrutable counsels of God. He is the Universal Way spoken of by the prophets; . . . Who was born of the seed of Abraham, and Who asserted of Himself, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life." He is the Way not of one nation, but of all . . . Who in His Nativity wrought the sacrament of a virgin maternity, Who in His Resurrection foreshadowed the transfiguration of our bodies, and Who now purifies the whole man and prepares the mortal in every point for immortality. . . .

*Concluding Summary.*

Of these ten books, the first five were written in answer to those who hold that the pagan gods were to

be worshipped for the sake of the blessings of this life; and the concluding five against those who believed that the heathen deities are to be propitiated in view of the life to come.

## BOOK XI.

### THE CREATION OF THE WORLD—ITS SIGNIFICANCE, PURPOSE AND GOODNESS.

[Augustine now proceeds, according to his promise, to consider the relations of the two states, the polity of this world, and the polity of God, to one another.]

Ch. I. Of the City of God scripture, which excels all the writings of every nation and has influenced all sorts of human minds through its divine stamp, by no fortuitous movement, but by a providential arrangement, bears witness. There the words are written, "Glorious things of thee are spoken, City of God," and "God is in the midst of her, she shall not be moved." Thus we learn from scripture that there is a City of God of which we yearn with a divinely inspired affection to be citizens. The citizens of the earthly city prefer their own gods, in their ignorance, to the Founder of the Holy City. I shall now, remembering what is expected of me, and mindful of my promise, and in every step relying on the support of our Lord and our King, attempt to consider the relations of the two states, the polity of God and the polity of the world, so intimately connected with each other in this life, and to contrast their respective origins, courses, and issues, until they finally diverge into hell and heaven. I shall first of all explain how the beginning of the two states originated in the difference of the angels.

[He pauses here, in duty bound, at the beginning of this great argument, to say that the knowledge of God, the knowledge necessary for this work, can only be

attained through the mediator between God and man,—the man Christ Jesus.]

Ch. II. It is indeed a very exceptional thing for a man after he has traversed in thought the whole universe of change, spiritual and material, to pass beyond it and reach after the unchanging God, and to learn from Himself that He has created it. Yet God does not address man through any physical medium, speaking to him in his bodily ears; nor are we connected with Him as we are with one another by the vibrations of air<sup>1</sup> intervening between us and Him, nor by the visions that are the representation of bodily objects. . . . But He speaks to the mind of man, and the truth is His Word.<sup>2</sup> . . . But the reason and intelligence of man, having been so stultified by darkening and inveterate vices, could not ever bear, much less abide in the immutable light, until it had been renewed from day to day and made capable of such felicity by the purification of faith. . . . And with a view that it might advance with more boldness to the truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, by *taking up manhood without laying down His Godhead* ('Homine assumpto, non deo consumpto'), established and founded this faith so that to the God of man there might be a way for man through the God-man. For this is the mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus. Inasmuch as He is man, He is both mediator and way. For if there lies a *road* between him who strives and the goal he is making towards, he has the hope of attainment; but if there is not, or if it is not known, what boots it to know the goal? But the only scheme that is secure against all mistakes is, that the same person be both God and man—as God the end of the road, and as man the road itself ('Deus quo itur: homo quâ itur').

<sup>1</sup> Augustine was familiar with the theory of sound-waves—"ut inter amantem et audientem aëria spatia verberentur."

<sup>2</sup> "Sed loquitur ipsâ veritate, si quis sit idoneus ad audiendum mente, non corpore."

[In the following chapters Augustine bases the authority of the Scriptures on the Word of the Mediator, and then proceeds to point out that the world has had a beginning in time, as the Scripture saith, "In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth."]

*Augustine describes the Creation.*

Ch. IV. But why did God determine to create the heavens and the earth then and not before? If they who ask this question would have it appear that the world was eternal, without any beginning, and therefore not made by God, they are in extreme error and incurably profane. For even if the voice of prophecy were silent, the world itself by its regular changes and movements testifies to the fact that it has been created, and that it could not have been created save by a God ineffably and invisibly great and unspeakably and spiritually beautiful.<sup>1</sup> While others who maintain that the world was indeed the work of God, Who gave it its causal but not its temporal beginning, display an officious solicitude to defend the deity from the charge of instability and uncertainty of purpose. . . . But I fail to see how this reasoning can hold good, especially in the case of the soul, which they say is co-eternal with God. For if it never had a beginning, how is it possible that misery is a new chapter in its life? But they must admit that the misery of the soul has a beginning in time, and so also has the soul that experiences it, although it has no end. Whereas if they admit that it was created in time, but is not to perish in time, like number having a beginning but not having an end, they cannot hesitate to believe that this is brought about by the abiding immutability of the counsel of God. And, in like manner, they may believe that the world

<sup>1</sup> For the connection of the beauty of the universe with the spirituality of the Maker, see Gore's *Bampton Lectures* and Dr. Kennedy's *Natural Theology and Modern Thought*.

could be made in time and yet without any alteration in the plans of the Almighty.

Ch. V. [Augustine warns us not to look into the immensity of space that reaches beyond the bounds and the infinitude of time that rolled before the commencement of creation, "for there was no time before the world was made."]

Ch. VI. For if one rightly distinguishes time from eternity, and regards time as that which cannot exist without change, but eternity as that which admits of no change, one will see that there could be no such thing as time had not the creation of some creature caused a change.<sup>1</sup> Therefore we rightly say, "in the beginning," because there could be no past when as yet there was no creature, by whose movements time might be measured.

*The Light.*

[Augustine now describes the beginnings of light and order in the creation, and does not fail to point out, that in the record of Genesis the sun was not created until the fourth day, and yet there was light from the very moment when God said, "Let there be light."]

Ch. VII. What the nature of the light was, and by what alternation it made the evening and the morning, is beyond our human powers to conceive or imagine. But yet we are to believe that there was such a thing as light, whether it was a material light proceeding from the upper parts of the world or from the place where the sun was kindled, or whether it was a spiritual light, the holy City of God with the holy angels and blessed spirits concerning which the Apostle says in one place, "which is the Jerusalem above, our eternal mother in the heavens;"<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> We may notice that Kant's theory of time, that it is only a subjective capacity of the mind, its way of looking at things, is much inferior to that of Augustine, who here takes into consideration the objective correlation of time, changes in the external world.

<sup>2</sup> Gal. iii. 26.

and in another passage, "You all are the sons of light, and the sons of day; we are not (children) of the night, or of darkness."<sup>1</sup> . . . For the knowledge of the creature in comparison with the knowledge of the Creator is as the darkness of eventide to the brightness of the day. The day dawns and breaks when the creature is brought back to the praise and love of the Creator, and the night never falls so long as the man ceases not to love his Maker. . . .

*The Sabbath.*

Ch. VIII. But when God rests on the seventh day from all His works, and sanctifies it, we must not understand these words in a childish manner, as if He rested after a weary course of labour, which is unthinkable in the case of One "Who spoke, and it was done." But the rest of God signifies the rest of those who rest in Him, just as the joy of a household signifies the joy of those who form it, although it is not the household but some other thing that creates the joyousness. When it is said in Scripture, then, that God rested, it is meant that His rest is the rest of His people, who find rest in Him, and whom He causes to rest. The Sabbath-rest is then a type of the rest of the kingdom of heaven.

*Creation of Angels.*

Ch. IX. When the constitution of the world is described in the Scriptures, nothing is clearly stated concerning the creation of the angels and the order of that creation. If they are not omitted, their creation must be included in the creation of the heaven, or rather of the light of which I have spoken. And I cannot believe they were omitted, because we read that God rested on the seventh day from all His works. . . . And are not the angels also His work? . . . Accordingly when God said, "Let there be light," and the light was made, if the

<sup>1</sup> 1 Thess. v. 5.

creation of the angels was involved in that of this light, surely they also were made partakers of the eternal light, because that is the immutable wisdom of God, by Whom all things were made, even "the Only-begotten Son of God." "For the true light which illumines every man that comes into the world,"<sup>1</sup> also lighteth the whole angelic host, so that it is not the light as in itself, but as in God; from which if an angel turns aside, he becomes unclean, like the unclean spirits, who are no longer light in God, but darkness in themselves, being deprived of the participation in the eternal light. *For there is no nature of evil, but the loss of the good is called evil.*

[Augustine now writes of the simple and unchangeable Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, one God, of one substance and quality, and throws a light on the simplicity of the essence, and the complexity of the existence and the wisdom of the deity.]

Ch. X. That which is begotten of the simple good is like the good itself, and is simple as it is. These two are the Father and the Son, and both together with their Spirit *is* one God. And He (the Holy Spirit) is another than the Father and the Son; another person ('*alius*') not another thing ('*aliud*'), because He is equally with them the simple ('*simplex*') Good, unchangeable and co-eternal. And this Trinity is one God, and is not the less simple because a Trinity. But we do not say it is simple on this account because there is only one Person, Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, nor do we hold with the Sabellians that it is a nominal Trinity without any subsistence of Persons, but we say, "It is simple because it is what it has" (that is, of course, when the mutual relations of the Persons are not taken into account). The Father has a Son and yet He is not the Son, and the Son has a Father and He is not Himself the Father. . . . But in regard to Himself, Each is that which He has ('*Hoc est quod*

<sup>1</sup> John i. 9.

habet') independently of the Others ('non ad alterum'); inasmuch as He is in Himself said to be living, by reason of having the Life and being the Life He has. . . .

For there are not many wisdoms, but one Wisdom, in Which are untold and infinite treasures of intelligible things, in Which are all invisible and unchangeable *reasons*<sup>1</sup> of things visible and changeable.

[Augustine now returns to the state of the angels, and discusses the quality and quantity of the original blessedness of the fallen ones and their creation, aptly quoting in this connection our Lord's explanation of the devil's fall, "He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, for the truth is not in him"<sup>2</sup> (c. xiv.).]

Ch. XV. Nor is that passage in the book of Job which speaks of the devil, "This is the beginning of the work of the Lord, which He made to be the scorn of angels,"<sup>3</sup> and which is paralleled in the psalm, "This is the dragon whom thou didst make for sport,"<sup>4</sup> to be understood as signifying that the devil was created a devil from the beginning, that he might be the sport of the angels, but as meaning that he was ordained to this punishment after his sin. His beginning, just as the beginning of all the angelic host, was the work of God. . . .

Ch. XVI. With regard to the different ranks of intelligent life, the angelic is superior to the human, and the human to the natural. . . . Though angels in their natural order are superior to men, good men by the law of righteousness are superior to bad angels.

Ch. XVII. But we understand these words, "This is

<sup>1</sup> *Rationes*: The Platonic ideas. Here Augustine anticipates the theory of the Realists, who believe that there are existences in nature corresponding to general terms.

<sup>2</sup> John viii. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Job xl. 14, after the Septuagint, but xl. 19, in A.V., which has a different reading.

<sup>4</sup> Ps. ciii. 26, after the Septuagint.

the beginning of the work of God," to refer to the nature and not the malice of the devil; for wickedness has not its origin in the creator, but is contrary to nature arising from an evil will. But as God is the best creator of good natures,<sup>1</sup> so He is the most just regulator of evil wills; so that while the latter make an improper use of good natures, He Himself makes a good use of even the evil wills. . . . And since God, when He made him, was well aware of his future malignity, He also planned out of his evil to bring forth good.

Ch. XVIII. But God would never have created any—I do not say angels, but even man—whose future wickedness He foreknew, unless He knew at the same time equally well to what advantage of the good He could turn it,<sup>2</sup> and so might set off the progress of the age as a beautiful poem is embellished with antitheses, by the contrast of the good and the evil.<sup>3</sup> For even as the juxtaposition of contraries lends beauty and point to language, so the opposition of contrasts adds brilliancy to the symmetry of the world by an eloquence of things. "Good is set over against evil; life is set over against death, and the sinner is set over against the righteous. Look upon all the works of the Most High, and you will find that these are two and two, one set over against the other."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> According to Kant, the only thing that is good is the good will.

<sup>2</sup> Augustine would accordingly regard evil as a useful ingredient in life.

<sup>3</sup> "Contra malum bonum est et contra mortem vita; sic contra pium peccator, et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi, bina bina, unum contra unum" (Augustine). The Vulgate has, "Contra malum bonum est, et contra mortem vita; sic et contra virum justum peccator. Et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi. Duo contra duo et unum contra unum." Cf. Browning ("Pisgah Sights"):

"All's lend-and-borrow;  
Good, see, wants evil,  
Joy demands sorrow,  
Angel weds devil."

<sup>4</sup> Eccl. xxxiii. 13.

*The figure of antithesis as employed in Chapter xii.*

Ch. XII. [In this chapter Augustine himself wields this figure of antithesis with effect when contrasting the state of the man in Paradise with his present condition.]

With respect to present happiness, the man in paradise was happier than any righteous man in this condition of infirmity ; but as regards the future hope, the man who is assured of the eternal fruition of the supreme God in the angelic community, no matter what suffering he has to endure, is more blessed than the man who is uncertain of his destiny, no matter what felicity he at present enjoys.

*The goodness of Creation.*

Ch. XXI. "And God saw that it was good." In these words we see the approval of God stamped upon His work. For God did not merely discover that His work was good after He had finished it, but He teaches us that it is good. Plato was more bold, and said that God rejoiced in the completion of the universe. He was not, indeed, so foolish as to imagine that God was rendered more happy by this new work of His, but he wished to explain that the idea of the Divine Artist had been realized to His own satisfaction. . . . If, then, any one should ask 'who made the world?' God, is the answer. If, 'by what?' He said, "Let it be," *and it was made*. If, 'for what?' *Because it is good*. There cannot be a higher author, a more effectual instrument, or a more excellent reason, than God, His word, and His creation of the good. Plato<sup>1</sup> also states that the reason why God created the world was, that good works might be made by a good God.

[As it would be tedious to follow Augustine<sup>2</sup> through

<sup>1</sup> In *Timaeus* Plato speaks of the joy of the Creator when He beheld the created image of the eternal gods living and moving.

<sup>2</sup> In another part of his writings Augustine suggests that man was created to fill the place of the fallen angels.

the labyrinths of his diatribe against the Manichaeans and their doctrine of the evil of matter which had caused him in his youth to quit their ranks, we shall pass on to c. xxiii., in which he points out the error of Origen, who taught that the creation of bodies was a punishment for disobedient spirits.]

*Origen's views of the Creation.*

Ch. XXIII. But it is far more strange that certain who hold, as we do, that there is one principle of all things, and that any nature which is not what He is can only be from Him as Creator, still, do not allow that the cause of the Creation was so good and simple, *i. e.* that a good God should create good things, and that those things which are not what He is, might be after Him the good works of a good God. For they assert that the souls, being not, indeed, parts of God, but His handiwork, have sinned by withdrawing in different degrees from the Creator and His heaven towards the earth, and in consequence have been burdened with various bodies, and they affirm that the motive of the creation was not the production of the good, but the imprisonment of the evil ('non ut conderentur bona sed mala cohiberentur.')

Ch. XXXIV. Seeing, however, that we would be led into a long discussion and digression from the subject of our work, if we were to examine every detail with the requisite diligence, and as we seem already to have devoted a sufficient space to a description of those two different and mutually opposed communities of angels, from which the two societies of human life take their rise, we may now conclude this book.

## BOOK XII.

## THE CREATION OF MAN AND THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.

[The following ten books of this treatise are devoted to the history of the origin, progress, and issues of the two states, the state of God and the state of the world.]

*The disobedient wills of men and angels are bad, but the natures of things as created by God are good.*

Ch. I. These states consist of angels and men together, and their constitutional difference is due to the essential unlikeness that exists between the good and the bad angels. Created similar, the angels proved dissimilar in will and desire : some regarding it the height of happiness to *adhere to God*—while others preferred to follow their own selfish desires ; the former delighted in God—the Immutable good, the one true and happy God—and are happy, while the latter departed from Him, and so are miserable. . . .

Ch. II. Since God is then the supreme essence, that is, He exists supremely and therefore immutably, no essence can be contrary to Him Who is the highest essence and the author of every other essence. . . .

Ch. III. The enemies of God are so through sin, and not by nature. They have no power to injure Him, but they injure themselves ; and are more conspicuous for their will to resist than for their power to hurt. . . . For those natures which have been originally<sup>1</sup> corrupted by the evil will, are bad so far as they are corrupt, but good so far as they are natures. When such are punished, it is a good thing for them, for it is a greater evil to evade punishment than to endure it.<sup>2</sup> For one is not punished for natural blemishes, but for voluntary faults.

<sup>1</sup> *Initio*, v. l. *vitio*.

<sup>2</sup> An echo of the Socratic argument in the *Gorgias*, that it is the greatest of evils to do wrong and not to suffer for it.

*Augustine on the survival of the fittest in sub-human life.*

Ch. IV. But it is absurd to regard the blemishes of the beasts and trees and other things mutable and mortal, devoid of intellect, feeling, or life, as deserving blame, since these parts of the creation have received that very form from the Maker Who intended that they by giving place to one another should perform their rôle in the order of life. For the things of this world have a beauty of their own, though much inferior to the heavenly type. In the struggle for life, some perish and others succeed; the less give way to the greater, and are changed into the qualities of the predominant type.<sup>1</sup> But the grand resultant beauty of this universal order of things is not apparent to man, who is himself involved in a part of the creation.<sup>2</sup> We can but see parts of God's plan, and we cannot judge of the effect of the whole; what may seem defects to us may, all the while, be contributing to the beauty of the all. . . . Nature, therefore, apart from man's advantage or disadvantage, when regarded in itself, gives glory to the Divine Architect.<sup>3</sup> . . .

Ch. V. All natures then, since they have a form peculiar to themselves, a beauty and a certain harmony of their own, are surely good. . . .

<sup>1</sup> An anticipation of the modern theory of "the struggle for life" and natural selection, founded most probably on Lucretius, *De Rerum Naturâ*, v. 873. In *De Gen.* v. 23, he anticipates the doctrine of evolution. "Porro illud germen ex semine: in semine ergo illa omnia fuerunt primitus, non mole corporeae magnitudinis sed vi potentiaque causali": "ita ipse mundus cogitandus est cum Deus simul omnia creavit, habuisse simul omnia quae in illo et cum illo facta sunt, quando factus est dies."

<sup>2</sup> Nature is an organism whose parts must be taken in relation to each other and the whole. This was the Platonic conception of the world which is called ζῷον (animal) in the *Timaeus*, c. xi.

<sup>3</sup> Augustine does not, as some philosophers of the evolutionist school, regard the end of beauty to be the advantage of the species, but the glory of God.

*The pride of the angels.*

Ch. VI. The cause of the unhappiness of the bad angels arose from their abandonment of Him Who supremely is, and their concentration of their affections upon themselves, who are not supreme. And this fault is pride. For pride is the beginning of all sin. They would not abide in God, the condition of an ampler life, and they were, therefore, reduced to a lower life through their preference of self to God. But what was the efficient cause of their evil will? We cannot say. This is a question which resolves into another, viz. What is the origin of evil? What is the efficient cause of the evil will? Is it something possessed of a will or not? If it is possessed of a will, it must be an evil will, because a good will could not be the cause of sin. And if it is possessed of an evil will, what made the will evil?

*The Origin of Evil.*

So we may go on for ever, without any likelihood of reaching the end of this series of questions that arise one out of another. The other alternative, then, remains, that that which corrupted even the nature of the angels, which was the first to sin, was something without a will, and inferior. But everything down to the very earth itself is surely good, being a nature and essence, and having a mode<sup>1</sup> and beauty of its own after its kind and in its order.

How then can a good thing cause an evil will? How, I say, is good the cause of evil? When the

<sup>1</sup> It would seem that Spinoza had studied the passages on essences and modes in the *City of God*. Augustine speaks of God as "the highest essence, that which supremely is" (xii. 2), while Spinoza defines the "Causa sui" as that of which the essence involves existence, as that which can only be conceived as existing (*i.e.* not as non-existent). Augustine says everything has a certain mode (xii. 2), or form of being; while Spinoza defines a mode as the affection or modification of substance.

will, turning from the better of two alternatives, chooses the worse, it becomes evil; not because that is evil to which it turns, but because the turning itself is vicious ('non quia malum est quo se convertit sed quia perversa est conversio'). Therefore it is not the inferior thing that has corrupted the will, but it is the desiring of the inferior thing, contrary to the dictates of reason, that has corrupted it. Take the case of two men, one of whom was tempted by a certain thing and yields to it, while the other, equally tempted, controls himself by an effort of his will. What makes the one yield to the sin? . . . Is it because he was tempted by a suggestion of the devil? Just as if he did not consent by his own will to this suggestion. But what caused this consent to sin? If this difficulty were removed, and both were tempted by the same temptation, and one yielded and the other did not, it would seem that it was the will of the one that refused and the will of the other that gave consent. Behind that will we cannot go. . . .

Ch. VII. Instead, therefore, of treating the evil will as an efficient cause, one should treat it rather as a defect, and therefore the result of a deficient cause. It is a negative rather than a positive factor in our moral history, and may be said to have its origin in time, when it first fell away from the higher standard to the lower.<sup>1</sup> . . .

*Perversity the cause of evil will.*

Ch. VIII. The evil of the evil will does not then consist in the choosing of the evil because it is evil, as much as in its choosing the worse of two alternatives, in spite of its being the worse—a result of moral perversity. Much less does it consist in the things themselves. For

<sup>1</sup> "Deficitur enim non sed mala, sed male, id est non ad malas naturas, sed ideo male, quia contra ordinem naturarum ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est. . . . Ac per hoc qui *perverse* amat cujuslibet naturae bonum, ipse fit in bono malus" (xii. 7).

it would be absurd to say that avarice existed in the gold and not in the heart of the man who desired it inordinately above justice, or that luxury was the fault of the comforts of life rather than of the heart which cherished them immoderately. For the will could not become evil unless through its own *perversity*.<sup>1</sup>

Ch. IX. Since, then, there is no natural, efficient or essential cause of the evil will . . . the evil angels though created good became evil by their voluntary defection from the good, so that the cause of evil is not the good but defection from the good, while the good angels always possessed a good will, and the love of God shed abroad in their hearts. [The defection of the former was spread to humanity], while the good of the latter is equally shared by those men who adhere to God and form among themselves a divine society, a state of God, a living sacrifice and a living temple of God. . . . Though the will, however good, be ineffectual in itself to carry out its own desire, by His help Who made the good nature from nothing to be capable of receiving Himself, and by His inspiration and power it can be raised and strengthened, and by communion with Him men may live better and happier lives. . . .

[In chapters x.—xxiii. of this book, Augustine discusses a great many curious theories concerning the origin and antiquity of the world which were in vogue in his time, especially that of Apuleius, that "Individuals die, but the race as a whole lasts for ever," and confutes with all his power the idea that man could have been created by any being less than God, "whose secret power penetrating everywhere with His inviolable presence gives everything that exists in any way the existence it has" (c. xxvi.).]

<sup>1</sup> In this passage Augustine has done ample justice to the will, and has anticipated the most popular of the ethical theories of our day. (*Vide* Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory*, Part II.)

*The Creation of Man.*

Ch. XXIV. God then made man after His image. For He created in him a soul by which through reason and intelligence he should have the dominion over all things on earth. And when God had formed man out of the dust of the earth He made him a help-meet. But this story of the Creation is not to be interpreted after a carnal fashion, as if God wrought like a common artisan moulding a material object; for the hand of God is the work of God, that, working unseen, produces results that are visible. . . .

*Men and Women.*

Ch. XXVIII. With regard to the making of the woman out of the side of man, this means nothing more than that the relation of husband and wife should be a tender one. . . . In this first man as in a germ was already contained the whole plenitude of the human race from which the two states were in the Divine foreknowledge to be derived in the process of time. . . .

## BOOK XIII.

## THE FALL OF MAN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

[The argument of this book is the fall of the first man, and the origin and propagation of human sin and death.]

Ch. I. God did not make man exempt from death like the angels, but in the event of their continuing faithful, He intended that an angelic immortality should be theirs, otherwise death was to be visited upon them. . . .

Ch. II. It is the death then of the soul when God deserts it, just as it is the death of the body when the soul leaves it. Therefore it is the death of both, when the soul abandoned of God abandons the body. This is death, the opposite of life, which is union with God, and is there-

fore applicable to that state of existence when the soul and body united and living are yet bereft of the Divine Presence. . . .

Ch. III. This death, which the sin of the first parents brought upon them, passed from them upon all the members of the race. Thus a *penal antecedent in the ancestors became a natural consequence*<sup>1</sup> in the descendants, and man transmitted the damage of his fall to all his posterity, whose nature became deteriorated in proportion to the greatness of the condemnation of sin. For man does not spring from man as man sprang from the soil. But as the parent is, so is the child. In the first man there existed the whole human race which was to be transmitted to posterity by the woman. What man therefore became after his sin, that character he propagated so far as the origin of sin and death are concerned.<sup>2</sup> Human nature became so vitiated in the person of Adam, although not reduced to the weakness of infancy, that he suffered in his flesh the rebellion of lust, and became bound by the law of death. And he having become so bound, his descendants are equally bound. However, by

<sup>1</sup> Ut quod paenaliter praecessit in peccantibus hominibus primis etiam naturaliter sequeretur in nascentibus ceteris.

<sup>2</sup> This argument demands some explanation. To understand how sin is propagated according to the law of heredity which Augustine had in his mind, although he had not the modern name for it, we should reflect how every fresh sin makes us start from a lower position in the moral world. The difficulty is then to rise again—

“facilis descensus Averno.

Sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras  
Hoc opus, hic labor est.”

The same law of continuity that holds good in the individual also holds good in the race of man, which we may regard as the life of one human organism. We can understand how it is that sin tends to perpetuate and propagate itself in such a life, and how the fall of the original parent involved all who came after him in his own disgrace and death.

the grace of Christ the Mediator, infants are delivered from this *vinculum* of sin.

[Augustine now throws an interesting light on the subject of death, showing how Christianity has completely altered man's opinions concerning that event.]

*Augustine on Death.*

Ch. IV. If grace cancels guilt, why do men still suffer death? This question has already been treated in another work on Infant Baptism, where it is pointed out that if bodily immortality followed upon the *sacrament of regeneration* there would be no trial for faith . . . whereas now by the greater and more wonderful grace of the Saviour, the punishment of sin has been turned to the advantage of justice. At the beginning, it was said to man, "Thou shalt die if thou sin," but now it is said, "Die, that thou sin not." Death is no longer, thanks to the ineffable mercy of God, regarded as a penalty for sin, but as a way of escape from the evil of the world and the persecution of the pagan. It is no longer a disability, but a service. It is no longer entailed upon unbelief, but is embraced by faith. Thus death becomes the instrument of life ('*instrumentum per quod transiretur ad vitam*') to those who trust in God. . . .

Ch. V. In this way the good are able to make a good use of death which is an evil, while the evil make a bad use of the law which is good. . . . "The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law." Most true, for the prohibition increases the desire for the thing prohibited, the lust of sin being stronger than the love of righteousness. . . .

Ch. VI. The penalty of death is the penalty of being born a descendant from the first man; but if it be paid in the name of piety and righteousness the penalty becomes the privilege of a new birth. . . .

Ch. X. On the whole the life of mortals deserves the

name of death rather than life ; for we no sooner begin to live than we begin to move towards death.<sup>1</sup> . . .

*The eternal death.*

Ch. XI. For that is the most cruel and bitter of all woes which is caused not by the separation of soul and body, but by the union of both for eternal punishment. Then there will be no discussion of the time before or after death, but they will always be in death, and so never living, never dead, but ever dying. This is the worst thing that can happen a man in death—to find that it is deathless.<sup>2</sup> . . .

Ch. XIII. After man's transgression, the grace of God left him, and his eyes were opened to his shame. They felt, therefore, the new motion of disobedience of the flesh, for by reason of the perverse use of his freedom of will an antagonism of the flesh was created against the spirit, and man was deprived of his self-mastery. . . . With this internal contradiction we are born, and we draw the origin of a physical death and a spoiled nature from that first prevarication.

*Adam's Sin.*

Ch. XIV. For in Adam we were all at that time, in the idea of God and in the seed of humanity, and therefore his disordered and vitiated nature has been propagated to us.<sup>3</sup> Thus the chain of the calamity was forged by that wrong use of his will from which as from a rotten root the corrupted race of man has sprung.

Ch. XX. As the spirit when in subjection to the flesh

<sup>1</sup> "Quotidie morimur ; quotidie demitur enim aliqua pars vitæ.—Seneca. This thought of Seneca is worked out in this chapter, in which *mors* is defined as a *detractio vitæ*.

<sup>2</sup> In c. xvi. he quotes Cicero's translation of the address of the supreme deity in the *Timæus* of Plato to the lesser deities, in which that deity is represented as assuring the others of an immortality in the body by his own will.

<sup>3</sup> *Vide* sermon on original sin by Professor Bernard (T.C.D.) in *Via Domini*.

is called carnal, so the flesh when subservient to the spirit will be rightly termed spiritual, not because it shall be changed into the spirit as some would infer from the passage, "It is sown an animal (psychic) body, it will rise a spiritual body,"<sup>1</sup> but because there will be then no antagonism of the flesh to the spirit, no bodily hindrance to the working of the will, and no corruption to mar the image of God. . . .

*Paradise.*

Ch. XXI. Such a life will be a Paradise, the life of the blessed, watered by the four virtues—prudence, fortitude, temperance, and righteousness; and sustained by the trees of knowledge and life and discipline that bear as fruit the morals of the good.<sup>2</sup> . . .

## BOOK XIV.

### THE TWO STATES.

[Augustine dwells in this book upon the enormity of man's first sin, and the lust, the carnal life, thereby engendered.]

Ch. I. Those who live after, or according to the flesh, belong to one class of the human society, while they who live after the spirit belong to another. . . .

Ch. III. But the flesh is not the origin of all vices and sins, as Vergil thought, who ascribed to it the four principal emotions of the soul. It is rather the seat of the emotions, the sphere in which the evil spirit works out its will. The corruption of the flesh is not therefore

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Jerome: "seminatur corpus animale (*i. e.* psychic) surget corpus spirituale" (1 Cor. xv. 44). The Greek has the present tense, and is followed by the Augustanus Codex, which reads 'surgit.'

<sup>2</sup> Augustine thinks we may regard the life in Paradise, as described in Genesis, an allegory of this kind, "provided the truth of that history is still believed" (c. xxxi.).

sin, but the consequence of sin. For the head and front ('caput atque origo') of all offending is the pride which rules without flesh in the devil. . . .

Ch. X. How happy were they (in Paradise) when disturbed in mind by no anxiety, and afflicted in body by no malady. Thus happy, indeed, the whole society of man would have been if they had passed on no evil to their children, and no one of their stock had sowed in crime what he should reap in consequence:

Ch. XI. Thus man lived according to the will of God in a paradise at once physical and spiritual. . . . But when that aspiring angel, who preferred

"To reign in Hell than serve in Heav'n,"

fell from the spiritual paradise, stirred with malice he sought to corrupt the as yet innocent nature of man by means of a serpent's art, insinuating himself into the favour of the woman, through envy that she should stand when he himself had fallen.<sup>1</sup>

*How the will of man became perverted.*

Ch. XIII. In secret they had already become evil before they lapsed unto open disobedience. For they had not come to an overt act of sin had not an evil will prepared the way for it. Man was already puffed up with pride and corrupted in mind, otherwise he had not listened to Satan's advances. "For pride is the begin-

<sup>1</sup> Milton (*P. L.* 263) was indebted to Augustine's words, "et quodam tyrannico fastu gaudere subditis quam esse subditus eligens," and compare *P. L.* 33 *sqq.* :

"Who first seduced them to that foul revolt?  
Th' infernal serpent; he it was, whose guile  
Stirred up with envy and revenge, deceived  
The mother of mankind, what time his pride  
Had cast him out from Heav'n."

ning of all sin" <sup>1</sup> ("initium omnis peccati superbia est"). What is pride but the desire of undue exaltation? And this desire arises when the mind, instead of cleaving to Him Who should be its end, becomes an end in itself. And thus man's falling away is spontaneous. For had the will been constant to the Higher Good, it would not have turned away to find pleasure in itself; the woman would not have believed the serpent, and the man had not been persuaded by the woman.

The forbidden fruit was accordingly eaten by people already wicked. Man had in the first instance been made out of nothing, and therefore could become depraved by vice. But man did not so fall away as to become absolutely nothing, but, being centred in himself, his being became more contracted than it was when he clave to Him Who supremely is. It is a good thing to lift up the heart ('sursum habere cor'), not to oneself, for that is pride; but to God, for that is obedience. And "pride goeth before a fall." Therefore they were pleased with the promise, "Ye shall be as gods." They had, however, a better chance of that attainment, had they adhered obediently to the supreme Principle of Truth. For they were not created gods in their own right, but they are gods by participation in the True God. . . .

Ch. XV. Then well-merited punishment was meted out to the disobedient—

"For one restraint, lords of the world besides."<sup>2</sup>

And justly so; for when the penalty was so great and the command so easy, the disobedience cannot be

<sup>1</sup> Thus Shakespeare is true to nature when he represents the fallen Wolsey saying to his friend—

"Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition:  
By that sin fell the angels."

<sup>2</sup> Again Milton echoes Augustine, "et res a Creatore facilis imperata."

estimated, and this disobedience became the punishment of disobedience, as sin is its own punishment; so that man cannot now do what he would, because he then would not do what he could ('ut quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest velit'). . . . And so God's ways are justified. For He does not need our service so much as we require that of the body, and therefore it is our punishment, because we receive it, and it is not His because we have done the deed. . . .

[In the closing chapters he contrasts in a graphic manner the nature of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly.]

*The contrast between the two states.*

Ch. XXVIII. These two states have been created by two different sets of affections, the earthly by the love of self to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God to the contempt of self. That one glories in self; this one in God. The former seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its own head in its pride; the other says to its God: "Thou art my Pride, and the Lifter-up of my head." In the one, the princes are actuated by a thirst for ruling; while in the other, the princes and the subjects serve one another in love: the former by their care, the latter by their obedience. That loves its own strength; this says to its God: "I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength." In that city, the wise live according to man, and seek profit for their own bodies or souls, and those who might have known God did not honour Him as God. While in this state the only human wisdom is piety, which offers true worship to God, and looks for its reward in the society of the saints, consisting of both men and angels, that "God may be all in all."

## BOOK XV.

## BIBLICAL ACCOUNT OF THE COURSE OF THE TWO STATES.

[In this book Augustine narrates the progress of the two states of which Sarah and Hagar were types, and of which Abel and Cain were examples. In a rather tedious disquisition on the Antediluvians, he shows that if Methuselah's age be set down at the high figure of 967 years, he must have been living at the time of the Deluge and for fifteen years after that event (c. xi.). With reference to these numbers he says, we should follow the Hebrew rather than the Septuagint authorities (c. xiii.). After discussing the meaning of most of the difficult passages in the earlier part of Genesis, he proceeds to show in the concluding chapters of this book that the allegorical interpretation of such events as the Deluge and the construction of the Ark does not at all detract from their historical value. "For the ancient records were compiled for a certain purpose, setting forth facts which have a figurative reference to and contain a spiritual prophecy of the Church of Christ" (c. xxvii.). Thus the Ark<sup>1</sup> is said (c. xxvi.) "to be without doubt a figure of the city of God in its pilgrimage through this life, that is of the Church which is saved through the wood, on which the Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus, hung."]

## BOOK XVI.

## SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

[In this book Augustine proceeds to trace in the events that took place after the Deluge, the history of the two cities, the heavenly that lives according to God, and the earthly that lives according to man, and breaks off

<sup>1</sup> Augustine traces a mystical correspondence between the proportions of the human frame and the measurements of the Ark in this chapter.

with the mention of the kings. As this narrative is familiar to every reader of the Scriptures, we may pass on to the next book.]

## BOOK XVII.

### PROPHETICAL REFERENCE TO THESE STATES.

[Augustine resumes the subject from the point to which he had brought it—the history of the kings, and takes occasion *en passant* to point out the threefold significance of the prophecies, which are to be referred now to the earthly, now to the heavenly Jerusalem, and now to both (c. iii.). He illustrates his meaning by showing how Hannah, representing the Church, foretold the change of the kingdom and priesthood of Israel (c. iv.). This book brings us down to the age of Christ.]

## BOOK XVIII.

### AUGURY VERSUS PROPHECY.

[In this book Augustine places before us, in parallel columns as it were, the histories of the heavenly and the earthly cities from the rise of Abraham—a remarkable contrast which offers much food for reflection. It also contains a long discourse on all the prophecies of Jew and Gentile, Scriptural and Sibylline, that referred, or might be thought to refer, to the coming of Christ, and quotes a long Latin acrostic by the Erythraean Sibyl.<sup>1</sup>]

<sup>1</sup> Augustine might well have mentioned in this connection the lines of the famous fourth eclogue of Vergil, in which many profess to see a reference to Christianity, and which may be rendered—

“The last cycle of Cuma’s song has come,  
The old order changing gives place to new;  
A Virgin restores ancient realms of bliss,  
A new child, Birth-goddess, visits these climes.  
Smile on the babe, thy Apollo is he,  
Beneath whose star the iron age shall cease,  
And golden years shall circle back to men.”

*The Sibylline Acrostic.*

Ch. XXIII. Varro says there were more Sibyls than one. And truly this Erythraean Sibyl wrote some things that clearly refer to Christ. . . . For Flaccianus, a distinguished man, of proconsular rank, showed me a Greek manuscript, saying as he did so that it was the composition of that Sibyl, the beginning letters of each verse making up the Greek words, *Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ υἱὸς σωτήρ*, which are in the Latin, *Jesus Christus Dei filius salvator*. The following is a translation of these verses as they stand:—

I n presence of judgment the earth shall sweat.  
E ternal King, to these shores from above,  
S entence on man to give, comes in the flesh.  
O God ! the just and unjust shall see Thee  
U plifted with saints at the end of time,  
S tanding before Thy throne nude in their fear.

C rude lies the earth, a vast desert of thorns ;  
R ejected are gods and treasures of gold.  
E arth, sea, and heaven shall burn in the fire  
I n its course destroying the gates of hell.  
S aints shall have free light in body and soul,  
T he flames consume the guilty for ever ;  
O f private deeds must each disclosure make,  
S ecrets, too, are then to be brought to light.

Th ere will be grief, men gnashing with their teeth,  
E clipsed the sun, stars falling from their course ;  
O f moon the face darkened, sky rolling past,  
V alleys exalted, and all hills brought low.

U tterly gone is greatness from man's life,  
I n the plains mountains and seas are confused.  
O 'er-past is all, earth breaks now to perish,  
S prings and rivers are burnt up in the flames.

S ounding from high heaven trumpet peals forth  
O 'er the wretched deeds and trials of men ;  
T he confusion of hell is now made clear,  
E very monarch must stand before his God,  
R ivers of sulphur pouring upon them.

*Antiquity of the Scriptural prophecy.*

[Having alluded to this heathen prophecy, he now in chaps. xxiv.—xliii. takes up the various predictions of the minor, and then those of the greater, prophets, and shows how some of these records are more ancient than any source of the Greek philosophy, and how they all tell the one story and promote the one system; whereas the writings of the Greek sages are full of discrepancies and differences. In the course of this argument he points out that the well-known prophecy of Haggai, "The glory of this house shall be greater than of the former," was fulfilled not in the rebuilding of the temple of Solomon, but in the building up of the Church of Christ (c. xlvi.). In c. xliii. he gives his views on the Septuagint, which have too important a bearing on his quotations to be passed over.]

*Augustine on the Septuagint and Jerome's Vulgate.*

Ch. XLIII. There have been other interpreters who translated these holy scriptures from the Hebrew into the Greek, such as Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, or that version by an unknown author, which is called the fifth edition. But this, which is called the Septuagint, has been received by the Church as the only one, and indeed many Christians are unaware of the fact that there are other versions. Latin translations of this Septuagint version are in vogue among the Latin churches, but in our times a presbyter, Jerome, a most learned man and well versed in all three languages, has turned their scriptures directly from the Hebrew into the Latin. But, although the Jews declare that that erudite work is correct, and that the Seventy are often at fault, the Churches of Christ declare that the authority of so many men who were elected for that great undertaking is supreme; for although there was not clearly one divine spirit among them, still when seventy learned men discussed, in a scholarly fashion, the words of the translation, and chose the

reading that was agreed upon by all, no single translator should take precedence of them. . . . For the same Spirit that directed the words of the prophets guided the translation of the Septuagint. And He purely by His divine authority could say a different thing or the same thing in a different way, or He could add or omit in order to show that that slavish and human adherence to the original which a verbal translator must exhibit is not to be looked for in this work, in which we have evidence rather of a divine power filling and ruling the mind of the interpreter. Whereas some are of opinion that the Greek manuscripts of the Septuagint version should be emended from the Hebrew manuscripts, they have not yet dared to take away aught that is read in the Septuagint though not in the Hebrew texts; and have merely added what has been discovered to be in the Hebrew but not in the Greek, and have marked these passages with certain star-like signs which they call asterisks placed in front of the verses, while the passages that are not in the Hebrew but in the Septuagint are marked with a *virgula* (*i. e.* obelus) in the same place. Many Latin manuscripts have these marks throughout. . . . If then, as is right, we see nothing in those scriptures save what the Spirit spoke though men, whatever is in the Hebrew authorities and not in the Greek, He must be understood to wish the former to say and the latter not to say. But whatever is found in the Septuagint and not in the Hebrew, the same Spirit preferred should be said by the one and not by the other, thus showing that both parties were prophets. . . .

*Persecution.*

[In chaps. li.—liii. of this book he enumerates the persecutions of the Church, and shows how heresy and oppression have helped to strengthen her (c. lii.). And in conclusion (c. liii.) he calls the attention of his readers to the fact that the foolish prediction of the

pagans—to wit, that the Christian religion was only to last for 365 years—had already been refuted by history.]

*The oracle ascribed to St. Peter.*

Ch. LIV. It is not necessary to enquire into what took place in the other parts of the world, but, in the meantime, we may say what has come to our knowledge. In the well-known and illustrious state of Carthage in Africa, Gaudentius and Jovius, officers of Honorius, did, on the fourteenth day before the Kalends of April, overthrow the temples of the false gods and brake their images in sunder; and that was in the year when this religion was to cease, if one reckons from the consulship of the Gemini<sup>1</sup> to the consulship of Mallius Theodorus. It is now thirty years since that time, and the Christian religion is daily making progress.<sup>2</sup> . . .

*Augustine on St. Peter.*

[Augustine now refers to St. Peter, the supposed authority for this legend, in language which showed how utterly he was opposed to the infallibility of that apostle in matters of doctrine.]

We, then, who are Christians in reality as well as in name, do not centre our faith in Peter, but in Him on Whom Peter believed; we are edified by Peter's sermons on Christ, but we are not bewitched by his predictions ('non venenati carminibus'). And we receive help from his good deeds, though we are not beguiled by his evil

<sup>1</sup> Augustine would seem to place the death of Christ in the consulship of Lusius Geminus and Rubelius Geminus, who held office in the fifteenth year of Tiberius (29—30 A.D.). The Tract Committee of the S. P. C. K. have pointed out to me that this date has been corroborated by modern research (see Dr. Hastings, *Dict. of Bible*, art. 'Chronology'). This oracle was really raked up by Flavianus, a champion of the dying paganism, with a view to dishearten the Christians and encourage the pagan Romans, but his hopes were extinguished with his life at the battle of the Frigidus (394 A.D.).

<sup>2</sup> If this computation, in which Augustine follows Lactantius, be correct, these words were penned in the year A.D. 424.

actions. That Christ, who was Peter's master in the doctrine that leadeth to eternal life, even He is our Master also.

## BOOK XIX.

### THE IDEALS OF LIFE AND THE OBJECTS OF EXISTENCE.

[This book, which may be entitled "De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum,"<sup>1</sup> is an excellent treatise on ancient ethics and the different schools of Greek Philosophy, Stoics and Epicureans, Cynics and Cyrenaics, the older and the later Academy. In chaps. i.—iii. Augustine shows how many conflicting theories were held by men concerning the Supreme Good, some regarding it as centred in the body, others in the mind, and others in the two; some identifying it with pleasure, a few with virtue, and others again with both, and proves that the efforts of the natural man to secure happiness in this life are absolutely fruitless. He calls the philosopher Varro again into the witness-box against his own philosophy, for he said "in his book on philosophy that two hundred and eighty-eight sects might be formed out of the different opinions which were in vogue on the subject of the *summum bonum* of life" (c. i.), and then showed that this was universally regarded as centred in self. Whereas in c. iv. Augustine points out that the Christian denies that his good is to be estimated from such a standpoint. His highest good is not self, but God. His happiness is not sought in this world, but is hoped for in the life to come. And his end is peace.] . . .

#### *The Peace of the City of God.*

Ch. XI. So we might say that the end we desire to reach is peace. For even the mystical name of the state is Jerusalem, which means the vision of peace. . . .

<sup>1</sup> It would seem, however, that Cicero, who took his views of the Greek Philosophy from other writers, not consulting the original authorities, was Augustine's master in this branch of knowledge.

Ch. XII. This peace all men are striving to obtain ; the very cruelty of war is an effort to secure it, and even the fiercest beasts tend their own progeny in a peaceful way. . . .

Ch. XIII. This peace nature preserves through all its disturbances . . . and this peace belongs in some measure to all men, for there is no nature in which there is not some good. Even the nature of the devil, so far as it was nature, not being evil, was made so by perversity. There cannot, then, be war without some peace, just as there cannot be pain without life, for nature requires peace. . . .

Ch. XIV. Our Lord gave two precepts in which man finds three things to love—God, himself, and his neighbour. For he who loves God will not love himself too much. . . .

Ch. XXVII. The true peace, which is complete and eternal, Heaven's perfect peace, belongs, however, to the Christian only, now in prospect, then in possession. . . .

Ch. XXVIII. And, whereas there is now but an imperfect rest for the citizen of the worldly city, there will then be a perpetual unrest and continual disquiet. . . .

*Augustine on Justice ; cf. Ethics of Aristotle, Book V.*

[Augustine shows that justice, which he defines as that virtue 'quae sua cuique distribuit' (c. xxi.), is the principle that makes for peace in the relations of soul and body, and in the relations between man and God (c. xxvii.), and in the mutual relations of the members of a state. Cf. Plato, who in his *Republic* defined justice as a sort of harmony when each person or power does his or its own work (Book iv. *passim*).<sup>1</sup>]

<sup>1</sup> Spencer's formula of justice is:—"Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."

## BOOK XX.

## THE LIFE TO COME.

[In this book Augustine proceeds to describe the resurrection and the final judgment, and to review the passages that bear upon this subject in the Old and New Testaments. He also condemns Chiliasm. See p. 112.]

*The Final Judgment.*

Ch. I. What the Church of the true God regards as the appointed time for the coming of Christ to judge the quick and the dead, she calls the last day of divine judgment. Therefore, when we speak of the day of God's judgment, we add the word 'last' or 'final,' because He is judging now, and has judged from the beginning of the race of man. . . .

Ch. XVI. And the sea is no more: for then there shall no longer be this life of man so turbulent and stormy, which is figuratively termed a sea. . . .

Ch. XX. But another objection meets us here, because the same apostle says when writing of the resurrection of the body to the Corinthians,<sup>1</sup> "We shall all rise again," or as some manuscripts read, "we shall all sleep." As there cannot be a resurrection without a death, and sleep must mean death in this passage, how shall all either sleep or rise again when so many who are to be found by Christ in the body shall neither sleep nor rise again?

## BOOK XXI.

## SIN—ITS PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS.

[Without delaying to illustrate further the eschatology of Augustine, we may move on to the next book, in

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 51. We have already in the Preface noticed this important variant.

which he discusses the final issues of the city of the world, and meets two arguments which infidelity brings against the eternity of punishment. Contrary to modern thought, Augustine believed in the physical nature of future punishment, which he says (c. ii.) is an actual and continual burning of men's bodies. He cites several examples in nature (chaps. ii.—iv., e. g. chalk, the diamond, and the salamander) to prove that bodies may remain unconsumed and alive in fire; and in the case of the damned he believes their bodies are "kept burning without being consumed, and in pain without dying, by the miraculous power of God" (c. vii.). In c. ix. he discusses the nature of Gehenna and the nature of eternal punishment, referring the expression which is now held to apply to the spiritual torment of regret and disappointment,—“Where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched,”—to the *physical* agony of the damned as they burn in “a material lake of fire, which is well able to torture the solid bodies of men and the aerial bodies of devils.”

He seeks to support his view of the endlessness of punishment by showing that even in this life punishments last longer than the sins themselves.<sup>1]</sup>

Ch. XI. In the case of the man who is punished with death for some great crime, does the law regard the moment of execution as the sentence, and not rather the fact that he is removed for ever from the society of the living? Now as removing men from the mortal state is to punish them with the first death, to remove them from the immortal state is to condemn them to the second death. For, as the laws of this state cannot bring back

<sup>1</sup> Augustine seems to confound the overt act of sin with the sin itself, which is of a much longer duration than he supposed, having its roots deep down in the human heart, and exerting an incalculable influence for an immeasurable time over the human character. It is, therefore, very questionable whether the punishment of any sin is of longer duration than the sin itself.

a man who has been executed, in like manner the laws of that state cannot restore to eternal life one sentenced to the second death. How, then, they say, is that true which your own Christ declared, "In what measure ye shall mete, it shall be meted to you again," if a sin of time is followed by a sentence of eternity? But they do not observe that the measure applies not to duration of time, but to the law of retribution, so that he who has done evil shall suffer evil.

Ch. XIII. [Future punishment not wholly and solely purgatorial.] The Platonists, indeed, although they would have no sin allowed to go unpunished, still hold that all penalties, whether inflicted by human or divine laws, are remedial ('*emendationi adhiberi*') in their tendency, whether in this life or in the life to come. Thus it was that Vergil, after describing the earthy bodies and moribund limbs of man, and remarking of the souls:—

"From hence rise griefs and joys, desires and fears,  
And to yon light their eyes do ne'er look up  
Closed round by darkness, and prisoned in gloom"

added these words, and said:—

"Nay: when from dying eyes the light has fled,  
The wretched are not freed; not utterly  
Do plagues depart; but of necessity  
Are long-contracted stains ingrained deep  
And strangely. Thus exercised by evils  
They pay the penalties of ancient crimes.  
On winds these are hung; from those deep-dyed guilt  
In vast gulf washed or is burnt out with fire."<sup>1</sup>

They who think thus would have all punishments purgatorial. And we do indeed recognize that certain punishments have this object, that is, in the case of those who are constrained by them to lead a better life.

<sup>1</sup> Vergil, vi. 733 *sqq.*

All other punishments, both temporal and eternal, are given because of sins past and present, or with a view to promote discipline of life and godly example among men and angels.<sup>1</sup> . . .

*Origen's theory of the devil's conversion.*

Ch. XVII. [In this chapter Augustine mentions the heresy of Origen, who believed in the ultimate conversion of the devil and his angels, a heresy which was condemned by the Fifth Œcumenical Council.]

Some merciful people, indeed, believe that there is a limit to future misery. But, in this matter, Origen was surely more merciful, for he believed that the very devil and his angels, after a longer and heavier course of punishment, are to be released from their torments, and to be associated with the holy angels. . . . And yet he is found to be more wrong and perverse in his attitude to God, inasmuch as he seems to himself to be more kind than God.

*The Antinomian heresy.*

Ch. XVIII. There are indeed some with whom I have conversed who though they seem to reverence the holy scriptures are to be censured for their morals. In excuse they plead a far greater clemency than even the above. For they say that the words of inspired prophecy concerning the bad and faithless are true; but that when the case is brought up for trial, mercy will carry the day.

Ch. XIX. [In this chapter he speaks of a certain curious opinion which was held by some concerning the salvability of the heretics after their participation in the body of Christ. This opinion is interesting as it shows that, while there were some who understood our Lord's

<sup>1</sup> This is a just remark, for punishment where it is regarded solely as a corrective, as a means to make men better, loses its ethical character of retribution.

words, "I am the living bread which came down from heaven," and "If a man eat of this bread he shall live for ever," in a literal sense, Augustine was not among the number.]

There are likewise others who hold out the hope of freedom from eternal punishment, not indeed to all men, but only to those who have been washed in the baptism of Christ, who have been made partakers of His body, no matter what their life has been, no matter in what heresy or impiety they have been involved, on account of that saying of Jesus: "This is the bread which came down from heaven, so that if a man shall eat of it, he shall not die." "I am the living bread, Who has come down from heaven."

Ch. XXV. [Augustine proceeds to unfold in this chapter the meaning of the words, "Whoso eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood;" and in the course of his remarks proves that the Catholics—that is, the orthodox Christians as opposed to the heretics—have no ground for their opinion, "that they will be saved by the reception of the sacraments of Baptism and of the Body of Christ, in spite of their immoral lives."]

*What membership in Christ means.*

For he who is in the unity of that body, that is, in the society of Christian members, the sacrament of which body the faithful communicants are wont to take from the altar, he may be truly said to eat the body of Christ and to drink His blood. And, therefore, heretics and schismatics, separated from the unity of that body, may partake of the same sacrament, but it is not merely useless but injurious to them. For they are not in that bond of peace which is expressed in that sacrament. Such have abandoned the very righteousness of life, which Christ is to them, by their sin. They cannot be said to abide in Christ, because to abide in Christ is to abide in His faith, and "the faith worketh by love, and love worketh

no evil." Neither can such persons be said to eat the body of Christ, for they cannot be numbered among his members. For a man cannot be at one and at the same time the member of Christ and the member of a harlot. And finally, the words of the Lord Himself: "Whoso eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood abideth in Me, and I in him," show that it is necessary not merely in the sacrament ('sacramento tenus sed re vera') but also in reality to eat the body of Christ and to drink His blood. For this is to dwell in Christ, so that Christ may also dwell in us.

Ch. XXVII. [In this chapter he exposes the folly of those who fondly imagine that they could purchase absolution for their sins by almsgiving and charitable deeds.]

For these would be compelled to admit, as the logical conclusion of their own premises, that a rich man might purchase absolution for all kinds of heinous crimes, murders, adulteries, et cetera, by the daily payment of a paltry sum.

And seeing that this is a most absurd and unreasonable thing to say, if the question rises what are those alms that are due for sins, and concerning which the Forerunner said, "Do the deeds meet for repentance," without doubt they shall not be found to perform such who bury their lives in death by the commission of daily crimes. . . . For if they made distribution of all their goods to the needy members of Christ, it could not profit them, unless they desisted from such deeds by having that charity which loveth righteousness. . . . So it is of little use to do alms, no matter how great, for the smallest crime, and still to continue therein.

But the daily prayer which Jesus Himself taught, and which is therefore called the Lord's prayer, does indeed destroy the daily sins when the words are daily said, "Forgive us our debts," and the clause that follows, "as we forgive our debtors," is not only said but done. . . .

For what is the meaning of "your sins," unless it means "sins without which you will not be, even you who have been justified and sanctified."<sup>1</sup>

## BOOK XXII.

## RIGHTEOUSNESS, ITS REST AND FREEDOM.

[The burden of the last book is the eternal bliss and rest of the City of God. After making a short digression on the subject of miracles in c. viii., he describes some recent wonders wrought in answer to faith and prayer, especially mentioning the miraculous discovery of the bones of Protasius and Gervasius, the resting-place of which was said to be revealed to Archbishop Ambrose of Milan in a dream; and after recurring to the statement so fully developed in Book X., that "the Church does not offer the body of Christ in sacrifice to the martyrs, for they too belong to that body" (c. x.), he rises gradually to the height of his great argument, and in spite of certain pessimistic remarks in c. xxii., vindicates the goodness of God to man as manifested in the natural gifts of utility and beauty that lie around his path in life, the wonderful harmony of nature, and the unspeakable providence of the Maker in a chapter (xxix.) that is quite Lucretian in the sweetness of its language and the sublimity of its sentiments.<sup>2</sup>]

Ch. XXII. To begin with our subject at its very commencement, this very life, if it is to be called a life, teeming with so many and great evils, testifies that the whole race of man was under a curse. For what else is signified by so great a depth of ignorance, from which

<sup>1</sup> Augustine did not believe in the doctrine of perfection.

<sup>2</sup> Augustine, like Lucretius, was a keen observer of nature, looking on the world with a certain divine delight ('divina voluptas') and reverential awe (horror). Cf. Lucretius, *De R. N. L. I sqq.*, and *De C. XXII. c. xxi.*

arises every error which has taken all the sins of Adam in its murky bosom, so that the man can only be liberated from its embrace by pain and sorrow and fear? . . . From the misery of this hell of life upon earth only the grace of our Saviour Christ can free us by giving us the hope of a better life in eternity. . . .

Ch. XXIII. But in addition to these woes, which are common to the good and the evil in this life, the righteous have also their own peculiar troubles in contending with the vices and in battling with the hardships and dangers of such a campaign. . . .

Ch. XXIV. We should now consider the many blessings which the goodness of Him Who rules His creation has poured upon this very wretched existence to which His laudable justice has condemned us. There is first the blessing of increase pronounced before the *sin*, and not afterwards revoked. But both flow together as it were in the stream of humanity, the evil being drawn from the parent, the good from God. In original sin there are two things, sin and its punishment; in original goodness there are other two, propagation and conformity of the species. . . . But now it is my purpose to speak of the blessings of God, which He conferred, and still confers, on our blemished nature. For in His condemnation He did not take back all He had given, otherwise it were wholly gone; nor did He remove it altogether from His own power, even when He subjected it to a penal sentence with the devil, since He had not entirely removed the devil from His control, for He Who supremely is, and makes everything that exists, also grants subsistence to the nature of the devil. Of the two above-mentioned gifts, He gave the propagation by His benediction to the first works of the world, but the conformity to that work of His on which He is now engaged: for without it propagation would not preserve the forms and modifications of kind. . . . We are now speaking of the nature of the human mind with which this mortal life is adorned. See-

ing that God, the True and Supreme One, is the maker of this wonderful nature which has done everything it has done by His guidance and with Him at the helm of its life, holding supreme command, it had never come to such sorrow which is to be eternal save for the redeemed, had not the sin of the first man, from whom all are descended, been exceeding great. . . .

*Augustine on the symmetry of the human frame.*

Even in the body, mortal like the beasts, and even more feeble than they, how greatly do the goodness of God and the providence of the Maker shine forth! Are not the seats of the senses ('*loca sensuum*'), the dispositions of the limbs, the very appearance and form and stature of the whole body, so regulated that they seem made to minister to the mind? For man is not fashioned like the beasts that perish stooping to the earth,<sup>1</sup> but with a frame erect to heaven that bids him lift his thoughts above. Then that marvellous quickness of head and tongue, so suitably arranged for writing and speaking, and duties and tasks of various kinds—does it not reveal the dignity of the mind to which such a body is given to serve? And yet apart from such necessary functions, the symmetry of all parts is so perfectly, and their correspondence so exquisitely managed, that one could not say whether it is with a view to beauty or utility that they were more especially designed. For there is nothing which was intended for work therein which is utterly devoid of grace. This would be more evident to us if we knew the exact proportions and measurements of the internal parts. But this has yet to be discovered; although the cruel diligence of certain medical men, who are called anatomists, unable to desist from dissecting the bodies of the dead and of those dying under the knife, has penetrated to the very secrets of the human

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lucretius I. 1061: "Et simili ratione animalia suppa vagari."

frame ; yet still the numbers according to which the internal and external parts are attuned to each other like the strings of a musical instrument, forming what is called in Greek *ἀρμονία*, no one can find out, no one presumes to inquire. As there are certain parts of the body made solely for charm, I think it may be easily inferred that the dignity of the human person was the first thought of its Maker. For its use will pass away, and the time will come when beauty shall be loved for its own sake. . . .

*The beauty of Nature.*

But with regard to the general beauty and use of the creation which man immersed in such a sea of sorrows has been graciously allowed to behold and enjoy, what discourse would be adequate to describe the loveliness so manifold and so diversified of sea and land, the wondrous brightness and abounding fulness of the light, the sun and moon and stars, the colours and perfumes of the flowers, the shadows of the groves, the variety and number of the birds of plumage and the birds of song, the unnumbered kinds of animals so many and so great, and those tiny forms of bees and ants which are yet more wonderful than the large dimensions of the whales, and that grand spectacle of the sea, changing ever and anon its hue, now green, now a blaze of many colours, now purple and now blue ; even in its angry mood how pleasant is its aspect to the eye, and its charm is all the greater when it soothes the soul of him who watches the wild waves and is not tossed upon their rising crests !<sup>1</sup>

What shall I say of the many sorts of food and flavours bountifully supplied by nature, and not acquired by art, but by toil ? What of the many things that help to maintain and recover the health ? How grateful is the change of day and night, and the sweet breath of the breezes !

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lucretius, *De R. N.* II. 1 sqq.

Who could count them all? And these all are consolations for the evil, not compensations for the good. What will He, Who has given such gifts to those He has predestinated to death, give to those He has fore-ordained for life? What blessings will He bestow in yonder realm upon those for whom He here has willed that His Only-Begotten Son should die? "How will He not give us all things with Him?" What shall be our life and nature when that promise shall be fulfilled! What will the spirit of man be like, when it is removed from every vice that masters and subdues, and is at perfect peace, its warfare ended . . . when the wisdom of God is received from the divine source itself, freely and happily! What will the body then be like, when in every way the subject of the Spirit, and needing nought of sustenance! For it is no more animal, but spiritual; having indeed the substance of flesh, but not its corruption.

Ch. XXIX. [In this chapter Augustine describes the nature of the beatific vision.] I do not know what shall be the employment or rather leisure of the saints in their immortal and spiritual bodies. And if I should say what my mind bids me, what were all that in comparison of such glory? For there is "the peace of God, which passeth all understanding." There is the reward of faith, the vision of which John the Apostle wrote, even the manifestation of the glory of God, which is described under the figure of 'face,' . . . and in which we shall be able to discern God everywhere present and governing all things, material as well as spiritual. For then God will be so known and recognized by us, that we shall see Him by the Spirit in ourselves, in one another, in Himself, in the new heavens and in the new earth. . . .

*The Peace of God.*

Ch. XXX. [The burden of this chapter is the song of peace in which the discords of time are resolved into the concords of eternity, the sorrows of mortality melt away in the presence of the immortal love, and the troubles of time vanish before the growing light of the vision of the city of God.] How great will be the bliss, when no evil remains and no good is forgotten ; when life shall be one long sabbath of peace and praise to God, "Who shall be all in all !" For what else shall life be when no weariness fatigues and no want compels us to toil ? All the members of our incorruptible body shall then be employed in the praise of God, and the mind shall discover the wondrous harmonies in things. Wherever the spirit may desire, the body will go ; but the spirit will not desire ought that is unseemly to itself or its body. There will be true honour and true peace where there shall be rest from external danger and internal discussion. There shall be degrees of glory, but there shall be no envy, for each will long for that he has alone and nought besides, though bound by love to him who other lot obtains.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dante, who wrote, inspired by this passage, in his *Paradiso* (Canto iii. 1 sqq.) :—

“Nay tell me, ye, who here live happily,  
 Do ye desire a higher place in bliss  
 Where ye may see more, also make more friends ?  
 She smiled a moment with the other shades,  
 And then replied so cheerfully to me,  
 That she seemed all aglow with love's first flame :  
 'Brother, our will has been composed by that  
 Virtue of charity which makes us live  
 For that we have alone and nought besides.  
 Should we desire in higher state to be,  
 Our wills no more would move in harmony  
 With that great will of Him who placed us here,  
 A thing impossible in climes like these,  
 Where life in love is our necessity ;

*The free-will of the blessed.*

They shall have freedom of will, although sin may no longer tempt. For the will shall be freed from the fascination of evil and won to the unchanging enjoyment of righteousness. The first free-will given to man when first created had the power to sin and the power not to sin; this last free-will will be stronger, for it will not be able to sin; and this by the gift of God, and not by the capability of nature. For it is one thing to be God, and another thing to be participator in God. God cannot sin by reason of His nature; while he who shares in His life has received from Him the power of not sinning. But because that nature sinned when it could sin, it is redeemed with a larger grace that it may be led onwards to that liberty in which it cannot sin. For as that first immortality which Adam lost by sin was the power of avoiding death, and the last shall be beyond the power of death; so that first free-will was the power of not sinning,<sup>1</sup> and the last shall be without the power to sin; for piety and righteousness shall be as imperishable as happiness itself. Therefore in that city there shall be one will in all and in each, free from every evil, filled with every good, enjoying the sweetness of eternal delights, oblivious of faults and punishments, but not so forgetful of its redemption as to be ungrateful to its liberator; and as far as knowledge goes, mindful even of its past misfortunes, yet

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And if its nature thou investigate,  
 The principle of blessedness is this,  
 To keep ourselves within the Will divine,  
 So that, as we are ranked from grade to grade  
 Through all the realm, we all are satisfied  
 Just as the King, who bent us to His Will,  
 That Will Divine is man's tranquillity;  
 It is the sea to which creation moves."

<sup>1</sup> Ita primum liberum arbitrium posse non peccare, novissimum non posse peccare.

as far as experience goes utterly unconscious of them, just as a physician is acquainted with every malady that is known, but has only personal experience of those he has suffered. . . . It were too long to dwell upon each of the ages that must pass ere Christ returns. The seventh, however, shall be our Sabbath, which ends, not in the eventide, but in the dawning of the Lord's day, an eternal octave . . . consecrated by the resurrection of Christ. There we shall have vision and love and peace and praise in that kingdom which knows no end.<sup>1</sup> . . .

*Conclusion.*

With the help of God, I seem to have finished my task. May those who are dissatisfied pardon its defects and its faults. Let those who are satisfied give the glory, as I do, to God.

<sup>1</sup> In xx. 7-9 Augustine had dealt with Chiliasm, distinguishing between a spiritual and a carnal form, and admitting that he had once believed in the former, "nam etiam nos hoc opinati fuimus aliquando." He identified the millennium with the history of the Church militant here on earth, and the first resurrection with the spiritual change referred to in Col. iii. 1, "If ye be risen with Christ." This was the death-blow of Chiliasm in the West, which had been advocated by Papias, Barnabas, Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Lactantius, etc., and was opposed chiefly by Dionysius of Alexandria, the Presbyter Caius, and Augustine. It was based on Jewish Apocalypses and Rev. xxi., and was found in its most literal form among the Montanists.

**AUGUSTINE ON MIRACLE, *De C. D.* xxi. 8.**

Augustine writes, "We say that all miracles (portenta) are contrary to nature, but they are not. For how can that be contrary to nature which takes place by the will of God, seeing that the will of the Great Creator is the true nature of everything created. So miracle is not contrary to nature but only to what is known of nature (Portentum ergo fit non contra naturam sed contra quam est nota natura)." Professor Sanday (*Life of Christ in Recent Research*,

p. 216) describes this as "a remarkable, far-sighted, philosophical passage, which shows that we moderns have no monopoly of deeper thought on the relation of miracles to the uniformity of nature." Bishop Bernard (Hastings' Dict. iii. 381, *Miracles*) says "the distinction is as old as Augustine and must be carefully borne in mind. Nature as we know it is not to be identified with nature as God knows it, with the nature of which He is a part, and it is only of the latter that we can say that its laws are universally valid." Sanday seems to think that Augustine meant that miracles may be found to be in accordance with *physical* nature, as some day it may be known when science has made further strides. Bernard, on the other hand, seems to include the "natura naturans" in the "natura naturata." Augustine used the term in a wider sense than understood by Sanday, for he embraces all that may be God's will, for every created thing is explained by that will. "Dei voluntas natura rerum est."

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